THE ROUTES OF SENSE THOUGHT, SEMANTIC UNDERDETERMINACY AND COMPOSITIONALITY Walter B. Pedriali A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2012 Full metadata for this item is available in St Andrews Research Repository at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3142 This item is protected by original copyright e Routes of Sense ought, Semantic Underdeterminacy and Compositionality Walter B. Pedriali A thesis to be submitted to the University of St Andrews for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Departments of Philosophy School Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies University of St Andrews November I, Walter B. Pedriali, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately , words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me, and that it has not been submitted in any previous appli- cation for a higher degree. November Signature of candidate I was admitted as a research student and as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in September ; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between and and between and . November Signature of candidate I hereby certify that the candidate has fullled the conditions of the Resolu- tion and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualied to submit this thesis in application for that degree. November Signature of supervisor In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also under- standthatthetitleandabstractwillbepublished, andthatacopyofthework may be made and supplied to any bona de library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use un- less exempt by award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. I have obtained any third-party copy- right permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below. e following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the electronic publication of this thesis: (iii) Embargo on both all of printed copy and electronic copy for the same xed period of three years on the following grounds: —publication would preclude future publication. November Signature of candidate Signature of supervisor Contents Abstract ix Acknowledgements xi RootingforSense . Introduction ........................ . e Extension Problem . . ProjectingMeanings . . ContextandSemanticContent . . ePlan........................... What Compositionality Could Not Be . Introduction ........................ . CreativityandCompositionality. .. TowardsNonsense . .. WhyNonsense? ................. . VarietiesofNonsense . .. DegreesofNonsense. .. (De-)selectingNonsense . .. eAutonomyofSyntax . . CategoriesandtheLawsofMeaning . .. HusserlianMeanings . .. JustifyingBoundaries . .. ImplementingBoundaries . . UnderstandingNonsense. .. Representationalism,Again. .. Scenarios ..................... . Conclusion ......................... .. eRoadAhead ................. .. WhatRoleforStructure? . v eRootsofSense . Introduction ........................ . MeaningDeterminationandContent . .. IndividuatingContent. .. ArgumentsfromIndeterminacy . .. SemanticistResponses. .. eFlightfromContext. . eContentExpansionesis. .. ImplementingCET. ... CET-Eternalism . ... CET-Indexicalism . . eRadicalPragmaticistArgument . .. AnotherHaltingProblem . ... RescuingCET . .. EssentialIndexicality . . Grice’s Circle: A New Dilemma for Pragmaticism . .. NarrowingDownInterpretation . . Conclusion ......................... No Buts and Ifs . Introduction ........................ .. UaGS,theConnectivesandRepresentationality .. OneProblem,Twoeses . . LetAousandSensesBloom. .. CountingSenses . .. SpecifyingApplicabilityConditions . .. Stating the ‘and’ meaning-specications . . Keeping‘And’Univocal . .. eCohenObjection . .. eScopePrinciple . . AWayOut?Enrichingtheconjuncts . .. Enriching the Conjuncts, the Pragmaticist Way .. Enriching the Conjuncts, the LF-Indexicalist Way......................... ... SyntaxandLogicalForm . ... Context-relative Semantic Enrich- ment.................. ... Patching LFI: Conjunction As Deletion................ . Conclusion ......................... Situating Consequence . Introduction ........................ . eScienceofReasoning. .. eGeneralityClaim . ... CETandtheStructureofProof . . Content,ValidityandLogicalRevision . .. DisambiguationandInference . . LogicandCompetence: AgainstIdealisation . . SituatedRepresentation. .. On What Is Internal and External to Language . Conclusion ......................... When Authority Gives Out . Introduction ........................ . NormativityandItsSources . .. RulesofLanguage . .. eNormativityofMeaning . .. MeaningasExpectation . .. FromNormstoRules . . eParadoxofAuthority. .. A Response-Dependence Account of Lin- guisticJudgements . .. SomeDifficulties . .. MindandWord ................. ... LaRègleduJeu. . Background,Blindsight,andAuthority: Generalising Indexicalought ..................... .. Four Ways of Mapping Language to ought . RadicalMinimalism(WithoutBoundaries) . .. AWrongTurn?.................. . SixObjectionstoRCM .................. .. Replies....................... . Conclusion ......................... List of Abbreviations Abstract What does it mean to be a rational language user? What is it to obey linguisticrules? Whatistheproperaccountoflinguisticcompetence? A Fregean answer to these questions would make essential appeal to the notion of sense: we are masters of a language to the extent that we are able to recognise the cognitive value of its expressions; we are rational judges regarding truth-value assignments to the extent that we are sensitive to the ways in which the sense of an expression guidesusinthesemanticevaluationprocess; andasforobeyingrules, it is our ability to respond to how sense directs us, for a particular assertion of a sentence, towards the determination of its truth-value that best exemplies what it is like to follow a linguistic rule. My thesis explores a cluster of closely interrelated issues arising from these questions (whether or not considered from a Fregean per- spective). Accordingly, in tracing the routes of sense my dissertation places itself at the intersection of the philosophy of language, linguistics, philosophy of logic, and meta-ethics—and indeed, I end up agree- ing with Allan Gibbard that the theory of meaning really belongs to meta-ethical reection. Chapter introduces some of the main research questions that I try to address in the rest of the thesis. In chapter I state a number of theses which I take to be the den- ing ones for semanticism. I show that they form a class of jointly incompatible commitments. I choose nonsense as a problem case for compositionality and I argue that it forces the semanticist to aban- don either the learnability or the compositionality constraint. e escape route I adopt, going radically minimalist about content, is in- compatible with another key semanticist thesis, namely, that grasp of meaning is grasp of truth-conditions (robustly conceived). In chapter , I consider the account of atomic meanings given by both the semanticist and the pragmaticist and I conclude that on nei- ther account does interpretation come out as a process of rational ix choice between candidate bearers of content. Again, I suggest the les- son from indeterminacy is that we ought to embrace an ineradicably minimal conception of content. In chapter I turn my attention to the meaning of the logical con- stantsandIarguethatindeterminacyworriesextendtotheveryheart of the compositional machinery. Chapter examines the view that logic is the science of reasoning. Unsurprisingly, I conclude that a defence of this claim requires en- dorsing content-minimalism. In chapter I conclude my dissertation by sketching a radical view of content minimalism and I try to show how it can solve the puzzles I had been considering over the course of the previous chapters. x Acknowledgements e idea (and the title) for this dissertation came to me while reading Dummett (a: ), a short, highly compressed review note on David Bell’s book on Husserl. e crucial question discussed in that note was the relationship between the Fregean notion of sense (for Dummett, an essentially object-directed one) and Husserl’s views re- garding objectual reference. Dummett pointed out that in giving an account of intentionality and meaning, we must do justice to both the intensional (object- independent) and the extensional (object-dependent) mode. e dif- culty is becoming clear as to which mode Fregean Sinn belongs to. In stating his own view of the matter, Dummett said the following (p. ): We must not […] think of a Fregean sense as an intermediate station en route to the referent, as if the thinker aimed at the sense, which then readdressed the thought to the referent. e sense is itself the route; the entire route,