The Campaign Against Piedmont-Sardinia, April 1796
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
88 Schneid Chapter 3 The Campaign against Piedmont-Sardinia, April 1796 Frederick C. Schneid The most astounding aspect of Napoleon’s campaign in 1796 was not the speed and decisiveness of his operations, but their scope and depth. To be sure, “scope and depth” refer to the parameters initially placed on the young general and, second, the distances covered in his operations over a course of eight weeks. The orders Lazare Carnot issued to Napoleon in anticipation of the forthcoming campaign were well defined in their short- and long-term objec- tives. They clearly established operational goals within the larger strategic plan: first the defeat of Piedmont-Sardinia and then the advance south of the Po River. In extent and detail, Carnot’s orders to Bonaparte indicate a serious expectation that a decisive campaign could be waged in the Italian theater of war in 1796. The question that arises, however, is why was the Directory so con- fident that the next campaign in Italy would be decisive? France’s military situation in Italy did not engender bravado, and all previ- ous military directives for that theater between 1793 and 1795 had been limited in scope. Forces that had previously served in Spain provided valuable rein- forcements for all French armies, although only a very small percentage went to Italy. Thus, the expectation that a decisive stroke would be delivered in Italy in 1796 derived from the erosion of the First Coalition, the changing diplomatic climate, and the prospect that Piedmont-Sardinia could be forced from the war. This confidence stemmed from the awareness of the severely strained relationship between Turin and Vienna. Carnot therefore designed operations and Napoleon conducted them to achieve victory as quickly as possible. On the same day that the Directory accepted General Schérer’s letter of res- ignation as commander of the Army of Italy, they dispatched instructions to his replacement, General Napoleon Bonaparte.1 These orders reflected the 1 A. Debidour, Recueil des actes du Directoire Exécutif, Procès-verbaux, arrètés, Instruction, Lettres et actes divers, Instructions pour le général en chef de l’Armée d’Italie, 2 vols (Paris, 1911), 1:718– 719. The Instructions pour le général en chef de l’Armée d’Italie appear in edited form in Léonce Krebs and Henri Moris, Les campagnes dans les Alpes pendant la Révolution, vol. 2, 1794, 1795, 1796 (Paris, 1895), the classic comprehensive work on the war in Italy, but are reprinted in full © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004310032_005 The Campaign against Piedmont-Sardinia, April 1796 89 Directory’s clear understanding of the broader context of Piedmontese poli- tics. The French understood that they had forced the war on Piedmont by their 1792 invasion, which in turn prompted the House of Savoy to join a coalition consisting of Austria, Prussia, Britain, Spain, Naples, and the Holy Roman Empire. They also recognized that, despite this wartime necessity, the relation- ship between Piedmont and Austria was strained. This, however, was not a new situation for Piedmont, but an essential part of its historic role as a buffer between Austria and France. Consequently, by 1796, the French government believed that, if Piedmont could be politically and militarily separated from its recent dependency on Austria, King Victor Amadeus III would be willing to withdraw from the Coalition. Carnot provided unambiguous instructions on how to cleave Victor Amadeus from his Habsburg alliance. Piedmont-Sardinia could be compen- sated, he explained, with the Milanese (Austrian Lombardy). Previous French governments before and during the current war made similar proposals.2 Furthermore, the Directory would offer Victor Amadeus an offensive–defen- sive alliance against Austria. Carnot intended for Napoleon to “chase” the Austrians from Italy, which would enable Piedmont to safely annex Lombardy.3 On this final point, Carnot made it clear that the Directory would not accept the simple neutrality of Piedmont, but would demand an active alliance against Austria. In this regard, the Directory had already achieved success when Spain signed the Peace of Basel on 22 July 1795. According to its stipula- tions, Spain not only withdrew from the First Coalition, but entertained negotiations to establish a military alliance with France. The broader context of Directoral foreign policy therefore called not only for the defeat of Coalition powers, but also the turning of their former enemies against the two main powers they understood as existential threats: Britain and Austria. Military planning should reflect the strategic and foreign policy goals of a state, and this was the case in Italy. To achieve their ends, the French deployed two armies: the Army of the Alps and the Army of Italy on the Piedmontese frontier. The latter was subordinate to the former, and was smaller in man- power. The Army of Italy provided a supporting role in the Italian theater from 1793 to 1795. Thereafter, its commanders and their respective orders reflected a in Recueil des actes du Directoire Exécutif. The version in Campagnes dans les Alpes includes only the military operations, not the first part of the Instructions, which provide the diplo- matic and strategic context of the operations. See Appendices I and II to this chapter. 2 The first similar offer was made in the Treaty of 1697 between Louis XIV and Victor Amadeus II. 3 Debidour, Instructions pour le général en chef de l’Armée d’Italie, 1:719..