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Technical Report RHUL–ISG–2021–2 10 March 2021

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Technical Report RHUL–ISG–2021–2 10 March 2021 Protecting Personal Investors on UK Investment Platforms from Cyber Threats Gerard Phillips Technical Report RHUL–ISG–2021–2 10 March 2021 Information Security Group Royal Holloway University of London Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX United Kingdom Student Number: 100937313 Gerard Phillips Protecting Personal Investors on UK Investment Platforms from Cyber Threats Supervisor: Geraint Price Submitted as part of the requirements for the award of the MSc in Information Security at Royal Holloway, University of London. I declare that this assignment is all my own work and that I have acknowledged all quotations from published or unpublished work of other people. I also declare that I have read the statements on plagiarism in Section 1 of the Regulations Governing Examination and Assessment Offences, and in accordance with these regulations I submit this project report as my own work. Signature: Date: 23 August 2020 Page 1 of 153 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................... 2 LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................... 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................. 4 GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................................ 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... 8 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 9 1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................ 9 1.2 METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 9 CHAPTER 2: THE UK FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR ........................................................................... 11 2.1 THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR AS PART OF UK CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE ....................... 11 2.2 HOW THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR IS STRUCTURED AND REGULATED ........................................... 11 2.3 INVESTORS MAKE ATTRACTIVE TARGETS ...................................................................................... 12 2.4 INVESTMENT PLATFORMS MAKE ATTRACTIVE TARGETS ................................................................... 13 2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 15 CHAPTER 3: CYBER ATTACKS AND THE MATURING CRIMINAL MARKET ECONOMY ......................... 16 3.1 CYBER ATTACKS ON FINANCIAL SECTOR SERVICES ............................................................................ 16 3.1.1 The Expanding Attack Surface ........................................................................................ 16 3.1.2 Attacks on Financial Services in the UK .......................................................................... 17 3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CRIMINAL ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE ..................................................... 20 3.2.1 The Enabling Criminal Ecosystem ................................................................................... 20 3.2.2 Criminal Groups and their Increasing Capabilities ......................................................... 21 3.2.3 Making Crime Pay: How Criminals Monetise CyBer-crime ............................................. 23 3.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 24 CHAPTER 4: THREAT MODELS ......................................................................................................... 26 4.1 UNDERSTANDING THREAT MODELS .............................................................................................. 26 4.2 REVIEW OF EXISTING THREAT MODELS ........................................................................................ 27 4.2.1 Common Threat Models ................................................................................................. 27 4.2.2 The APEX Program Threat Models ................................................................................. 29 4.3 DEVELOPING THE NEW FSS THREAT MODEL ................................................................................. 33 4.3.1 The New FSS Strategic Threat Model ............................................................................. 34 4.3.2 The New FSS Intermediate Level Threat Model .............................................................. 34 4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 35 CHAPTER 5: CREATING A DATASET TO POPULATE THE NEW THREAT MODEL .................................. 36 5.1 DATA REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................................... 36 5.2 DATA AVAILABILITY ................................................................................................................... 37 5.2.1 Data from Government Sources ..................................................................................... 37 5.2.2 Data from FSS institutions .............................................................................................. 38 Page 2 of 153 5.2.3 Internet Searches ........................................................................................................... 38 5.3 ASSEMBLING A PROXY DATABASE AND POPULATING THE NEW THREAT MODEL ................................... 38 5.3.1 The Original Datasets ..................................................................................................... 39 5.3.2 The Synthesised Attacks Dataset ................................................................................... 40 5.3.3 Populating the new FSS model with data ....................................................................... 41 5.4 DRAWING INFERENCES FROM THE DATA ....................................................................................... 41 5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 42 CHAPTER 6: ANALYSING ATTACKS USING THE NEW THREAT MODEL ............................................... 43 6.1 ANALYSIS OF THREAT LANDSCAPES .............................................................................................. 43 6.1.1 Defining Threat Landscapes ........................................................................................... 43 6.1.2 Evidence from the SAD Dataset ...................................................................................... 44 6.2 ANALYSIS OF THREAT SOURCES DATA ........................................................................................... 45 6.2.1 Investor Landscape ......................................................................................................... 45 6.2.2 FSS Institutions landscapes ............................................................................................ 46 6.2.3 FSS infrastructure landscapes ........................................................................................ 47 6.3 ANALYSIS OF THREAT EVENTS DATA ............................................................................................. 48 6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 49 CHAPTER 7: THREAT SCENARIOS AND PROTECTING INVESTORS ON INVESTMENT PLATFORMS ....... 50 7.1 THREAT SCENARIOS FOR FSS INSTITUTION AND FSS INFRASTRUCTURE LANDSCAPES ............................. 50 7.2 THREAT SCENARIOS FOR INVESTOR THREAT LANDSCAPES ................................................................. 50 7.2.1 Strategic Threat Scenarios ............................................................................................. 51 7.2.2 Case Study: An Intermediate Level Threat Scenario ....................................................... 54 7.3 PROTECTING INVESTORS ON INVESTMENT PLATFORMS .................................................................... 55 7.3.1 Evidence of likelihood of crime ....................................................................................... 56 7.3.2 Investor Survey ............................................................................................................... 56 7.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 58 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................. 60 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................... 63 APPENDIX A PART 1: SYNTHESISED ATTACKS DATABASE ................................................................. 69 APPENDIX A PART 2: SYNTHESISED ATTACKS DATABASE ............................................................... 114 APPENDIX B: HOW CRIMINALS MONETISE CYBER-ATTACKS ......................................................... 141 APPENDIX C: THREAT SCENARIOS FOR FSS INSTITUTION
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