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the moment. So are specific steps aimed at resolving the usually are not focused on activities that cannot bring and conflicts. Harm reduction anything tangible in the short run. is the only realistic policy objective in that area. As to the long run, one should admit that nobody At the same time, cannot afford to lose ties can confidently predict what will be happening in the to the people who live in Abkhazia and South Ossetia region in ten–fifteen years time or beyond that. Georgia now – whatever political attitudes they may have. This has too much on its hands right now to be too involved is not easy, but Georgians – both in government and in speculations about it. It is rational to focus on ob- in society – should be creative and inventive on this jectives that can be achieved and not allow things that point. Apart from technical impediments for such con- cannot be changed for the time being to get one de- tacts, the trick is that there can be no short-term politi- pressed. cal advantages coming from such contacts, and people

About the Author: Professor Ghia Nodia is the Director of the School of Caucasus Studies at Ilia Chavchavadze State University in , Georgia and chairman of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, a Georgian think-tank.

Georgian Attitudes to Russia: Surprisingly Positive By Hans Gutbrod and Nana Papiashvili, Tbilisi

Abstract What do Georgians think about Russia? What relationship would they like to have with their northern neighbor? And what do they think about the August conflict? Data collected by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) allows a nuanced answer to these questions: although Georgians have a very crit- ical view of Russia’s role in the August conflict, they continue to desire a good political relationship with their northern neighbor, as long as this is not at the expense of close ties with the West. Georgians remain favorable to Russians as individuals, and to doing business with Russia. Culturally, however, Georgians are orienting themselves towards the West.

Political Attitudes strated by all the polling that CRRC has undertaken Following the conflict in August 2008, the geopoli- since 2004. In 2007, for example, 57% said that they tics of the Georgian-Russian relationship have received wanted full political cooperation with Russia. Only significant attention. Moreover, the Levada Center in 13% suggested that they wanted limited political co- Russia has published a series of analyses of Russian pub- operation. At the same time, a majority of Georgians lic opinion on the conflict. Yet the view of the Georgian desired an equally close political cooperation with the public so far has received little attention. United States, while also favoring NATO membership Between 2007 and August 2009, the CRRC con- (with 63% in favor, and only 6% explicitly against, the ducted seven different nationwide surveys in Georgia, remainder being neutral or don’t knows). and also in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Interviewers This positive view of cooperation with Russia has worked countrywide (with the exception of the con- remained stable. In August 2009, 54% of Georgians tested territories), in face-to-face interviews according to continued to favor extremely close political coopera- international standards, with more than 1,600 respon- tion with Russia. (see diagram overleaf) dents (and up to 3,200). Detailed information on the Even right after the war, in October 2008, 20% of general survey methodology is available on the CRRC the Georgian population named re-establishing good website (www.crrccenters.org). economic and political relations with Russia to be the Georgians overwhelmingly desire a good political fourth most important issue for Georgia. Politically, relationship with Russia. This view was clearly demon- Georgians carry no grudge. 8 russian analytical russian analytical digest 68/09 digest

Q55. Georgia Should Have an Extremely Close Political have been harboring pro-Russian views (30% could Cooperation With… not make up their mind between the options, and 50% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% chose the West). One reason why there does not seem to be a big pro- USA 71% Russian faction is that Georgians see little advantage in cooperating with the Kremlin. They do not believe EU 65% that there is a deal to be had with Russia. In October Russia 54% 2009, only 13% agreed with the idea that “if Georgians would just give up on the idea of joining the West and Ukraine 29% let Russia have its way, Russia would stop supporting T u r k e y 17% the secessionists”, and of those only 5% agreed strong- ly. The suggestion that such a deal was on offer was re- Azerbaijan 15% jected by 59% of respondents. If Russia ever was willing Armenia 6% to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement, as the former Georgian ambassador to Russia, Erosi Kitsmarishvili, China 2% has suggested, this certainly was not regarded as a re- Kazakhstan 1% alistic possibility by the Georgians themselves. More broadly, the Georgian case highlights a seri- Source: CRRC, EU Survey, August 2009. ous limitation of Russian power: while the Kremlin may be an attractive partner for corrupt elites, it is hard to see what Russia offers to a people it wants to win over Views of the August Conflict to its side. Data from November 2008 illustrates this: By contrast, Georgians largely blamed Russia for in- even in Armenia, the showcase example of a Russian stigating the August conflict. In October 2008, when ally that fundamentally relies on its patronage, 31% asked to describe the conflict in their own words, 35% said they would favor membership in NATO, and only of the respondents stated that Russians had attacked 29% rejected that idea (with the remainder neutral, or first. Another 15% said that the Russians told the South saying they had no opinion on this issue). Russia offers Ossetian militias to attack first, and 5% believed that no compelling vision of a revived Russian sphere of in- the South Ossetian militias themselves attacked. Only fluence, even for its own allies. This makes for a limit- 4% of respondents suggested that Georgians had at- ed ability to project power and sustain influence, and tacked first. much would need to change before a Russian protégé Similarly, in talking about the conflict as a whole, could gain any traction in Georgia. the most mentioned description was that the Russians Approached from a different angle, and asked which targeted civilians – mentioned by 44% of respondents – country they saw as either friendly or unfriendly to and, after saying that the Russians attacked first, among Georgia, 90% of Georgians rated Russia as unfriend- the most mentioned statements was that the Russians ly, with only 2% rating Russia as friendly (and the rest occupied national territory and then refused to leave. scattered among neutral, don’t know and refuse to an- When asked outright to choose between the West swer). In the same survey in late November 2008, 71% and Russia, only 15% said that they would choose Russia of Georgians thought that the August war was in the – although the question was deliberately leading, inviting interest of the Russian government. (see Diagram 1 on the respondent to agree that “Georgia might not be able p. 19) to simultaneously ally with the West and Russia, and clearly should choose the latter”, i.e. one should choose No Enemies Russia. When the question was phrased to suggest that Yet on a personal level, Georgians generally have favor- one should choose the West (to another group of re- able views of Russians, and these views stayed remark- spondents, since the sample had been split into three ably stable throughout the conflict. 94% of Georgians parts to undertake embedded experiments), 13 percent approve of being friends with Russians. This made said one should side with Russia. The proximity of re- Russians closer than some of Georgia’s overseas friends, sults suggests that there is not a big undercurrent of pro- as 87% of respondents approve of being friends with Kremlin opinion in the country, although potentially the US citizens. The number of people that approve the 4% that refused to answer the question might also of doing business with Russians has dropped slight- 9 russian analytical russian analytical digest 68/09 digest

ly, from 91% in 2007 to 84% in 2009, but has stayed of Georgian women marrying Russians. Russians again on a high level. are among the most popular nationalities to marry, on In 2007, when asked whether respondents would the same level with the English, and slightly ahead of approve of marriage to various nationalities, 55% said the French, Americans, Italians, and 5% ahead of Poles. they would approve of marriage to Russians, making Russians no longer are the most popular nationality, but them the most popular nationality to marry, ahead of they still are in the top group. Greeks, Ossetians, US citizens and other ethnicities and The results from August 2009 also highlighted nationalities. that the views of Georgians toward the Abkhaz and Q15. Would You Approve or Disapprove Marrying the the Ossetians remain relatively positive. In August Following Nationality: 2009, 37% of Georgians approved of a Georgian wom- an marrying an Abkhaz man, and 36% of marrying Approve Disapprove an Ossetian – while only 31% approved of marrying an Armenian, and 22% of marrying Turks. While the 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% friendly view that Georgians have of the Ossetians and 55% Abkhaz is often taken for granted, it stands in sharp Russian 44% contrast to attitudes that Armenians and Azerbaijanis 48% have to each other – or the differences that marked Greek 50% many ethnic conflicts in the Balkans. Georgians may 44% have fought with Russians, Abkhaz and Ossetians, but Abkhaz 54% they do not see them as enemies.

44% Ossetian 54% Endorsing Russian Business with and in

38% Georgia US citizen 59% Views of doing business with Russia are also compar-

31% atively positive. Three months after the war, only 27% Armenian 67% thought that limiting trade with Russia was a good idea, with only 14% thinking it was a very good idea. 26% Jewish 72% By contrast, 48% percent specifically described limit- ing trade with Russia as a bad idea. Respondents un- 22% Azerbaijani 76% der 40 years of age were a little more likely to be against trading with Russia, but they were also more in favor 18% T u r k 80% of trading. A larger percentage of older age groups said they just didn’t know. 17% Iranian 81% Effectively, Georgian views almost corresponded with those in Azerbaijan. In Azerbaijan, 24% thought that restricting trade with Russia was a good idea. Source: CRRC, DI, 2007. Note: Don’t knows are eliminated in Armenia’s strategic partnership with Russia was reflect- this diagram. ed in the data: 11% favored limiting trade, while 66% described it as a very bad idea, and another 17% as a When these questions were repeated in the spring of bad idea. Although trade obviously serves both sides, 2008, amidst rising political tensions, Russians still were and Russia could be a sizeable market for Georgian ex- the most popular, followed at a considerable distance by ports of wine, vegetables and mineral water, the gener- Greeks (other EU countries had not been listed in that al openness of Georgia such a short time after the war survey). For this new survey we specified the question arguably is remarkable. further, asking whether respondents would approve of Even more remarkable were Georgian views of Georgian women marrying another nationality, since Russian businesses operating in Georgia. Just two marrying out of one’s own national group would cap- months after the conflict, 32% of Georgians were in ture a more specific scenario. favor of allowing Russian companies to purchase busi- So how did approval rates for marriage with Russians nesses in Georgia, with 36% against – and 30% say- change, after the war? Remarkably, the numbers re- ing they did not know. This contrasted with Azerbaijan, mained relatively stable. In August 2009, 44% approved where only 23% thought that Russian companies should 10 russian analytical russian analytical digest 68/09 digest

be allowed to purchase businesses in Azerbaijan, and nounced than in neighboring countries, although it is 45% wanted that to be prohibited. Georgians, in spite of again striking how even in Armenia, English is broad- the conflict, were 9% more positive regarding Russian- ly preferred to Russian. owned businesses than Azerbaijanis. Q11. Respondent’s Foreign Language Teaching Preference in Secondary Schools Culturally, Georgia Orients itself Westward If Georgia thus remains fairly open to Russian busi- Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia ness, culturally it is orienting itself to the West. In 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% August 2009, 54% of Georgians agreed with the state-

ment (by the late Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania) that 3% No foreign language should be “I am Georgian and therefore I am European”, with 33% 9% mandatory disagreeing. 3% In terms of languages, the orientation towards the West is also stark. In an EU-focused survey (i.e. a survey 57% in which Russia was not seen as part of Europe), 75% English 63% 72% of Georgians agreed that if Georgian students want to

receive a quality education, they need to know one of 35% the European languages. Skills in European languages Russian 18% are gaining ground. English is in the lead, followed by 21% German and then French. 0% Turkish 5% Advanced Intermediate Beginner None 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 3% 32% Other foreign language 1% 43% 1% Russian 16% 9% 1% Don't know 4% 5% 3% 11% English 13% 71% Source: CRRC, DI, 2007 1% 5% German 10% Curiously, while other values remained broadly sta- 83% ble, the number of Georgians that identified as hav- ing advanced Russian knowledge declined by 8% be- 1% tween 2007 and 2008, potentially signaling an under- 2% French 3% current of turning away from cultural self-identifica- 94% tion with Russia.

1% Conclusion 2% Other European language The political implications of these findings are nuanced. 1% 95% While Georgians desire a better relationship with Russia, they don’t believe that the Kremlin brings any good- will to the relationship. Consequently, it is not an issue The turn away from Russia is particularly pronounced that offers itself as a political platform in Georgia itself. with regards to teaching preferences in secondary schools. Politicians that are in power can work to improve the When asked which should be the first mandatory for- relationship, but rapprochement with Russia is not likely eign language, an overwhelming majority of Georgians to generate electoral support, as several Georgian poli- choose English. In Georgia this preference is more pro- ticians recently found out. 11 russian analytical russian analytical digest 68/09 digest

Given the general resilience of Georgian public old theme: potentially one feature which smaller neigh- opinion in spite of seismic events, we can expect it to re- boring ethnic groups find irritating about Georgians is main stable for the foreseeable future: friendly towards that they have a fuzzy positive and even embracing at- Russians, skeptical of the Kremlin, but consistently ori- titude, which can be taken to imply that they do not ented towards the West. A fundamental change would recognize small groups as substantially different – when only be likely if either the West comprehensively dis- what small groups often clamor for is recognition as be- appoints (although the cultural orientation towards the ing distinct. This remark, however, is speculative and West would still retain traction), or if Russia under- would require research in Abkhazia and Ossetia to sub- stands that for it to exercise real power it will need to stantiate. hold an attractive vision, and not just the means of co- Public opinion data illustrates how Georgian policy ercion. It follows that the Kremlin would probably in- has deep roots in underlying opinions. It also offers a crease its reach if it facilitated trade with Georgia and fascinating study of how sizable events impact on what lifted the ban on Georgian mineral water, wine and veg- a people think. This article only highlighted some of etables. Arguably, the Kremlin inadvertently strength- the main features. A deeper and more comprehensive ened the Georgian leadership it was seeking to displace analysis of these issues is still waiting to be done, and by holding all of Georgia hostage to its enmity. should offer rich opportunities to any researcher who On a side note, the relatively positive views that wants to engage with a topic at the cross-section of cul- Georgians have of the Abkhaz and the Ossetians raise an tural, historic, geostrategic and political interests.

About the Authors: Hans Gutbrod is Regional Director and Nana Papiashvili is Research Associate at the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC).

Recommended Reading: www.crrccenters.org. (Not all surveys are online at the moment, but much of the data can be made available on de- mand. Please contact the authors if you have further questions.)

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