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Issues Related to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation – Part I

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Issues Related to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation – Part I Issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation – Part I delivered by John Burroughs, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy drafted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; John Burroughs, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy; John Hallam, People for Nuclear Disarmament Nuclear Flashpoints Project; John Kim, Fellowship of Reconciliation; Young Dae Ko, Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea; Jae Won Lee, Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea; Oh Hye-ran, Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea; Elizabeth Shafer, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy; Steven Starr, Physicians for Social Responsibility; Hiromichi Umebayashi, Peace Depot Japan. INTRODUCTION In two parts, this presentation addresses some of the key issues currently facing the non- proliferation/disarmament regime. In Part I, we begin with US-Russian negotiations, and then comment on modernization and investment; transparency and reporting; and operational status of nuclear forces. Part II addresses the CTBT and a fissile materials treaty; security assurances and alliances; the Korean peninsula and North-East Asia; NWFZs; preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons; and universality. US-RUSSIAN REDUCTIONS AND BEYOND The New START agreement signed April 8, 2010 by Presidents Medvedev and Obama will not fundamentally alter the nuclear balance of terror between the United States and Russia. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) set a ceiling of 2200 strategic deployed warheads. Seven years after entry into force, New START would lower the ceiling to around 1500 warheads deployed on land- and submarine-based missiles, plus up to several hundred bombs assigned to heavy bombers.1 This would not qualitatively change the relationship. The main virtue of the new agreement is that it will continue the process of reduction and ensure continued fulfillment of the verification and monitoring functions once met by START. One encouraging feature is that inspectors will verify the numbers of warheads deployed on missiles. In contrast, under START warheads were ascribed to permitted delivery systems. The stakes—and the obstacles—would be much higher with respect to a subsequent agreement the Obama administration has indicated it would seek. Such an agreement following the START replacement could further reduce strategic warheads, reduce non-strategic warheads, and provide, for the first time, for verification of the dismantlement of withdrawn warheads. The result would be verified limits on the entire nuclear arsenals, not just deployed strategic warheads, of both sides. Provision should be made for international monitoring as well, to afford accountability. Obstacles arise in part from the fact that Russia attaches great importance to its nuclear forces, including its non-strategic weapons, in view of its degraded security and military posture. And Russia will be reluctant to pursue deep strategic reductions while the United States engages in research and development regarding strategic anti-missile systems, makes advances in non-nuclear strategic strike 1 See Pavel Podvig, “New START treaty in numbers,” Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, March 27, 2010, at http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml; Hans Kristensen, “New START Treaty Has New Counting,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, March 29, 2010, at http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/03/newstart.php; Jeffrey Lewis, “Prague Treaty Cuts Are Modest, Real,” ArmsControlWonk.com, April 5, 2010, at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2682/prague-treaty-cuts-are-modest-real. Civil Society Presentations—2010 NPT Review Conference—Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Part I systems, and holds open the option of deploying space-based strike and interceptor systems.2 On the US side, there will be opposition from influential elements to limitations on all three types of non-nuclear strategic systems.3 Tensions between the two countries over anti-missile systems are ongoing. Regarding non-nuclear strategic strike systems, the Obama administration has proposed about $440 million in 2011 spending on “Long Range Strike” and “Prompt Global Strike,” and spending on related work is scattered throughout the budget.4 There likely would also be significant resistance within the US government to further reductions of strategic nuclear arms per se.5 From the standpoint of civil society, it would be unacceptable for Russia to put nuclear disarmament on hold pending improvement of its overall security posture. But it is also crucial for the United States to reassure Russia in deed as well as word that nuclear disarmament is part of the project of building common security. The two countries should establish a process for Continuous Arms Reduction Talks (CART) bringing in other states that possess nuclear arsenals.6 Reductions could proceed in parallel with preparations, deliberations and negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. A final but important observation regarding reductions: Negotiations can be derailed by domestic or international developments. It remains the case that the United States and Russia, and other states with nuclear weapons, can and should undertake unilateral reductions, which can be politically coordinated.7 Such initiatives both reduce tension and invite reciprocation.8 2 Russia’s statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly on 15 October 2009 made clear that in negotiations after a START replacement is agreed, it will want to address all three types of non-nuclear strategic systems. See Viktor L. Vasiliev, Statement to the UNGA First Committee, New York, 15 October 2009, at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com09/statements/15Oct_Russia.pdf . 3 In 2009, the US Congress adopted a provision on military spending in 2010 urging the President that the START replacement treaty not include any limitations on US ballistic missile defense systems, space capabilities, or advanced conventional weapons systems. For analysis and recommendations from a disarmament perspective, see Jürgen Scheffran, Ray Acheson, and Andrew Lichterman, “Missiles, Missile Defence, and Space Weapons,” in Ray Acheson, ed., Beyond arms control: challenges and choices for nuclear disarmament (2010), full text available at http://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/books/BAC/text.html. 4 For a report on current thinking in the US government about “Prompt Global Strike,” see David Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Faces Choice on New Weapons for Fast Strikes,” New York Times, April 22, 2010. 5 For many in the US nuclear establishment, the New START levels may be as low as they are prepared to support. Those levels still enable the performance of missions historically assigned to US nuclear forces. 6 President Obama’s campaign pledge points in the direction of widening the reduction process: “I will initiate a high- level dialogue among all the declared nuclear-weapon states on how to make their nuclear capabilities more transparent, create greater confidence, and move toward meaningful reductions and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.” Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A, September 10, 2008, http://www.armscontrol.org/2008election. The recently released US Nuclear Posture Review refers to strategic dialogue with China as well as Russia, and also identifies as an objective: “Following substantial further [post-New START] nuclear force reductions with Russia, engage other states possessing nuclear weapons, over time, in a multilateral effort to limit, reduce, and eventually all nuclear weapons worldwide.” US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010 (“NPR”), pp. 46- 47. The problem with this approach is that it delays indefinitely the involvement of states other than the United States and Russia. 7 Unfortunately, the Nuclear Posture Review ties US reductions to the need to avoid “large disparities in nuclear capabilities” with Russia, not for any articulated strategic reason, but because they “could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners.” NPR at p. xi. The NPR does state that reductions following entry into force of New START “could be pursued through formal agreements and/or parallel voluntary measures.” Id. at p. 30. 8 There are precedents, among them the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, and the 2001 US decision to undertake Civil Society Presentations—2010 NPT Review Conference—Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Part I MODERNIZATION AND INVESTMENT In and of themselves, reductions do not suffice to create a path to elimination. A key step toward multilateral nuclear disarmament is for all nuclear weapon states—including those outside of the NPT—to cease all research, development, modernization, and production of nuclear weapons. Ending modernization and investment is mandated by the Article VI obligation to negotiate cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, the principle of irreversibility agreed in 2000, and the principle of good faith. As Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, former president of the International Court of Justice, has explained, good faith requires states “to respect the integrity” of the NPT and “to refrain from acts incompatible with [its] object and purpose;” good faith also proscribes “every initiative the effect of which would be to render impossible the conclusion of the contemplated disarmament treaty.”9 Yet research and development is taking place in all states possessing nuclear weapons
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