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NUCLEAR ARMS the Current Situation 61 EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVES NUCLEAR ARMS The Current Situation Herbert Scoville, Jr. posture of "launch-on-warning" or everyone's security depend on The United States and the Soviet "launch-under-attack," which means whether or not Soviet computers Union are adding daily to their that when one side's computers work correctly. However, that is the nuclear weapons stockpiles. detect a launch from the other side, kind of position that we are pushing it automatically launches its missiles the world into today- a posture in Looking objectively at the state of so it won't be destroyed. This may which computers may decide the fate the nuclear confrontation and the seem to be a sure way of protecting of the world, rather than, at least, risks of a nuclear war breaking out, the missiles, but, in effect, this leaving it to mankind with all its the prospects are gloomy. Arms strategy has to short-circuit virtually foibles. control negotiations are at a the whole command and control The Arms Race: I ts Beginnings standstill. The United States and the structure and to rely solely on Soviet Union are adding daily to computers. First, let us look at a little history to their nuclear weapons stockpiles. The United States' procurement of see how we got ourselves into this The numbers are now so high that the MX missile may lead the Soviets position. Briefly, one should they have no real meaning regarding to adopt this dangerous posture. remember that, in 1945, we had a the damage they can do; a fraction of President Reagan said recently that monopoly on nuclear weapons-and the total could create such he wants the MX as quickly as we used two of them. devastating consequences that possible. To have, what he called, a From my point of view, the civilization as we know it would be prompt threat to Soviet ICBMs in important thing was that we had ended. their silos. That prompt threat from that monopoly through most of the A special concern is that both those MX missiles is so prompt that 1940s-the Soviets did not test a countries are acquiring strategic it is only a threat if we launch them nuclear weapon until 1949. In the nuclear weapons delivery systems in a first strike. The Soviet Union, of 1950s, we saw that both sides were which make nuclear war more likely. course, knows that; what we are not satisfied with the puny 15- These systems provide incentives for doing with the MX program is to kiloton weapons which destroyed each side to launch first in a push the Soviets into a position Hiroshima, so we both moved into preemptive strike. Such capabilities where they will adopt a launch-on­ the hydrogen bomb era-where the threaten to undermine the strategy warning posture. explosive yield of the new weapon of deterrence for both sides. We may was a thousand times as great as not like the psychology of having to that which wiped out, in essence, the depend on deterrence, but we have I don't want •.• the security of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. to live with nuclear weapons-and world to depend on whether the Furthermore, not only did we put the only situation which makes sense United States' computers work greater explosive power in nuclear is when mutual deterrence is stable. properly. warheads; we also started to develop Because of their destructive nature, new kinds of delivery systems. The nuclear weapons can serve no I don't want my security or the United States moved forward quickly military purpose; they can be used security of this country or the on bomber delivery systems, and a only to deter the other side from security of the world to depend on little slower regarding missiles. This using its weapons. whether the United States' delay, in the long run, aided our A major danger of first-strike computers work properly and don't security. The Soviets, on the other weapons is that they are only useful give false alarms, and the last thing hand, essentially bypassed the if you want to use them first! They in the world that I want is to have development of modern bombers and encourage both sides to adopt a went to intercontinental missiles. EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVES I 7 They tested an ICBM before we did, The Arms Race: Rushing Ahead government, after a lot of debate, and it looked as though it was a The ABM Treaty was signed in decided to race the Soviets in MIRV reliable missile which they could 197Z. That should have put a cap on development. We went ahead with deploy. the arms race because it guaranteed our MIRV deployments, and as In the 1950s, we didn't have any that both countries would have a might have been predicted, the satellites which could take pictures of survivable deterrence posture for the Soviet Union came along five years the entire Soviet Union, and so our foreseeable future. However, it was behind us and also deployed MIRVs. intelligence, without being able to at that point that both sides went Thus, we moved into a situation prove it, believed that the Soviets astray. Instead of profiting from the where both sides had increased the had developed a reliable ICBM and relatively stable, mutual deterrence incentives for 1mt1ahng a nuclear had deployed at least a small number situation which we had in 1972, both attack. of them. Of course, the Air Force superpowers went ahead and The second s1gnif1cant US weapons said there were hundreds, and we in procured more weapons with greater development in the 1970s is directly the CIA were saying a much more aim accuracies. Now one hears claims related to MIRVs, 1t was the modest number, but there wasn't all the time that the Russians are to development of more advanced much argument that some blame for the arms race since 197Z guidance systems for MIRVed deployment was going forward. and that we didn't do anything after warheads, so that each one would It wasn't until the end of 1960, SALT I because we just relied on have at least a high theoretical when we started to get satellite arms control for our security. probability of being able to destroy a coverage of the entire Soviet Union, Frankly, nothing could be further m1ss1le silo of the other side. I would that we realized that the Soviets had from the truth. The United States stress the term " theoretical," because never even deployed their first­ has to take its share of the I don't think this 1s a real-life generation ICBM-or at least no responsibility for the continued arms capability, but with this development more than a handful of their first­ race, which moved in very dangerous came the culmination of the threat generation missiles. In the meantime, directions in the 1970s. to the land-based portion of the we had already reacted to what we The United States took the lead in deterrent posture of both sides. In thought was a missile gap and had the two most destab1lmng our case, this was not a great gone ahead with extensive programs developments of that decade. One disaster, m spite of what you might for developing both 1.md-based and was to develop and deploy Multiple gather from the press, because m the submarine-based ICBMs. The land­ Independently Targeted Reentry 1960s and 1970s we had made the based ICBMs were put in hardened Vehicles- MIRVs- which are proper decision to put only 25 silos; so we sat with a relatively multiple warheads on a single percent of our forces into land-based large. highly survivable deterrent missile. Each warhead has a separate missiles which were becoming strategic force. Because of aiming guidance system so that 1t can be theoretically vulnerable inaccuracies, there was no risk to aimed at separate targets. MIRVs However, the Soviet Union put 75 that force-no matter what the revolutionized the whole strategic percent of their efforts into land­ Soviets did. There was no chance balance. For the first time there was based missiles, which were becoming that they could gain anything by the potential for one m1ss1le, if 1t was vulnerable to our advanced guidance trying to launch a first strike against fired first, to be able to destroy systems. And, as might be expected, It. Then, of course, the Soviet Union several missiles on the other side the Soviets got better guidance came tagging along behind us. By the We had created a system which gave systems. too, so all these end of the 1960s, they had also built an advantage to using nuclear technological improvements did was up an approximately equal strategic weapons first. This was an extremely raise the level of the arms race to deterrent force, which was also dangerous development because another more dangerous level. That invul~erable. what we should have been doing 1s the s1tuahon in which we see Actually, for a long time before then and should continue to do now ourselves today Both sides are the end of the 1960s, neither is try to create situations where deploying, or have deployed, country had the kind of forces that there is no advantage to going first! weapons which have theoretical could contemplate a first strike. But, There may have been some capability of destroying at least the by the end of that decade, there was opportunity for getting MIRVs ICBM portion of the deterrent, and, no question that we were in a under control in SALT I, but the US as I said, this is a much more serious position of mutual deterrence.
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