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Thomas C. Schelling Chancellor's Distinguished Fellows Program 2007-2008 Selective Bibliography UC Irvine Libraries Thomas C. Schelling 6 March 2008 Prepared by: Daniel C. Tsang Economics, Political Science, Asian American Studies & Acting Film & Media Studies Bibliographer [email protected] Table of Contents Books by Schelling……………………………….………….. 1 Book Chapters by Schelling ..………...……………………… 2 Rand and Other Reports by Schelling………………………... 5 Journal and Magazine Articles by Schelling……….……….... 5 Newspaper Articles by Schelling….….……………………… 7 Web Articles by Schelling………………….………………... 8 Books and Theses about Schelling….………………………... 8 Articles about Schelling…………………………....……….... 9 Reviews of Schelling’s Books…….….……………………… 11 Web Articles about Schelling……...……….………………... 13 Articles cited may contain hyperlinks to UCI-licensed resources. To connect from off-campus: http://www.lib.uci.edu/services/how/connect.html Pagination may refer only to first page of the cited article. Books by Schelling Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton, 2006. New edition. Langson Library Call Number H61 .S355 2006 1 Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. Langson Library Call Number HB846.8 .S34 2006 The Western Community and the Gorbachev Challenge. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989. Co-edited with Armand Clesse. Langson Library Call Number DK286.5 .W48 1989 Choice and Consequence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. Langson Library Call Number H35 .S335 1984 Incentives for Environmental Protection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983. Editor. Langson Library Call Number HC79.E5 I513 1983 Thinking Through the Energy Problem. New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1979. Langson Library Call Number HD9502.U52 S32 Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton, 1978. Langson Library Call Number H61 .S355 1978 Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966. Langson Library Call Number U104 .S33 Strategy and Arms Control. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. Langson Library Call Number UA11 .S27 The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960. Langson Library Call Number BF637.N4 S3 c. 2 International Economics. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1958. Langson Library Call Number HF1411 .S297 National Income Behavior: An Introduction to Algebraic Analysis. New York: McGraw- Hill, 1951. Based on his Ph.D thesis at Harvard University, 1951. Langson Library Call Number HA40.I5 S35 Book Chapters by Schelling “The Marshall Plan: A Model for What?” In: John Agnew and J. Nicholas Entrikin, eds. The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor. New York: Routledge, 2004. http://www.economicsnetbase.com/books/2732/0714655147ch9.pdf "Commitment: Deliberate vs. Involuntary." In: Randloph M. Nesse, ed. Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001. 2 "Commitment." In: Peter Newman ed. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. Macmillan, 1998. "Comment." In: Climate Change Policy, Economic Growth, and Environmental Quality. Washington DC: American Council for Capital Formation, Center for Policy Research, April 1998. "Social Mechanisms and Social Dynamics." In: Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, eds. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Langson Library Call Number HM24 .S54426 1998 "Why Does Economics Help Only With Easy Problems?" In: Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, et al, eds. Economic Science and Practice: The Roles of Academic Economists and Policy- makers. Lyme, NH: Edward Elgar, 1997, 134-146. Langson Library Call Number HB74.P65 E356 1997 "The Role of Nuclear Weapons." In: L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr, eds. Turning Point: The Gulf War and U. S. Military Strategy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. Langson Library Call Number UA23 .T85 1994 "Greenhouse Effect." In: David R. Henderson, ed. The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics. New York: Warner Books, 1993, 447-452. Langson Library Call Number HB61 .F67 1993 “The Global Dimension." In: Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds. Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order. New York: Norton, 1992, 196-210. Langson Library Call Number UA23 .R458 1992 "Economic Responses to Global Warming: Prospects for Cooperative Approaches." In: Rudiger Dornbush and James M. Poterba, eds. Global Warming: Economic Policy Responses. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. Langson Library Call Number HC79.A4 G56 1991 "Cigarette Smoking: A Study of Change in Behavior." In: Martin Shubik, ed. Risk, Organizations, and Society. Boston: Kluwer, 1991, 129-42. "The Marshall Plan: A Rehearsal for the Atlantic Alliance." In: Armand Clesse and Archie C. Epps, eds. Present at the Creation: The Fortieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan. New York: Harper and Row, 1990, 60-69. Langson Library Call Number HC240 .P68 1990 "Global Environmental Forces." In: John L. Helm, ed. Energy: Production, Consumption, and Consequences. National Academy Press, 1990, 75-84. 3 Science Library Bar Call Number TJ163.15 .E5384 1990 "Life, Liberty or the Pursuit of Happiness." In: Isabel V. Sawhill, ed. Challenge to Leadership: Economic and Social Issues for the Next Decade. Washington DC: The Urban Institute, 1988. Langson Library Call Number HC106.8 .C465 1988 "Value of Life." In: John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. IV. London: Macmillan, 1987, 793-6. Langson Library Reference Call Number HB61 .N49 1987b v.4 "The Role of War Games and Exercises." In: Ashton B. Carter et al., eds. Managing Nuclear Operations. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1986, 426-444. Langson Library Call Number U263 .M324 1987 c.2 "Against Backsliding." In: Alejandro Foxley et al., eds. Development, Democracy and the Art of Trespassing: Essays in Honor of Albert O. Hirschman. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986, 233-238. Langson Library Call Number HD74 .D48 1986 "Whose Business Is Good Behavior?" In: Winthrop Knowlton and Richard Zeckhauser, ed. American Society: Public and Private Responsibilities. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1986, 153-180. Langson Library Call Number HN53 .A64 1986 "Policy Analysis as a Science of Choice." In: R. S. Ganapathy et al., eds. Public Policy and Policy Analysis in India. Sage Publications, 1985, 19-29. "The Mind as a Consuming Organ," In: Jon Elster, ed. The Multiple Self. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Langson Library Call Number BD450 .M78 1986 "Energy Security: International Implications." In: Richard J. Gonzalez, Raymond W. Smilor, and Joel Darmstadter, eds. Improving U.S. Energy Security. Cambridge, MA., Ballinger, 1985. Langson Library Call Number HD9502.U52 I48 1985 "Common Security and the Limitation of War." In: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Policies for Common Security. Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1985, 129-33. Langson Library Call Number JX1952 .P585 1985 "Alternative Sources of Middle East Conflict." In: Nissan Oren, ed. Images and Reality in International Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984, 206-210. Langson Library Call Number JX1391 .I535 1984 4 "Confidence in Crisis." In: Karl Kaiser, ed., Confidence-Building Measures. Forschungsinstitut des Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, December 1983. "Arrangements for Reciprocal Assurance." In: Hilliard Roderick and Ulla Magnusson, eds. Avoiding Inadvertent War: Crisis Management. Austin, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, 1983, 123-30. Langson Library Call Number JX1974.8 .A96 1983 "Climate Change: Implications for Welfare and Policy." In: Changing Climate: Report of the Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee. The National Academy Press, 1983. Science Library Bar Call Number QC981.8.C5 C44 1983 Rand and Other Reports by Schelling Strategy and Self-command . Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1985. Langson Library Call Number BF632 .S33 1985 A Tribute to Bernard Brodie and (Incidentally) to Rand. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1979. Langson Library Call Number: AS36 .R28 no.6355 Models of Segregation. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1969. Science Library Bar Call Number Q180.A1 R36 no. 6014 The Role of Theory in the Study of Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1960. Science Library Bar Call Number Q180.A1 R36 no. 2515 International Cost-sharing Arrangements. Princeton, NJ: International Finance Section, Dept. of Economics and Sociology, Princeton University, 1955. Langson Library Call Number HG136 .P7 no.24 Journal and Magazine Articles by Schelling “Nuclear Deterrence for the Future.”Issues in Science and Technology 23/1 (Fall 2006), 50-52. “What Makes Greenhouse Sense?” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2002). http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020501facomment8138-p0/thomas-c-schelling/what- makes-greenhouse-sense.html "Intergenerational and International Discounting," Risk Analysis 20/6 (2000), 833-838. “Some Economics of Global Warming.” American Economic Review 82/1, 1992, 1. http://sedac.ciesin.org/mva/iamcc.tg/articles/SC1992/SC1992.html 5 "The Legacy of Hiroshima: A Half-Century Without Nuclear War.” Philosophy & Public Policy 20/2-3 (Summer 2000). http://www.puaf.umd.edu/IPPP/Summer00/legacy_of_hiroshima.htm "Remembering Mancur Olson." Southern Economic Journal 66/3 (2000), 793-800. "The Environmental Challenges of Power Generation." The Energy Journal 19/2 (1998), 115-128. "The Cost of Combatting Global Warming," Foreign Affairs 76/6 (November/December1997), 8-14. "The Contradiction
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