DOCSLIB.ORG

A Co-Citation Network for Philosophy

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Co-Citation Network for Philosophy Sher G 1991 Field H 1994 Lewis D 1970 Quine W 1970 Field H 1972 A Co-Citation Network for Philosophy Field H 1986 Goldman A 1967 Williams B 1978 Field H 1994 Ginet C 1990 Lewis D 1981 Horwich P 1990 Wright C 1992 Dummett M 1973 Fischer J 1994 Quine W (13) Widerker D 1995 Leading Works and Discussion Communities Gettier E 1963 Shapiro S 1998 Dummett M 1991 Zagzebski L 1991 Ginet C 1996 Hempel C 1965 The graph shows co-citation patterns for just over the 500 most-cited items O'connor T 2000 Boghossian P 1990 Vaninwagen P 1983 Frankfurt H 1969 Goldman A 1976 Gupta A 1993 Frege G 1979 Haji I 1998 from 1993 to mid-2013, based on over 34,000 references in 2,262 articles Dummett M 1978 Pereboom D 2001 Kane R 1996 Mumford S 1998 Blackburn S 1984 Dennett D 1984 published in four leading generalist, English-language philosophy journals: Johnston M 1992 Martin C 1994 Williams B 1981 Fischer J 1998 Frankfurt H 1971 Vanfraassen B 1980 Dummett M 1981 Nous, Mind, the Journal of Philosophy, and the Philosophical Review. The cuto Mele A 1995 Mcginn C 1983 Woodward J 2003 Dummett M 1977 Wallace R 1994 Dowe P 2000 for inclusion is having received at least ten citations. The colors of the nodes Bird A 1998 Lewis D 1997 Lewis D 1986 represent the results of a community-detection algorithm applied to the Salmon W 1984 co-citation matrix. Communities are identied inductively. Edge width Byrne A 1997 Hitchcock C 2001 Lewis D 1973 indicates relative frequency of co-citation. The key gives an approximate Mcginn C 1982 Sellars W 1963 topical description of each citation community and one of its central items. Putnam H 1975 Hardin C 1988 Noe A 2004 Conee E 2004 Byrne A 2003 Lewis D 2000 Cohen S 2002 Dretske F 1969 Wright C 1985 Dennett D 1978 Hurvich L 1981 Wright C 2002 Martin M 2002 Metaphysics, David Lewis (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds Peacocke C 2004 Hilbert D 1987 Mellor D 1995 Paul L 2000 Stalnaker R 1975 Huemer M 2001 Millikan R 1984 Metaphysics/Language, Saul Kripke (1980), Naming and Necessity Block N 1986 Jackson F 1987 Searle J 1983 Tye M 2000 Dennett D 1987Dretske F 1988 Shoemaker S 1994 Hintikka J 1962 Skyrms B 1980 Pryor J 2000 Lewis D 1981 Byrne A 2001 Philosophy of Mind, David Chalmers (1996), The Conscious Mind Priest G 1987 Churchland P 1989 Armstrong D 1968 Hurley S 1998 Fodor J 1992 Block N 1995 Horwich P 1998 Bach K 1979 Armstrong D 1973 Mcdermott M 1995 Dennett D 1991 Epistemology, Timothy Williamson (2000), Knowlege and its Limits Fodor J 1990 Lewis D 1976 Derose K 1991 Vendler Z 1967 Mcdowell J 1982 Soames S 1999 Gardenfors P 1988 Dretske F 1995 May R 1985 Philosophy of Mind, Jerry Fodor (1990), A Theory of Content Derose K 1996 Horwich P 1998 Fodor J 1975 Lewis D 1980 Jackson F 1979 Craig E 1990 Martin M 2004 Davidson D 1967 Dretske F 1981 Tye M 1995 Metaethics, Derek Part (1984), Reasons and Persons Chomsky N 2000 Derose K 2002 Russell B 1912 Brandom R 1994 Bennett J 1988 Edgington D 1995 Evans G 1976 Unger P 1975 Mackie J 1974 James W 1890 Schier S 1972 Cartwright N 1983 Ethics and Political Philosophy, John Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice Earman J 1992 Lewis D 1966 Lycan W 1996 Larson R 1995 Cappelen H 2005 Williamson T 2000 Kaplan M 1996 Menzies P 1989 Adams E 1975 Millikan R 1989 Siewert C 1998 Fodor J 1983 Ramachandran M 1997 Hawthorne J 2004 Unger P 1975 Fodor J 1987 Jackson F 1977 Block N 1999 Braddon-mitchell D 1996 Metaphysics/Causation, David Lewis (1986), “Causation” Lycan W 1987 Chalmers D 2001 Hall N 1994 Kim J 1973 Searle J 1980 Montague R 1974 Rysiew P 2001 Kripke S 1975 Mcginn C 1991 Strawson G 1994 Derose K 1992 Stanley J 2005 Lewis D 1994 Ryle G 1949 Papineau D 1993 Hill C 1997 Metaphysics/Free Will, Peter van Inwagen (1983), An Essay on Free Will Derose K 1995 Tooley M 1977 Lewis D 1986 Searle J 1992 Harman G 1986 Joyce J 1999 Lange M 2000 Bennett J 1984 Barwise J 1981 Fantl J 2002 Lewis D 1979 Unger P 1984 Kyburg H 1961 Armstrong D 1983 Davies M 1980 Cohen S 1988 Hajek A 2003 Vanfraassen B 1989 Bennett J 2003 Harman G 1990 Lewis D 1996 Black M 1952 Nagel T 1974 Schier S 2003 Wright C 1991 Chalmers D 1996 Dretske F 1977 Stalnaker R 1968 Jackson F 1986 Foley R 1987 Levine J 1983 Davies M 1981 Frege G 1918 Dretske F 1970 Jerey R 1983 Moore G 1903 Women in Philosophy Nozick R 1981 Schier S 1996 Evans G 1977 Lewis D 1979 Arntzenius F 2003 Maher P 1993 Lewis D 1973 Vanfraassen B 1995 Fodor J 1974 A notable feature of the graph is the relative absence of items written by Kim J 1998 Frege G 1879 Yablo S 1992 Lewis D 1984 Jackson F 1982 Neale S 1990 Sosa E 1991 women. Of the 520 items, 19 are by women—3.6 percent of the total. Their Russell B 1919 Stroud B 1984 Wittgenstein L (10) Dretske F 1971 Kim J 1993 Vanfraassen B 1984 Jackson F 1998 Salmon N 1998 names and locations are shown below. By comparison, 6.3 percent of the Frege G 1892 Bach K 1997 Goldman A 1970 items are by David Lewis. There are 15 women authors in total. Three of the Davidson D 1963 Russell B 1905 Crimmins M 1992 Chisholm R 1989 Anscombe G 1957 Grice P 1989 Williamson T 2007 Wittgenstein L (31) Bonjour L 1985 Lewis D 1983 Schier S 1987 Braun D 1998 items are in the top 100: Ruth Millikan’s Language, Thought, and Other Loux M 1979 Davidson D 1972 Quine W (14) Soames S 1988 Rorty R 1979 Stanley J 2001 Adams R 1979 Armstrong D 1978 Lewis D 1970 Burge T 1977 Shoemaker S 1984 Salmon N 1989 Richard M 1983 Biological Categories (1984, ranked 47th), Christine Korsgaard’s The Sources of Ginet C 1975 Hazen A 1979 Russell B 1903 Perry J 1979 Harman G 1973 Sorensen R 1988 Lewis D 1999 Geach P 1980 Forbes G 1989 Armstrong D 1997 Yablo S 1987 Quine W 1953 Lewis D (10) Salmon N 1986 Armstrong D 1989 Davidson D 1980 Soames S 1989 Stalnaker R 1999 Normativity (1996, 75th), and Dorothy Edgington’s “On Conditionals” (1995, Fumerton R 1995 Field H 1989 Lewis D 1972 Salmon N 1988 Alston W 1989 Tye M 1990 Schier S 1998 Armstrong D 1978 Rosen G 1990 Stalnaker R 1978 Burke M 1994 Lewis D 1999 Barwise J 1983 Katz J 1994 Kaplan D 1989 82nd). Christine Korsgaard has three items in the dataset. Ruth Millikan and Baker L 2000 Fine K 1994 Kripke S 1980 Plantinga A 1993 Unger P 1979 Soames S 2002 Chisholm R 1977 Dummett M 1975 Wiggins D 1968 Adams R 1974 LewisForbes D 1968 G 1985 Audi R 1993 Lewis D 1986 Salmon N 1981 Crimmins M 1989 Philippa Foot have two each. The other women are Barbara Herman, Plantinga A 1993 Williamson T 1994 Sider T 1997 Leonard H 1940 Lewis D 1983 Strawson P 1950 Kaplan D 1989 Schier S 1992 Wright C 1975 Kripke S 1963 Bealer G 1982 Almog J 1989 Fine K 1975 Hyde D 1997 Strawson P 1959 Richard M 1990 Larson R 1993 Penelope Maddy, Lynne Rudder Baker, Nancy Cartwright, Gila Sher, G.E.M. Benacerraf P 1973 Parsons T 1980 Braun D 1993 Donnellan K 1966 Feldman R 1985 Lewis D 1986 Perry J 1977 Putnam H 1975 Linsky B 1994 Stalnaker R 1984 Margalit A 1979 Munitz M 1971 Margalit A 1979 Anscombe, Susan Hurley, Sally Haslanger, L.A. Paul, Linda Zagzebski, and Sosa E 2007 Goldman A 1986 Evans G 1978 Merricks T 1995 Salmon N 1989 Lewis D 1991 Field H 1980 French P 1979 Mcgee V 1991 Haslanger S 1989 Merricks T 1994 Plantinga A 1974 Frege G (13) Goldman A 1979 Wright C 1983 Armstrong D 1989 Fodor J 1981 Burge T 1979 Judith Jarvis Thomson. Dummett M 1991 Chisholm R 1976 Lewis D 1983 Bratman M 1987 Putnam H 1975 Burge T 1986 Chisholm R 1957 Gibbard A 1975 Mcginn C 1989 Pollock J 1986 Sider T 2001 Dummett M 1981 Burge T 1986 Fodor J 1980 Sher G 1991 Goodman N 1951 Carroll L 1895 Heller M 1990 Benacerraf P 1965 Pollock J 1999 Simons P 1987 Vaninwagen P 1990 Lewis D 1979 Burge T 1993 Boolos G 1985 Fine K 1985 Bonjour L 1998 Wiggins D 1980 Williams D 1953 Keynes J 1921 Burge T 1988 Marr D 1982 Zagzebski L 1991 Boolos G 1984 Frege G 1884 Jackson F 1977 Recanati F 1993 Evans G 1982 Clark A 1998 Parsons T 1990 Thomson J 1983 Mele A 1992 Vaninwagen P 1990 Bratman M 1999 Johnston M 1992 Frege G 1984 Maddy P 1990 Campbell J 2002 Travis C 2004 Benacerraf P 1983 Boolos G 1998 Frege G 1893 Vaninwagen P 1980 Brewer B 1999 Blackburn S 1998 Unger P 1980 Stanley J 2000 Campbell K 1990 Plantinga A 1983 Mcdowell J 1994 Blackburn S 1993 Heck R 2000 Locke J (35) Peacocke C 1983 Paul L 2000 Railton P 1986 Markosian N 1998 Evans G 1985 Millikan R 1984 Austin J 1962 Harman G 1977 Field H 1973 Vaninwagen P 1981 Kant I (22) Hurley S 1998 Frankfurt H 1988 Merricks T 2001 Peacocke C 1992 Mackie J 1977 Zimmerman D 1995 Quine W 1960 Aristotle No Year P981a24 (10) Bach K 1994 Gibson J 1979 Edgington D 1995 Cartwright N 1983 Watson G 1975 Tarski A 1983 Davidson D 1969 Korsgaard C 1997 Boyd R 1988 Quine W 1953 Quine W 1951 Peacocke C 1999 Darwall S 1983 Hume D (38) Devitt M 1996 Putnam H 1971 Kuhn T 1970 Harman G 1999 Nagel T 1970 Pettit P 1990 Burke M 1992 Quine W 1969 Lewis D 1969 Evans G (10) Smith M 1994 Velleman J 2000 Broome J 1999 Quine W 1966 Quine W 1981 Searle J 1995 Quine W 1986 Stanley J 2000 Dancy J 2000 Foot P 2001 Herman B 1993 Grice H 1989 Hume D (10) Putnam H 1981 Anscombe G 1957 Korsgaard C 1996 Kripke S 1982 Lewis D 1992 Korsgaard C 1986 Mcdowell J 1979 Scanlon T 1998 Baker L 2000 Lewis D 1989 Carnap R 1956 Davidson D 1984 Horn L 1989 Moore G 1912 Haslanger S 1989 Putnam H 1994 Kavka G 1983 Nagel T 1986 Davidson D 1990 Putnam H 1978 Williams B 1973 Wittgenstein L 1953 Thomson J 1983 Olson E 1997 Part D 1984 Maddy P 1990 Scheer S 1982 Searle J 1969 Tarski A 1956 Lepore E 1986 Williams B 1981 Davidson D 1986 Aristotle (16) Korsgaard C 1997 Foot P 1978 Boghossian P 1989 Moore G 1903 Gibbard A 1990 Nagel T 1979 Rawls J 1993 Foot P 2001 Herman B 1993 Korsgaard C 1986 Korsgaard C 1996 Hare R 1952 Hume D 1978 Kagan S 1989 Grice H 1961 Nozick R 1974 Rawls J 1980 Wiggins D 1987 Gibbard A 2003 Geach P 1965 Ross W 1930 Rawls J 1971 Gauthier D 1986 Hart H 1961 Crimmins M 1998 Sidgwick H 1907 Brink D 1989 Kant I (13) Walton K 1990 Kieran Healy / socviz.co Brandt R 1979 Data: Web of Science.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Gibson's Ecological Approach: Perceiving What Exists
    1 TRENDS IN INTERDISCIPLINARY STU DIES AVANT The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard AVANT Pismo awangardy filozoficzno-naukowej 2/2012 EDITORS OF THIS ISSUE / REDAKTORZY TEGO NUMERU Witold Hensel, Dawid Lubiszewski, Przemysław Nowakowski, Nelly Strehlau, Witold Wachowski TORUŃ 3 ISSN: 2082-6710 AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard AVANT. Pismo Awangardy Filozoficzno-Naukowej Vol. III, No. 2/2012 (October-December 2012), English Issue Toruń 2012 The texts are licensed under / Teksty udostępniono na licencji: CC BY-NC-ND 3.0. Graphics design / Opracowanie graficzne: Karolina Pluta & Jacek S. Podgórski. Cover/Okładka: pictures by / obrazy autorstwa: Teresa Young (front/przód: "The Ripple Effect"; back/tył: " Flight Of The Humblebee"). Graphics inside by / Grafika wewnątrz autorstwa: Karolina Pluta. Address of the Editorial Office / Adres redakcji: skr. poczt. nr 34, U.P. Toruń 2. Filia, ul. Mazowiecka 63/65, 87-100 Toruń, Poland www.avant.edu.pl/en [email protected] Publisher / Wydawca: Ośrodek Badań Filozoficznych, ul. Stawki 3/20, 00-193 Warszawa, Poland www.obf.edu.pl Academic cooperation: university workers and PhD students of Nicolaus Copernicus University (Toruń, Poland). Współpraca naukowa: pracownicy i doktoranci Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. The Journal has been registered in District Court in Warsaw, under number: PR 17724. Czasopismo zarejestrowano w Sądzie Okręgowym w Warszawie pod numerem: PR 17724. ADVISORY BOARD / RADA NAUKOWA Chairman/Przewodniczący: Włodzisław
    [Show full text]
  • UC San Diego UC San Diego Previously Published Works
    UC San Diego UC San Diego Previously Published Works Title Logical consequence: An epistemic outlook Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/66m8m3gp Journal Monist, 85(4) ISSN 0026-9662 Author Sher, G Publication Date 2002 DOI 10.5840/monist200285432 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Logical Consequence: An Epistemic Outlook Author(s): Gila Sher Source: The Monist, Vol. 85, No. 4, Consequences (OCTOBER 2002), pp. 555-579 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903798 Accessed: 10-08-2015 00:28 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Monist. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 137.110.34.89 on Mon, 10 Aug 2015 00:28:56 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Logical Consequence: An Epistemic Outlook The Ist-order thesis, namely, the thesis that logical consequence is standard lst-order logical consequence,1 has been widely challenged in recentdecades. My own challenge to this thesis inThe Bounds ofLogic (and related articles2) was motivated by what I perceived to be its inade quate philosophical grounding.The bounds of logic are, in an important sense, the bounds of logical constants, yet the bounds of the standard logical constants are specified by enumeration, i.e., dogmatically, without grounding or explanation.
    [Show full text]
  • Mieli, Maailma Ja Referenssi. John Mcdowellin Mielenfilosofian Ja
    JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 328 Petteri Niemi Mieli, maailma ja referenssi John McDowellin mielen filosofian ja semantiikan kriittinen tarkastelu ja ontologinen täydennys JYVÄSKYLÄN YLIOPISTO JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 328 Petteri Niemi Mieli, maailma ja referenssi John McDowellin mielenfilosofian ja semantiikan kriittinen tarkastelu ja ontologinen täydennys Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston yhteiskuntatieteellisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston päärakennuksen salissa C1 tammikuun 12. päivänä 2008 kello 12. Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Jyväskylä, in the Main Building, Hall C1, on January 12, 2008 at 12 o'clock noon. UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ JYVÄSKYLÄ 2008 Mieli, maailma ja referenssi John McDowellin mielenfilosofian ja semantiikan kriittinen tarkastelu ja ontologinen täydennys JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 328 Petteri Niemi Mieli, maailma ja referenssi John McDowellin mielenfilosofian ja semantiikan kriittinen tarkastelu ja ontologinen täydennys UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ JYVÄSKYLÄ 2008 Editors Jussi Kotkavirta Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy/philosophy, University of Jyväskylä Irene Ylönen, Marja-Leena Tynkkynen Publishing Unit, University Library of Jyväskylä URN:ISBN:9789513931988 ISBN 978-951-39-3198-8 (PDF) ISBN 978-951-39-3030-1 (nid.) ISSN 0075-4625 Copyright ©2008 , by University of Jyväskylä Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä 2008 ABSTRACT Niemi, Petteri Mind, World and Reference: A Critical Examination and Ontological Supple- ment of John McDowell’s Philosophy of Mind and Semantics Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2008, 283 p. (Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 0075-4625; 328) ISBN 978-951-39-3198-8 (PDF), 978-951-39-3030-1 (nid.) Summary Diss.
    [Show full text]
  • Cg 2014 Alexander D. Morgan ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
    c 2014 Alexander D. Morgan ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ON THE MATTER OF MEMORY: NEURAL COMPUTATION AND THE MECHANISMS OF INTENTIONAL AGENCY by ALEXANDER D. MORGAN A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Philosophy written under the direction of Frances Egan and Robert Matthews and approved by New Brunswick, New Jersey May 2014 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION On the Matter of Memory: Neural Computation and the Mechanisms of Intentional Agency by ALEXANDER D. MORGAN Dissertation Directors: Frances Egan & Robert Matthews Humans and other animals are intentional agents; they are capable of acting in ways that are caused and explained by their reasons. Reasons are widely held to be medi- ated by mental representations, but it is notoriously difficult to understand how the intentional content of mental representations could causally explain action. Thus there is a puzzle about how to `naturalize' intentional agency. The present work is motivated by the conviction that this puzzle will be solved by elucidating the neural mechanisms that mediate the cognitive capacities that are distinctive of intentional agency. Two main obstacles stand in the way of developing such a project, which are both manifestations of a widespread sentiment that, as Jerry Fodor once put it, \notions like computational state and representation aren't accessible in the language of neu- roscience". First, C. Randy Gallistel has argued extensively that the mechanisms posited by neuroscientists cannot function as representations in an engineering sense, since they allegedly cannot be manipulated by the computational operations required to generate structurally complex representations.
    [Show full text]
  • Ruth Millikan/Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information (Oxford, 2017) Summary Notes
    Ruth Millikan/Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information (Oxford, 2017) Summary Notes The notes below were produced by Dorit Bar-On in preparation for meetings of a reading group on Beyond Concepts and lightly edited by Ruth Millikan. The notes were prepared for online publication with the help of Drew Johnson. (Bullets in italics are reader glosses, comments, or questions.) Part I: Unicepts Introduction to Part I 0.1 Overview (p.1-2) - Kant’s q: How is knowledge possible? (p.3) Þ How is it possible for creatures with cognitive systems like ours to know the natural world? ● What must the natural world be like so that creatures like us could learn/acquire information about it? ● What must our cognitive system be like so that it can represent such a world? ● How can language be informative? - Priority claim: natural ontology comes before cognition (‘In the beginning there was the natural world’.) “Knowledge of the world is made possible in large part by the dense clumpings together of entities with common properties that constitute, first and foremost, the endurance of individuals over time, then the existence of real though rough kinds, and finally the existence of real categories of real kinds that can support meta-induction.” (p.6) 0.2 Selection Processes (p.4-6) - Backdrop: Using contemporary evolutionary theory and its analogues in learning and cultural selection to account for intentionality. - Background principle: “[I]ntentional explanation in psychology, explanation by reference to beliefs, desires, and so forth, is explanation by reference to a kind of engineering principle exemplified in mechanisms that have been formed by selection processes, natural selection, learning, cultural selection.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Gila Sher Chen Bo Foundational Holism
    1 GILA SHER CHEN BO∗ FOUNDATIONAL HOLISM, SUBSTANTIVE THEORY OF TRUTH, AND A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC: INTERVIEW WITH GILA SHER BY CHEN BO (Ⅰ) (To appear Chinese Journal of Philosophy (Blackwell, A&HCI)), 2018 ABSTRACT This interview consists of four parts. The first part outlines Gila Sher’s academic background and earlier research. Although getting strong intellectual influence from Kant, Quine, and Tarski, Sher tries to keep her intellectual independence. The second part discusses Sher’s foundational holism. Among its distinctive features are: applicability to all branches of knowledge; a substantial grounding-in-reality requirement; focus on structural holism; sanctioning not only a rich network of connections among theories, but also a rich network of connections between theories and the world; and a fine-grained approach to circularity, including the introduction of “constructive” circularity. Based on her foundational holism, Sher puts forward a post- Quinean model of knowledge. This involves (i) a conception of reality that puts abstract and concrete features of objects on a par, (ii) a conception of intellect as central to empirical as well as to abstract knowledge, (iii) a conception of intellectual knowledge as quasi rather than fully apriori, (iv) a new paradigm of intellectual activity - “figuring out,” and (v) a new conception of realism - “basic realism” - applicable to all fields of knowledge. The third part discusses Sher’s substantive theory of truth. The theory sets forth three basic principles of truth: the “fundamental principle of truth,” the “manifold correspondence principle,” and the “logicality principle.” The fourth part discusses Sher’s new philosophy of logic, whose key idea is that logic is grounded both in the world and in humans’ mind.
    [Show full text]
  • Project Abstract the Summer Program for Diversity in Logic for Undergraduates Builds Upon the PIKSI Summer Program Model, Focusi
    Project Abstract The Summer Program for Diversity in Logic for Undergraduates builds upon the PIKSI Summer Program Model, focusing on Logic, an area in philosophy needing to increase diversity. We request seed funding for the pilot run of the program in May of 2016, when we will offer 12 students the opportunity to explore an exciting research theme in Logic –Paradoxes—receive small-group tutoring in formal techniques, receive mentoring and support for professionalization, experience validation, understanding and advice regarding diversity issues they have encountered –sexism, racism, ableism (and which the students may worry about encountering them in the profession), and develop a sense of community with students and faculty with whom they can identify and, in turn, come to strengthen their own identities. Project Purpose Our goal is to empower students to conceive of themselves as aspiring logicians, philosophers of logic and formal philosophers who belong in our profession. As Audrey Yap has noted, a majority of philosophy majors encounter some logic as a part of their undergraduate curriculum. Increasing diversity in logic is not simply a problem of exposure, but concretely addressing underlying pressures women and minority students experience, particularly stereotype threat and pernicious ideas about “natural aptitude.” (1) These pressures are especially strong in the subfield of logic, where almost no women and minorities have contributed to the research literature until very recently, and women and minorities remain underrepresented to a higher degree than in philosophy more broadly. Women and minorities learning logic can be vulnerable to feeling that a field like logic, that tends to be male and white dominated on the whole, is not welcoming to them.
    [Show full text]
  • PHIL-36 - Philosophy of Language Amherst College Spring 2009 – Visiting Prof
    PHIL-36 - Philosophy of Language Amherst College Spring 2009 – Visiting Prof. Kevin C. Klement (UMass faculty member) Mondays and Wednesdays 12:30pm-1:50pm in Cooper House 201. Course description: “Caesar was stabbed.” With those words, I can make a claim about someone who lived in the distant past. How is that possible? How do our words succeed in picking out particular portions of reality, even ones with which we have had no contact? How does language enable us to convey thoughts about everything from Amherst College, to the hopes of a friend, to the stars beyond our galaxy? What are the thoughts, or the meanings, that our words carry? And whatever they turn out to be, how do they come to be associated with our words: through some mental activity on our part, or instead through our shared use of language? This course covers selected topics in 20th century analytic philosophy of language, including meaning, reference, naming, truth, speech acts, propositional attitudes, translation, and the nature of linguistic representation. Contact info: You may e-mail me at [email protected], which is often the best way to reach me. I have a mailbox in the Amherst College philosophy department office (208 Cooper House). My office at UMass is 353 Bartlett Hall, and I also have access to Prof. Alexander George’s Office (307 Cooper House) for meetings at Amherst College. My UMass office phone is 545-5784. My office hours there are Tuesdays 2:30-3:30pm, Thursdays 11am-12pm and other times by appointment. I am also happy to make an appointment to meet with you at AC instead.
    [Show full text]
  • Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic
    Erkenn (2010) 72:151–176 DOI 10.1007/s10670-009-9202-x ORIGINAL ARTICLE Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic Gila Sher Received: 1 July 2008 / Accepted: 16 November 2009 / Published online: 11 December 2009 Ó The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract Knowledge requires both freedom and friction. Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of foundationalism as a solution to the problem of fric- tion, an alternative solution in the form of a neo-Quinean model, and the possibility of solving the problem of friction as it applies to logic and the philosophy of logic within that model. 1 The Problem of Epistemic Friction The problem of epistemic friction is the Kantian problem of providing our theories with appropriate resistance so they do not ‘‘hover idly in thin air’’. Kant illustrates the problem with his ‘‘dove’’ metaphor: ‘‘The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that her flight would be still easier in empty space…’’ (Kant 1781/1787, p. A5/B8-9). Kant’s prototype of a frictionless discipline is traditional metaphysics which purports to provide knowledge of ‘‘things in themselves’’ through our conceptual faculty (‘‘understanding’’) alone, having no adequate tests for its ideas or means for correcting its theories.
    [Show full text]
  • Some Strands of Wittgenstein's Normative Pragmatism, and Some
    Some Strands of Wittgenstein’s Normative Pragmatism, and Some Strains of his Semantic Nihilism ROBERT B. BRANDOM §1. Strands of Normative Pragmatism FIRST READ THE TRIUMVIRATE of classical American pragmatists as an I undergraduate, under the tutelage of Bruce Kuklick. He saw them as instituting a vibrant philosophical tradition that was visibly continued not only by C. I. Lewis, but by his students Goodman and Quine. (More controversially, but I believe, also correctly, he further saw the semantic holism Quine shared with Sellars as picking up a central strand of the idealist tradition —represented in the Golden Age by Lewis’s teacher Josiah Royce— with which pragmatism had always been in conversation.) My Doktorvater Richard Rorty then made familiar to me an understanding of pragmatism sufficiently capacious to include such disparate and reciprocally unsympathetic philosophers as the early Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein, as well as Sellars, and Quine’s student Davidson. I came to think of pragmatism as a house with many mansions, comprising a number of more or less closely related but distinct and separable commitments, relating various thinkers in the way Wittgenstein made famous under the rubric of “family resemblances.” Excavating the conceptual antecedents of those various pragmatist views led me to see some of the most central among them as rooted firmly in the thought of the German Idealists, Kant and Hegel —as Peirce and Dewey had explicitly avowed1. Among the most important of these antecedents is a thought that I take it serves as a fundamental orienting insight for the later Wittgenstein. This is the idea that intentionality is through and through a normative phenomenon.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Evolution Has to Matter to Cognitive Psychology and to Philosophy of Mind Joëlle Proust
    Why evolution has to matter to cognitive psychology and to philosophy of mind Joëlle Proust To cite this version: Joëlle Proust. Why evolution has to matter to cognitive psychology and to philosophy of mind. Biologi- cal Theory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press (MIT Press), 2007, 2, pp.0-00. ijn_00139330 HAL Id: ijn_00139330 https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00139330 Submitted on 30 Mar 2007 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. 1 In: Biological Theory, 2007, 2 Why evolution has to matter to cognitive psychology and to philosophy of mind Joëlle Proust CNRS Philosophy of mind has essentially been shaped by philosophers of language, epistemologists and philosophers of science, such as Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, John Searle, Jerry Fodor and Fred Drestke. Much valuable work has been done in their wake, in the logical, semantic and pragmatic analysis of belief-desire attribution, in the theory of intentionality and in the analysis of meaning as well as in the exploration of the mental content involved in all kinds of propositional attitudes (perception, memory, emotion, etc.). This line of research permeated various other domains in cognitive science, such as the development of mentalisation, the psychology of action and of reasoning, psycholinguistics, cognitive anthropology and A.I.
    [Show full text]
  • Function, Natural Design, and Animal Behavior
    FUNCTION, NATURAL DESIGN, AND ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: 3.5 WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGY? PHILOSOPHICAL AND ETHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 3.6 SHOULD TELEOLOGICAL NOTIONS IN BIOLOGY BE ANALYZED DIRECTLY IN TERMS OF NATURAL SELECTION? Colin Allen1 and Marc Bekoff2 3.7 NATURAL SELECTION ACCOUNTS: FORWARD LOOKING OR BACKWARD LOOKING? 1 4. ATTRIBUTING FUNCTIONS TO BEHAVIOR: THE ROLE OF Department of Philosophy EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE Texas A&M University 5. PLURALISM ABOUT NOTIONS OF FUNCTION College Station, TX 77843-4237 Part Four: Distinguishing Design from Function <[email protected]> 1. DESIGN 2. TWO SENSES OF DESIGN IN PSYCHOLOGICAL TELEOLOGY 2 Department of Environmental, Population, and Organismic Biology 3. DESIGN AND FUNCTION IN PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTEXTS University of Colorado 4. NATURAL DESIGN DISTINGUISHED FROM BIOLOGICAL FUNCTION Boulder, CO 80309-0334 5. EVIDENCE BASES FOR NATURAL DESIGN <[email protected]> Concluding Remarks Acknowledgements In N.S. Thompson (ed.) Perspectives in Ethology, Volume 11: Behavioral Design. NY: References Plenum Press, pp.1-47 Figures and Tables Table of Contents Abstract Abstract Introduction This essay is on teleological notions in biology, particularly as they are applied to the study of 1. FUNCTION, DESIGN, AND TELEOLOGY behavior. Biologists and philosophers interested in the conceptual foundations of biology 2. DEFINITIONS (biophilosophers) have been greatly concerned about the role of teleological language in Part One: Philosophy and Biology evolutionary biology. We discuss the role of biophilosophy for understanding teleology in biology 1. BIOPHILOSOPHERS AND BIOPHILOSOPHY and explain why teleology is controversial in biology. We present an analytical survey of recent 2. REFORMERS AND ELUCIDATORS literature on teleology in biology, in the form of a classification tree.
    [Show full text]