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European Strategic Autonomy in Security and Defence Now the Going Gets Tough, It’S Time to Get Going

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European Strategic Autonomy in Security and Defence Now the Going Gets Tough, It’S Time to Get Going European strategic autonomy in security and defence Now the going gets tough, it’s time to get going Dick Zandee Bob Deen Clingendael Report Kimberley Kruijver Adája Stoetman European strategic autonomy in security and defence Now the going gets tough, it’s time to get going Dick Zandee Bob Deen Kimberley Kruijver Adája Stoetman Clingendael Report December 2020 Disclaimer: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. December 2020 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. Cover photo: Earthlights 2002 © Wikimedia Commons Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright, trademark and / or other laws. Should a user download material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, or the Clingendael Institute, for personal or non-commercial use, the user must retain all copyright, trademark or other similar notices contained in the original material or on any copies of this material. Material on the website of the Clingendael Institute may be reproduced or publicly displayed, distributed or used for any public and non-commercial purposes, but only by mentioning the Clingendael Institute as its source. Permission is required to use the logo of the Clingendael Institute. This can be obtained by contacting the Communication desk of the Clingendael Institute ([email protected]). The following web link activities are prohibited by the Clingendael Institute and may present trademark and copyright infringement issues: links that involve unauthorized use of our logo, framing, inline links, or metatags, as well as hyperlinks or a form of link disguising the URL. About the authors Dick Zandee is Head of the Security Unit at the Clingendael Institute. His research focuses on European security and defence issues, EU-NATO, military forces and capability development, defence industry and other security topics. Bob Deen is coordinator of the Clingendael Russia and Eastern Europe Centre (CREEC) and Senior Research Fellow in the Security Unit of the Clingendael Institute. His research centres on international security issues and multilateral cooperation, with a particular focus on Eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Kimberley Kruijver is Junior Researcher at the Clingendael Security Unit. Her research concentrates on (European) security and defence issues, including the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, NATO and multilateral cooperation. Adája Stoetman is Junior Researcher at the Security Unit of the Clingendael Institute. Her work revolves both around security and defence as well as strategic foresight. Her area of expertise is international security, with a specific interest in Latin America and the Dutch Caribbean. The Clingendael Institute P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands Follow us on social media @clingendaelorg The Clingendael Institute The Clingendael Institute Email: [email protected] Website: www.clingendael.org Contents Executive summary 1 1 Introduction 4 2 Conceptualising European strategic autonomy 6 The need for strategic autonomy 6 Defining European strategic autonomy 8 3 Strengthening the European security architecture 11 The perennially underused potential of the European Union 12 EU-NATO cooperation and a ‘European pillar’ within NATO 15 A patchwork of smaller formats – the bottom-up battle 18 A European Security Council as the ‘bridge beyond Brexit’? 20 4 Military level of ambition 23 Strategic Compass and an EU military level of ambition 23 The EU-NATO framework 27 The impact on capability development 28 Bring in industry 29 How to address the challenge? 31 5 Views across Europe 33 Czech Republic 33 Denmark 34 France 35 Germany 36 Italy 38 The Netherlands 39 Poland 40 Sweden 41 United Kingdom 43 6 Conclusions and recommendations 45 The concept of ESA 45 The European security architecture 46 Military level of ambition 47 Views across Europe 49 Recommendations for the Netherlands 50 Annex 1 Why Europe should strive for more strategic autonomy – a French view 53 Annex 2 Germany and European strategic autonomy: two constants at play 58 Annex 3 Poland and the European strategic autonomy debate 62 Annex 4 Survey on European strategic autonomy 67 Executive summary The history of European security and defence cooperation is characterised by a plethora of terms and buzzwords. One of these is ‘European strategic autonomy’, first introduced in the European Union’s Global Strategy of June 2016. The term created political turmoil – both in Europe and in the United States – as it was interpreted as an alternative to NATO. In particular, Allies in eastern Europe opposed pleas for European strategic autonomy out of a fear that the United States might end its commitment to defend Europe. These concerns have not disappeared completely, but there seems to be more common ground regarding the meaning of the term. Even the staunchest proponent of European strategic autonomy – France – has made clear that the Alliance continues to be the primary organisation responsible for the territorial defence of Europe. On the other hand, European strategic autonomy remains an undefined term, which has contributed to misinterpretation and political abuse in the form of portraying it as ‘Europe going alone’. Once more, this is not the case. EU High Representative Josep Borrell has referred to ‘a certain degree of autonomy’. EU member states have different views on what strategic autonomy entails, but positions are converging towards an explanation of ‘the ability to act, together with partners when possible, alone when needed’. The deteriorating transatlantic relationship under President Trump has been a major factor for bringing European countries closer on the topic of strategic autonomy. Increasing doubt about the US security guarantee might wither away in the post-Trump era, but in many European countries it has already changed the mindset. Furthermore, American pressure on Europe to take more responsibility for its own security is there to stay, whoever occupies the White House. Hence, more European responsibility can no longer be interpreted solely as realising a better burden-sharing in NATO; it is also about Europe becoming a geopolitical actor in the context of the changing international order with China, Russia and the US as the main competing world powers. European strategic autonomy – also referred to as sovereignty, independence, self- sufficiency or responsibility – embraces all elements of power: political, economic, military and others. Europe’s weakest element is security and defence. Thus, realising more strategic autonomy in this area is key to becoming a geopolitical actor. Contrary to the field of trade and finance, for security and defence ‘Europe’ cannot be limited to merely the EU member states. In the post-Brexit era the United Kingdom – one of the key players in European security and defence – is no longer included. Other European countries, such as Norway, are also not members of the EU. Furthermore, NATO has its own responsibilities in this field. The EU-NATO relationship is an essential issue when it comes to elaborating the concept of European strategic autonomy. For these reasons Europe is not limited to the EU. In this report ‘European’ means EU plus non-EU European NATO countries, ‘strategic’ implies that Europe should be able to safeguard 1 European strategic autonomy in security and defence | Clingendael Report, December 2020 its long-term interests in the field of security and defence, and ‘autonomy’ refers to Europe’s ability to act on its own when deemed necessary. From that follows a definition: European strategic autonomy in security and defence is the ability of Europe to make its own decisions, and to have the necessary means, capacity and capabilities available to act upon these decisions, in such a manner that it is able to properly function on its own when needed. From this definition it follows that four interrelated aspects have to be taken into account: the political, institutional, capabilities and technological-industrial dimensions. In the political and institutional dimensions the essential question is how to strengthen unity and to accelerate decision-making in crisis situations. The root of the problem is the member states’ reluctance to pool or transfer sovereignty in security and defence from the national to the European level. Not addressing the issue by solely underlining national sovereignty provides no solution. It will result in the continuation of finding patchwork solutions on a case-by-case basis at slow speed. A crisis will not wait until Europe has completed its lengthy deliberations. In other words: the current set-up needs to be adjusted to become more effective. Several steps can contribute to achieving this. First, there is unused potential in the Treaty on the European Union. Especially Articles 42.7 and 44 offer sufficient legal pathways to become more assertive in shouldering the EU’s responsibility for the protection of its interests and the security of its citizens. Constructive abstention as defined in Article 31 could be used by member states which cannot fully agree on decisions to be taken, but are willing to refrain from vetoing EU action. Secondly,
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