Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC International Relations: One World, Many Theories Author(s): Stephen M. Walt Reviewed work(s): Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 29- 32+34-46 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149275 . Accessed: 19/12/2012 09:38 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign Policy. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:38:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Relations: One World, Many Theories byStephen M. Walt Why should policymakersand practitioners care about the scholarlystudy of interna- tional affairs?Those who conduct foreign policy often dismiss academictheorists (frequently, one mustadmit, with good reason),but there is an inescapablelink betweenthe abstractworld of theoryand the realworld of policy.We need theoriesto makesense of the blizzardof informationthat bom- bardsus daily.Even policymakerswho are contemptuousof "theory" mustrely on their own (often unstated)ideas about how the world worksin orderto decidewhat to do. It is hardto makegood policy if one'sbasic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hardto construct goodtheories without knowing a lot aboutthe realworld. Everyone uses theories-whetherhe or sheknows it ornot-and disagreementsabout policyusually rest on morefundamental disagreements about the basic forcesthat shape international outcomes. Take,for example, the currentdebate on how to respondto China. Fromone perspective,China's ascent is the latestexample of the ten- S TE P H EN M. WALT is professor ofpolitical science and master of thesocial science colle- giatedivision at theUniversity ofChicago. He isa memberofFOREIGN POLICY'S editorial board. SPRING 1998 29 This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:38:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions InternationalRelations dencyfor risingpowers to alterthe globalbalance of powerin poten- tiallydangerous ways, especially as theirgrowing influence makes them moreambitious. From another perspective, the key to China'sfuture conductis whetherits behaviorwill be modifiedby its integrationinto worldmarkets and by the (inevitable?)spread of democraticprinciples. Fromyet anotherviewpoint, relations between China and the restof the worldwill be shapedby issuesof cultureand identity:Will China see itself(and be seenby others)as a normalmember of the worldcom- munityor a singularsociety that deserves special treatment? In the sameway, the debateover NATO expansionlooks different dependingon whichtheory one employs.From a "realist"perspective, NATO expansionis an effortto extendWestern influence-well beyond the traditionalsphere of U.S. vital interests-duringa periodof Russ- ian weaknessand is likelyto provokea harshresponse from Moscow. From a liberalperspective, however, expansion will reinforcethe nascentdemocracies of CentralEurope and extendNATO'S conflict- managementmechanisms to a potentiallyturbulent region. A third viewmight stress the valueof incorporatingthe CzechRepublic, Hun- gary,and Poland within the Westernsecurity community, whose mem- bersshare a commonidentity that has made war largely unthinkable. No singleapproach can captureall the complexityof contemporary worldpolitics. Therefore, we arebetter off with a diversearray of com- petingideas rather than a singletheoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theorieshelps reveal their strengthsand weaknessesand spurssubsequent refinements, while revealingflaws in conventional wisdom.Although we shouldtake care to emphasizeinventiveness over invective,we shouldwelcome and encouragethe heterogeneity of contemporaryscholarship. WHERE ARE WE COMING FROM? The studyof internationalaffairs is bestunderstood as a protractedcom- petitionbetween the realist, liberal, and radical traditions. Realism empha- sizes the enduringpropensity for conflict betweenstates; liberalism identifiesseveral ways to mitigatethese conflictive tendencies; and the radicaltradition describes how the entire system of staterelations might be transformed.The boundariesbetween these traditionsare somewhat fuzzy and a numberof importantworks do not fit neatly into any of them, but debateswithin and amongthem have largelydefined the discipline. 30 FOREIGN POLICY This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:38:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Walt Realism Realismwas the dominanttheoretical tradition throughout the Cold War.It depictsinternational affairs as a strugglefor power among self- interestedstates and is generallypessimistic about the prospectsfor eliminatingconflict and war. Realism dominated in the ColdWar years becauseit providedsimple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism,obstacles to cooperation,and other international phenom- ena, and becauseits emphasison competitionwas consistent with the centralfeatures of the American-Sovietrivalry. Realismis not a singletheory, of course,and realist thought evolved considerablythroughout the ColdWar. "Classical" realists such as Hans Morgenthauand ReinholdNiebuhr believed that states,like human beings,had an innatedesire to dominateothers, which led themto fight wars.Morgenthau also stressedthe virtuesof the classical,multipolar, balance-of-powersystem and saw the bipolarrivalry between the Unit- ed Statesand the SovietUnion as especiallydangerous. By contrast,the "neorealist"theory advanced by KennethWaltz ignoredhuman nature and focusedon the effectsof the international system.For Waltz, the internationalsystem consisted of a numberof greatpowers, each seekingto survive.Because the systemis anarchic (i.e., thereis no centralauthority to protectstates from one another), each statehas to surviveon its own. Waltzargued that this condition wouldlead weakerstates to balanceagainst, rather than bandwagon with, morepowerful rivals. And contraryto Morgenthau,he claimed thatbipolarity was more stable than multipolarity. An importantrefinement to realismwas the additionof offense- defensetheory, as laid out by RobertJervis, George Quester,and StephenVan Evera.These scholarsargued that warwas morelikely whenstates could conquer each othereasily. When defensewas easier thanoffense, however, security was more plentiful, incentives to expand declined,and cooperationcould blossom.And if defensehad the advantage,and states could distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons,then statescould acquirethe meansto defendthemselves withoutthreatening others, thereby dampening the effectsof anarchy. Forthese "defensive" realists, states merely sought to surviveand great powerscould guaranteetheir security by formingbalancing alliances and choosingdefensive military postures (such as retaliatorynuclear forces). Not surprisingly,Waltz and most other neorealistsbelieved that the United States was extremelysecure for most of the Cold War. Their SPRING 1998 31 This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:38:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions InternationalRelations principlefear was that it mightsquander its favorable position by adopt- ingan overlyaggressive foreign policy. Thus, by the endof theCold War, realismhad moved away from Morgenthau's dark brooding about human natureand taken on a slightlymore optimistic tone. Liberalism The principalchallenge to realismcame from a broadfamily of liber- al theories.One strandof liberalthought argued that economicinter- dependencewould discouragestates from using force againsteach otherbecause warfare would threaten each side'sprosperity. A second strand,often associatedwith PresidentWoodrow Wilson, saw the spreadof democracyas the keyto worldpeace, based on the claimthat democraticstates were inherentlymore peaceful than authoritarian states. A third, more recent theory argued that international institutionssuch as the InternationalEnergy Agency and the Inter- nationalMonetary Fund could help overcomeselfish state behavior, mainlyby encouragingstates to foregoimmediate gains for the greater benefitsof enduringcooperation. Althoughsome liberals flirted with the ideathat new transnational actors, especially the multinationalcorporation, were gradually encroachingon the powerof states,liberalism generally saw states as the centralplayers in internationalaffairs. All liberaltheories implied that cooperationwas more pervasive than even the defensiveversion of real- ismallowed, but each view offered a differentrecipe for promoting it. RadicalApproaches Until the 1980s,marxism was the mainalternative to the mainstream realistand liberaltraditions. Where realism and liberalismtook the statesystem for granted, marxism offered both a differentexplanation for internationalconflict and a blueprintfor fundamentally transform- ing the existinginternational order. Orthodoxmarxist theory saw capitalism as the centralcause of inter- nationalconflict. Capitalist states battled each other as a consequence of theirincessant struggle