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MAPPING the EVOLUTION of PEACE and ITS DRIVERS Quantifying Peace and Its Benefits

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MAPPING THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE AND ITS DRIVERS Quantifying Peace and its Benefits The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world’s focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress. IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace. IEP has offices in Sydney, New York, The Hague and Mexico City. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organizations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace. For more information visit www.economicsandpeace.org CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 02 1 RESULTS & FINDINGS 05 2017 Mexico Peace Index Rankings 06 2017 Mexico Peace Index Results 08 Methodology at a Glance 10 Verifying Mexico’s Official Crime Data 12 2 TRENDS 13 Trends in Peacefulness: Changes from 2011 to 2016 14 Risers & Fallers: State-by-state Trends 21 3 POSITIVE PEACE 31 About Positive Peace 32 Positive Peace in Mexico 34 2017 Mexico Positive Peace Index 42 4 CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACEBUILDING IN MEXICO 51 Impunity in Mexico 52 Policing in Mexico 56 Positive Peace Factors for Reducing Homicides 64 What can Local Governments do to Build Peace? 67 5 THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE 71 The Economic Value of Peace in 2016 55 Per Capita Economic Impact of Violence 75 Trend in the Economic Impact of Violence, 2003-2016 76 Methodology at a Glance 79 The Impact of Crime & Violence on Mexican Businesses 81 6 EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS 83 Putting Citizens at the Center of Policy, Luis Avila, General Coordinator, Como Vamos Nuevo León 84 Current Overview of Public Ministeries within the Criminal Justice System, Froylán Rolando Hernández Peña, 86 Judicial Advisor for the Coordination of Special Projects, México Unido Contra la Delincuencia Corruption: The Ally of Violence in Mexico, Dalia Toledo and Jonathan Jiménez, Researchers, Ethos 88 Peace in Culiacán: Perspectives of an Entreprenuer, Ing. Alberto Coppel Luken 90 7 METHODOLOGY 91 2016 Mexico Peace Index Methodology 92 2016 Mexico Positive Peace Index Methodology 96 Methodology for the Economic Impact of Violence 99 APPENDICES 103 Appendix A: Verifying Mexico's Official Crime Data 103 Appendix B: Results Tables 113 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The 2017 Mexico Peace Index (MPI), produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), provides a comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico. The MPI is based on the work of the Global Peace Index, the leading measure of global peacefulness that has been produced by IEP every year since 2007. It is part of a series of national peace indices, which includes the United States Peace Index and the United Kingdom Peace Index. This research, now in its fifth year, aims to identify the key trends, patterns and drivers of peace while highlighting policy opportunities. The MPI report includes an analysis of the economic benefits that will flow from a more peaceful society and provides a backdrop for strategic discussions among policymakers, researchers, business leaders and the general public on building peace in Mexico. Mexico’s peacefulness deteriorated by 4.3 percent in 2016. Last The full analysis of Mexico’s peacefulness shows mixed year marks both the ten-year anniversary of the declaration of results. On the one hand, the nationwide peace score the war on drugs and the first deterioration in peacefulness deteriorated in 2016, mainly because of the increase in since the recovery began in 2012. Mexico’s most violent year was homicides. On the other hand progress has been made in 2011, when domestic military deployments peaked and the structural reform. homicide rate rose to double that of 2006. In 2012, the country Despite the deterioration in the 2016 score, Mexico remained began to recover — an improving trend that was maintained for nearly 14 percent more peaceful in 2016 than in 2011, with the next four years. However, in 2016, the homicide rate rose 18 improvements being recorded in 21 out of 32 states in 2016. percent and the use and availability of firearms increased, The violent crime rate is at a 14-year low and the homicide resulting in a less peaceful overall MPI score. rate is 16 percent lower than in 2011. Organized crime related Yucatán was the most peaceful state in Mexico in 2016, offenses reached a ten year low, having returned to pre-drug followed by Nayarit, Tlaxcala, Hidalgo and Coahuila. Guerrero war levels. The rate of crimes committed with a firearm was was Mexico’s least peaceful state for the fourth year in a row, 10 percent lower than in 2011, although recent trends show an followed by Colima, Sinaloa, Baja California and Baja increase in the purchase of guns. California Sur. Nayarit, Durango, Coahuila, Quintana Roo and Chihuahua Mexico’s northern region, along the border with the United have had the largest improvements in peacefulness over the States, is the least peaceful of the five regions. Violence is also last six years while Colima, Baja California Sur, Zacatecas, escalating in a number of states along the Pacific coast, Oaxaca and Michoacán have shown the largest deteriorations. especially Baja California Sur, Colima and Guerrero. These five states all have rising homicide rates, especially Colima, which had a 2016 homicide rate three times higher The 2016 deterioration in peacefulness led to an estimated than its 2011 levels. additional economic impact of 79 billion pesos, driving the It is too early to determine whether the deterioration recorded yearly total to 3.07 trillion pesos. This is equivalent to 17.6 in 2016 constitutes the start of a new trend. percent of Mexico’s GDP or 25,130 pesos per capita, which is more than one month of income for the average Mexican worker. The 2017 MPI report details four important policy areas In some states, the impact is much higher; in Colima, for instrumental to building high levels of peacefulness: impunity, instance, it is nearly 66,500 pesos. Furthermore, businesses in policing, strategies to reduce homicide rates, and the role of Mexico identified insecurity and crime as their most pressing local governments. Improvements have been recorded in concern, well above other issues such as taxation or corruption. these areas. For example, the percentage of citizens that trust 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY the police rose by 13 percentage points to reach 50 percent, One method of understanding possible future trends in peace while the overall perception of corruption in local police is through tracking progress in Positive Peace — the attitudes, forces fell by six percentage points. Nonetheless, local institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful governments still stand to improve the most: the local forces societies. Positive Peace consists of eight pillars or domains are perceived as the most corrupt and the least trusted. that describe the factors most closely associated with highly peaceful societies. States have been making investments in professionalizing and strengthening their police forces. Coahuila and Chihuahua Positive Peace in Mexico is improving, although progress is have had the largest increases in the size of their forces, at uneven. Solid improvements are evident in the sound 270 and 47 percent, respectively, from 2015 to 2016. However, business environment and high levels of human capital pillars. increases in the numbers of police need to coincide with The indicators that improved the most within these pillars professional development to fully gain the benefits of the were the cost of starting a business, which fell by 14 percent increased capacity. States that pay higher salaries also tend from 2011 to 2016 and high school enrollment, which rose by to spend more on professional training for their officers. Given eight percentage points from 2011 to 2015. There were also the high risks associated with the job and the larger payouts improvements in free-flow of information, equitable often offered by organized crime, salaries need to adequately distribution of resources and acceptance of the rights of compensate officers. others across a variety of indicators. However, violence against journalists remains a risk to free flow of information. Impunity is also a major challenge for Mexico. On average, nine percent of crimes committed are punished. Impunity is a There has been progress in well-functioning government and widespread issue across multiple states and law enforcement low levels of corruption, but the pace of improvement is more and justice agencies, including impunity for violence moderate. An average of 13 percent more citizens reported committed by some state actors. There is also a high level of lower levels of perceived corruption across all law impunity for violence against journalists, with 76 media enforcement and justice entities in 2016 compared to 2011. professionals being murdered in 2016. However, this is coming off a high base and levels of corruption are still too high, well above Mexico’s international Mexico needs to improve the overall capacity of its judicial and peers. Good relations with neighbors has deteriorated, most law enforcement systems. The average rate of justice officials notably for the indicator measuring citizens’ perceptions of is 3.5 per 100,000 people, roughly four times lower than the safety in their neighborhood, which fell from 60 percent in global average. However, recent improvements are substantial, 2011 to 54 percent in 2016. with the expenditure on the justice system increasing by 41 percent from 2011 to 2016, to 213 billion pesos. Taken all together, the 2017 MPI findings highlight the need to maintain the pace of judicial reform and improve There have been improvements in the collection and accuracy accountability.
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