European Strategic Autonomy in 2020
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European Strategic Autonomy in 2020 WORKING PAPER 10 · DECEMBER 2020 10 · DECEMBER 2020 PAPER WORKING Groupe d’études géopolitiques Groupe d’études géopolitiques European Strategic Autonomy in 2020 45, Rue d’Ulm 75005 Paris legrandcontinent.eu [email protected] References : Groupe d’études géopolitiques, European Strategic Autonomy in 2020, Working Paper 10, December 2020. Contributors Brigid Laffan, Director and Professor at the Alberto Alemanno, Jean Monnet Professor Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies in European Union Law & Policy at HEC and and Director of the Global Governance Pro- Founder of the Good Lobby gramme at the European University Institute (EUI), Florence Anu Bradford, Professor of Law and Inter- national Organization and the Director of Bruno Maçães, Author of « The Dawn of Eura- European Legal Studies Center at Columbia sia », (Penguin, 2018) University Jean-Dominique Merchet, Defense and Di- Thierry Chopin, Professor at Université catho- lique de Lille (ESPOL) and special advisor, the plomacy correspondent, l’Opinion Jacques Delors Institute Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Caroline de Gruyter, Europe correspondent Professor, Emeritus and former Dean of the and columnist for NRC Handelsblad Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government Daniel Fiott, Security and Defence Editor EU Simone Tagliapietra, Research fellow at Brue- Institute for Security Studies gel, (Brussels) Nathalie Tocci, Director of the Istituto Affari Ulrike Guerot, Founder, European Democra- Internazionali (IAI); Special Advisor to EU High Representative and Vice President of the cy Lab Commission Josep Borrell, Rome Benjamin Haddad, Director Future Europe Tara Varma, Head of the Paris office of the Initiative, Atlantic Council European Council on Foreign Relations Pierre Haroche, European Security Resear- Nicolas Veron, Senior fellow at Bruegel (Brus- cher at Institut de Recherche Stratégique de sels) and the Peterson Institute for Internatio- l’École Militaire (IRSEM) nal Economics (Washington DC) Pierre Vimont, Senior fellow, Carnegie Eu- Yannis Koutsomitis, European affairs analyst rope Ivan Krastev, Chairman of the Centre for Cornelia Woll, Professor of Political Science, Liberal Strategies in Sofia and permanent Co-Director of the Max Planck Sciences Po fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, Center Vienna Charles Wyplosz, Professor of International Hans Kribbe, Author of « The Strongmen: Economics at the Graduate Institute of Inter- European Encounters with Sovereign Power » national and Development Studies (Agenda Publishing, 2020) Foreword When Ursula von der Leyen spoke about a «Geopolitical Commission» when she took office in 2019, the disruption brought about by the year 2020 could not quite be predicted. Faced with the world’s upheavals, caught up in between Sino-American rivalry, it is essential to assess and question the Union’s position in the world and its perspectives for the future. At the heart of this endeavour is a debate on the meaning of European strategic autonomy. As part of the Groupe d’études géopolitiques’ publications, following a major interview with the French President1 and a long analysis written by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy2, we have asked some twenty scholars, observers and experts from multiple horizons, nationalities and fields of expertise to position themselves on a scale from 0 («the EU has become less strategically autonomous») to 5 («the EU has become 4 more strategically autonomous»), explaining their mark with a short text. 1. “The Macron Doctrine A Conversation with the French President”, Groupe d’études géopolitiques, 16 novembre 2020, Url : https://geopolitique.eu/en/macron-grand- continent/ 2. Josep Borrell, “What European foreign policy in times of COVID-19?”, Groupe d’études géopolitiques, Url : https://geopolitique.eu/en/2020/12/14/borrell-doctrine/ Working Papier Groupe d’études géopolitiques Alberto Alemanno • Jean Monnet Professor in European Union Law & Policy at HEC and Founder of the Good Lobby 1/5 In 2020 the EU has become less strategically autonomous due to its major regression on the EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN 2020 AUTONOMY STRATEGIC EUROPEAN rule of law. In other words, how can the EU increase self-sufficiency at the very same time it departs from its foundational self-organisational principle of the rule of law? Historically, what brought together - and kept together - EU countries is not only a set of shared rules, but also and especially a deeper commitment to abide by them. Yet recent events, from the EU response to Covid – both as a health and financial crisis – to Brexit itself, are putting into doubt the Union’s adherence to, and relationship with, the rule of law. Here’s how and why this might have consequential effects for the Union’s strategic autonomy. 5 Amid Covid, the EU nonchalantly suspended most of its existential and operational rules, from Schengen free-travel area to state aids. Those rules being now in a limbo, they are difficult to reinstate, and might have been enduringly damaged. This builds upon another disturbing, present-day trend: the EU Commission’s reluctance to act as a guardian of the Treaties by going after those countries that depart from EU obligations. Against such a backdrop the EU has been turning a blind eye to major, systemic infringements of the rule of law, such as the attacks to judicial independence or that of the media in Hungary and Poland, and that despite those breaches having already been found by the ECJ. Yet the most spectacular disregard for the rule of law happened when, during the December 2020’s EU Summit, the EU member states – in a bid to persuade recalcitrant member to sign off the EU budget and Recovery Plan – committed a coup by illegitimately replacing the Parliament and Commission, in full disrespect of the principles governing the Union as a community based on the rule of law. 2020 has revealed the fragility of the rule of law underpinning the Union’s democratic life. This self-inflicted, complacent erosion of the rule of law is inevitably set to affect the EU’s ambition to self-sufficiency. The Union can’t be and appear a democracy when it no longer acts as one. Instead, to acquire its long-dreamt strategic autonomy, the Union must hold on to its core values and practices. This should be all the more so in a time of uncertainty and fear. Ultimately, the rule of law is a sine qua non condition for the Union’s strategically autonomous future. Groupe d’études géopolitiques Working Papier Anu Bradford • Professor of Law and International Organization and the Director of European Legal Studies Center at Columbia University 3/5 In many ways, the EU emerges from the year of 2020 stronger than before. Despite the calamity EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN 2020 AUTONOMY STRATEGIC EUROPEAN of the pandemic, the EU has shown its collective capacity to act decisively. The vaccine developed in Europe is now being procured and administered under a common EU vaccine strategy. This past July, the EU leaders agreed to a historical 750-billion-euro Recovery fund to restore European economies. These developments may pave the way towards an EU health union and closer fiscal integration, showing how the crises can usher in a stronger and more autonomous EU. Yet whether we talk about military, economic, or technological independence, the EU remains 6 far from being able to declare itself strategically autonomous. The EU is not a military power— it is questionable if it will ever be, or if it even wants to be one. The EU also remains vulnerable to the US’s ability to weaponize the dollar’s hegemony as long as the euro remains a small share of global foreign exchange reserves. The EU has further not made significant inroads towards compromising US and Chinese hegemony in technology. For example, when it comes to regulating technology, the EU is able to assert its sovereign vision effectively. The year 2020 further entrenched this global regulatory power with the unveiling of significant new regulatory acts and initiatives. Yet, the EU should not only strive to be a global referee in the technology race between the US and China; it must develop its own technological capabilities to become a more autonomous player. A narrow industrial policy focused on creating European champions does not offer the right path towards technological sovereignty; European Google will not emerge through protectionism. Completing the digital single market and the capital markets union, together with attracting the world’s best innovative talent to Europe are much more likely to enhance the EU’s capabilities and, with that, technological sovereignty. Groupe d’études géopolitiques Working Papier Thierry Chopin • Professor at Université catholique de Lille (ESPOL) and special advisor, the Jacques Delors Institute 2,5/5 The end of the year 2020 was marked by the deal between the EU and the United Kingdom EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN 2020 AUTONOMY STRATEGIC EUROPEAN on post-Brexit relations. It is remarkable that the 27 EU member states displayed a united front against the British. The balance of power was clearly in favour of the EU, a situation which can be explained by several factors, some of which could apply to the management of other strategic challenges for the EU : an acute awareness of a higher common interest - the absolute need to preserve the integrity of the internal market as a fundamental aspect of the EU’s political existence; the unanimous will not to grant the United Kingdom, as a third country, a more favourable status outside the EU than as a member state; the EU’s economic and commercial weight and lesser commercial dependence on the United Kingdom than the 7 other way around; the unanimous mandate given by the 27 member states to the EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, who embodied the unity of the Union. From a geopolitical point of view, it is interesting to note that the necessity for the EU-27 to negotiate with a state destined to become a third country was a unifying factor.