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VERTIC Brief 1 Findlay.Indd “The verifi cation and compliance regime for a nuclear weapon-free world will need to be more eff ective than any disarmament arrangement hitherto envisaged. One hundred per cent verifi cation of compliance with any international arms agreement is highly improbable. In the case of nuclear disarmament, however, the security stakes will be so high that states will not agree to disarm and to disavow future acquisition of nuclear weapons unless verifi cation reduces to a minimum the risk of non-compliance” VERTIC BRIEF • 1 • MAY 2003 BRIEF Verifi cation of a nuclear weapon-free world Dr Trevor Findlay Dr Trevor Findlay is Introduction Moreover, the same conjunction of good Executive Director of relationships between major states that will e verifi cation and compliance regime for VERTIC. He was formerly permit the negotiation of a nuclear disarma- an Australian diplomat a nuclear weapon-free world will need to ment treaty will overcome many of the and Project Leader on be more eff ective than any disarmament obstacles, which today seem insurmountable, Peacekeeping and Regional arrangement hitherto envisaged. One to the construction of an appropriate veri- Security at the Stockholm hundred per cent verifi cation of compliance International Peace Research fi cation and compliance system. Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden. with any international arms agreement is highly improbable. In the case of nuclear disarmament, however, the security stakes will be so high that states will not agree to disarm and to disavow future acquisition of nuclear weapons unless verifi cation reduces Verifi cation tasks for a nuclear to a minimum the risk of non-compliance. weapon-free world Similarly, the compliance mechanism must is paper starts with the assumption that, be as compelling as possible, providing a by the time the transition to complete nuclear high degree of assurance that any violation disarmament is imminent, Russia and the will be dealt with fi rmly and eff ectively. Both will have reduced their arsenals to below the verifi cation and compliance systems , warheads each through a continuing must be able to cope with the most feared strategic nuclear disarmament process, non- threat to complete nuclear disarmament: strategic reductions and limitations and/or ‘breakout’. is is when a state party is unilateral measures. eir remaining weapons suddenly revealed to have a previously hidden are all likely to be considered strategic: tactical nuclear arsenal or to have produced new weapons, those for short-range or battlefi eld weapons. use, will have to have been prohibited and Meeting these requirements is a tall order, the ban subject to verifi cation (itself a highly but not an inconceivable one. For a start, challenging undertaking that will set prece- a verifi cation and compliance regime for dents for verifi cation of a nuclear weapon-free total nuclear disarmament will not be world).1 constructed from scratch. It will build on Depending on the size of the remain ing practical experience of the disarmament Russian and arsenals, the lesser nuclear process as it moves towards zero and will weapon states (China, France, India, Israel, draw on yet unforeseen developments in the Pakistan and the ), all of them by this information and technological revolutions. stage declared, will either have joined in An array of procedures, techniques and the process or will be ready to. Naturally, technologies that would be used to verify those nations under suspicion of having complete nuclear disarmament has been secretly produced nuclear weapons, such as identifi ed, researched and evaluated. In some Iraq and North Korea, will either have been cases they have already been implemented, verifi ably denuclearised or will be willing to especially in relation to Russia– bilateral become so. e remaining nuclear weapons nuclear arms limitations, the nuclear test retained by any state, as zero draws near, will ban and nuclear safeguards. Continuing no longer be on alert status or deployed on research is needed to ensure that the latest missiles or aircraft. ese steps will be subject technological advances are incorporated to verifi cation, including on-site inspection. into verifi cation and that promising avenues Such verifi cation measures will set precedents . For some states, such as India, Israel and Pakistan, whose likely are explored. e long-term aim should and provide experience for those charged intended targets are relatively close, be to preclude verifi cation from becoming with designing and implementing the much warheads designed for short-range systems would be considered ‘strategic’ a negotiating obstacle once the political more complicated verifi cation regime to for arms control purposes. will to achieve nuclear disarmament emerges. come. Verifi cation of a nuclear weapon-free world Trevor Findlay If this is the scenario, as the world appro- to the national and international verifi cation aches complete nuclear disarmament, the organisation. Such a system would be the following fi ve verifi cation tasks become clear: starting point for verifying the dismantle- ment and destruction of the weapons. (Some • verifi cation of the dismantlement and experts have suggested pooling all remaining destruction of existing declared nuclear weapons into a single site under international weapons and nuclear weapon facilities; auspices, although this may be considered • verifi cation that no undeclared nuclear a step too far by some nuclear weapon states weapons or facilities remain; and too tempting a target for a country with • verifi cation of restrictions or bans on a secret cache of remaining weapons). delivery systems; Before destruction could begin, the con- • verifi cation of non-diversion of fi ssion- tents of the bonded stores would require able materials to new nuclear weapon authentication to prove that they were not produc tion; and fake. is would have to be done without • timely detection of research, development revealing sensitive design information, particu- and manufacture of new nuclear weapons. larly to international inspectors from non- nuclear weapon states. Research is under way in the 3 and the into infallible authenti- Verifi cation of the dismantlement and cation techniques based on measure ment of destruction of declared weapons and radiation emissions and other characteristic nuclear weapon facilities signatures.4 ‘Fingerprinting techniques’ can e fi rst task of any verifi cation system for be used to determine that weapons purport- a totally nuclear weapon-free world will be edly of the same type are in fact identical in 5 to verify the dismantlement and destruction composition and manufacture. of all remaining declared weapons and After authentication, chain-of-custody weapon production and maintenance facili- procedures, like those developed for missile ties. is is the easiest part of nuclear disarma- reductions under the Intermediate- range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the ment verifi cation. ( ) .The following is adapted from Tom It would begin with each possessor state fi rst and second Strategic Arms Reduction Milne and Henrietta Wilson, ‘Verifying Treaties () of and would be the transition from low levels of nuclear submitting to an international verifi cation weapons to a nuclear weapon-free organisation (the nature of which remains implemented. (Unfortunately, the new world’, VERTIC Research Report, no. 2, June 1999, p. 17 ff . to be determined) a declaration giving a Strategic Off ensive Reductions Treaty( ), signed by Russia and the in Moscow on . For information on the nuclear detailed inventory of its remaining weapons verifi cation research programme of the and weapons-grade fi ssionable material and May , provides no new verifi cation UK’s Atomic Weapons Establishment models, since it leaves the method and time- at Aldermaston, see Gary George and their location. e weapons and materials Martin Ley, ‘Nuclear warhead arms would be placed, if this had not already been table for achieving reductions entirely to the control research at the AWE’, Verifi ca- tion Yearbook 2001, VERTIC, London, done, in sealed containers with a unique discretion of each party.) In the case of com- plete nuclear disarmament, chain-of-custody 2001. tamper-proof tag and seal affi xed to each . See Oleg Bukharin and Kenneth warhead and container. Any untagged items procedures would be used not just for missiles Luongo, ‘US-Russian warhead disarm- but also for nuclear weapons themselves: antlement transparency: the status, subsequently discovered would constitute problems, and proposals’, Princeton a treaty violation. e containers would be University/Center for Energy and Environmental Studies (PU/CEES) stored in secure identifi able locations, some- • to monitor the transport of the items to report no. 314, April 1999. times referred to as ‘bonded stores’, well away destruction/disposition sites; . Theodore B. Taylor and Lev P. Feo k- 2 tistov, ‘Verifi ed elimination of nuclear from any potential delivery systems. After • to verify the dismantling and destruction warheads and disposition of contained declarations had been made, international of weapon components; and nuclear materials’, in Francesco and national on-site inspectors could monitor • to ensure that weapons-grade fi ssionable Calogero, Marvin L. Gold berger and Sergei P. Kapitsa (eds), Verifi cation: these sites permanently, supplemented by material is placed under international Monitoring Disarmament, Westview a range of sensors directly linked by satellite safeguards. Press, Boulder, CO, 1991. Verifi cation of a nuclear weapon-free world Trevor Findlay Trevor Findlay Verifi cation of a nuclear weapon-free world Dismantling facilities could be built with ‘challenge’ activities will need to be handled one entrance and one exit. Warheads would carefully to avoid creating mistrust and be monitored entering the facility and correl- suspicion. According each former nuclear ated with the warhead ‘pits’ (reformed into weapon state the right to conduct a quota shapes that have no security classifi cation) of such inspections in the fi rst few years of and other components and materials as they a total ban entering into force—regardless of came out through the exit.
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