Military Intelligence3military Intelligenceby Don Adamson Design Director 32 Lessons Learned: a Ground Surveillance System Platoon in Specialist Ernesto A
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
From the Editor “Whom shall he teach knowledge? and whom shall he make to understand doctrine? ... for precept must be upon precept, ... line upon line... here a little, and there a little.” -Isaiah 28:9-10 (KJV) Even in ancient times, a solid foundation of doctrine has been a non-negotiable prerequisite for success. Army Intelligence doctrine changes as appropriate and as required. The primary impetus towards positive change begins with the observations and lessons learned that impact real-world implementation of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Doctrine was never intended to be so abstract that an advanced degree in physics is required to comprehend it; instead, doctrine is supposed to build, with theory and reality supporting one another. The theoretical underpinning provides the basic material that is adapted to the particular venue; the real-world applications, in turn, sometimes change our methodologies. Technology and advanced capabilities significantly influence the type and na- ture of data needed and desired by decision makers. Innovative and adaptive field expedient methods can become doctrinal solutions. For all these reasons, doctrine is always evolving and adapting. For all these reasons, we need to hear from you, in the field, how you conduct business—what are your successes? Failures? And what can or should be done to fix these matters? In this issue, Doctrine Corner specifically lays out the questions and base-line queries for which we are actively seeking answers. Elsewhere, we lay out some of the specific observations thus far collected, and outline how these observations may impact current Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF). We invite you to consider the questions in light of your own experiences, and to submit your responses to the Lessons Learned team. We would also like to share your knowledge with the rest of our readership—so write us an article, or even a Letter to the Editor. This is YOUR magazine—and as such, the thought-pieces presented are likely to provoke some of you to write. We welcome your letters and, as time and space permit, will publish as appropriate. This is a period of tremendous Operational Tempo for the entire Army, and particularly for the Intelligence Community. Despite these demands, you have shared your knowledge and experience with the rest of the readership. We extend our sincere thanks to all who contributed their time and effort to the creation of this issue of MIPB. CW3 Del E. Stewart Managing Editor MILITARY Check us out on the Internet INTELLIGENCE http://mipb.futures.army.mil PB 34-03-4 Volume 29 Number 4 October-December 2003 FEATURES 5 Lessons Learned: Six Things Every “2” Must Do— STAFF: Fundamental Lessons from OIF Commanding General by MG James A. Marks and LTC (P) Steve Peterson Major General James A. Marks 15 Lessons Learned: Task Force Sentinel Freedom OEF/OIF Deputy Commandant for Training by COL Michael J. Gearty Jerry V. Proctor 17 Open-Source Information: The Wild Card of the Modern Deputy Commandant Battlefield for Futures by John W. Davis (MAJ, U.S. Army, Retired) Colonel Jack W. Russell Director/Dean of Training 20 Deception – Magic! Development and Support by John W. Davis (MAJ, U.S. Army, Retired) Russell W. Watson, Ph.D. 23 Language Choices Chief, Doctrine Division by Ray Lane Aldrich Stephen B. Leeder Managing Editor 25 Interpreters in Intelligence Operations Chief Warrant Officer Three by COL John S. Rovegno, Linda Hajdari, and Drita Perezic Del E. Stewart 29 ASAS Contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom Editor by Michael J. Gaynor (CW3, U.S. Army, Retired) Elizabeth A. McGovern Associate Editor 31 Software Engineering Center’s Support to CENTCOM JoNell M. Elkins 3Military Intelligence3Military Intelligenceby Don Adamson Design Director 32 Lessons Learned: A Ground Surveillance System Platoon in Specialist Ernesto A. Bolaños Afghanistan Associate Design Director by 1LT Jacqueline L. Dominguez and Administration Specialist Misty L. Bolaños 36 Al-Qaeda Wave Attack Assessment Cover Design: by Ben N. Venzke Specialist Misty L. Bolaños 38 Lessons Learned: Army National Guard G2X in Bosnia Purpose: The U.S. Army by MAJ Larry Lee Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes 43 CI and HUMINT Operations in Support of Operation the Military Intelligence Profes- Enduring Freedom sional Bulletin quarterly under by MAJ Ron Stallings and SFC Michael Foley provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB disseminates material designed to 47 Transforming Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence enhance individuals’ knowledge of by CW3 Larry Norris past, current, and emerging 56 Al-Qaeda Threat to Oil Industry and U.S. Allies concepts, doctrine, material, training, and professional by Ben N. Venzke and Aimee Ibrahim developments in the MI Corps. 59 Commentary: Don’t Let Terrorists Spread Fear Subscription: Subscription rates by John W. Davis (MAJ, U.S. Army, Retired) are $21.00 (Domestic, APO, and FPO) and $29.40 (Foreign). For in- DEPARTMENTS formation on changes of address 2 Vantage Point 71 Sly Fox and subscriptions, see page 28. 3 CSM Forum 73 TSM Notes Disclaimer: This publication pre- sents professional information, but 60 Doctrine Corner 75 MI Heritage the views expressed herein are 66 Proponent Notes 77 Professional Reader those of the authors, not the Depart- 68 Distance Learning ment of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect By order of the Secretary of the Army: the official U.S. Army position and Official: does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army pub- lications. We reserve the right to edit JOEL B. HUDSON PETER J. SCHOOMAKER any submitted material. Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Contact Information for MIPB is on Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff page 80. 0328002 Always Out Front by Major General James A. Marks Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca During Operation Iraqi 96 Hours Freedom (OIF) and after We cannot afford to wait for some significant thought the future force tactical units since my return to Fort (units of action) that are Huachuca, a number of deployable anywhere in the lessons learned themes world in 96 hours. The transi- became apparent to me. tion to this paradigm must oc- One of these themes is cur now. The ripple effect of that with intelligence op- this change touches many dif- erations there is no “time ferent aspects of intelligence to out.” We, as intelligence include doctrine, training, force professionals, are always structure, organizational mis- engaged. We are either sions, intelligence reach, and postured for success be- building analytical collabora- cause of hard training, tion. However, these are all thorough planning, me- manageable issues that we ticulous preparation and must tackle now. This change aggressive execution, or is non-negotiable, and we must we are postured for failure. start the process now. We are no longer at a crawl, walk, run pace. In our current opera- Modularity tional environment we must maintain intelli- We need to relook many of our tables of organiza- gence readiness to support operations on no tion and equipment (TOEs) and tables of distribu- notice. Our Army is running; we must stay tion and allowances (TDAs) in light of the require- ahead! ments to support deployable forces with modular in- This statement underscores the importance of telligence teams within 96 hours, to provide intelli- our profession. Intelligence drives or fails to drive gence support “24/7,” and based on the complexi- operations (to include decision making, opera- ties of the operational environment. New and im- tional execution, and targeting). If intelligence fails proved intelligence systems are great, but technol- to drive operations we fail but, more significantly, ogy means nothing without highly trained soldiers soldiers’ lives are at risk. and civilians. In the near future we will scrub all of our TOEs and TDAs hard and make sure we have There are four specific aspects of this theme the right soldiers in the right positions in rapidly that I believe are important: deployable modules. This must be available at all Change our units and organizations, through- echelons. out the Army and Department of Defense (DOD), so that they are able to fight off-the- Train As We Fight ramp within 96 hours. MI must critically reevaluate itself “[by] changing Get more modular. our mindsets from depending on an ‘intelligence Significantly change our garrison and train- buildup’ to performing intelligence readiness checks ing activities so that we truly train as we fight. on a daily basis. This change will allow us to meet Help the Army develop mature, assured com- the requirements for strategic responsiveness munications and battle command-on-the- move capabilities. (Always Out Front continued on page 4) 2 Military Intelligence CSM Forum by Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. Haubrich U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps In last month’s article I asked will be calling a mobilization POI you the leadership to try and to fill the void of the backlog with find the time to think about next our BNCOC and ANCOC classes. I year’s Command Sergeants need the leadership’s help in Major/Sergeants Major (CSM/ assuring our soldiers show up SGM) Worldwide Conference, for their respective NCOES to bring to the table those classes. “NO SHOWS” are unac- lessons learned from your ceptable unless there is a justifiable formations involved with the reason. We had six no shows at global war on terrorism the last ANCOC, and some of the (GWOT). We are currently justifications I heard were totally planning for the conference unacceptable. I must remind the and solicit your input for panel leadership conditional promotions subjects for breakout discus- are only for one year. Within that sion, briefings, and speaking year the soldier has to attend presentations for “our confer- NCOES; if not, they revert to ence.” What we the Sergeants their previous rank held.