Millikan's Teleosemantics and Communicative Agency
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Millikan’s Teleosemantics and Communicative Agency Pierre Jacob Millikan’s teleosemantic approach constitutes a powerful framework for explaining #uthor the continued reproduction and proliferation of intentional conventional linguistic signs, and thereby the stability of human verbal intentional communication. While Pierre Jacob this approach needs to be complemented by particular proximate psychological acob-ehess.fr mechanisms, Millikan re ects the mentalistic psychological mechanisms, which are part of the !ricean tradition in pragmatics. "he goal of this paper is to assess the +nstitute Jean ,icod balance between Millikan’s teleosemantic framework and the particular proximate Paris, .rance psychological mechanisms that she favors. (ommentator Keywords Acceptance $compliance%&understanding ' (ommunicative&informative intention ' Marius .. Jung (onventions ' (oordination ' )irect&derived proper function ' Etiological theory of m ung/0- students.uni1main2.de functions ' +mitative learning ' Mindreading ' ,atural signs ' Perception theory of Johannes !utenberg13niversit4t verbal understanding Main2, !ermany *ditors "homas Met2inger met2inger -uni1main2.de Johannes !utenberg13niversit4t Main2, !ermany Jennifer M. Windt ennifer.windt-monash.edu Monash 3niversity Melbourne, Australia 1 Introduction In this paper, I wish to revisit a topic that I ad- cording to which f!nctions are selected effects dressed many years ago (cf. Jacob 1997) from a (Milli$an 1984, 1989b/ Neander 1991, 1995, novel perspective. !ch philosophy of mind of -..,/ 2right 1973)4 the f!nction of a trait is the latter part of the twentieth cent!ry has the effect caused by the trait that e)plains the been devoted to nat!rali"ing intentionality or contin!ed reprod!ction (s!rvival or prolifera- the contents of mental representations. #ne of tion) of past tokens of this trait. the landmarks of nat!ralistic philosophy of Milli$an's teleosemantic approach is par- mind of the past thirty years is !n%!estionably tic!larly impressive for two related reasons. &!th Milli$an's teleosemantic framework. (ele- 5irst, it applies in a single stroke to the con- osemantic theories are teleological theories that tents of intentional mental representations, see$ to e)plain content by appealing to the whose f!nction is to mediate between pairs of functions of representations. Li$e most teleose- cognitive mechanisms located within single mantic approaches, Milli$an (1984, -..,) em- brains, and also to the meanings of intentional braces an etiological conception of f!nction, ac- conventional linguistic signs, whose f!nction is Jacob, P. $0/56%. Millikan’s "eleosemantics and (ommunicative #gency. +n ". Met2inger 7 J. M. Windt $*ds%. Open MIND: 0/$"%. .rankfurt am Main8 M+,) !roup. doi8 10.566/0&9:;<96;6:/5=/ 1 | 00 www.open1mind.net to mediate between pairs of cognitive mechan- of the distinction and ass!me that (whether !l- isms located in the brains of distinct individ!- timate e)planations are causal e)planations or als. 6econd, her overall teleological (or teleo- not) !ltimate and pro)imate e)planations are f!nctional) approach, based on the etiological complementary, not competing, e)planations. theory of f!nctions, is meant to offer an account <iven that why-q!estions are f!ndamentally of the proliferation or contin!ed reprod!ction of different from how-q!estions, it is li$ely that !l- both biological entities and non-biological c!l- timate e)planations offer few (if any) con- t!ral things, s!ch as linguistic and non-lin- straints on pro)imate e)planations, and vice guistic conventions. versa. I will f!rther ass!me that the distinction 5ollowing ayr (1961), evol!tionary biolo- carries over from biological to c!lt!ral evol!tion gists and philosophers have long argued that and applies to the evol!tion of h!man comm!- the distinction between so-called ultimate and nication (cf. 6cott-Philipps et al. 2011). In par- proximate e)planations of biological traits (e.g., tic!lar, Milli$an's basic teleosemantic account behaviors) is central to evol!tionary theori"ing. of the proliferation of intentional conventional &oughly spea$ing, !ltimate e)planations ad- linguistic signs can !sef!lly be construed as a dress why-q!estions4 for e)ample, why do birds $ind of !ltimate e)planation of h!man (verbal sing? 2hy does singing confer a selectional ad- and non-verbal) comm!nication. Its main tas$ vantage (or greater fitness) to birds8 9ro)imate is to address %!estions s!ch as4 what is the evol- e)planations address how-q!estions4 for e)- !tionary or c!lt!ral f!nction of h!man comm!- ample, what are the partic!lar e)ternal circ!m- nication8 2hy do h!mans engage in comm!nic- stances which trigger singing in birds8 2hat are ation at all8 As with other $inds of !ltimate e)- the internal brain mechanisms that allow birds planations, it needs to be s!pplemented by spe- to sing? cific pro)imate e)planations whose role is to (he distinction between !ltimate and disclose the partic!lar h!man cognitive capacit- pro)imate biological e)planations raises some ies and mental processes whereby h!mans pro- deep scientific and philosophical %!estions. #ne d!ce and !nderstand intentional conventional s!ch %!estion is whether !ltimate e)planations signs. should be construed as non-causal answers to (he goal of this paper is to assess the bal- why-q!estions. 6ome philosophers have arg!ed ance between illi$an's broad teleosemantic ap- that !ltimate e)planations are selectional e)- proach to the cooperative f!nction of h!man com- planations based on nat!ral selection. Nat!ral m!nication and the choice of partic!lar pro)imate selection can account for the prevalence of some psychological mechanisms that she endorses. In trait in a pop!lation of individ!als, b!t it can- partic!lar, I will foc!s on her anti-mentalistic not trac$ the causal process whereby the trait is view, namely that verbal !nderstanding of an- generated in each individ!al in the first place other's !tterance is a $ind of direct perception of (6ober 1984, pp. 147–152; ;rets$e 1988, pp. 92– whatever the !tterance is abo!t, and her correlat- 93; ;rets$e 1990, pp. 827–830). #ther philo- ive re>ection of the basic <ricean pragmatic as- sophers have replied that selectional e)plana- s!mption that verbal understanding is an e)ercise tions are causal e)planations, on the grounds in mindreading. #ne of the distinctive feat!res of that no token of a trait whose type has been se- the h!man mindreading capacity is that it en- lected for f!lfilling its (etiological) f!nction ables individ!als to ma$e sense of two $inds of could proliferate !nless it was lin$ed by a causal agency4 instr!mental and comm!nicative agency. chain to the earlier prod!ction of the selected In order to ma$e sense of an agent's instr!mental effect by ancestor tokens of the same type of action, one m!st represent the contents of both trait (Milli$an 1990, p. 808).1 her motivations and epistemic states. In order to In this paper, I will not address s!ch per- ma$e sense of an agent's comm!nicative action, ple)ing iss!es. I will simply accept the validity as <rice has basically arg!ed, the addressee m!st infer what the agent is trying to convey, i.e., her 1 5or f!rther disc!ssion cf. Jacob 1997, pp. 256–269. comm!nicative intention, whose very f!lfilment Jacob, P. $0/56%. Millikan’s "eleosemantics and (ommunicative #gency. +n ". Met2inger 7 J. M. Windt $*ds%. Open MIND: 0/$"%. .rankfurt am Main8 M+,) !roup. doi8 10.566/0&9:;<96;6:/5=/ 2 | 00 www.open1mind.net re%!ires that it is recogni"ed by the addressee. • (he <ricean mentalistic tradition also rests 2hat is distinctive of h!man intentional comm!- on the ass!mption that verbal !nderstanding nication is that it enables the comm!nicative is an e)ercise in mindreading, whereby the agent to ca!se her addressee to ac%!ire new psy- addressee recogni"es the comple) psycholo- chological states, and thereby to manip!late his gical state that !nderlies the speaker’s com- mind. m!nicative act. I'll call this the mindreading (h!s, I shall e)amine the contrast thesis. (Blearly, the mindreading thesis is between the partic!lar pro)imate mechanisms pres!pposed or entailed by the separability favored by illi$an and the <ricean prag- thesis.) matic tradition. In the first section, I shall • (hird, the <ricean mentalistic tradition f!r- spell o!t the basic <ricean mentalistic frame- ther rests on a f!ndamental hypothesi"ed wor$. In the second section, I will spell o!t asymmetry between what is re%!ired for !n- illi$an's teleosemantic machinery. In the derstanding instrumental non-comm!nicative third section, I will e)amine illi$an's view agency and communicative agency. An agent that verbal !nderstanding is an e)tended form intends her instr!mental action to satisfy her of perception. In the fo!rth section, I will e)- desire in light of her belief, and the desirable amine the e)tent to which illi$an's acco!nt outcome of her instrumental action can be of conventions can s!pport her re>ection of the recogni"ed even if the agent fails to f!lfil her <ricean ass!mption that verbal !nderstanding goal or intention. C!t the intended effect of a is an e)ercise in mindreading. 5inally, in the speaker’s comm!nicative action, which is the last section, I will show that recent develop- addressee's understanding of what she means, mental findings in the investigation of early cannot be achieved !nless the speaker's in- h!man social cognition are relevant to the tention to achieve this effect is recogni"ed (cf.