Putinization of Georgia: Georgian Media After the Rose Revolution

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Putinization of Georgia: Georgian Media After the Rose Revolution Putinization of Georgia: Georgian Media after the Rose Revolution Media in Georgia 2003-2007 The Human Rights Centre (HRIDC) is a non-governmental human rights organization, without any political or religious affiliations. The purpose of HRIDC is to increase respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Georgia, as well as to contribute to the democratic development of the country. HRIDC implements projects to ensure compliance with human rights laws and standards. We cooperate with international organizations and local organizations which also share our view that respect for human rights is a precondition for sustaining democracy and peace in Georgia. Contact Details: Human Rights Centre (HRIDC) 3a Kazbegi Ave., Entrance 2, 4th Floor, Apt. 22. Tbilisi, 0160 Georgia Tel: (+995 32) 37 69 50, (+995 32) 45 45 33; Fax: (+995 32) 37 69 50; Email: [email protected] Web-Site: www.hridc.org On-line magazine: www.humanrights.ge Prepared by: Eka Kevanishvili Simon Papuashvili Edited by: Wieteke Daniëls Ucha Nanuashvili 2 Content Executive Summary………………………………………………………………………………4 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….... 7 Legal Assessment ………………………………………………………………………………....8 Central Media……………………………………………………………………………………..10 Assessment of the November Events..............................................................................................36 Experts’ Assessment……………………………………………………………………………….39 Regional Media …………………………………………………………………………………....43 Broadcasting Licenses Confiscated from their owners..................................................................67 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………….76 3 Why is Georgian media freedom at danger? I consider that that the Georgian media is in danger and it is everybody’s fault. Collectively Georgian society chose not to react to the shooting incident at house of Luba Eliashvili, journalist of TV Company Iberia in November, 2003. Georgian society sat back and chose not to say anything when TV Company Iberia was raided by Special Forces, Moreover, we as Georgians sat back and said nothing when Prime Minister Zhvania sued Tavisupali Gazeti (Free Newspaper) with the demand 5 thousand GEL in compensation for damage to his character. Rather we preferred to say nothing when the government imposed restrictions on movement for journalists in the State Chancellery in 2004. We thought that it was insignificant that political talk shows (Gamis Mzera, Gamis Kronika, etc) and other TV programs were suddenly shut down, and it came unexpectedly out of blue. Some organizations, including Human Rights Center tried to publicize the problem but journalists preferred to remain silent. They tried to justify the closure of their programs by saying that it was decisions taken by the owners of the channels on their own prerogative. Still we said nothing about the so-called “self-censorship.” Self-censorship is a term that was invented by the government and some media outlets. In actual practice self censorship is another way of saying real censorship in a more politically correct way. Nonetheless still remained silent when TV Company Metskhre Arkhi (Ninth Channel) was taken off the air (it must be highlighted that few days before the suspension, Metskhre Arkhi gained license to broadcast for entire region of Georgia). The society was still inert when Akaki Bobokhidze, Governor of Imereti Region hit Irakli Imnaishvili, journalist during a live broadcasted program. Again we stood in silence when the activists of the National Movement and Kakheti regional police harassed journalists in the regional town of Signagi in East Georgia. It is unfortunate that the arrest of Shalva Ramishvili, TV anchor of TV-company 202, was not properly evaluated by greater Georgian society. We chose not to react to the words of Vano Merabishvili, Minister of Internal Affairs over the arrest of Shalva Ramishvili. The minister said that “this was only the beginning of a series of raids on Georgian journalists.” However, in actually he only heralded intentions for an organized program of mass harassment of journalists. Again the people stood by and proclaimed, “let the government do its job, let’s wait and we shall how things will improve to the better.” When TV-202 was suspended, people were saying that Saakashvili’s government was immature and its naïve mistakes were justified by its lack of maturity. The majority of people thought that the government would soon realize its mistake and make amends. Society is still waiting. In the meantime, however, the process of the redistribution of shares in government related channels remained an activity beyond the interest and privy of society. It is interesting to note that some journalists have actually been harassed while others may have pretended to be under pressure by the government. Regardless of the overall ledger of guilt or innocence, there is justification for the media to politically organize in protecting their interests and the integrity of their profession. All what is transpiring in Georgia is outside of the realm of law and the goals of an open civil society. What the government has done to suppress basic freedoms is totally unacceptable to the Human Rights Center. 4 The majority of Georgian journalists preferred to remain silent unless others loudly vocalized the problems facing the Georgian media. Even TV Company Imedi preferred to turn a blind eye to many of the government’s shortcomings in the beginning. It was not until the interests of Badri Patarkatsishvili, owner of Imedi clashed with the interests of high ranking governmental officials in February, 2006 that the tide started to change. Since then the journalists of TV-Imedi have brought to public light the crimes of governmental authorities. Consequently, Georgian society found out that high ranking governmental officials and law enforcer agencies had murdered innocent people such as the cases of Sandro Girgvliani, Buta Robakidze and others, many who are still nameless and easily forgotten. Badri Patarkatsishvili was using TV Imedi as a bridge of his political and economic activities. When the oligarch had good relations with President Saakashvili he and his team demanded employed journalists to be loyal to Saakashvili’s government. However, when the relationship soured between the Oligarch and the government, Imedi journalists became ever much more critical to the activities of the government. Consequently, the government raided Imedi on November 7, 2007. During the state of emergency all of Georgian society was under the impression that they were again living in Soviet Union. Information was controlled and people were in fear of speaking out. The only source of information was Georgian Public Television, First Channel Radio, The Voice of America and Radio Liberty. Fortunately, however, in November 2007 we still had access to the Internet as an alternative to the above-mentioned media sources. Though the state of emergency was lifted long time ago, we still feel its phantom in the society, especially in media. I think that Georgian media is in a serious crisis; moreover, the free media is withering away. The media in the regions of Georgia is in a very difficult situation. It lacks proper equipment and does not have enough professionals. Nobody underscores these problems. All media owners prefer to have good relationships with the government in order to have fewer problems. The journalists that are financed by international donors/organisations are more impartial (for example, Radio Liberty). The Georgian government is trying to press Georgian media by not subscribing newspapers for the Parliament and other state bodies. Consequently; Georgian press business is in a financial and moral crisis. The press does not enjoy any special tax privileges. There is now a ban on the selling of newspapers in the city center of Tbilisi, which is also a form of pressure on the media. The first signs of internet censorship appeared in 2007. Moreover, the journalists (for example, Gela Mtivlishvili, Saba Tsitsilashvili, etc) were physically assaulted by regional governmental representatives and law enforcers. It is unclear why international donors have stopped funding investigative journalism. The criminal case against TV-company Iberia has been resolved to the benefit of the station but in spite of the results of the court proceedings, showing that adequate grounds did not exists for lack of evidence (Iberia was shut down by the government in spring, 2004). However, nobody has been legally held accountable for having made false charges in the first place. 5 Georgian society as well as Georgian media must assume its share of responsibility: Georgian media must publicize the crimes and misconducts of the government. All effort must be made to inform and protect society and in such a way that it will be able appropriately reaction to various challenges. Ucha Nanuashvili, Executive Director HRIDC 6 Introduction Since independence, the Georgian media has not been as restricted as today, at the 4 year anniversary of the Rose Revolution. Many Georgian journalists feel the same on that issue. Many of them have left the field of their activities out of a feeling of protest. Some of them went abroad and some of them continued their career in a more peaceful sphere. The post-revolutionary expectation on enhancing and protecting democratic values was so huge that the Georgian media granted time and opportunity to the new government. But this concession reflected negatively on the freedom of the press in Georgia. Self-censorship
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