The Science of Security A Program of the Breakthrough Institute JANUARY 2012

PLANE S, TRAIN S, AND CAR BOMB S

THE METHOD BEHIND THE MADNESS OF TERRORISM

BY NICK ADAMS, TED NORDHAUS, AND MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER

The Science of Security A Program of the Breakthrough Institute

436 14TH STREET, SUITE 820, OAKLAND, CA 94612,

PHONE: 510-550-8800 WEBSITE: www.thebreakthrough.org TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 4

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 10

II. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS HAVE DONE ...... 15

III. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS ARE TRYING TO DO ...... 20

IV. A SPECTACLE FOR TWO AUDIENCES (PLUS A THIRD) ...... 26

V. THE METHODICAL MADNESS OF HIRABI ATTACK DESIGN ...... 36

VI. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS ARE CAPABLE OF DOING ...... 43

VII. A LIMITED REPERTOIRE ...... 55

VIII. CONCLUSION ...... 67

AUTHORS’ NOTE ...... 69

ENDNOTES ...... 70

January 2012 The Science of Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As we marked the ten-year anniversary of Laqueur wrote that “yesterday’s nuisance has 9/11, we also marked the expiration date of become one of the gravest dangers facing countless predictions that other devastating al mankind.” 3 Many proponents of the “new Qaeda (inspired, financed, or directed) attacks terrorism ” meme became even more emphatic would occur on US soil within a decade of after the attacks, arguing that religiously- that fateful day. Little more than a week after inspired terrorism had become divorced from the atrocities, Attorney General John Ashcroft rationality. 4 Laqueur lamented that “until worried aloud “that terrorist activity against recently , terrorism was, by and large, dis - the United States may increase once this criminate, selecting its victims carefully… country responds to [the] attacks.” Ten It was, more often than not, ‘propaganda by days later, Democratic Senator Carl Levin deed.’ Contemporary terrorism has increas - told Fox News that “biological and chemical ingly become indiscriminate in the choice of threats […] are real. We ought to put re - its victims . Its aim is no longer to conduct sources there.” Republican Representative pro paganda but to effect maximum destruc - Chris Shays of Connecticut was more trench - tion.” Laqueur described the new terrorists as ant: “I am absolutely certain that terrorists, “paranoiac ” and driven by “all-consuming,” if they don’t have access to biological weapons “nonexistent hidden motives” leading to now, will; and I am absolutely certain that “a loss of the sense of reality.” “The outlook,” they will use them. The expertise exists. he concluded, “is poor; there are no known The potential that it has been shared with cures for fanaticism and paranoia.” 5 a terrorist is almost a no brainer .”1 President With the political and expert classes signifi - Bush pushed the possibility of catastrophe cantly aligned in their description of insane, to its logical extreme : “these terrorists … religiously fanatical terrorists determined to are seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear kill millions with weapons of mass destruc - weapons. Given the means, our enemies tion, journalists and the public could do little would be a threat to every nation and, but wait for the next heavy shoe to drop. eventually , to civilization itself .” 2 As they looked around them, they saw vul - Such dire predictions were not confined to the nerabilities everywhere. After rumors of the political class. Terrorism experts and academ - potential for biological or chemical attacks on ics like Walter Laqueur, Jessica Stern, Bruce America’s water supply raced through the Hoffman, Mark Juergensmeyer, and many internet, The New York Times reported on local others had seized upon the notion that a “new governments’ efforts to secure reservoirs and terrorism” was emerging. Even before 9/11, other sources of drinking water: “Helicopters,

The Science of Security 4 January 2012 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

patrol boats and armed guards sweep across published a long article suggesting that more the watershed feeding New York City, enforc - should be done — that billions should be ing a temporary ban on fishing, hunting, and spent developing and stockpiling vaccine for hiking. Massachusetts has sealed commuter every disease that terrorists could possibly use roads that run atop dams or wind down to to harm Americans. 9 Never mind that terror - the water’s edge. And Utah has enlisted the ists have shown no capacity to successfully help of the Federal Bureau of Investigation develop and weaponize any of them. to peer down at reservoirs from planes and Despite the perennial warnings about exotic satellites, hoping to spot any weak points.” 6 weapons and targets (warnings that, ironically, By November 1 st , USA Today was reporting offer terrorists tantalizing clues about how and that “scientists and politicians are growing where the United States is vulnerable), mem - increasingly worried about another possible bers and allies of al Qaeda’s hirabi (AKA target for terrorists: the food supply.” 7 Several ‘jihadi’) movement continue to carry out the authors over the years have also flagged same sorts of attacks they executed in the America’s vulnerability to internet attacks decades before 9/11. In 1993, hirabis used a that could significantly disrupt the critical truck bomb in an attempt to topple the World infrastructure upon which our economy Trade Center, the same tactic they used in depends. In a recent report, Washington’s 1996 to bomb the Khobar Towers barracks Bipartisan Policy Center recommended that in Saudi Arabia, and in 1998 to bomb US “defending the U.S. against such attacks must Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In 2000, be an urgent priority.” “This is not science they used a different vehicle — a small boat — fiction,” they wrote, “It is possible to take to approach their target when they bombed down cyber systems and trigger cascading the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen. disruptions and damage.” 8 A year later, they used different vehicles again, Even as our greatest fears have not come to airplanes, to bomb the World Trade Centers pass, the drive to promote measures eliminat - and the Pentagon. Months later a hirabi ing even the impression of risk or threat has named Richard Reid attempted to bomb a hardly lost momentum. Despite the fact that plane itself with a chemical explosive hidden the United States has developed enough vac - in his shoe. In May 2002, a car bomb killed cine to inoculate its entire population against 14 people at a Karachi hotel frequented by the two most deadly biological agents that Westerners. In October of that year, another terrorists might conceivably learn to produce bomb, placed in a Bali nightclub, killed 202 someday, The New York Times Magazine recently mostly Australian citizens.

January 2012 5 The Science of Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2004, hirabis detonated ten bombs on four The stark contrast between the hirabi reper - trains in Madrid, killing nearly 200 people. A toire of targets and tactics and the expansive year later, hirabis attacked three trains and a and expanding concerns of journalists, bus in London. Later in 2005, bombs placed politicians , experts, and academics begs expla - at American hotels in Amman, Jordan killed nation. We find that the pattern of hirabi 57 people. In 2007, British police uncovered attacks is not accidental. It is well-suited to a car-bomb plot targeting Glasgow Airport. their primary strategy — one attempting to In 2008, a car bomb killed six people and iteratively grow support for their cause so they injured dozens more outside Pakistan’s Danish can one day gain political power and govern Embassy. Al Qaeda claimed the attack was territory. That their goals are likely delusional retaliation for an offensive political cartoon. does not diminish the rationality of their strat - In September 2009, Najibullah Zazi was ar - egy, the tactics they use, or the targets they rested in the final stages of a plan to replicate select, all of which are chosen to manipulate the Madrid attacks of 2004 in New York the governments they seek to change and the City’s subway system. On Christmas Day publics they seek to recruit. Various internal of the same year, Nigerian Umar Farouk and external constraints on hirabi organiza - Abdulmutallab attempted and failed to down tions also limit their capability, and thereby, a passenger plane over Detroit by detonating the range of tactics and strategies they can a chemical bomb concealed under his clothes. pursue. This paper explores in depth all of The next spring, Faisal Shahzad tried to deto - these factors shaping hirabi activity. nate a car bomb in Times Square, but failed.

Months later, in October 2010, al Qaeda PAPER OVERVIEW in the Arabian Peninsula placed explosive devices in cargo planes, but cooperating inter - The paper unfolds in eight sections. We begin national intelligence agencies foiled their by reviewing common errors in previous threat plans before they could detonate the bombs. assessments that have likely contributed to Most recently, Rezwan Ferdaus has been their incorrect conclusions, and then introduce charged with a plot to use remote controlled our own sociological approach to threat assess - planes to deliver bombs to the Pentagon. ment. Section II begins our analysis of the All of these and other al Qaeda directed, hirabi threat with an itemization of hirabi financed , or inspired attacks have targeted attacks planned or attempted on the United planes, trains, buses, government and States in the last decade. The range of attack symbolic buildings, and western hotels with styles and targets is far more limited than that bombs (and sometimes assault weapons). imagined by previous threat analysts.

The Science of Security 6 January 2012 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Section III begins to explain this discrepancy rorist campaigns for good or bad. Their by drawing on previous work and internal responses constitute a major factor determin - hirabi documents to show that the main hirabi ing the duration and success or failure of strategy does not rely on killing tens of thou - terror campaigns. sands of people at a time, but on recruiting Section V applies the logic of terrorists’ polar - tens of millions to support what remains a ization/recruitment strategy to data describing rather unpopular vision. A closer look at their attacks and proposes a theory explaining hirabi strategy reveals that they perform for the method behind the madness of terrorism. three audiences: their potential supporters, Hirabis choose their weapons and target sites the populations and governments whose with at least an intuitive understanding of how behavior they wish to coerce, and their own attacks will provoke target states, feed into re - membership. The most successful attacks cruitment narratives, reflect martial values that provoke state repression policies that drive promote member morale, generate spectacular populations into terrorists’ arms. media coverage, and produce maximal psy - Section IV fleshes out the relationships be - chological impact on their audiences. We find tween terrorists and their various audiences. that the rather conventional weapons hirabis We find that the populations hirabis wish to have used and the targets they have attacked recruit, at least for now, are not very sympa - time and again — before 9/11 and since — thetic to their cause. Internal documents show are better suited for their purposes than those hirabis’ sensitivity to their diminished popu - imagined by other threat analysts, but not yet larity and eagerness to understand the lessons seen. And we explain, as no other analysts of past terrorist campaigns that died out due have, why terrorists are so enamored by planes and other transportation targets, and so disin - to lack of public support. Hirabis are not, terested in infrastructure attacks and contrary to some claims, interested only in the cyber-terrorism. favor of a vengeful God. Their internal strate - gic documents show that they deliberately Section VI reviews hirabis’ internal organiza - (and sometimes rather effectively) manipulate tional challenges, the counterterrorist obstacles states and state supporters. We find that some they face, and their evolution in response to deep-seated human psychology (related to those obstacles. We find that hirabi organiza - in-group /out-group relations) exacerbates sus - tions, including the al Qaeda flagship, are ceptibility to terrorist manipulation, but also chronically plagued by internal divisions about that states and their supporters have a great goals, strategy, tactics, ideology, resources, deal of power to shape the outcomes of ter - logistics , and even personal conflicts. In addi -

January 2012 7 The Science of Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

tion, the counterterrorism obstacles they face are significant. US and international efforts to deny hirabis safe haven, dry up their funding A NOTE ON channels, secure dangerous materials, enhance HIRABI VS. JIHADI screening mechanisms at ports, borders, and airports, harden optimal targets, and use in - Jihad is a much-debated term that authors creasingly surgical force that limits civilian use to refer to a range of struggles required, casualties have all exacted a heavy toll on the encouraged, or otherwise appreciated hirabi movement. In response, al Qaeda and by God. Like every other religion, Islam its affiliates and allies continue to evolve. generates wide-ranging debates about Though their decline has not been linear, the God’s will, in general, and the means to evolution of the hirabi movement, in general, achieve it, in particular. Throughout history, has resulted in an organization currently countless groups in Muslim ter ri tories have characterized by scattered bands of hirabis purported to do their work in service of with fewer resources, lower competence, and God and have endeavored to overcome weaker weapons. obstacles through holy struggle, or jihad.

Section VII explores, in more detail, the exter - Some of these struggles, many would 10 nal and self-imposed limits on hirabis’ arsenal. agree, have been noble. Others are seen We find not only that WMDs may not suit as atrocious, falsely claiming the word jihad. hirabis’ needs, but also that (whether they are While most people, including Muslims, chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) support the repulsion of foreign invaders they are exceedingly difficult to procure or from their lands, few agree that the word develop . Hirabis are not likely to expand their jihad describes acts of terrorism targeting range of targets either since the targets that 11 innocents. Self-proclaimed jihadi groups optimize their strategy remain relatively have argued that Qu’ranic verses forbidding vulnerable . Barring a major strategic shift 12 the bloodshed of innocents are irrelevant enabled by some highly unlikely weapons because those they have killed, including breakthrough, evidence suggests that hirabis Muslim women and children, are not inno - will continue to use a limited, but strategically cent. They claim the power of takfir — the sufficient repertoire of attacks targeting power to determine who is a true Muslim — planes, trains, and buildings with bombs and 13 and then they kill apostates with impunity. assault weapons.

The Science of Security 8 January 2012 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Many Arabic speakers or scholars of the goal of attacking the United States or 16 Qu’ran are more likely to associate such European nation-states on their own territory. terrorism with the word hirabah which The Qu’ran’s “Covenant of Security” forbids refers to the killing of civilians in order a Muslim from attacking his foreign host if 17 to sow fear, discord, or chaos. According the host society allows him to worship freely. to the Islamic equivalent of Christianity’s Many fighters saw things Azzam’s way. “just war” tradition, political violence Abu Jandal, a man who left al Qaeda shortly can only be seen as legitimate (i.e., before the 9/11 attacks, explained fighters’ as jihad) if it is used by a head-of-state dissatisfaction with Bin Laden’s hirabah to against armies invading or occupying FBI interrogator Ali Soufan: “The brother s… 14 Muslim lands. Citing the Qu’ran, many are fighters who fight the enemy face-to-face. scholars claim that al Qaeda can never They don’t understand Bin Laden’s war and wield legitimate force as long as it is not the new jihad, so they went home .” More 15 a state. to the point, they did not see Bin Laden’s

Others who set aside the criterion of war as proper jihad, but as hirabah. Many statehood, including some very prominent still do not.

self-proclaimed jihadis, reject the legiti - In this paper, we reclaim the narrower, macy of al Qaeda’s attacks on other traditional definition of jihad by using it grounds. The highly influential muja - sparingly to refer to struggles that do not hedeen leader and one-time partner of intentionally kill civilians. We refer to Osama Bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, individuals using terrorism, and especially believed that Muslims should fight jihad those using it offensively outside of Muslim to defend their oppressed fellows and lands, as hirabis engaging in hirabah. We expel western influence from once- hope this convention will catch on. Using Muslim lands like Israel, but he strongly hirabis’ preferred moniker, jihadi, has only and publicly argued against Bin Laden’s served to legitimate them and their cause.

January 2012 9 The Science of Security I. INTRODUCTION

THE NEED FOR UPDATED gaged in very heated and public debate seek - THREAT ASSESSMENT ing to discredit forensic psychologist Marc Sageman’s characterization of al Qaeda as The Navy Seals who dispatched Osama Bin an organization transitioning to a more net - Laden recovered documents indicating that worked globular structure lacking clear lines he was concerned about his group’s future of authority. One could charge Sageman with prospects. It had become so unpopular after exaggerating the extent of this transition in failing in Iraq and killing thousands of the title of his book: Leaderless Jihad (a play on Muslims elsewhere, that Bin Laden was seri - “leaderless resistance,” which is a nonhierar - ously considering renaming and rebranding chical organizational style many clandestine the most feared terror network in the world. direct-action groups have employed to protect Despite these well founded concerns, to say the anonymity of members). But virtually all nothing of Bin Laden’s death, some American analysts agree that al Qaeda evolved in the terrorism experts continue to assert that al direction of Sageman’s description, including Qaeda remains a major threat to the United Hoffman himself, in his less polemical States. Georgetown University professor writings . 19 Bruce Hoffman has continually warned of al Qaeda’s resilience and potency throughout Along with Hoffman, former CIA officer and its existence. In July 2011, Hoffman rejected Brookings Institute Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel CIA and Defense Department claims that has continued to warn about al Qaeda’s con - al Qaeda was nearing “strategic defeat,” tinuing strength and relevance even after the claiming, days after Defense Secretary Leon death of Bin Laden and the fundamental po - Panetta’s assessment, and well before any data litical shifts brought on by the Arab Spring. 20 could have been tabulated, that there was On the tenth anniversary of September 11 th , “no empirical evidence that either the appeal Riedel even prophesied that al Qaeda’s moti - of [al Qaeda’s] message or the flow of recruits vating ideology “won’t die.” 21 into its ranks has actually diminished.” 18 Graham Allison, of Harvard’s Belfer Center, Hoffman, author of one of the canonical has also emphasized worst-case scenarios. In analyses of the inner workings of a range of his 2004 book, Nuclear Terrorism, he contended modern terrorist organizations, Inside Terrorism, that a nuclear terrorist attack was inevitable if has repeatedly defended his initial (rather dire) counterterrorism did not change course. 22 In assessment of al Qaeda against the updated 2005, he estimated the probability of an attack characterizations offered by other scholars. with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) at For example, in the mid-2000s Hoffman en - 50 percent within the next ten years, repeating

The Science of Security 10 January 2012 I. INTRODUCTION

that claim in 2007 in a Council on Foreign broader counterterrorism field as a “self- Relations (CFR) online debate with CFR licking ice cream cone.” 28 Fellow Michael Levi. 23 He wrote the forward Many analysts predict doom after they have to a provocative 2010 white paper authored lost focus on what enemies will likely do and, by his Belfer Center colleague, Rolf Mowatt- instead begun to catalogue all of the fearful Larssen, that conflated al Qaeda’s frequent vulnerabilities in their midst. Thus, the US bluster about nuclear weapons and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS), WMDs with its actual capabilities. 24 shortly after its creation, generated a list of Such dire, but apparently incorrect, assess - thousands of potential terrorist targets ranging ments may be driven by a number of factors. from the realistic (e.g., Statue of Liberty) to Humans tend to overestimate the dangers of the paranoid (e.g., Amish Country Popcorn terrorism and other risks over which they have Factory) offering little explanation for why any little control. 25 Experts are not immune to target would be desirable from a terrorist’s these cognitive errors and may suffer from perspective. 29 More recently The New York Times others, as well. Studies show that experts may Magazine has published a piece lamenting be more prone to faulty estimates and pre - the government’s failure to spend billions of dictions because they have more detailed dollars developing and stockpiling vaccines information (even if it is offset by contrary for all the dangerous diseases known to man, evidence ) with which to bolster their prefig - while providing no analysis of terrorists’ ured conclusions. 26 limited intent and capability when it comes to weaponizing the diseases. 30 Overestimations of terrorist threats may also be driven by authors’ feelings of responsibility Such reports, itemizing attacks that could, un - to protect targeted populations. No one wants der some expansive (and often undefined) set innocent lives to be lost because he or she of conditions, be carried out against US inter - counseled policymakers to worry too little ests are actually vulnerability assessments, not about a threat. More cynically, some have threat assessments. And they are of little value argued that government (and other) funders because, to put it simply, every human in a tend to handsomely reward work that raises public space is vulnerable to a suicide bomber urgent concerns not work producing sober, or a mad gunman. Whether they are threatened methodical, and ultimately reassuring assess - by such killers is an entirely different question ments. 27 In this regard, alarmist threat analysis — one which requires an understanding of may fit Richard Clarke’s description of the how and why terrorists choose the targets they

January 2012 11 The Science of Security I. INTRODUCTION

do, and what kind of attacks they are truly A COMPREHENSIVE capable of executing. FRAMEWORK FOR THREAT ASSESSMENT This highlights another problem with many previous threat assessments: the failure to ade - In assessing the current threat of hirabi terror - quately distinguish between terrorists’ ism, we have taken pains to avoid the pitfalls intentions and their capabilities. Some reports of previous threat analyses. We have eschewed conflate the two, stoking fears, for instance, references to political or policy lodestars, al - lowing the collective facts of hirabi terrorism that terrorists’ transparent bluffs and stated to unfold into conclusions informed by rele - desires to procure massively destructive vant social science research. Readers will find weapons suggest that they will successfully that we start our analysis below with a very detonate those weapons soon. 31 Such assess - transparent and simple tabulation of data ments not only fail to regard terrorists’ threats about the attacks attempted or plotted by with any skepticism, they fail to carefully ana - hirabi terrorists in the United States since lyze what terrorists are capable of alongside 9/11. There, a pattern of targets and tactics an appropriate accounting of all the obstacles emerges showing that hirabis, to this point, they face as they pursue their purported goals. have sought to execute a range of attacks far more limited than the scope of atrocities Threat assessments biased towards inflating analysts have warned against. We explore, the danger of terrorism are often defended in depth, the factors limiting this range. with reference to the precautionary principle, Accurate and useful threat assessment requires a concept most famously demonstrated in the understanding how terrorist campaigns grow domain of counterterrorism as Dick Cheney’s and how they die. Though terrorists’ lethality “one percent doctrine.” 32 But while it may is an urgent concern and might seem to be the seem “better to be safe than sorry,” inaccu - most relevant factor in any assessment of the rately exaggerating the threat of terrorism threat they pose, evidence suggests that the can help terrorists achieve one of their main long-term survival and success of terrorist objectives – to frighten the public and policy - campaigns depends much less on the death makers into making decisions that actually tolls they amass than on their ability to contin - help terrorists’ causes. Assessments that ually replenish and grow their ranks. 33 While underplay the threat of terrorism, of course, death tolls are easily quantifiable and often may also have tragic consequences if they used to measure the success of terrorist and breed complacency. counterterrorist campaigns (probably because

The Science of Security 12 January 2012 I. INTRODUCTION

they are so easily measured), 34 terrorist organi - Understanding how terrorists perform for zations are not fundamentally military groups various audiences also helps us to explain why seeking to kill or capture enemy soldiers, they gravitate to the use of some weapons or but rather political groups seeking to attract attack styles over others. We discuss these and and inspire an audience of potential recruits other factors relevant to their targeting and and supporters while coercing targeted weapons decisions, including their own martial governments and populations to grant values, their proficiency and familiarity with different weapons, and the various psychologi - their demands. cal impacts that weapons can have on victims. This insight — that terrorist organizations Together with strategic necessities, these fac - employ violence discursively (i.e., in order to tors constrain the list of weapons and attack secure reinforcements in an ongoing war of styles terrorists are likely to employ. There is ideas) not just militarily (i.e., in order to wield a method to the madness of terrorism. direct control over the lives and deaths of The social sciences also have much to say their enemies) — is not new. It was implicit in about how the responses of targeted govern - Paul Wilkinson’s Terrorism v. Democracy and cen - ments and populations affect the success and trally placed in Audrey Kurth Cronin’s How longevity of terrorist campaigns. This area 35 Terrorism Ends , for just two examples. But it is of threat assessment has been significantly frequently undervalued by a national security neglected by previous threat reports. But the apparatus often ill-equipped to perform quali - relational (or interactive) theory of terrorist tative social scientific analysis. 36 One of the campaigns that we employ stresses the impor - things we bring to threat assessment in what tance of the quality of targeted governments’ follows, therefore, is an accessible application responses. As we elaborate below, terrorists of the broader theory of social movements often strategically goad states to react with and discursive performance to questions policies that create a rift between the state and about how terrorism campaigns perpetuate the people that terrorists would like to recruit. themselves or decay. 37 We focus particular at - Terrorist success, therefore, often depends on tention on how hirabi groups, often troubled the susceptibility of targeted populations and by conflicting internal organizational impera - their policymaking elite to the psychological traps terrorists set for them. tives, communicate and miscommunicate (sometimes directly and sometimes through It is not entirely clear why so much previous violent action) to different audiences as they threat assessment has shied from addressing aim to grow their movement and its salience. the role that state responses play in the out -

January 2012 13 The Science of Security I. INTRODUCTION

comes of terror/counterterror campaigns. The failure to attend to mutually determined consequences could reflect the authors’ funda - mental cognitive preference for dualistic, as opposed to relational thinking. Or, perhaps researchers have demurred from any analysis that could be misinterpreted as “blaming victims ” for their lot. Maybe the men and women tasked with previous threat assessment have been directed by their superiors to focus their work on ‘them’ and not ‘us and them,’ perhaps to avoid making recommendations to civilian higher-ups uninterested in policy approaches that may disappoint their retribu - tion-seeking constituencies. Whatever the reason for the lack of such relational analysis, we have sought to correct it here as we assess the multitude of factors affecting the capacity of, and threat posed by, hirabi terrorist groups.

First, in order to calibrate our assessment of the hirabi threat with reality, we review all of the hirabi attacks planned or attempted on the United States since September 11, 2001.

The Science of Security 14 January 2012 II. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS HAVE DONE

The tenth anniversary of 9/11 rebuffed wide - more skilled. Although increased airport spread predictions that another large-scale al screening can be credited with forcing Richard Qaeda (inspired, financed, or directed) terror - Reid and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to use ist attack would occur within the decade. Such more complicated and less reliable chemical predictions were actually quite modest in late bombs, their detonations were ultimately pre - 2001 — even to the point of media irrele - vented by the interventions of alert and brave vance — as many pundits foretold another passengers. Faisal Shahzad’s truck bomb dud devastating attack within five years, one year, in New York City’s Times Square a month or even a matter of months. Government vul - after Abdulmutallab’s attempt, again, showed nerability and threat reports raised concerns that America’s counterterrorism successes that terrorists might attack water and food would, at times, come down to serendipity and supplies, nuclear facilities, critical energy in - alert citizens’ actions. It was a T-shirt vendor frastructure, bridges, and key Internet nodes, (and practicing Muslim), not a New York or, worse, that they might attack civilian popu - Police Department officer sitting in his cruiser lations using chemical, biological, radiological, across the street, who first noticed and re - or nuclear (CBRN) weapons capable of pro - ported smoke billowing from Shahzad’s SUV. ducing casualties in the tens of thousands or Though fortune appears to have smiled on the more. So far, however, the decade since 9/11 United States in these cases, most of the has produced none of these feared attacks. 38 thirty-four plots foiled since 9/11 have been Only two men identifying with the hirabi prevented thanks to public tips, undercover in - movement have successfully harmed targets formants or officers, international intelligence on US soil in the last ten years. In 2009, cooperation, or traditional surveillance tactics Abdullah Mujahid Muhammad (formerly that uncovered a web of hirabi interlocutors known as Carlos Bledsoe) shot two soldiers (see Table 1). 40 at a military recruiting station in Little Rock, Of the thirty-four unsuccessful plots, 41 a plu - Arkansas, killing one. A few months later, rality targeted symbolic and/or government Nidal Malik Hassan opened fire on his col - buildings with bombs. Transportation targets, leagues at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 and including trains, planes, and airports, were the wounding over 40 others. Both men appear to second most popular targets, followed by US have been inspired, in part, by al Qaeda in the military personnel, facilities, and assets. Malls, Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) propagandist and synagogues, hotels, and political figures were US citizen Anwar al Awlaki. 39 the planned targets in three or fewer plots In some cases, Americans appear simply to each. None of the plots targeted food or water have been lucky that hirabi attackers were not supplies, or energy or internet infrastructure.

January 2012 15 The Science of Security II. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS HAVE DONE

TABLE 1: FOILED PLOTS TARGETING OR PLANNED BY US CIVILIANS SINCE 9/11

ACTORS/ HOW TARGET WEAPONS YEAR PLOT NAME FOILED

Direct civilian Richard Reid Airliner TATP shoe bomb 2001 intervention

Library Foreign intelligence Symbolic building Airliner as missile 2002 Tower Plot cooperation

Mis/Information Buildings in Chicago Nonexistent Jose Padilla from detainees 2002 (supposedly) “dirty bomb” (Zubaydah)

Community tip Assault weapons Lackawanna Six and then paid under- Unspecified 2002 and IEDs cover informants

Multiple Foreign intelligence Mohammed Jabarah international targets Bombs 2002 cooperation in Singapore

Community tip and American soldiers Assault weapons Portland Seven then undercover 2002-2003 in Afghanistan and IEDs informants Reward for tips Airliners as missiles, Khalid Sheikh program, foreign Several symbolic bombs, assault 2003 Mohammed (KSM) intelligence buildings weapons cooperation American and Virginia Jihad Assault weapons Community tips international soldiers 2003 Network and IEDs fighting hirabis

Information from Iyman Faris Brooklyn Bridge Acetylene torch 2003 detainee (KSM)

Information from Nuradin Abdi Ohio shopping mall Bombs 2003 detainee (Faris)

Bombs, nonexistent Financial institutions Dhiren Barot UK surveillance “dirty bomb” 2004 in US and UK (UK plot)

The Science of Security 16 January 2012 II. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS HAVE DONE

ACTORS/ HOW TARGET WEAPONS YEAR PLOT NAME FOILED

Community tip and James Elshafay and NYC Herald Square then undercover Bombs 2004 Shahawar Siraj subway station informants Discovered Yassin Aref and intelligence, then Pakistani Diplomat Grenade Launchers 2004 Mohammad Hossain undercover informant and surveillance

Umer Hayat and Undercover agent None specified None specified 2005 Hamid Hayat

Initially investigated Synagogues, military Bombs and LA Terror Plots for robberies facilities, government 2005 assault weapons to fund their efforts buildings

Mohammed Amawi Undercover agent US soldiers in Iraq Bombs 2006 et al.

Associated The Pentagon Syed Ahmed and with other and the Capitol Bombs 2006 Ehsanul Sadequee terrorism suspects Building

Liberty City Seven Undercover agent Sears Tower Bombs 2006

New York Associated with Assem Hammoud PATH train Bombs 2006 terrorist website tunnels

Liquid Foreign intelligence Multiple airliners TATP bombs 2006 Explosives Plot cooperation

Mall, synagogue, Guns, bombs, Derrick Shareef Undercover agent 2006 government buildings grenades

Associated with other US military facilities, Christopher Paul Bombs 2007 terrorism suspects western hotels

Community tip Assault weapons, Fort Dix Plot and then undercover US military facilities 2007 explosives informant

January 2012 17 The Science of Security II. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS HAVE DONE

ACTORS/ HOW TARGET WEAPONS YEAR PLOT NAME FOILED

CIA intelligence Jet fuel tanks and JFK Terror Plot gathered in the Bombs 2007 pipelines Caribbean

Associated with other Hassan Abujihaad US Naval vessels None specified 2008 terrorism suspects

Synagogues, military Bombs, James Cromitie et al. Undercover agent 2009 aircraft stinger missiles

Apparent foreign Najibullah Zazi et al. intelligence NYC subway Backpack bomb 2009 cooperation

Law enforcement discovered suspicious Illinois Federal Michael Finton Truck bomb 2009 writings during Building routine traffic stop

Associated with Dallas, Texas Hosam Smadi Truck bomb 2009 terrorist website skyscraper

Information from Malls, US soldiers, informant and Tarek Mehanna and US government Assault weapons 2009 associated with officials known terror suspect

Umar Farouk Direct intervention TATP underwear Airliner 2009 Abdulmutallab by citizens bomb

Faisal Shahzad Community tip Times Square Truck bomb 2010

Foreign intelligence Chicago area Printer Bomb Plot IEDs 2011 cooperation synagogues

Small drones, IEDs, FBI undercover Small Drone Plot Pentagon and Fedeyeen-style 2011 operation attack

The Science of Security 18 January 2012 II. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS HAVE DONE

None of the thirty-four plots included any attacks have been attempted. No large-scale credible plan for using weapons of mass chemical attacks have been attempted. 44 45 destruction , either. The majority would have To understand why hirabi terrorists have used conventional bombs or improvised pursued particular attack strategies and what explosive devises (IEDs). Another three would sorts of attacks they are likely to pursue in the have used larger truck bombs. Seven of the future , we must first understand what they plots would have used conventional assault are trying to do. What are their overall goals? weapons and two would have attacked with What strategies are they employing to achieve conventional grenades. In another two cases, them? And how do some targets and some plotters hoped to get their hands on a grenade styles of attack advance those strategies better launcher or a stinger missile launcher prom - than others? Answers to these questions begin ised disingenuously by an FBI informant. to explain why hirabi terrorists have not been And, in two cases, terror suspects were alleged more lethal in the past, and even suggest that to have concocted schemes to use “dirty their present and future efforts may be signifi - bombs” even though they had no access to cantly hampered by political changes beyond the bombs or the materials to make them. 42 their control. This pattern of attacking and plotting against symbolic buildings, transportation targets, and other government assets with conventional guns and explosives has held not just in the United States, but throughout the world. With the exception of Iraqi insurgent and sectarian attacks (which most experts would not classify as terrorism, but insurgency) on oil infrastruc - ture, roads and bridges, and some water infra structure, hirabi attacks have targeted military, government, and transportation tar - gets and some brand name hotels frequented by westerners. 43 Virtually all of these attacks have been carried out using explosives and assault weapons. No nuclear or radiological attacks have been attempted. No biological

January 2012 19 The Science of Security III. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS ARE TRYING TO DO

Hirabi terrorist groups are motivated by a war of ideas with the state. The battlefields ambitions to replace secular regimes in of that discursive war are the minds of people Muslim-majority countries with fundamental - who could sympathize with some of the goals ist Islamic theocracies. Some even hope these of the aspiring revolutionary group but might theocracies will join together into larger tend to believe those goals are better (or more regional Islamic governments, or even a fun - safely) pursued through the political channels damentalist caliphate spanning northern of a state they see as more legitimate. To win Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Central the support of these people, rebel groups and South Asia (though there appears to be create security disturbances in ways that little agreement about who would lead such undermine state legitimacy in so far as they a caliphate, what interpretation of Islamic law 1) show that the state is more vulnerable than would predominate, etc). To realize even the people imagine (discrediting the state’s well- initial phases of their vision, hirabis must crafted image of unrivaled social control), and not only topple existing regimes in Muslim- 2) provoke state repression that negatively majority countries, they must do so by (or impacts the people the revolutionary group while) uniting broad swaths of the Muslim wishes to convert to its camp. population behind their goals. These impera - tives strongly influence hirabis’ strategic A particularly nonviolent form of this polar - use of terrorism . 46 ization/recruitment strategy was effectively used in Egypt when large crowds of protestors A POLARIZATION AND disrupted normal economic and government RECRUITMENT STRATEGY functions, provoking the state to disperse

Contrary to common misunderstandings, them. Police forces were overwhelmed, show - hirabis primary strategy is not based simply ing the state’s weakness. News coverage of the on killing innocents to coerce targeted states; events raised the polarizing question through - its primary objective is to recruit followers and out Egyptian society: “are you with the supporters in order to grow the hirabi move - protestors or the Mubarak regime?” And ment. The hirabi approach is not new either. when the Egyptian military answered that it It is just a particularly violent strain of a was with the protestors, or at least unwilling strategy used by numerically weaker insur - to violently disperse them for Mubarak’s sake, rectionist groups for centuries. 47 The strategy, the revolution was a fait accompli . A function - regardless of whether it employs terrorist tac - ally equivalent strategy based on polarization tics, is primarily aimed at winning converts in and recruitment marks the histories of most

The Science of Security 20 January 2012 III. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS ARE TRYING TO DO

countries conceived in the crucible of popular successful attacks can iteratively build support revolution. for the rebel forces until revolutionary mass action becomes feasible. The efficacy of such a rebel strategy (regard - less of violent or terrorist tactics) depends on THE ORIGIN OF MILITANT a few factors: HIRABI STRATEGY 1. the salience of the rebel group’s cause in Hirabis’ strategy of driving wedges between the minds of the population it hopes will support it (we will call this population the states and their populations has developed prospective constituency), over a long period, beginning when early and middle 20 th century rebel movements sought 2. the degree of preexisting rift between the to replace postcolonial secular authoritarian aspiring rebels’ prospective constituency governments with states modeled on the politi - and the state (and its supporters), cal system of Islam’s Prophet Mohammed. 3. the prospective constituency’s perception Many of those movements — typified by the of the legitimacy of the state’s response to early Muslim Brotherhood under the leader - rebel activity, which often depends on, ship of its founder Hassan al Banna — were initially nonviolent. But as they were repressed 4. the state’s ability to recognize and avoid from the political field, splinter groups formed the trap that the rebel group has designed and dedicated themselves to achieving their for them, and, finally, ends through violent jihad, or even hirabah. 48 5. the international community’s degree of Decades of sporadic rebel violence in Egypt, support for the aspiring revolutionary Algeria, Syria, and elsewhere in the region – group’s cause. sometimes including terrorist attacks and as - Rebel groups sometimes employ provocative sassinations – produced moderate success. violence or even terrorism when conditions Not only did Middle Eastern secular states 1 & 2 only yield soft support for their cause. appear unable to provide general safety, their Direct attacks on the state or its supporters, in security forces’ violent dragnets and torturing the name of a prospective constituency, often of hundreds of political dissidents and inspire state reactions against the prospective innocents resulted in considerable public dis - constituency (depending on factor 4), increas - content and nostalgia for a (perhaps mythical) ing the valence of factors 1, 2, and 5, while Islamic republic that could save them from un - decreasing the valence of factor 3. A series of just government abuses.

January 2012 21 The Science of Security III. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS ARE TRYING TO DO

But despite the rebel groups’ successes, they Afghanistan to fight off the Soviet invasion also experienced setbacks. The groups de - there. Several autocratic Middle Eastern and scribed their actions as “jihad” because they North African (MENA) states even supported wanted people to see their means, in addition the migration of militant groups to to their ends, as legitimately “Islamic.” But Afghanistan. By sponsoring the Afghan jihad the religious justification for their use of vio - with fighters and weapons, the states won lence was debated from the start. 49 Many in credibility with their Islamic populations while the public did not support their methods or sending dangerous internal enemies thousands the extremity of their political vision. Poorly of miles away. Similar exports of jihadi fight - targeted attacks, like Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s ers occurred during the Balkans Wars and (EIJ) accidental killing of an innocent school - flare-ups in the Russian/Chechen conflicts girl during an assassination attempt on Prime throughout the 1990s. 51 Minister Atif Sidqi, repulsed many members of the public, undermining the appeal of the But as the Soviets were repulsed from groups and their violent campaigns. Afghanistan in 1989, victorious mujahedeen from all over the MENA and Central Asian re - In addition, populations became so fearful of gions had nowhere in particular to apply their the state’s firm authoritarian response that newly developed skills. Among them, a debate they did not rise up into Iranian-style Islamic emerged about what to do next. Many wished revolution as the rebel groups had hoped, but to return to their homelands and offer their instead largely withdrew from political life and new guerrilla tactics and fighting acumen counseled their sons and daughters to stay to local rebel movements. Other leaders in away from political activity that could lead to Afghanistan had a larger vision for the muja - trouble. The 1997 Luxor Massacres, in which hedeen. Osama Bin Laden and his partner in the militant group Ga’ma Islamiyya used ma - Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam, agreed that chetes and guns to kill over fifty international the fighters should capitalize on their victory tourists including children and honeymooning against the Soviet superpower by working couples, generated deep and widespread pub - to unite all of the disparate local movements lic revulsion that probably placed the final nail seeking strict Islamic theocracy. Azzam, in the coffin of the militant Islamist move - a widely influential and charismatic leader ment in Egypt. 50 among the victorious mujahedeen, believed As jihadi and hirabi rebel movements sput - the fighters should focus on rebuilding tered in their home countries throughout the Afghanistan to make it into a truly Islamic 1980s, many of their fighters were drawn to state and then lead a campaign to destroy

The Science of Security 22 January 2012 III. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS ARE TRYING TO DO

Israel. Bin Laden believed the fighters should fight the United States, creating training unite against a more powerful common en - camps in which practice targets were identified emy with ties to governments throughout the as US soldiers and trainees were schooled in region — the United States. In his opinion, anti-American ideology and history. In 1990, the hated secular autocratic regimes of the he returned to Saudi Arabian, offering to Arab world were only surviving thanks to US rally the remaining mujahedeen to defend his backing. Expel US influence from the region, homeland against the threatened aggression he thought, and the apostate regimes would of Saddam Hussein. The Saudi royal family easily topple. rebuffed his offer and invited the United States to defend them instead. This was not just a Abdullah Azzam rejected Bin Laden’s position personal affront in Bin Laden’s opinion; invit - on strategic and religious grounds. Not only did a battle against the extremely wealthy and ing armed ‘infidels’ into the land of Mecca powerful United States seem unwinnable to and Medina sacrilegiously abetted an invasion him, it also contravened religious text relating of Islam’s holiest lands. He denounced the to just war — text that prioritizes fights Saudis. And they shunned him in return, forc - in Muslim (or formerly Muslim) lands far ing his escape to Sudan. 52 higher than those with enemies abroad. But There, Bin Laden built momentum behind his Azzam’s debate with Bin Laden ended in late anti-American approach, establishing a web 1989 when he was killed by an IED. As Ali of front corporations to distribute money and Soufan notes: “Responsibility [for the IED] weapons to militant groups in exchange for in - was never assigned, but it was suspected that fluence over their goals and strategies. By that Zawahiri [who was becoming increasingly time, Bin Laden’s network had fully incorpo - close to Bin Laden and would eventually rated Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad, so become his deputy and successor] was con - when the EIJ was expelled from Sudan after nected. While before Azzam’s death Zawahiri attempting to assassinate Egypt’s President had denounced him in public, after his Mubarak, Zawahiri and then Bin Laden death he pretended they had been the best moved back to Afghanistan to rebuild their of friends.” 53 organization under the protection of the Many mujahedeen had agreed with Azzam, Taliban’s Mullah Omar. Within months of and chose to return to their home countries to returning to Afghanistan in 1996, Bin Laden struggle against their local governments rather doubled down on his anti-American strategy, than join Bin Laden. But the well-resourced publicly declaring war on the United States Saudi Arabian pressed on with his plan to via the London-based Arabic newspaper Al

January 2012 23 The Science of Security III. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS ARE TRYING TO DO

Quds Al Arabi . The Taliban’s Mullah Omar, Laden’s televised call to arms on October 7, reportedly , was not happy with Bin Laden’s 2011 was almost entirely unheeded by unilateral announcement, but he did not expel Muslim masses, who at least tacitly supported or extradite Bin Laden either. 54 their governments’ anti-terror efforts. And the United States was quickly destroying THE NESTED POLARIZATION Bin Laden’s training camps and chasing him AND RECRUITMENT to what appeared to be his capture or death. STRATEGY – TARGETING Holed up and surrounded in the caves of Tora ENEMIES NEAR AND FAR Bora, Bin Laden reportedly apologized to his soldiers for “getting [them] involved in [the] Bin Laden’s anti-American strategy found a battle,” offered them his blessing if they would home in Afghanistan. Combined with the lo - like to surrender, 56 and even updated his will. 57 cal strategies of the groups in his network, a nested polarization and recruitment strategy But when Special Forces and the CIA re - was emerging. Local groups would provoke quested reinforcements to aggressively pursue “near enemy” government reprisals at home, Bin Laden, commanders in Washington (who undermining their legitimacy and sowing fear according to some reports were distracted by and discontent among their publics. Attacks the task of drawing up battle plans for Iraq) against the American “far enemy” would rejected those requests. 58 By relying on un- pressure them to retreat from Muslim lands moti vated, unreliable Afghan warlords and and politics, leaving “near enemy” client gov - Pakistani security forces to seal the border to ernments weakened — easy prey for local Pakistan, senior US commanders and the militant groups. White House, many have concluded, allowed Bin Laden and hundreds of his men to quietly In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, though, sneak into Pakistan. 59 Bin Laden’s strategy appeared to be a bust. He had predicted that the United States With the invasion of Iraq imminent, Bin would withdraw from the region, as it had Laden and al Qaeda quickly recast their two- withdrawn from Somalia after the ‘Blackhawk tiered strategy. Harkening back to his 1996, Down’ incident in Mogadishu in 1993. Al “Declaration of War Against the Americans Qaeda apparently made no plans for a robust Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy invasion of Afghanistan and did not foresee Mosques” in which Bin Laden argued that the defeat of their Taliban hosts — the only foreign occupations could “provoke the people government in the world operating according of the country…and push … them to take up to their strict interpretation of Islam. 55 Bin armed struggle against the invaders occupying

The Science of Security 24 January 2012 III. WHAT HIRABI TERRORISTS ARE TRYING TO DO

the land,” he sought to transform the invasion The nested near and far enemy strategy also of Iraq into a Muslim casus belli . Abu Bakr al produced other benefits exploited by hirabi Naji, a prominent hirabi strategist and author terrorists as they honed their craft. First, while of The Management of Barbarism , a grand strat - local attacks tended only to build momentum egy for global hirabi rebellion, explained: within one nation or a small region, transna -

“The solution [to the problem of the tional attacks seized global headlines and failed attempts to oust pro-Western seeded the minds of a new wave of disaffected regimes] is to provoke a superpower youth Marc Sageman calls, “wannabe holy 61 into invading the Middle East directly. warriors.” Second, the war in Iraq provided This will result in a great propaganda a training ground to replace the training victory for the “jihadis” because the camps destroyed in Afghanistan. Hundreds of people will: people have now learned how to create and deploy IEDs and carry out guerrilla tactics 1. be impressed that the “jihadis” that, if motivated, they can use outside of the are directly fighting a superpower, Iraqi conflict zone. Third, direct attacks on 2. be outraged over the invasion “far enemies” like the United States and the of a foreign power, United Kingdom have provoked repressive

3. be disabused of the notion that domestic reactions by those states that have the superpower is invincible the resulted in significant public disenchantment longer the war goes on, and, with the government. In particular, coercive counterterrorism tactics like “enhanced inter - 4. be angry at the proxy governments rogation techniques,” a controversial war in [i.e., secular regimes] allied with Iraq, prisoner abuse, domestic spying, and the invading superpower. ” 60 incursions on ancient civil liberties caused

The US invasion of Iraq fit Bin Laden’s some around the world, including American updated strategy precisely. It required tens citizens , to question the benevolence of of thousands of allied ground troops who Washington’s motives. Such state reactions provided easy targets for guerrilla fighters, can create relationships of mutual suspicion enraged Iraqi and other Muslim populations, and antagonism between governments and and even led to inflammatory abuses of the governed — poisoned relationships that Muslims like those documented at Abu may, in part, contribute to so-called ‘home - Ghraib prison. grown’ terrorism.

January 2012 25 The Science of Security IV. A SPECTACLE FOR TWO AUDIENCES (PLUS A THIRD)

To succeed with a strategy based on polariz - dominance are significant causes of your suf - ing the state and prospective followers, fering. We are fighting in your name and for optimal terrorist attacks must grab and hold your honor against the greatest economic and the attention of both groups long enough to military power the world has ever seen. And convey the messages designed for each. While we are taking the fight into their home, to the terrorism has been employed for centuries, very sources of their wealth and might. Join us it has become especially popular since the and we will avenge all of our brethren who advent of mass media, particularly television have suffered because of Western influence in 62 and the internet . If a picture is worth a our region. ” thousand words, instant transmission of Both of these messages were heard by both audio /video to audiences around the world audiences and their respective reactions were may be worth a billion . amplified, broadcast, and fed back into the The attacks of September 11th provide an process of meaning-making surrounding the excellent case in point. On that day, terrorists events. Many Americans were disgusted by hijacked airliners and steered them into the tiny pockets of support for the attacks the most prominent symbols of American in some Muslim-majority countries. Many economic and military power, creating televi - Muslims, for their part, were disgusted by sion footage that included horrific fireballs, some Americans ’ expressions of Islamophobia smoldering buildings, people diving from after the events. Such distorted echoes carry skyscrapers , and eventually the collapse of through media feedback loops and can exacer - the two tallest towers in the United States. bate the very sort of polarization terrorists seek to create . The message to Americans was clear: “You Elites’ translation of events, too, can also con - cannot take your luxurious lifestyles, or your tribute to increased polarization. The Bush global economic and military prominence for Administration’s oft-repeated refrain about granted. We will die and kill to thwart your “evildoers” committing the attacks because ambitions and raise the cost of your meddling they “hate our freedom,” though successfully in the affairs of Muslim-majority countries. side-stepping discussion about America’s activ - And we will pursue you even to the very ities in the MENA region, was probably too sources of your power.” vague, fueling uninformed and often hysterical The message to hirabis’ prospective con - speculation about who exactly hated our stituency was something like: “America’s freedoms and why. Among Muslims, such military power and its political and economic statements were often experienced as offen -

The Science of Security 26 January 2012 IV. A SPECTACLE FOR TWO AUDIENCES (PLUS A THIRD)

sively simplistic since they ignored what many gling out people from Muslim-majority coun - nonviolent Muslims considered legitimate tries for increased scanning at airports around grievances. the world. After Faisal Shahzad lit up his dud of a truck bomb in Times Square, policymak - The failure to offer clear and realistic coun - ternarratives to those offered by terrorists can ers and talking heads raised a fuss about an open the door to far-fetched, but psychologi - interfaith (but primarily Muslim) cultural cally cathartic accounts of the events that only center to be erected blocks away from the site tend to increase the polarization terrorists of the former World Trade Center towers. As seek. Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civiliza - al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula sent printer tions” thesis provides the most popular and cartridge bombs to Detroit, some American seemingly legitimate example of separate lawmakers called for legislation preventing groups’ tendencies (discussed more thoroughly Sha’ria law from supplanting the American below) to exaggerate the differences between Constitution. Throughout all these events, them, while failing to recognize the diversity, a fringe group of pundits claimed the current heterogeneity, and structural complexity presidential administration was coddling or 63 in each group. When these group-based participating in an Islamic conspiracy to take psychological mechanisms are operating, over the United States. 64 terrorists can easily amplify them, exacerbat - ing the polarization that fuels their cause. While many Americans saw this Islamophobia as unseemly or ridiculous, many others easily THE TARGETED AUDIENCE: participated in the polarization hirabis sought HOW INTERGROUP to inspire. Polls measuring Americans’ support PSYCHOLOGY PRODUCES for the construction of a multi-faith cultural UNHELPFUL RESPONSES center blocks from Ground Zero quickly TO TERRORISM shifted in the fall of 2010 as a few bloggers characterized the center as a “Victory Though hirabis have been especially poor at executing their latest attempted attacks — Mosque” intended to taunt the United States. failing to detonate weapons in all of their last Attempts by the center’s imam to explain his three attempts — they have provoked pre - record of, and commitment to, building inter - cisely the kinds of polarizing reactions they faith coalitions did not neutralize opponents’ hoped for. When Farouk Abdulmutallab tried beliefs. They insisted that Muslims cannot and failed to down a jetliner on Christmas be taken on their word, citing as evidence a Day, the US government responded by sin - Qu’ranic verse in which the Prophet

January 2012 27 The Science of Security IV. A SPECTACLE FOR TWO AUDIENCES (PLUS A THIRD)

Mohammed instructed a subordinate in his mental processes humans use to organize real - army to deceive their enemy. ity at a categorical conceptual level, which, in turn, allows us to infer properties of individu - Such reactions are not at all unique, of als from the categories to which they belong. 70 course. A broad and deep literature on in- This cognitive classification process is ex - group/out-group relations predicts not only tremely useful and efficient in the realm of that many (or most) humans exaggerate and inanimate objects, but it is identical in form to focus in on the differences between separate the stereotyping process we often use with our groups, 65 but also that they are much more much more complex fellow humans. In that likely to do so when they feel threatened by, or domain, our categories, and inferences based are in apparent conflict with, an out-group. 66 upon these categories, often break down. Various strands of in-group/out-group re - Stereotyping often causes policymakers and search, from Henri Tajfel’s “Social Identity the general public to violate Sun Tzu’s first Theory” through Jim Sidanius’s and Felicia rule of conflict: “Know Thy Enemy.” Worse, Pratto’s “Social Dominance Theory” 67 have as in the present case, it often causes people demonstrated through experimental and to mistake friends for enemies. field studies that humans are relatively “hard-wired” to see out-groups through In some cases, intergroup prejudices might distorted lenses. be useful and adaptive. Rallying against a common foe can productively increase in- Cognitive scientists interested in ethnocen - group cohesion. 71 But the conditions required trism and intergroup perceptions suggest that to trigger intergroup rivalry and in-group while prejudicial stereotyping is usually not cohesion are shockingly minimal and often rational from an objective or scientific per - irrational. The mere dividing of experimental spective (i.e., many or most ethnic stereotypes subjects into groups named “A” and “B” are substantially incorrect and un help ful), can inspire intergroup competition and the process whereby beliefs about out-group differentiation. 72 And Tajfel’s Social Identity members are collated is “subjectively rational” Theory research shows that in situations of in so far as it offers the individual mental intergroup comparison (whether cooperation, shortcuts that allow him or her to process the competition, or conflict), in-group members world with less effort. 68 will attempt to maximize the distinctiveness According to this Social Cognitive Theory 69 of their group even when that entails an absolute the ability to efficiently distill meaning from loss of social or economic resources for their own a complex and dynamic world derives from group .73 Follow-up studies have shown that

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these self-inflicted wounds are ignored by NOT ALWAYS BOOSTING participants and that they actually report POLARIZATION feeling better about themselves after sacri fic - The broad findings of research into intergroup ing utility to exclude or harm out-group competition and conflict strongly suggest members. 74 The findings from decades of that group psychology itself is one of the fac - research into inter-group psychology suggest tors increasing the longevity of, and damage that humans easily engage in group-affirming wrought by, terrorism campaigns. To illustrate conflict even when there is little rational basis how terrorist groups’ polarization can flourish for doing so. or fizzle based on the targeted populations’ In the context of terrorist attacks executed in group-psychological response, we compare the name of some out-group, these findings the intergroup dynamics of two militant predict that in-group member responses will theocratic campaigns in the United States: focus on achieving greater separation from one led by Christian theocrats, one by and punishment of those out-group members, Muslim theocrats. even to the detriment of other priorities, The United States has suffered well over a like achieving optimal security outcomes. century of terrorism from groups claiming to These very human reactions to intergroup competition or conflict, of course, play di - fight for Christendom. The Ku Klux Klan, rectly into terrorists’ polarization strategies. The Army of God, The Lambs of Christ, Though more study could be done, a number The Covenant the Sword and the Arm of the of authors have posited that such reactions Lord, Defensive Action, Hutaree, and several underlie the comparatively poor record other groups associated with the “Christian mass-democratic countries have had dealing Identity” or “Christian Patriot” movements with terrorism. 75 While autocratic regimes have wreaked episodic havoc on US citizens sometimes respond to political violence with for generations, killing many more people a dispassionate calculation of their strategic than have been killed in the United States by interests , elected officials are often rewarded Muslim terrorists. Yet, terrorism claiming in - when they respond to terrorism with policies spiration from a Christian God (all else being that express the outrage (and misperceptions) equal) is much less likely to incite polarizing of their electorates, with the best of them reactions from the American public and its learning to resist such expressionist impulses policymakers. This is so because the members over time. 76 of violent Christian theocracy movements seek to recruit a prospective constituency (Christians) that the vast majority of

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Americans perceive to be a significantly lieved their actions would be regarded as complex and incoherent category sharing heroic by their coreligionists and God. Such ascriptive characteristics broadly diffused limited and emotionally ‘hot’ information through out American society. Simply put, tends to swamp new information about the the prospective constituency such violent category, the precise thing that can help to Christian fundamentalist groups want to enlist break down harmful stereotypes (or at least are not an apparently coherent out-group make them more complex, flexible, and pro - around which Americans can generate credi - ductive.) 78 Studies show that the most effective ble fear-based stereotypes, much less mobilize way to dismantle inaccurate stereotypes is for policies designed to isolate, surveil, and through increased cooperative contact with control them. Consequently, Americans’ re - outgroup members. 79 But apart from those fa - sponses to Christian theocratic terrorism have miliar with public intellectual Fareed Zakaria, provided little to no traction or momentum basketball player Kareem Abdul Jabbar, for that terrorist movement. Congressman Keith Ellison, or comedian By contrast, hirabis’ prospective constituency Dave Chappelle, most Americans witness few is an easy target for misunderstanding and exemplars of the moderate and modernizing mistreatment. Many Americans mistakenly majority of Muslims. believe that Muslims courted by terrorists are With Arab and South Asian Muslims compris - identifiable by the ascriptive characteristics ing only about One percent of the American of Arab or South Asian heritage, like brown population, often isolated in diaspora com - skin. Actually, according to the research of munities, there may have been few groups in Duke University professor David Schanzer American society better situated for the ostra - and his colleagues, people charged for crimes cizing that would result if a terrorist group related to hirabi terrorism in America are executed an attack in their name. If a terrorist only slightly (and insignificantly) more likely group purporting to speak for Christians, to be of Arab descent than of African- African-Americans, Latinos, Japanese, Native or Caucasian-American heritage; and equal Americans, or most any other group found numbers of South Asians and African- in US society had carried out the 9/11 attacks, Americans have volunteered for hirabah Americans’ familiarity with the prospective since 9/11. 77 constituency would have substantially miti - Also, most US citizens’ knowledge of Muslims gated any rush to judge it as suspicious, goes little further than the fact that the 9/11 frightening, or deserving of invasive surveil - hijackers were Muslim, and apparently be - lance and security measures. But with the

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relatively recent (20 th century) immigration passenger prescreening system and no-fly lists of Arabs and South Asians into the United to avoid unnecessarily polarizing communities States, the testy relationship between US ally no more likely to identify with hirabism Israel and its Arab neighbors, and the media than the typical Christian is to identify with bias towards reporting spectacular tragedies Christian theocratic terrorism. everywhere, including from the Middle East, Americans have not been conditioned to re - THE PROSPECTIVE gard Muslims (if, and when, they do regard CONSTITUENCY: TURNING Muslims) with ease and understanding. That THEIR BACKS ON HIRABAH the events of 9/11 were purportedly carried To inspire new recruits and the general out in the name of Islam almost guaranteed support of their prospective constituency, ter - that policy responses would offer hirabis rorists attempt to describe their acts as heroic. strong polarizing effects with which to fertilize Heroes, in popular mythologies around the their movement. world, usually achieve unimagined success Fortunately, even though the last decade has against great odds, often through self-sacrifice. not witnessed a great deal of learning among Since terrorists are almost always facing great the US public — polls show that Americans’ odds, they can easily satisfy one condition anxiety about Muslims have attenuated little of the heroic “underdog” role. But to avoid since October 2001 80 — the United States se - seeming like mere troublemakers or mass- murderers they must also appear to act on curity apparatus has abandoned many of its behalf of their prospective constituency. most polarizing September 12 th policies. The Hirabis, therefore, attempt to project an FBI quit its controversial “Interview Project,” image of themselves and their actions as which submitted American residents from consonant with the prevailing values frame - Muslim-majority countries to a barrage of work of the Muslim communities they wish alienating questions about their commitment to recruit. to fundamentalist distortions of Islam. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Hirabis tell a self-narrative that attempts to scaled back and eventually abandoned its compare their acts to the fighting of honor - National Security Exit-Entry Registration able holy war, which has an illustrious System that placed young men from Muslim- tra di tion in Islam. The Prophet Mohammed is majority countries on de facto federal celebrated by Muslims not only for his military probation. And the Transportation Security prowess, but also for his wisdom and mercy Agency (TSA) has significantly reformed its during conflict. Islamic narratives of gentle -

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manly warfare carried forward through region far more hope for political change than Saladin’s repulsion of the European decades of hirabi violence ever did. Crusaders in the 9 th century (which inspired To be clear, the goal of creating hard-nosed great admiration even from his imprisoned Islamic theocracy has never been especially Christian adversaries) and into the present popular in the region anyway. Though polls day. Hirabi militants seeking to identify them - of Muslims often show significant support for selves with these examples are sure to offer basing legislation on interpretations of found - some (even obtuse) warning to their victims. ing Islamic texts and parables (just as US polls And they nearly always describe their attacks show that the majority of Americans support as defensive or retaliatory, referencing the basing legislation on the Bible and Ten plight of Palestinians in Israel, Iraqis under Commandments), 84 large majorities in pre - UN sanctions, Chechens vying for independ - dominantly Muslim countries reject the notion ence from Russia, or even Bosnians, who they felt were unfairly disarmed by NATO forces that government should be run by clerics or during the Balkans Wars. Even the attacks of based entirely on the most stringent interpre - 85 86 September 11 th were justified as defensive op - tations of Sha’ria law. Even more yearn for erations. And in his address to Americans democratic institutions and basic liberties like 87 immediately before the 2004 presidential elec - freedom of speech and political association. tions, Bin Laden offered an alternative course These majorities have never even supported of action (electing John Kerry) to Americans the extreme goals of the hirabi movement, interested in a cessation of violence: “fulfilling setting aside questions of its tactics. the ‘duty to retreat’ element of the self-de - Furthermore, only a small minority of the 81 fense argument.” Osama Bin Laden, early in minority who do support fundamentalist his career, even anointed himself a religious theocracy continue to embrace violence 82 scholar so that he could issue his own fatwas . 88 against civilians as a means to achieve it. Right now, though, the receptivity of Muslim Similarly-minded activists who share some audiences to the hirabi narrative may be at its of the hirabi vision but disagree with their ap - lowest point ever. The years of violence proach present perhaps the greatest obstacle targeting Muslims have eroded nearly all legit - to the long-term survival and success of hirabi imacy hirabi groups held with pockets of the terrorist groups. These nonviolent theocrats faithful. 83 And the largely nonviolent uprisings call for revolutionary mass action, even using of the Arab Spring (and Summer, Fall, and the rhetoric of jihad. But because they dis - Winter) have offered men and women of the avow terrorist tactics, they are able to steer

The Science of Security 32 January 2012 IV. A SPECTACLE FOR TWO AUDIENCES (PLUS A THIRD)

potential hirabi sympathizers away from vio - of the Arab Spring. Not only are nonviolent lent pathways. Islamist groups, once banned from the politi - cal arena, gearing up for elections where they Islamist theocrats’ turn from violence and em - stand a real chance of winning influential brace of political action has been building blocs in new governments, many violent momentum for years now. Former Director of Islamist groups are laying down their arms National Intelligence Mike McConnell re - to engage in the newly opened political field. ported to Congress in 2008 that, “Over the Even al Gama’a Islamiyya, a faction of which past year, a number of religious leaders and was allied with al Qaeda, has sworn off fellow extremists who once had significant in - violence and formed its own political party fluence with al Qaeda have publicly criticized in Egypt. As nonviolent political engagement it and its affiliates for the use of violence.” Of those religious leaders and fellow extremists, becomes increasingly viable, hirabi approaches 90 journalists Peter Bergen and Paul Cruikshank become increasingly irrelevant. have highlighted public disavowals coming As terrorism scholar Olivier Roy conceives it, from former leader of the Libyan Islamic many members of the hirabi movement may Fighting Group, Noman Benotman; father have never shared the dream of a fundamen - of the Saudi fundamentalist religious revival talist Islamic utopia anyway. 91 Studies show (known as “the Sahwa”) and fierce opponent that most recruits are no more pious than their of any “infidel” occupation of Muslim lands, nonviolent peers, and often less so. 92 Instead, Sheikh Salman Al Oudah; former Zawahiri Roy argues, they appear to have joined the mentor and Islamic scholar Sayyid Imam Al movement they thought was best able to throw Sharif (aka Dr. Fadl); former supporter of Bin off the yoke of dominant and pathological po - Laden and al Qaeda, Imam Usama Hassan; litical and economic institutions they perceived former al Qaeda recruit, Hanif Qadir; and to be emanating from the West. The hirabi former mujahedeen fighter, Abdullah Anas. 89 movement may still appeal to some of these As fundamentalist Islamists peel off from individuals if it can portray Western influence the hirabi movement, they offer alternative as a major cause of people’s problems and its courses of action to others who may be anti-Western agenda as the only solution. But drawn to some aspects of the hirabi narrative, competing revolutionary movements, even sec - but are uncomfortable with the violence ular ones, are likely to sap strength from that they perpetrate . narrative. They may not be able to promise Islamist theocrats’ transition to nonviolent their most outraged neophytes opportunities politics has accelerated further with the events for extremely violent adventure, but as recent

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history has shown, they can offer higher anything else. 94 And Max Abrahms has prospects of success and a sort of struggle argued that grizzled and specialized terrorists, most disaffected youths will find more salutary at some point, become so dedicated to their and vivifying than committing spectacular craft and their fellows that their specific cause mass murder. To the extent that competing or strategy matters less to them than continu - revolutionary movements (of any ilk) are pop - ing the fight. 95 Ralph Dowling has gone so ular, viable, and promising, observers can far as to argue that displaying self-relevance expect them to siphon support from terrorist is the primary goal of most terrorist groups. 96 groups also seeking political upheaval. Indeed, the 1990s literature on “new terror - ism” frequently supposed that terrorists’ RANK AND FILE HIRABIS: ambitions were substantially narcissistic MAINTAINING MORALE (which only added to their incommensurable unreality .) While hirabis are performing for the two dif - ferent audiences they seek to polarize, they All of these works point to the conclusion that are also performing for themselves and each what terrorists do to satisfy themselves can be other. The life of a terrorist, as we discuss in disconnected from, and even harmful to, their Section VI, is not easy. Material rewards are larger strategies for winning over prospective scarce, and life underground and on the run constituents and provoking poorly targeted is very challenging. Maintaining morale is state repression. Recruits hungry for action difficult , but it tends to spike with the adrena - sometimes wish to wantonly kill ‘apostate’ line-filled celebration of a successful attack. Muslims who lack their zeal, but only drive Bruce Hoffman has chronicled various former more Muslims away from their cause. Foolish terrorists’ descriptions of this “rush,” but it terrorists focused on kill counts may want to may be captured best by Menachem Begin’s devise ways to target their enemies’ children reappropriation of Descartes’ “existential or burn down their schools, aprovoking wide - proof.” As Begin put it: “We fight, therefore spread public backlash. Daredevils may be we are! ” 93 more interested in pulling off a shocking stunt that impresses their peers than designing Though sometimes overlooked in threat attacks that strategically move their enemies assessments, the notion that morale plays a or prospective constituency. part in terrorist attacks is not new. Ami Pedhazur has shown how a rise in Palestinian Sometimes, leaders of terrorist groups find it suicide bombing was driven more by intra- necessary to allow this kind of activity. The terrorist competition for prestige than summer of 2011 may have provided an excel -

The Science of Security 34 January 2012 IV. A SPECTACLE FOR TWO AUDIENCES (PLUS A THIRD)

lent case in point. With hirabis’ prospective prayers to shoot them ‘execution style’ in the constituency absorbed in historic political street — were both brutal and tone deaf in developments not likely to be aided by violent terms of propaganda. But allowing the blood - campaigns, their near enemies (provisional shed may have at least allowed some hirabis to governments) largely supported by those feel they were doing something, anything, as prospective constituencies, and their far history seemed to be passing them by. Such enemy (the United States) answering provoca - attacks may sustain hirabis for a time, but in tions not with polarizing ground occupations strategic terms, they are comparable to eating but with surgical drone strikes, hirabis were one’s own limbs to delay starvation. If hirabis performing before a nearly empty theater. remain unpopular with their prospective con - stituency while self-determinative political It is little surprise, then, that hirabis attempted mechanisms continue to offer Muslims more to recruit new audiences in new theaters while promising avenues of political reform, they allowing younger guns to run self-satisfyingly may face a slow death from lack of relevance. wild in the summer of 2011. At the same moment al Qaeda announced Bin Laden’s successor, it also announced its renewed com - mitment to engage in battles in Somalia, Chechnya, and the Palestinian territories — places where its activity had been limited. Weeks later, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb made news for reaching out to a militant Islamist group in Nigeria to try to gain a foothold there. And al Qaeda has strength - ened its ties to al Shabaab. With these moves, al Qaeda increased the odds that it could become relevant in some territory.

To maintain hirabis’ sense of self-relevance, al Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate also (probably) “greenlighted” multiple attacks there on the first day of Ramadan. 97 Neither al Qaeda in Iraq, nor al Qaeda Central has officially claimed the attacks, many of which — like the dragging of men from a mosque during

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To effectively communicate to their various provocations is not a simple matter. An attack audiences, hirabis not only attempt to explain that is too small or ineffective may be ignored their attacks as self-defensive and heroic, they by counterterrorist forces. An attack that is too choose their weapons and target sites with at large or atrocious, or inappropriately targeted least an intuitive understanding of how they may inspire an overwhelming security reprisal will provoke target states, feed into recruit - and/or public revulsion, backlash against ment narratives, reflect martial values that the terrorist group, and/or defection by mem - build member morale, generate spectacular bers or allies unwilling to associate themselves media coverage, and produce maximal psy - with atrocities or withstand subsequent secu - chological impact on their audiences. Data rity pressures. (presented in Section II) show that hirabis have been most apt to hit government or Al Qaeda’s internal communications display symbolic buildings with bombs. But they also their concern with the task of calibrating their 99 display a preoccupation with transportation provocations. Osama Bin Laden and his targets — trains, buses, and especially planes. Shura 100 council even discussed the likelihood We suggest, against some commentators and extent of a US counterattack in the run claims that terrorists attack “randomly” or up to 9/11. 101 Early al Qaeda attacks on US “indiscriminately,” 98 that these targeting and interests, like the coordinated bombings of US weapons-use patterns, as well as the implicit embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, incited US attack-design schemas that produce them, are missile strikes on Afghan targets and a phar - explicable and worthy of additional research. maceutical factory in Sudan believed to be After discussing the factors that influence associated with the production of chemical terrorist targeting, we illustrate how they com - weapons, but did not drive the United States bine to make airplanes the most highly valued entirely from the region as intended. The targets of terrorist attacks. attack on the USS Cole off the port of Aden, Yemen garnered no military response at all. At EFFECTIVELY CALIBRATING the time, incoming President George W. Bush TERRORIST ATTACKS: said he was “tired of [a US policy toward al GOADING THE GIANT Qaeda that amounted to] swatting at flies.” 102 The success of hirabi attacks depends heavily The 9/11 attacks, however, overshot al on their ability to provoke a larger and more Qaeda’s goal in terms of provocation, eliciting powerful enemy to behave against its own in - widespread international condemnation and terests. Designing and calibrating such an overwhelming NATO response that deci -

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mated al Qaeda’s Afghan organization and its “groups claiming to act in the name of Taliban hosts. 103 religious doctrine are often more apoc - alyptic in their rhetoric than in their The notion that militant hirabis calibrate the behavior. They have often shown lethality of their attack runs counter to the themselves to be astute political strate - idea that terrorists attack with the goal of gists, using terrorism successfully to creating as many casualties as possible. These drive out foreign military forces or dis - charges have been frequently leveled by rupt peace processes. Hezbollah and authors who believe that hirabis attack not Hamas are excellent examples, and al to influence human affairs or audiences, but Qaeda’s activities can also be inter - to gain the favor of some vengeful deity. Some preted in pragmatic terms. Acting in evidence supports claims that religious groups the name of religion does not mean are more lethal than others. Bruce Hoffman acting without reason .” 105 has documented the fact that religious terrorist groups produce a disproportionate number A circumspect view of this matter might note of total terrorism deaths in most given years. 104 that different terrorists likely orient toward While this evidence is compelling, i t is worth their activity in different ways. Those in posi - noting that some of the higher death toll asso - tions of strategic leadership may behave coolly ciated with religious terrorism likely results and strategically, deploying religious justifica - from interreligious/interethnic communal tions in service of a strategy seeking political violence in many parts of the world. The situ - power. Others, perhaps bellicose young re - ation of two religious terrorist groups engaged cruits with the zeal of converts, may be driven in escalating conflict against each other is more by some mix of youthful adventure seek - quite different from, and more lethal than, ing and “true religion.” 106 forms of terrorism targeting governments that Internal al Qaeda documents, at least, reflect often attempt to deescalate terror campaigns. its leaders’ awareness of the dangers of indis - But even taking the evidence of dispropor - criminate killing. 107 Ayman al Zawahiri’s tionate lethality at face value, many scholars correspondence to Abu Zarqawi, admonishing who study terrorist behavior and communi - him for the counterproductive effects of his cation conclude that hirabis are driven by grotesque brutality in Iraq, is famous in the sub stantially earthly ambitions, and are capa - terrorism literature. 108 And the Combating ble of savvy political calculation. According Terrorism Center’s (CTC) report on al to Stanford Professor and terrorism expert Qaeda’s internal documents, “Harmony and Martha Crenshaw: Disharmony,” offers several other examples of

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self-understandings as well. Many hirabis see al Qaeda leadership stressing the need to con - themselves as holy warriors on a path leading trol the violence of overzealous operatives and to heaven. Those volunteering to carry out op - maintain an appreciation for public percep - erations seek glory in battle and, inshallah (if tions of their attacks. 109 God wills it), a martyr’s death. These opera - These sources debunk the notion that hirabis tives probably gravitate to the use of bombs are trying to kill as many people as possible. and guns that give them an exhilarating sense On the contrary, they are trying to garner of doing battle. Silently releasing biological particular audience responses as we have ex - and chemical agents, by comparison, may gen - plained above. As the reaction to 9/11 taught erate relatively less excitement for trigger-men, many hirabis, bigger attacks are not always in addition to violating norms of honorable strategically better. Conventional bombs and war-fighting. guns, targeted to harm populations the gov - Of course, research shows that killing is more ernment is sworn to protect, can significantly difficult for humans in practice than it is in discredit state competence and provoke dele - theory. 110 The same young recruits who were gitimizing state reactions. But weapons that excellent videogame marksmen at home may significantly escalate terrorism campaigns be - lose their stomach for shooting when staring yond what states have become accustomed to down the barrel at a live human, preferring — like the attacks on 9/11, or feared biologi - instead to kill from a safe and impersonal dis - cal, chemical, or nuclear attacks — may go tance. But just like modern militaries, militant too far, alienating potential supporters and groups use group pressure and leaders’ author - garnering a hardline state response that large ity to normalize, valorize, and encourage majorities see as entirely legitimate. As we dis - killing. 111 Group-based martial values derived cuss further in Section VII, many of the most from such collective training and indoctrina - feared weapons, like nuclear bombs and bio - tion probably lead many terrorists to prefer logical and chemical weapons, may work best more conventionally-masculine battle using when they are just used as bluffs. guns and explosives. Future interview studies with former hirabis might test and develop EFFECTIVE RECRUITING AND this hypothesis further. MORALE BOOSTING MAXIMAL DISPERSION: Hirabi attempts to narrate their attacks as self- CREATING A MEDIA SPECTACLE defensive and compatible with Islam’s just war tradition provide more than an external justi - Another potential problem with biological or ficatory façade; they penetrate hirabis’ chemical poisons is their relative weakness for

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garnering media attention. As J.B. Bell wrote Within split seconds victims and bystanders over thirty years ago, terrorists “are, in fact, see an incredible flash, hear a boom of thun - television producers constructing a package so der, feel a bursting shockwave of heat and fire, spectacular, so violent, so compelling that the and smell the acrid stench of burning fuel and networks, acting as executives, supplying the flesh. The extreme nature of these sensual cameramen and the audience, cannot refuse traumas can create new neurons imprinted the offer.” 112 But for these media spectaculars with the details of the survivors’ situation in to appeal to broadcast audiences, terrorists the moment immediately before and as the must deliver compelling visual footage. blast occurs — a neurophysiological adaption Earth-shattering explosions, buildings ablaze, designed to warn them away from similar fu - 113 bloodied, shell-shocked victims walking ture dangers. The crack of gunfire, emitting among the fallen, and gunmen mowing down from the second most used tool of terrorism, panicked crowds all fit the bill. Severely can be similarly shocking to the senses. ill people expiring from internal hemorrhag - Indeed, the famous behavioral scientist J.B. ing offer comparatively little in the way of Watson identified loud noises as one of hu - 114 compelling footage. While any large-scale poi - manity’s three innate fears. soning, if it can be accomplished (a subject to Other weapons, dreaded but rarely used, lack which we turn later), is sure to generate news these sense-shaking characteristics. Poisons commentary, it is less likely to produce the sort and biological agents are usually entirely un - of visual propaganda that would be contin - detectable to the senses. Though they might ually looped on 24-hour news channels, and increase dread of terrorism in the abstract, therefore less likely to produce the sort of these weapons have less impact on the neuro - visceral trauma terrorists wish to create. physiology of survivors. And while they may be useful on a small scale for assassinations, MAXIMAL PSYCHOLOGICAL they are less adept at inciting the sorts of IMPACT: TARGETING HUMAN spectacular traumas that coerce policymakers EMOTIONAL SYSTEMS and publics.

Terrorists have not only developed an intu - OTHER FACTORS: ition about the media and political impacts of CATASTROPHIC SUCCESS, their targets, they also choose their weapons ATTRITION with an eye for their psychological impacts. Bombs create a spectacle for almost all the We believe the above categories capture the senses — sight, hearing, touch, and smell. major factors that influence terrorists’ (espe -

January 2012 39 The Science of Security V. THE METHODICAL MADNESS OF HIRABI ATTACK DESIGN

cially hirabis’) selection of weapons and tar - As for attrition, while al Qaeda’s rhetoric, gets, but others may also have an impact. It is indeed , frequently references the bleeding of possible that terrorists consider the intensity America’s economy and morale, there is little trajectory of their attacks, seeking to project evidence that attrition guides their targeting a constant upward momentum. Thus, some choices. If hirabis’ targeting choices were authors have attempted to explain al Qaeda’s driven by attrition, we would expect many failure to execute another major attack on more attacks on infrastructure critical to the American soil since 9/11 as a function of US economy. Instead, hirabis still design at - their “catastrophic success” on that day. The tacks to create fearful spectacles. They do tend attack is said to have been too good to be to trot out notions of “attrition” when attacks topped. Others have argued that hirabis are fail, or when no attack occurs at all but hirabi likely to choose targets to advance al Qaeda’s leaders wish to rally their troops around the stated attrition strategy, one based on bleeding strategic efficacy of their mere existence. 115 the US economically, much as many hirabis But, based on the record of hirabi attacks, believe the mujahedeen successfully bled the we conclude that the attrition strategy, while Soviet Union (though almost all historians it may contribute to the long-term goal of would rate the failed Afghan invasion as a removing US influence from the MENA minor cause for the collapse of the USSR). and Central Asian regions, is not a significant While these factors may have some influence contributing factor in hirabis’ targeting on the hirabi targeting calculus, we suggest decision -making. that they are only secondary concerns, at best. AIRPLANE ATTACKS: THE First, a number of attempted plots since 9/11 PINNACLE OF TERROR debunk the notion that al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other hirabi groups are unwilling to Though most observers agree that airplane execute attacks smaller than 9/11. Indeed, attacks appear to be valued at a premium by Richard Reid’s, Farouk Abdulmutallab’s, hirabi terrorists, precisely why this is the case Nidal Hassan’s, and Faisal Shahzad’s plots, has not been fully elaborated by terrorism as well as the printer bomb plot, would have scholars. 116 However, their appeal as targets been smaller in scale than 9/11. These and becomes apparent when we consider them other plots offer a wealth of evidence that in light of the factors enumerated above. hirabis continue to attempt attacks of any size Attacking government-secured transportation as soon as they are operationally feasible. advances multiple goals of terrorists at once.

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For one, such attacks show the state to be in - rorizing. In the first place, flying several capable of protecting its people, embarrassing thousand feet above the Earth is quite fear- it and provoking its (sometimes counterpro - inducing in a species that has been decidedly ductive) response. Second, because accessing ground-based since its beginnings. Even at any public transportation, especially planes, the height of our technological competence, requires people to pass through some level of relatively few people can experience heavy screening (backscatter X-ray machines in the turbulence without also suffering a twinge of case of air travel, but sometimes just the frightful adrenaline. Indeed, “sudden loss of peer screening of fellow passengers for other support (i.e. falling)” was another of the three modes of transport), a terrorist attack carried innate human fears Watson identified in his out in the name of a prospective constituency investigation of fear psychology. 118 Terrorists can provoke polarizing screening procedures attacking air transportation, therefore, need against that group. After 9/11, the US TSA not produce fear out of whole cloth; they can implemented what amounted to a de facto simply amplify preexisting fears. ethnic profiling policy that focused dispropor - Such fears are most reliably overcome by fac - tionate attention on people who hail from ing them down repeatedly, a fact well known predominately Arab or South Asian countries. to therapists who help people quash phobias. In the aftermath of Abdulmutallab’s more re - But few people fly often enough to overcome cent Christmas Day attempt, the TSA also their fear of turbulent air, much less terrorist instituted (then months later quietly retracted) bombings or hijackings. The fears generated a policy requiring travelers coming from or by a single attack can linger with infrequent passing through majority-Muslim countries to flyers for years. Attacks on commuter buses submit to heightened screening. Such policies, and trains in London and Madrid, by compar - because they divide populations into the very ison, no doubt generated broad-based fear categories terrorists seek to polarize, often for passengers there (and perhaps around the advance their general polarization/recruit - world) for a number of days. But the trauma ment strategy. dissipated fairly quickly. By all accounts, com - Third, attacks on public transit, especially muters, out of necessity (public transportation airplanes , exploit the heightened fear humans is the only reliable and cost effective way to get experience when they encounter risks over to work in many cities), faced down their fears which they do not have control. 117 Additional over a matter of days and returned to normal dynamics of human fear suggest other reasons levels of ridership. Terrorists hoping to create why air attacks, in particular, might be so ter - a broad-based and sustained level of horror

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MIGHT INSPIRE NEW SUPPORT/RECRUITS

Symbolic Gov’t Targets Cyber Attacks Transportation Targets Fedeyeen Attacks Bombs/IEDs Infrastructure Attacks Suicide Attacks Attacks on ‘Apostate’ Muslims Mass-Casualty Nuclear Attacks

Mass-Casualty Biological Attacks

Mass-Casualty Chemical Attacks

Mass-Casualty Radiological Attacks

Poisoning Food and Water Supplies

PROVOKES RALLIES STATE ESCALATION MEMBERSHIP

and dread will be most successful, it seems, poisons and other weapons, they simply use when they attack targets that many people them so frequently because they are so widely come into contact with, but do not frequent available. But when we observe hirabis’ target - in quotidian fashion. ing of planes, public transportation, and

Until now, little has been written about how g overnment buildings in light of their overall and why terrorists choose the targets and polarization and recruitment campaign, weapons they do. 119 It has been assumed by we are struck by the seamless compatibility many that hirabi terrorists seek to cause the between their tactics and strategy. While more greatest loss of life possible, or even that they research is needed to confirm our hypotheses target indiscriminately. The record of hirabi about terrorists’ targeting and attacking attacks, however, belies these claims. Perhaps, schemas, hirabis seem to intuit that some contrary to our suggestion that hirabis actu - forms of attack and some weapons are better ally prefer conventional guns and bombs to suited to their strategies than others.

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We have discussed what militant hirabi groups against them. While a small fraction of terror - are seeking to do and how they go about ist groups — those allied to well-organized, doing it. Below, we examine in more detail popular political movements attracting the the range of their capabilities as a function support of international elites — have seen of their organizational capacities and limits, their ultimate goals achieved, the vast majority the external (primarily counterterrorism) con - of terrorism campaigns have ended in defeat. straints they face, and the competencies of Even in the few “successful” cases, it is unclear the individuals who comprise them. While if terrorism precipitated victory for an allied these factors combine to produce the overall movement or if the movement succeeded de - 121 operational capability of terrorist groups, spite the use of terrorist tactics. they also influence one another through time. With so much stacked against them, terrorist We have attempted to portray some of this groups often die out after inspiring near- 120 causal mutuality below. universal public backlash, implode from infighting, succumb to the betrayal of inform - THE HARD ROAD OF ants or undercover security agents in their TERRORISM midst, or are thoroughly repressed by state 122 Focusing on the difficulties governments security forces. Below, we highlight some encounter as they deal with terrorism can of the key obstacles terrorist groups must sometimes lead us to forget that hirabis face overcome to succeed in their operations. far greater challenges. They are disadvan - taged in terms of manpower, weaponry, THE CHALLENGES OF SECRET legitimacy, support, and almost every imagi - ORGANIZATIONS nable social, political, economic, and cultural Like any organization, terrorist groups suffer resource. They must live, communicate, from endemic “principal/agent” problems, — coordinate, and execute their plans in secret. challenges arising from the fact that tasks may But they are also constantly striving to not be communicated to or carried out by increase support and membership. Even with - agents (e.g., employees or volunteers) accord - out security constraints, that task is difficult ing to principal’s (e.g., employers or leaders) since terrorists’ tactics are usually widely un - wishes. Operatives may bungle orders, they popular and their ambitions are often seen as may act inappropriately in the name of the or - delusional by wider society. The law is against ganization without permission, or leaders may them. Their friends and families are often ineffectively communicate their instructions. against them. And history appears to be As al Qaeda’s internal documents and corre -

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spondence reveal, principal/agent problems At least part of the reason such conversations can be especially pronounced in terrorist have been so public stems, paradoxically, from groups that must communicate under security the fact that terrorists must keep their commu - pressures. 123 Furthermore, leaders cannot ter - nications so secret. In a security environment minate the employment of operatives without where state officials can intercept point-to- risking significant blowback. Even threatening point cellular, electronic, and telephonic to fire an operative may push him into the communications, direct correspondence can hands of security officials. Leaders dedicated be very risky. As a result, many terrorist com - to advancing a recruitment/polarization munications not specific to particular strategy that avoids uncalibrated, revolting operations are published for all to see on the internet. 126 Counterterrorism analysts and violence often have difficulty managing zeal - academics have pored over these documents, ously violent operatives. exploiting their strategic telegraphy (in works like, “Stealing the Al Qaeda Playbook”) 127 THE CHALLENGE OF to produce more effective counterterrorism COORDINATING DISCOURSES strategies, a subject to which we now turn. OF VIOLENCE

Hirabi militant groups often suffer from multi - COUNTERTERRORISM – ple internal fractures concerning ideology, DENYING SAFE HAVEN strategic communications, and tactics. Al Though the strategic use of terrorism seeks to Qaeda’s central organization, for example, goad targeted states into polarizing reactions, has fought over its ideological underpinnings not all state reactions work to terrorists’ advan - since it was first cobbled together out tage. The invasion of Afghanistan and other of a multinational mujahedeen force in international counterterrorism efforts greatly Afghanistan. Disputes have raged over fun - disturbed the trajectory of al Qaeda as an or - damental questions like whether political ganization. By the second half of the 1990s, compromises are ever useful, whether Shi’a the group had slowly amassed hundreds of Muslims should be included in the movement, members, thousands of supporters, and had and who can legitimately be targeted for trained perhaps thousands of men in basic attacks . Internal documents and highly public guerrilla warfare tactics. The group was also conversations within the militant hirabi able to recruit consultants on chemical, bio - community show that these debates are more logical, and nuclear weapons to explore than academic. 124 125 developing such weapons. But when the 9/11

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attacks inspired an international invasion of ample evidence suggests that al Qaeda has Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, much of this experienced serious budget limitations. activity ceased. 128 The organization lost half A CTC report cites al Qaeda documents or more of its personnel and many of those showing that at various points in the past few captured or killed had held important logis - years, al Qaeda Central has solicited funds in tical and management positions. The large, ways that betray significant financial difficul - hierarchical, globally-connected hirabi ties. 130 A budding Bahraini terrorist cell was organization working towards developing broken apart in July 2008 and charged with, threatening weapons and training fighters among other things, directing their small from around the world was, by 2002, just independently generated funds to al Qaeda a hollowed out shell of weakened militants Central. This reversal of the more typical top- surrounding a few vital personalities. down resource flow has not been exceptional. In July 2005, Zawahiri wrote to Iraqi Sunni COUNTERTERRORISM – insurgent leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi asking DRYING UP FUNDING for “ a payment of approximately one hundred CHANNELS thousand [because] many of the lines have 131 While degrading the territorial safe haven that been cut off.” Al Qaeda Central has also allowed al Qaeda to plan attacks and train stepped up its internet-based fundraising ef - recruits , the United States also worked to dry forts over the last few years. In May 2007, up their funding channels. The United States Saeed al Masri, al Qaeda’s number three and took advantage of an international mood financial director at the time, issued the follow - favoring cooperation and led global efforts ing webcasting: to secure and monitor money being funneled “As for the needs of the ‘jihad’ in to violent anti-government groups. The Afghanistan, the first of them is finan - Department of the Treasury partnered with cial. The mujahedeen of the Taliban Belgium’s Society for Worldwide Interbank number in the thousands, but they lack Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) to funds. And there are hundreds wishing track and significantly disrupt al Qaeda’s to carry out martyrdom-seeking oper - pre-9/11 funding network. While some have ations, but they can’t find the funds questioned the efficacy of such efforts, argu - to equip themselves. So funding is the ing that they have merely driven the group mainstay of jihad. … And here we to channel its finances through traditional would like to point out that those who (and virtually untraceable) hawala networks, 129 perform jihad with their wealth should

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be certain to only send the funds to (CFATS) that coordinate the security efforts those responsible for finances and no of private chemical manufacturers and local, other party, as to do otherwise leads to state, and federal officials. DHS inspectors disunity and differences in the ranks of enforce the standards, guidelines, and regula - the mujahedeen.” tions of CFATS to ensure that a range of dual-use chemicals (which can be used for The apparently cash-strapped group even industrial purposes or to create weapons) are employed Zawahiri in a “robocall” fundrais - ing campaign in Saudi Arabia in 2008. 132 closely guarded and carefully transferred and Another more urgent plea for “jihad with transported . Only licensed buyers can access money” came from al Masri in 2009. 133 And dangerous chemicals in bulk. If some terrorist in 2010, al Qaeda Central sent out desperate group sought to compromise a licensed buyer fundraising appeals at least three times. 134 or seller of the chemicals, the compromised person could quickly be discovered by regula - Financial barriers are not likely to entirely tors and investigators, which deters such undermine hirabi efforts. But they do slow the activities in the first place. consolidation of money and power into the hands of a hirabi elite, preventing the devel - Biological agents that could be used to develop opment of a sophisticated hierarchy able to bioweapons are similarly monitored and train new recruits and invest in new and more controlled via the coordinated efforts of the lethal weapons. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the COUNTERTERRORISM – Department of Health and Human Services’ SECURING DANGEROUS (HHS) National Science Advisory Board for MATERIALS Biosecurity (NSABB). The scope of biological The United States, in addition to preventing agent activities to secure is even more con - terrorists from raising money to research and strained than for dual-use chemicals. While develop massively destructive weapons, has dual-use chemical facilities may be found in participated in expanding and overlapping urban industrial zones around the country, international treaties and conventions curtail - dangerous biological agents only exist within ing the production or sale of CBRN weapons a small network of high-containment lab- or the materials needed to produce them. By oratories (usually connected to hospitals, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security universities, and/ or government agencies like (DHS) formalized a set of regulations, the the CDC) with strict security protocols to pre - Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards vent spread of dangerous pathogens. Workers

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in these labs, their projects, and any pub li- any suspicious or unsanctioned activity. 136 cations from their work are vetted by Over the last ten years, in an effort to ensure institutional biosafety committees to ensure that terrorists cannot access nuclear materials, that the risks of research into dangerous dis - participating IAEA countries have voluntarily eases do not outweigh the benefits. According submitted to a more rigorous and frequent to the 2009 report of the Trans-Federal inspections regime. The two key nuclear pow - Task Force on Optimizing Biosafety and ers, the United States and Russia, have worked Biocontainment Oversight, comprised of to reduce their nuclear arsenals and convert officials from the Departments of Health and their weapons-capable materials into safe fuel Human Services, Agriculture, Commerce, for nuclear power plants. Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Labor, State, Transportation, and Veterans’ Affairs, COUNTERTERRORISM – in addition to the Environmental Protection PORT, BORDER, Agency and the National Science Foundation, AND AIRPORT SECURITY “a robust system for bio-safety and biocon - In addition to securing the materials of mass- tainment oversight of high and maximum scale violence at their source, the United containment research and related activities States has also improved security at its borders is in place.” 135 and at points of entry into the country. The Nuclear materials are also very closely formalization of airport screening by the TSA guarded. The International Atomic Energy has raised barriers to more weapons and ex - Association (IAEA) has been closely regulating plosives. Despite popular criticism that the the sale, transfer, transportation, and use United States screens too few of the contain - of radiological and nuclear materials since ers entering its ports, the Container Security its creation in 1957. IAEA safeguards have Initiative (CSI) of DHS has secured interna - evolved to become more stringent and exact - tional cooperation with ports around the world ing since their conception and include to increase screening of nearly 86 percent of remotely monitoring nuclear material invento - the cargo that eventually enters the country. 137 ries, maintaining close measurement and Increased international intelligence coopera - oversight of fissionable materials, inspecting tion and air cargo screening also helped to foil nuclear facilities (sometimes unannounced), the first air cargo attacks attempted by hirabis overseeing sale and transfer of materials, in November 2010. In addition to keeping setting security standards for nuclear energy harmful cargo from entering the country, the facilities, and conducting investigations into TSA and other agencies, like the Bureau of

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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) targeting can be continually improved (and we and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) hope this paper contributes to that effort), bil - have worked to prevent terrorists from setting lions of homeland security dollars have been foot on American soil. ICE’s biometric iden - dedicated to the enhancement of surveillance tity verification processes for non-US citizens and shielding of potential targets around the (part of their US-VISIT program) aims to cut country, as well as damage mitigation proce - down the incidence of passport fraud, and dures should they be attacked. Metropolitan recent improvements to TSA’s passenger- areas have been equipped with sophisticated screening systems demonstrate the continual sensors able to detect pathogens and toxins in evolution of counterterrorism in response or around food and water supplies. And bil - to terrorist threats. 138 Together, the work of lions more have been spent securing nuclear multiple agencies rounds out a multi-layered facilities like Indian Point, less than forty miles from Manhattan. defense of American borders, from securing trade routes abroad to screening travelers and While these large sums may be misspent or cargo in ports of entry at home. overspent in some places, they have certainly made the task of attacking symbolic targets COUNTERTERRORISM – like the Statue of Liberty or the Washington HARDENING TARGETS Memorial more difficult. Tens of billions have also been spent preventing the hijacking or In the wake of 9/11, the US government bombing of airplanes. While, as others have established the Department of Homeland argued, some portion of those resources Security and tasked it with, among other appears to accomplish the appearance of things, assessing America’s vulnerabilities and security more than tangible security out - prioritizing resources for the protection of comes, 140 TSA screening has ensured that the potential targets. Initial assessments of vulner - last two attempts to bomb American airliners abilities were overly broad and offered little used unreliable chemical explosives that direction to policymakers regarding the allo - ultimately harmed no one but the men at - 139 cation of security resources. But over the tempting those attacks. years, DHS budgets have become somewhat more focused, targeting resources to the creation of multi-layered security systems for many national monuments and centers of American power. While the process for understanding and responding to terrorist

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COUNTERTERRORISM – minds have become the most crucial fronts in INCREASINGLY SURGICAL USE Iraq and Afghanistan, the casualty rates for OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND American service members and Iraqi and DRONE STRIKES Afghan civilians have generally diminished. At the same time, the rate of hirabi deaths has When the United States first undertook a continued to climb. As US military targeting “global war on terror,” waging ground war becomes more discerning, bystander popula - was one of its primary tactics. Over time, tions are less likely to see Americans as the however, US military and security officials invading monsters of hirabi fables. learned that the war in Iraq, and the subse - quent occupation, probably produced more THE HIRABI MOVEMENT’S terrorists than they neutralized 141 — and of - ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION fered those terrorists relatively easy targets. IN THE FACE OF Gradually, US and allied forces became more COUNTERTERRORISM skilled at avoiding conflict with the popula - tions they were charged to police and protect. Since the invasion of Afghanistan and the And eventually, the US missions in both Iraq decimation of al Qaeda’s hierarchical central and Afghanistan have evolved beyond the organization there in 2001 and 2002, most kind soldiers were originally trained to fulfill. observers have noted a shift in al Qaeda’s Though US armed forces spend a lot of time structure to a looser, multi-nodal network. 143 and energy training young men to become Rather than serve as an operational logistics soldiers who can kill when necessary, killing is and financing hub, al Qaeda Central began usually a discouraged practice for the vast ma - focusing its efforts on inspiring and guiding the jority of infantry and marines dedicated to strategy of would-be hirabis around the globe. Afghan and Iraqi counterinsurgency missions In this capacity, they have claimed some credit seeking to win “hearts and minds.” 142 Instead, for international attacks without playing much killing is to be carried out by special-forces or any role in their planning or financing. units in the dead of night, or by unmanned More than anything, al Qaeda seeks to be the aerial vehicles that rain down precision- brand name for the global hirabi movement. guided missiles from several thousand feet. Al Qaeda Central has survived and enjoyed These shifts in mission and operations have moderate success not because it was ever begun to produce a shift in the relationship particularly large or robust — its core organi - between American soldiers and the popula - zation in Afghanistan has never grown beyond tions with whom they interact. As hearts and a few hundred members 144 — but because it

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cornered the market (among hirabi groups) on Algeria (al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb), the “far enemy” strategy and an anti-imperial, Iraq (al Qaeda in Iraq), and Somalia (al anti-American narrative tailored for a Muslim Shabaab or al Qaeda in East Africa). Of those audience. As the keepers, coordinators, and franchises, only AQAP has attempted any far financiers of that strategy and that narrative, enemy attacks. The others appear to be free they have been able to attract and establish riding on the al Qaeda name without making a sort of “brand loyalty” among supporters, costly contributions to the far enemy element recruits , and donors. As a result, many more of its strategy. local independent hirabi militant groups have Right now, too, there is considerable specula - sought to boost their own appeal by adopting tion about how committed these groups are the al Qaeda brand name or affiliating them - to al Qaeda’s new leader, Ayman al Zawahiri. selves with the organization. It was several weeks after the announcement This branding and affiliation practice has not of his ascension before all of al Qaeda’s only made al Qaeda appear larger, it has named franchises made their obligatory public helped its affiliates and their operatives seem statements accepting his leadership — some more menacing. Global publics might have relatively lukewarm. As of this writing, no feared little from Algeria’s Salafist Group for other hirabi group (not bearing al Qaeda’s Preaching and Combat. But when the group brand name), other than the organizationally adopted al Qaeda’s brand and strategy, overlapping Pakistani Taliban, has spoken up calling itself al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to salute the new leader. Some attribute this (AQIM), publics become worried that the tepid reception to Zawahiri’s gruff and dry group responsible for killing 3,000 Americans style, but it is also unclear how Zawahiri’s on 9/11 was opening a franchise in Europe’s (and al Qaeda’s) preferred far enemy strategy backyard. Many groups affiliated with advances the interests of any other hirabi al Qaeda are like AQIM. They have not group at this time. demonstrated special skill at advancing a Hirabi groups in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, polarization /recruitment strategy through the Bahrain, Yemen, and elsewhere certainly have use of transnational violence. But they gain more to gain by engaging (peacefully or not) credibility and give al Qaeda a larger interna - in ongoing local struggles than by lashing out tional footprint by adopting its brand. at some distant Western superpower. Doing so Thus, the al Qaeda brand name has been might provoke a US response, but it is not adopted in recent years by militant groups in likely to be the kind of ground occupation that Yemen (al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), Bin Laden and al Naji successfully turned to

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their advantage (for a time) in Iraq. 145 Instead, share the victories of an insurgent army esti - hirabi groups embarking on or even merely mated to be a few thousand strong. They may openly claiming a far enemy strategy are likely also secure a tranche of existential credit and to invite the drone strikes that have been deci - a possible safe haven should al Shabaab defy mating al Qaeda’s named franchises in the odds and hold stable territory in the horn Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and of Africa. But, al Shabaab’s alliance with Iraq. This dynamic could shift in the mid to al Qaeda may be more limited than either long term if hirabis sense that they can roil a group wishes to admit . The Somali group has nascent and stabilizing secular regime by pro - never demonstrated any dedication to a far voking foreign interventions that create a crisis enemy strategy. 146 of sovereignty. But, at least for the time being, Closer to home, al Qaeda Central may be in the possibility of winning real political power, danger of losing its most reliable ally of the either at the ballot box or in the street, seems last decade: the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah instead to be creating incentives for hirabis Omar. While the Taliban’s immediate reaction to give up their global violence, if not their to Bin Laden’s death included a eulogy and violence altogether. a vow of revenge, the group has said far less By contrast, al Qaeda Central has all of its about its continuing relationship with the post- prestige and influence to lose if it allows a Bin Laden organization. Multiple insiders full retreat from the far enemy strategy. With have suggested that the al Qaeda-Taliban allied hirabi groups distracted by local strug - marriage was always based much more on the gles opened up by the Arab Spring, and its mutual respect and compounding prestige inspirational and founding leader dead, the of Omar and Bin Laden than on the strategic group could fizzle out of existence. Perhaps, needs of the Taliban. The latter group, from fearing this outcome, al Qaeda’s command its founding, has been much more focused on council, in announcing Zawahiri’s promotion achieving control over Pashtun territories than and the continuation of their strategy, sought on creating a transnational caliphate. When to align the teetering organization with Bin Laden was able to bankroll those efforts the few armed struggles still at all relevant (even after attracting a massive post-9/11 to some Muslims: the civil war in Somalia, NATO reprisal) Mullah Omar was happier the ongoing struggle in Israel/Palestine, and fighting NATO forces than turning over the the independence movement in Chechnya. hero of militant hirabism to Western powers. By declaring a close bond with al Shabaab’s Zawahiri is no such hero, though, and his al efforts in Somalia, al Qaeda may be able to Qaeda is relatively cash-strapped and drawing

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major fire from the US military and CIA. It is level, are directly implicated in the rise of unclear to many why Mullah Omar, at this hirabism outside predominantly Muslim terri - point, would renew his subscription to the al tories. Over 80 percent of those involved in Qaeda club. With al Qaeda Central operating international terrorist attacks carried out by almost entirely from within Pakistani territory, al Qaeda and affiliated organizations through Omar would be smart to take a deal that ac - 2008 were living outside of their home complishes an American withdrawal from the country at the time they radicalized, often in Afghan territory he wishes to control. Europe. 149 They reported feeling alienated there, growing disaffected with their host soci - SELF-FORMING CELLS eties in their late teens and twenties. For them, international integration/assimilation failed. In addition to al Qaeda’s network of alliances, the group has also inspired several smaller Feeling disappointed and frustrated by eco - groups, self-forming cells, and (possibly) a rare nomic, cultural, and social exclusion, some “lone wolf” 147 to join the global hirabi move - young immigrants have identified with ment. According to Sageman, recruitment discourses — preached in some Salafist or messages for hirabah have lately found their Wahhabi mosques or by self-appointed imams most fertile ground in the minds of people — that compare their own experience of disenchanted with their life prospects (often feeling underappreciated, held down, and living in Western countries indifferent to the misunderstood by a wider community with cultural elements shaping their identities) and the plight of (a postmodern reconstruction determined to make their lives meaningful. of the history of) Islamic civilization. 150 The Young people in particular — those idealistic almost one-to-one identification between their enough to aspire to ‘greatness’ but, for what- situation and that of Islam has led some to ever reason, unable to achieve it through believe they are destined to emancipate them - traditional channels — are most likely to selves and the ummah (imagined Islamic world heed the call to arms. 148 community 151 ) through heroic action.

This is especially the case at this point in his - Such ideas find fertile ground in the frustrated tory. The two broad movements of advanced minds of markedly few people, and even they modernity, increasing economic and political rarely come to the extreme and violent theol - integration at the international level, and the ogy of hirabah by themselves. According proliferation of discourses and technological to interview studies with current and former channels for the making of (anti-) heroic iden - hirabis, knowledge or fidelity to a fundamen - tities and communities at the sub-national talist interpretation of the Qu’ran plays a

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much smaller role in determining who will the world... Sleeper cells are believed to be op - become a terrorist than the affiliations of erating in more than 60 countries controlled one’s friends. 152 Radicalization is usually a by a ‘Mr. Big’ who is based in Europe.” 154 In group process in which people iteratively con - the following years, reports of potential sleeper vince themselves that they should mutually cells continued to trickle across the pages of commit their lives to some great (mis)adven - US newspapers. 155 But in 2005, a classified FBI ture. Hirabah inspires markedly few “lone report partially leaked to ABC news declared wolves.” And for every one, there are many that, “US Government efforts to date…have more who joined as a ‘group think’ process not revealed evidence of concealed cells or allowed them to deepen and transform their networks acting in the homeland as sleepers.” pre-existing relationships and themselves. 153 No report, of course, can prove that sleeper Together, these groups of young men go cells do not exist in the United States. But if through similar trials and find meaning they do, it would be quite bizarre for them to together as they fight for a cause they believe have remained inactive during a decade that can make them heroes of a vast transhistori - has seen so many setbacks hirabis have so cal, transworldly, imagined community. desired to avenge.

SLEEPER CELLS FEWER RESOURCES, While the threat of terrorism may increas - LOWER COMPETENCE, ingly come from small, self-forming cells, WEAKER WEAPONS there was a period when security officials and Fortunately for their targets, many in the new experts were especially concerned about wave of the hirabi movement are less ‘sleeper cells’ – terrorist groups lying in wait, experienced and less connected than their living seemingly normal lives, but furtively predecessors. They receive less and lower- listening for word from Bin Laden to unleash quality training than previous recruitment untold horrors on innocent Americans. cohorts who benefited from al Qaeda safe Immediately after 9/11, such concerns found haven. And if recently attempted attacks in expression in dozens of media reports, the United States can serve as examples, they some more urgent than others. Just weeks appear to be less competent. Three of the last after the Twin Towers and Pentagon were four al Qaeda-inspired or coordinated attacks attacked, New York’s The Mirror reported that: attempted against American civilians failed “An 11,000-strong terrorist army trained by or were foiled thanks to the incompetence of Osama Bin Laden is ready to be unleashed on operatives . Najibullah Zazi was caught in the

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final steps of planning a 7/7 style attack on New York’s public transportation system after multiple indiscrete preparatory activities confirmed an international intelligence tip that he was involved with terrorism. Farouk Abdulmutallab bungled the ignition of his chemical explosive on Northwest Flight 295. And Faisal Shahzad failed miserably in his attempt to detonate a poorly constructed im - provised car bomb in New York City’s Times Square. 156 Given the constraints on many new terrorists’ technical expertise and their limited operational experience in an environment of heightened international intelligence cooperation , counterterrorists can expect the militant hirabis of the future to find more suc - cess when using tried and true (and readily available) weapons like bombs and guns, and less success with weapons that are more difficult to acquire, engineer, and deploy. We discuss these and other limitations in more detail below .

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Because of the strategic, discursive, and oper - 2002, retired four-star general Eugene ational constraints discussed above, hirabi Habiger, who led nuclear anti-terror programs terrorists are not likely to attempt many of the for the Department of Energy (DOE) until attacks analysts and policymakers have most 2001, stated that when it came to nuclear feared. But even supposing they might seek terrorism “it’s not a matter of if; it’s a matter 157 to switch to some new strategy based on co - of when.” Many other officials tasked ercing their enemies with horrifyingly deadly with national security, including former weapons, developing those weapons appears Governor Thomas Kean, Chair of the 9/11 to be well beyond the capabilities of today’s Commission, and FBI Director Robert hirabi groups. Here, we address the full range Mueller have publicly stated that they some - of potential terrorist attacks discussed by times sleep poorly because of fears of nuclear 158 America’s policymaking class and explain why terrorism. And all of the last four major- hirabis are likely to continue using a well- party presidential candidates have cited practiced but comparatively limited repertoire nuclear terrorism as their gravest concern. of attacks as they continue their efforts to gain support for their ambitions . Some academics, too, have joined in sounding the alarm and calling for increased measures

MASS CASUALTY ATTACKS to prevent WMD terrorism. As we have already noted, Graham Allison of Harvard’s Much of the fear surrounding terrorism has Kennedy School of Government and centered on the worst case hypothetical Director of its Belfer Center for Science and scenario of terrorists using WMDs. Bush’s International Affairs, has frequently raised the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was specter of nuclear terrorism. RAND re - not optimistic about America’s ability to searchers Eric Larson and John Peters, based prevent such an outcome when he testified on the (dubious) assumption that twenty-five to the Senate Armed Services Committee on terrorist groups had a 1/100 chance of em - Sunday, May 19, 2002: “Terrorist networks ploying a WMD in any given year, calculated have relationships with terrorist states that in 2001 that “the probability of a successful have weapons of mass destruction, and they attack in the next year is (1-(1-.01) 25 ) = 0.222, inevitably are going to get their hands on or a little over one in five. The probability of them, and they would not hesitate one minute a successful attack in the next 10 years is (1-(1- in using them. That’s the world we live in .” 159 160 .01) 25 *10) = 0.918, or about nine in 10.” Rumsfeld was not a lone voice in the military Perhaps based in part on Larson’s and Evans’s establishment making such an assessment. In calculations, the US government reported to

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the UN Security Council in June 2003 that Al Qaeda’s central organization first sought “there is a high probability that al Qaeda will to acquire such weapons, and/or the materials attempt an attack using a CBRN weapon to produce them, starting in the mid 1990s within the next two years.” according to the testimony of Jamal Ahmad al Fadl in the 2001 grand jury hearing of But so far, no terrorist group anywhere in the Osama Bin Laden ,162 but the uranium al world has been able to execute an attack even Qaeda thought it was buying turned out to a quarter as deadly as the 9/11 attacks which be of low quality, incapable of creating a killed nearly 3000 people. And none have nuclear blast. Regardless, Bin Laden stated in deployed the massively destructive CBRN a 1998 interview with Time magazine’s weapons of our nightmares. Security obsta - Rahimullah Yusufzai: cles, which we addressed above, have played a part in preventing groups from using WMDs, “Acquiring weapons for the defense but few non-state militant groups have ever of Muslims is a religious duty. If I had the money, safe haven, and personnel to have indeed acquired these weapons, begin weapons development programs. The al then I thank God for enabling me to Qaeda Central organization of the late 1990s do so. And if I seek to acquire these (before the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001- weapons, I am carrying out a duty. 2002) is an exception. But are hirabi groups It would be a sin for Muslims not to — even the arch-hirabi group, al Qaeda — try to possess the weapons that would interested in deploying such weapons? prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.” 163 DO HIRABIS WANT TO USE WEAPONS OF MASS This statement came at the end of a year DESTRUCTION? marked by escalating violence between Bin Laden’s network of self-described “jihadists” Despite evidence of hirabi militants’ careful and the United States. In the previous months, calibration of their attacks as effective “propa - Bin Laden issued a fatwa encouraging Muslims ganda by deed,” al Qaeda’s central leadership to kill any Americans, hirabis simultaneous has expressed significant interest in weapons bombed US embassies in Dar es Salaam and that would seem to go far beyond any meas - Nairobi, and President Clinton’s administra - ured act that could be spun as self-defense. tion launched retaliatory missile-strikes. These WMDs include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons capable of Though reports indicate that nothing came of killing tens of thousands or more at a time. 161 Bin Laden’s efforts then, he renewed his quest

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for WMDs with Zawahiri’s help in 1999 after won nuclear devices to terrorists, this is highly moving to Afghanistan. However, for reasons unlikely. The IAEA and the US government discussed more thoroughly below, al Qaeda have developed tools of nuclear forensics that has not yet been able to acquire or produce allow them to trace the origin of bombs even these deadliest weapons. after detonation. 167 168 This effectively places a “return address” on a nuclear attack, which, Regardless of their failures, the group deter - by the logic of mutually assured destruction, mined early on that they could achieve some deters states from relinquishing control of of the strategic advantages of holding devas - their nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, states tating weapons merely by claiming to possess lending nuclear weapons would have little them and threatening their use. As recalled by reason to trust that terrorists would keep al Masri in his account of al Qaeda’s discus - their secret or do with the weapon what they sions, the leadership never agreed about the promised . Terrorists could easily blackmail strategic value of WMDs, but saw verbal or threaten any donor state for more weapons threats as a way to “bestow some credibility or power. on the Mujahedeen, and maybe some respect, moral influence and an aura of invincibility The other way terrorists could get their hands in the minds of people” 164 The bluffs were on a nuclear weapon is to build one. But reported as credible intelligence by many first they would need to procure significant international spy agencies and newspapers, 165 quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU 169 but appear fairly transparent with the benefit or U-235) or plutonium. The latter is diffi - 166 cult to come by, is highly radioactive (easily of hindsight. setting off passive sensors and sickening those Even if one sets aside significant evidence that who handle it), and must be prepared inside al Qaeda was strategically bluffing about its nuclear reactors that are heavily guarded. WMD weapons programs, producing any of And building a plutonium bomb, because the feared weapons is exceedingly difficult. of its sophisticated architecture and pluto - nium’s dangerous radioactive instability, is NUCLEAR WEAPONS extremely difficult even for nuclear physicists and skilled engineers. Only a handful of countries with industrial - ized economies have ever accomplished the Terrorists’ hopes for a nuclear weapon, there - task of acquiring and assembling the ingredi - fore, rest on simpler uranium bombs that, ents for a nuclear weapon. While some worry while still requiring rare technical expertise, that states might simply hand over those hard may use a less complex “gun” mechanism

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(which fires a piece of HEU into a larger rial. The interdicted sales (if successful) would chunk of the same material) to create a vio - have only resulted in the transfer of less than lent nuclear chain reaction. 170 But there are 17.5 pounds of HEU and less than 1 pound of multiple hurdles to clear before even begin - plutonium. Even the most generous estimates ning the complex process of creating such a of terrorists’ technical ability and luck would “gun-bomb.” First, terrorists would need to require them to gather around 50 pounds of collect HEU. There are two paths by which HEU to construct a sophisticated and efficient they could do this. They could gather a great gun-bomb, 172 twice as much if their design deal of uranium-238 (which can be mined out were simpler. 173 As Vahid Majidi, head of of the ground) or reactor grade low enriched the FBI’s WMD directorate has recently uranium and then build technically precise concluded , the prospect of nuclear terrorism and powerful centrifuges able to spin the fissile is “very exciting, always good to see in a U-235 to the top. Those centrifuges, Libyan, movie setting...but we haven’t seen a credible Iraqi, and Iranian scientists can testify, require approach .” 174 industrial scale operations that are incredibly precise and very difficult to replicate. This RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS path, multiple authors agree, is not at all likely If terrorists cannot access enough HEU to cre - to be successfully tread by terrorists. 171 ate a nuclear bomb, they might be tempted to The only other path terrorists could take to use what little uranium they might acquire to create a uranium gun bomb would require construct a “dirty bomb.” Such a weapon uses that they beg, borrow, or steal HEU from a conventional explosives to disperse radioactive corrupt employee of some nuclear facility. material into a larger area. Dirty bombs are But, current international nonproliferation only sometimes considered WMDs in the efforts make that method of procurement counterterrorism literature since their effects exceedingly difficult even for well-financed are not likely to greatly outstrip those of con - sovereign states. Any illegal sale of fissionable ventional bombs in most cases. Deaths by material would launch an exhaustive manhunt radiation depend heavily on the type of mate - focusing on the relatively few people able to rial used. Gamma-emitting materials like access the material. Such attempted illegal caesium-137 (often used for radiation therapy sales of nuclear material were discovered against cancer) are more destructive to human eighteen times between 1993 and 2007 as tissues than alpha or beta-emitting materials states of the former Soviet Union reacted like uranium-235 and strontium-90 (which slowly to the need to secure fissionable mate - have several other medical uses). Alpha parti -

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cles can be blocked with a single piece of pa - easy to execute as some believe. The contain - per, while gamma particles require a few ment dome at Indian Point Nuclear Facility – centimeters of lead to shield against them. often represented as a prime target for terrorist attacks because it is only an hour’s drive from To the extent that radiological weapons are New York City — can withstand the impact terrorizing, the terror appears to be based of a jetliner and/or detonations from large mostly on ignorance of the basic nuclear bombs. 177 Other nuclear facilities may not be physics of radioactive dosing. While people so well protected, but they are also farther within a hundred meters of a dirty bomb from population centers, limiting their attrac - might die of a high radioactive dose — if they tiveness as targets. did not perish from the effects of the blast itself — most of the people farther away CHEMICAL WEAPONS or shielded by buildings would suffer only low doses of radiation comparable to those The use of chemical weapons by non-state 175 we experienc e on a particularly sunny day. groups is rare. Aum Shinrikyo, the apocalyptic Fears of radiological weapons, therefore, Japanese cult, executed the first non-state mostly come down to fear of fear (i.e., chemical attack against the public on the concern that a panic will ensue). Tokyo Metro in 1995. Though hundreds were The long-term economic impact of such a traumatized by their release of sarin gas in bomb, also cited as a major concern, depends the confined space, only a dozen died. Aum on the half-life of the material used. The Shinrikyo’s middling success points to some radioactive effects of a radium dirty bomb, of the major challenges of creating and using for instance, would fully dissipate to safe levels chemical weapons. First, compiling the ingre - (even at the epicenter) within a matter of dients for chemical weapons is difficult given days. A uranium dirty bomb, on the other surveillance and enforcement protocols. Dual- hand would require significant clean-up ef - use chemicals like chlorine, phosgene, and forts since the half-life of uranium-235 is over hydrogen cyanide are readily available for 700 million years. Some authors, especially licensed industrial users. But DHS’s CFATS after the Fukushima disaster, have also raised regime ensures that only well-trained, patient, concerns that terrorists would attack a nuclear and lucky terrorist operatives would have any power plant in order to spread radioactive chance at orchestrating the loading of the material over a population. 176 The economic chemicals undetected. Other chemicals, like impact of such an attack could certainly be the G- and V-nerve agents, incapacitating devastating. However, these attacks are not as agents, and the toxin ricin are difficult and

January 2012 59 The Science of Security VII. A LIMITED REPERTOIRE

dangerous to produce, especially in large quantities to do significant harm would be dif - quantities of sufficient quality to be used ficult without arousing suspicion. Because it is as weapons. And because their precursors so difficult to acquire or produce the chemicals do not have industrial uses, they are very and/or effectively disperse them into a crowd difficult to procure even for the skilled con- that is both captive and accessible, large-scale artist/terrorist . attacks are not likely to be attempted when other means are available. Small-scale attacks If terrorists could create or acquire such tox - would almost certainly be less effective than ins, weaponizing them presents other major those using conventional weapons and even hurdles. Some chemicals, like chlorine, are Rolf Mowatt-Larssen agrees that hirabis are “volatile,” meaning they evaporate at typical not likely to execute such attacks. 180 While an pressures and temperatures. They do not nec - essarily require sophisticated dispersal AK-47 is able to kill with the pull of a trigger mechanisms to be effective; they can simply it is also able to deter counterattacks. A terror - be spilled and their gases can be carried by ist employing a container with a spray nozzle, the wind. But most, and the most deadly, must on the other hand, could quickly and easily be be dispersed at a fairly specific particle size, neutralized by anyone armed with a gas mask, or “aerosolized,” to reach the most vulnerable a weapon, and/or a good amount of courage. parts of the human respiratory system. 178 Also, as we have suggested above, chemical at - Aerosolization is a difficult process that tacks do not fit the targeting schemas of requires a technical knowledge of fluid dy - terrorists because they lack the psychological namics and the coagulative properties of the impact and media cache of bombs and guns material being used. Or, if the toxic agent and are incompatible with hirabi narratives of is a solid in its weaponized form, it must be jihadist heroism. ground down to the correct particle size and Aum Shinrikyo was rare in its use of chemi - protected from static charges that can cause it cals. Its leader, Shoko Asahara, was said to be to agglomerate. In any case, the dispersal of obsessed with poisons. But even his group, in - chemical weapons is disrupted by even mild credibly well-funded (with around $300 wind, (too much or too little) humidity, air pol - million) when it attempted ten separate chemi - lution, ultraviolet light, or excessive heat. 179 cal terror attacks, could not manage to kill In the most ideal weather conditions, deadly more than a dozen people, much less bring on chemicals could potentially be aerosolized the dark apocalypse of Asahara’s nightmares. over crowds from some upwind building or a Aum Shinrikyo’s failures, despite all their at - crop-dusting plane, but moving large enough tempts and financial and scientific resources,

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reveal how unreliable and inefficient chemical bars in Oregon, the 1993 release of anthrax weapons are compared to bombs and guns, spores by Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo, and the the time-tested tools of terrorism. 2001 anthrax attacks, known as the Amerithrax attacks, executed through the US Postal BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Service. The first two attacks resulted in zero fatalities. While the salmonella poisoning suc - In the late 1990s, Ayman al Zawahiri hired a cessfully sickened hundreds of people, no one mid-level Pakistani biologist, Abdur Rauf died. The Aum Shinrikyo anthrax attack failed Ahmed, to develop bioweapons for al Qaeda. because the anthrax particles were either inap - FBI and Pakistani Interservices Intelligence propriately weaponized for toxification or (ISI) reports suggest that Rauf Ahmed was were not a sufficiently virulent strain of the unable to acquire a pathogenic strain of an - bacterium. While the Amerithrax attacks thrax , and, anyway, it appears his relationship certainly inspired a great deal of fear, only five with al Qaeda soured, over money, well before people died as a result and evidence suggests the anthrax could be cultured and weaponized that the attacks were carried out by a rogue in the labs he helped design. 181 Al Qaeda’s fail - US bioweapons researcher, not hirabis ure was not a sign of gross incompetence so unfamiliar with the sensitive process of much as it indicated how difficult it is to pro - weaponiz ing anthrax powder. 183 cure or produce biological weapons in the first place. First, biological weapons share many of The limited number and effect of these bio - the limitations of chemical weapons. They are terror events, however, have not allayed some at least as difficult to procure and prepare as people’s concerns that an extremist group the most difficult chemical weapons, and are could one day unleash the bubonic plague, as difficult to weaponize and disperse. Despite smallpox, botulism, the Ebola virus, or the al Qaeda’s multiple attempts to obtain anthrax Marburg virus. 184 Advances in biogenetics from 1997 to 2001, they could never secure have even generated worries that someone a pathogenic strain of the bacterium. But somewhere someday years into the future even if terrorists did somehow access a small might create a new “superbug” capable of amount of some biological agent, growing wiping out millions of people at a time. a stockpile and making it into an aerosolized At present,research indicates that terrorists’ weapon are not simple tasks. 182 knowledge-base regarding the development Given these hurdles, bioterrorism has been of chemical and biological weapons is “crude” rare and mostly unsuccessful. Known cases in - at best. Researchers from the Center for clude the 1984 salmonella poisoning of salad Nonproliferation Studies described the instruc -

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tions available on hirabi websites and manuals has not suffered a single such attack. 188 for the production and weaponization of Whereas transportation (especially commercial cyanide, hydrogen sulfide gas, mustard gas, aviation) attacks strike existential fear into the botulinum toxin, ricin, and the plague as hearts of Americans, attacks on infrastructure “amateurish ,” “very crude,” “vague,” and show the public that terrorists do not intend to “insufficient .” They judged that none of the kill them directly. 189 In a worst-case scenario, instructions seemed likely to produce a quality sabotage of some city’s critical infrastructure agent, none of them effectively outlined the might force significant numbers to relocate process by which readers could manufacture or significantly alter their daily routines for a munitions, and none of them presented time, but this may be more stress- and anger- instructions sufficiently outlining “credible inducing than terrorizing. delivery systems.” In their estimation, the Acts of sabotage, unlike the killing of civilians, probability that a group could produce mass- also suffer in terms of their propaganda value. casualties based on the knowledge provided Images of exploding airplanes or public panic by these various manuals and websites (and in a city center are more likely to be looped on assuming they had the proper ingredients) television news than the smoldering remains ranged from zero to “very low.” 185 186 of an infrastructure fire in an industrial zone. In many cases, such attacks may even be SUB-OPTIMAL TARGETS: dismissed by government as industrial acci - INFRASTRUCTURE, WATER dents unrelated to terrorism — undermining AND FOOD SUPPLIES militant groups’ attempts to gain attention for In addition to raising concerns about a range their cause. And crucially, such disruptions are of weapons hirabis are not likely to use, au - eventually repaired thanks to the emergency thors have also raised concerns about various efforts of the one party militant groups wish classes of American targets that hirabis have to delegitimize: the government itself. While shown little interest in attacking. 187 the state can never bring a human back to life, it can certainly repair a bombed pipeline, The reasons why airplane attacks are so a blown-out bridge, or a downed electrical sought after and why they so successfully gen - transformer. erate fear (sometimes even when they are not well-executed) are also the reasons why other Attacks on food and water supplies are also targets are so undesirable to terrorists. Despite sub-optimal for terrorists. They may result in a great deal of DHS attention on infrastruc - the destruction of many plants and animals, ture attacks, for instance, the United States great economic losses, and even several human

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deaths, but they are very difficult to spin into a reroute water supplies, warn the public, and heroic narrative. Those harmed most by such take other remediary action. 190 attacks would likely be the chronically under - For attacks on infrastructure or food and water nourished like the children of the poor, not supplies to be counted as successes, terrorist a target population many people can sym - groups must be able to explain to potential pathize with harming. Even the die-hard recruits how the attacks advance the glory of terrorists willing to risk backlash with such an their cause while undermining the popularity attack are not likely to be energized by killing of the governments that mitigate the damage with poisons when they could kill with guns and characterize the attacks as cowardly and and explosives. In majority-Muslim countries, barbaric. Such sabotage, while often useful for like most other societies, poisoning is generally disrupting supply lines in force-on-force wars, viewed as a dishonorable form of fighting, is not likely to accomplish much for a strategy one not likely to inspire support much less an attempting to rally support. influx of young recruits seeking adventure or martyrdom. CYBER ATTACKS Such attacks are not easy to execute either. The latest national security vulnerability to oc - Dangerously contaminating a water source cupy America’s political class grows out of the like a reservoir or lake, for instance, requires country’s economic and logistical dependence very large amounts of hazardous material. on the Internet and cloud computing. In June Depending on the size of the reservoir, it is 2011, President Obama released a report unlikely that fewer than several dump-truck outlining his “International Strategy Against loads of any hazardous material could signifi - Cyber Warfare.” While his report focuses cantly toxify a city’s water supply. Instead, particular attention on cyber threats from terrorists would need to dump contaminates other nation-states, specifically China, some into a main water pipeline headed into a city. security experts and pundits have also ex - These lines are sealed, though, and in almost pressed concerns about cyber-terrorism by all modern population centers, sensors hirabi militants . (designed to protect safety and manage the pressure of the water supply) will alert water Many agree that the sorts of denial-of-service department officials if they are tampered with attacks against credit card companies and or lose pressure. Any subsequent investigation banks executed by the group “Anonymous” could quickly turn up evidence of foul play in support of embattled WikiLeaks founder and authorities would have some time to Julian Assange have the potential, if wide -

January 2012 63 The Science of Security VII. A LIMITED REPERTOIRE

Cyber Attacks Mass-Casualty Nuclear Attacks

Fedeyeen Attacks

Symbolic Gov’t Targets Infrastructure Attacks Mass-Casualty Biological Attacks Poisoning Water Supplies Transportation Targets Suicide Attacks Poisoning Food Supplies Bombs/IEDs Attacks on ‘Apostate’ Muslims Mass-Casualty Chemical Attacks

Mass-Casualty Radiological Attacks

ADVANCES HIRABI WITHIN HIRABIS’ STRATEGY CAPABILITIES

spread and long-running enough, to disrupt relatively talented hackers able to mask the IP the American economy at a time when it is addresses and locations of users, they do not already underperforming. The use of the appear to have recruited the sorts of sophisti - “Stuxnet” virus against Iran’s nuclear facilities cated computer engineers who can threaten also demonstrated that well-placed hacks can the viability of key cyber-infrastructure or warp and destroy automation processes com - internet nodes. monly used throughout energy and industry Such attacks do not fit the modus operandi of sectors. Fears of such attacks are probably the hirabi movement, either. There is nothing slightly overblown, however, since most particularly inspiring about a denial-of-service computer networks managing such processes attack. And even a more consequential attack operate offline, meaning that hacks could on infrastructure (if it could be accomplished) be prevented by simply controlling access sends the wrong signal to hirabi recruits. to systems ’ upload portals. (The “Stuxnet” Hirabi leaders want to ingratiate themselves virus, apparently, was uploaded into Iranian into the pantheon of world historical figures machines via a portable USB drive.) by attacking the monuments of American Whatever the threat of cyber-attacks may be, power as they did on 9/11, or by marauding there are no indicators suggesting that hirabi its revered and feared soldiers, as they have terrorists are particularly interested in execut - done in zones of occupation or directed fol - ing them. Though hirabis spend a fair amount lowers like Nidal Hassan to do. But tinkering of time in internet chat rooms and have a few with computer machines that disrupt internet

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access or manufacturing processes inspires anger and revulsion against al Qaeda among little sanguinity among the militants who London’s Muslim population but also their comprise the vast majority of their movement. frustrations with the UK’s subsequent anti- The profile of the hirabi movement is, simply terror policies, the Madrid attacks seemed to put, not that of the hacker set. accomplish their precise objective — coercing the Spanish electorate to install a government SMALLER-SCALE TERRORISM that would remove its troops from Iraq. 191 IS EASY (AND POTENTIALLY In both cases, the deadly attacks were fairly EFFECTIVE) easy to plan and remarkably inexpensive, self- funded by operative savings and/or small lines While WMD, infrastructure, and food and of credit. water supply attacks are difficult and poten - tially harmful to the hirabi agenda, it is a Even the 9/11 attacks did not require any plain and unfortunate fact that small-scale technical genius or expenditures on the scale terrorist attacks, especially in the absence of of a national military — just flight lessons, (but even given) security obstacles we have box-cutters, and passengers’ trust that the discussed , are shockingly easy to execute. safest response to a hijacking was to remain Any person with a conventional bomb calm. Understandably aghast commentary (constructed according to instructions readily notwithstanding, the attacks were hardly available on the internet) or an assault weapon ‘unthinkable .’ Their only innovation entailed (which can be purchased legally in the United replacing the vehicle used in the common States) can, with horrifying ease, kill several tactic of suicide truck bombing. Using planes people at any given moment in any place also required placing operatives in US flight where people congregate. schools. But al Qaeda’s (partial) clearing of these additional hurdles never constituted evi - Even small terrorist cells or lone individuals dence that hirabis had jumped to a new level with little to no connection to a larger hirabi of terror allowing them to kill thousands of organization may be capable of carrying out innocents whenever and wherever they wanted attacks that perpetuate the struggle between with any conceivable weapon. hirabis and Western governments. The Madrid and London bombers, to that point, The 9/11 attacks were not the first (and may appear to have operated without financial or not be the last) of hirabis’ coordinated attacks. logistics support from al Qaeda’s central The embassy bombings al Qaeda orchestrated organization . While the London attacks may in Kenya and Tanzania happened within min - have had mixed strategic results, inspiring utes of each other. Several other hirabi plots

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— the Bojinka plot, the London/Heathrow plot, the Mumbai attacks (carried out by Lakshar-e-Taiba), and threatened plots repeat ing Mumbai-style attacks throughout Europe in the summer of 2010 — have been designed to generate panic and disorientation by attacking multiple sites at once. Such plots cannot be carried out by a single ad hoc ter - rorist cell, but require a larger team including planners, organizers, and trainers. Smaller militant groups are happy if they can success - fully complete a single bombing.

Even given hirabis ’ use of a rather limited repertoire of weapons attacking a limited range of targets, their aggregate threat could still be potent in the years to come. Audrey Kurth Cronin was surely right when she wrote that "the fear that a small organization with a loose network has metamorphosed into a pro - tracted, monolithic, global ideological struggle without end is misguided and ahistorical. ”192 But while disconnected amateur terrorists may not be able to deploy CBRN WMDs, or even reliably execute the sorts of attacks that have failed lately, they can, in the words of Bruce Hoffman, “readily achieve their dual [tactical] aims of fear and intimidation simply by blowing things up.” 193 If hirabis can carry out more attacks goading the United States and its allies into polarizing responses that play into hirabi recruitment narratives, they may find a way to live on.

The Science of Security 66 January 2012 VIII. CONCLUSION

Our extensive review of intelligence reports, advanced weapons capable of killing thou - internal documents from militant hirabi sands at a time. And none yet have come close groups, news reports, and previous threat as - to success. sessments shows that hirabis are motivated by Taken together, our findings suggest cautious ambitions that appear to be unrealistic. But optimism about the threat from hirabi terror - this does not mean they behave irrationally in ism. Three developing external factors bolster pursuing their goals. On the contrary, militant that optimism. First, al Qaeda’s central organ - hirabi groups employ a strategy common to ization is battered, harried, and facing demise. numerically weak forces, using the power of Not only are special operations and drone their larger adversaries against them by pro - strikes eliminating many of its members, its voking reactions that help them build a larger recruitment rate has significantly slowed over base of support. That strategy is best served the past several years. Security pressures have by spectacular attacks targeting planes, trains, made members wary of new applicants, and busses, government buildings, and other applications to join have slowed as the popu - symbols of Western political, economic, and larity of the group has plummeted. cultural influence. The anemia of al Qaeda, in terms of popular Analysts should not be surprised that hirabis support, will likely only be exacerbated by the have rarely sought to attack inanimate infra - events of the still unfolding Arab Spring. That structure, or food or water supplies. Such movement, driven by mostly non-violent citi - attacks do little to advance their strategy, zen protesters demanding self-determinative and can even play into governments’ hands. governments, has repudiated al Qaeda’s tactics Weapons of mass destruction, too, appear and its goals. Also, we should recall that like all less than optimal for the hirabi approach. politics, all political violence is local. Virtually Though many hirabis probably fantasize every hirabi group (including al Qaeda) ini - about WMDs, it is not clear that their use tially formed to address some local grievance would help build substantial popular support (even if they later agreed to share in a larger for their still tiny movement seeking a international effort). As local fields of political transcontinental fundamentalist theocracy. contestation open to more players, many Massively destructive weapons are much more hirabis are already setting aside their transna - likely, in fact, to provoke overwhelming revul - tional or international ambitions to see what sion from all quarters. In any case, very few they can accomplish in their own backyards. hirabis are likely to attempt the intricate, ex - Some are even giving up violence so they can pensive, and dangerous process of developing engage directly in elections. Throughout

January 2012 67 The Science of Security VIII. CONCLUSION

Muslim-majority countries, many who once sympathized with al Qaeda because they believed it offered the best prospect of thor - oughgoing political change have now moved on to effect that change through less violent means without al Qaeda’s input.

As we have observed, governments’ responses to terrorism campaigns significantly affect their duration and success. US counterterror - ism appears to be improving on the whole. Counterterrorist forces are achieving greater success as they continually narrow the focus of their strikes to hardened terrorists, avoid civil - ian casualties, and develop mutually respectful and cooperative relationships with the non- combatant populations they encounter – populations increasingly disenchanted with hirabis’ goals and methods. Thanks to an Arab Spring that has obviated al Qaeda’s rai - son d’etre and the steady suffocating pressure of ten years of international counterterrorism efforts, the United States stands poised to diminish the al Qaeda-led hirabi movement to a nuisance level by eliminating many of its members and encouraging the pacification and localization of other groups once sym - pathetic to its cause. In the meantime, policy makers and the public should under - stand that the threat from hirabi terrorism is not apocalyptic. And the limited impact of terrorism over the past decade was no acci - dent. It was the result of a limited terrorist strategy and limited repertoire of tactics that we now understand quite well.

The Science of Security 68 January 2012 AUTHOR S ’ NOTE

We wish to thank the many scholars, researchers , journalists, and government analyst s whose work we have drawn on in completing this research. This paper was possible thanks to the generous support of the Lotus Foundation and the Open Society Institute. We thank them not only for funding this research but also encouraging our independence in the process. We would also like to thank our many colleagues who have offered us guidance, encouragement, and enriching conversations throughout the production of this paper. We are especially grateful for the engagement of Audrey Kurth Cronin, Suzanne Spaulding, Karen Greenberg, Mark Fallon, Tom Parker, Mike German, and Nancy Chang.

January 2012 69 The Science of Security ENDNOTES

1 19 Ashcroft, Levin and Shays quotes pulled from: The Hotline Staff. 2001. In the second edition of Inside Terrorism , Hoffman disaggregates al Qaeda in “New Threats: Not Out of the Woods Yet?”. The Hotline. The National response to the very organizational shift Sageman amplifies, focusing Journal Group. October 1. increased attention on al Qaeda’s “affiliates and associates” and “al Qaeda 2 locals.” Hoffman writes: “On the eve of 9/11, al Qaeda was a unitary Diebel, Linda. 2001. “Bush Warns of Biological, Nuclear Threat by Bin organization, assuming the dimensions of a lumbering bureaucracy… Laden.” The Toronto Star. November 7. A8. [now,] al Qaeda in essence has transformed itself from a bureaucratic entity 3 L aqueur, Walter. 1999. The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass that could be destroyed… to the clearly less powerful, but nonetheless Destruction . Oxford University Press. New York. arguably more resilient, amorphous entity it is today [in 2006].” Hoffman, 4 Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism . Columbia University Press. New York. Pg. 283. Some of these authors have been more careful than others when character - 20 izing the category of religious terrorism. It seems to us that the apocalyptic Riedel, Bruce. 2011. “Zawahiri’s First 100 Days.” The Daily Beast. August terrorism of Aum Shinrikyo (seeking an end to the world) is quite different 15, 2011. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/08/15/ayman-al- from the theocratic terrorism of al Qaeda and their hirabi allies (which zawahiri-s-first-100-days-as-al-qaeda-leader-after-bin-laden.html seeks to govern territory). 21 In doing so, Riedel actually referred heavily to Abdullah Azzam’s ideology, 5 Laqueur, Walter. 2003. No End to War . Continuum International. New York. which, as we’ve pointed out in our note on ‘hirabi’ vs. ‘jihadi’ and else - Pg. 10-11. where, departed significantly from Bin Laden’s and al Qaeda’s motivating 6 ideology. Winter, Greg and William Broad. 2001. “A Nation Challenged: The Water 22 Supply: Added Security for Dams, Reservoirs, and Aqueducts.” The New A website promoting his book, Nuclear Terrorism , even features a ‘Blast Map’ York Times . September 26. tool allowing visitors to enter their zip codes to see how much of their 7 neighborhoods would be incinerated by a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb. Manning, Anita. 2001. “Food Supply May be Terror Target.” USA Today. 23 November 1. http: //www.cfr.org/publication/13097/how_likely_is_a_nuclear_terrorist_at 8 tack_on_the_united_states.html Staff Writer. 2011. “Cyberterrorism a Threat That Won’t Go Away.” UPI. 24 September 16. Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. 2010. “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction 9 Threat: Hype or Reality?” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs . Hylton, Wil. 2011. “How Ready Are We for Bioterrorism?” The New York January 2010. Times Magazine. October 26. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19852/al_qaeda_weapons_ 10 The United States, for instance, supported the jihad of Afghans and other of_mass_destruction_threat.html Muslims against the USSR from 1979-1989. 25 See Smil, Vaclav. 2008 Global Catastrophes and Trends: The Next Fifty Years. 11 Esposito, John and Dalia Mogahed. 2007. Who Speaks for Islam? What a MIT Press. Cambridge, Mass. Pgs. 229-231, 233 for a review of literatures Billion Muslims Really Think. Gallup Press. New York. Pg. 17-19. on the lay psychology of risk assessment. 12 26 See, for example, the following verses of the Qu’ran: 2:190 4:90 and Tetlock, Philip. 2005. Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Maida 5:32. Know? Princeton. 13 27 However, the Qu’ran denies Muslims the right to pass such judgment on This and other explanations for exaggerating the threat of terrorism are their fellows in verse 4:94. Several anecdotes of the Hadith support this reviewed in Friedman, Benjamin. 2010. “Chapter 10. Managing Fear: verse. See http://www.islamopediaonline.org/fatwa/prohibition-takfir-mus - The Politics of Homeland Security.” Terrorizing Ourselves . Cato Institute. lim-calling-another-muslim-unbeliever for examples. Pgs. 193-202. 14 28 Esposito, John and Dalia Mogahed. 2007. Who Speaks for Islam? What a Clarke, Richard. 2004. Against All Enemies . Free Press. New York. Pg. 239. Billion Muslims Really Think . Gallup Press. New York. Pg. 75. 29 Lipton, Eric. 2006. “Come One, Come All, Join the Terror Target List.” 15 See for example: http://www.islamopediaonline.org/fatwa/what-jihad- The New York Times . July 12. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/12/wash - who-can-declare-jihad or http://www.khalidzaheer.com/qa/255 ington/12assets.html 16 30 Bruce Riedel papered over this significant (especially from a US security Hylton, Wil S. 2011. “How Ready Are We for Bioterrorism?” The New York perspective) difference between al Qaeda’s ideology and that of Azzam Times Magazine. October 26. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/maga - in his September 11, 2011 piece arguing that Azzam’s and al Qaeda’s zine/how-ready-are-we-for-bioterrorism.html?_r=2&hpw ideologies are one and the same and are not dying anytime soon. 31 See Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. 2010. “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction 17 See Qu’ran’s verses pertaining to covenants: 17:34 2:100. For context and Threat: Hype or Reality?” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs . Hadith, see http://www.suhaibwebb.com/society/international/muslim- January 2010. americans-must-obey-u-s-laws-nidal-hasan-disobeyed-islamic-doctrine-at-lo http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19852/al_qaeda_weapons_ onwatch-com/ of_mass_destruction_threat.html 18 32 Miller, Greg. 2011. “US Officials Believe Al-Qaeda on Brink of Collapse .” According to Ron Suskind’s 2006 book The One Percent Doctrine. Simon and The Washington Post. July 26, 2011. Schuster, Cheney once told an advisor that if terrorists had a 1% chance of http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-qaeda-could- successfully detonating a nuclear bomb, security authorities ought to behave collapse-us-officials-say/2011/07/21/gIQAFu2pbI_story.html as though a nuclear attack was certain.

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33 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2010. How Terrorism Ends . Princeton University http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/dysfunction-and-decline-lessons-learned- Press. from-inside-al-qaida-in-iraq 34 44 This is a classic case of a person looking for their keys under a street light Only in occupied Iraq were chemical weapons used with any lethal effects by not because there is good reason to believe they are there, but because the insurgent groups associated with Hirabi terrorism. There, however, the light is there. chemical agents were used in conjunction with conventional explosives. 35 Reports indicate that the fatalities (totaling 37 for seven attacks), and most of See also Parker, Tom. 2007. “Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How the more serious injuries, resulted from the conventional explosives and not Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Movements They Oppose.” the chlorine shells (which only temporarily sickened hundreds (total) in the Terrorism and Political Violence . Vol. 19. attacks). There was also an accusation by Jordanian security officials that a 36 It may also be undervalued because the “New Terrorism” thesis of the late cell connected to Al Zarqawi was attempting to make a mass casualty chem - 1990s convinced many that al Qaeda was no longer behaving according to ical bomb that could result in a lethal toxic cloud. Follow-up investigation any comprehensible strategy. revealed that the chemicals collected by the cell – according to former sen - 37 ior U.N. adviser on chemical weapons, Ron Manley – might have been able Such theory was at least implicitly understood by scholars of previous waves to “generate some toxic byproducts, but they’re unlikely to result in signifi - of terrorism like Brian Michael Jenkins and Walter Laqueur as cited in cant deaths by poisoning.” (See Hanley, Charles. “‘WMD terrorism’: Sum of Dowling, Ralph. 1986. “Terrorism and Media: A Rhetorical Genre.” all fears doesn’t always add up.” USA Today . Oct. 29, 2005. Journal of Communication . Winter. Though we have not closely reviewed their http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-10-29-terror-vision_x.htm work for this piece, we also nod to an analytical tradition focusing on the 45 dynamics of oppositional politics that has been handed down from sociolo - All data available in the Global Terrorism Database: gists like Charles Tilly and Doug McAdam to scholars like Jeff Goodwin, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ David Snow, and Tom Parker. 46 For a synthetic review of academic literatures on terrorist’ strategic decision 38 Usage of the term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ has not been formalized, making, see: McCormick, Gordon. 2003. “Terrorist Decision Making.” but has often been related to the death tolls the weapons can produce. For Annual Review of Political Science . Vol. 6: 473-507. the purposes of this paper, we will consider a WMD any weapon that kills 47 Mike German offers perhaps the clearest formulation of this strategy in the more than 3000 people, the approximate number killed in the 9/11 attacks. seventh chapter of his book. German, Mike. 2007. Thinking Like a Terrorist: However, the FBI and DOJ are keen on charging people who would use Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent . Potomac Books. Washington, D.C. even small bombs only capable of killing dozens – Zazi, Abdulmutallab, Chapter 7. and Shazad among them – with attempted use of ‘weapons of mass 48 destruction.’ We reject this usage as a trivialization of a term that also, in The key difference between jihad and hirabah is the latter approach’s target - theory, references a category including thermonuclear weapons capable of ing of civilians not directly responsible for policy decisions. See “A Brief incinerating millions at a time. Note on Hirabi vs. Jihadi ” above for further explanation. 39 49 Nonetheless, some people contest the classification of these attacks as See chapters 1 and 2 of: Moghadam, Assaf and Brian Fishman, Editors. ‘terrorism ’ since they targeted members of the military. Some have also 2010. “Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions Within Al-Qa’ida and suggested that Hassan’s attack has more in common with a workplace its Periphery.” Combating Terrorism Center. West Point. shooting than a terrorist act. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Self-Inflicted- 40 Also see Difo, Germain. 2010. “Ordinary Measures, Extraordinary Results: Wounds.pdf 50 An Assessment of Foiled Plots Since 9/11.” Report of American Security In hindsight, that hirabi atrocity may have been a key switchpoint in history Project. http://americansecurityproject.org/wp- leading to the use of a nonviolent approach to Mubarak’s ouster over a content/uploads/2010/09/Foiled-Plots.pdf decade later. 41 51 One could well object that many of these plots were significantly influenced Soufan, Ali. 2011. The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War by FBI undercover agents or informants. It is possible, therefore, that some Against al-Qaeda . W.W. Norton and Company. New York. Pgs. 30, 61-5. terrorists, not under the influence of FBI assets, might choose wholly differ - Moghadam, Assaf and Brian Fishman, Editors. 2010. “Self-Inflicted ent approaches. However, an expanded search of worldwide terrorist Wounds: Debates and Divisions Within Al-Qa’ida and its Periphery.” incidents over a much longer period shows that almost all fit the same pat - Combating Terrorism Center. West Point. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp- tern of targeting and attack style as those dreamed up under the conditions content/uploads/2011/05/Self-Inflicted-Wounds.pdf of FBI sting operations. 52 42 Moghadam, Assaf and Brian Fishman, Editors. 2010. “Self-Inflicted Charges that Jose Padilla was interested in detonating a dirty bomb resulted Wounds: Debates and Divisions Within Al-Qa’ida and its Periphery.” from information gathered during a coercive interrogation of a subject Combating Terrorism Center. West Point. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp- shown to have made many false statements under duress, and were later content/uploads/2011/05/Self-Inflicted-Wounds.pdf removed from his federal indictment. 53 43 Soufan, Ali. 2011. The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War It should be noted, too, that the Al Qaeda in Iraq campaign has been Against al-Qaeda . W.W. Norton and Company. New York. Pg. 32. studied by terrorists as a model of what not to do because it was largely 54 responsible for the ‘Anbar Awakening’ that saw Iraqis reject sectarian vio - Kean, Thomas et al. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report . Norton and lence and cooperate with state-based security initiatives. See Fishman, Company. London. Pg. 250-2; Bergen, Peter. 2011. The Longest War. Brian. 2009. “Dysfunction and Decline.” Combating Terrorism Center . Mar 16. Free Press. Pgs. 7-10.

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55 Bergen, Peter. 2011. The Longest War. Free Press. Pg. 89. sit on has other unseen properties relevant to the ‘chair’ category, namely 56 that it is sturdy enough to hold our weight. Without even thinking about it, Bergen, Peter. 2011. The Longest War. Free Press. Pg. 77. we draw conclusions about unknown individual chairs from what is neces - 57 Committee Report. 2009. “Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get sarily an incomplete knowledge about the category ‘chair.’ This is a Bin Laden and Why it Matters Today.” US Government Printing Office. cognitive process that fails us from time to time, e.g. when we sit in a chair Washington, D.C. Pg. 13. that collapses beneath us. But it is far more efficient to suffer those failures 58 than to carefully test the properties of every chair (or window, door, vehicle, Committee Report. 2009. “Tora Bora Revisited: How we Failed to Get etc.) before putting it to use. Bin Laden and Why it Matters Today.” U.S. Government Printing Office. 71 Washington, D.C. Pg. 12. Sumner, W. G. 1906. Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, 59 Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals . Ginn. Ibid. See also Bergen, Peter. 2011. The Longest War. Free Press. Pg. 80. 72 60 For reviews of this literature, see Diehl, M. 1990. “The Minimal Group Brachman, Jarret M., and William F. McCants. 2006. “Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29(4):309-321. Paradigm: Theoretical Explanations and Empirical Findings.” European Review of Social Psychology 1:263-292. … and… Turner, J. C. 1981. “The 61 Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First experimental social psychology of intergroup behaviour.” Intergroup behaviour . Century . University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia. Pgs. 66-101. 62 73 In “The Oath,” a 2010 documentary by Jonathan Oppenheim, former Tajfel, H., M. G. Billig, R. P. Bundy, and C. Flament. 1971. “Social catego - terrorist Abu Jandal explains the purpose of the 9/11 attacks to young men rization and intergroup behavior.” European Journal of Social Psychology he councils: “They hit America and humiliated it like no one ever did… 1:149-178. It’s a matter of honor. Why does Islam prohibit the slap on the face? 74 Because the face is symbol of dignity and respect. … [The attacks] Oakes, P. J., and J. C. Turner. 1980. “Social categorization and intergroup tarnished America’s dignity around the world. That’s the whole story. behaviour: Does minimal intergroup discrimination make social identity You stain their reputation.” more positive.” European Journal of Social Psychology 10:295–301. 63 75 For a thorough review and systemization of this literature, see Bornstein, For a couple examples, see Wilkinson, Paul. 2006. Terrorism Versus Democracy: Gary. 2003. “Intergroup Conflict: Individual, Group, and Collective 2nd Edition. Routledge. New York; or… Art, Robert and Louise Richardson Interests.” Personality and Social Psychology Review . Vol. 7, No. 2. (Eds.). 2007. Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons From the Past . U.S. Institute 64 of Peace Press. Washington, D.C. … or Richardson, Louise. 2007. Andrew C. McCarthy, Pamela Geller, Glenn Beck, and Robert Spencer “Terrorist Rivals: Beyond the State-Centric Model.” Harvard International comprise the Islamophobic vanguard. Others, including Michael Mukasey, Charles Krauthammer, Bill O’Reilly and Liz Cheney’s ‘Keep America Safe’ Review. Spring. 76 have made statements affirming the credibility of these authors’ even if As Robert Art and Louise Richardson conclude: “The Italian, Peruvian, they have demurred from publicly sharing some of their most outlandish Indian, and British governments… each learned from their mistakes… concerns. and each dramatically improved the effectiveness of its counterterrorism 65 Tajfel, Henri. 1982. “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.” Annual policies .” Art, Robert and Louise Richardson. Eds. 2007. Democracy and Reviews in Psychology 33:1-39. Pg. 21. Counterterrorism: Lessons From the Past . United States Institute of Peace Press. 66 Washington, D.C. Pg. 563. See Rosenblatt, Abram and Jeff Greenberg et al. 1989. “Evidence for 77 Terror Management Theory: I. The Effects of Mortality Salience on Schanzer, David, Charles Kurzman, and Ebrahim Moosa. 2010. “Anti- Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural Values.” Journal of Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans.” National Institute of Justice, Personality and Social Psychology. Vol. 57, No.4, 681-690 … and … Department of Justice. Washington, D.C. Greenberg, Jeff, Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, Abram Rosenblatt, 78 The increased weighting of limited and available information over and et al. 1990. “Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of information not readily accessible is described in the psychology literature mortality salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural as the “availability heuristic.” Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1973. worldview.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58:308-318. “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability.” Cognitive 67 Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto. 2001. Social dominance: an intergroup theory of Psychology . social hierarchy and oppression . Cambridge University Press. 79 Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice spawned a great deal of research in this area. 68 Rydgren, J. 2004. “The Logic of Xenophobia.” Rationality and Society 16:123. Allport, G. W. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice . Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Pg. 124. 80 See Pew Research Center Polling report, “Muslim Americans” 69 Fiske, S. T., and S. E. Taylor. 1991. Social Cognition. McGraw-Hill. New York. http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/30/section-6-terrorism-concerns- 70 To illustrate, when we arrive at a friend’s home and they tell us to “grab a about-extremism-foreign-policy/ chair,” we do not scan the room for the exact chair we first encountered as 81 German, Mike. 2007. Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI a child. Instead, we have learned over the course of our lives – based on Undercover Agent . Potomac Books. Washington, D.C. Pg. 102. our experiences with thousands of chairs – that a chair is just an object 82 with a horizontal surface 2-3 feet off the ground. Once, we’ve found an A fatwa is an Islamic religious ruling from an Islamic scholar pertaining object fitting that description, we then infer that the object we are about to to some matter of Islamic law.

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83 99 Pew Research Center polling data. 2009. Alan Cullison, a Wall Street Journal investigative journalist, accessed http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2009/09/27/weekinre - Zawahiri’s computer in late 2001, read his files, and concluded that “ view/20090927_SHANE_GRFK.html al-Qaeda understood that its attacks would not lead to a quick collapse of 84 the great powers. Rather, its aim was to tempt the powers to strike back in Esposito, John L., and Dalia Mogahed. 2008. Who Speaks For Islam?: a way that would create sympathy for the terrorists.” Cullison, Alan. 2004. What a Billion Muslims Really Think . Gallup Press. Pg. 48. “Inside Al Qaeda’s Hard Drive.” The Atlantic . September. Kydd and Walter, 85 Esposito, John L., and Dalia Mogahed. 2008. Who Speaks For Islam?: in reviewing terrorist strategizing, state that “Evidence abounds that ter - What a Billion Muslims Really Think . Gallup Press. Pg. 37. rorists explicitly consider the prior behavior of states…” Kydd, Andrew and Barbara Walter. 2006. “The Strategies of Terrorism.” International 86 Because the founding prophet of Islam fused politics and religion, Muslims Security . Vol. 31.1. Pg. 63. Indeed, Bin Laden, in his 2004 Message to tend to be more comfortable with mixing Mosque and State than the World video recording boasted that it was “easy for us to provoke this Christians, whose messiah eschewed politics and counseled followers to [Bush] administration.” Pgs. 241-242. “render unto God what is God’s and unto Caesar what is Caesar’s.” But 100 An Arabic word for ‘consultation.’ Islam’s long history of mixing politics and religion has also created several 101 competing interpretations of how the two should be integrated. While Kean, Thomas et al. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report . Norton and many Muslims agree that some basic and fairly universalist Islamic Company. London. Pgs. 251-2. principles should guide law, they reach little agreement on interpretations 102 According to the testimony of Condoleezza Rice to the National of more detailed aspects of the Qu’ran, Hadith, and Sunnah Commission on Terrorist Attacks, April 8, 2004. (Mohammed’s example) – not unlike Christians’ diverse and diverging 103 interpretations of biblical texts. Doran, Michael. 2002. “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al Qaeda” Political 87 Science Quarterly . Vol. 117. No. 2. Esposito, John L., and Dalia Mogahed. 2008. Who Speaks For Islam?: 104 What a Billion Muslims Really Think . Gallup Press. Pg. 37. Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism . 2 nd Edition. Columbia University 88 Press. New York. Page 88. Esposito, John L., and Dalia Mogahed. 2008. Who Speaks For Islam?: 105 What a Billion Muslims Really Think . Gallup Press. Pg. 69. Crenshaw, Martha. 2003. “ “New” versus “Old” Terrorism.” Palestine-Israel 89 Journal . Vol. 10. No.1. Bergen, Peter and Paul Cruickshank. 2008. “The Unraveling.” 106 The New Republic. June 11, 2008. … regardless of whether or not their beliefs truly reflect the religion of Islam. This is one of the conclusions of Ken Ballen’s recently published 90 See William McCants recent essay in Foreign Affairs for a thorough Terrorists in Love. Ballen, Ken. 2011. Terrorists in Love: The Real Lives of Islamic discussion of Islamist politicians’ undermining of al Qaeda’s momentum: Radicals. Simon and Schuster. New York. McCants, William. 2011. “Al Qaeda’s Challenge.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 90, 107 Combating Terrorism Center. 2006. “Harmony and Disharmony: No. 5. Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities.” Department of 91 Roy, O. 2008. Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of Social Sciences, US Military Academy. February, 14. http://iis- Narrative. MICROCON Policy working Paper 2, Brighton: MICROCON. db.stanford.edu/pubs/21057/Harmony_and_Disharmony-CTC.pdf 92 108 Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad . University of Pennsylvania Press. Pg. A copy of Zawahiri’s letter can be found at 51-2; and also Esposito, John L., and Dalia Mogahed. 2008. Who Speaks For http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zar - Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think . Gallup Press. qawi-letter_9jul2005.htm . 93 109 Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism . Columbia University Press. Combating Terrorism Center. 2006. “Harmony and Disharmony: New York. Pgs. 246-248. Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities.” Department of 94 Social Sciences, US Military Academy. February, 14. Pgs. 11-13 http://iis- Pedahzur, A., and A. Perliger. 2005. “The Changing Nature of Suicide db.stanford.edu/pubs/21057/Harmony_and_Disharmony-CTC.pdf Attacks: A Social Network Perspective.” Social Forces.Vol. 84. 110 95 Grossman, Dave and Bruce Siddel. 2000. “Psychological Effects of Abrahms, Max. 2008. “What Terrorists Really Want.” International Security . Combat.” Academic Press. Vol. 32, No. 4. Pp. 78-105. 111 Ibid. 96 Dowling, Ralph. 1986. “Terrorism and the Media: A Rhetorical Genre.” 112 Journal of Communication . Winter 1986. Bell. J.B. 1978. “Terrorist Scripts and Live-Action Spectaculars.” Columbia Journalism Review. May-June 1978. Pg. 50. 97 More than forty separate militant attacks were executed, but it is unclear 113 how many were actually the work of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Kaufer, Daniela et al. 2011. “Basolateral Amygdala Regulation of Adult Hippocampal Neurogenesis and Fear-related Activation of Newborn 98 Austin Turk makes this mistake in multiple writings, e.g. Turk, Austin. 2004. Neurons.” Molecular Psychiatry . AOP. “Sociology of Terrorism.” Annual Review of Sociology . 30:27. Pg. 273. 114 Watson, J.B. 1928. Psychological Care of Infant and Child . W.W. Norton and Co. December 2001. Laqueur pushed the meme too far as well, as we pointed New York. out in our Executive Summary to this document. The mistake is especially 115 common in journalistic accounts and political speeches, with examples too In other words, terrorists boasting of an attrition strategy are often making numerous to itemize. a virtue of necessity. For instance, AQAP spoke of an attrition strategy after

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125 their “printer bomb” plot failed as a way of pointing out that for only a Also see “Self-Inflicted Wounds” for a thorough account and analysis of few thousand dollars, they might be able to force America and the West to these and other schisms in the hirabi movement. Moghadam, Assaf and implement increased security measures for cargo planes. But virtually no Brian Fishman, Editors. 2010. “Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and one believes that similar attacks could bankrupt the US, much less that they Divisions Within Al-Qa’ida and its Periphery.” Combating Terrorism will result in the transnational fundamentalist theocracy of hirabis’ dreams. Center. West Point. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp- To achieve their major goal, hirabis need to inspire their prospective content/uploads/2011/05/Self-Inflicted-Wounds.pdf constituency and turn them against the states they fight. Attrition does 126 Before the internet became a popular mode of communication, terrorist not do this. strategists often communicated their plans through other open media 116 Our extensive searching turned up no academic articles and only a few like pamphlets and even novels. The Turner Diaries by William Pierce, for opinion articles on the subject. Some work focuses on the familiar instance, laid out the very plan Timothy McVeigh eventually executed by argument that religious groups are more likely to attack helpless civilians exploding a truckbomb outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in (whether or not they are traveling), but we found nothing suggesting why Oklahoma City. airplanes were chosen above other soft targets. 127 Brachman, Jarret M., and William F. McCants. 2006. “Stealing Al Qaeda’s (http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/Making%20the%20Wrong Playbook.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29(4):309-321. %20Connection.pdf ) 128 117 In early 2001, al Qaeda also sought to partner with Umma Tameer e Nau Studies in risk analysis reflect humans’ tendency to perceive increased risks (UTN), a Pakistani social welfare NGO founded by (among others) some in activities they are unfamiliar with or lack control over. Hence, many feel prominent members of Pakistan’s military and nuclear weapons establish - safer when driving than flying despite the fact that fewer people die per ment. The group reportedly had plans to aid al Qaeda in the production hour of flying than do when driving. See Smil, Vaclav. 2008 Global of a nuclear weapon, but that work was hardly off the ground before the Catastrophes and Trends: The Next Fifty Years. MIT Press. Cambridge, Mass. September 11 th attacks and the NATO-led invasion of Afghanistan forced Pgs. 229-231, 233 for a review of literatures on the lay psychology of risk al Qaeda out of its camps and underground. Pakistani intelligence arrested assessment. many in the UTN organization for questioning, and placed many under 118 Watson, J.B. 1928. Psychological Care of Infant and Child . W.W. Norton and surveillance and/or house arrest. “Fortunately,” as David Albright and Co. New York. Holly Higgins concluded in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, “the fall of 119 the Taliban regime ended the threat that a … nuclear weapons program Hoffman attempts, in a comparative way, to explain the ideological con - could have emerged in Afghanistan.” The international crackdown on straints on the targeting choices of leftists, ethnonationalist, and religious al Qaeda’s activities also resulted in the late 2001 arrest of Rauf Ahmed terrorist groups, but hardly addresses the strategic advantages and disad - and the few others involved in the militant network’s chemical and vantages of various weapons. Pgs. 229-240. bioweapons programs. Albright, David and Holly Higgins. 2003. “A Bomb 120 We also wish to stress that while nearly all threat assessments (including for the Ummah.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . Vol. 59. No.2. Pg. 54. this one) analyze terrorists’ goals and strategies separately from their capa - http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SAAN_/message/511 129 bilities, this analytical de-coupling is dangerous if analysts forget that the See for examples: http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/finance_primer-pr.cfm ; matching of strategy and capability is vital for the success of terror cam - http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/37973_915549761_714044665.pdf paigns. In other words, terrorist groups with a perfect strategy wretchedly 130 executed or a wretched strategy perfectly executed are no more threatening Levitt, Matthew. 2008. “Al-Qa’ida’s Finances: Evidence of Organizational in the middle to long term than groups wretchedly executing a wretched Decline?” CTC Sentinel. April, 2008. strategy. More concretely, a terrorist group with a WMD strategy but no http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/4807814218aed.pdf 131 WMDs is not a significant threat. Neither is a terrorist group with a WMD Global Security has an English translation of Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi capability, but no strategy to use them. at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri- 121 See Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why Terrorism Does Not Work.” International zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm 132 Security. Vol. 31. No.2; and Rappaport, David. 2006. “The Four Waves of Levitt, Matthew. 2008. “Al-Qa’ida’s Finances: Evidence of Organizational Modern Terrorism.” UCLA International Institute. http://www.interna - Decline?” CTC Sentinel. April, 2008. tional.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=47153 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/4807814218aed.pdf 122 133 For a thorough review of the various ways terrorism campaigns meet their NEFA 2009. “Statement from Shaykh Mustafa Abu al Yazid re: Jihad demise, see Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2010. How Terrorism Ends . Princeton with Money and the Need for Money for Jihad in Afghanistan and University Press. Elsewhere.” June 9. 123 http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefaabualyaz See Combating Terrorism Center. 2006. “Harmony and Disharmony: idinvu0609.pdf Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities.” Department of 134 Social Sciences, US Military Academy. February, 14. http://iis-db.stan - 2010. “Al-Qaeda Appeals to Sympathizers for Donations.” Asharq al Awsat . ford.edu/pubs/21057/Harmony_and_Disharmony-CTC.pdf August 12, 2010. 124 http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=21931 For a review of these debates, see the International Institute for Counter- 135 Terrorism’s frequently updated reviews of terrorist website activity. Trans-Federal Task Force on Optimizing Biosafety and Biocontainment http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/JihadiWebsitesMonitoring/JW Oversight. 2009. “Report of the Trans-Federal Task Force on Optimizing MGPeriodicalReviews/tabid/344/Default.aspx Biosafety and Biocontainment Oversight.” Pg. 128. Available at:

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http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/br/bbotaskforce/biosafety-FINAL-REPORT- “cunning and deadly predator[s],” but instead “skulk about, sniffing at 092009.pdf violence , vocally aggressive but skittish without backup.” See Jenkins, 136 Brian Michael. 2011. “Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies.” RAND Occasional See IAEA document “IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Paper. September, 2011. Weapons” for more detailed information. http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP343.pdf http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf 148 137 Olivier Roy and Marc Sageman both discuss the youthful skew of Deflem, Mathieu. 2010. The Policing of Terrorism: Organizational and Global al Qaeda’s recent recruitment cohorts in their works cited elsewhere in Perspectives . Routledge. New York. Pg. 51. this paper. 138 See DHS document “Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations” 149 Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad . University of Pennsylvania Press. for more information. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/implementing- Pg. 65. 9-11-commission-report-progress-2011.pdf 150 139 A recent study published in the journal SCIENCE by Jennifer Whitson and For instance, as Benjamin Friedman has lamented, “The homeland secu - Adam Galinsky shows through experimental data that when people feel like rity strategy mentions the Northern Mariana Islands and “native Alaskan they lack control, they are more likely to endorse illusions of control offered Villages” as locations that require defense against all types of terrorists by superstition, conspiracy theories, and religion. Whitson, Jennifer and attacks” when all available evidence suggests that terrorists prefer to hit Adam Galinsky. 2008. “Lacking Control Increases Illusory Pattern iconic world-renowned symbolic targets. Friedman, Benjamin. 2004. “Leap Perception.” SCIENCE . Vol. 322. Pgs. 115-117. Before you Look.” Breakthroughs. Spring 2004. Page 33. 151 140 To borrow a concept and phrase from Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Schneier, Bruce. 2009. “Beyond Security Theater.” The New Internationalist. Communities. Verso. London. No. 427. November. 152 141 Some of the 9/11 hijackers were even reported to have enjoyed alcohol To wit, even by October 16, 2003 – in a memo to General Dick Meyers, and strip clubs, clear violations of fundamentalist Islamic practice. Marc Paul Wolfowitz, General Pete Pace, and Douglas Feith – Donald Rumsfeld Sageman’s research shows that most terrorists joined through pre-existing worried about the following questions: “Are we capturing, killing or deter - friendship networks, not primarily out of a religious devotion to the hirabi ring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the cause. Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? … Is our Century . University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia. Pgs. 66-67. A CTC current situation such that “the harder we work, the behinder we get”?” survey study of Guantanamo detainees also found that association with Full memo published as “Rumsfeld’s War-on-Terror Memo” USA Today . another member of al Qaeda was a better predictor of joining the group May 20, 2005. than believing in the ideology of hirabah. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld- 153 memo.htm Interested readers might consult social psychological literatures on ‘group 142 think,’ ‘unpopular norms,’ ‘norm falsification,’ ‘social proof’ and ‘peer pres - The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is even developing a sure’ to read a more complete explanation of the group processes whereby social science based simulation trainer aiming to train tens of thousands of faulty ideas can be made to seem correct. Marines and other military in the art of face-to-face diplomacy so that they 154 can better accomplish their counterinsurgency missions without resorting to Lines, Andy. 2001. “War on Terror: Bin Laden Army: 11,000 Terror violence. Agents Set to Strike; Sleepers are in 60 Countries.” The Mirror. New York, https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=e8 NY. September 24, 2001. edd91f9faea26ab89ebf762ef3b0aa&_cview=0 155 Persky, Anna. 2005. “FBI Can’t Find Sleep Cells.” FOX News . March 10. 143 Authors including Hoffman, Sageman, Bergen, Cruickshank, Cronin, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,149999,00.html Rose, and many others too numerous to cite here agree. 156 A fourth attempted attack, in which al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s 144 Bergen, Peter. 2010. “Why Bin Laden Still Matters .” Newsweek. September operatives attempted to bomb synagogues in Chicago with printer-cartridge 4. http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/09/04/why-osama-bin- IEDs, was interdicted thanks to the cooperation of international intelligence laden-still-matters.html agencies. 145 157 While the invasion of Iraq was first a boon to the hirabi movement, Keller, Bill. 2002. “Nuclear Nightmares.” The New York Times Magazine . al Qaeda in Iraq utterly failed as surrounding populations rejected its May 26. attempt to establish an Islamic government. For more on al Qaeda’s 158 Mueller, John. 2008, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood.” debacle in Iraq, see: Fishman, Brian. 2009. “Dysfunction and Decline: Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University Lessons Learned from Inside Al Qa’ida in Iraq.” Harmony Project . of Chicago. January 15. Pgs. 1-2. Combating Terrorism Center. West Point. 159 146 The notion that 25 terrorist organizations have precisely the same probabil - It has carried out one brutal attack against international football (soccer) ity of developing WMDs is rather odd given that developing such weapons fans in Uganda as a way of avenging Ugandan participation in Somali does not proceed according to the logic of a lottery or game of chance. peace-keeping missions, but has done little to effect attacks on Western Furthermore, assuming that the probability of success is the same from year powers . to year presumes not only that terrorist weapons developers experience 147 Brian Michael Jenkins has suggested that the term “stray dog” may be identical conditions from year to year, but also that they are repeating the more appropriate since many of these self-radicalizing individuals are not same process each year with the same probability of success. Pegging that

January 2012 75 The Science of Security ENDNOTES

probability at 1/100 may seem conservative to some readers, but the expe - this flight of fancy is still reported as credible intelligence in some circles. riences of determined and far better resourced state-led weapons programs Later statements by al Qaeda journeyman, writer, and strategist Setmariam show otherwise. Instead of guessing at probabilities and using mathematical and leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, actually presume hand-waving, analysts might look to the history of weapons development to the falsehood of Bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s statements. Setmariam wrote better assess the immensity of the scale of the challenge, not to mention on a jihadist website in late 2004 that a WMD attack on U.S. territory was: the multiple low probability events that must be achieved along the way, failure at any of which will dash all prospect of success. “eventually possible and has now become necessary. [An] option [is] to 160 destroy the United States by means of decisive strategic operations with Larson, Eric and John Evans. 2001. Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, chemical, or biological Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options . Arroyo Center. Page 54. weapons if mujahidin are able to obtain them…” (italics added). 161 Usage of the term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ has not been formalized, (See Cruikshank, Paul and Mohannad Hage Ali. 2007. “Abu Musab but has often been related to the death tolls the weapons can produce. For Al Suri: Architect of the New al Qaeda.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism . the purposes of this paper, we will consider a WMD any weapon that kills Vol. 30. Pg. 7. more than 3000 people. The FBI and DOJ have been keen to charge peo - The leader of al Tawhid wal Jihad, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (who later ple who would use even small bombs only capable of killing dozens – Zazi, adopted the brand name “Al Qaeda in Iraq” for his Iraqi Sunni insurgency) Abdulmutallab, and Shazad among them – with attempted use of ‘weapons was perhaps too candid in an April 2004 audiotape denying his involvement of mass destruction.’ We reject this usage as a trivialization of a term that, in an alleged chemical bombing plot in Amman, Jordan: in theory, references a category including thermonuclear weapons capable of incinerating millions at a time. “If we had such a bomb – and we ask God that we have such a bomb soon 162 – we would not hesitate for a moment to strike Israeli towns, such as Eilat, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, United States of America Tel Aviv and others.” vs. Osama Bin Laden: Testimony of Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl , Feb 6-13, 2001. Pgs. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3672891.stm 291, 366, 524-26. 167 163 IAEA Staff. 2008. “An Atomic Detective’s Essential Kit: Nuclear Forensics.” Time Staff. 1999. “Wrath of God.” Time . January 11. July 22. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2008/forensicskit.html http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054517,00.html 168 164 Talmadge, Caitlin. 2007. “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11.” The Washington Al Masri. 2004. The Story of the Arab Afghans . Asharq Alawsat. Cited in: Quarterly. Spring. Salama, Sammy, and Lydia Hansell. 2005. “Does Intent Equal Capability?: http://www.twq.com/07spring/docs/07spring_talmadge.pdf Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Nonproliferation Review . Vol. 169 12, No. 3. November 2005. Pg. 626. The critical mass needed for a very simple gun-type 100% enriched 165 Uranium nuclear bomb is 52kg, about 115lbs. However, a more complex Louise Richardson catalogues these, here: Richardson, Louise. 2006. What gun-type design encasing one portion of the uranium in a dense reflector Terrorists Want . Random House. New York. Pgs. 160-162. material (like Uranium 238 or Beryllium) to reflect neutrons back into the 166 Public interviews with Bin Laden and Zawahiri often included dubious HEU could create a more efficient chain reaction and push the critical mass bluffs later undermined by events or the more candid assessments of their down by half or so to roughly 25kg or 55lbs. Since HEU is rarely 100% associates. When Bin Laden was asked In an October 2001 interview to enriched and the design and construction of a bomb by a non-state group speak about Western reports of his chemical and nuclear weapons develop - under security pressure is likely to be sub-optimal, we estimate that a terror - ment, the following exchange took place: ist group would have to acquire at least a hundred pounds of HEU to have Osama Bin Laden : “I heard the speech of American President Bush yester - any hope of creating a blast on the scale of Hiroshima’s “Little Boy” bomb day [Oct 7]. He was scaring the European countries that Osama wanted to – equivalent to 17 kilotons of TNT. 170 attack with weapons of mass destruction. I wish to declare that if America This judgment reflects a synthesis of conclusions from the following used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with sources: Bunn, Matthew and Anthony Weir. 2006. “Terrorist Nuclear chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.” Weapon Construction: How Difficult?” The ANNALS of the American Academy Hamid Mir : “Where did you get these weapons from?” of Political and Social Science. Vol. 607; Mark et al. “Can Terrorists Build Osama Bin Laden : “Go to the next question.” Nuclear Weapons?” Nuclear Control Institute . http://www.nci.org/k- In the same interview Bin Laden’s partner, Ayman al Zawahiri, stretched m/makeab.htm ; Union of Concerned Scientists. 2004. “Preventing Nuclear the boundaries of credulity, claiming that, Terrorism: Fact Sheet.” http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/nuclear_terrorism-fis - “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in central Asia, contact sile_materials.pdf ; Federation of American Scientists. “Nuclear Weapon any disgruntled Soviet scientist, and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase Design.” http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm ; Foland, bombs are available. They have contacted us, we sent our people to Andrew. 2008. “How Much Uranium.” Moscow to Tashkent to other central Asian states, and they negotiated and http://nuclearmangos.blogspot.com/2008/07/how-much-uranium.html we purchased some suitcase bombs.” 171 Mueller cites several authors on this point, including those most concerned Here Zawahiri pretends (1) that there is a nuclear bonanza across Central about the threat of nuclear terrorism: Milhollin, Gary. 2002. “Can Asia (that other nuclear-aspiring governments and entities have somehow Terrorists Get the Bomb?” Commentary . February. Allison, Graham. 2004. failed to exploit) (2) that suitcase bombs are even viable a decade after their Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. Times Books. New York; construction and several years after their shelf-life has expired and (3) that Cameron, Gavin. 2004. “Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism al Qaeda had multiple functioning bombs and chose not to use even one as Research: Past and Future.” In Terrorism: a deterrent to the NATO-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Somehow, Trends, Achievements and Failures . Editor: Andres Silke. Frank Cass Publishing.

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182 New York. Pg. 83; Leitenberg, Milton. 2005. “Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bunn, Matthew, and Anthony Weir. 2006. “Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Bioterrorism Threat.” Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. Pgs. 46-48. Construction: How Difficult?” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science . September. bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA442204&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Pgs. 136-137; 183 Langewiesche, William. 2007. The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor . United States Department of Justice. 2010. “Amerithrax Investigative New York: Farrar, Strauss Giroux. New York. Pg. 20; Perry, William J., Summary.” Washington, DC. February 19. Ashton B. Carter, and Michael M. May. 2007. “After the Bomb.” New York http://www.justice.gov/amerithrax/docs/amx-investigative-summary.pdf Times. June 12. 184 Reports that a North African terrorist cell lost 40 members to bubonic or 172 We do not review the technical hurdles of nuclear weapon design here. pneumonic plague – http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1121842/Al- But, it may suffice to note that building more than a very simple nuclear Qaeda-hit-Black-Death-fear-medieval-plague-kills-40-terrorists-training-cam device would require terrorists to recruit nuclear scientists who would p.html — were quickly seized upon as evidence of bioweapons development rather risk their lives and freedom working for poorly resourced terrorists even though the plague kills 3,000 people a year in the developing world. than offer their services to any of several nuclear or nuclear-aspiring states. Even if this particular cell was attempting weaponization, the incident 173 This judgment reflects a synthesis of conclusions from several sources, indicates their incompetence and the difficulty of taming the weapons, not including: Bunn, Matthew and Anthony Weir. 2006. “Terrorist Nuclear that such weapons threaten Westerners. Weapon Construction: How Difficult?” The ANNALS of the American Academy 185 of Political and Social Science. Vol. 607; Mark et al. “Can Terrorists Build See also this CNS testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Nuclear Weapons?” Nuclear Control Insitute . http://www.nci.org/k- Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations: m/makeab.htm ; Union of Concerned Scientists. 2004. “Preventing http://cns.miis.edu/testimony/parach.htm Nuclear Terrorism: Fact Sheet.” http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/docu - 186 Salama and Hansell cite two cases in which terrorist cells attempted and ments/nwgs/nuclear_terrorism-fissile_materials.pdf; Federation of failed to weaponize small amounts of ricin and cyanide. They conclude, American Scientists. “Nuclear Weapon Design.” however, that “difficulties in weaponization mean that such substances http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm ; Foland, Andrew. 2008. “How Much Uranium.” are suitable only for targeted assassinations, as opposed to mass casualty http://nuclearmangos.blogspot.com/2008/07/how-much-uranium.html attacks.” Salama and Hansell. 2005. “Does Intent Equal Capability?” 174 Nonproliferation Review. Vol. 12, No 3, November. Monterey, CA. Gellman, Barton. 2011 “Is the FBI Up to the Job 10 Years After 9/11” Pgs. 622-623. Time. May 12, 2011. http://www.time.com/time/nation/arti - 187 cle/0,8599,2067995,00.html#ixzz1PHtyE43C ) See especially Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies. 2006. 175 “The Jericho Option: Al-Qa’ida and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure.” For more on radioactive dosing and the effects of dirty bombs see: Miller, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. June 2006. For an article offering William and Robert Lindsay. Editors Ghosh, Tushar et al. 2010. “Chapter 16: Nuclear Terrorism: Dose and Biological Effects.” Science and Technology a strong counterpoint, see Toft, Peter, Arash Duero, and Aruna Bieliauskas. of Terrorism and Counterterrorism. 2nd Edition. CRC Press. Boca Raton. 2010. “Terrorist Targeting and Energy Security.” Energy Policy . Vol. 38. 176 188 The evidence of terrorist’s intentions re: attacking nuclear facilities is The only plots coming close to the definition of infrastructure attacks, mixed. According to an al Jazeera reporter speaking on 60 minutes II in the Brooklyn bridge plot and the plan to ignite gas lines under JFK airport, April 2003, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed removed nuclear facilities from al were infeasible. Qaeda’s list of targets citing worry that “it might get out of hand.” 189 Such attacks may even result in increased community solidarity as http://www.energybulletin.net/node/1243 frequently occurs in cities experiencing electricity blackouts, flooding, 177 On ability to withstand commercial airliner attack, see expert peer- or other mid-grade disruptions. reviewed study 190 http://www.nei.org/filefolder/EPRI_Nuclear_Plant_Structural_Study_200 See FBI Congressional testimony that outlined the significant hurdles 2.pdf . On nuclear facilities continually improving security against teams to water supply attacks as early as October 2001. of attackers, see Stone, Daniel. 2011. “Flirting with Disaster.” Newsweek. http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/terrorism-are-americas-water- January 4. resources-and-environment-at-risk. 178 191 For security reasons, we have chosen not to get too specific about some This might appear to contradict an al Qaeda strategy of provoking occu - of these details. pations of the Middle East by foreign countries, but that strategy does not 179 require that any or every country occupy the Middle East at the same time. Ghosh, Tushar et al. 2010. Science and Technology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism. 2nd Edition. CRC Press. Boca Raton. Chapters 6, 7, Attacking Madrid reduced western troop levels in Iraq, weakening the and 23. impression that the US occupation was broadly supported by the interna - tional community. 180 Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. 2010. “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction 192 Threat: Hype or Reality?” Belfer Center, Harvard University. Pg. 6. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2009. How Terrorism Ends. Princeton University 181 Press. Princeton, New Jersey. Pg. 2. Warrick, Joby. 2006. “Suspect and a Setback in Al-Qaeda Anthrax Case; 193 Scientist with Ties to Group Goes Free.” Washington Post . Pg. A1. Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism . Columbia University Press. New October 31. York. Pg. 281.

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