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Supreme Court of the United States Docket No. 19-508 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States STATE OF FORDHAM FIREMEN’S PENSION FUND, Petitioner, v. HORIZONS, INCORPORATED AND THATCHER LYON, Respondents. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS Team No. R12 QUESITON PRESENTED 1. Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, does a purchaser have standing when it cannot show it actually purchased the specifically tainted security? 2. Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, does an investment bank qualify as a statutory underwriter when it does not market the security, perform book-building, set the reference price, set the opening price, or act as an intermediary between the issuer and purchasers? ii Team No. R12 TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESITON PRESENTED ................................................................................. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................... iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... iv STATUTORTY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS .............................................. 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................ 1 STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................. 4 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................. 4 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 6 I. Petitioner lacks standing to bring a Section 11 claim because it cannot trace its shares to Horizons’ Registration Statement. .................................... 6 a. Precedent requires a plaintiff to trace her shares to the direct listing’s registration statement regardless of the difficulty it presents. .................... 7 b. A narrow interpretation of “such security” is consistent with the legislative history of direct listings. .......................................................... 10 c. Petitioner’s reliance on Slack’s rule is misplaced because lock-up agreements are available, and its rule does not offer a limiting principle. 12 d. Petitioner and future plaintiffs have alternative remedies within current Securities Law and within the market. ..................................................... 16 II. Thatcher Lyon is not a statutory underwriter because it does not purchase, sell or offer, or participate in Horizons’ direct listing. .................. 18 a. Thatcher Lyon did not purchase any securities in the direct listing. ... 18 b. Thatcher Lyon did not sell of offer any shares in Horizons’ direct listing. 19 c. Thatcher Lyon did not participate in the direct listing because the Court should adopt the Second Circuits definition of participation. ................... 23 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 30 iii Team No. R12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................. 4 Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009) .................................................. 26 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) .....................................................................19, 21, 22, 23 Herman v. Mclean, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) ......................................................... 18 Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175 (2015) ........................................................................................ 6 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) ............................................. 29 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS CASES Ackberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1989) .................................................... 24 Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967) ............................................ 6, 7, 12, 16 Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co, 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995) ..... 24, 25, 26 In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................ 12 In re Lehman Brothers Morg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2011) .. 24, 26 In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005) ........................................ 29 Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2005) .................................... passim Obasi Inv. LTD v. Tibet Pharm., Inc., 931 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2019) .......................... 16 SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp. 617 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2010) ..................... 24 SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass’n, 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1941) ........ 20, 22 iv Team No. R12 Wampler v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 597 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2010) ........................................ 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CASES AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Ruttenberg, 229 F.R.D. 676 (S.D. Ala.) .............. 22 In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 674 F. Supp. 2d 580 (M.D. Pa. 2009) ............................................................ 21 In re Laser Arms Corp. Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). ............. 30 In re National Century Enterprise, Inc. Financial Investment Litigation, 553 F. Supp. 2d 902 (S.D. Ohio 2008) ........................................................... 16 Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)……………………....……7, 8, 9 Pirani v. Slack Technologies, Inc., 445 F.Supp. 3d 367 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ................................................. 13, 14, 27 Walk-In Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bruer Capital Corp., 651 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ................................................................ 21 STATUTES 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (2018) ................................................................................ 19 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2018) ................................................................................ 6 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (2018)........................................................................... 18 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(11) (2018) ........................................................................... 18 OTHER AUTHORITIES 1 Securities Practice Guide § 4.04(1)(b) (2020) ............................................... 21 Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation, 2 LAWSECREG § 7:21 (2020) ... 17 Anat Alon-Beck, Robert Rapp, and John Livingstone, Investment Bankers as Underwriters—Barbarians or Gatekeepers? A Response to Brent Horton on Direct Listings, 73 SMU L. Rev. 251 (2020)............................................ 22, 28 v Team No. R12 Arthur Pinkasovitch, How Are Bonds Rated?, investopedia.com (last accessed 2/7/2021). ............. 25 Benjamin L. Nickerson, The Underlying Underwriter: An Analysis of the Spotify Direct Listing, 86 UCHILR 985 (2019).........................................15, 19, 20, 24 Brent J. Horton, Spotify’s Direct Listing: Is It a Recipe for Gatekeeper Failure?, 72 SMU L. Rev. 177 (2019) ........................................................22, 26, 28, 30 Cody L. Lipke, Direct Listing: How Spotify is Streaming on the NYSE and Why the SEC Should Press Play, 12 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 149 (2019) ............................19, 23, 28, 29 Public Statement, Statement on Primary Direct Listing, Allison Herren Lee and Caroline A. Crenshaw (Dec. 23, 2020) ........................................................ 11 Richard Pan, Blockchain, Securities, and Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 453 (2019) ......................................................... 17 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90768 (Dec. 22, 2020) (SR-NYSE-2019-67) ...................................................... 11, 14 vi Team No. R12 STATUTORTY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS This case first presents a question as to whether the Court may dispense with the traceability doctrine pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2018) when shares are sold under a direct listing. The second question focuses on whether Respondent Thatcher Lyon can be liable as a statutory underwriter under 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (2018) when they merely act as a financial advisor. STATEMENT OF THE CASE After graduating from Stanford University, Peter Maxfield (“Maxfield”) aspired to create a medical technology company, Horizons, Inc. (“Horizons”). R. at 2. He intended to start by treating and monitoring early childhood cognitive problems, such as attention difficulties, and would later expand to other cognitive disorders, such as early-stage dementia. R. at 2. Unfortunately, Maxfield lacked the capital to start his company alone, so he reached out to Mathew Stowe (“Stowe”), a former alumnus, friend, and venture capitalist at Ashford Investors (“Ashford”). R. at 3. Stowe connected him with Geoffrey Robbins (“Robbins”). R. at 3. Robbins shared Stowe’s enthusiasm and agreed to invest $10 million for a 6 percent stake in Horizons. R. at 3. Over the next year, Maxfield and Robbins became confidants, built out technology and production facilities, and implemented a sales program. R. at 3. As the company grew, they decided they needed to raise more capital. R. at 3. In an attempt to acquire more capital, Maxfield once again called his friend Stowe. R. at 3-4. Stowe set up a meeting between Maxfield and a senior partner at Ashford. R. at 4. Impressed by Maxfield’s pitch, the senior partner 1 Team No. R12 reached out to the Franklin Fund (“Franklin”),
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