International Relations: One World, Many Theories Author(S): Stephen M

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International Relations: One World, Many Theories Author(s): Stephen M. Walt Reviewed work(s): Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 29- 32+34-46 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149275 . Accessed: 19/12/2012 09:38

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This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:38:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Relations: One World, Many Theories byStephen M. Walt

Why should policymakersand practitioners care about the scholarlystudy of international affairs?Those who conduct foreign policy often dismiss academictheorists (frequently, one mustadmit, with good reason),but there is an inescapablelink betweenthe abstractworld of theoryand the realworld of policy.We need theoriesto makesense of the blizzardof informationthat bom- bardsus daily.Even policymakerswho are contemptuousof "theory" mustrely on their own (often unstated)ideas about how the world worksin orderto decidewhat to do. It is hardto makegood policy if one'sbasic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hardto construct goodtheories without knowing a lot aboutthe realworld. Everyone uses theories-whetherhe or sheknows it ornot-and disagreementsabout policyusually rest on morefundamental disagreements about the basic forcesthat shape international outcomes. Take,for example, the currentdebate on how to respondto China. Fromone perspective,China's ascent is the latestexample of the ten-

S TE P H EN M. WALT is professor ofpolitical science and master of thesocial science colle- giatedivision at theUniversity ofChicago. He isa memberofFOREIGN POLICY'S editorial board.

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dencyfor risingpowers to alterthe globalbalance of powerin poten- tiallydangerous ways, especially as theirgrowing influence makes them moreambitious. From another perspective, the key to China'sfuture conductis whetherits behaviorwill be modifiedby its integrationinto worldmarkets and by the (inevitable?)spread of democraticprinciples. Fromyet anotherviewpoint, relations between China and the restof the worldwill be shapedby issuesof cultureand identity:Will China see itself(and be seenby others)as a normalmember of the worldcom- munityor a singularsociety that deserves special treatment? In the sameway, the debateover NATO expansionlooks different dependingon whichtheory one employs.From a "realist"perspective, NATO expansionis an effortto extendWestern influence-well beyond the traditionalsphere of U.S. vital interests-duringa periodof Russ- ian weaknessand is likelyto provokea harshresponse from Moscow. From a liberalperspective, however, expansion will reinforcethe nascentdemocracies of CentralEurope and extendNATO'S conflict- managementmechanisms to a potentiallyturbulent region. A third viewmight stress the valueof incorporatingthe CzechRepublic, Hun- gary,and Poland within the Westernsecurity community, whose mem- bersshare a commonidentity that has made war largely unthinkable. No singleapproach can captureall the complexityof contemporary worldpolitics. Therefore, we arebetter off with a diversearray of com- petingideas rather than a singletheoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theorieshelps reveal their strengthsand weaknessesand spurssubsequent refinements, while revealingflaws in conventional wisdom.Although we shouldtake care to emphasizeinventiveness over invective,we shouldwelcome and encouragethe heterogeneity of contemporaryscholarship.

WHERE ARE WE COMING FROM? The studyof internationalaffairs is bestunderstood as a protractedcom- petitionbetween the realist, liberal, and radical traditions. Realism empha- sizes the enduringpropensity for conflict betweenstates; liberalism identifiesseveral ways to mitigatethese conflictive tendencies; and the radicaltradition describes how the entire system of staterelations might be transformed.The boundariesbetween these traditionsare somewhat fuzzy and a numberof importantworks do not fit neatly into any of them, but debateswithin and amongthem have largelydefined the discipline.

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Realism Realismwas the dominanttheoretical tradition throughout the Cold War.It depictsinternational affairs as a strugglefor power among self- interestedstates and is generallypessimistic about the prospectsfor eliminatingconflict and war. Realism dominated in the ColdWar years becauseit providedsimple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism,obstacles to cooperation,and other international phenom- ena, and becauseits emphasison competitionwas consistent with the centralfeatures of the American-Sovietrivalry. Realismis not a singletheory, of course,and realist thought evolved considerablythroughout the ColdWar. "Classical" realists such as Hans Morgenthauand ReinholdNiebuhr believed that states,like human beings,had an innatedesire to dominateothers, which led themto fight wars.Morgenthau also stressedthe virtuesof the classical,multipolar, balance-of-powersystem and saw the bipolarrivalry between the Unit- ed Statesand the SovietUnion as especiallydangerous. By contrast,the "neorealist"theory advanced by KennethWaltz ignoredhuman nature and focusedon the effectsof the international system.For Waltz, the internationalsystem consisted of a numberof greatpowers, each seekingto survive.Because the systemis anarchic (i.e., thereis no centralauthority to protectstates from one another), each statehas to surviveon its own. Waltzargued that this condition wouldlead weakerstates to balanceagainst, rather than bandwagon with, morepowerful rivals. And contraryto Morgenthau,he claimed thatbipolarity was more stable than multipolarity. An importantrefinement to realismwas the additionof offense- defensetheory, as laid out by RobertJervis, George Quester,and StephenVan Evera.These scholarsargued that warwas morelikely whenstates could conquer each othereasily. When defensewas easier thanoffense, however, security was more plentiful, incentives to expand declined,and cooperationcould blossom.And if defensehad the advantage,and states could distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons,then statescould acquirethe meansto defendthemselves withoutthreatening others, thereby dampening the effectsof anarchy. Forthese "defensive" realists, states merely sought to surviveand great powerscould guaranteetheir security by formingbalancing alliances and choosingdefensive military postures (such as retaliatorynuclear forces). Not surprisingly,Waltz and most other neorealistsbelieved that the United States was extremelysecure for most of the Cold War. Their

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principlefear was that it mightsquander its favorable position by adopt- ingan overlyaggressive foreign policy. Thus, by the endof theCold War, realismhad moved away from Morgenthau's dark brooding about human natureand taken on a slightlymore optimistic tone. Liberalism The principalchallenge to realismcame from a broadfamily of liberal theories.One strandof liberalthought argued that economicinter- dependencewould discouragestates from using force againsteach otherbecause warfare would threaten each side'sprosperity. A second strand,often associatedwith PresidentWoodrow Wilson, saw the spreadof democracyas the keyto worldpeace, based on the claimthat democraticstates were inherentlymore peaceful than authoritarian states. A third, more recent theory argued that international institutionssuch as the InternationalEnergy Agency and the Inter- nationalMonetary Fund could help overcomeselfish state behavior, mainlyby encouragingstates to foregoimmediate gains for the greater benefitsof enduringcooperation. Althoughsome liberals flirted with the ideathat new transnational actors, especially the multinationalcorporation, were gradually encroachingon the powerof states,liberalism generally saw states as the centralplayers in internationalaffairs. All liberaltheories implied that cooperationwas more pervasive than even the defensiveversion of real- ismallowed, but each view offered a differentrecipe for promoting it.

RadicalApproaches Until the 1980s,marxism was the mainalternative to the mainstream realistand liberaltraditions. Where realism and liberalismtook the statesystem for granted, marxism offered both a differentexplanation for internationalconflict and a blueprintfor fundamentally transform- ing the existinginternational order. Orthodoxmarxist theory saw capitalism as the centralcause of internationalconflict. Capitalist states battled each other as a consequence of theirincessant struggle for profits and battled socialist states because they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction.Neomarxist "dependency" theory, by contrast, focused on relations between advancedcapitalist powers and less developedstates and arguedthat the former-aided by an unholy alliance with the ruling classes of the developing world-had grown rich by exploiting the latter.The solu-

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tion wasto overthrowthese parasitic elites and installa revolutionary governmentcommitted to autonomousdevelopment. Bothof thesetheories were largely discredited before the ColdWar even ended.The extensivehistory of economicand military cooperation amongthe advancedindustrial powers showed that capitalism did not inevitablylead to conflict.The bitterschisms that dividedthe communistworld showed that socialismdid not alwayspromote har- mony. Dependencytheory suffered similar empirical setbacks as it becameincreasingly clear that, first, active participation in the world economywas a betterroute to prosperitythan autonomoussocialist development;and, second,many developing countries proved them- selvesquite capable of bargainingsuccessfully with multinationalcor- porationsand other capitalist institutions. As marxismsuccumbed to its variousfailings, its mantle was assumedby a groupof theoristswho borrowedheavily from the wave of postmodernwritings in literarycriticism and social theory.This "deconstructionist"approach was openly skepticalof the effort to devise generalor universaltheories such as realismor liberalism. Indeed,its proponentsemphasized the importanceof languageand discoursein shapingsocial outcomes. However, because these scholars focusedinitially on criticizingthe mainstreamparadigms but did not offerpositive alternatives to them, they remaineda self-consciously dissidentminority for most of the 1980s.

DomesticPolitics Not all ColdWar scholarship on internationalaffairs fit neatlyinto the realist,liberal, or marxistparadigms. In particular,a number of important worksfocused on the characteristicsof states,governmental orga- nizations,or individualleaders. The democraticstrand of liberaltheory fits underthis heading,as do the effortsof scholarssuch as Graham Allison andJohn Steinbruner to use organizationtheory and bureau- craticpolitics to explainforeign policy behavior, and those of Jervis, IrvingJanis, and others, which applied social and cognitive psycholo- gy.For the mostpart, these efforts did not seekto providea generalthe- ory of internationalbehavior but to identifyother factors that might lead states to behave contraryto the predictionsof the realistor liberal approaches.Thus, much of this literatureshould be regardedas a complement to the three main paradigmsrather than as a rival approachfor analysisof the internationalsystem as a whole.

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NEW WRINKLES IN OLD PARADIGMS

Scholarshipon internationalaffairs has diversifiedsignificantly since the end of the Cold War.Non-American voices are moreprominent, a wider range of methods and theories are seen as legitimate, and new issuessuch as ethnic conflict, the environment,and the futureof the state have been placed on the agendaof scholarseverywhere. Yetthe senseof dejavu is equallystriking. Instead of resolvingthe struggle betweencompeting theoretical traditions, the end of the Cold Warhas merelylaunched a new seriesof debates.Ironically, even as manysocieties embracesimilar ideals of democracy,free markets,and humanrights, the scholarswho studythese developmentsare more divided than ever.

Realism Redux Although the end of the Cold War led a few writersto declare that realismwas destined for the academicscrapheap, rumors of its demise have been largelyexaggerated. A recent contributionof realisttheory is its attention to the problem of relativeand absolutegains. Responding to the institutionalists'claim that internationalinstitutions would enable states to foregoshort-term advantagesfor the sakeof greaterlong-term gains, realists such as Joseph Grieco and Stephen Krasnerpoint out that anarchyforces states to worryabout both the absolutegains from cooperation and the way that gains are distributedamong participants. The logic is straightforward:If one state reaps largergains than its partners,it will graduallybecome stronger,and its partnerswill eventuallybecome morevulnerable. Realistshave also been quickto explorea varietyof new issues.Barry Posen offers a realist explanation for ethnic conflict, noting that the breakupof multiethnicstates could place rivalethnic groupsin an anarchic setting, therebytriggering intense fearsand temptingeach groupto use force to improve its relative position. This problemwould be par- ticularlysevere when each group'sterritory contained enclaves inhabit- ed by their ethnic rivals-as in the formerYugoslavia-because each side would be tempted to "cleanse"(preemptively) these alien minori- ties and expand to incorporateany others from their ethnic groupthat lay outside their borders.Realists have also cautioned that NATO, absent a clear enemy, would likely face increasingstrains and that expandingits presenceeastward would jeopardize relations with Russia. Finally,scholars such as Michael Mastandunohave arguedthat U.S.

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Waiting for Mr. X The post-ColdWar world still awaitsits "X"article. Although many have tried,no one has managedto pen the sortof compellinganalysis thatGeorge Kennan provided for an earlierera, when he articulatedthe theoryof containment.Instead of a singlenew vision,the mostimpor- tantdevelopment in post-ColdWar writings on worldaffairs is the con- tinuingclash between those who believeworld politics has been (or is being)fundamentally transformed and those who believe that the future will looka lot likethe past. Scholarswho see the endof the ColdWar as a watershedfall into two distinctgroups. Many experts still see the stateas the mainactor butbelieve that the agendaof statesis shiftingfrom military competition to economiccompetitiveness, domestic welfare, and environmental protection.Thus, President Bill Clintonhas embracedthe view that"enlightened self-interest [and] shared values.., willcompel us to cooperatein more constructiveways." Some writersattribute this changeto the spreadof democracy,others to the nuclearstalemate, andstill others to changesin internationalnorms. An even moreradical perspective questions whether the stateis still the mostimportant international actor. Jessica Mathews believes that "theabsolutes of the Westphaliansystem [of] territorially fixed states. . . areall dissolving,"and John Ruggie argues that we do not even have a vocabularythat can adequatelydescribe the new forces that (he believes) are transformingcontemporary world politics. Althoughthere is still no consensuson the causesof this trend,the view that statesare of decreasingrelevance is surprisinglycommon amongacademics, journalists, and policy wonks. Prominentrealists such as Christopher Layne and Kenneth Waltz continueto givethe statepride of placeand predict a returnto familiar patternsof greatpower competition. Similarly, Robert Keohane and otherinstitutionalists also emphasize the centralrole of the stateand arguethat institutionssuch as the EuropeanUnion and NATO are importantprecisely because they provide continuity in the midstof dra- maticpolitical shifts. These authors all regardthe endof the ColdWar as a far-reachingshift in the globalbalance of powerbut do not see it as a qualitativetransformation in the basicnature of worldpolitics. Who is right?Too soon to tell, but the debatebears watching in the yearsto come. -S.W.

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foreignpolicy is generallyconsistent with realist principles, insofar as its actionsare still designed to preserveU.S. predominanceand to shapea postwarorder that advances American interests. The mostinteresting conceptual development within the realistpar- adigmhas been the emergingsplit between the "defensive"and "offensive"strands of thought.Defensive realists such as Waltz,Van Evera, andJack Snyder assumed that states had little intrinsicinterest in mili- taryconquest and arguedthat the costs of expansiongenerally out- weighedthe benefits.Accordingly, they maintainedthat greatpower warsoccurred largely because domestic groups fostered exaggerated per- ceptionsof threatand an excessivefaith in the efficacyof militaryforce. Thisview is nowbeing challenged along several fronts. First, as Ran- dall Schwellernotes, the neorealistassumption that statesmerely seek to survive"stacked the deck"in favorof the statusquo because it pre- cludedthe threatof predatoryrevisionist states-nations such as Adolf Hitler'sGermany or NapoleonBonaparte's France that "valuewhat theycovet far more than what they possess" and are willing to riskanni- hilationto achievetheir aims.Second, Peter Liberman, in his book DoesConquest Pay?, uses a numberof historicalcases-such as the Nazi occupationof WesternEurope and Soviet hegemonyover Eastern Europe-to showthat the benefitsof conquestoften exceed the costs, therebycasting doubt on the claimthat military expansion is no longer cost-effective.Third, offensive realists such as Eric Labs, John Mearsheimer,and FareedZakaria argue that anarchyencourages all statesto tryto maximizetheir relative strength simply because no state can everbe surewhen a trulyrevisionist power might emerge. Thesedifferences help explainwhy realists disagree over issues such as the futureof Europe.For defensive realists such as VanEvera, war is rarelyprofitable and usuallyresults from militarism, hypemrnationalism, or someother distorting domestic factor. Because Van Everabelieves suchforces are largely absent in post-ColdWar Europe, he concludes that the regionis "primedfor peace."By contrast,Mearsheimer and otheroffensive realists believe that anarchy forces great powers to com- pete irrespectiveof theirinternal characteristics and that security com- petitionwill returnto Europeas soonas the U.S. pacifieris withdrawn.

New Life for Liberalism The defeat of communismsparked a roundof self-congratulationin the West, best exemplified by Francis Fukuyama'sinfamous claim that

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COMPETING PARADIGMS REALISM LIBERALISMCONSTRUCTIVISMI

MainTheoretical Self-interestedstates Concernforpower Statebehavior shaped Proposition competeconstantly for overriddenbyeconomic/ byl61ite beliefs, powerorsecurity politicalconsiderations collectivenorms, (desirefor prosperity, andsocial identities commitmentto liberalvalues) MainUnits of Analysis States States Individuals (especiallyl61ites) MainInstruments Economicand Varies(international Ideasand especiallymilitary institutions,economic discourse power exchange,promotion ofdemocracy) ModernTheorists HansMorgenthau, MichaelDoyle, AlexanderWendt, KennethWaltz RobertKeohane JohnRuggie Representative Waltz,Theory of Keohane, Wendt,"Anarchy Is ModernWorks InternationalPolitics AfterHegemony WhatStates Make ofIt" Mearsheimer,"Backto Fukuyama,"TheEnd of (International theFuture: Instability History?"(National Organization,1992); inEurope after Interest,1989) Koslowski& theCold War" Kratochwil,"Under- (InternationalSecurity, standingChanges in 1990) InternationalPolitics" (International Organization,1994) Post-ColdWar Resurgenceof Increasedcooperation Agnosticbecause it Prediction overtgreat power asliberal values, free cannotpredict the competition markets,andinterna- contentofideas tionalinstitutions spreac MainLimitation Doesnot account for Tendstoignore the Betteratdescribing the internationalchange roleof power pastthan anticipating thefuture

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humankindhad now reachedthe "endof history."History has paid little attentionto this boast,but the triumphof the West did give a notableboost to all threestrands of liberalthought. Byfar the mostinteresting and important development has been the lively debateon the "democraticpeace." Although the most recent phaseof thisdebate had begun even before the SovietUnion collapsed, it becamemore influentialas the numberof democraciesbegan to increaseand as evidenceof thisrelationship began to accumulate. Democraticpeace theoryis a refinementof the earlierclaim that democracieswere inherently more peaceful than autocratic states. It rests on the beliefthat althoughdemocracies seem to fightwars as oftenas other states,they rarely,if ever,fight one another.Scholars such as MichaelDoyle, James Lee Ray, and Bruce Russett have offered a number of explanationsfor this tendency, the mostpopular being that democracies embracenorms of compromisethat bar the use of forceagainst groupsespousing similar principles. It is hardto thinkof a moreinfluen- tial,recent academic debate, insofar as the belief that "democracies don't fight each other"has been an importantjustification for the Clinton administration'sefforts to enlargethe sphereof democraticrule. It is thereforeironic that faith in the "democraticpeace" became the basisfor U.S. policyjust as additionalresearch was beginning to identify severalqualifiers to this theory.First, Snyder and EdwardMansfield pointedout thatstates may be moreprone to warwhen they are in the midstof a democratictransition, which impliesthat effortsto export democracymight actually make things worse. Second, critics such as JoanneGowa and David Spiro have argued that the apparentabsence of warbetween democracies is due to the way that democracyhas been definedand to the relativedearth of democraticstates (especially before 1945). In addition,Christopher Layne has pointed out that when democracieshave come close to warin the pasttheir decision to remain at peaceultimately had little do withtheir shared democratic character. Third,clearcut evidence that democracies do not fighteach other is confinedto the post-1945era, and, as Gowa has emphasized, the absenceof conflictin thisperiod may be duemore to theircommon interest in con- tainingthe SovietUnion than to shareddemocratic principles. Liberalinstitutionalists likewise have continued to adapt their own theories.On the one hand, the core claimsof institutionalisttheory have become more modest over time. Institutionsare now said to facilitate cooperationwhen it is in each state'sinterest to do so, but it is widely

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agreedthat they cannot force states to behavein waysthat are contrary to the states'own selfishinterests. [For further discussion, please see RobertKeohane's article.] On the otherhand, institutionalists such as JohnDuffield and Robert McCalla have extendedthe theoryinto new substantiveareas, most notably the studyof NATO.For these scholars, NATO'Shighly institutionalized character helps explain why it has been ableto surviveand adapt, despite the disappearanceof its main adversary. The economicstrand of liberaltheory is stillinfluential as well. In particular,a numberof scholarshave recently suggested that the "globalization" of world markets,the rise of transnationalnetworks and nongovernmentalorganizations, and the rapidspread of globalcommu- nicationstechnology are undermining the powerof statesand shifting attentionaway from military security toward economics and social welfare.The detailsare novel but the basiclogic is familiar:As societies aroundthe globebecome enmeshed in a web of economicand social connections,the costsof disruptingthese ties will effectivelypreclude unilateralstate actions, especially the useof force. This perspectiveimplies that warwill remaina remotepossibility amongthe advancedindustrial democracies. It alsosuggests that bring- ing Chinaand Russia into the relentlessembrace of worldcapitalism is the bestway to promoteboth prosperityand peace, particularly if this processcreates a strongmiddle class in thesestates and reinforces pres- suresto democratize.Get thesesocieties hooked on prosperityand com- petitionwill be confinedto the economicrealm. This viewhas beenchallenged by scholarswho arguethat the actu- al scopeof "globalization"is modest and that these various transactions stilltake place in environmentsthat are shaped and regulated by states. Nonetheless,the beliefthat economic forces are superseding tradition- al greatpower politics enjoys widespread acceptance among scholars, pundits,and policymakers,and the role of the state is likelyto be an importanttopic for future academic inquiry. ConstructivistTheories Whereasrealism and liberalism tend to focuson materialfactors such as poweror trade,constructivist approaches emphasize the impactof ideas. Insteadof takingthe state for grantedand assumingthat it simplyseeks to survive,constructivists regard the interestsand identitiesof states as a highly malleable product of specific historical processes.They pay close attention to the prevailing discourse(s) in society because dis-

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coursereflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted normsof behavior.Consequently, constructivism is especially attentive to the sourcesof change,and this approachhas largelyreplaced marx- ismas the preeminentradical perspective on internationalaffairs. The end of the Cold Warplayed an importantrole in legitimating constructivisttheories because realism and liberalismboth failedto anticipatethis event and had some troubleexplaining it. Construc- tivists had an explanation:Specifically, former president Mikhail Gorbachevrevolutionized Soviet foreign policy because he embraced new ideassuch as "commonsecurity." Moreover,given that we live in an erawhere old normsare being challenged,once clearboundaries are dissolving, and issuesof identity arebecoming more salient, it is hardlysurprising that scholars have been drawnto approachesthat place these issuesfront and center. Froma constructivistperspective, in fact, the centralissue in the post-ColdWar world is how differentgroups conceive their identities and interests.Although power is not irrelevant,constructivism emphasizeshow ideasand identities are created, how theyevolve, and how they shapethe waystates understand and respond to theirsitua- tion. Therefore,it matterswhether Europeans define themselves pri- marilyin nationalor continentalterms; whether Germany and Japan redefinetheir pasts in waysthat encourage their adopting more active internationalroles; and whether the UnitedStates embraces or rejects its identityas "globalpoliceman." Constructivisttheories are quite diverse and do not offera unified set of predictionson anyof these issues.At a purelyconceptual level, AlexanderWendt has arguedthat the realistconception of anarchy does not adequatelyexplain why conflictoccurs between states. The realissue is how anarchyis understood-inWendt's words, "Anarchy is whatstates make of it."Another strand of constructivisttheory has focusedon the futureof the territorialstate, suggesting that transna- tionalcommunication and shared civic valuesare undermining tradi- tionalnational loyalties and creatingradically new formsof political association.Other constructivists focus on the role of norms,arguing thatinternational law and other normative principles have eroded ear- lier notions of sovereignty and altered the legitimate purposesfor which state power may be employed.The common theme in each of these strandsis the capacityof discourseto shape how political actors define themselves and their interests,and thus modify their behavior.

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DomesticPolitics Reconsidered As in the ColdWar, scholars continue to explorethe impactof domestic politicson the behaviorof states.Domestic politics are obviously centralto the debateon the democraticpeace, and scholarssuch as Snyder,Jeffrey Frieden, and Helen Milner have examined how domestic interestgroups can distort the formationof statepreferences and lead to suboptimalinternational behavior. George Downs, David Rocke, andothers have also explored how domestic institutions can help states dealwith the perennialproblem of uncertainty,while students of psy- chologyhave appliedprospect theory and othernew tools to explain why decisionmakers fail to act in a rationalfashion. [For further dis- cussionabout foreign policy decision making, please see the articleby MargaretHermann and Joe Hagan.] The pastdecade has also witnessedan explosionof interestin the conceptof culture,a developmentthat overlaps with the constructivist emphasison the importanceof ideasand norms. Thus, Thomas Berger andPeter Katzenstein have used cultural variables to explainwhy Ger- manyand Japan have thusfar eschewed more self-reliant military policies;Elizabeth Kier has offereda culturalinterpretation of Britishand Frenchmilitary doctrines in the interwarperiod; and lain Johnston has tracedcontinuities in Chineseforeign policy to a deeplyrooted form of "culturalrealism." Samuel Huntington's dire warnings about an immi- nent "clashof civilizations"are symptomatic of thistrend as well,inso- faras his argumentrests on the claimthat broadcultural affinities are now supplantingnational loyalties. Though these and other works defineculture in widelyvarying ways and have yet to providea full explanationof how it worksor how enduringits effectsmight be, cul- turalperspectives have been verymuch in vogueduring the pastfive years.This trend is partlya reflectionof the broaderinterest in cultural issuesin the academicworld (and within the publicdebate as well)and partlya responseto the upsurgein ethnic,nationalist, and cultural con- flictssince the demiseof the SovietUnion.

TOMORROW'S CONCEPTUAL TOOLBOX

While these debatesreflect the diversityof contemporaryscholarship on internationalaffairs, there are also obvious signs of convergence.Most realists that and recognize nationalism,militarism, ethnicity, other domestic factorsare important;liberals acknowledge that poweris centralto inter-

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nationalbehavior; and someconstructivists admit that ideaswill have greaterimpact when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring materialforces. The boundariesof eachparadigm are somewhat perme- able,and there is ampleopportunity for intellectual arbitrage. Whichof thesebroad perspectives sheds the mostlight on contem- poraryinternational affairs, and which should policymakers keep most firmlyin mind when chartingour course into the next century? Althoughmany academics (and morethan a few policymakers)are loatheto admitit, realismremains the mostcompelling general frame- workfor understanding international relations. States continue to pay close attentionto the balanceof powerand to worryabout the possi- bilityof majorconflict. Among other things, this enduringpreoccupa- tion withpower and security explains why many Asians and Europeans are now eagerto preserve-andpossibly expand-the U.S. military presencein their regions.As Czech presidentVaiclav Havel has warned,if NATOfails to expand,"we might be headingfor a new glob- al catastrophe... [which]could cost us all muchmore than the two worldwars." These are not the wordsof a manwho believesthat great powerrivalry has beenbanished forever. As forthe United States, the past decade has shown how much it likes being"number one" and how determined it is to remainin a predominant position.The UnitedStates has taken advantage of itscurrent superiori- ty to imposeits preferenceswherever possible, even at the riskof irritat- ingmany of itslong-standing allies. It has forced a seriesof one-sidedarms controlagreements on Russia,dominated the problematicpeace effort in Bosnia,taken steps to expandNATO into Russia's backyard, and become increasinglyconcerned about the risingpower of China.It has called repeatedlyfor greaterreliance on multilateralismand a largerrole for internationalinstitutions, but has treatedagencies such as the United Nationsand the WorldTrade Organization with disdain whenever their actionsdid not conformto U.S. interests.It refusedto jointhe restof the worldin outlawingthe productionof landminesand was politely unco- operativeat theKyoto environmental summit. Although U.S. leadersare adeptat cloakingtheir actions in thelofty rhetoric of "worldorder," naked self-interestlies behind most of them.Thus, the endof the ColdWar did not bringthe end of powerpolitics, and realismis likelyto remainthe sin- gle most usefulinstrument in our intellectualtoolbox. Yet realism does not explain everything, and a wise leader would also keep insights from the rival paradigmsin mind. Liberaltheories

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identify the instrumentsthat states can use to achieve shared interests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and societies must now contend, and help us understandwhy states may differ in their basic preferences.Paradoxically, because U.S. protection reduces the dangerof regional rivalriesand reinforcesthe "liberal peace"that emergedafter 1945, these factorsmay become relatively more important, as long as the United States continues to provide securityand stability in many partsof the world. Meanwhile, constructivisttheories are best suited to the analysisof how identities and interestscan change over time, therebyproducing subtle shifts in the behavior of states and occasionally triggeringfar- reaching but unexpected shifts in international affairs.It matters if political identity in Europecontinues to shift from the nation-state to more local regionsor to a broadersense of Europeanidentity, just as it matters if nationalism is graduallysupplanted by the sort of "civiliza- tional" affinities emphasizedby Huntington. Realism has little to say about these prospects, and policymakers could be blind-sided by change if they ignore these possibilitiesentirely. In short, each of these competing perspectivescaptures important aspects of world politics. Our understandingwould be impoverished were our thinking confined to only one of them. The "compleatdiplo- mat"of the futureshould remain cognizant of realism'semphasis on the inescapablerole of power,keep liberalism'sawareness of domesticforces in mind, and occasionallyreflect on constructivism'svision of change.

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For a fair-mindedsurvey of the realist, liberal, and marxistparadigms, see Michael Doyle'sWays of War and Peace (New York,NY: Norton, 1997). A guide to some recent developmentsin internationalpolitical thought is Doyle & G. John Ikenberry,eds., New Thinking in Inter- national Relations Theory (Boulder,CO: Westview,1997). Those interestedin realismshould examine The Perils of Anarchy: ContemporaryRealism and InternationalSecurity (Cambridge,MA: MITPress, 1995) by Michael Brown,Sean Lynn-Jones,& Steven Miller, eds.; "Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their War Aims" (SecurityStudies, Summer 1997) by EricLabs; and "Dueling Realisms" (InternationalOrganization, Summer 1997) by Stephen Brooks.For alter-

44 FOREIGN POLICY

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native realistassessments of contemporaryworld politics, see John Mearsheimer's"Back to the Future:Instability in Europeafter the Cold War"(International Security, Summer 1990) and RobertJervis' "TheFuture of WorldPolitics: Will It Resemblethe Past?"(Interna- tionalSecurity, Winter 1991-92). A realistexplanation of ethnic conflict is BarryPosen's "The SecurityDilemma and Ethnic Conflict" (Survival,Spring 1993); an up-to-datesurvey of offense-defensetheory can be foundin "The SecurityDilemma Revisited" by CharlesGlaser (WorldPolitics, October 1997); and recent U.S. foreignpolicy is explained in Michael Mastanduno's"Preserving the Unipolar Moment:Realist Theories and U.S. GrandStrategy after the Cold War"(International Security, Spring 1997). The liberal approachto internationalaffairs is summarizedin AndrewMoravcsik's "Taking Preferences Seriously: A LiberalTheo- ry of InternationalPolitics" (InternationalOrganization, Autumn 1997).Many of the leadingcontributors to the debateon the democratic peace can be foundin Brown& Lynn-Jones,eds., Debatingthe DemocraticPeace (Cambridge,MA: MITPress, 1996) and Miriam Elman,ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracythe Answer?(Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 1997). The contributionsof institutionalisttheory and the debateon relativegains are summarized in DavidBaldwin, ed., Neo- realismand Neoliberalism:The ContemporaryDebate (New York, NY:Columbia University Press, 1993). An importantcritique of the institutionalistliterature is Mearsheimer's"The False Promise of Inter- nationalInstitutions" (Intemrnational Security, Winter 1994-95), but one shouldalso examine the responsesin the Summer1995 issue. For appli- cationsof institutionalisttheory to NATO,see JohnDuffield's "NATO's Functionsafter the Cold War" (PoliticalScience Quarterly, Winter 1994-95) and RobertMcCalla's "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"(International Organization, Summer 1996). Authorsquestioning the role of the stateinclude Susan Strange in The Retreatof the State:The Diffusionof Powerin the WorldEcon- omy(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Jessica Math- ews in "PowerShift" (ForeignAffairs, January/February 1997). The emergenceof the stateis analyzedby HendrikSpruyt in The Sovereign Stateand Its Competitors(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), and its continued importanceis defended in Globalizationin Question: The InternationalEconomy and the Possibilities of Gover- nance (Cambridge:Polity, 1996) by Paul Hirst and GrahameThomp-

SPRING 1998 45

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son, andGoverning the GlobalEconomy: International Finance and the State (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1994) by Ethan Kapstein.Another defense (from a somewhatunlikely source) is "The WorldEconomy: The Futureof the State"(The Economist, Septem- ber 20, 1997),and a moreacademic discussion of these issuesis Peter Evans'"The Eclipse of the State?Reflections on Statenessin an Era of Globalization"(World Politics, October 1997). Readersinterested in constructivistapproaches should begin with AlexanderWendt's "Anarchy Is WhatStates Make of It: The Social Constructionof Power Politics"(International Organization, Spring 1992), while awaitinghis Social Theory of InternationalPolitics (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). A diverse arrayof culturaland constructivistapproaches may also be foundin PeterKatzenstein, ed., The Cultureof NationalSecurity (New York, NY: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1996) and YosefLapid & Friedrich Kratochwil,eds., The Returnof Cultureand Identityin IR Theory (Boulder:CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996). Forlinks to relevantWeb sites, as well as a comprehensiveindex of relatedarticles, access www.foreignpolicy.com.

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