The Case Against Paramilitary Policing Considered

BRIT.J. CRIMINOL. VOL.33 NO. 3 SUMMER 1993 THE CASE AGAINST PARAMILITARY POLICING CONSIDERED P. A. J. WADDINGTON* Tony Jefferson's recent book, The Case against Paramilitary Policing (Jefferson 1990) Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article/33/3/353/386581 by guest on 27 September 2021 deserves serious consideration not only because it takes issue at length with a brief article written by me, but, more importantly, because it represents a powerful polemic against modern methods of police riot control. However, this polemic fails to convince for several reasons, both analytical and factual. This article will challenge Jefferson's thesis on four grounds: the definition of'paramilitary' thai is employed; the factual basis for the alleged 'strong correlation' between paramilitary policing and ensuing violence; the stance of viewing paramilitary policing 'from below'; and, finally, his criticism of the supposedly idealistic emphasis in my prescription of impartiality and restraint. Defining Paramilitarism The central issue that divides Jefferson and me is the meaning of the word 'paramilitary'. This has become something of a term of abuse in recent commentaries on policing (see, for example, Scraton 1985; Stephens 1988; Fielding 1990). It has several connotations: police wearing protective clothing and carrying shields; the existence of specialist public order units, like the SPG (Special Patrol Group) or TSG (Territorial Support Group); the deployment of police in squad formations; and the willingness to use force. It was the central contention of my original article (Waddington 1987) that there was an additional, and potentially valuable, connotation of the term that was largely ignored, namely co-ordination through superior command and control. Instead of leaving individual officers to take uncoordinated action at their own discretion, a para- militaristic approach deploys squads of officers under the direction and control of their superiors. This allows for a more disciplined response to disorderly and violent situations than is possible by traditional methods. Helmets and shields Although Jefferson does not make too much of the appearance of officers equipped for riot control, this factor is clearly just beneath the surface of his analysis and uppermost in the minds of many other commentators. For example, one definition of paramilitarism that he uses is policing comprising 'large numbers, military organization, protective clothing and equipment and so on' (Jefferson 1990: 109, emphasis added). It is obviously an unwelcome sight to see police officers equipped with visored helmets and flame- retardant overalls, carrying shields, and conveyed in vehicles with window-grilles; at the same time, however, it should be acknowledged that all this equipment is merely defensive. Police officers are also employees, and it is no more acceptable to expose them to a hazardous working environment without adequate protection than it is so to * Director, Criminal Justice Studies, University of Reading. 353 P. A. J. WADDINGTON expose any other group of workers. Those who complain of the 'militaristic' appearance of police officers engaged in riot control rarely, if ever, complain of the fact that ambulance crews sent to riot areas are sometimes equipped with visored helmets identical to those worn by police, or that at Orgreave they used a field ambulance borrowed from the army. Specialized squads Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article/33/3/353/386581 by guest on 27 September 2021 In practice Jefferson equates paramilitary policing with public order policing per se (1990: 52); 'aggressive' police tactics undertaken by whomsoever (p. 55); but most persistently with the activities of SPG-type units (chs. 3, 4, and 6). Now, there are valid criticisms that can be made of this kind of specialist squad and Jefferson makes some of them, but it is surely incorrect to equate them with paramilitarism per se.' First, specialization, even in the use of force, is not distinctively militaristic, nor a modern feature of policing. Many police forces have traditionally deployed specialized mounted officers in public order situations—certainly they have been a conspicuous feature of the Metropolitan Police since its inception. Military forces, it is true, have their specialized components: artillery, sappers, signals, armoured divisions, infantry, and so on. However, they would win, or even effectively fight, very few conflicts if simply left to roam the battlefield fighting their opponents in whatever way seemed expedient at the time. What is crucial to military operations is not that soldiers are armed, specially trained, and operate in squads, but that their actions are co-ordinated in accordance with the strategy and tactics taken by those in command.2 Second, many of the tasks performed by members of SPG-like squads are indis- tinguishable from those undertaken by ordinary uniformed patrol officers. For example, Jefferson describes an arrest made by a pair of SPG officers at a football match, which could just as readily have been made by any pair of officers. Tuck's observations of policing disorderly young people in Gravesham (Tuck 1989: 33-5) suggest that patrol officers can be just as aggressive with boisterous crowds of youngsters as the officers cited by Jefferson. Surely, anyone who has observed officers on routine patrol can recite such episodes. Indeed, Jefferson admits as much, for not only did he observe the SPG officers being aggressive, but at the same football match also reports seeing 'a divisional officer on traffic patrol manhandle a child and tell him to go' (1990: 57, emphasis added). The use of such force is ubiquitous among the police, whether deployed as members of the SPG-like units or not. What distinguishes SPG-type squads is that they are trained in how to use force, if it becomes necessary. By contrast, as the Policy Studies Institute report on the Metropolitan Police (1983) noted, the ordinary constable has 1 At least Jefferson avoids the error committed elsewhere (Fielding 1990) of equating all PSUs with such squads. For the record, a 'PSU' is a collection of officers, comprising eighteen constables, three sergeants, and an inspector, plus drivers where appropriate. They may be permanently constituted specialist units trained in advanced public order tactics (Level I). They may be a more or less ad hoc collection of individuals who have no permanent unity aside from the period when they are deployed for public order training and duty and who are either (a) equipped with protective clothing and trained in basic shield manoeuvres (Level II) or almost entirely untrained in public order tactics (Level III). However, what unites specialist squads (Level I) with Levels II and III is that they are all officers deployed, not individually, but in squads under superior command. * Of course, this does not extend only to battle. One of the reasons why military forces are deployed for the purposes of disaster relief is that their superior command and control increases their effectiveness. 354 THE CASE AGAINST PARAMILITARY POLICING CONSIDERED little more training in techniques of restraint and arrest than that acquired in school playground brawls. This means not only that the latter are vulnerable to assault, but that they are not able to use a judicious measure of force to overcome resistance. Being trained in how to use force can mean using less with equal effectiveness. Violence and weaponry This brings us to the next connotation of 'paramilitary'—its association with un- restrained violence against an enemy. Put bluntly, if officers are trained to use force, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article/33/3/353/386581 by guest on 27 September 2021 will they use it in preference to other means? Certainly, many paramilitary police forces worldwide have reputations for violence. However, excessive violence is not the preserve of paramilitary forces. Both the Walker report into the violence that accompanied the 1968 Democratic Party Convention in Chicago (Walker 1968) and the Kerner report on the 1967 Detroit riot (Kerner 1967) drew invidious comparisons between the disciplined restraint shown by militarized units compared to the excessive and punitive force used by the civil police. The fear and anxiety generated in ordinary police officers by unruly or disorderly crowds is likely to increase violence and arbitrary arrest. Only to the extent that such officers are kept under close command can restraint be maintained. The lesson to be drawn from Stark's rather partial analysis of 'police riots' (Stark 1972) is that poorly organized police forces, unable to gather sufficient intelligence, overreacted to events. Far from exemplifying 'paramilitarism', the police described by Stark were its very antithesis. The reason why members of the regular army showed more restraint during the Detroit riot than did the police or National Guard was because they were ordered by their commanders to remove live rounds from their rifle magazines (Kerner 1967). They did not do this out of ^//"-discipline and restraint, but because they were told to do so by those in command. When force becomes necessary it is at least arguable that traditional methods of policing are more likely to inflict serious injury on arbitrarily selected members of a disorderly crowd than would paramilitary weapons and tactics. The use of paramilitary-style weapons, such as CS smoke and water cannon, may inflict less serious injury than the traditional method of crowd dispersal used in Britain, the baton or mounted charge (Waddington 1991). When Jefferson complains of police 'clearing the street' he is referring not to some modern, paramilitary innovation, but a method employed since 1830 (Palmer 1988). This is not to commend or even excuse such methods: Jefferson is quite correct in pointing to how supervison and control break down once such a manoeuvre is commenced. Under such conditions, frightened, angry, and possibly vengeful officers are unleashed upon the crowd. Officers no longer do as they are commanded, because there is no opportunity to exert command over dispersed individuals.

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