Strategy and Two-Level Games U.S. Domestic Politics and the Road to a Separate Peace, 1977–1978
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Strategy and Two-Level Games U.S. Domestic Politics and the Road to a Separate Peace, 1977–1978 ✣ Galen E. Jackson How and to what extent do domestic political factors influence U.S. foreign policy? Are U.S. decision-makers more or less free to operate as they please, or does the political context at home impose real constraints on their freedom of action? How limiting is public opinion as a check on presidential authority in the realm of international affairs? How important are the views of other domestic political elites, such as influential members of Congress, the media, issue-specific experts, and special interest groups? What role do these various influences play in shaping the manner in which the White House approaches policy choices in the particular case of the Arab-Israeli conflict? According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, the answer is straight- forward. In their view, the existence of a powerful pro-Israel lobby in the United States, which they define as “a loose coalition of individuals and or- ganizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel di- rection,” is what explains U.S. policy toward the Middle East dispute. “Were it not for the lobby’s efforts,” they write, “the strategic and moral arguments that are commonly invoked to justify unconditional American support [for Israel] would be called into question more frequently and U.S. policy in the Middle East would be significantly different than it is today.” Mearsheimer and Walt insist that, in the absence of the lobby, the United States would be much more willing to exert pressure on Israel to reach a peace settlement with its Arab neighbors. “But,” they conclude, “this will not happen as long as the lobby makes it impossible for U.S. leaders to use the leverage at their disposal to pressure Israel into ending the occupation and creating a viable Palestinian state.”1 1. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2007), pp. 5, 112, 346. For the authors’ original publication on the topic, Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 19, No. 3, Summer 2017, pp. 160–195, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00757 © 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 160 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00757 by guest on 29 September 2021 Strategy and Two-Level Games Unsurprisingly, these claims sparked a major debate. “Although neither John Mearsheimer nor Stephen Walt speaks much Gaelic,” Douglas Little wrote in a review of their book, “they touched off the academic equivalent of an Irish bar brawl.”2 “Seldom,” L. Carl Brown similarly observed, “have just over40pagesoftext...kickedupsuchastorm.”3 The two scholars’ work, Gideon Rose commented, “produced the foreign-policy equivalent of a cable TV shout fest.”4 The controversy over this issue carries with it implications that are of fundamental importance for debates among scholars of international relations theory and U.S. foreign policy. The extent to which domestic political con- straints influence strategic decision-making bears directly on the question of whether international politics is to be understood mainly in structural realist terms. Structural realism’s most basic assumption is that the anarchic struc- ture of the international system generates strong pressures on leaders to make choices based on power politics. Politics at home, in this perspective, is usually of minimal importance.5 Of perhaps even greater importance, the Israel lobby debate profoundly affects arguments over how domestic political factors shape U.S. foreign pol- icy. If correct, the idea that the actions of small, well-organized groups—rather than the contours of mass public opinion—determine outcomes suggests con- sequences of a far-reaching nature both for democratic theory and for the way in which the United States conducts its foreign relations.6 More broadly, such see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby,” The London Review of Books,23 March 2006, pp. 3–12. 2. Douglas Little, “David or Goliath? The Israel Lobby and Its Critics,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 123, No. 1 (Spring 2008), p. 151. 3. L. Carl Brown, Review of “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, September/ October 2006, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2006-09-01/israel-lobby-and -us-foreign-policy. 4. Deborah Amos, “Paper on Israel Lobby Sparks Heated Debate,” Morning Edition (National Pub- lic Radio), 21 April 2006, available online at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId =5353855. 5. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For this reason, the argument by Mearsheimer and Walt about the Israel lobby is somewhat surprising. Both scholars are prominent proponents of structural realist theory. See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001); and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 6. For the Mearsheimer-Walt discussion of this point, see Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 111, 140; and “Conversations with History: John Mearsheimer and Steve Walt,” YouTube video, 1:01:02, posted by “UC Berkeley Events,” 21 September 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FSXZNm2jGVE, at 6:16–10:03. Mearsheimer and Walt derive this conclusion from the literature on collective action, particularly Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collec- tive Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). 161 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00757 by guest on 29 September 2021 Jackson a finding would imply that domestic political structure affects, to an almost deterministic degree, the way democracies behave in international politics.7 This issue, however, has not been adequately addressed in the political science literature. On the one hand, prominent American politics scholars like John Zaller assert that one cannot study this question effectively using case studies. There is little to be gleaned, he claims, from testimonial evidence because leaders are unlikely to admit that their foreign policy decisions are “politically motivated.” If politicians do talk about such factors, they will be sure to limit the discussion to their “closest aides, who would then remain loyally silent.” Social scientists are, he thus concludes, “properly skeptical” of studies that attempt to infer, via process tracing, that domestic political considerations affect statecraft, for they “rely on unsystematic data. It is too easy for someone with an active imagination and any talent for writing to spin out alluring stories.”8 Because it is so difficult to operationalize the “policy impact” of special interest group influence, Robert Trice similarly argues, any attempt to study this question “is likely to be a difficult if not impossible task given current social science methods.” The degree to which such organizations affect decision-making, he claims, “is very often impossible to measure.”9 At the same time, Zaller has significantly qualified his initial beliefs about the viability of large-N observational approaches to the study of this issue. Scholars of public opinion, he points out, must pay more attention to the 7. On the interaction between domestic political structure and international bargaining outcomes, see Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427–460. The issue also has important implications for debates pertaining to the literatures on audience costs and regime type. On this point, see Elizabeth N. Saunders, “War and the Inner Circle: Democratic Elites and the Politics of Using Force,” Security Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July/September 2015), pp. 469–473, 497–500. On audience costs, see James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577–592; and Marc Trachtenberg, “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis,” Security Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January/March 2012), pp. 3–42. 8. John Zaller, “Strategic Politicians, Public Opinion, and the Gulf Crisis,” in Lance Bennett and David Paletz, eds., Taken by Storm: The News Media, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 254, 270. See also John Zaller, “Coming to Grips with V. O. Key’s Concept of Latent Opinion,” in Michael B. MacKuen and George Rabinowtiz, eds., Electoral Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), p. 320. 9. Robert H. Trice, Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: U.S. Policy in the Middle East (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976), pp. 51, 72. Note also James Lindsay’s pessimism regarding the ability of researchers to investigate how presidents’ consideration of the “anticipated reaction” from Congress to their for- eign policy proposals influences U.S. diplomacy. James Lindsay, “Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 4 (Winter 1992–1993), p. 615. On “antic- ipated reaction” and U.S. policy toward the Middle East, see William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 20; and Dan Fleshler, Transforming America’s Israel Lobby: The Limits