DOCSLIB.ORG

Russia-Georgia Relations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Russia-Georgia Relations russian analytical russian analytical digest 68/09 digest the moment. So are specific steps aimed at resolving the usually are not focused on activities that cannot bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts. Harm reduction anything tangible in the short run. is the only realistic policy objective in that area. As to the long run, one should admit that nobody At the same time, Georgia cannot afford to lose ties can confidently predict what will be happening in the to the people who live in Abkhazia and South Ossetia region in ten–fifteen years time or beyond that. Georgia now – whatever political attitudes they may have. This has too much on its hands right now to be too involved is not easy, but Georgians – both in government and in speculations about it. It is rational to focus on ob- in society – should be creative and inventive on this jectives that can be achieved and not allow things that point. Apart from technical impediments for such con- cannot be changed for the time being to get one de- tacts, the trick is that there can be no short-term politi- pressed. cal advantages coming from such contacts, and people About the Author: Professor Ghia Nodia is the Director of the School of Caucasus Studies at Ilia Chavchavadze State University in Tbilisi, Georgia and chairman of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, a Georgian think-tank. Georgian Attitudes to Russia: Surprisingly Positive By Hans Gutbrod and Nana Papiashvili, Tbilisi Abstract What do Georgians think about Russia? What relationship would they like to have with their northern neighbor? And what do they think about the August conflict? Data collected by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) allows a nuanced answer to these questions: although Georgians have a very crit- ical view of Russia’s role in the August conflict, they continue to desire a good political relationship with their northern neighbor, as long as this is not at the expense of close ties with the West. Georgians remain favorable to Russians as individuals, and to doing business with Russia. Culturally, however, Georgians are orienting themselves towards the West. Political Attitudes strated by all the polling that CRRC has undertaken Following the conflict in August 2008, the geopoli- since 2004. In 2007, for example, 57% said that they tics of the Georgian-Russian relationship have received wanted full political cooperation with Russia. Only significant attention. Moreover, the Levada Center in 13% suggested that they wanted limited political co- Russia has published a series of analyses of Russian pub- operation. At the same time, a majority of Georgians lic opinion on the conflict. Yet the view of the Georgian desired an equally close political cooperation with the public so far has received little attention. United States, while also favoring NATO membership Between 2007 and August 2009, the CRRC con- (with 63% in favor, and only 6% explicitly against, the ducted seven different nationwide surveys in Georgia, remainder being neutral or don’t knows). and also in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Interviewers This positive view of cooperation with Russia has worked countrywide (with the exception of the con- remained stable. In August 2009, 54% of Georgians tested territories), in face-to-face interviews according to continued to favor extremely close political coopera- international standards, with more than 1,600 respon- tion with Russia. (see diagram overleaf) dents (and up to 3,200). Detailed information on the Even right after the war, in October 2008, 20% of general survey methodology is available on the CRRC the Georgian population named re-establishing good website (www.crrccenters.org). economic and political relations with Russia to be the Georgians overwhelmingly desire a good political fourth most important issue for Georgia. Politically, relationship with Russia. This view was clearly demon- Georgians carry no grudge. 8 russian analytical russian analytical digest 68/09 digest Q55. Georgia Should Have an Extremely Close Political have been harboring pro-Russian views (30% could Cooperation With… not make up their mind between the options, and 50% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% chose the West). One reason why there does not seem to be a big pro- USA 71% Russian faction is that Georgians see little advantage in cooperating with the Kremlin. They do not believe EU 65% that there is a deal to be had with Russia. In October Russia 54% 2009, only 13% agreed with the idea that “if Georgians would just give up on the idea of joining the West and Ukraine 29% let Russia have its way, Russia would stop supporting T u r k e y 17% the secessionists”, and of those only 5% agreed strong- ly. The suggestion that such a deal was on offer was re- Azerbaijan 15% jected by 59% of respondents. If Russia ever was willing Armenia 6% to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement, as the former Georgian ambassador to Russia, Erosi Kitsmarishvili, China 2% has suggested, this certainly was not regarded as a re- Kazakhstan 1% alistic possibility by the Georgians themselves. More broadly, the Georgian case highlights a seri- Source: CRRC, EU Survey, August 2009. ous limitation of Russian power: while the Kremlin may be an attractive partner for corrupt elites, it is hard to see what Russia offers to a people it wants to win over Views of the August Conflict to its side. Data from November 2008 illustrates this: By contrast, Georgians largely blamed Russia for in- even in Armenia, the showcase example of a Russian stigating the August conflict. In October 2008, when ally that fundamentally relies on its patronage, 31% asked to describe the conflict in their own words, 35% said they would favor membership in NATO, and only of the respondents stated that Russians had attacked 29% rejected that idea (with the remainder neutral, or first. Another 15% said that the Russians told the South saying they had no opinion on this issue). Russia offers Ossetian militias to attack first, and 5% believed that no compelling vision of a revived Russian sphere of in- the South Ossetian militias themselves attacked. Only fluence, even for its own allies. This makes for a limit- 4% of respondents suggested that Georgians had at- ed ability to project power and sustain influence, and tacked first. much would need to change before a Russian protégé Similarly, in talking about the conflict as a whole, could gain any traction in Georgia. the most mentioned description was that the Russians Approached from a different angle, and asked which targeted civilians – mentioned by 44% of respondents – country they saw as either friendly or unfriendly to and, after saying that the Russians attacked first, among Georgia, 90% of Georgians rated Russia as unfriend- the most mentioned statements was that the Russians ly, with only 2% rating Russia as friendly (and the rest occupied national territory and then refused to leave. scattered among neutral, don’t know and refuse to an- When asked outright to choose between the West swer). In the same survey in late November 2008, 71% and Russia, only 15% said that they would choose Russia of Georgians thought that the August war was in the – although the question was deliberately leading, inviting interest of the Russian government. (see Diagram 1 on the respondent to agree that “Georgia might not be able p. 19) to simultaneously ally with the West and Russia, and clearly should choose the latter”, i.e. one should choose No Enemies Russia. When the question was phrased to suggest that Yet on a personal level, Georgians generally have favor- one should choose the West (to another group of re- able views of Russians, and these views stayed remark- spondents, since the sample had been split into three ably stable throughout the conflict. 94% of Georgians parts to undertake embedded experiments), 13 percent approve of being friends with Russians. This made said one should side with Russia. The proximity of re- Russians closer than some of Georgia’s overseas friends, sults suggests that there is not a big undercurrent of pro- as 87% of respondents approve of being friends with Kremlin opinion in the country, although potentially the US citizens. The number of people that approve the 4% that refused to answer the question might also of doing business with Russians has dropped slight- 9 russian analytical russian analytical digest 68/09 digest ly, from 91% in 2007 to 84% in 2009, but has stayed of Georgian women marrying Russians. Russians again on a high level. are among the most popular nationalities to marry, on In 2007, when asked whether respondents would the same level with the English, and slightly ahead of approve of marriage to various nationalities, 55% said the French, Americans, Italians, and 5% ahead of Poles. they would approve of marriage to Russians, making Russians no longer are the most popular nationality, but them the most popular nationality to marry, ahead of they still are in the top group. Greeks, Ossetians, US citizens and other ethnicities and The results from August 2009 also highlighted nationalities. that the views of Georgians toward the Abkhaz and Q15. Would You Approve or Disapprove Marrying the the Ossetians remain relatively positive. In August Following Nationality: 2009, 37% of Georgians approved of a Georgian wom- an marrying an Abkhaz man, and 36% of marrying Approve Disapprove an Ossetian – while only 31% approved of marrying an Armenian, and 22% of marrying Turks. While the 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% friendly view that Georgians have of the Ossetians and 55% Abkhaz is often taken for granted, it stands in sharp Russian 44% contrast to attitudes that Armenians and Azerbaijanis 48% have to each other – or the differences that marked Greek 50% many ethnic conflicts in the Balkans.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Who Owned Georgia Eng.Pdf
    By Paul Rimple This book is about the businessmen and the companies who own significant shares in broadcasting, telecommunications, advertisement, oil import and distribution, pharmaceutical, privatisation and mining sectors. Furthermore, It describes the relationship and connections between the businessmen and companies with the government. Included is the information about the connections of these businessmen and companies with the government. The book encompases the time period between 2003-2012. At the time of the writing of the book significant changes have taken place with regards to property rights in Georgia. As a result of 2012 Parliamentary elections the ruling party has lost the majority resulting in significant changes in the business ownership structure in Georgia. Those changes are included in the last chapter of this book. The project has been initiated by Transparency International Georgia. The author of the book is journalist Paul Rimple. He has been assisted by analyst Giorgi Chanturia from Transparency International Georgia. Online version of this book is available on this address: http://www.transparency.ge/ Published with the financial support of Open Society Georgia Foundation The views expressed in the report to not necessarily coincide with those of the Open Society Georgia Foundation, therefore the organisation is not responsible for the report’s content. WHO OWNED GEORGIA 2003-2012 By Paul Rimple 1 Contents INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................3
    [Show full text]
  • The EU's Eastern Policy in Light of the Georgian Conflict and the Gas
    The EU’s Eastern Policy in light of the Georgian Conflict and the Gas War Abstract The EU is seeking to develop its relations with former ex-Soviet republics at a time of growing Russian opposition to the expansion of Western influence into what it considers its sphere of influence, coupled with increased tensions between Russia and some of the other former Soviet states. The EU should not accept the concept of a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The circumstances leading to the Second World War and the Cold War have made it clear that the same principles of international law, and national sovereignty, must apply throughout the continent. Furthermore, the Georgian conflict and the Russo-Ukrainian gas war have shown that the state of Russia’s relations with its neighbours can adversely affect EU interests. Furthermore, there is a danger of a renewal of the Georgia conflict and of further interruptions of the Russian gas transiting Ukraine. The EU should therefore make the state of Russia’s relations with its neighbours a factor in the EU’s co-operation with Russia. For the EU to influence most effectively Russian policy, and for the EU to develop its relations with the other former Soviet republics without Russian opposition, the West has to deal with Russian fears of Western expansion by working out a new security arrangement for Europe. The West might place greater emphasis on engaging Russia constructively on a wide range of world issues. The West should also seek to involve Russia further in the Western network of organizations and agreements.
    [Show full text]
  • Failed Prevention 35
    Table of Contents Foreword by the Editors 5 PART I: CONCEPTS IN CONFLICT PREVENTION 9 Concepts and Instruments in Conflict Prevention 11 Frida Möller PART II: CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT AND FAILED PREVENTION 35 The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict 37 Sabine Fischer Missed Windows of Opportunity in the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict – The Political Agenda of the Post-Revolutionary Saakashvili Government (2004-2006) 59 Doris Vogl Failures of the Conflict Transformation and Root Causes of the August War 79 Oksana Antonenko PART III: VIEWS FROM THE REGION 95 Frozen Conflicts: The Missed Opportunities 97 Salomé Zourabichvili Failure to Prevent Violence – Lessons Learnt from the Georgian- Abkhazian Conflict Resolution Process 113 Liana Kvarchelia Missed Chances in the Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict – A View from South Ossetia 131 Alan Parastaev 3 PART IV: THE INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 139 OSCE Early Warning and the August Conflict in Georgia 141 Dov Lynch The Role of the United Nations in Abkhazia, Opportunities and Missed Opportunities between 1992 and 2009 151 Charlotte Hille United States’ and NATO’s Role in Georgia’s Territorial Conflicts August 1992-July 2008 169 Eugene Kogan Used & Missed Opportunities for Conflict Prevention in Georgia (1990-2008) – The Role of Russia 187 Markus Bernath Russia and South Ossetia: The Road to Sovereignty 207 Flemming Splidsboel Hansen PART V: CONCLUSIONS 235 Some Lessons Learnt in Conflict Prevention from the Conflicts in the Southern Caucasus 237 Predrag Jurekovi ć List of Authors and Editors 243 4 Foreword by the Editors The violent escalation of the Georgian/South Ossetian and Georgian/Abkhazian conflict in the summer of 2008 resulted in a significant deterioration of the regional security situation in this part of the Southern Caucasus.
    [Show full text]
  • The Curious Case of Rustavi-2 PROTECTING MEDIA FREEDOM and the RULE of LAW in GEORGIA
    The Curious Case of Rustavi-2 PROTECTING MEDIA FREEDOM AND THE RULE OF LAW IN GEORGIA PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 400 November 2015 Cory Welt1 George Washington University Rustavi-2 is the most popular television channel in Georgia. It has the most advertising revenue and airs most of the country’s top-watched programs, including news shows. In opinion polls, over 80 percent of respondents say they regularly watch the station (and Imedi, Georgia’s second most popular channel). This is why a controversial Tbilisi court decision to take the station away from its opposition-affiliated owners has caused such consternation. It has raised questions about media freedom and judicial independence under the watch of the Georgian Dream ruling coalition, which came to power in protest against former president Mikheil Saakashvili’s government, which frequently disregarded both. The present government has pledged to adopt democratic European values and is working to implement governance reforms as part of an EU association agreement. Whether the legal process can now right itself will be an important test of Georgia’s democratic standing. Ideally, potential injustices leading to Rustavi-2’s current ownership status can still be properly investigated and remedied. But this should not come at the cost of rule of law abuses and the undermining of Georgia’s democratic media environment. The Politics Around Rustavi-2 In addition to being popular, Rustavi-2 has a reputation for being close to politics. The station was a fierce critic of Eduard Shevardnadze and an active supporter of the 2003 Rose Revolution that brought Saakashvili to power.
    [Show full text]
  • Georgian Media and Civil Society
    The authorities also came under fire from the media for arresting several prominent photographers on espionage charges. The arrests roiled Georgian media and civil society. Calling the allegations spurious, many media professionals launched a campaign to free the photo reporters. GEORGIA 174 MEDIA SUSTAINABILITY INDEX 2012 INTRODUCTION OVERALL SCORE: 1.88 GEORGIA The year 2011 ended on a strange note for Georgian media with the hijacking of an entire television station. In the wee hours of November 30, a man with several associates in tow climbed over the fence of Maestro, a small Tbilisi-based television company and locked the station from the inside. Detecting the intrusion, Maestro’s Tjournalists locked themselves in the control room. The police arrived, and a long standoff ensued. The standoff was particularly dramatic, if farcical, given that the intruder was Erosi Kitsmarishvili, a man hired to run Maestro and fully within his rights to walk through the station’s front door. Maestro’s owners had outsourced the station’s management to Kitsmarishvili’s firm, but he claimed the station’s owners had slighted him, as they reportedly were considering a takeover proposal from Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. Ivanishvili is interested in the station because he announced that he is entering politics and challenging the ruling party in upcoming parliamentary elections. Looking for an outlet for publicity, he made offers to Maestro and Kavkasia TV; Maestro is considering the offer and Kavkasia turned him down. Maestro’s co-owner accused Kitsmarishvili of attempting to silence a channel known for its criticism of the government. An avid government critic himself, Kitsmarishvili rejected the allegations.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Kosovo: a Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War Over South
    Toal.fm Page 670 Monday, December 22, 2008 10:20 AM Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War over South Ossetia Gearóid Ó Tuathail (Gerard Toal)1 Abstract: A noted political geographer presents an analysis of the August 2008 South Ossetian war. He analyzes the conflict from a critical geopolitical perspective sensitive to the importance of localized context and agency in world affairs and to the limitations of state- centric logics in capturing the connectivities, flows, and attachments that transcend state bor- ders and characterize specific locations. The paper traces the historical antecedents to the August 2008 conflict and identifies major factors that led to it, including legacies of past vio- lence, the Georgian president’s aggressive style of leadership, and renewed Russian “great power” aspirations under Putin. The Kosovo case created normative precedents available for opportunistic localization. The author then focuses on the events of August 2008 and the competing storylines promoted by the Georgian and Russian governments. Journal of Eco- nomic Literature, Classification Numbers: H10, I31, O18, P30. 7 figures, 2 tables, 137 refer- ences. Key words: South Ossetia, Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia, Abkhazia, genocide, ethnic cleansing, Kosovo, Tskhinvali, Saakashvili, Putin, Medvedev, Vladikavkaz, oil and gas pipe- lines, refugees, internally displaced persons, Kosovo precedent. he brief war between Georgian government forces and those of the Russian Federation Tin the second week of August 2008 was the largest outbreak of fighting in Europe since the Kosovo war in 1999. Hundreds died in the shelling and fighting, which left close to 200,000 people displaced from their homes (UNHCR, 2008b).
    [Show full text]
  • The War in Georgia and the Western Response
    This article was downloaded by: [National Chengchi University] On: 14 September 2012, At: 01:42 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Central Asian Survey Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccas20 The war in Georgia and the Western response Mike Bowker a a School of Political, Social and International Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK Version of record first published: 24 May 2011. To cite this article: Mike Bowker (2011): The war in Georgia and the Western response, Central Asian Survey, 30:2, 197-211 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2011.570121 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and- conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Central Asian Survey Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Rose Revolution: the Challenges and Peculiarities of Democratization
    Georgian Rose Revolution: The Challenges and Peculiarities of Democratization in Post-Soviet Countries A thesis presented to the faculty of the Center for International Studies of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Anna Gabritchidze November 2011 © 2011 Anna Gabritchidze. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled Georgian Rose Revolution: the Challenges and Peculiarities of Democratization in Post-Soviet Countries by ANNA GABRITCHIDZE has been approved for the Center for International Studies by Dauda AbuBakar Professor of Political Science Jie Li Li Director, International Development Studies Drew McDaniel Interim Director, Center for International Studies 3 Abstract GABRITCHIDZE, ANNA, M.A., November 2011, International Development Studies Georgian Rose Revolution: the Challenges and Peculiarities of Democratization in Post- Soviet Countries (73 pp.) Director of Thesis: Dauda AbuBakar This thesis will describe and analyze the challenges and peculiarities of democratization in post-Soviet countries with Georgia as the main focus. It will cover the investigation of phenomena of so-called “fourth wave” democracies with their transition regime styles. In the end of the 1990s Samuel Huntington asked if we can expect a new wave of democratization in the 21st century and what factors would define it. The dramatic wave of political changes which gripped republics of the former Soviet Union during this short period led to “Rose Revolution” in Georgia in November 2003, the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in November 2004 and the “Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan” in March 2005. The Georgian case study could be an evident demonstration of this political and social change with the challenges common to all post-Soviet countries as well as with its uniqueness.
    [Show full text]
  • Georgian Diplomat Said Georgia Started War in South Ossetia
    Georgian Diplomat Said Georgia started war in South Ossetia By Global Research Region: Russia and FSU Global Research, November 27, 2008 Theme: Crimes against Humanity Russia Today 26 November 2008 Georgia’s former ambassador to Russia Erosi Kitsmarishvili has accused his own country of starting the war in South Ossetia. His comments almost led to a fistfight between politicians. “It was the Georgian government that launched the military action. It doesn’t matter whether it was provoked or not,” he told the Georgian parliamentary commission analysing the August events. “As for the fact that Russia was prepared for it, Moscow was ready to perform the actions it did, because they were part of Russia’s overall plan. I am not saying Georgia is to blame for everything, because Russia was not an innocent lamb either.” Erosi Kitsmarishvili was one of the founders of the ‘Rose Revolution’ and the former head of Georgia’s Rustavi-2 TV station. This, however, didn’t prevent the anger of one member of the commission on hearing his statement. He threw a pen at the former ambassador and seemed ready to fight. “Today’s session is a vivid example of how the Saakashvili regime is collapsing,” commented Pikriya Chikhradze, a leader of the Georgian opposition party, New Rightists. “The behaviour of the commission members who assaulted Erosi Kitsmarishvili, shows that they are interested not in listening to a person who possesses really important information, but in publicly denying it.” Kitsmarishvili had more revelations about his conversations with President Saakashvili. “The President told me he wanted to relocate the Georgian capital to Sukhum in Abkhazia in August,” he said.
    [Show full text]
  • Escaping the Kmara Box: Reframing the Role of Civil Society in Georgia's Rose Revolution Angley, Robyn E
    www.ssoar.info Escaping the Kmara Box: Reframing the Role of Civil Society in Georgia's Rose Revolution Angley, Robyn E. Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Angley, R. E. (2013). Escaping the Kmara Box: Reframing the Role of Civil Society in Georgia's Rose Revolution. Studies of Transition States and Societies, 5(1), 42-57. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-362472 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use. anderweitig nutzen.
    [Show full text]
  • Discordant Neighbours Ii CONTENTS Eurasian Studies Library
    CONTENTS i Discordant Neighbours ii CONTENTS Eurasian Studies Library Editors-in-Chief Sergei Bogatyrev School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London Dittmar Schorkowitz Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany Board Members ildikó bellér-hann – paul bushkovitch – peter finke geoffrey hosking – mikhail khodarkovsky marlène laruelle – virginia martin david schimmelpenninck van der oye – willard sunderland VOLUME 3 The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/esl CONTENTS iii Discordant Neighbours A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian Conflicts By George Hewitt LEIDEN • BOSTON 2013 Coveriv illustration: Whilst the map on the front-coverCONTENTS delineates the frontiers of the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the areas in green represent the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as recognised by Russia (26 August 2008) and five other UN member-states; red indicates the territory subject to the writ of the Georgian government and thus the reduced frontiers of today’s Republic of Georgia. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hewitt, B. G. Discordant neighbours : a reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South- Ossetian conflicts / by George Hewitt. pages cm. -- (Eurasian studies library, ISSN 1877-9484 ; volume 3) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-24892-2 (hardback : acid-free paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-24893-9 (e-book) 1. Georgia (Republic)--Relations--Georgia--Abkhazia. 2. Georgia (Republic)--Relations--Georgia-- South Ossetia. 3. Abkhazia (Georgia)--Relations--Georgia (Republic) 4. South Ossetia (Georgia)-- Relations--Georgia (Republic) 5. Ethnic conflict--Georgia. 6. Georgia (Republic)--Ethnic relations. 7. Georgia (Republic)--History--1991- 8.
    [Show full text]
  • The Georgian Propaganda Blaming It All on the Russians
    Dear Friends: Here are two well-written opinion pieces that bring us up to date on the critical situation that first came to world attention a year ago, when the Republic of Georgia got itself entangled in a mini-war against its gigantic neighbor and former imperial master, Russia. That incident created a situation that still remains potentially explosive, notwithstanding the fact that it has disappeared from the front pages of our newspapers. Those among you who may be suffering from boredom in these August doldrums, when there never seems to be enough discouraging news about wars, threats of new wars, financial disasters and political scandals to satisfy our thirst for gloom and doom, I thought you might like to take on another project: remembering Ossetia and Abkhazia, and worrying about that still-unresolved crisis --- a situation that unfortunately could still become the source of very serious headaches for Europe, the US, Central Asia and even the ever-suffering Middle East (which one would think had enough of its own home-grown difficulties!) There are two articles here, if you are interested. (If not, hit DELETE now and spare yourself some unnecessary mental stress!) The first piece is by a woman named Gwynne Dyer. She is a highly respected, London-based Canadian journalist who has been an independent columnist, broadcaster, lecturer on international affairs and military analyst for more than twenty years. The article below was picked up by SALON. Below Ms. Dyer’s article is a follow-up commentary and analysis by William Polk, whose long and distinguished career has included service on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff under JFK, and professorships at the University of Chicago and Harvard.
    [Show full text]