Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas
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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA An Innovative Approach to Liberum Arbitrium in the Thirteenth Century: Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy By Jamie Anne Spiering Washington, D.C. 2010 Abstract In this dissertation, I contrast the methods of approaching free decision ( liberum arbitrium ) that we see in the writings of Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Lombard with the methods of the thirteenth-century authors Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. My goal is to show that, in the writings of Philip, Albert, and Thomas, we see an innovative way of approaching human free choice. A secondary goal is to offer reasons for these changes in philosophical method. The first four chapters of the dissertation prove that innovations took place in four areas and suggest reasons for these innovations. Anselm and Peter begin their discussions of free decision by asking whether freedom is the power to sin, but the other authors begin the discussion of human freedom from the perspective of a study of human nature. Again, the earlier authors analyze free decision as a given fact, while Philip, Albert, and Thomas show a new interest in accounting for the existence of human freedom. There was also a change in the components required for a complete account of free decision: each of our thirteenth-century authors insists on free decision’s character as a power of the soul and specifies its relation to reason and will. Lastly, Philip, Albert, and Thomas made use of new characteristics of reason and will in the discussion of free decision. The fifth chapter of the dissertation discusses ideological continuity in these writings and its impact on philosophical method. The five authors share the insight that freedom involves a relation to God; they were also convinced that free decision was not the ability to do evil and could not be lost. These shared ideas provided unity and structure to the debate on liberum arbitrium, and the changes made by the thirteenth-century authors are in many ways motivated by the desire to preserve these insights. This dissertation by Jamie Anne Spiering fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Philosophy, approved by Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D., as Director, and by John Wippel, Ph.D., and Kevin White, Ph.D., as Readers. ______________________________________ Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D., Director _______________________________________ John Wippel, Ph.D., Reader _______________________________________ Kevin White, Ph.D., Reader ii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 1 A. THE PURPOSE OF THE WORK AND THE SELECTION OF AUTHORS .................................................................. 2 B. THE STATE OF THE QUESTION AND THE METHOD USED IN THIS WORK ........................................................ 8 C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................ 10 CHAPTER 1: A NEW POINT OF ENTRY: WHERE DOES THE INVESTIGATION OF LIBERUM ARBITRIUM BEGIN? .............................................................................. 20 PART I: THE CHANGE IN HOW FREE DECISION IS INTRODUCED ....................................................................... 20 A. The introduction of free decision by structure ........................................................................................ 22 B. The introduction of free decision by preliminary argumentation .......................................................... 33 PART II: REASONS FOR THE CHANGE IN INTRODUCTORY CONTEXT ................................................................. 46 A. External reasons for change .................................................................................................................. 46 B. Difficulties in the old context ................................................................................................................. 49 C. Solutions in the new context .................................................................................................................. 53 D. Some points of controversy ................................................................................................................... 55 CHAPTER 2: A NEW GOAL FOR THE INVESTIGATION: WHAT KIND OF ACCOUNT OF LIBERUM ARBITRIUM IS THOUGHT TO BE NECESSARY? ........ 58 PART I: CHANGE IN THE GOAL OF THE LIBERUM ARBITRIUM DISCUSSION ........................................................ 58 A. Anselm and Lombard: definitions based on theological awareness of freedom .................................... 62 B. Philip, Albert, and Thomas: definitions that seek the cause .................................................................. 64 C. Some points of controversy .................................................................................................................... 73 PART II: REASONS FOR THE CHANGED GOAL OF THE LIBERUM ARBITRIUM DISCUSSION .................................. 81 A. The problem of divine freedom .............................................................................................................. 82 B. The problem of freedom in different states of human life on earth ........................................................ 85 CHAPTER 3: A NEW LEXICON: WHAT ARE THE COMPONENTS IN A SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF LIBERUM ARBITRIUM? ............................. 88 PART I: THE CHANGES IN THE COMPONENTS USED TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF LIBERUM ARBITRIUM ................ 90 PART II: REASONS FOR CHANGED COMPONENTS IN THE ACCOUNT OF FREE DECISION ................................... 95 A. Four reasons for the power/habit question............................................................................................ 96 B. The unified account of the soul which the power specification made possible .................................... 105 PART III. SOME POINTS OF CONTROVERSY .................................................................................................... 115 A. Is it a groundless act of reification to define free decision as a “power”? ......................................... 116 B. Does the attempt to find a genus for free decision ignore the real problems of human freedom? ....... 120 CHAPTER 4: A NEW USE FOR THE CHARACTERISTICS OF REASON AND WILL IN ACCOUNTING FOR FREE DECISION ....................................................... 126 SECTION I: NEW CHARACTERISTICS OF REASON USED TO EXPLAIN FREE DECISION ..................................... 128 Part I: Changes in the characteristics of reason used to explain liberum arbitrium ............................... 128 Part II: Reasons for change ...................................................................................................................... 159 SECTION II: NEW CHARACTERISTICS OF WILL USED TO EXPLAIN FREE DECISION ........................................ 164 Part I: Changes in the characteristics of will that were used ................................................................... 165 Part II. Reasons for change ..................................................................................................................... 194 Part III. Some points of controversy ......................................................................................................... 199 iii CHAPTER 5: CONTINUITY IN THE TREATMENT OF HUMAN FREEDOM ..... 208 PART I: THE FACT OF CONTINUITY : FIVE FUNDAMENTAL APPROACHES TO FREE DECISION ......................... 210 A. Freedom without evil ........................................................................................................................... 210 B. Divine free decision is similar to human free decision ......................................................................... 219 C. Free decision is received from God, in whom it exists pre-eminently ................................................. 225 D. Free decision involves an orientation toward God ............................................................................. 231 E. Free decision is not losable ................................................................................................................. 240 PART II. REASONS FOR CONTINUITY .............................................................................................................. 246 A. Exterior causes of continuity ............................................................................................................... 246 B. Reasons for continuity within the debate on free decision .................................................................. 255 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 261 PART I: A FRAMEWORK FOR INNOVATION ...................................................................................................... 261 A. The first two innovations: abandoning the context of temptation and treating free decision through its causes ........................................................................................................................................................ 262 B. The third and fourth innovations: treating free decision as a power and specifying its relation to its