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Crime Severity Levels

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Crime Severity Levels CRIME SEVERITY LEVELS . The Crime severity Level is selected from the table of offenses listed below. If the offense is not listed, the severity level containing the most similar offense is chosen. Unless otherwise specified, if the inmate is serving for an "attempted" offense, the offense will be rated one (1) severity level less than where the actual offense is listed. If the inmate is serving for multiple offenses, the most serious offense will determine the Crime Severity Level. If serving for parole/probation revocation based on the commission of a new offense, the Crime Severity Level will be determined by that offense, unless otherwise specified. LEVEL I 15 TO 26 months LEVEL V 30 to 60 months Aggravated Assault (no injury or weapon) Bad Checks - under $2,000 Arson I Burglary - non-dwelling, less than $300, one count VGCSA - Cocaine or Meth. - 28 to 199 grams* Credit Card Theft Identity Fraud Criminal Interference with Government Property VGCSA - Marijuana - 10 to 1,999 pounds* Escape Custody - no weapon, aiding escape Manufacturing Meth. - 2nd offense or child injured Forgery II - possession, 10 or fewer counts or less than VGCSA - Opiates - 4 to 13 grams* $1,000 VGCSA - sale/distribution/intent to sell Schedule I Habitual Violator or II drugs, third offense Possession/passing forged prescriptions - first offense VGCSA – Mteh. Trafficking – less than 200 grams* Possession of tools to commit a crime Theft - under $1,000 LEVEL VI 36 to 78 months Theft of Vehicle - not to sell; one count, first offense – VGCSA - possession, single offense Burglary unoccupied dwelling VGCSA - Cocaine or Meth. 200 to 399 grams* LEVEL II 18 to 28 months VGCSA - Marijuana - 2000 to 9,999 pounds* VGCSA - Opiates - 14 to 27 grams* Bad Checks - $2,000 or more Burglary - non-dwelling, $300 to $2,000, one count LEVEL VII 40 to 102 months Credit Card Fraud - 10 or fewer counts or less than Attempted Aggravated Child Molestation $1,000 Attempted Armed Robbery Criminal Damage II - $300 to $2,000 Attempted Kidnapping Forgery I - 10 or fewer counts or less than $1,000 Attempted Aggravated Sexual Battery Possession of Illegal Firearm or Explosives Attempted Aggravated Sodomy Possession/Theft - materials to manufacture illegal Pimping or Pandering a child under age 18 drugs, first offense Probation Revocation based on Level VIII offense Reckless Conduct by HIV Infected Persons Probation Revocation based on Serious Violent Felony Theft - $1,000 to $4,999 RICO Act Theft of Vehicle - not for sale, second offense VGCSA - possession, second offense LEVEL VIII 65% to 90% of prison sentence VGCSA - sale/intent to sell/distribution, first offense Aggravated Assault (with injury or weapon) LEVEL III 20 to 32 months Aggravated Assault on a Police Officer Burglary - non-dwelling, 2 to 5 counts, or $2,001 to Aggravated Battery $5,000 Aggravated Battery on Police Officer Credit Card Fraud - more than 10 counts or $1,000 Aggravated Stalking Criminal Damage - life in danger or over $2,000 Attempted Rape Destroying or Injuring Police Dog or Horse Attempted Murder Forgery I - over 10 counts or $1,000 or more Burglary - occupied residence Manufacturing Methamphetamine - first offense Bus Hijacking Obstruction of Officers - Felony Child Molestation Possession/Theft - materials to manufacture illegal Cruelty to Children drugs, second offense Enticing a Child for Indecent Purposes Terroristic Threats Feticide by Vehicle Theft - $5,000 to $10,000 Hijacking Motor Vehicle Theft of Vehicle - for sale or 2 to 3 counts Homicide by Vehicle while DUI or Hab. Violator without intent to sell or third offense Incest VGCSA - sale - second offense or third drug possession Involuntary Manslaughter Robbery LEVEL IV 22 to 38 months Statutory Rape Voluntary Manslaughter Arson II - $2,000 VGCSA - Cocaine or Meth.- 400+ grams * Burglary - non-dwelling, over $5,000 or 6 or more counts VGCSA - Marijuana 10,000+ pounds* Homicide by Vehicle - not DUI/HV VGCSA - Opiates - 28+ grams* Manufacturing Methamphetamine - near a child Serious Injury by Vehicle Not Parole Eligible except on Life Sentence** Theft of Vehicle - 4 or more counts or fourth or greater offense Aggravated Sexual Battery Theft - over $10,000 Aggravated Child Molestation VGCSA - sale/distribution/intent to sell Aggravated Sodomy Schedule I or II drugs, second offense Armed Robbery Kidnapping Rape Murder *Based on the gross weight of any mixture containing a controlled substance ** Eligible for Parole Consideration after 14 years or 30 years if crime Revised – Mar. 2008 commi tted after July 1, 2006 .
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