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The Syria Conflict and the Geopolitics of the Region

The Syria Conflict and the Geopolitics of the Region

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2014 48 State of Play and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis Keys Keys or achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace, has led the stabilise to failures ongoing with along crisis, rian Sy- the resolve to efforts international of failure The and SaudiArabia. that has been described as a ‘cold ’ between and international power struggles, especially a rivalry regional for theatre a become increasingly has tality bru and corruption against revolt local a as started What resolve. to harder and bloodier become has As it has become more internationalised, the conflict ferent politicalsidesandsectariangroupings. exacerbated by the influx of Syrian refugees from dif being ’s are , and Iraq especially neighbours, troubling pressures economic and social political, pre-existing The opposition. Syrian the ed homes in the European countries that have support given thousands of tens few a only neighbouring with countries, within remain refugees the of Most this means a third of Syria’s population is displaced. country.inside the people displaced lion Altogether, mil 4.5 estimated an of top on year, the of end the by million, 4.1 to third, one than more by rise would refugees Syrian registered of number the estimated Refugees on Commissioner High UN the to worsen: hascontinued situation the Moreover, conflict. Israeli-Palestinian 66-year the of result a as gees refu as registered Palestinians of number the half 2011 and May 2014. This is equivalent between to more than country the outside refugees as register The had forced 2.7 million Syrians to Chatham House, London The Royal InstituteofInternational Affairs at MENA Programme Senior Research Fellow andDeputyHead Jane Kinninmont of theRegion The SyriaConflictandtheGeopolitics State ofPlayandOutlooktheSyrianCrisis * willing the question to region the in allies West’s ThisarticlewasfinalisedinApril2014 (Editor’snote). *

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cused their efforts more on diplomacy and humani and diplomacy on more efforts their cused fo subsequently have Europe and US The stocks. weapons chemical government’s Syrian the of tling avoid in favour of a UN-supervised disman to decision subsequent US’s the and Syria, in ons the US as punishment for the use of chemical weap participation in airstrikes that were briefly mooted by given the UK parliament’s refusal to authorise British ever, than likely less appeared countries by Western intervention military Direct like. would they rity secu of kind the offer to US the of ability and ness aty hog te rs o is einl iar with rivalry regional its of prism the through partly conflict Syria the sees Arabia Saudi while However, supporters oftheregimethroughoutcrisis. strong remained have Russia, and Iran allies, tional tradi Syria’s Meanwhile year. the of half latter the in Turkeyand Qatar Arabia, Saudi by joined were and the to support 2011, in began uprising the when opposition Syrian governments first the were states tions of the Gulf States and . Initially, Western expecta the to contrary intervention, military direct evident that no Western powers had the appetite for opposition the forces made losses as on the ground, and as it became opposition, the of backers the among grow tensions 2013 of half second The Crisis: Troubles amongAllies oftheSyrian The InternationalGeopolitics and sectarianidentitypolitics. an end to police brutality has been derailed by ethnic an uprising initially concerned with social justice and how of example preeminent the as uprisings, wider Arab the over shadow a cast also has crisis The areas. opposition-held against violence its calated es has government Syrian the and progress, scant made have talks UN-brokered but assistance, tarian

------localised and diverse nature of the opposition, inter highly the Given motivations. economic and litical po ideological, of range wide a encompassing and state, centralised highly a against up rise to locales different in up sprung has that movement tralised decen loose a being fragmented, naturally is sition oppo Syria’s groups. opposition different between fissures existing the exacerbated has opposition the of backers different between Competition practice. in opposition the of elements different backed have (SNC), National Syrian the support ficially further have of which countries, These picture. other, the complicated the on Turkey and Qatar and hand one on and Arabia Saudi opposition, the of backers regional main the between rivalry A this goal, andthemeanstoachieveit(seebelow). to accord they priority of level the over views different take countries Western and Gulf the But down. step should and legitimacy lost has Assad al- Bashar President that said all have powers an Europe most and US the countries, Gulf The . and Syria, in transitions political be should there that agreed nonetheless were They mocracy. de supporting of rhetoric administration’s US the uprisings, as the Gulf countries do not look kindly on Arab the to attitudes different taken have generally also Arabia, Saudi especially countries, Gulf the and US The markets). energy global of stability the in interest an retains it (though Gulf the from plies sup energy on dependent directly longer no is US the since especially allies, Arab Gulf longstanding its with diverge to beginning be may US the of ests questions over the extent to which the regional inter dent, Hassan Rouhani, in June 2013. This has raised Presi Iranian new a of election the since Iran with rapprochement a sought explicitly has US the Iran, tion at a disadvantage when it comes to participating little success. This fragmentation places the opposi had have afar, from often it, unify to efforts national between Iran and between IranandSaudi has beendescribedasa‘coldwar’ struggles, especiallyarivalrythat regional andinternationalpower increasingly becomeatheatrefor has against corruptionandbrutality What asalocalrevolt started ------hr ae hnes f omncto wt Iran with communication of channels talks, are the there attend to Iran to invitation an withdraw end the conflict. (While the US insisted that Brahimi to work to players external the among agreement an secure to be could talks international the for tive objec best the that possibility the raises opposition the representing effectively of difficulty chronic The senior ranks. its among cohesion relative maintain to managed has which but territory, former its of swathes huge of control lost have may that government a of atives the SNC delegation was confronted with represent progress, little made which talks, the At practice. in power significant wield Westbut the to unpalatable are groups armed Islamist more these (FSA); Army Syrian Free the than other groups armed all cluded ex and groups opposition Islamist) (mainly several by boycotted were These Brahimi. Lakhdar envoy, UN the by brokered 2014, in Geneva in place took that talks the as such negotiations, international in and that it would deter similar breaches of interna of breaches similar deter would it that and line,” “red a be to deemed previously had Obama be a punishment for crossing what President Barack would this that basis the on targets, regime Syrian against airstrikes limited launching considered tion chemical that weapons had been used reports in Syria, the US administra following 2013, August In The USDecidesagainstMilitaryIntervention escalated. ground the on violence Meanwhile, contacts. two As of May 2014, formal talks had given way to track- concessions. political than rather chips, as bargaining access humanitarian in improvements offering towards tended representatives government talks, the At stalemate. or defeat military avoid to essary nec was compromise political that sense any than rather it, that upon pressure deal international reduce a would negotiate thus could and ground the on winning was it that perception a reflected table negotiating the to come to willingness its militarily; betting on the likelihood that it could win the civil war the time of writing, the Syrian regime appeared to be local players, including local ceasefires. However, at parallel with an agreement or agreements among the in come to need would this effective, be To gime.) re the of part formally not are who Iranians through ------

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2014 49 State of Play and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2014 50 State of Play and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis Keys ers that supported the – namely – opposition Syrian the supported that ers pow Western leading the onwards, 2013 tember Sep From weapons. chemical the of dismantling the oversee would that agency main the as term, short the in least at power re in continuation Syrian gime’s the accepted effect in it intervention, militaryof idea the drop opportunity.it did only Not this on seized US The supervision. UN under tled disman stocks weapons chemical Syria’s have to ing to broker a deal whereby Mr Assad would agree offer by face, losing entirely without action military avoid to and issue, weapons chemical the address to opportunity the US the gave Russia Meanwhile, “Saddam” whentheymeant“Assad.” to referring of slip Freudian the made MP one than tellingly,more and, war Iraq 2003 the of experience the to referred repeatedly this on debate liamentary alongside the US in military strikes on Syria. The par participate to UK the for approval Cameron, David parliament refused to give the British Prime Minister, gressmen to return from their summer break, the UK Con for waited world the While . and Iraq from withdrawing of platform a on elected been had Obama Mr that fact the and East Middle the in unpopularity of becoming involved in another conflict the given this, give would Congress whether clear sional approval for any military action, and it was un Congres seek to expected also was President The scenario. different a be likely would US the by strikes profile high- However, Israel. against retaliated Syria has neither Syria nor Israel have acknowledged but this publicly, nor , to transfers arms possible deter to Syria in airstrikes targeted out carried has Israel that reported been has it occasions several On bows.” the across shot “a the of speaking changing regime, at aimed be not would and limited, strictly be would strikes any insisted Obama sident Pre- won. they if interests US support would forces Martin General opposition Syrian believe not did chiefs-of-staff, he said Dempsey, joint the of head the him; overthrow briefing to were militarily intervening leaders against military US go,” must sad the At “As US. that stance US nominal the despite time, same the join to readiness their expressed leaders French and UK The future. the in law tional manitarian response to the crisis, while continuing while crisis, the to response manitarian hu the up stepping and solution diplomatic a ing the US, UK and – became focused on seek ------

the then head of intelligence, Prince Bandar bin Sul month, same the In reasons. the of one as Syria in Council, citing the UN’s failure to resolve the conflict Security UN the on seat non-permanent a up take to opportunity the down turned Arabia Saudi level, highest the at pique of fit apparent an in October, was always likely to be controversial in the region. In that stance a airstrikes, US putative the endorsing publicly of step rare the taken had Saud, Al del-Aziz Ab bin Faisal Al Saud Prince Minister, Foreign their leadership in particular felt betrayed, especially after Saudi The Syria. in militarily intervening not for tries unusual position of being criticised by the Gulf coun the in now is US the Iraq, in militarily intervening for allies its by criticised roundly being after Ironically, lethal aid. by prevented non- than other anything providing from parliament was government UK the whereas provides US the FSA with limited The amounts of weapons, FSA. the and SNC the to aid provide to the potential for military intervention to effect positive about scepticism public widespread is there when and pressure under are budgets government when time a at unpopular generally is action Such action. military of consideration serious to return will tries It seems unlikely that the US or other Western coun to theFrenchParliament. the US, and in the event the issue was never brought with concert in out them carried have only would try port for airstrikes was purely theoretical as the coun tary equipment from France. However, France’s sup mili on spend to US$3bn with Lebanon providing by and helicopters French 142 purchasing macy: diplo arms-sales using by action military of support in stance France’s for appreciation its underlined it said It Jordan. and France with closely Kingdom more work would The Iran. against ally stronger a di-Iranian , rather than offering Saudi Arabia Sau the to comes it when non-aligned be to prefer generally Brazil and China, as such countries any appetite to intervene militarily in Syria either, and shown has powers rising major world’s the of None other alliescouldbe. those who clear not was It allies. other towards and US the from away moving be would Arabia Saudi that and UN, the not US, the for had message a rejection been this said Washington, to bassador am Kingdom’s previously the as years had twenty to close who spent Saud, Al Abdel-Aziz bin tan ------

states because of its support for Assad. By backing By Assad. for support its of because states Arab leading of ire the drawing initially after ground, political some gained has Russia that such is US the with states Arab pro-Western of frustration The be to dominated byjihadists. opposition the perceive they as policy his ing an international pariah have come to agree with mentators who com had initially criticised Putin political for back Russian Some dimming. are Syria over co-operation for prospects the suggest 2014 April in in crisis political the over Russia and US the between tensions heightened Sharply areas. opposition-held bombard to bombs barrel and aircraft using now government Syrian the with negotiations, violence has increased on the ground, track-two high-profile less to way given have talks peace faltering while But Geneva. in talks peace of rounds several in participation opposition tial) par least (at and government both secure to himi, envoy,UN the of efforts the supported Bra Lakdar labelled a success. The US, EU and Russia have all decisively be yet cannot and complete from far is nied possessing. However this dismantling process de had regime the years for which weapons, cal chemi of stockpiles its dismantle to Syria for deal international an reaching of breakthrough ceived crisis in Syria. They have hoped to build on the per to work with Russia to sought find a diplomatic solution to have the countries European and US The Russia’s Role porter oftheinternationalwaronterror. MPs before their vote to portray the regime as a sup such fears; its parliamentary speaker wrote to British exploit to how knows regime Syrian The to blowback. lead could this that risk possible the and Syria concerned about their own nationals going to fight in regime change. They have also become increasingly of wary – Dempsey General like – them makes This prophecy. self-fulfilling a becoming be may that tive narra exaggerated initially an jihadis, anti-Western tion that the opposition is increasingly dominated by percep widespread increasingly the by concerned are countries Western Moreover, Syria. in change 1 one of the main parties in the conflict, it has come to Jubin G oodarzi , Syria andIran:DiplomaticAlliance Power Politics intheMiddleEast ------opponents will be emboldened enough to try to take its falls, regime Syrian the if that concerned come be has Iran and Arabia, Saudi with rivalry Iran’s for current conflict, Syria has also become a key theatre the In arms. with Hezbollah supply to corridor land its maintain to been traditionally has Syria in interest primary Iran’s ways. different radically in this terpret in but leadership, and legitimacy Islamic claim both stituency, in contrast to Iran and Saudi Arabia, which con same the for competing not are they as ance, alli their sustain to helped even have differences Syria’s SignificanceforIran ance whenitcomestoregionalsecurity. also has been more talk of the need for There greater Arab self-reli Morsi. Mohammed against coup from the US was suspended as a result of the 2013 Russian fighter jets after some of its usual military aid buying of possibility the about Russia with cussions dis entered pointedly and Assad, by sticks Russia like them by stick would US the wish they US the to saying also are states Arab the of Some deal. peace possible any in player key a as seen be co-operation overSyriaaredimming 2014 suggesttheprospectsfor the politicalcrisisinUkraineApril andRussiaover between theUS Sharply heightenedtensions Hezbollah. It has been argued been has It Hezbollah. and Hamas with along region, the in interests Israeli and US to axis’opposed ‘resistance self-styled a of part as alliance longstanding a have they but State, Syrian secular the of that from different very is ology more than they geopolitical are ideological; the Islamic Republic’s ide are Syria in interests key Iran’s Hezbollah, alsoopenlyenteredtheconflictinSyria. ally, territory. Iran’s own their on it fight to having up needed to fight al-Qaeda in Syria, or they would end they that claiming by policy this justified officials an Irani force. militia pro-regime new a train to Guards Revolutionary its sent it that acknowledging gime, down onitssupport for Basharal-Assadandhisre doubled has Iran 2014, of half first the and 2013 In , IBTauris, 2006. 1 that their ideological their that ------

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2014 51 State of Play and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2014 52 State of Play and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis Keys tators have portrayed Turkey and the Gulf States as States Gulf Turkeythe portrayed and have tators the uprising. As part of this narrative, many commen of roots socioeconomic and geopolitical the masks and simplistic overly is centuries-old this but struggle, Sunni-Shia a of manifestation latest the as war civil Syrian to tendency growing a is There Turkey andtheGulf perceptions ofthefightersinSyria). international dominate to – unfairly however – come have (which groups jihadi Gulf-backed with pared evils’com two of ‘lesser the represents Assad that perception general their by strengthened been has internationally. However, Iran’s appeal to isolated its core Shia constituency become have Assad and caused a split with Hamas, while its allies Hezbollah Iran’s Syria Instead, policy has undermined all these efforts and Brotherhood. has Muslim the towards overtures made and revolutions Islamic an-inspired 2011 it sought to portray the Arab uprisings as Irani In world. Shia the beyond sympathisers of stituency con a reach to issue, Palestinian the as such es, traditionally has and caus anti-imperialist and pan-Islamic use to sought East Middle the in minority ethnic and religious a in is which Iran, for costs had without attributing this to the regime. This policy has weapons, chemical of use the condemned Rouhani with the only hint of criticism coming when President uprising, the to response violent its in government Syrian the backed consistently therefore has Iran Hezbollah in theregion,alongwithHamasand andIsraeliinterests opposed toUS axis’ part ofaself-styled‘resistance allianceas they havealongstanding geopolitical morethanideological; Iran’s keyinterestsinSyriaare Maliki inIraq. Al- Nuri by led government Iranian-allied the down play a part in this conflict and sectarian rhetoric has rhetoric sectarian and conflict this in part a play regime allied with Shia Iran. certainly having sectarian motivations for opposing an Alawite - - - - - Turkeyvio fomenting for Assad Mr blamed also has made tothem. he commitments on reneging for him blamed and crisis, the resolving about Assad Mr under with standings personal reach to attempted leaders of their each when rather but violence, first state the of at waves not – uprising Syrian the into some months positions their changed countries three All made significant investments in Syria, prior to 2011. and family, Assad the with relations cordial had tar Qa why nor Iran; from away it wean to – incentives business and financial with coupled – identity Arab reached out to Syria in the hope of using their shared several times in the preceding decade, Saudi why,Arabia travel; visa-free for providing free and a zone trade creating borders, their over countries two the between tensions traditional the reduce to Syria with worked had TayyipErdogan Recep of ernment gov Turkish the 2011, to prior why, explain to fails narrative sectarian the But extensively. used been other, more Islamist militant groups, prioritising the prioritising groups, militant Islamist more other, supported has intelligence Saudi that perception a is there but 2013, in SNC the for support their ed 11’‘London the reiterat that Ministers Foreign of group among was Ministry Foreign the this; counter to how on views different have Arabia Saudi in er tion” by Iran. It appears that different centres of pow “occupa under country a in “genocide” of spoken has Minister Foreign the and Syria in brutality the by horrified been has he say King the know who Those Syria. in presence Iranian the countering to mitted com most the been has Arabia Saudi three, the Of national security. Turkey’s threatening are the towards and ia domestic opponents argue his policies towards Syr Erdogan’s Mr But Turkey. of integrity the to threat tions, rather than necessarily seeing them as a major aspira Kurdish wider on groups Kurdish Syrian of tried to manage the impact of the growing autonomy has government Turkish the backdrop, this Against 2013 to be negotiating with the Turkish government. in revealed was Ocalan, Abdullah leader, prisoned with accommodation the PKK, a Kurdish armed movement whose an im reach to more trying is controversial), it (since tentatively more and, Kurdistan, economic partner of the regional government in Iraqi key the becoming by all above region, the of Kurds dogan has sought to reset Turkey’s relations with the Er Mr Meanwhile, Kurds. own its among unrest lent ------nonetheless tried to avoid an all-out civil war returning The leaders of Lebanon’s major political factions have Future Movement, Mohammed Chatah, in a car bomb. anti-Syrian the to adviser and Minister Finance mer for a of assassination the and Beirut in embassy an Irani the on attacks bomb of series a including 2013 late in incidents major with bombing, and battles gun to leading Lebanon, into over spilled has conflict The opposition. the support to gone have fighters Sunni while places) holy Syria’s defend and al-Qaeda fight to need they (saying government Assad the porting ian conflict, with Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militias sup Syr the of sides both on part taking now are fighters Iraqi and Lebanese fissures. sectarian own their ed, exacerbat and with, overlapped has Syria in groups ed, as the increasingly sectarian alignment of different affect worst the been have Lebanon and Iraq bours. neigh Arab Syria’s on strains socio-economic and The conflict in Syria has exacerbated existing political Iraq, LebanonandJordan sions intheregion. ten sectarian reduce to together work could they hope expressed and Iran of government new the to against out reached – Morsi ally,Mohammed Egyptian their coup the for support its to owing Arabia, Saudi of distrustful increasingly Turkey– and Qatar 2013, late In enemy. an as Iran view not does but Syria over Iran with disagrees it said has It position. domestic his consolidating on initially energies his focusing be to assumed was who Thani, Al Hamad given the accession of a new Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin given perceptions it was running into difficulties, and to back the opposition, but took a step back in 2013, efforts of forefront the at been previously had Qatar ligence, PrinceBandar,in2014. could This change with the departure Ministry.of the head of intel Interior Saudi the worried have that blowback of risks the over Iran game’against ‘great ------after the2014election. coalition ruling another build to attempts Maliki’s Mr opposing now factions Shia major with community, Shia majority the within rivalry severe is there where Iraq, in so not is it politics, Lebanese in line dividing main the is Assad for support while However, Iraq. in divisive bitterly proven has This regime. the with fight to territory Syrian into cross to militants Shia allowed has and threat, larger a as opposition ian tory to fight the US occupation there, it sees the Syr terri Iraqi into cross to militants Sunni allowed had who Assad, for love little had previously government Maliki’s Mr While 2007. since seen previously not levels reaching violence, severe more seen has Iraq of thepopulation. non has reached over one million, or close to one-fifth mic strains as the number of Syrian refugees in Leba econo- faces also country The territory. own their to (and used)asawarningoftherisksrebellion. seen widely been has conflict the as unrest, litical off the monarchy in terms of domestic social and po time the crisis in Syria has also taken some same pressure the At worsened. have electricity and water of shortages and refugees, Iraqi and Palestinian of waves previous of top on coming refugees of sands economic resources have been strained by the thou country’s the However easily. go not would Assad are agreed on one thing: that they all warned officials the US and Israeli Iraqi Jordanian, fissures. tarian sec same the have not does it as and fighters, tion it is reportedly used as a training ground for opposi to take a more neutral public stance on Syria, though sought has it as divisions such avoided has Jordan not goeasily would Assad all warnedtheUS are agreedononething:thatthey Jordanian, IraqiandIsraeliofficials ------

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2014 53 State of Play and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis Keys

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