Kant on the Beautiful Justin P
The University of Maine DigitalCommons@UMaine
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Fogler Library
Spring 5-12-2017 Kant On The Beautiful Justin P. Amoroso University of Maine, [email protected]
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Recommended Citation Amoroso, Justin P., "Kant On The Beautiful" (2017). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2677. http://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd/2677
This Open-Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine. KANT ON THE BEAUTIFUL
By
Justin Amoroso
B.A. University of Maine, 2001
A PROJECT
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
(in Interdisciplinary Studies)
The Graduate School
The University of Maine
May 2017
Advisory Committee:
Michael Howard, Professor of Philosophy, Advisor
Kirsten Jacobson, Associate Professor of Philosophy
Michael Grillo, Associate Professor of History of Art KANT ON THE BEAUTIFUL
By Justin Amoroso
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Michael Howard
An Abstract of the Project Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts (in Interdisciplinary Studies) May 2017
This thesis looks at Kant’s question about the antagonism between free- dom and determinism and how he tried to reconcile them through aesthetics. I begin the thesis by sketching the influences on Kant’s aesthetics, by looking at the problem that arose after he completed his first two critiques, and by defining his three faculties. From there I examine his four moments of beauty. Next, I ask how beauty symbolizes morality. In the conclusion I submit a possible answer how beauty can resolve the antagonism between freedom and determinism. The tentative answer is as follows.
According to Kant, beauty doesn’t require us to look at a thing through de- terminate concepts. In those moments we see a thing as an appearance and other than its appearance (as free). We then come closest to seeing a thing-in- itself because we see the thing as other than its label—we see it as purposive- ness and not as a purpose to be used. When Kant said beauty is a symbol of morality, perhaps he meant absolute freedom can’t have a direct representation outside of an aesthetic experience. If Kant is right that beauty bridges determin- ism and freedom, Kant makes a case for beauty’s importance. ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This thesis couldn’t have been written without my committee, Michael
Howard, Kirsten Jacobson, and Michael Grillo. I am incredibly grateful to them.
I’m infinitely grateful to my advisor, Michael Howard. I would not have been able to complete this project if he hadn’t agreed to help me. He also gave me invaluable comments, criticism, praise, and guidance. His guidance gave me the confidence to pursue these ideas, too. In addition, some of his ideas and the questions he asked me have been influential. I’m very grateful to him.
Kirsten Jacobson gave me valuable guidance in how to get this project go- ing again. I had worked on a related project, but life circumstances arose that prevented me from reaching completion. She helped me get started again, and stayed on. I’m grateful to her for doing so. She also gave me invaluable com- ments.
Michael Grillo helped me develop a prototype of this thesis in an indepen- dent study I did with him. I’m very grateful for the encouragement he gave me.
And like Kirsten, he was on my original committee. I’m very grateful he stayed on. His questions also played an important role in helping me along, too.
Babette Babich of Fordham University, where I did my undergrad work, was the one who introduced Kant’s Critique of Judgment to me. I’m infinitely grateful to her as well.
Finally, my parents Henry and Marilyn and girlfriend Jen Clark have very been supportive during the writing of this thesis. I’m grateful to each of them. iii
PREFACE
How does Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) resolve the antagonism between freedom and determinism in his aesthetics? “Determinism” refers to the Newton- ian laws of nature. “Freedom” refers to the moral law (or free will) within ethics.
Another way of looking at these two terms is, freedom is the “ought” of ethics and determinism is the “is” of science.
Kant gave a tentative answer to this question in his first two critiques.
Within time, space, and the laws of nature, a thing appears as determined. But space and time prevent us from seeing the thing-in-itself as free. But this an- swers the question in the negative: time and space belies freedom. Kant claims to give a positive answer in his third critique, The Critique of Judgment (1790).
Frustratingly his answer isn’t clear. So, in this thesis I’d like to speculate what his answer may be. Here’s one possibility. And it’s the thesis’s argument.
The beautiful lets us see a thing without determining it with concepts. As a result, we come close to seeing a thing-in-itself (as free). In other words, in mo- ments of beauty, a thing appears within the laws of nature (as phenomenon) yet also as “more than” its appearance (as noumenon). In the beautiful, we experi- ence a thing as both phenomenon and noumenon. This is a paradox, true. But
Kant will define beauty in four paradoxes. Underlying these paradoxes is a guid- ing principle: “purposiveness.” Purposiveness senses a thing as appearance and freedom. Beauty, then, may be a symbol of morality because a truly good (free) will can’t have direct presentation, except indirectly. That’s beauty. iv
In Chapter 1 I’ll sketch the thinking about aesthetics that influenced Kant.
In Chapter 2, I’ll sketch Kant’s driving question in the third critique. In Chapter 3,
I’ll define his three faculties as his aesthetics depend on an understanding of these terms. In Chapter 4, I’ll delve into Kant’s four paradoxical moments of beauty. In Chapter 5, I’ll discuss how “the paradox of beauty” is a symbol of morality. Finally, in Chapter 6 I can develop the possibility that beauty solves the antagonism between determinism and freedom—as an object of beauty is free from concepts yet also appears within the sensible realm of determinable con- cepts.