The Prairie Fire That Burned Mogadishu: the Logic of Clan Formation in Somalia

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu: The Logic of Clan Formation in Somalia

Alex de Waal

December 2018

The World Peace Foundation, Overview

Tuftsan operating University, foundation aims to affiliatedprovide with the Fletcher School at For the last 25 years, Somalis and international interlocutors intellectual leadership on issues concerned with state-building appear to have assumed of peace, justice and security. We that ‘clans’ are the core identity units in Somalia, bonded believe that innovative research and by primordial ties. However, the prevalent formula that teaching are critical to the challenges redefines selected corporate lineage aggregations as of making peace around the world political-territorial identity units is a historical contingency and should go hand-in-hand with that needs to be explained. Somalia has a segmentary lineage advocacy and practical engagement system in which the recognized four major Clans are a level with the toughest issues. To respond of collective aggregation, both arbitrary and inconsistent, to organized violence today, we not determined by contingencies external to the kinship system only need new instruments and itself. This paper presents analysis of the processes that tools—we need a new vision of peace. led to the emergence of the Clan-based political-military- TheOur challenge Conflict Researchis to reinvent Program peace. at territorial units in the period 1987-92. It describes the transformations of pastoralism, specifically rangeland enclosure, and the resulting inter-communal armed conflicts the London School of Economics aims and associated changes in the political significance of the to understand why contemporary lineage system. It describes the manipulation of lineage violence is so difficult to end and politics by Siyaad Barre as he sought to make his regime to analyze the underlying political coup proof and the rivalries among the opposition leaders, economy of violence with a view to which culminated in the formation of Clans as political informing policy. The research sites units for the purposes of capturing state power. Those units are Iraq, Syria, South Sudan, Somalia proved intrinsically unstable and transient and, even with and the Democratic Republic of sustained efforts to find civic representatives of Clans who Congo. can share power, it is unsurprising that Clans are unsuited to serve as the basis for the reconstruction of the country. Alex de Waal is the Executive Director at the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School, Tufts University.

World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher Conflict Research Programme School, Tufts University London School of Economics 169 Holland Street, Suite 209 and Political Science Somerville, MA 02144 Houghton Street (617) 627-2255 London, UK WC2A 2AE www.worldpeacefoundation.org +44 (0)20 7405 7686 Introduction answered. My hypothesis, that it sprang in part is more than a matter from the traumatic ruptures of the2 pastoral Understanding the dynamics1 that led to Soma- economy, remains worthy of inquiry. lia’s ‘year zero’ in 1991 of history. The processes of socio-economic and The terminology of ‘clan’ is pervasive in Soma- political transformation that were underway in lia and some clarification is needed. The word the years immediately prior to state collapse ‘clan’ is used in an elastic manner, to refer to left an imprint on the country that endures corporate lineage groups at any number of dif- more than 25 years later. In this paper I argue ferent levels of aggregation. Thus, the Ayr, the that the height of the civil war (approximate- Habr Gidir and the Hawiye are all labeled as ly 1987-92) was a period in which the logic of ‘clans’, despite the fact that each one is a sub- identity politics was substantially altered. This section of the next. If used in such a malleable happened through two processes. The first was and contextual manner, the term ‘clan’ can thus the political organization of the means of vio- explain everything and nothing. The word is lence in pursuit of state power (by both regime also used to refer to units that, in other African and armed opposition), and the second was the contexts, would have been termed ‘tribes’ or economic transformation in the pastoral social ‘ethnic groups’. In this paper, I reserve the word economy. The outcome of the first was the tran- Clan for these units—the capital ‘C’ indicating sient dominance of political-military-territori- their status as historically produced. To mini- al units based on units that, in this paper, I call mize confusion, I use the (somewhat clunky) Clans (with a capital ‘C’). The result of the sec- terminology of ‘corporate lineage groups’ to andond processhave remained was that the these dominant units were framework intrinsi- refer to any other formation. When I use the cally unstable. Nonetheless, Clan units became word ‘clan’ it is either in a direct quotation of others’ work or in the everyday elastic and in- for explaining Somali society and politics, and determinate sense of the word. (despite strong complaints) they pervade per- sistent international efforts to construct (or re- The period 1987-92 was the most violent in construct) a functional state. Somalia’s modern history. While a number of memoirs and journalists’ accounts were pub- This paper draws primarily on unpublished lished at that time, the events of that year have research that I conducted in Somalia during only recently been subject of more critical 1991-94, involving interviews with politicians, scholarly scrutiny. Notably, Lidwien Kapteijns businesspeople, and civil society activists, into has detailed the ‘clan cleansing’ of3 Mogadishu the political economy of the civil war, and re- and its legacy (Kapteijns 2013). Episodes of search using secondary literature on the polit- extreme violence such as this have the charac- ical economy of pastoralism. Returning to the teristic of appearing to speed up history and research materials after 25 years, it is striking warp time. Within a relatively short time pe- how much remains relevant today. The ques- riod, many momentous events occurred, with tion that motivated my initial research—what impacts that reverberate up to today. Moreover, is the United Somali Congress, the force that de- as noted by Donald Donham (2007), episodes stroyed Mogadishu?—has not been adequately of extreme violence tend to ‘primordialize’ the ‘Grass 1 Cf. Clapham 2017. 2 The research was interrupted by the Rwanda genocide. The African Rights discussion paper, and the Roots of Peace’ (African Rights 1994) was completed in April 1994 but only circulated to a limited audience. In the list of published discussion papers, its place as number 3 was taken by a paper on Rwanda. 3 The term ‘clan cleansing’ was first used with reference to north-western Somalia by Jama Ghalib (1995, p. 187). The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 2 titiescollective and identitieshatreds intoand hatredsthe past that and existed thereby at dismantled military and civilian-administra- the moment of violence, projecting those iden- tive institutions to preserve his personal pow- er. In parallel opposition leaders, for reasons of obscuring, and perhaps even inverting, the law political tactics, chose not to establish institu- of cause and effect. Thus, because the episodes tions—and indeed, those that existed within of anti-Isaaq violence of 1988 and the Hawi- the first and most potent opposition front, the ye-Darood violence of 1991 were so important Somali National Movement (SNM), were shat- in defining subsequent identities and polari- tered by military calamity in 1988. ties, the events leading up to those battles and massacres tend to be seen through the lens of Beginning with this period, one of the remark- Hawiye and Darood Clan units. This is an error, able aspects of the Somali political crisis is that which in this paper I try to correct. many analysts and almost all policymakers use the term ‘clan’ as though it refers to a natural In his account of the United Somali Congress unit, despite the fact that historians and social (USC) and its role in bringing down the regime scientists have—with a few notable excep- of Mohamed Siyaad Barre, Omer Elmi (1993) tions—long ago abandoned such primordialist writes of the ‘prairie fire’ of violence that frameworks. A singular and fixed formula of burned among the pastoralists of the central ‘clan’ identity is simultaneous decried as ma- rangelands, which spread at last to Mogadishu. lign and invoked as unavoidable. ‘Clans’ are his- Elmi is avowedly partisan but the details he torically constituted and are used by members provides of the USC’s foundational conference of the country’s political and military elites as appear to be factually accurate. He describes instruments of power—seeking state power ‘guerrilla’ delegates from a number of ‘bases’ and disciplining their constituents. They are who congregated at a garrison in Ethiopia to used by external intervenors for political and anoint their leader (General Mohamed Farah (especially) military purposes. Given that con- Aideed). He candidly notes that they were al- temporary conflicts in Africa and the Middle ready armed and mobilized before the arrival East almost always take on an ethnic character, of their leader. The ‘bases’ and ‘guerrilla units’ it is not surprising that Somalia’s civil war in he lists map precisely onto groups of self-armed the 1980s should have become an ethnic con- pastoralists, who had organized themselves in- flict. What needs to be explained is when and crementally over the previous ten years in or- why the particular configuration of collective der to protect their livestock, fight for access to entities emerged that are known as Clans, and grazing land, and raid others. These were the why they persisted. foot soldiers of the USC-Aideed who ransacked much of Mogadishu in 1991 and 1992. Follow- The central claim of this paper is that Clan has ing a discussion of lineage and identity politics served as handmaiden to the construction of in Somalia, the first substantive part of this pa- the current Somali political-territorial con- per describes how these local conflicts arose. figuration much as ‘nation’ did to the modern European state system (c.f. Gellner 2006). Clan The Hawiye Clan identity of these groups was cannot be taken for granted. It has been formed the product of Aideed’s burning political am- through violent and extractive processes at the bition to seize state power—the other ‘prairie intersection of pastoral livelihoods, military fire’ that consumed Somalia. Many others also organization and spoils politics as a strategy sought state power and used much the same for seeking and sustaining political power. But mechanism to try to achieve it. But both regime identities also have their own autonomous sub- and opposition lacked institutions and rule- stance and logic, and in Somalia this demands bound procedures for regulating such rivalrous that we analyze the lineage system, its speci- ambitions. President Mohamed Siyaad Barre ficities and the function played by narratives

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 3 around ‘clan’. Ironically, it was attempts by civ- 150-1). Throughout this paper I follow Lidwien ic leaders and foreign mediators to circumvent Kapteijns (2010) in regarding it as an invented or marginalize Somalia’s warlords that subse- and largely malign tradition. However, we will quently formalized the Clan system—a back- also come across cases in which this framework handed complement to the hegemony achieved served as a useful fiction, lending authority to by the violent processes of Clan formation. arguments for civility, notably in the construc- Thirtytion of Somaliland.years on, in Blood and Bone, Lewis ar The starting point for analysis of Somali identi- ty is I.M. Lewis’s classic ethnography, A Pastoral - Democracy (Lewis 1961). It is the intellectual gued that his analysis applied wholly un- point of origin for the conventional parsing of changed as the central explanation for civil war the Somali ‘total lineage’ into what Lewis called and collapse of the state (Lewis 1994). Such four clan families, their constituent clans, sub- unreformed primordialism cannot be taken se- clans, and sub-sub clans. These terms have riously. It is also inherently ‘groupist’ in that it subsequently been used loosely and confusing- attributes agency to social units (c.f. Brubaker ly,Figure and 1I will avoid this classification. 2009), transgressing the principle that ‘clan’ is an expression of lineage relations rather than : Conventional parsing of the Somali lineage system a property of collective units. Most recent scholarship on the history and politics of Somali identities has focused on the non-nomadic peoples of south- ern Somalia who have histori- cally been politically marginal- ized and whose lineage system has been seen as a deficient version of the ‘pure’ northern Somali version, or who are not ‘Somali’ by lineage at all. This is an important corrective to the dominant narration of So- Source: mali identities. In this paper, however, the focus is more Lewis 1994. narrowly on those historically dominant pastoralist groups Lewis did his fieldwork in the last years of colo- themselves—the very same communities that nial rule and his book was a product of that his- Lewis studied, namely the Isaaq and Darood torical moment. In common with the pioneer- pastoralists of northern Somalia and the Haw- ing generation of British social anthropologists, iye of the central rangelands—and how their the colonial state is both ubiquitous and invis- identities have been reconstructed. ible in Lewis’s monograph. Late colonial eth- nographies such as this were an integral part Lewis was a sufficiently diligent ethnographer of the administrative tribalism that the British that his material is much richer than might be Empire bequeathed to the first generation of inferred from the pared-down primordialism post-colonial leaders, and these writings influ- that he and his acolytes have advocated. Lew- enced their thinking for both good and ill. Thus, is’s book still provides a useful starting pointxeer General Mohamed Farah Aideed cites Lewis’s for understanding the Somali lineage sys- framework as authoritative (Ruhela 1994, pp. tem and its historical corollaries, notably

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 4 4 (‘contract’). Interestingly, itthe gives level no of pointers lineage beled as clans at one point or another. Howev- aggregationto the future mostof Clan salient conflict. for Topolitical re-state, purposes, in this er, while scholars have increasingly questioned constitutedpaper, I use asClan the to basic refer element to of armed con- primordialized accounts of Clan, they have paid flict and ethno-nationalism less attention to why Somalia is dominated by this specific configuration of Clan-based po- . In the 1950s, Clans litical-military-territorial formations. Indeed, were convenientdia for colonial administrative otherwise-astute analysts of how clan has been tribalism, but other levels of lineage identity constructed have accepted this formula. Thus (sub-clan and -paying group) retained their Abdisalam Issa Salwe advocates ‘clan balanc- social reality and political potential. Clans only ing’ as a remedy for clan domination (Issa-Sal- became the politically dominant aggregation at we 1996, p. 134) and Alice Hashim advocates a laterFigure time. 2. ‘clan self-rule’ (Hashim 1997). One of the rea-

Somali total lineage

Source:

adapted from Abbink 2009.

There is nothing in the Somali lineage system sons for their advocacy is that by invoking Clan, that preordained that any one level of cor- they can generate a formula for representation porate lineage association should be para- in peace talks and political structures that is mount. The four major Clans are an arbitrary based on something other than military force construct. And indeed, as levels of corporate (Menkhaus et al. 2009, pp. 44-5). lineage association, they do not match one another evenly. The three major pastoral lin- I follow Abdi Samatar (1992), Daniel Compag- eages are Hawiye, Diir/Isaaq and Darood; but non (1998) and Lidwien Kapteijns (2013) in lo- the most commonly usages of ‘clan’ are for the cating this inflection point somewhere during Isaaq and for subsets of the Darood: the Dul- the zenith of the Mohamed Siyaad Barre’s op- bahante, Majerteen, Marehaan and Ogadeen. pression and the depths of the civil war and the Meanwhile the Harti (consisting of principally mass atrocities that accompanied it. At the mo- of the Dulbahante, Majerteen and Warsengeli) ment of the final battle for state power in Jan- is the salient level of corporate association in uary 1991—which was also in retrospect the Kismaayo. All the units in figure 2 have been la- moment of state collapse—there were three 4 Pronounced heer and written that way prior to the establishment of the Somali script in 1972. The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 5 main armed movements, namely the Somali try to understand violent events in their cor- National Movement (SNM—‘Isaaq’), the Unit- rect sequence, it is important also to attend to ed Somali Congress (USC—‘Hawiye’) and the what happened immediately beforehand. Why Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM—‘Ogadeen’). did Clan emerge as the organizing framework Others had recently formed, namely the Soma- for the insurgency? This paper seeks to answer li Democratic Movement (SDM—‘Reewin’ or this question. ‘Rahanweyn’) and Southern Somali National Lineage and ‘Clan’ Movement (SSNM—‘Diir’), while the Soma- li Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF—‘Ma- jerteen’) had been revived from a moribund state. The Somali National Front (SNF—‘Mare- However much they are politically instru- han’) was created from remnants of the re- mentalised, socio-political identities also have gime. These were, I argue, the vehicles for the their own autonomous logics. When a politi- political-military-territorial units, identified as cian appeals to identity as the basis for polit- Clan, that have dominated ever since. In invok- ical mobilization he is making a pact with the ing Clan, the political-military entrepreneurs custodians of identity, such as tribal chiefs or made an implicit bargain with the custodians sectarian religious authorities. In most societ- of Clan identity, but erroneously assumed that provideies, those them custodians with havesome social autonomy constituencies vis-à-vis they would be masters of that bargain. Subse- and hold to systems of values and beliefs that quently, at peace conferences in 1996 in Sodere (Ethiopia) and 2000 in Arta (Djibouti), media- the politicians. Along with the way in which tors and civic leaders turned that logic against episodes of extreme violence generate identity the warlords by appealing directly to Clan el- configurations, this is one of the core dynamics ders, and fastening onto Clan-based represen- of identity-construction in a situation of polit- tation formulae that culminated in the ‘4.5’ ical contestation and armed conflict. However, specification (Menkhaus et al. 2009). The ‘4.5’ segmentary lineage systems allocate authority are constituted by the four big Clans: Daarood, over identity in an egalitarian manner, which Diir (including Isaaq), Hawiye and Reewin/ means that politicians and businesspeople can Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle); with a half (or themselves be effective identity entrepreneurs, ‘fifth clan’) allocated to minority groups. While without having to appeal to custodians of iden- this was an effective tactic for marginalizing tity who possess autonomous authority. the armed factions, and possibly the best way of securing representation for minorities, it has Somalia is a paradigmatic example of a segmen- formalized the legacy of Clan formation. It has tary lineage system. It is a simple and elegant subsequently been translated into a constitu- system in which each identity-based corporate tionally-sanctioned allocation of power accord- association corresponds precisely to a genera- ing to the ‘4.5’ formula and a territorial division tional level of the patriliny (Lewis 1961). This into the ‘building blocks’ of Federal 5 Member is encapsulated in the formula, ‘me against my States that matches it, albeit unevenly. brother; me and my brother against our cous- in; me and my cousins against the stranger.’ All The violent episodes of 1987-92 were un- members of the main pastoral clans can trace doubtedly crucial in fixing the narrative of Clan descent from a common ancestor within a ‘total identity and Clan hatred, and severing cross- genealogy’. The highest, most unifying levels of clan ties, in such a way that a turn to civic rep- this genealogy appear to have been established resentation could not reverse these new reali- in the nineteenth century at the time of resis- ties. However, following Donham’s enjoinder to tance to imperial encroachment (Ahmed 1995; 5 Each of the Federal Member States has a dominant ‘clan’ and significant numbers of minorities and trans-state communities (those with a presence across state boundaries). The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 6 Cassanelli 2010, p. 60). There are many fic- that can be mobilized militarily. This constraint tions in the higher levels of the genealogy and does not scale easily: as the level moves higher telescoping of the generations (Mansur 1995; in the genealogical tree, the sentiment of soli- Abbink 2009). Somalis have qabiila vocabulary that darity remains, but its mechanics vary. As Ro- refers to different levelsreer of lineage organizajilib and- land Marchal observes, the internal function of laaftion, including terms such as (generically lineage units is diverse: ‘history, migration and used for identity unit), (‘family’), urbanization … have made each clan very dis- (lower levels of lineage grouping). It has tinct, even while they claim many commonali- become solely a matter of convention to name ties’ (2007, p. 1098). certain levels of lineage as ‘subclans’, ‘clans’ and ‘clan families’, as though they correspond- Note that there is a danger of circularity in at- ed in some manner to ‘ethnicity’ or ‘tribe’. The tributing conflict to lineage units, asdia the func- total genealogy means that each male mem- tion of these units may be to organize violence ber of the main pastoral Somali lineages is in and reconcile after violence. The -paying principle able to choose the lineage-based unit group is a paradigmatic example of this. It il- of solidarity from the level of the immediate lustrates the phenomenon of how the antici- family to that of the Somali people as a whole, pated mechanism of resolving the conflict de- with units such as ‘clans’ becoming salient on finesIn the a similar formation way, of the in the conflict contemporary parties. In a circumstantial or arbitrary basis. It is a dem- era of Clans, military commanders and ocratic patriliny: all adult males in the gene- alogy have, in theory, equal standing. When a militiamen justifiably anticipate that man’s name attaches to a lineage formation ceasefires and political settlements will at any level (‘clan’, ‘sub-clan’, etc.) that occurs be negotiated on the basis of Clans, and solely because he achieved prominence as an so will participate accordingly. individual, through political, military, social or economic proficiency. We must not conflate dia or confuse two different things: ‘clan’ as rela- tionship and ‘clan’ as unit. One is individuals’ the era when the localized -paying group general affinity with their lineages; the other is was the most salient form of lineage organiza- individuals’ purported singular identification tion, then when there was a potentially violent with a Clan. negotiatedconflict, the betweenparticipants dia would enter it in the knowledge that the final settlement would be The simplicity of segmentary lineage conceals -payingdia groups. Any four vitally important aspects. First, the con- individual participating in that conflict would tent of what is at stake in the lineage system be liable for contributing to -payments or changes with level (cf. Simons 1995, p. 138). In ashis a family member would of a diabe eligible for receiving such the pastoralist system as it existed during the compensation only insofar as he participated colonial era, the fundamental unit of identity -paying group. In a similar was the mutual assistance associationdia among way, in the contemporary era of Clans, military patrilineal kin, organized for the purposes of commanders and militiamen justifiably antic- paying or obtaining bloodwealth ( dia) as rec- ipate that ceasefires and political settlements ompense for homicide. For obvious practical will be negotiated on the basis of Clans, and so fourpurposes, to eight this generations, used to limit a few the hundred -paying to a will participate accordingly. Conflict and iden- group to a relatively restricted span of kin— tity units are mutually constitutive; neither is logically prior to the other. few thousand men—whodia are within a geo- graphical range (Lewis 1961, p. 6). Implicitly, Second, kinship is necessarily leavened by com- it identifies the -paying group with a group plementary institutions of contract-making. In

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 7 the customary system as described in Lewis, Third, the ‘classic’ segmentary lineage mode of this was ‘a form of social contract’ known as social organization is closely associated with a xeer. Lewis describes it in these terms: ‘All lin- particular form of livelihood, namely nomadic eages which act corporately do so first because pastoralism. This customarily has a particular of their agnatic basis, and secondly through an form of territorial organization, according to wasexplicit the treatydia defining the terms of their col- which grazing lands are a common resource, lective unity.’ (Lewisdia 1961, p. 3) Typically, it and access and utilization of the rangeland together through-paying xeer group that is the contract- is based on negotiation among the collective ing unit. While the -paying units that came groups that organize herds of livestock. Wa- were usually from the ter ownership and access varies: in the case of same clan or clan family, there was no auto- wells and reservoirs it is organised according matic solidarity, but rather a deliberate pro- to who dug and maintained them. Historically, cess of negotiation that allowed for groups to land was plentiful but water and grazing re- diabe approached or not approached, and to opt in sources were dispersed, seasonal and variable or out. There was also no restriction on which from one year to the next. As recently as 1970, -paying groups can be approached to form most Somali herds were kept primarily for a contract. Lewis writes, ‘it is possible to have subsistence. Few animals were sold, reflecting treaty obligationsgashaanbur and political solidarity with- the pastoralists’ dependence on the direct con- out agnation’ (p. 193). For example, one kind of sumption of milk rather than the sale of animals contract ( ) was among a coalition to obtain money with which to buy other com- of small lineages, to resist the power of a bigger modities (British Veterinary Teamdia payment, 1973). Oth the- one (Compagnon 1998, p. 84). er main reasons for removing animals from the herd were bridewealth and There can be other bases for making contracts slaughter of animals for religious feasts and to and creating corporate associations, for exam- honour guests, and changing the composition ple Islamic law and practice, or administrativexeer have of the herd. The lineage system becomes more arrangements associated with the state. In the complex in the south, and especially among the last half century, customary forms of historically settled peoples of the inter-riveri- changed, either merging into or beingdia replaced an areas, where livelihoods were historically by other forms of civil, commercial and political based on a combination farming and livestock transactions and agreements. The -paying herding. As Abdi Samatar observes, the first or- group remains significantdia but has become de- der of intellectual business in updating Lewis’s tached from its basis in local pastoralist orga- Pastoral Democracy should be to focus on that nization. Instead, the -paying group is fused imprecise word ‘pastoralism’ and analyse how with other networks of solidarity, among them it has been transformed by the commodifica- business-commercial ties, and the organiza- tion of livestock and the means for sustaining tion of political and economic rewards around them (Samatar 1992, pp. 627, 631). Clans and other forms of lineage solidarity that diaraise funds for common activities. Theqaraan group, Finally, lineage identity does not exist in a polit- that organizes the collection of payments for ical vacuum. Segmentary lineages are the clas- and other obligations is known as sic example of a self-governing society without thewhich dia can be more flexible than solely follow- a state; but to the extent that such statelessness ing the lineage principle to the boundaries of ever existed, it was incomplete and occurred -paying group, and may include friends only in a particular context. Where there is an and the wider clan (Simons 1995: 120-122). important presence of a state or a commercial The lineage principle animates all these forms entity, the significance of lineage changes. A po- of solidarity, but none of them presuppose a litically significant individual becomes a broker fixed identity unit. between the state and the lineage. Offices such

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 8 as sultan and ugaas

usually emerged in these In other contexts, we can depict the instrumen- circumstances. Lineages as such cannot be rep- talization of ethnicity as a bargain between resented in power structures. Rather, individu- politicians who wish to utilize identity for their als have posts in hierarchies of military power, own purposes, and the custodians of legitimate administration and patronage, which intersect identity, who have their own interests and con- with their positions in their lineages. dependsstraints (which on the authoritycan be extremely and interests diverse). of those The degree to which identity politics is regulated In the 1950s, the northern Somali lineage sys- tem engaged with the colonial power, howev- custodians, which are in varying degrees inde- er much the ethnographer might have tried to pendent from the politicians. In the pastoral make the colonial impact invisible. In much the Somali case, where no such autonomous custo- same way that ‘tribes’ emerged from the colo- dians of identity have historically existed, any nial encounter as a means of making African so- adult male can aspire to become recognized as cieties legible to imperial authorities and pro- a lineage leader and the only mechanisms for viding the means to administer them indirectly restraint or regulation are his peers. This rec- (Ranger 1983; Mamdani 1996), the framework ognition can arise through political-military of ‘clan’ was a military-administrative conve- prowess and reputation, through personal in- nience for defining colonial subjecthood. In the tegrity and respect, through riches, through post-colonial era, the lineage system interacts serving as a broker with an external political with other political ethnicities (in southern entity, or a combination of the above. During Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya), with domestic the post-colonial period, political-economic state authorities, and with international pow- developments pressed the Somali lineage sys- ers. And, it is under pressure to conform to the tem to generate forms of political identity com- standard model of modern state formation (Sa- patible with state formation. This allows us to matar 1988). begin to understand the dynamics of intensely competitive Clan formation, driven by the vi- One significant element in the Somali segmen- olent rivalries among political entrepreneurs tary lineage system is, however, difficult to and the (weaker) efforts of ‘elders’, espousing change. As noted, and in contrast to forms of norms of civility, to restrain them. The logic of ethnicity that prevail in agrarian societies those lineage could be mobilized with equal legitima- in which customary systems have been adapt- cy by all these actors in such contests—and in- ed and validated by state authority, the Somali deed a single individual could switch between lineage system has no privileged specialist cus- different roles in accordance with contingency todians of identity. There are no chiefly offices and choice. tied to land, spiritual authority or aristocratic lineage. All adult males possess, in principle, The formation of Clans through the process- equal legitimate claim to public authority. Any- es described in this paper, however, have also one of a certain age and mental capacity can be created the positions of identity custodians. an ‘elder’: it is a normative term that refers to Alongside political-military entrepreneurs, ‘el- someone who acts in Ugaasa certain or Sultanway, rather, do so than in ders’ have begun to emerge as respected repre- a descriptor of an office. Individuals who hold sentatives of Clans. The mechanisms for identi- chiefly titles such as - fying these representatives are critical. Notably, sofar as they carry out the functions of the po- the 2000 Arta peace conference where each sition; their status may be heritable but hold- Clan was asked to nominate 180 individuals ing the office is ultimately based on individual (160 men and 20 women), was a pivotal case. merit and collective agreement. The egalitari- In Ethiopia, the principle of ‘nationality’ has anism of the lineage system has important im- been incorporated into political organization plications for how Clan has been politicized. since the 1970s and forms a central and con-

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 9 troversial element in the 1995 Federal Consti- transformed. There was a rapid commercial- tution. This recognises Somalis as a constituent ization of livestock ownership and a huge land nationality of the Ethiopian federation, where grab. Four main factors drove these changes: they have the intriguingly named Ethiopian growth in numbers, commercialization and Somali National Regional State. By extension, associated social stratification, changing land Somali Clans are also recognized as constitu- use, and politics and war. The ‘great Somali ent elements of the Somali nation, implicitly a land grab’ of the 1980s drove a series of pasto- theorization of ‘segmentary nationalism’ (c.f. ral land conflicts that were pivotal in shaping Lewis 1989) that has informed Ethiopian pol- the ways in which violence, politics and ‘clan’ icy towards Somalia since 1991. Among other identities were organized. things this has contributed to Ethiopia’s pref- erence for a ‘building blocks’ approach and its Map 1. Land use in Somalia advocacy of formulae based on equal political status for Clans in Ethiopian-sponsored peace processes, such as the 1996 Sodere conference (Menkhaus et al. 2009, p. 14). By recognizing Clans as administrative entities, the Ethiopians have elevated Clan elders and administrators into privileged guardians of Clan identity, solid- ifying the preconceptions of those who articu- lated the framework in the first place. The Transformation of Pastoralist Livelihoods

The first element in the origins of the ‘prai- rie fire’ is how disruptive changes in the pas- toral economy created what might be called a proto-insurrection—poorly coordinated forms of violent resistance and intercommu- nal conflict—before any organized insurgency Source: University of Texas emerged. Growth in numbers of livestock. A huge in

The ‘ideal type’ of Somali lineage organization, - as enscribed in the ethnographic canon, existed tioncrease of inherders, numbers the of growthcamels, ofsheep, veterinary goats and fa at a time when the basis ofdia livelihoods—live- cattle was related to the commercial orienta- stock ownership—was widely distributed and - organized by families and -paying groups, cilities, increased provision of water and the and Somalis political ambitions were limited expanding human population. The result was by colonial rule. The transformation in pasto- that, in contradiction to the historical combi- ralism was the first factor in reshaping iden- nation of water scarcity and plentiful pasture, tities and the emergence of the post-colonial grazing became increasingly scarce, while wa- ‘clan’. ter was relatively abundant. In turn, there was an overall deterioration in the quality of the Between the early 1970s and the late 1980s, range, particularly the depletion of the most traditional forms of pastoral livelihoods were favoured species of grass. One result was that

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 10 pasture became a scarce resource, and private keted animals were exported, and were sent to ownership of pasture grew. Perhaps the most Saudi Arabia and Yemen, in particular for the striking development in the 1980s was the Haj market. This made the market highly sea- widespread private enclosure of the range. In sonal, and concentrated commercial activity on the traditional nomadic economy, herders and a single trade route (through Berbera) at a sin- their livestock could move freely, subject only gle time of year, that shifts by eleven days each Theto negotiationrapid spread with of others thorn in thefences vicinity. across Fenc - year in accordance with the Islamic calendar. The southern livestock market was focused on the rangelands, enclosing land claimed Mogadishu and Kenya. as private, was an indicator of a dramatic change in the territoriality of Somalia’s Another unique feature of Somali pastoralism political economy. is its credit arrangements, whereby middlemen are paid by exporters only when their animals are sold in the destination market. This was a mechanism for concentrating livestock own- ing the grazing lands would have been unthink- ership among the wealthy. In the 1980s, most able. The rapid spread of thorn fences across animals on the range were owned by brokers, the rangelands, enclosing land claimed as pri- middlemen and export traders, who employed vate, was an indicator of a dramatic change in young men as herders. Those businessmen Commercialization.the territoriality of Somalia’s political economy. co-opted the lineage system for their purpos- es. The traditional small-scale organization of From the 1970s to the the lineage system was changed to one of com- The1990s, bust Somalia’s was brought livestock about economy by government followed mercially-owned herds, with traders and their a dramatic sequence of boom, bust and boom. agents making the key decisions concerning management and sale. If animals were stolen restrictions on exports, droughts (1974-75 theor herdersdia killed, the businessman would in- and 1986-87), and war. The background was voke lineage solidarity and perhaps mobilize the fast growth in the commercial export of -paying group to resolve the dispute, livestock which came to dominate the pasto- but these actions clearly would hold a different ral economy in the 1970s and 1980s, reaching meaning to their invocation by members of a to even the most remote parts of Somalia. The lineage acting in solidarity with one another. livestock trade was the main motor of social and economic trade among Somali pastoral- The monetization of the herders’ economy was ists before the war. It had a profound impact a closely related phenomenon, which arose on herding patterns and on resource use, and from the increasing sale of animals, combined played a central role in shaping the conflicts with improving terms of trade between live- that arose. The trade itself was a major eco- stock and consumable goods such as grain. It nomic resource, and thus a focus of conflict be- led to a marked change in herders’ lifestyles tween the government and its opponents. and diet; instead of being primarily depen- dent on meat and milk, herders bought larger By the mid-1980s, commercial pastoralism amounts of foodstuffs from the market, includ- dominated over traditional livestock herding. ing sugar, tea and cereals, and also purchased The trading sector was highly dynamic and ex- other consumer goods. The major source of panding rapidly. The marketing structure that income was sale of livestock. But a growing developed was highly sophisticated, and (in number of poorer rural people also began to the north and centre of the country) adapted engage in economic activities that brought to the peculiar demands of the market in the in small amounts of money, with which they Arabian peninsular. The majority of the mar- would buy essential commodities. The growth

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 11 of the low-income monetized informal sector supplies—a well or reservoir could spell the in towns, and the growth of small trading cen- intrusion of herds belonging to other clans or tres, was very noticeable. big traders into what had previously been a wet season reserve for local herds. A consequence was intensified economic strat- ification. Pastoralist societies are commonly in- Herders had some difficulty in communicating equitable, and dominated by small numbers of their scepticism about the value of improved wealthy herders. In the late 1970s and 1980s, water supplies to the agencies responsible a new phenomenon in Somalia was the chron- for providing water ‘development.’ One of the ic inability of smaller herders to sustain them- first priorities of the Central Rangelands De- selves, with resulting impoverishment. This velopment Project (CRDP) after its inaugura- was made worse by serious livestock losses tion in 1983 was the provision of permanent during the 1987 drought. The consequences water sources in areas prone to water short- included widespread indebtedness, outmigra- age. At Budbud in Bulo Burte district of Hiraan Changingtion, and livelihood land use. diversification. region, Hawadle pastoralists rejected plans for the agency GTZ to drill a borehole in their The most important factor seasonal pastures in 1984. They feared they in driving changing use of pastureland was the would lose exclusive use of this land. When rapid development of year-round water provi- the GTZ engineer nevertheless started drill- sion. In the traditional Somali nomadic pasto- ing, they attacked and killed him. Similarly, in ral system, water rights were more developed 1986, Ogaden herders in Afmadow in the Low- than grazing rights. This reflected the relative er Jubba lobbied against the further develop- scarcity of water and the investment required ment of water resources in their area, fearing to dig a well or a reservoir, and to maintain it. the encroachment of other herds. The fear was Thus, complex systems of water rights evolved. well-founded: Marehan herders began to use The individual or lineage who dug the well the water and grazing resources, leading to were said to own the well, and hence to have conflict. first right to the water, but these rights did not extend to refusing water to others, if it were During the war, many deep bore holes and res- available. ervoirs became inoperable due to lack of spare parts and maintenance. For some pastoralists, The provision of improved water supplies this was not unwelcome. In some areas, herders became a political and economic priority for refused to ask for their water supplies to be re- ernmentsuccessive rewarded governments their supportersand international by provid aid habilitated, fearing that this would spark con- programmes. Officials in the Siyaad Barre gov- flict. A key water point near Zeila in Somaliland - remained unrepaired until 1994, at the request ing deep bore holes with mechanical pumps or of the local Issa and Gadabursi herders, on ac- excavating public reservoirs. The rapid spread Politicscount of and fears war. of conflict. of water supplies across the rangelands rad- Thisically meantchanged that the many nature areas of pastoralism. that were pre Wa- The Siyaad Barre government ter became relatively plentiful all year around. repeatedly intervened in the rangelands in sup- - port of certain clans. This was the key factor in viously unusable, could be grazed, and areas escalating local disputes that would otherwise that previously could be grazed only in the wet have been resolved by mediation among the season, were now open for year-round grazing. parties concerned, into intractable conflicts theirThis increasedattitude towards the pressure the provision on pastures of water and of a national political nature. Fomenting such led many pastoral communities to reconsider disputes was part of Siyaad Barre’s divide-and- rule strategy. The resolution of these conflicts

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 12 to the thesis of this paper that transformations ultimately depended on the overthrow of the only on the third, because it is the most relevant government. Several of these disputes will be described below. in pastoralism contributed to transformations in identity politics. Historically, we can see that In turn, the armed conflicts contributed to a the pastoral land grab was also important in the further assault on the social and economic organization of violence in the formative stages base of pastoralism. War began by disrupting of the civil war. It is also the least document- the trading systems; as it intensified, pasto- ed. The pastoral land grab took quite different ral movement was disrupted by sowing land forms in different parts of the country (Afri- mines, by the destruction of water supplies, can Rights 1994): this paper will focus on the and by the requisitioning and slaughter of central rangelands and immediately adjoining livestock by the Somali army and later by the areas (Hiraan, Galgadud and Middle Shebelle militias. Some of the government counter-in- regions) as this was pivotal to the emergence surgency strategy was specifically aimed at of the USC as a clan militia, and not deal with rendering pastoralism unviable: the theory the Jubba Valley or the north-west. was that once the herders had been forced to abandon their herds, the guerrillas could no As the war began, vast areas of the central longer exist in the rural areas. It did this by tar- rangelands were being enclosed, with thorn geting migration routes and seasonal pastures fences thrown up. Enclosure strikes at the very for mining, by blowing up water points, and by heart of nomadic pastoralism. It forbids free mounting rural patrols that terrorized herders movement of herds and prevents open access and confiscated their animals. The collapse of to grass and where it is widespread it spells an veterinary services also contributed to the cri- end to traditional nomadism. sis of pastoralism. The Somali army destroyed considerable areas of forest in order to deny The Land Registration Act of 1975 made all insurgents the opportunity of using the natural collective land the property of the state, and cover provided by trees. gave government courts rather than lineage elders or Shari’a courts the authority to adju- As a consequence of all the above, rural peo- dicate land and inheritance claims. This was ple moved out of traditional forms of nomad- transformative for the farmlands of southern ic pastoralism. They moved to cities, as labour Somalia, leaving the minority groups that had migrants to Arab countries, became agro-pas- customary rights to the land at the mercy of the toralists, or became part of a massive dis- state and its officials (Cassanelli 2015). It also possession of farmland in other parts of the had far-reaching impacts on rangeland man- country. Most immediately important for the agement and pastoral land rights. Colonial ad- changing geography of clan, was the growth in ministrations imposed regulations on land use, agro-pastoral livelihoods that mixed livestock including restricting grazing rights to certain herding and cultivation. This was one driver in areas to certain clans and demarcating pasto- a huge land grab: a development that demands ral, agricultural and forest areas. The manage- Thespecial Great attention. Somali Land Grab ment and enforcement of these regulations were mostly entrusted to lineage elders. The 1975 act abolished the elders’ role. The restric- The ‘great Somali land grab’ had three manifes- tions had helped to ensure the range remained tations: the massive dispossession of farmland open; the relaxations always benefited the ex- in the south (Besteman and Cassanelli 2000), pansion of cultivation and enclosure. Selective the seizure of urban land in Hargaisa, Mogadi- attempts to re-impose land use classifications shu and Kismaayo (Kapteijns 2013), and the during the 1980s were not successful, as it enclosure of the range. This section focuses proved impossible to enforce grazing reserves. The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 13 There were also sporadic government attempts or well-connected individuals were able to cir- to regulate pastoral and agro-pastoral enclo- cumvent the law. Some were awarded land for sure, which met with mixed success. Often, agricultural projects which never materialized, fences were burned on the orders of an admin- enabling them to use the land for private gain. istrative officer, only to be rebuilt within a few In areas where commercial sheep production years. All land-use regulation collapsed during was advanced, large enclosures were common. the war, and none was re-imposed. Hence, the This was the case for example in Nooleye in moved,regulations and thatthe pressure (intermittently towards and private unevenly) own the central rangelands (Somali Democratic Re- held the growth of enclosure in check were re- public and Mascott Ltd., 1985, Annexe I Section - 3.2). Close to towns, many pastoralists began ership of pasture gathered momentum, uncon- to enclose pastures to support cattle, so that strained by legislation. they could provide milk supplies to the urban markets. Many of the bigger commercial enclo- Enclosure occurred for a number of reasons. sures were dismantled and overrun during the The reasons listed below are not mutually ex- war, but as soon as commercial livestock pro- clusive and often, a particular piece of land was duction rebounded in the early 1990s, enclo- Agro-pastoralenclosed for several enclosures. reasons simultaneously. Commercialsure resumed grass where production. it was possible.

The economic need Enclosure of to cultivate was probably the most common the range can also be an economic proposition reason for enclosure. There were several forms for non-herders. Sale of the grass—either by of agro-pastoral enclosure. One can be called renting out the grazing for a fee or by cutting a ‘rotational pastoral enclosure.’ Under this the grass for sale in the marketplace—can be system, an area of land—say, four hectares— an important source of income. For the most is enclosed, but only one hectare cultivated in part, traders themselves deny that they have any one year. The farmer assumes that three enclosed land for their own use, instead they years are required for the land to recover from prefer to buy fodder on the market. Many of each year’s cultivation. The farmed area rotates those who have enclosed have been poor peo- through the whole enclosed area, in a self-sus- ple or speculators with low incomes, who see taining cycle (Behnke 1988). The second is Landthe sale banking. of grass as a potential source of income. ‘shifting enclosure.’ Under this, an area is en- closed and part of it cultivated, but there is no Once enclosure has started in a intention to manage the enclosed area on a sus- particular area, it develops a momentum of its tainable basis. After a while, the enclosure will own. Those who have no immediate reason for be abandoned as the farmer encloses another enclosure may try to enclose land, fearing that area, or revert to a pure (albeit degraded) pas- if they do not do it now, the opportunity will toral enclosure. The third is ‘fictional agro-pas- be lost. There is an element of panic and spec- toral enclosure.’ According to law and custom, ulation in every land-grab. This was well-ex- only cultivated land should be enclosed. Hence, pressed‘The byproblem, Roy Behnke: [Nooleye residents] main- a pastoralist wishing to enclose rangeland may tained, was that everyone has panicked, create a small area of cultivation within a large anticipating a land shortage, and enclosed enclosure purely in order to give an appear- huge fallow areas for future use. But like a Pastoralance of complying grazing with reserves. the law. Ownership of run on a bank, the panic was self-fulfilling... No-one planned to enclose the area, resi- dents say it just happened, the unintended grazing reserves or ranches was a character- result of each individual protecting his own istic of the wealthy. Enclosure of the range is strictly illegal, but under Siyaad Barre, wealthy

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 14 interests (Behnke 1988, p. 6).”

overthrew Siyaad. Three conflicts in the central rangelands that fed into the USC rebellion, are A land-grab for pasture can be sparked by any Conflictsexamined next. in the Central form of enclosure. For example, in any area Rangelands where there is a threat of agro-pastoral enclo- sure, herders are prone to fence land pre-emp- tively. Politically-motivated land enclosure. Conflict among pastoralists in the central rangelands had reached a high intensity be- Once fore any politically-organized insurgency be- a land grab was underway, in the context of a gan. The story of these conflicts has rarely been violently contested political struggle, it inevi- told, and still more rarely have their origins tably became a political, and sometimes mili- and dynamics been analyzed. tary, matter. As we turn to the process of armed group formation, below, the intrusion of poli- The USC’s Omer Elmi writes, ‘Mudug was the tics and counter-insurgency into land seizure cradle of USC struggle well ahead of USC’s for- will be clear. mation.’ (Elmi 1993, p. 29) He describes the was a massive growth in the private ownership first ‘guerrilla units’ forming in 1988 at Balli The outcome of the land grab in pastoral areas Gidir,Dhuumoodle near Galkayo, consisting of fight- ers from6 two Hawiye clans, Salebaan and Habr of pastureland and the appropriation of land who first clashed with the ‘regime’ (spe- and water for the exclusive use of particular cifically, Clan groups aligned with the presi- clans. In turn this led to a reconfiguration of dent) and then joined first the SSDF and then territoriality and identity, a shift away from a wards one governed by a more standard mod the SNM before forming the nucleus of the USC. society governed by the lineage principle to- They had two ‘bases’: Dhuumoodle and Hanah - Weilod. Elmi writes that by the end of 1990, el of territorially-constituted political units. ‘the Dhumoodle Base had finally proliferated Another outcome was a proliferation of land into a prairie fire of guerrilla activities up to the disputes. Several of these contributed direct- gates of Mogadishu’ (p. 29). lyMap to the 2 mobilization of the insurgencies that

. Central Rangelands The story can also be told as a series governmentof conflicts overintervened pasture in anda partisan water, in which the senior figures in the

ofmanner, whether intensifying those disputes the violence. originat It is not easy to resolve the question - ed in the pasturelands or among the political elites circulating in and out of the president’s political favour, but my focus in this section is on the local drivers of conflict. One such dispute was between Marehan and Salebaan (Hawiye) herders in Mudug. The or- Source: igins of this conflict lie in a history of migration and displacement in Reliefweb Galgadud. The contested area, north- west of the main north-south ‘Chi- 6 Note that in the Somali lineage, the Salebaan are usually classified as a subclan of the Habr Gidir. The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 15 nese’ road, is an important grazing area with mostly at water points, especially when wa- good year-round water widely available. The ter is scarce. During the early 1980s, in fact, proximity to the road also makes the area valu- the Sa’ad were largely free from the pressures able for commercial herds as they can be easily on land that existed further to the south. The trucked to Berbera or Bosaso. major reason for this was that between 1978 and 1985, the government was engaged in con- In the 1960s, the Salebaan corporate lineage flict against the Majerteen on account of the group was expanding into previously Marehan attempted coup of 1978 and the subsequent governmentareas. Under madeSiyaad a Barre,big dry this season process grazing was re- formation of the SSDF. The southernmost Ma- versed. In 1983, on the creation of the CRDP, the jerteen lineage, the Omer Mohamoud, were - among the chief targets. serve in an area previously grazed by the Sale- baan, but Marehan herders were given prefer- In this region, Mudug, territorial disputes be- ential access. The following year, the CRDP put tween the Omer Mohamoud and the Sa’ad in a water point at in the same locality, and the had existed since the 19th century. The Ital- local authorities awarded the water rights sole- ians designated a line between the two clans, ly to the Marehan. This led, inevitably, to armed known as the Tomaselli Line, but this was for- conflict between the Marehan and Salebaan, mally abolished in 1971 with the abolition of with the government supporting the Marehan. clan territories. Moreover, in the 1960s, Ma- jerteen-dominated governments had been en- The 1987 drought led to disruption through- couraging Omer Mohamoud herders to push out the central rangelands, with several con- southwards. However, the tide dramatically re- flicts erupting over grazing and water. For ex- versed after 1978 with Siyaad Barre’s repres- ample Habr Gidir-Ayr (Hawiye) herders fought sion of the Majerteen. Although not designed to against Murursade (Hawiye) pastoralists near have this effect, it allowed the Sa’ad to expand El Bur, but the government was neutral in this northwards. In 1985, with the government’s conflict and helped settle it. However, the gov- adoption of ‘Daroodism’, Siyaad Barre made a ernment intervened decisively against the Sale- fromrapprochement this in terms with of government the Majerteen. positions, The Omer but baan. Troops machine-gunned herds of camels Mohamoud was the clan that benefitted least trying to cross the Chinese road into Mare- han-controlled areas, and despatched soldiers it now had government and if necessary mili- to defend Marehan water points against use by tary support in regaining its lost territories, other clans. and violent conflict over the grazing land esca- lated. This contributed directly to the mobiliza- A second case is a dispute between the Omer tion of the Habr Gidir-Saad as a proto-militia, Mohamoud (Majerteen/Darood) and the Habr which was then the raw material for the USC’s Gidir-Sa’ad (Hawiye). This conflict appears to Dhuumoodle ‘garrison’. have been almost entirely politically-instigat- ed: it is the one referred to Elmi above. The A third example, illustrates another wrinkle in north-western part Mudug region is dry and this story. It is the conflicts arising from wide- the enclosure or private ownership of land spread enclosure in the south-east of Galgadud here would be almost entirely futile, and there region in the 1980s. It shows the complex and is the additional problem of shortage of trees inter-connected roles of different reasons for and bushes with which to make fences. For enclosure, including the political motive for both clans, cooperation in providing access controlling territory by rival clans—in this to grazing has a stronger economic rationale case both of them Hawiye. The dispute was than an attempt to exclude the other from cer- between the Abgaal and Murursade corporate tain areas. Historically, clashes have occurred lineage groups. The political component of the

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 16 dispute was a rivalry over political control of merchants and elders, such as the Ali Shador the district councils. The Abgaal (specifically family, also invested in private water points to the Waisle lineage) controlled El Dheere dis- try to expand their area of control. trict and were dominant in Nooleye district. The Murursade were dominant in El Bur dis- Violent conflict is reported to have started at trict (shared with Habr Gidir Ayr and Duduble) Nooleye with Murursade herders demanding and a substantial minority in Nooleye, but felt access to the Abgaal-controlled (but legally that their numbers and importance warranted open to all) borehole. During a local drought in control of another council. Under the leader- The1984, government Murursade intervened herders moved in support southwards of the ship of Mohamed Sheikh Osman (then minister and tried to graze Abgaal enclosures by force. of finance), Murursade businessmen invested in several villages, including Birgaan, Jacar and Murursade and burned many fences, but the Gal Harerey and finally succeeded in having the enclosures were rapidly re-established. latter upgraded to a district council, which was duly controlled by Murursade. This conflict illuminates how two other pro- to-militias arose, linked to patrons with polit- Control of land was both means and aim of the ical and business interests distributed across struggle. The Abgaal hoped to expand their ter- different levels of local and national govern- ritory to cope with their increasing numbers of ment, and each serving as an incubator of Clan. animals; the Murursade tried to block them off. Each lineage group rushed to enclose land, es- Siyaad Barre’s pecially prime land close to water points. This Instrumentalization had a clear economic rationale—it was this of Disorder very land that was ideal for commercial sheep production and was desired by both groups. Under economic pressure, many herders were also taking up cultivation. But it also had a po- To understand the emergence of the Clan-based litical (and psychological) rationale—by en- military-political order, we need also to analyse closing land, it was denied to the other. Once the political-military context in which it arose. the rush for land had started, members of each Two strands are particularly crucial. The first, lineage group enclosed what they could while discussed here, is the security strategies adopt- land was still readily available. The rush to- ed by Siyaad Barre. The second, in the next sec- wards land was further intensified by the 1987 tion, is the organization of the insurgency. drought, which caused serious livestock losses (up to 80 percent in the Middle Shebelle). Siyaad Barre did not create clan politics from scratch or alone, but his attempts to coup proof Control of water was another means in the ri- his regime in Mogadishu and suppress insur- valry. Murursade politicians were able to direct gencies in the north were crucial to the way international assistance supplied through the in which lineage identities became politically CRDP preferentially into their area. For exam- salient. At a tactical level, Siyaad Barre used ple in 1987, the CRDP engineering team re- lineage as a mechanism for neutralizing the sponsible for excavating water reservoirs was organizational capability of military units and directed to work in Murursade areas as a pri- state institutions that he saw as threats. To un- ority, despite their relatively good water sup- dermine and circumvent them he animated al- plies, overturning its professionally-assessed ternative patronage networks utilizing patron- priority of providing help to the largely wa- age. Unlike the colonial powers that had floated terless areas customarily grazed by Duduble- above the lineage system and used clan as an owned herds. Meanwhile, prominent Abgaal instrument for indirect rule, Siyaad Barre was

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 17 embedded within the lineage system, and used forces crossing the border in 1981 and 1982. it directly for divide and rule. But Siyaad Barre was more fearful of a coup than an invasion. Within a decade, Somalia’s From the first days of his regime, Siyaad’s big- once-proud national army had been reduced to gest immediate threat had been his closest mil- a coalition of Clan militias. This was a familiar itary colleagues. Two of his most prominent strategy of disorder as a political instrument co-conspirators in the coup were dismissed in (Chabal and Daloz 1999), with the predictable 1970 and 1971, one of them executed. Siyaad consequence that, while reducing the threat of then consolidated his regime and hugely ex- a coup, it increased the likelihood of insurgency panded the army and its officers’ privileges. In (c.f. Roessler 2016). It was also a familiar pro- the mid-1970s, the USSR provided 250 tanks cess whereby an armed conflict, as it persists, and 52 combat aircraft, meaning that it out- consolidates ethno-territorial identity units. numbered and outclassed Ethiopia (Lefebvre 1992, pp. 159-60; Robinson 2016, p. 240). The The process of dismantling the army began army was the symbol of national unity, with apace in 1982. The former head of intelligence officers and men from all Somali speaking ter- Jama Ghalib (1995) details the arrests of seven ritories. They were well-paid, well-trained and high-ranking officials on 9 June 1982. One was had high social standing. After the debacle of Ismail Ali Aboker, third vice president and a key the 1977-78 war and the ignominious retreat engineer of the 1969 coup. Others included the from the Ethiopian Ogaden, the officer corps former foreign minister Omer Arteh, extreme- was thean attempt number one threat to Siyaad Barre’s ly well-connected to Somalia’s Arab sponsors. power. And indeed withinUnlike a few the months colonial there powers Both that of thesehad floated were Isaaq. above Five were southern- - ers including the lineage system and used clan as an instrument ed putsch. Be- two from Si- cause of the lin- for indirect rule, Siyaad Barre was embedded yaad’s own waseage branded of several as within the lineage system, and used it directly for Marehan (a of its leaders it divide and rule. third Mare- han was also identitya Majerteen was conforged- more in its repression than on the list spiracy: its Clan but couldn’t be found that evening). The most significant of its inception. But the spirit of nationalism— these was General Omer Haji Mohamed, who now defensive and fearful—still animated the had earlier been groomed as a potential head army, with fears that Ethiopia was going to of the army but had drawn up plans for reform launch a large-scale counter-invasion. There ran afoul of the patronage networks of Siyaad’s neitherwere indeed superpower two cross-border was going to incursions risk another in senior wife Khadija (pp. 168-70). 1981 and 1982, although it became clear that This was to be Siyaad’s logic: power first, lin- confrontation on the scale of 1977. eage or Clan identity as a secondary factor, manipulated for the purposes of power. Ghalib After defeat in 1978, all Somalis agreed that Si- observes how he both favoured the Marehan yaad Barre’s days were numbered. In turn, the and hit them hardest when they were disloyal president’s dominant calculus was neutraliz- to him (pp. 174-5). ing the always-imminent threat of a coup. This led him to dismantle any institution that could A few years later, the opposition dubbed Si- threaten him, starting with the army. Purges of yaad’s security apparatus ‘MOD’: Marehan, senior officers began even while Ethiopia still Ogadeen, Dulbhante. It was a characteristic So- presented a serious military threat, with its mali play on words, describing the Ministry of

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 18 Defence as a cabal of lineages. It was true in- surgency of remarkable brutality, destroying sofar as individuals from those clans occupied entire cities in the north, looting and disposing high positions in the army and intelligence, but whole communities, displacing hundreds of it misrepresentedchosen the to representsystem of rule, which. Through was thousands, and killing tens of thousands (Af- not rule of clans but rule of Somalia by using rica Watch 1990). It was the intensification of individuals clans - this insurgency, which Siyaad Barre identified out the 1980s, Siyaad played clan politics by as an ‘Isaaq’ Clan rebellion, and his evocation mentmaking and sure army, that making some representatives them into brokers of each of of ‘Daroodism’ as a counterweight, that made clan or subclan had a position in the govern- Clan the most salient level of lineage organiza- tion. patronage, coopting them into his kleptocracy, and playing them off against one another. Political Competition within the Opposition One of the standard mechanisms for coup-proofing is divide-and-rule, especially keeping commanders busy in their home areas and tying them up with local rivals. Siyaad was The final and most essential element of the a master of this. Compagnon notes, ‘One of his story of the creation of ‘clans’ is the rivalrous tactics was to militarize the clans by creating politics within the armed opposition. The ac- clan militias, giving them weapons, and then count begins with the first coup attempt in implicating them in the repression against a 1978, and becomes particularly significant in targeted clan segment.’ (1998, p. 176) These the mid-1980s with the deeply compromised militias were typically commanded by SNA of- attempt to build a unified national opposition ficers, serving or retired. The problem is that front. The failure of that attempt was marked these militias are typically less effective than the fracturing of the SNM, which in turn was a professional military. First, they are poorly crucial for the emergence of the USC as the trained and less disciplined. Second, they per- putatively dominant political-military force in petrate indiscriminate violence against com- the Hawiye areas of the central rangelands and munities, partly because they do not have the Mogadishu. The dynamics of the birth of the accurate intelligence to identify individuals and USC have discoloured Somali politics—notably so inflict atrocities on entire communities, and identity politics—ever since. partly because they have material incentives to rob and loot. Because militia commanders The opposition to Siyaad Barre began by trying have some command autonomy, they can also to claim nationalist credentials. After the disas- more readily rebel, though any such rebellions trous war with Ethiopia, Siyaad Barre could not are less dangerous than the mutiny of a regular be accused of being unpatriotic, only of being army unit. an incompetent dictator. The opposition fronts were established with the enormous handicap The 1980s witnessed mutiny after mutiny. Not that their bases were in Ethiopia, the historic all the mutineers joined the opposition. Many enemy. The names they chose speak of their at- negotiated with the government and some ac- tempts to claim nationalist legitimacy. Despite cepted to return to the regime, usually gaining the way in which they became identified with a post that allowed them to profit from cor- ‘clans’, each front has a name that combines ruptly-awarded contracts or to run a private ‘Somali’, with ‘salvation’, ‘national’, ‘patriotic’ militia as a lucrative counter-insurgent and and ‘united’. looting operation. The opposition was handicapped in practical The government also mounted a counterin- ways by its foreign sponsors. The Ethiopians

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 19 did not want inadvertently to incubate a new elements. One was a local militia, initially a unit nationalist government in Somalia, and repeat- of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), edly interfered in the leadership of the SSDF which had been the guerrilla force fighting and SNM, sometimes brutally. Another spon- hand-in-hand with the Somali National Army sor was Libya, but Colonel Muammar Gaddafi inside Ethiopia. The WSLF set up rear bases was mercurial and unreliable. The communist in north-west Somalia after being pushed out government in South Yemen provided crucial of Ethiopia in 1978. Its fighters gained a bad early support to the SNM, but did not follow reputation for abusing local people, and Isaaq up. However, much more problematic was the elders petitioned the government to create an internal disorganization of the opposition and Isaaq wing of the WSLF. Known as Afraad (the its violent factionalization. The SSDF was bro- ‘fourth unit’), this became operational 1979 and ken by internal disputes. Among other things, quickly came into armed conflict, first with the this had the disastrous legacy that Somali in- WSLF and then with government forces. Forc- tellectuals were deterred from joining the op- ibly transferred away from the border, many position, leaving the leadership to soldiers and esAfraad between militiamen Isaaq anddefected Ogadeni and herders became inguer the- businessmen. The opposition political analy- rillas. In parallel there was a series of clash- sis was limited to the goal of removing Siyaad Barre and his clique from power (Samatar Haud pastures of the north-west and adjoining 1992, p. 625; Elmi 1993, p. 18). areas of Ethiopia. The first armed actions by the SNM took place inside Ethiopian territory, The underlying structural weakness of the op- as the SNM drove the WSLF out of Ethiopia. position was that each group was set up with the intent of mounting a military putsch—and Another element was military officers from the they expected that opportunity to come soon. north-west who defected and began organizing The priority was not winning a people’s war by a rebel army in 1981-82. The name they chose following the classic stages of guerrilla insur- is instructive: it is a deliberate echo of the So- gency but rather to possess sufficient military mali National Army, from whose ranks the SNM strength to either strike the death blow or to be officers were drawn, and it espoused a national on hand to take over as the regimevis-à-vis crumbled. their in agenda, and—despite the fact that Somalis all Therefore the driving logic of the rebel leaders speak the same Somali language—it chose to was positioning themselves - give itself an English name and set of initials, so ternal rivals to be in the best position to take as to attract international support. Most of the power at that critical moment. It followed that SNM officers were in fact from the Isaaq clan until internal rivalries were resolved, the war family, and most of its financial support was should continue. They thus replicated the key from Isaaq clan family businessmen abroad. feature of the Siyaad Barre regime, which was Nonetheless they recruited non-Isaaq and at keeping institutional capacities weak for fear times the SNM had substantial components of a takeover. For the rebels, this was a fatal im- from other clans. A third component was busi- pediment to building a mature political move- nessmen, with those in the diaspora in Britain ment and an institutional and disciplined army. taking the lead as they were freer to act than Leaders were fearful that newcomers might ar- those within Somalia. Their preference was rive with financial resources or newly-defected generally to form an Isaaq clan movement. military units that would be strong enough to Thetake over Somali the leadership. National The political trajectory of the SNM in the 1980s Movement created the template for the disordered clan- nism that followed. It managed the personal rivalries among its leaders better than oth- er movements, but at the expense of never The SNM began through a hybrid of different The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 20 clarifying its political objectives. Particularly counter-insurgency (Africa Watch 1990). (knownproblematic as calan was cas)the divide between the dias- pora leadership and the military commanders The government counter-insurgency was , with deep rivalries with- aimed at the Isaaq Clan explicitly and indis- in each grouping. Although the final outcome criminately. Siyaad Barre and his son-in-law was the separation of Somaliland, the seces- General Mohamed Hersi ‘Morgan’ did not trust sionists in the movement could not show their the SNA and so did not rely on its units. They hand because they relied on Ethiopia which hired foreign mercenaries to fly their planes, was vehemently anti-separatist. The unionists and they mobilized refugees from the Ogaden initially won the tactical arguments, so that clan and from Oromo refugee camps as count- military operations were expanded from the er-insurgent militia. The fighters were paid in north-west (the homeland of the Isaaq, from loot: when they had finished, Hargaisa was a where the founders were drawn) to the centre roofless city, with all the zinc stolen for sale, and south, and a Hawiye deputy president was as well as any remaining vehicles, contents of chosen (Ali Wardigley, who became a founder shops, furniture, copper wire, even window of the USC). frames.

The SNM massively under-utilized its material The regime, as by far the more powerful actor, and human resources. Jama Ghalib, a former must take the greater share of responsibility senior intelligence officer who helped organize for turning a political conflict into an ethnic clandestine support for the SNM and was pro- war. But the SNM was not innocent of ethnici- foundly frustrated to see how the capable and zation either. It had a historic opportunity in well-placed individuals he helped recruit were 1988: in renouncing the Somali claim to the not utilized, explains it in these words: ‘The Ogaden, Siyaad Barre forfeited his strongest rules of the game played by the opportunists nationalist card. Many army officers were driv- [in the SNM] were that the SNM should never en to mutiny: commanders from the Ogadeen succeed in overthrowing Siad Barre or in forc- in the SNA and from diverse lineages aligned ing his troops out of the North until certain of- with the SSDF contacted the SNM to bring their ficers could seize the leadership of the move- forces over. The SNM spurned them, passing up ment.’ (1995, p. 186) its political chance.

The course of the war and the identity of the Two SNA commanders, Colonel Omer Jees and SNM dramatically changed in 1988. Faced with Colonel Bashir Bililiqo, offered to mutiny with growing insurgency and continual political their fully-formed military units and establish crisis, Siyaad Barre gambled that a peace deal a common front. When the SNM did not take with the Ethiopian government (facing similar them up, they joined armed herdsmen of the crises) would free him from the SNM rebels. He Ogadeen in the Jubba Valley to form the Soma- miscalculated. In response to the imminent ex- li Patriotic Movement (SPM). The pastoralists pulsion of the SNM from its rear bases in Ethio- were in a stage of near insurrection because of pia, the SNM leadership decided to go on the of- disputes with the Marehaan over control of the fensive, against huge odds, and attack the cities Afmadow pastures (Janssen 1988) and rival- of Hargaisa and Burao. The results of the attack ries over the export of cattle (Little 1992). included: the devastation of the SNM fighting forces, with as many as half of its officers and The SNM withdrew its units from central and men killed or out of action; the devastation of southern Somalia and proposed to its non- the two cities and the flight of most of the pop- Isaaq members that they set up friendly politi- ulation to the refugee camp of Hartisheikh in cal-military fronts in their home areas. In 1989, Ethiopia; and the escalation of the government General Mohamed Farah Aideed, from the Habr

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 21 Gidir-Ayr (Hawiye), approached the SNM lead- anism for organizing solidarity. This might ership wanting to join the organization and appear to vindicate the Lewisian thesis of the broaden its base. The SNM leadership advised resilience of clan, and indeed a narrative of the him to start his own resistance front in the cen- selfless, respected clan elders forming a council tral rangelands, the Hawiye home territory and to resolve the quarrels of the fractious fighters handed over one base (Mustahil) to him. Guurtiand politicians served the people of northwest Somalia well, through to the meeting of the Instead, the SNM became an Isaaq Clan move- (council of elders) in 1993 that forged a ment. The shattered rebel army regrouped in government for Somaliland (Bradbury 2008). Hartisheikh camp, while the relatives of the dis- It is no accident that the Isaaq leaders of that possessed and disappeared mobilized in out- time appealed simultaneously to the legacy of rage and solidarity. The camp itself was laid out British colonialism (which defined the territory on the basis of lineage groups. This was partly of Somaliland),Pastoral Democracy, to the clearest and to exposition a generation of late of spontaneous and partly for ease of adminis- colonial administrative tribalism, namely Lew- tration of relief rations by the UN. There was is’s a flood of angry and dispossessed young men men shaped by that colonial encounter. It is the wanting to join; their leaders agitated them on most benign face of clannism, but it is an his- behalf of the Isaaq, which had been subject to torical invention nonetheless. The ‘elders’ had a genocidal attack. The SNM veteran soldiers no special claim to leadership other than their were vastly outnumbered by these recruits. For personal reputations and social standing. Most Asease the of movement organization became the SNM an was Isaaq re-mobilized Clan were businessmen or out-of-work politicians, entity, it set its sights on the state power some were professionals and academics. All commensurate with its reach: a separate had brothers and cousins who were fighting Somaliland republic. men or active politicians. It was merely person- al circumstance and moral choice that led some to become ‘elders’ dedicated to the community rather than political or military entrepreneurs, as lineage-based fighting units. Clan elders fa- and indeed some switched from one category cilitated the recruitment of volunteers. Ghal- to the other, in either direction. ib describes how ardent volunteers managed to ‘force their way into the movement, when The ironic success of Siyaad Barre’s counter-in- their sub-clans brought pressure to bear on surgency and instrumentalization of disorder the SNM military commanders, a pattern which was that he destroyed the SNM as a fighting was eventually to have a negative effect … It force and an organized political movement. strengthened loyalty to the parochial sub-clans He reduced it to a mirror image of the regime, at the expense of central authority.’ (1995, p. paralyzed by infighting and without effective 192) Family networks provided the circuitry leadership. The SNM command could not even for sending supplies to the camp and the SNM coordinate the means to keep control of their and bringing the elderly and sick abroad for putative capital of Hargaisa in 1989: they cap- care and treatment. ‘Clan cleansing’ in Hargaisa tured it but those responsible for resupplying and Burao was instrumental in creating a sense the troops did not keep their word, forcing the of politicized clan identity among the survivors. fighters to abandon the city (Ghalib 1995, p. As the movement became an Isaaq Clan entity, it 186). set its sights on the state power commensurate with its reach: a separate Somaliland republic. Between 1988 and 1993, the SNM’s own deci- sion-making structures were gradually merged In this situation of crisis, the institution of with the clan structure of the north-west, dom- lineage ‘elders’ emerged as a workable mech- inated by the Isaaq, and ultimately taken over

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 22 evenby the as Clan. the The armed lineage movement institutions disintegrated, were suffi- ating confidence in the opposition, so that (to ciently robust to regulate political competition suinguse the promissory language of note the topolitical be redeemed marketplace) for a they could have begun trading in futures—is- and the SNM served mainly as a political forum that legitimized Clan formation and the take- specified price at such time that a recognized over of a ruined state, and then dissolved when government were set up. Such donor support Thethat job United was done. Somali Congress might have been a possibility just a year or two later, when western policies had shifted into their post-Cold War democratization mode. A The trajectory of the SNM from putative nation- third reason is the efficacy of violent suppres- al political resistance front to vehicle for Clan sion, exemplified by the trauma of the 14 July formation, was followed by the USC, albeit in 1989 massacre, which followed the murder of a different configuration, and with a different the bishop of Mogadishu in circumstances that outcome. The USC emerged from the three el- were never explained. This immediate outcome ements of businessmen and civic leaders seek- was a rapid disintegration of security in the ing a modicum of an orderly transition, ambi- city and a rush by residents to arm themselves. tious military officers intent on seizing power, There was, at the time, no evident logic of ei- and the existence of a large number of armed ther Clan or political mobilization, but rather a young men, already mobilized. sense of bewilderment, fear and isolation (Si- mons 1995, pp. 67-98). The Manifesto Group of 114 business and civic leaders, who came together in 1990, was Soma- The Manifesto Group was the co-originator of lia’s most tragic missed opportunity (Sahnoun the USC. But the military wing of the USC, led 1994). Even while Somalia descended into by Gen. Aideed, quickly became dominant. Al- a militarized kleptocracy, its business class though the split between the two wings was thrived (Jamal 1988). This did not translate evident from the outset, neither could abandon into a well-organized bourgeois opposition. the name USC, because—following the exam- We can speculate several reasons for this fail- ple of the SNM—it was coterminous with the ure. One is Siyaad Barre’s secularism, so that Hawiye Clan and its claimed homeland. As that he did not permit an Islamist opposition (not- territory included the capital city, the fate of ing that the Muslim Brothers at that time had Somalia turned on the resolution of the ques- their power base in business and civil society). tion of who should lead the USC. A second is the lack of external support for any such initiatives. When the Manifesto Group The earlier section on the land disputes in the issued its warning of the perils of the current central rangelands provided detail on how var- situation, it was the best chance for a negoti- ious lineage units of the Hawiye formed armed ated transition of some kind. Siyaad Barre ar- militia. Those processes of militarization fol- rested most of the signatories or forced them lowed different paths and the armed units that to flee: the list of those victimized is a verita- emerged were organized at different levels of ble catalogue of the most eminent Somalis of lineage segmentation. The key facts are that the independence generation (Ingiriis 2012). none were fighting as the ‘Hawiye clan’ but The most energetic and persuasive member nonetheless what Elmi calls the ‘prairie fire’ of of the Manifesto Group, Ismail Jimale, died of the central rangelands (1993, p. 29) was already a heart attack in Rome just two months later. burning fiercely before the USC was formed. Moreover, the group was supported by just one When Aideed crossed the border from Ethiopia foreign embassy (Italy). A donor consortium he found militias awaiting a leader, and he was demanding change might have been effective, happy to oblige. This meant, of course, that his both in pressuring Siyaad Barre and in gener- units were also organized on the lineage princi- The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 23 to no more than designating separate areas of ple rather than as a disciplined liberation force or even a unified Clan army. The USC never had operations. The failure of this initiative meant a core of nationalist veteran soldiers compa- thanthat asdividing the collapse up the ofareas the theyregime intended accelerated, to de rable to the SNM, nor even units drawn from the opposition had no plan for power other across all the Hawiye lineage groups.dia Recall, - groupsmoreover, bound that together this was by not xeer a traditional kind spoil. of mobilization of camel-herding -paying . Rather, this was In December 1990, an uprising began in Mog- a combination of youngmooryan men whose prospects adishu against Siyaad Barre. At that time, USC of traditional pastoral livelihoods were dim and SPM forces were more than a hundred (popularly known as ), businessmen miles from Mogadishu: USC to the north, SPM who owned the herds and were deeply imbri- to the south. The main forces in the city were cated in the enclosures, and lineage elders who Siyaad Barre’s units drawn from the most loyal were trying to manage these changes and trau- lineages: Marehan, Dulbahante and the Aforqe mas, while pursuing their own interests too. lineage of the Majerteen under command of Si- yad Barre’s son-in-law, General Morgan. Mor- Mustahil was the former SNM base inside Ethi- gan’s troops were stationed at the national opia, handed over to the USC in 1989. Aideed stadium and began stopping people on foot convened a conference there in May-June 1990, and in cars and buses, and selectively killing at which delegates unanimously voted for him Abgaal and Habr Gidir. Dulbahante troops at chairman of the USC. Elmi summarizes the fairground followed suit. participants and agenda. Delegates from the diaspora, from the SNM Southern Front, from Closest to the city was Omar Jees with his SPM the ‘bases’ at Dhumoodle, Hana-Weilood and forces. However, on Aideed’s insistence that Hiran—each of them in effect a self-mobilized Mogadishu was Hawiye territory, and that pastoralist self-defence militia—and what Hawiye troops would occupy the city with less were described as ‘Galgadud and Mogadishu resistance and less bloodshed, Jees held back guerrillas and activists’ were present. Elmi and allowed the Aideed to send his fighters writes: ‘Action plans were drawn up to unify ahead. Immediately after the battle for Moga- all these USC supporting factions and armed dishu, most Darood 7said that they believed that struggle streamlined from scattered groups Aideed tricked Jees, but it is also possible that and spontaneous sporadic actions into a uni- Aideed’s promise to bring Jess into government fied comprehensive form with a centrally com- was genuine and was simply overtaken by manded force.’ (Elmi 1993, p. 30) There was no events. In any case, the SPM lost its chance to time for training or even organization, only a take part in the ‘liberation’ of the capital, which rush of existing units under their commanders also allowed the USC to seize control of the vast into battle or in search of spoils. military arsenals there as well as loot the rich- es of the city. The absence of Darood among the Aideed then called for the SNM and SPM to join ‘liberators’ helped make the final battle in Mog- him for a conference to determine the future adishu into a clan war. Jees and his army waited coalition government. The SNM refused to at- just outside the city in Afgoy while the USC pol- tend—its more nationally-oriented members iticians squabbled and the USC fighters looted, felt that they should be the convenors of the pillaged, raped and killed. An exodus of Darood conference, and its more secessionist members civilians streamed through Afgoy going south. wanted nothing to do with Mogadishu. They Aideed’s lieutenants were also busy seizing the could agree only to coordinate military opera- best farms along the Shebelle river. There is no tions to remove Siyaad Barre, which amounted agreed account of why Jees switched sides, but 7 Speaking to this author, Nairobi, February 1992. The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 24 the most credible story is that the final straw single clan-family organization, but it was fall- for him was when his erstwhile allies, the Ra- ing apart. The USC also had one, but its two hanweyn Somali Democratic Movement forces, main factions were fighting one another, while turned against SPM troops in Baidoa on 7 Feb- some Hawiye subclans (Sheikhal, Hawadle) ruary. Three days later, Jees joined the emerg- remained neutral. The Darood clan family had ing Darood resistance in Kismayo and the Jub- two, the SPM and SSDF, each of which had dis- ba valley. Clan cleansing in Mogadishu created persed territories or potential territories, and the sentiments of a politicized common Clan shortly thereafter a third, the SNF. The minori- identity among the Darood. tiesMap didn’t 3. have any.

As the war reached its crescendo, the near-mor- Clan territories ibund SSDF was reinvented, as a solely Ma- jerteen organization. After he was driven from Mogadishu in January, Siyaad Barre mobilized his Marehan clan as the Somali National Front (SNF), and tried to stage a comeback, his forc- es reaching within thirty miles of Mogadishu in April 1991 before Aideed rallied the USC to drive them back. The Dynamics of Fragmentation 1991-92

At the moment of victory over Siyaad Barre, the organization of the war in Somalia appeared very simple: the Isaaq had the SNM, the Hawiye had the USC, the Rahanweyn had the nascent SDM, and the Darood were divided between the Ogadeni SPM, the Majerteen SSDF and the rem- Source: nants in government. This was the first time in Somali history that political-military organi- University of Texas. zation had reached the level of Clan (approx- imately the four big clan families of the total The civil war made ‘clans’ as political-mili- genealogy). It was a product of that particular tary-territorial units, and ‘clans’ in turn made historic moment: a fight for the state follow- war to seize the state (or states, if we include ing acts of genocidal violence at the Clan level Somaliland and Puntland). Even when the of aggregation (Kapteijns 2013). Somalia ap- state had collapsed, the expectation of a state peared to fragment into subnational territories shaped the conflict. But once the USC had failed that followed Clan lines. Darood fled towards to control the national capital and thereby cap- Kismayo and Kenya; a huge convoy of Isaaq left ture the state, a different logic of fragmentation Mogadishu and headed north to Hargaisa. became dominant.

But even at that moment of apparent simplic- The first wars in Mogadishu, fought in 1991, ity, there were clear inconsistencies in the had dual logic. On one hand, they were fought mapping of clan-family identities onto polit- over the pillars of state power: Villa Somalia, ical-military-territorial units. The SNM had a the national radio, currency for the bank, and

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 25 uniforms for the police. Ali Mahdi, by virtue of feated, the USC leaders fell out again. By the capturing Radio Mogadishu first and proclaim- end of 1992, there were numerous local wars ing himself president, appointed the world’s fought among ever more local armed groups. biggest cabinet (over 70 members, from every clan), almost every one of whom was eyeing fu- The fighting of 1991-92 was hugely destructive, ture lucre; General Aideed (formally, Minister and created famine, with an epicentre in Bay of Defence) did not turn up to the swearing-in and Lower Shebelle regions where local people ceremony, negotiations in Djibouti failed, and were stripped of everything, even their cooking instead Aideed launched a coup in November pots and clothes. The extent of depravity was 1991. His military strike failed and there was a shocking, and it both revealed and sharpened stalemate. the racism towards the minorities who lived in the devastated areas (Besteman and Cassanelli On the other hand, there was looting: spoils 2000). politics taken to the extreme. As the Darood fled, their property was ransacked. This soon All militia looted humanitarian aid, an act with- became organized commercially. The looters’ out immediate consequence because aid fell first targets were high value, low bulk electron- outside the moral orbit of the lineage system: ic goods: televisions, video players, fridges, air no compensation could be demanded or need coolers, word processors, generators. Traders agonizedbe paid. Internationalover whether aidto hire agencies armed had guards, nev- from Kenya, Sudan and the Gulf converged on er faced this kind of problem before, and they Mogadishu with ships and light aircraft. Indus- trial machinery, furniture. Then items with a and improvised in their distribution systems. resale value such as light fittings and window This experience led to a vigorous debate about frames, plumbing fixtures, copper wiring and the ethics and political economy of aid provid- aluminium sheets. ers becoming players in a war economy, and— more significant for this account—the role of Then, food became an object of looting. Relief aid in fuelling warlordism. food was particularly vulnerable to attack. Lo- cal voluntary organizations tried to get around Among the most creative were the Internation- humanitarianthis problem operation by opening was that kitchens ‘The dry serving food al Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Save cooked food. The rationale for this unorthodox the Children Fund (SCF). They used dispersed routes for delivering aid so as to minimize the distribution is the one the gangs use [target]; extent to which they were targeted by looters. they can sell it and do any other things, but The ICRC, which ran by far the biggest aid oper- when the food8 is cooked, it has not any value ation, offloaded from ships anchored offshore except to eat. near Brava, Merca, Adala, Obbia and Gezira beach, onto small dhows which could sail up to The next round of politically-instigated fight- the beaches. When the monsoon winds changed ing was over the centres of commerce and rev- and offloading on small boats was not possible, enue, such as Mogadishu port and airport and the ICRC used helicopters. The ICRC delivered Kismayo city. Those conflicts were also unre- 180,000 tons of food to Somalia in 1992. In solved, and the fighting shifted to disputes over Mogadishu, SCF ran numerous small feeding more local issues, such as smaller towns and centres using local staff, and almost completely the farmland along the Shebelle River. Briefly, escaped looting. the USC reunited to confront the threat of Siyad Barre’s attempted comeback from the Kenyan By contrast, the World Food Programme and border, but as soon as the SNF forces were de- its main implementing agency, CARE, stuck to 8 Dhahabo Isse, interviewed in Mogadishu, 23 March 1993. The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 26 the standard practice of using the main port in emergency aid themselves to working through Mogadishu, storing food in a large warehouse, local NGOs, authorities and commercial con- and dispatching convoys of 25 or more lorries tractors, creating the new problem that their to large distribution centres. They became tar- activities became associated with the identities gets for both political appropriation, massive of their Somali intermediaries (Gundel 2002). looting, and armed attack. The rate of distri- Aid’s main resources (food) and the even more bution was desperately slow, as CARE staff substantial secondary resources provided by tried and failed to negotiate safe passage for aid agencies (employment, housing and trans- their vehicles. When fierce fighting broke out port contracts, protection payments) became a in the city on 17 November 1991, nearly 8,000 major, if transient, part of Somalia’s economy, tons remained in the warehouse in the port. and control of aid became an integral part of On 20 January 1992, while CARE prevaricat- the political-commercial viability of politi- ed and the price of food in Mogadishu soared, cal-military units. the Hashamud militia that controlled the port announced it would open the food warehous- The fighting of 1991-92 also reconfigured po- es to all comers. Thousands of Mogadishu res- litical-military alignments. Aideed constructed idents flocked to the port and took what they the Somali National Alliance, bringing in ele- could carry: residents reported seeing people ments from other armed groups (notably the totally white from the spilled flour that covered SPM), while his rival Ali Mahdi constructed a their bodies and clothes. The price of food in parallel Somali Salvation Alliance that similar- the city dropped to just one seventh of what it ly spanned different ‘clans’. The two coalitions had been, and tension was markedly if briefly whosehad discernibly interests were different in seizing economic urban interests:property reduced. This was probably the best thing that the USC-Aideed and SPM were ‘liberators’ could have happened to the WFP wheat, though it contributed to a somewhat misleading claim, and farmland, while the USC-Mahdi, SSDF and made later that year, that 80 percent of food SNF leaders were more concerned with pro- aid in Somalia was being looted, which was a tecting the property rights they had acquired, justification for the U.S. military intervention. by whatever means, over the previous decades. The experience of a lessening of tension due to But those potential class interests were sub- a lower price of staple food led to a proposal merged by the immediacies of mobilizing and to ‘flood the country with food’ by any means. funding military units. The USC existed only in- Recognizing that any managed distribution of sofar as it was the political vehicle legitimized large amounts of dry food posed a security risk, for taking state power in Mogadishu, because the plan was to bring down the market price by it was identified with the Hawiye Clan, and for any means, taking the pressure off the national that reason neither of the rival leaders could food system. Ultimately, the strategy of provid- abandon its name. In his brief stint as Special ing as much food as possible by any means nec- Representative of the UN Secretary General, essary worked; the famine prices prevailing in the Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun cul- July 1992 fell by two thirds by October. tivated Hawiye elders as a counterweight to the warlords (Sahnoun 1994). Had he succeeded, More aid agencies arrived in Somalia in late the USC might have mutated into the Hawiye 1992 as the U.S. mounted an emergency airlift Clan as a less militarized political institution. to the epicentre of the famine in Bay region, Something comparable happened in Somalil- and still more after the U.S. military interven- and, where the SNM collapsed entirely and tion and the establishment of a huge and am- clan elders constituted a functional govern- bitious UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). ment from the ashes. In south-central Somalia, NGOs responded to the continuing security that burn through was interrupted. Sahnoun problem by moving from directly providing was dismissed in October 1992 and the U.S.

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 27 mounted a military intervention six weeks lat- could be recognized. The fast fragmenting po- er, which suddenly restored hope in a central litical-military organizations scrambled to be- Interventionstate, a fountain of rents. and the come credible interlocutors with the interven- Consolidation of Clan ing forces and to get a seat at the table for the forthcoming talks. The Somalis, accustomed to strategic rents because of the geo-strategic position of their country during the Cold War, The insurgencies of 1987-92 were organized interpreted Operation Restore Hope as a re-af- on the basis of Clan for the purposes of captur- firmation of the importance of their country to ing state power, in Hargaisa or Mogadishu, or in America, and expected corresponding largesse. the proto-state of Puntland. However, the polit- ical-military fronts were formed from fractious Second, the Americans and the UN required a and disorganized pastoralist militia, and what- simple, legible model and map of the country, ever Clan unity existed was momentary, cir- and an associated formula for peacemaking. cumstantial, and unsustainable. The USC and The one they chose was to deal with the exist- its contenders were founded on massacre, ran- ing political-military organizations, as labelled, sacking and ‘clan cleansing’. Subsequently, the at the highest level of aggregation. UNOSOM memories of those traumas left Clan identity adopted a policy of restricting political repre- with an enduring salience, but only as vehicles sentation on the envisaged National Council to for channelling resentment. factions existing at the time of the intervention. While UNOSOM understandably did not want However, Clan also had a logic that was simple to spark a violent competition for places by and attractive to outsiders, not least because opening up options to new factions, this deci- the political-military organizations had given sion created another equally problematic po- themselves English-language names and ini- litical dynamic. It represented a contemporary tials, which mapped on to a conveniently small version of the colonial practice of creating trib- number of units which could also be represent- al territories and appointing administrative ed on a map of the country. This kind of terri- chiefs, and like that earlier version, involved toriality was new to Somali political ethnicity freezing a dynamic socio-political reality in (Hoehne 2016). Clan units proved equally effi- ing arrangement in others, and inventing a for some places, trying to resurrect a disintegrat- cacious as the interface with the international - didcommunity not persist in thefor absencemore than of aa fewstate. brief Although years, mula from scratch elsewhere. In many cases, the political-military entities existing in 1991 direct cash payments were made to those cho- sen as representatives; in others, participants they established an enduring framework for expected vast resources to flow in the near fu- Somali political authority. ture. The U.S.-U.N. military intervention of 1992-93 In making this decision, UNOSOM was guided had several immediate consequences. One was by the two places in which order was returning. to recentralize the political process: the imme- In the north-west, the self-declared Republic of diate prospect of state power was back. Ini- Somaliland, a convention organized by busi- tially, the Americans appeared to believe that nessmen and clan elders instituted a new polit- their humanitarian objectives meant that they ical order, without any external input. Most of were not political actors, and that their nego- those involved were members of the Isaaq Clan, tiations with the Mogadishu warlords would the shared Isaaq identity and the robustness and the simplest explanation for success was have no consequences other than enabling a safe environment for their troops and aid con- of traditional forms of conflict resolution and voys. Soon, the U.S. indicated that they were in- societal authority. The story is of course much deed intending to create a government which The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 28 more complicated (Bradbury 2008; de Waal mediators sought to balance a realistic recogni- 2015, pp. 130-140), but the narrative was reas- tion of the power of warlords, with attempts to suring to Somalis anxious to find laudable and ensure that all Somali groups were represent- state-building values and institutions in their ed in peace talks and the governance structures own society. In the north-east, in the territory set up. This reflects a laudable motive of ensur- that became Puntland, order was also restored, ing that politically marginalized groups have within an area that roughly corresponded to a seat at the peace table, and that discredited the domain of the Majerteen. The SSDF did not warlords do not dominate. However, the for- disintegrate; it formed an administration and mula for representation bears the deep imprint merged into it. The presumed model of inter- of the violent processes of Clan formation, and nally homogenous Clan territories was adopt- becomes a formula for sharing political offices, ed for the rest of the country, despite the far not solving political problems. greater complexities in lineage and territorial ...the outcome of the war represented the organization and the absence of any compara- end point of more than a decade of spoils Thebly cohesive main region political-military for the intervention organizations. was politics that culminated in massive ethnic cleansing, ransacking and forcible land- grabbing. south-central Somalia. Here, American mili- tary officers, UNOSOM and aid agencies could not engage operationally at the Clan level, as no united and centralized USC-Hawiye organi- International peace-making efforts had an- zation existed, and their efforts focused on es- other common feature: they prioritized pow- tablishing local councils as intermediaries for er-sharing agreements, leaving substantial providing security and protecting aid, with a political issues such as property ownership view to being the legitimate authorities for re- (farmland, urban real estate and pasture) and building a state. This process of identification residence rights for resolution by a future gov- was usually done very rapidly, with minimal ernment. This was never likely to work, as the consultation and little expertise. Some of those outcome of the war represented the end point brought in for managing the process, such as of more than a decade of spoils politics that cul- the Life and Peace Institute, devoted enormous minated in massive ethnic cleansing, ransack- effort to trying to make the councils more rep- ing and forcible land-grabbing. The Clan armies resentative and effective (Heinrich 1997), but existed precisely in order to pursue these tasks this was always a patch-up job: whatever lo- to their violent conclusion in the form of mass cal hierarchy existed at the time of UNOSOM’s killing, clan-cleansing and expropriation. The entry was kept intact, along with the security zero-sum politics of allocating political office mechanisms offered by that local elite. Joakin masked a still more important zero-sum spoils Gundel observes that local people preferred politics. UNOSOM to what came before or since, be- cause it did impose a degree of stability, but Over the subsequent fifteen years, all external concluded, ‘Yet the attempts by UNOSOM to peace-making, peace-building, state-building buy political agreements through direct pay- and constitution-writing efforts in Somalia had ments to local Somali leaders strengthened similar starting points: the assumption that a Somali perceptions of international assistance state in Somalia would arise through sharing as a source of competition that undermined power among representatives of the Clans, the peace process it was supposed to promote.’ identified as such. This was adopted in the So- (Gundel 2002, p. 154) dere Conference of November 1996-January 1997, where a formula for political representa- Beginning with the 1993 conferences, external tion based on equal standing for the four major

The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 29 Map 4.

Federal Member States intervenors use the Clan unit as their routine organizing framework—a testament to its he- gemony. While the entities SNM, USC and SPM quickly passed into history, they served as ve- hicles for imprinting their logics of identity and territory onto all subsequent political process- es, with the important exception of the Islamist ones. Conclusions and Implications

State failure in Somalia was not pre-ordained. A slightly different sequence of events could have led to a government that could have been rec- ognized internationally and formed the basis for a modest, fraught but nonetheless credible process whereby the state was preserved and reconstructed. A Clan-based territorial division of the country, and a formula for governance founded on the ‘4.5’ principle was also not Source: pre-ordained. Identity politics and inter-ethnic Chatham House war were probably inevitable on account of the way in which the regime used lineage-based Clans was first formally recognized. At the insti- patronage politics and the opposition mobi- gation of the Somali participants, the Darood, lized its fighters on the basis of local conflicts, Diir/Isaaq, Hawiye and Rahanweyn were each and their external relations on appeals to lin- awarded nine seats on the National Salvation eage solidarity. But Clan as the dominant orga- Council, with five seats reserved for minorities nizing principle was not inevitable. (Africa Confidential 1997, p. 2). Four years lat- er this evolved into the ‘4.5’ formula that was The civil war period of 1987-92 was a time explicitly named and adopted in the Arta Con- of traumatic and accelerated identity forma- ference of April-May 2000 and maintained at tion. This had three elements. The first was an the 2002-04 Mbagathi National Reconciliation identifiably modernising process whereby tra- Conference in Kenya, and throughout the sub- ditional lineage organization and livelihoods sequent constitution-building conferences. It is were transformed. Open range nomadism commonplace to hear the evils of clannism de- changed to a demarcated territorial system of cried by officials in international organizations herding animals primarily for commercial ex- and the leaders of East African countries that change, and lineages became militarized. The have dispatched troops to Somalia for peace Siyaad Barre regime used lineage-based pa- enforcement operations, who would prefer to tronage and divide-and-rule primarily to frag- build a bureaucratic Weberian state (Fisher ment internal threats, and in doing so stoked 2018). Nonetheless, in their political engage- the flames of rural insurrection. Those insur- ment with Somali political organizations and gencies were structured as vehicles for military (especially) their military cooperation with takeover, their leaders subordinating any sys- the Clan-based units of the putative Somali Na- tematic organization of resistance their per- tional Army and other security forces, external sonal ambitions. As they persisted, each rebel The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu 30 organization converged on an ethno-territorial The external interveners decried clannism but unit as a matter of military expediency. Militar- recognized that these ‘clans’ were formations ily shattered in 1988, the SNM abandoned its with which they could work. However, Clans national agenda and merged into a forum of the were initially formed as vehicles for spoils lineages of its core constituency. Clan formation politics, built on ‘clan cleansing’ and primitive occurred in defeat as a vehicle for the agenda of accumulation. Finding civic representatives of controlling its home territory—a task that the Clans and asking them to share power could dying SNM bequeathed to the Republic of So- not change this fundamental fact. For the U.S. maliland. In the meantime, the SNM’s introver- and U.N.-led peacebuilding process, the great sion duly gave birth to the USC, which took the unmentionable was the inter-communal armed same Clan formation logic to the national cap- conflict, massacre and dispossession that were ital, which it claimed as ‘its’ territory. The USC manner,foundational make for a those state units. through The war,prospect was thatnot was a fragile coalition from the outset, united such Clan formations could, in some Tillyean only by its leaders’ agreement that it should take state power. The USC duly disintegrated, founded on any analysis of whence they came but in the meantime the ruinous dynamics of or how they were constituted. This paper has political competition among its leaders deter- sought to show how transient, circumstantial, mined the fate of Mogadishu, and hence the localised and contradictory were those pro- Somali state as a whole. From this emerged a cesses of Clan formation. Although the politi- fractious, turbulent political system based on cal-military formations of 1991 have long since the trading of allegiances—the political mar- perished of their self-inflicted wounds, their ketplace that had incubated within the Siyaad ghosts still haunt Somalia. Barre regime and its systemic corruption. Bibliography

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This material has been funded by UK aid from the UK government; however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.

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