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1. (FOUO) Personalinformation: JDIMS Referencename: Abdullahmujahid Aliases and Current/ True Name: None Placeofbirth: Gardez, A

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1. (FOUO) Personalinformation: JDIMS Referencename: Abdullahmujahid Aliases and Current/ True Name: None Placeofbirth: Gardez, A SECRET DEPARTMENTOFDEFENSE JOINTTASK FORCEGUANTANAMO GUANTANAMOBAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 JTF GTMO- CG 13 July 2005 MEMORANDUMFORCommander, UnitedStates SouthernCommand, 3511NW Avenue, Miami, FL 33172. SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Transferto the ControlofAnother Countryfor ContinuedDetention(TRCD) for GuantanamoDetainee, US9AF-001100DP(S) JTF GTMODetaineeAssessment 1. (FOUO) Personal Information : JDIMS ReferenceName: AbdullahMujahid Aliases andCurrent/ True Name: None Placeof Birth: Gardez, Afghanistan (AF) Date ofBirth: 01January 1971 Citizenship: Afghanistan Internment Serial Number( ISN) : US9AF-001100DP 2. (FOUO Health: Detainee is in good health and has no known allergies 3. ( SINF) JTF GTMO Assessment: (S ) Recommendation : JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD). a . ( SI /NF) Summary : JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD ( ) on 12 November 2004. Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD). For this update recommendation , detainee is assessed as an Afghani political official with ties to senior Taliban and Al-Qaida personnel. He was involved with Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) CLASSIFIED BY : MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON : E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C ) DECLASSIFY ON: 20300713 SECRET NOFORN 20300713 SECRET 20300713 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Transfer to the Control ofAnother Country for ContinuedDetentionfor GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP ( S ) operations and is alleged to have planned an attack on US forces in Gardez, AF . Detainee also planned a coordinated effort to create civil unrest in the Gardez area in attempts to undermine President Karzai's leadership. He has direct ties to Taliban leaders Jalaluddin Haqqani and Saifullah Rahman Mansour. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk , as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. 4. ( SINF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements. a . (S ) Prior History: Detaineejoined the Harakut- UL-Mujahideen in 1989 to participate inthe Russian Jihad for a span offour years. Subsequently, detainee opened a restaurant in 1993 and joined the Department ofCriminal Division of the Gardez Police force mid 1994 or 1995, serving there until the rise of the Taliban in 1996. The Talibanjailed detainee three times in 1996, subsequently, the detainee served as one of President Rabbani's Battalion Commanders for six months until the Taliban disbanded the unit and detainee fled to Peshawar, Pakistan (PK) for a period 20 days. Detainee returned to Gardez, AF , and worked on his for one and a half years until 1999. Detainee assumed the position ofChief of Police for Gardez after the fall of the Taliban in2001 until his time of capture in2003. b . (S ) Training and Activities: Detainee claims that he fought against the Taliban in the Gardez area. Detainee claimed that it was mostly the Tajik Tribe, the detainee's tribal affiliation, that fought. The Taliban leaders they drove out were Mulavi and Shafik ; the Taliban fled to Miram Shah, PK. Detainee, Zia Auddin, and approximately three hundred soldiers ofAuddin's group, and coalition members, pursued senior Taliban Commander Saifullah Rahman Mansour to Shai Guls, Zormat province, AF . Saifullah likely escaped into Pakistan. After the Taliban fell, the elders appointed a four-person Paktia security committee. Hajji Saifzullah, governor ofthe Wardek Province in Afghanistan was president ofthe committee that appointed the detainee as ChiefofPolice ofGardez, AF . Sultani, detainee's deputy, became Chiefof Security and was later transferred to Kabul, AF . Abdul Rahman, (Analyst Note: This is likely the former Taliban commander and member of the Harakut- e -Mulavi reported as Abdurrahman. Abdurrahman is believed to be a translation variant.) became Chiefofthe Criminal Divisionfor the police force in Gardez, AF. Sharif became director ofthe prison in Gardez, AF. Sulrakahn became an officer inthe 12th division of the Afghan Army. Zia Audin became commander ofthe 12th division of the Afghan Army. ( Capture Information: United States Special Forces (USSF) arrested detainee in Gardez, AF, on 16 August 2003. Detainee was arrested after turning himselfinto USSF when a search ofhis compound was about to occur. Detainee was being investigated due to 2 SECRET 20300713 SECRETI/ // 20300713 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Transferto the Control ofAnother Country for ContinuedDetentionfor GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: -001100DP ( S) reports of him running illegal checkpoints, as well as collateral reporting implicating him in involvement with possible Anti -Coalition Militants (ACM) activities in Gardez region of Afghanistan. There is no record of what documents or weapons detainee had in possession at his time of capture. d . (S ) Transferredto JTF GTMO: 21 November2003 e . (SI/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO : To provide information on the following: To provide information on ACM activities in Gardez and High Value Targets ( ) in the Paktia Province of Afghanistan . 5. (SI DetaineeThreat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. ( SINF) Reasons for Detention: (S ) Detainee was involved inat least one attack against US forces and has ties to Al Qaida . Detainee was responsible for an attack on U.S. forces near Gardez, AF , on 25 June 2003 , which left one American dead and two others injured. The attack was in response to detainee's dismissal as the Commander of the Gardez police force. The source of this information has proved fairly reliable in his reporting. Faizal Mohammed Sultani was detainee's deputy and is affiliated with Al-Qaida and Taliban forces. Faizal may also be responsible for the attack against USSF that occurred inGardez, AF . Oibek Jamaludinovich Jabarov, 000452DP, stated that the detainee and he had a conversation inwhich the detainee had claimed he was a commander that fought against U.S. Forces within the Gardez area and had personal knowledge of a couple of Americans being killed. (Analyst Note: This may be associated to the attack referenced above .) Detainee secretly met with pro - Taliban and Al- Qaida liaisons in Gardez, AF , on 29 June 2003 to establish an agreement to assist Al - Qaida operatives in Shahi Kowt and surrounding area . This group included Zia Auddin , Faizal Sultani, and Hakim Ghulam 3 SECRETI 20300713 SECRET NOFORN 20300713 JTF GTMO- CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: -001100DP (S) Hussein . Additionally, on 25 May 2003, the Gardez, safehouse was rocketed three times by soldiers from detainee's police force in Zormat, AF . ( S //NF) Detaineeis associatedwith and possessesunexploitedknowledgeofkey leadersinthe PaktiaProvince, AF. These leaders include: Merahamed, ZiaAuddin, and AbdulFaizal. Detaineeandthese leaderswere workingwithsenior Talibancommanders andAl- Qaida associatesSaifullahRahmanMansourand JalaluddinHaqqanion operationsagainst U.S.and InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF) . was the commanderoftheNationalDefenseServiceinGardez, AF. Merahamed was also a former Taliban commander of the 1st battalion based in the Konduz province, AF, and then in Charikar Parwan province, AF . Zia Auddin was the commander of the Afghan National Army in Gardez, AF and is detainee's cousin. Additionally , Zia Audin works for and is related to Jalaluddin Haqqani. Zia Uddinand detainee made plans to relocate weapons caches prior to U.S. Special Forces (USSF) entering the Gardez area and also planned to create civil unrest around the Gardez area in attempts to show that President Karzai was unable to control civil unrest in areas outside ofKabul, AF . Reporting indicatedZia Auddin had been recruiting men from his tribe to fight; in the event USSF decided to attack him. Additionally, Zia Auddin is suspected to have been responsiblefor rockets attacks targeting a USSF firebase. Further reportingindicates that shortlyafter U.S. Forcescaptured the detainee, Zia Auddinwas pressuringeldersin Gardezto meet withthe Ministry ofthe Interiorin order to organizethe release ofthe detainee. Analyst Note : The familial connection between detainee and Auddin requires further exploitation . Saifullah Rahman Mansour is a senior Taliban Commander affiliated with Al Qaida and Usama Bin Laden (UBL). Mansour provided detainee with many heavy and light weapons after the fall ofthe Taliban. JalaluddinHaqqaniis a senior Taliban Commanderaffiliatedwith UBL and Al Qaida. ( S) Detainee needs further exploitation on his subordinates inthe Gardez police force that have been involved with ACM efforts. One of detainee's subordinates, - 001165, was in charge of the Pol-E Khost, AF, and supplied likely insurgent fighters to ACM efforts. Former Police officers of the Gardez police force , who may be still loyal to detainee , were possibly attempting to blow up the Khowst Bridge. Zia Audin's sub commander, Bow Auddin , was aiding these officers in this mission . 4 SECRET NOFORN 20300713 SECRET 20300713 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Transferto the ControlofAnother Countryfor ContinuedDetentionfor GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9AF-001100DP( S) Bow Auddin has been selling high explosives to anti -coalition militants
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