https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20190025274 2019-08-31T13:42:13+00:00Z View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by NASA Technical Reports Server SAFETY OF SPACEFLIGHT PARTICIPANTS ABOARD SUBORBITAL REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES – BACKGROUND RESEARCH Robert W. Seibold(1), Ronald Young(2), Nickolas M. Demidovich(3) (1)The Aerospace Corporation, P.O. Box 92957, M1/132, Los Angeles, CA 90009-2957, USA, [email protected] (2)NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center, P.O. Box 273, MS 2701, Edwards, CA 93523-0273, USA, [email protected] (retired) (3)Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, 800 Independence Avenue SW (AST), Washington, DC 20591, USA, [email protected] ABSTRACT harm and/or loss of life and must sign a waiver of liability based on informed consent. It is worth noting The anticipated advent of the U.S. Government that FAA-AST has developed and published sponsoring human-tended research on commercial recommended practices for human spaceflight occupant suborbital flights necessitates the establishment of safety and training, discussed later, to serve as safety review procedures for federal agencies to allow guidelines for developers during this learning period. government-sponsored spaceflight participants (SFPs) These recommended practices are intended to be aboard these vehicles. Safety practices for National translated into a regulatory safety certification regime Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) personnel after the learning period expires. aboard aircraft, orbital rockets and platforms, and a non- NASA vehicle, the Soyuz, are summarized. The 2. FAA AND NASA FLIGHT PARTICIPANT valuable “Recommended Practices for Human Space SAFETY PRACTICES Flight Occupant Safety,” published by the FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA-AST) in For commercial and private aviation, the FAA has 2014, are summarized. Medical recommendations for established and modified rules over decades to ensure operationally critical flight crewmembers, published by passenger safety. These rules incorporate proven the Aerospace Medical Association Commercial maintenance standards and practices based on practical Spaceflight Working Group, are reviewed. FAA-AST- experiences and rigorous aircrew training standards and approved SFP training available at three U.S. requirements. In contrast, NASA’s aviation safety commercial companies is summarized. Activities of authority self-regulates NASA-sponsored personnel ASTM International Committee F47 on Commercial aboard public-use and non-NASA-controlled aircraft. Spaceflight, formed in 2016, are reviewed. Finally, The cognizant NASA Center Technical Authority safety comparisons are made with another challenging oversees an independent safety review of the proposed environment, deep sea submersibles. aviation flight activity. Approval for a given flight or series of flights is granted after a comprehensive 1. INTRODUCTION program review to determine if mission and safety risks have been identified and mitigated to acceptable levels. At the urging of industry advocates, the U.S. Congress The scope of the review is based on the complexity and is encouraging the emergence of commercial space criticality of the aviation flight activity. capabilities by limiting government regulatory requirements for developers/providers [Commercial For U.S. astronauts, a NASA Procedural Requirements Space Launch Act (1984), extended by Commercial Document (NPR) establishes procedural and technical Space Launch Amendments Act (Public Law 108–492, requirements for human-rating certification. Exceptions Dec. 23, 2004)]. Like other commercial spaceflight are the International Space Station (ISS) and Soyuz (and providers, commercial suborbital Reusable Launch in an earlier revision, the Space Shuttle), which are not Vehicle (sRLV) providers are licensed under FAA-AST required to obtain a human-rating certification. Those regulations to provide safety to the uninvolved public latter programs “utilize existing policies, procedures, under a designated “learning period.” In essence, and requirements to certify their systems for NASA commercial space providers are operating in a safety missions” [1]. pre-certification era. As a commercial licensed activity, a sRLV provider can sell flights to the public for The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness participation at their own risk. Identified as spaceflight Act of 2015 (H.R. 2262) created new category of NASA participants (SFPs), they are informed that the vehicle people flying on commercial rockets, viz., “Government has not been independently certified as safe by the FAA. Astronauts.” This legislation allows highly trained They are informed of specific risks to potential personal astronauts to perform operations not allowed for SFPs. The NASA Administrator identifies which flight Expendable and reusable vehicles, human-rated occupants are so designated [2]. and non-human-rated Old and new technologies Soyuz is a series of spacecraft designed for the Soviet Past vs. present concepts of safety (user and space program by the Korolev Design Bureau in the government culture) 1960s that remains in service today. NASA performed Vehicle end use (commercial, recreational, a study on safety of flight participants aboard the government, military) current version of the Soyuz and concluded that multiple Differences in vehicle test programs (minimal solutions along an “arc of acceptability” (Fig. 1) have versus extensive) proven successful [3]. A parametric approach was employed to make 3. PARAMETRICALLY PROJECTED SAFETY predictions of sRLV safety using parametrics. The OF SUBORBITAL RLVs result was a safety comparison of a specific sRLV against other flight vehicle categories and activities. In 2013, the NASA Flight Opportunities Program The predictions were based upon 2015 flight sponsored research at The Aerospace Corporation to technology, Mach 3.5 maximum speed, professionally develop a model for predicting safety of new rocket- piloted human-rated systems, FAA controlled powered sRLVs. The approach was to evaluate effects airspace/flight rules, FAA safety regulations, and flight of vehicle catastrophic failure on the vehicle provider’s profile and other variables, all programmed into the business case, focusing on demand vs. supply. This model. Safety of the examined sRLV was found to market focus emphasized “probability of failure” as range across columns C and D in Tab. 1 [4,5]. The opposed to the more conventional reliability modeling developed model can be a useful tool for comparing approach, based on “probability of success.” The candidates to historical systems and constructing a primary challenge was the need to bridge performance business case analysis for newly developed flight data and cultural differences across several distinct vehicles [4]. The model responds to changes in areas with scant data: parameters deemed important to flight safety and is Subsonic, supersonic, and orbital flight calibrated to relevant history. Figure 1. Arc of Acceptability [3] 4. VEHICLE GUIDELINES FOR SAFETY- levels and then determine recommended flight rules to CRITICAL AREAS OF sRLVs minimize space weather hazards based on results of the mitigation methods. There were two principal Aerospace was tasked by FAA-AST in 2002-2003 to conclusions. First, owing to the short duration of flights develop minimum vehicle guidelines for safety-critical (~30 min. or less) and the even shorter exposure at areas of commercial RLVs, necessary to ensure the altitudes where atmospheric shielding is significantly safety of flight crew and passengers. These guidelines reduced (~5 min.), the exposure of crew and passengers were developed by reviewing and analyzing is minimal, except under circumstances where SPEs specifications, requirements, and lessons-learned for occur, which is less than about 5% of the time. Under safety of commercial, military, and experimental typical conditions, the radiation exposure to crew and aircraft, military space systems, and past and present passengers on a suborbital flight is less than that for a human-carrying space systems, followed by long duration airline flight. Secondly, avoiding interpolation and projection of these requirements for exposure to potentially harmful radiation associated crew and passengers aboard both suborbital and orbital with solar or geophysical disturbances can be achieved categories of future commercial RLVs. A bottoms-up by locating launch sites at middle latitudes, or lower, or approach was used to evaluate the following by delaying flights when there are indications that an subsystems: environmental control and life support SPE is in progress or imminent. For a high-latitude site, system; main propulsion system; guidance, navigation, a possible launch commit criterion could be based on and control system; avionics and software; main event probability distributions [7] structural system; thermal protection system; thermal control system; health monitoring system; electrical 6. CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED SFP power system; mechanical systems; flight safety system; INFORMED CONSENT and crew system [6]. U.S. Legislation (Commercial Space Launch 5. SPACE WEATHER BIOLOGICAL AND Amendments Act, 2004, and U.S. Commercial Space SYSTEM EFFECTS FOR SUBORBITAL Launch Competitiveness Act, 2015) gives FAA-AST FLIGHTS authority to regulate commercial spaceflight but does not allow the FAA to regulate the safety of people Aerospace and the