The Liberal International and the Cold War, 1947-1989

Giovanni Orsina Luiss-Guido Carli University, Rome IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca

1. Studying liberalism through the Liberal International

The Liberal International (LI) has been studied very little1. While this is to a certain extent understandable, given that it wielded no actual power, my argument here is that, at least as far as ideology is concerned, it can provide an interesting and reliable guide to post-1945 European liberalism. More interesting and reliable than individual liberal parties, the ideology of which is likely to be distorted by national political contingencies; more interesting and reliable than individual thinkers, whose value as representatives of liberalism can be – and almost invariably is – contested. The LI has held congresses or seminars every year since its birth in 1947, and every year has voted a number of resolutions2. This paper considers LI resolutions from 1947 until 1989, integrating it with a number of other LI documents, so as to ascertain how the LI confronted the Cold War and how its attitude towards the Cold War changed over time. Before coming to that, however, it is useful to have a more general look at the ideology of the LI.

2. Globalisation with a human face: the ideology of the LI

LI documents, and what little historical literature we have, show quite clearly that international liberalism was far from being unanimous. Deep divisions emerged often inside the LI – divisions which almost invariably can be traced back to the presence of a liberal “left” and a liberal “right”. That being

1 With some exceptions: J.H. MACCALLUM SCOTT, Experiment in Internationalism. A Study in International Politics, George Allen & Unwin, London 1967 – more a memoir than a history book –; J. SMITH, A Sense of Liberty. The History of the Liberal International, Liberal International, London 1997; G. THIEMEYER, Zwischen Kooperation und Konkurrenz. Die transnationale Zusammenarbeit liberaler Parteien in Europa, in J. MITTAG (ed.), Politische Parteien und europäische Integration. Entwicklung und Perspektiven transnationaler Parteienkooperation in Europa, Klartext Verlag, Essen 2006; G. Orsina, La globalizzazione dal volto umano. L’ideologia dell’internazionalismo liberale, 1945-1989, in G. Orsina (ed.), Leadership e culture politiche nell’Europa degli anni Ottanta, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, forthcoming. See also P. DELWIT (ed.), Libéralismes et partis libéraux en Europe, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles 2002; E.J. KIRCHNER (ed.), Liberal Parties in Western Europe, CUP, Cambridge 1988. 2 IL resolutions of the years 1947-74 and 1975-81 have been published in English and French in Liberal International Resolutions-Résolutions, vol. I, edited by E. CAMURANI E B. VONO, Florence 1975; vol. II, edited by E. CAMURANI, Bologna 1983. said, LI resolutions do outline a liberal ideology – an ideological core common to all liberals, both right and left wing – as coherent as any ideology can be. I’ve described this ideological core elsewhere, and it is not possible to reproduce that description – quite lengthy – here3. However, in order to fully understand how international liberalism confronted the Cold War, it is necessary to point out at least a few general ideological features of the LI: a) LI resolutions give prominence to the – so to speak – dialogical and progressive character of liberalism: an ideology of human interaction based on the conviction that, given an adequate institutional framework, that interaction can roll on in an orderly and progressive way largely by itself. The image of liberalism that we get from the LI, therefore, is dynamic and, in its own fashion, utopian: 1. dynamic because the solution of every problem and, above all, of any clash between values (e.g. universal rights and national self-determination; free market and the protection of the environment) is entrusted to the passing of time – or, more precisely, to the virtuous circle of historical development: «ecology and economy are not contradictory because in the long term economic and environmental interests are one and the same»; defending human rights «may lead states into conflict with their short-term interests», but «in the longer term such policies are often the most successful»; «in the long term, the poverty of large parts of the world can best be alleviated through freedom of trade»4; 2. utopian because it aims at creating (or, better, at letting grow) ever improving individuals in an ever improving society, even though it declares it impossible to state in what this improvement would consist precisely – the reason why this liberalism could best be described as “utopian by approximation”. b) The stability of these basic ideological tenets over time, from 1947 until 1989, is quite striking. Even more striking is the, so to speak, “Nineteenth-century flavour” they have. According to Michael Freeden, Nineteenth-century «liberalism became a dominant, even if not exclusive, ideology that could preach the virtues of openness and tolerance, precisely because it thrived in a sanguine world whose settledness was not endangered by such virtues. Nineteenth-century liberalism was a creed nourished by the certain belief in orderly progress»5. In the second half of the Twentieth century, the LI exhibits a liberalism which is equally nourished by the certain belief in orderly progress. Only, the world is not sanguine anymore. The existence of a conceptual hard core which liberals of all shades can share, the morphology of this ideology, the striking resemblance of Twentieth-century liberalism to its Nineteenth- 3 G. Orsina, La globalizzazione dal volto umano. L’ideologia dell’internazionalismo liberale, 1945-1989, cit. See also id., Il liberalismo europeo nell’età dei totalitarismi, in T. Piffer, V. Zubok (eds), Società totalitarie e transizione alla democrazia. Saggi in memoria di Victor Zaslavsky, il Mulino, Bologna, 2011, pp. 29-55; id., Da un dopoguerra all’altro. Alcune considerazioni sui destini del progetto liberale nell’Europa del Novecento, in M. Cau (ed.), De Gasperi, Adenauer e la sfida della ricostruzione (1945-1948), il Mulino, Bologna, 2012, pp. 23-49. 4 Resolution World Environmental Policy, 1986; Liberal appeal of Rome, 1981. 5 M. FREEDEN, Liberalism Divided. A Study in British Political Thought, 1914-1939, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986, p. 9. century predecessor are, in my opinion, the most interesting outcomes of this research on the ideology of the LI. c) Orderly and progressive cooperation, at we should expect, is the basis for the LI’s conception of international relations as well. Trade is the “ground floor” of that cooperation: the LI upholds free trade with almost no reservation whatsoever (although there is one significant exception: the CAP). Since the 1940s, liberals are by all means the “prophets” of globalisation. LI globalisation, however, has a human face: trade is the just first step of global cultural, social and political collaboration. The final aim of the liberals, therefore, can best be described as the creation of a “world civil society” (the expression within the LI is Ralf Dahrendorf’s, and emerges in the second half of the 1980s) made of human beings organised in separate but cooperating political communities; closely linked with each other by a multiplicity of ties; acutely aware of the existence, relevance, and positive character of those ties. World civil society is the final outcome of the largely spontaneous expansion of the liberal ideal, and of the social and individual, material and moral improvement which is necessarily linked to that expansion.

3. The changing attitude of the LI towards the Cold War

Given these premises, it is obvious that the Cold War should represent a major problem for Liberal Internationalism. Liberals were united in their anticommunism, desire to uphold the West, and conviction that in the event it would triumph. Better: to a relevant extent, the LI was born exactly to defend liberal values against the Soviet threat (it is no chance that it was created in 1947), even though it can be argued that this original aim created more problems than it solved, and in time it was overcome. However, when it came to deciding how the Cold War should be fought – whether one should first defend liberalism in its Western heartlands even though this meant temporarily giving up its universalism, or use its universalism as a weapon to win the Cold War even though this meant opening up the West to potential dangers –, the liberals split up. The presence of “hawks” and “doves” has been a permanent feature of the LI since its inception, very clearly underlined by the international’s memorialist and first historian MacCallum Scott. Beneath the permanence of that feature, however, the situation did change over time. We can identify at least four different periods. a) 1947-1953 – a die hard anti-Soviet stance. The whole of the worst phase of the Cold War, from 1947 until 1953, was characterised by a die-hard defensive attitude. The Uppsala Appeal, issued in 1951 by the LI Uppsala Congress, is possibly the best example of how the International confronted the Cold War in those years. The appeal aimed to answer USSR-sponsored pacifism by tightly linking peace and liberty. The constant and continuous violation of individual and national rights, together with the utter “opacity” of Communist countries – it argued – could by no means conduce to that «world- wide confidence which is the essence of peace». And, however, a peace «worth the name» could never be «purchased at the cost of freedom». b) From Stalin’s death until the mid-1960s: dialogue subordinate to security Starting with 1953, and taking into account the slow beginning of the Thaw, the LI came back to stressing its faith in international dialogue. From this moment on, its resolutions started showing a conceptually bipartite structure which, while it evolved over time, would fundamentally be reproduced until the end of the Cold War. Up to the mid-1960s, this dual entity was made on the one hand of the desire for less strained international relations and more dialogue, on the other of the absolute necessity that this desire be subordinate to the defence of the Free World against a Soviet Bloc which was deemed unwilling to coexist with the West6. Still in 1963, therefore: «The Congress of the Liberal International records its satisfaction that agreement was reached at Moscow between Russia, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. to ban nuclear tests in the air and under water … While it would be unrealistic to dismiss the pact as of no significance in the cold war, it would be unjustifiable to regard its negotiation and conclusion as permitting free states to relax their vigilance in the absence of much further evidence of Russia’s readiness actively to work for peace and encourage general freedom». While in those years defending the West was considered an absolute priority to which dialogue with the USSR should by all means be subordinated, however, this did not imply that liberal principles could be discarded to the point of tolerating right-wing authoritarian countries, or of suspending or limiting individual rights within Western democracies. The possibility that the Cold War make it necessary to depart «from the historical practice of the liberal democratic states» was discussed in the Lucerne congress in 1955, but discarded, and raised never more. In the memorandum Winning the Cold War, presented to the 1962 Congress, the then secretary general of the LI Richard Moore put it clearly enough: «In waging the Cold War, self-criticism is a weapon for the West to use in its own defence». c) From the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s: security subordinate to dialogue Starting from the mid-1960s, while the conceptually bipartite structure of the resolutions remained in place, the order of priorities started to be reversed, in a slow process which reached its conclusion grosso modo by the mid-1970s. The Zeitgeist certainly accounted for this transformation – as well, however, as the more specific political situation of a very influential liberal party such as the German FDP, since 1969 partner of the SPD in a government committed to Ospolitik. In 1966, for the first time, a LI Resolution showed a more dialogical than defensive attitude:

6 «Peaceful co-existence», stated for instance a 1960 resolution, «is indeed virtually identical with the Cold War which it is supposed to end … the persistent propaganda in its favour is solely designed to undermine the resistance of the West to the expansion of Communism». while being aware «of the continued hostility of communism towards democratic systems of government and hence the need for an effective Atlantic Alliance», the International underlined its faith in the principles of «collective security» and the necessity that Nato countries work together with the Warsaw Pact so as «to achieve a true detente in Europe, which should be a contribution towards a general balanced and controlled disarmament»7. In the following congresses the balance between the two elements continued tilting this way and the other – in 1969 the LI warned not to forget the real nature of the USSR; in 1972 that peace could by no means be based on an illusion or the Brezhnev doctrine –, but the political change was ever more evident: defending the free world was becoming less important than following the liberal policy of international openness and cooperation. Also because, for the first time, the International was beginning to acknowledge the fact that the Soviet Bloc was indeed capable to evolve: dialogue was no abstract principle, but a concrete political instrument which could yield significant results. In very changed historical circumstances, the faith the liberal “doves” of the 1950s had had in the pedagogical virtues of exchange was taking hold: the «peaceful coexistence of nations and social systems in Europe» would produce an «increasing exchange leading to free circulation of persons, ideas, and goods», which in its turn would generate «a gradual extension of essential freedoms throughout the continent»8. d) From the mid-1970s until 1989: from Western security to liberal values Finally, since the mid-1970s one of the two elements of the conceptual couple which had been born after Stalin’s death started to change: it was no longer the defence of the West which went together with dialogue, but, rather, that of abstract human rights. It was necessary to communicate and negotiate with the USSR as much as possible, even though it should never be forgotten how utterly incompatible communism and liberalism were, nor should liberals stop explicitly condemning the Eastern bloc whenever this incompatibility was showing up and asking that it respect individual rights – also on the basis of the Helsinki agreement.

4. The LI and international organisations

The changing attitude of the LI to the Cold War is matched – and confirmed – by its approach towards international organisations. Within the general framework of an unwavering faith in international cooperation, resolutions show quite clearly how, until the mid 1960s, the LI was primarily 7 Resolution The International Situation, 1966. J.H. MacCallum Scott underlined the novelty of this resolution in his 1967 book (pp. 196-7): «The two-day debate on the international situation in Copenhagen showed little basic change in attitude from what had been said in previous years … There was, however, one slight departure which reflected what may prove to be a coming alteration of the pattern of world alignments. It was recognized that some measure of detente was taking place between Russia and the West, largely on account of the Russo-Chinese estrangement … there were signs that a new atmosphere was being generated». 8 East-West Relations in Europe, 1970. looking at Western international organisations: the European Communities on the one hand and the Nato on the other – the latter being considered a non-merely military alliance, but the embodiment of a deep economic, political and cultural liaison crossing the Atlantic. Faced with a dual international crisis, for example, in 1956 liberals lamented the uselessness of the United Nations 9. Still in 1960, LI internationalism mostly consisted in urging «the free countries to build up their moral, political, economic and military strength, to draw closer together in every sphere of their mutual relations, to maintain and to strengthen the bonds of the Atlantic Alliance, to recognise the overriding importance of achieving the solidarity and unity of Europe within the framework of the Atlantic Community» 10. It is only a few years after that, that the situation started to change. Liberals began to contend that the UN, «notwithstanding its present shortcomings, deserves the support of the people in all countries in order to make it into an effective world authority, with clearly defined functions and real power, capable of enforcing the rule of law in international relations» 11. Criticisms were no longer aimed at the very idea that East and West could work together, but at the actual functioning of the UN, and above all at its weakness. An issue which might be addressed, for instance, by creating an international tribunal for the protection of human rights12. The growing interest for the UN was matched by the dwindling interest for the Nato – very visible above all in the 1970s. A dwindling interest, however, which led the liberals neither to saying that the Alliance was useless nor to adopting antiamerican stances: the Western anchorage of international liberalism was never called into question.

5. Universalism and self-determination

LI resolutions and documents were adamant about the universalism of theoretical liberalism: no mere child of the West, it was – and most emphatically ought to be – aiming at world hegemony. Historical circumstances, notably the Cold War and decolonisation, once again, set this aim against other values which were also prominent in LI ideology, such as self-determination and the respect for non-Western cultures. As it is often the case with LI resolutions – bearing very little practical consequences – contradictions were not necessarily addressed and solved: principles were expressed one after the other without paying particular attention to their consistency 13. This allowed the LI to give

9 Cfr. J.H. MACCALLUM SCOTT, op. cit., pp. 162-6. 10 Resolution on the International Situation, 1960. 11 Liberal Declaration of Oxford, 1967. 12 Resolution Human Rights, 1978. 13 See for instance the resolution Public and Private Initiatives in Developing Countries, 1968: «We firmly believe that every country has the right of determining its own governmental system. We also maintain, however, that the establishment of a liberal and democratic government limiting its power by the acceptance of the universal rights of man is the best possible way towards economic and social progress. Military or other dictatorships, fascist governments and bureaucratic regimes of different kinds are as detrimental to the liberty and well-being of citizens of developing countries as to citizens of highly industrialised countries. We shall never endorse authoritarian, dictatorial or other oppressive regimes». priority to the defence of the West, as we have seen; to announce the universalistic character of liberalism; to remain hostile to any form of colonialism; to believe that cultural diversity should not only be accepted, but cherished and promoted. Alternatively, the task to sort out the potential contradiction between self-determination and liberal universalism was entrusted to the other liberal deus-ex-machina we have already spoken of: the long term. International cooperation between an enlightened West and a morally and materially improving Third World, over time, would do the trick 14. However, there were times when the historical situation made it very difficult, if not impossible, not to adopt a clear stance that would run counter either the LI insistence on the defence of the West, or liberal universalism, or the principle of self determination. Confirming what we have been arguing so far, until the 1960s the defence of the West was given priority. Confronted with the Suez crisis, the LI first stressed the need for multilaterialism and international dialogue and cooperation – «progressive and voluntarily accepted limitations on the sovereignty of all states in the common interest», would overcome any «obsolete conception of imperialism and colonialism». But it also made it very clear that, while liberals were in favour of «the emancipation of nations and individuals» – nations and individuals both, on the same level of importance –, «in its application, this principle must not be twisted into forms of nationalism and totalitarianism resulting in tyranny and the misery of peoples». Principles such as self-determination and the hostility to colonialism, in sum, could not justify an illiberal regime such as Nasser’s. At the same time, what the LI was really worried about in 1956 was the breakup of Western solidarity, which would weaken the West vis-à-vis the Soviet menace. Also when confronted with the Vietnam war, LI resolutions – 1966, 1967, 1970 – insisted on dialogue and multilaterialism. But they made it clear also that the Americans should not withdraw at any cost, lest a gap opened up into which Russians and Chinese would quickly step. In the 1970s and 1980s, as noted above, the defence of the West was replaced by that of liberal values detached from their historical and geographical cradle and interpreted in more abstract terms. The universalistic and expansionist power of those values, however, remained more important than cultural pluralism and national self determination, although those principles were also respected: «Human rights are not a Western cultural prejudice. The dignity of man knows no boundaries. Insistence on basic human rights is universal»15.

6. Conclusion: disembedding liberalism

LI documents demonstrate how European liberalism even after World War Two, while adopting a

14 The Ottawa Human Rights Appeal of 1987 follows both the path of jusnaturalism («men and women are born free, unique and of equal worth»), and that of a rather generic converging relativism: «Respect for human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms goes far back in different historical, cultural and religious traditions». 15 See the LI general secretary Urs Schöttli on north-south relations, in 1983; Ralf Dahrendorf ’s communication at the Pisa Congress of 1988 and the resolution he proposed. cautious and realistic attitude, also remained in its peculiar fashion utopian and progressive. This raises the question whether liberalism – be it right of left-wing, Nineteenth- or Twentieth-century – can survive at all without a strong confidence in a virtuous circle made of liberty, social progress and individual improvement, and capable to a relevant extent to roll on spontaneously. And it shows how dependent liberalism is on its historical Zeitgeist and conditions – or, to put it differently, how fragile it is. Post-WWII liberals were acutely aware of this fragility, which the events of 1914-1945 had demonstrated beyond any doubt. Beside giving more prominence to institutions and conscious political action, they reacted by deeply embedding themselves into the West – or, better, exploiting the possibility of embedding themselves that the historical circumstances were giving them. From 1947 until the mid-1960s, therefore, in LI documents liberalism and the West overlapped substantially. It was a conjunctural, not structural, overlap: the ideology was never losing its universalism, in theory it was offered to anyone; in practice, however, its Atlantic roots were deemed necessary so that the theory may survive. With the 1970s, the situation changed deeply: the free world kept its importance, but just as a sort of primus inter pares, and liberal values were offered the world in a more abstract form. This was certainly due, partly at least, to the fact that in those years, and above all after the birth of the European Liberal Democratic Federation in 1976, the LI stopped being a merely European entity. It seems also a consequence, and a sign, however, of the more general historical developments of the 1960s and 1970s: the crisis of the very notion of the West, the further loss of centrality on the part of Europe, the evolution of the Cold War and of transatlantic relations. This transformation contributed giving international liberalism a more abstract, a priori character, reducing the weight that the realistic link with history, tradition and power had been given by the events of 1914-1945 and the Cold War. The jusnaturalistic accents which show up in the LI documents of the 1980s might be a reaction, but also a complement, to these developments.