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2007 Deliberations of the Portuguese Overseas Council on the Estado da Índia: survival 1707-50 Yong Huei Sim University of Wollongong

Recommended Citation Sim, Yong Huei, Deliberations of the Portuguese Overseas Council on the Estado da Índia: survival 1707-50, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Faculty of Arts, University of Wollongong, 2007. http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/1735

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DELIBERATIONS OF THE PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS COUNCIL ON THE ESTADO DA ĺNDIA: SURVIVAL 1707-50

Presented to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Wollongong in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

from

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

by

YONG HUEI SIM (TEDDY)

FACULTY OF ARTS 2007 CERTIFICATION

I, Yong Huei Sim (Teddy) declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Arts, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.

Yong Huei Sim

30 May 2007

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the survival of the in the East against the backdrop of the rise of the British Empire in India in the first half of the eighteenth century. The topic is investigated from the perspective of metropolitan through the central institution of the Overseas Council, based in . In a nascent field such as this, the methodology is part hypothesis-testing and part exploratory using empirical data from the archives of Lisbon and published primary sources. The register of the Council’s deliberations and other original documents provide empirical evidence about the role of leadership in the survival of the eastern Empire.

With so much focus on the decline studies of the Estado da India (Portuguese State of India) as well as Portuguese private and informal enterprise east of India, this thesis sets out to prove that, despite a series of severe defeats, the Estado was, in a livelier sense of the word, “alive and kicking”. It shows how the survival and prolongation of the Estado was dependent upon the centre and on direct representatives from that centre. It also reveals how this balance of interests was likely to tilt towards the latter the further away this periphery was from the centre. In the centre,this thesis tries to show how the personal style of the leadership of King João V also affected the administration dealing with the Estado, as well as the number and quality of leadership sent to India. More concretely, on the ground in India, it shows how survival was dependent on the day-to-day instruments of the early modern state, that is, diplomacy, war, and revenue extraction. In the context of the early modern international environment, the study shows how treaties were forged to bring the Portuguese respite from hostility, even though they were not followed to the full letter of the agreement. In terms of war, this thesis reveals that, despite their severe limitations, Portuguese arms were able to hold their own, despite suffering periodic defeats. In terms of revenue extraction, it shows how revenue collection became less reliant on trade and more dependent on rent. In exploring the attempt to revive commerce at Mozambique, this study shows how the endeavour was foiled by self-interests and by an attitude that was not conducive to business transactions. It also explores areas of ‘soft’ factors like religion and culture, where the results of state investment proved uncertain, although they would translate into factors of colonization in the long term. At the far end of the Eastern Empire in Timor, the study examines the role of religious establishments and state intervention in installing a permanent presence in the first half of the eighteenth century. Back in India, in examining the much touted revival in the 1740s, it reveals that it largely consisted of territorial stabilization and had little to do with later New Conquests.

Finally, this study bridges the gap between what is relatively known about one of the “less successful” players in a period when the British power was on the rise.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis began as a result of finding out more about my subject area whilst working as an education officer. The process has since helped me not only to understand my professional area but know more about myself.

This project would not have been possible without the support of my family members especially my mother who, at times, bore the brunt of the ups and downs of the project.

The project would also probably have stopped without the support of my wife, Sandy, and my mother-in-law.

Special thanks to my supervisor (Dr Lorraine White) and her partner (Stewart), who have always and especially nearing the end of the project, provided invaluable assistance; for instance, putting me up at their place.

Special thanks also to Professor Adrian Vickers for taking special interest to get the project moving.

At the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, the help from Dr Sintra and the staff is much appreciated.

Thanks are also extended to the Fundação Oriente who provided financial assistance for part of the purchase of materials.

To all others whom I have not been able to mention, my deep appreciation to those who have helped in one way or another.

Teddy

31 Mar 2006

TO JUN, OUR MOTHERS AND LORRAINE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

1 Introduction 1

2 Background 32 ¾ Portugal and its Empire to 1700 ¾ Constraint of Distance and Technology ¾ Context of and Empire

3 Leadership from Lisbon to Goa 56 ¾ Court of D. João V and Early Baroque Government ¾ Background and Role of Overseas Council ¾ The Viceregal Institution

4 Business of India 1 – War and Diplomacy 101 ¾ Diplomacy with Protagonists in India ¾ War and Reinforcements ¾ Peacemaking and Conflicts outside India

5 Business of India 2 – Commerce and Political Economy 142 ¾ Trade Activities of Estado and Conflicts ¾ Aspects of Revenue Collection ¾ Mozambique 1707-50

6 Business of India 3 – Religiosos, Race, State and Extreme Periphery 175 ¾ “Civilizing Mission” ¾ Poselytising Enterprises ¾ Macao and Sub-Imperialism at Timor

7 Beginning of a Revival? 201 ¾ Origins of New Conquests ¾ Campaigns, Diplomacy and Stabilization in Commerce ¾ D. João V’s Demise

8 Conclusions 226

Appendices A. Glossary 234 B. List of Governors and Viceroys 1668-1750 236 C. Tables 1-4 and Map-Statistics 237 D. Maps 1-6 239

¾ Bibliography 245

Please see print copy for image

Dom João V From Zuquete A.E. directed, Nobreza de Portugal (Lisbon, 1969), p. 573

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Estado da ĺndia in the first half of the eighteenth century has, to date, not been studied in any book-length treatment. A few reasons may account for this. First, this period coincided with the reign of King João V and is stereotyped as one of increasing absolutism. Yet, ruling during a period of transition, Dom (D.) João V’s role was less ‘popular’ than that of his son, who was associated with the ‘enlightened despotism’ of Pombal. In Portugal, dictatorship was only toppled in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Democracy and associated liberal ideas are still evolving in Portugal. 1 Hence, research in autocracy-related topics may be uncongenial. The fall of communism in the last decade of the twentieth century boosted the liberal ideology further. 2 Second, extending from this, India, the supposed backwater of the Portuguese empire in the eighteenth century, was seen as the last bastion of feudal vestiges and mercantilist practices of, and by, the Portuguese. Hence, whenever the king was discussed in relation to India, traditional narratives often took the route of an un-analytical chronicling of military exploits by his governors. The preoccupation of the historiography of the East is largely absorbed with the first half of the seventeenth century and before. In Portugal, many resources and much attention are still tied up in research of the glorious period of the sixteenth century because “there remains much to be studied”.3 This is affirmed by Wiarda in his Handbook of Portuguese Studies, who ascribes the reasons for the gap in studies on the Portuguese East to the lack of orientalists. 4 Third, contemporary materialistic culture is almost always concerned with success, ‘progress’ and quantifiable

1 improvement. In the early modern period, only the Dutch and British empires qualified as having achieved hegemony. And while it is still tolerable to study the British empire, it is more ‘fashionable’ to study the current American empire for possible signs of decline.5

The linkage of India in the first half of the eighteenth century with D. João V is apt because his reign of 1707-50 almost spans this entire period. Here, the focus of the Portuguese second empire is lopsidedly inclined towards the ‘rich’ and ‘higher priority’ Brazil. Moreover, the handful of studies covering the end of the sixteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries is concerned with the causes for decline. Yet, the remnants of the territories and outposts of the Portuguese East survived well into the twentieth century. Indeed, experienced a brief spate of expansion in the second half of the eighteenth century.6 At the extreme periphery, Macao participated alongside the great colonial powers such as and Britain in the Boxer suppression in China at the turn of the nineteenth century.7 As an extraterritorial concession, Portuguese Macao even outlasted British Hong Kong in the reversion to China at the end of the twentieth century. One of the first salvos of survival (as opposed to decline) studies was aptly put by Winius in an article, when he declared that:

the question of why the Portuguese failed to retain their Asian empire has ceased to have much meaning in the twenty-first century […] historians [now] marvel that it held so long in the face of native enemies and Dutch and English rivals.8

2 Shortly before this, a book-length cannonade had been fired off by Ames’ Renascent Empire.9

At this point, a few key terms and concepts need to be clarified: survival, colonisation and imperialism. In essence, are we talking about the same thing when we refer to factors for colonisation vis-à- vis reasons explaining “imperialism”? How does the recent search for the causes relating to the survival of the Portuguese empire fit into the picture? The Oxford Dictionary defines “imperialism” as a system of government by an emperor or similar sovereign over extensive dominions; “colonialism” is defined as the policy of having colonies or settlements.10 “Imperialism” is implemented more from the centre, whereas “colonialism” is carried out by settlers. Pre- nineteenth century empires of the sea are, therefore, more colonial than imperialistic.11 “Imperialism” is associated more with nineteenth century European empires. Later definitions of imperialism extended the coverage of the term to more than just political control (neo- imperialism comprising economic and cultural domination), and this can be seen as being more comprehensive.12 In a sense, imperial economic extraction at its highest may be equated to colonialism.13 Furthermore, Osterhammel thinks that either concept could exist without the other.14 In the end, pre-nineteenth century empires may not have been very “imperialistic” because the issue boils down to the degree of control exercised (itself limited by advances in technology).

Closely related to “imperialism” is the term “empire”. In a paper presented at the Second International Seminar of Indo-Portuguese History in 1980, Filipe Thomaz raised the idea of seeing the Portuguese enterprise in the East as a network rather than an empire, because whatever little of the territories there were consisted

3 of ports and naval outposts linked together by sea routes. In the same paper, Thomaz also queried whether the classification could have evolved over time, as there seemed to be evidence of a more land-based approach during the Habsburg Union (1580-1640) – seen in the acquisition of Ceylon. Disney raised a similar point, arguing for a more land-bound research of the Estado in India because the coastal strip of land in the north that stretched thirty miles inland in places totalled roughly 1,000 square miles.15 After the fall of Bassein in 1739, the Portuguese at Goa strove to expand outwards to create a buffer zone.16 Analogous in practice to a land- based empire, these lands also contributed taxes and rents to Goa. Although the actual white population remained small, intermarriage created a more sizeable mixed population. In this way, one can talk about a settlement through colonisation (although in no way could this be compared to the more populous and much larger plantations in Brazil).

This current study forms part of centre-periphery studies because it deals with the linkages between Lisbon centre and the Portuguese eastern periphery, which have tended to be neglected. The seminal study by Shils expounding on general centre-periphery relations will be briefly summarised here since more application will be made of it in later chapters. The “centre” is designated as the realm of “order of symbols, values and beliefs which govern society”. It has “little to do with geography”.17 The centre is also the “realm of action. It is a structure of activities, of roles and persons, within the network of institutions, organisations and sub-systems”. 18 According to Shils, the authority in each of these sub-bodies make up an elite. The elite choose to uphold that central value system because “human beings have a need for incorporation into something which transcends their individual existence”.19 Also, “[t]he lower one goes in the hierarchy,

4 the further one moves from the center of authority, the less likely is that authority to be appreciated”. 20 The appreciation for those in authority by those below and in the family units constitutes qualities which are called secondary values. Shils also adds that “not all persons who come into positions of authority possess the same responsiveness to authority”; 21 those who are more capable of resisting act as traditional brakes to that authority. Hence, “consensus is never perfect”. He goes on to say that “[t]he mass of the population in most pre-modern societies live, in a sense, outside society and have not felt their remoteness”. For Shils, “[m]odern society rests on technology to integrate the population into a more unified whole”.22

While Wallerstein’s Modern World System seeks to apply Shils’ concept, it does so without consideration of any voice that the periphery might have.23 Quite a number of studies have since sought to use Shil’s idea to look at variations in different European overseas empires, especially with respect to the Americas.24 With regard to the East, an earlier study which took a closer look at the interests of the periphery is Boxer’s Portuguese Society in the Tropics.25 In an article published in 1990, Ames tried to show that hegemony in stage-associated models (as in Wallerstein’s system) was fought and decided not only at the centre, but in the colonies as well.26

In one of the latest books on Portuguese overseas expansion extending to 1668, Newitt writes that “historians have been notoriously fickle in their interpretations. It is as though they are observing the behaviour of some animal without being able to agree to what species it belongs”. 27 This is as true for Portuguese expansion as for its decline. Herein also lies the linkage in discussion between decline and renaissance. Since research on the

5 Portuguese East has focused, up to the present, from the 1660s to the 1680s, whatever comes afterwards ought not to be classified or dubbed as decline simply because expansion had ‘fizzled out’. While there is no consensus on the dating of decline, the Portuguese were still thought to be expanding in the East in the reigns of kings João III and Sebastião in some literature. 28 This expansion came to an abrupt halt with the fiasco of Alcacer Kebir in Morocco and the death in battle there of the latter monarch. Subrahmanyam writes in his study on Portuguese Asia that they were already facing a crisis by the mid-sixteenth century.29 In another evidence of an earlier decline, Newitt observes that the Portuguese were dismantling the royal monopolies after the 1550s. 30 Cortesão, the historian doyen of Portugal, also dated decline from the mid-sixteenth century.31 For proponents of the thesis positing the Spanish Armada or Habsburg rule as a cause for decline thesis, such as Oliveira Marques, the first Portuguese empire deteriorated with the union with Spain in 1580.32 Boxer, meanwhile, thought the Portuguese faced a challenge from the Dutch at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and after 1663 lapsed into a period of stagnation and further contraction.33 The inconsistent and at times contradictory observations may be ascribed to what Newitt describes as a “dialectical rhythm”. These include: “royal centralisation at a time of popular migration […] the desire for religious orthodoxy conflicting with racial intermarriage and cultural syncretism”, the patrimonial order simultaneously existing with “the professional needs of a worldwide empire; the attempt at restrictive monopoly” while hoping for “the growth of a global market; epic and heroic aspirations with a profound sense of betrayal, corruption and failure”.34

If one can plot a graphic representation of Portuguese activities in the East against time, the Portuguese East seems to have sloped

6 upwards from around the turn of the fifteenth century, then stagnated to become a constant or even slightly downward slope from the mid- sixteenth century, thereafter dropping more rapidly during the Habsburg Union and spiralling down further during the first decades of the Restoration. Finally, the line returned to a constant or slight decline after the 1660s. In this context, Ames’ treatment might represent a slight upward slope. From here onwards, plotting a graphical representation becomes problematic, because if the Portuguese were “contracting” and “declining” thereafter (allowing for a steep drop again in 1740 with the loss of Bassein), they held on for another 250 years before having to give up the last of their territories in Asia! If the glorious expansion period is taken as a yardstick for Portuguese success, they would never be able to measure up after the mid-seventeenth century. From another angle, comparison between the earlier and later Portuguese enterprise in the East might not be as meaningful as it seems – in the latter, the Portuguese had made the transition to a more land-based entity. If one accepts the thesis of a long, drawn-out decline, Portuguese activities in the East may be seen as cyclical, with short peaks and troughs which approximate to a gradual declining slope. New research, for example, on the New Conquests and brief expansion during Pombal’s period can be seen as contributing to a short peak.

The periodisation discussed so far relates to the official Portuguese presence in the East. The picture would be quite different if one was to look at the Portuguese empire as a whole, or factor in the Portuguese informal existence. Current historiography tends to see the Portuguese empire in the long haul as a series of first, second and third empires. In the period of the second empire, an upward sloping graph would be seen, even if Portuguese Asia was not doing well, because territories and wealth were rapidly expanding in

7 Brazil. 35 Seen from a global perspective, the Restoration period might even be plotted as a constant because, while the Portuguese suffered defeat in the East, it was balanced out by triumph in the Americas against the Dutch.36

While this thesis does not deny that the centre extracted benefits from the periphery, it does try to understand the Portuguese official presence in the East from the perspective of home. This is not an argument in support of traditional absolutist studies, but there is a genuine need to understand Portuguese officialdom in the East since so much attention has been re-directed to the informal presence to explain Portuguese survival in the East. Members of the Overseas Council (Conselho Ultramarino, created 1643) as well as viceroys on the ground continued to engage in a flurry of tasks and duties in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in an effort to keep the head of the Estado da ĺndia above water. Even as Subrahmanyam reduced the Portuguese in Asia at 1700 to “private traders (trying to keep a distance from Goa) and remnant sub- imperialists (at Timor)”, acknowledgement was made of the fact that “diplomacy, finance and the occasional use of force ensured that the Estado did not teeter on the brink of collapse as is sometimes assumed”.37

As an intermediary in the communication between the king and officials in the colonies and an administrative body through which overseas matters were dispatched for settlement, the Overseas Council is an important by-subject of this thesis. Yet, the best monograph on the subject remains O Conselho Ultramarino – Esboço da sua História by Marcello Caetano, published half a century ago. His study traces the council broadly from its inception to an evolved structure in the twentieth century.38 This book, however,

8 reserves little space for the business the council dealt with, or the subtle changes that might have occurred in its inner workings.39 A recently completed doctoral thesis by a Brazilian scholar, Edval Barros, delved into the inter-institutional conflicts between the Overseas Council and other politico-administrative bodies for the period of its creation early in the Restoration up to 1661. The work sheds light on the difficulties of dispatching aid set against the background of those conflicts.40 Earlier in 2002, a seminal paper by Erik Myrup revealed how the founding motivations of the council were more closely tied with the rise of Brazil. He tried to prove this through an examination of the composition and background of the members appointed. 41 Elsewhere, brief mention can be found in Boxer’s Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola and Russell-Wood’s contribution to the recently published História da Expansão Portuguesa.42 In the former, Boxer briefly describes the decision-making process of the Restoration government and raised the possibility that the Overseas Council might also be dealing in matters of high policy. 43 In Russell-Wood’s chapter entry, the possibility of changes in the function of the council is raised, and diminution after 1736 is also noted. Specifically, the expansion of staff in the Overseas Council is brought up, although neither the cause of this nor the implications are discussed. 44

This thesis seeks to integrate preliminary work done on early eighteenth century politico-administrative developments at home to determine their impact on the management of overseas affairs. Aligning with the broad direction of this thesis, the context, role and minutiae relating to the East and India will be examined from consultations of the Council, as well as documents from extra- conciliar channels. This is despite assertions made by Myrup that the Council was oriented towards Brazil.45

9

This investigation of the matters of India, extending from Subrahmanyam’s observation (referred to above), will undertake to categorise and look at the activities of the Portuguese from the perspective of home in the following areas. First, the political and administrative developments in Portugal, especially those in the Overseas Council (and to some extent, with direct representatives on the ground), will be explored in chapter 3. Second, the consultations of the Council and other documents on India emanating from the Crown will be examined to determine how the Portuguese survived there. Specifically, it will determine how diplomacy and war were utilised as an instrument of state in the East. This will be the focus of chapter 4. Diplomatic efforts by the Estado da ĺndia, as seen from documents of the Overseas Council, will be examined. We will also explore the use of coercive force by the Portuguese on land and at sea in the event that negotiations failed. Third, this thesis will determine whether, and how far, trade and profitability continued to help sustain the eastern empire. This will be the focus of chapter 5. Revenue statements for particular years will be examined to determine the sources of revenue. From this, it will then be possible to assess the importance of commerce for the Estado da ĺndia in the quest for self-sufficiency in the first half of the eighteenth century. Finally, chapter 6 will look at how state support for, and interaction with, religion facilitated or inhibited survival in the short term. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will investigate the period up to the fall of Bassein in 1739. The much touted revival in the last decade of D. João V’s reign after 1739 will be analysed separately in chapter 7 from a largely political-economic perspective.

As was mentioned earlier, studies on Portuguese activities in the Estado da ĺndia in the eighteenth-century, whether formal or

10 informal, are limited. On India, a more comprehensive work that covers the whole of eighteenth-century India (to 1833) is Silva Rego’s O Ultramar Português no Seculo XVIII.46 For the eighteenth century, two further monographs by Saldanha and Lopes are available for the second half of the century.47 Saldanha’s book can be misleading at first glance for it only covers a part of the second half of the eighteenth century under the viceroyalty of the first Count of Ega. In terms of the conflict with enemies in India, the works by Pissurlencar and Lobato are elaborate.48 From Pissurlencar’s works (see the bibliography), The Portuguese and Marathas drew upon valuable manuscripts such as the Livros das Monções and Livros dos Reis Visinhos located in the Office of the Governor-General of the State of India (before the handover), and now located at the Historical Archive of Goa. Parts of The Portuguese and Marathas include the verbatim transcription of primary documents arranged into a flowing historical narrative. In themselves, these studies serve as first hand sources for further reference. The final chronology on the fall of Bassein was also drawn, among other printed primary sources, from several “relations” or reports (both published and unpublished); for example, Relações of the wars of India or of the then in charge, the Count of Sandomil, or Relações of “events” in the war with the Marathas or infidels. Lobato’s Relações Luso-Maratas is also narrative, but more analytical; for example, the issue as to whether the Portuguese pledged themselves as vassals is taken up vis-à-vis the opinion of Pissurlencar.49 This thesis will also extend its analysis to the various campaigns to show that the Portuguese military on land was not as ineffective or hopeless as has been portrayed, especially when aid was received from home.

On the southwestern coast of India, Jacob’s Rajas of Cochin and Stephen’s Portuguese on the Tamil Coast cover up to 1720 and

11 1749 respectively.50 From an economic viewpoint, there is no single work on the Portuguese for the first half of the eighteenth century, although a chapter entry in the voluminous História da Expansão Portuguesa noted that the stabilising efforts by the Portuguese were not examined because of avoidance of Portuguese sources (presumably by scholars who were unable to work with the language51). Having said that, it must be acknowledged that earlier works, for instance, that by Furber, gives useful cross references to the economic activities of the Portuguese in Asia.52 A compilation of papers and articles by Shirodkar is worth noting because it represents one of the most recent updates that draws upon primary sources relating to military and trade aspects of the first half of eighteenth-century India. Despite useful segments that reveal something about the Portuguese decline, the focus of Furber’s work is on the Dutch and English companies. Shirodkar’s treatment on trade strategy across the eighteenth century describes the continuing but frustrating experiences of the Crown in reviving its trade in India. 53 His evidence will be taken up in chapter 5. Shirodkar’s assessment is a dismal one for Portuguese colonial officialdom, but this thesis will try to present new evidence to ameliorate this view. Shirodkar’s coverage of the Portuguese military in the East focuses on the reforms and initiatives of individual viceroys from the inception of the Estado da ĺndia to the end of the period covered by the present study (i.e. 1750). Following this line, he could only, at best, bring out salient points and developments of the Portuguese eastern colonial military. This thesis will approach Portuguese war-making more holistically. It will consider war from a number of perspectives: as a political tool, in terms of strategy, through an analysis of campaigns, development of professionalism and advances in the light of European developments. The naval history of the Portuguese in the East suffers from the same ailment

12 as general historiography in that, other than Ames and Monteiro, no one has bothered to look at the Portuguese after the Dutch and English came onto the scene. 54 This thesis will devote some attention to naval exploits as an adjunct of the discussion on military endeavours to argue that the defeat of the Portuguese at sea was not a forgone conclusion. In this regard, while the military history of the Portuguese in India has been the specialty of , his coverage only extends to the later years of the Habsburg Union.55

Outside India, East is amply covered by the works of Boxer (and Azevedo) and Strandes, as well as Newitt.56 The first two look at coastal in detail; the episode of the failure and attempts at rescue in the are analysed. The work by Newitt is the most authoritative on the interior of East Africa. The extreme periphery of Macao, with a focus on trade, is the domain of the work of Souza.57 Portuguese Timor is the subject of a timeless work by Matos, which covers economic, politico-administrative and social-religious developments on the island from 1515 to about twenty years beyond the investigative period of this thesis.58

The main thrust of this thesis is to investigate the factors for the prolongation of the Portuguese in the East in the first half of the eighteenth century. Modern historiography has taken half a century for the investigation of decline to evolve into research about survival. In terms of the causes for decline, the chronology of developments can be traced as follows. The first decline literature was that of a contemporary source by Diogo do Couto. Correa’s Lendas, like Couto’s, belongs to a category of work which blames corruption for the decline of the Portuguese in Asia.59 Next comes Danvers’ study dating from the late nineteenth century which drew heavily on the early Portuguese chroniclers. In part due to the sources utilised and

13 in part from a Whiggish outlook, he did not deviate too far from the causes of decline advocated by do Couto.60 Duffy’s Shipwreck and Empire – Being an Account of Portuguese Maritime Disasters in a Century of Decline, kicked off the decline literature just after the mid- twentieth century, identifying the Portuguese mentality – for example, the lack of business acumen and greediness – as a cause for decline. 61 Cortesão, the widely-cited doyen of colonial studies during the Salazar regime, pointed to a number of reasons for the Portuguese decline in the East. These ranged from inadequate resources to feudalistic corruption and the meddling of the king.62

Outside Portugal, the exiles of the fascist Salazar regime, Magalhães Godinho and Oliveira Marques, were the first to catch up with developments in Western historiography in the 1960s, as seen in the Annales and even Marxist-affiliated approaches to Portugal’s overseas decline. In terms of Portuguese decline, a structuralist explanation was imputed – identifying decline in trade figures.63 In the same decade, Boxer’s seminal work The Portuguese Seaborne Empire ascribed the reasons of the downfall to lack of luck and the strength of their enemies. A point often overlooked in this work is the doyen’s observation that “the Portuguese decadence in Asia was not equally obvious at all times and places”.64

The historiography of decline went from here in several directions – Winius’ Fatal History of Ceylon added to the literature which blamed the Portuguese limitations on their incompetence and resource constraints.65 Disney’s work attempted to probe into the Portuguese decline by looking at the establishment and failure of the Portuguese India Company.66 In the 1980s, though not touching directly on the Portuguese but on their Iberian Spanish cousins, Israel’s work represented a new approach in trying to combine explanations from

14 both sides of the picture (that is, from the Dutch and Spanish).67 The work’s time frame of 1606-61 embraced about forty years in which Portugal was subsumed under Habsburg rule. On the side of Portuguese academia, Saraiva, writing in 1979, was more unilateral in ascribing the Portuguese decline to entanglement in Habsburg’s wars, namely, that against England in the cross-channel Armada battle.68 This argument is not new, nor did it go out of favour even in the 1990s.69

Beginning in the 1990s, there has been a trend towards a more symbiotic approach to explain the Portuguese decline, as seen in Subrahmanyam’s work, which incorporated non-European sources.70 Van Veen’s Portuguese Decline – Decay or Defeat utilised the idea of interacting groups in a network, and concluded with multiple reasons segmented into a few periods to explain the decline. 71 Winius’ observation in the twenty-first century in regard to decline and survival studies has already been noted above. Ames’ work, then, stands at the end of this long line of studies that seek to explain the admirable prolongation rather than defeat and decline.72 This thesis takes up the spirit of Ames’ work in attempting to explain how the Portuguese were able to avoid being ousted across the Estado da ĺndia. In relation to the Marathas, the main antagonist of the Portuguese in India, this study will also seek to incorporate some of the latest research to explain their actions towards the Portuguese.

Perhaps not so noticeable in the literature is the fact that there have been sporadic attempts to suggest how the Portuguese survived in the East. For a start, Ames’ work ascribes capable leadership from the centre by those who were able to implement economically self- sustaining reforms, military revival and measures in the colonies as

15 an explanatory factor for survival.73 As early as 1951 and 1963, short tracts on Portuguese colonisation were written during the government of Salazar by Caetano and Silva Rego respectively. Both pieces of writing highlighted religious conversion and assimilation as an activity of Portuguese colonisation. On a second point, Silva Rego thought that an administration modelled on that of the metropole assisted the colonisation process, while Caetano believed it was administrative differentiation on the ground as well as political uniformity which made the difference in Portuguese ‘success’. Finally, Caetano pinpointed the mutually benefiting system of economic development, while Silva Rego identified the spread of language as the sustainer of colonisation.74 It should be noted that the context of Caetano’s booklet is likely to have been a justification for the retention of Portuguese colonies overseas. In the same year of the publication of the booklet – that is, 1951 – the overseas empire was called “overseas provinces”, as opposed to the “colonies” referred before.75 From non-Portuguese quarters, it might be surprising to learn that Furber’s work, which covered developments of the Dutch and English companies in the orient (to 1800), argued that Portuguese pride, diplomacy with Asian enemies and Europeans rivals – especially the alliance with the English – were reasons for the Portuguese staying on.76 In more recent works, in looking at the evolution of Portuguese overseas strategy, Ferreira came to some conclusions regarding the continued Portuguese presence in the East. First, he proposed a spiritual underpinning with Christianity as a basis. Secondly, he proposed an exploring and ‘superior’ culture grounded in humanism and universalism. Thirdly, he advocated the importance of political unity and favourable conditions at home, as well as the adoption of this politico- administrative model abroad. Lastly, he argued that language also acted as a unifying factor.77

16

In terms of seeking an explanation for the survival, it would be useful to distinguish between short-term and long-term factors, and to understand the relation between them. The “principles of colonisation” in Caetano’s tract communicated more of the long-term factors. The use of the term “colonising” implied this. Secondly, how ‘successful’ and ‘lasting’ the Portuguese had been overseas became increasingly important during the middle years of Salazar’s dictatorship. In surmising the evolution of overseas strategies, Ferreira also presented the long-term factors. 78 Hence, long-term factors are those aggregated determinants which can be applied, in part or whole, to each of the periods analysed in Ferreira’s work – for instance, the reign of Afonso V, João III to the loss of independence, the reign of João V, nineteenth century developments (to the Conference of Berlin), etc. The factors which apply within each period become short-term ones. Ferreira, however, is not very clear about these short-term determinants, or how they apply to specific theatres like India. More immediate or contingent factors can be found by analysing individual viceregal administrations within each reign. However, it would call for more than one thesis to complete such an analysis!

Having highlighted the decline and survival factors from the available studies, can one talk about a relation between both sets of factors? Viewing the transition of the factors from a decline- to survival- perspective may only represent a chronological angle of the historiography. The factor of leadership can, naturally, be associated either with the rise, decline or even prolongation of the Portuguese east. The ‘disinterest’ of the liberal-minded academics and historians not only leads to the neglect of studies on monarchs (as leaders), but also to the latters’ de-mystification. For example, Prince Henry

17 the Navigator is no longer seen as the visionary who conceived the early of Portugal, but as a power-starved noble seeking out new opportunities for his private monopolies.79 There is also a division of opinion within academia – for example, while Manuel I’s role in the eastern expansion was being ravaged by Winius, a Portuguese publication as late as 2002 continued to look favourably on the visionary image of the king.80 On the ground, the efforts of viceroys are better appreciated compared to the initiatives of the king. While and are relatively much more written on, others like Lopo Soares de Albergaria are not highly regarded. 81 Further down the road, Disney’s study of the early career of the son of the Count of Linhares argues against the prevalent trend of mixing the assessment of Portuguese leadership with an alleged or real systemic flaw (such as feudalistic practices or corruption), although he is careful to point out that not all governors were flawless heads.82 The ‘revival’ effort by Ames also represents the strongest voice over the long haul to speak in support of the efforts of the centre under Pedro II in the immediate post-Restoration period.83

This study will look briefly at the system emanating from home by which the Portuguese operated in the East. The study of this system is also often enmeshed with larger debates of ideological, developmental and world system theories. Portugal was one of the first countries in Europe to break away from feudalism and develop an early modern state; this in turn enabled it to mobilise resources and undertake overseas expansion from the fifteenth century. Again, the very same reason which propelled Portugal onto the world stage is the one that also contributed to its decline. The more restricted debate which focuses on the administrative decadence is most exemplified by the work of Danvers; one might also add Winius’

18 Black Legend of Portuguese India to this. 84 Assuming that the Portuguese system was perfectly transplanted from home to its colony at this point in time, Winius argues that Portuguese Asia was a “uniquely corrupt place” to a degree that exceeded those in comparable systems in the English (EIC), (VOC) and even the Spanish empire. Winius points out that the abnormal circumstance of Portuguese Asia was not merely a by-product of the era of decline; it arose from a permanent condition upon which the patronage network, selfish values of the Portuguese nobility and the problem of distance all fed.85

In terms of the sources, a systemic study is neither the objective nor a feasible goal for this thesis. Such an investigation requires the undertaking of research into the broader overlapping economic environment, as well as the availability of ample primary data of the financial and trade structure of the Estado da ĺndia along the lines of studies undertaken by Magalhães Godinho and Federic Mauro. The nature of the sources – the consultations of the Overseas Council and isolated communications between the king and his representatives or confidants – means that it may not be possible to paint too concise picture of the centre.

The patronage network was also the redistributive system by which economic benefits were shared in a mutual protective arrangement between patrons. The theoretical and economic framework of pre- modern or redistributive exchange was explored as early as 1957 in a prominent article by Polanyi. 86 The Portuguese arrival and subsequent activities in the have been examined in terms of their redistributive impact by Steensgaard.87 Some of the figures used by Steensgaard were disputed and further refined by

19 Wake in 1979 – the former, it is claimed, had underestimated the proportion of pepper brought by the Portuguese to Europe, implying that the distributive share of the Portuguese had been larger. Wake argued that, despite whatever debate there might have been on the revival, the Levant trade seemed to have made up for the shortfall in commodities the Portuguese were not able to bring in via the Cape route.88 However, other studies as early as van Leur’s posthumously published Indonesian Trade and Society have dismissed the Portuguese impact in terms of shifts and the limited redirection of trade.89 The overlap between van Leur’s view and the current hot debates on eighteenth century historiography, spearheaded in part by prominent scholars such as Bayly, is whether the history of British India was pervasive or deep-seated enough to be seen as the .90 The link between the history of hinterland India and the coming of the earlier European powers, which based themselves along the coast, is the inland network with coastal colonial ports or settlements. It is an area which requires much more research.

Closely related to redistribution is the discussion on the semi- feudalistic versus early modern capitalist construct. The debate advanced is that the Portuguese mode of operation resembled the former, while the Dutch and English companies represented more of the early modern capitalist construct. In another variant of the model by Newitt, Portugal failed to break through in military professionalism and organisation because its soldiers were motivated towards the wrong ends, that is, feudalistic plundering instead of capitalistic profit-maximising motives.91 Hence, appointment to office was seen as enhancing the share of plunder; the granting of land was seen as regularising the revenues of plunder. In the end, Portugal’s “wrong turn” would relegate the kingdom to the status of a small power.92 However, Newitt was careful to clarify that Portugal’s rise as a

20 promising monopolistic capitalist state had, in the beginning, as good a chance of succeeding as that of any other state. Steensgaard himself admitted in the conclusion of The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century that the difference might just have been a matter of style in that companies also tried to achieve some form of redistributive effect. 93 More recent studies reveal that the “early multinational companies” of the northern Europeans had a heavy state hand and operated in Asia in much the same way, even reinforcing what the Portuguese had been practising. Why the former, especially the English, were able to triumph was ascribed to the “optimal” mix of state and free forces at work.94 The point of the discussion up to this stage is that the limited dent made by the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean trade during their ‘heyday’ was enough to contribute to their rise, although the increasing share of private Portuguese (vis-à-vis Crown share) in trade is to be noted.95 The imperfect control the early Portuguese monopolists tried to exert experienced a continual slide after the mid-sixteenth century, which contributed to their decline. In Ames’ work, the increasing private participation in the remaining official Carreira da ĺndia was seen as a “sign of maturation of the Bragança dynasty” – if the aim was to re- establish the Carreira, the reduced or even negative profits might be an accepted necessity, in conjunction with other schemes.96

A further issue is the extent to which rivalries between Asian states and the coming of the Europeans, along with Portuguese arms, were involved in the rise, decline and prolongation of the Estado da ĺndia before the eighteenth century. The Portuguese ability to survive was more complicated than a mere linear relationship with anarchy on the sub-continent. When the Portuguese arrived on the scene in the early sixteenth century, the large northern polity of the Dehli sultanate had broken down into a Hindu and a number of Islamic

21 kingdoms. In the south, the kingdom of Vijayanagar held sway with a host of port-sized principalities along the coast. Although the Mughals had risen in power during this period, it was not until the 1630s they were able to achieve a more complete unification of a large part of India. The Portuguese thrived in the beginning by exploiting feuds between the various political entities – the rulers of Cochin offered friendship to the Portuguese after having learnt of the uneventful first meeting between the of Calicut and Vasco da Gama; Krishnadevaraya of Vijayanagar was pleased that Goa was taken by the Portuguese from the Adil Shah of Bijapur.97 To a certain extent, the Mughal consolidation can be seen as a change in the overlord-vassal relationship. The Mughals were tolerant of the Portuguese as long as they did not disrupt the local centres of revenue and the balance of power. However, fellow Europeans had actively intruded into the Indian Ocean and were out-competing the Portuguese by this time (that is, the early 1600s). The Portuguese tried, in vain, to oust the other Europeans from the scene through an alliance with the Mughals, and later even tried to exploit their age-old relationship with the English with, as we shall see later, little benefit. Ames’ revival period (1668-1683) saw the beginning of a weakening in the Mughals, as well as intermittent interference by powers outside of India, for example, by the Omanis of Muscate, who foiled Portuguese attempts to make a come-back in certain areas. In the meantime, it seems that the Portuguese managed to stabilise their position.98

It is widely recognised that the Portuguese enterprise in the East was forged by naval superiority. On many occasions they prevailed against overwhelming local numerical odds, for example, in their victorious sea battle over the Egyptian fleet off Diu in 1509. Meanwhile, the Portuguese made up for their deficiency in shallow

22 waters by building a galley fleet. Ironically, the Omani threat came at a time when the Portuguese were supposed to be recovering just after the mid-seventeenth century. Ames has shown that the Portuguese were still able to marshal together respectable fire prowess on the sea. On land, the coastal fortresses continued to be the vital links of the Portuguese network. However, a number of these were lost to their Dutch adversaries in the face of resource inadequacy, rather then because of incompetence. A series of measures (financial and logistic) strengthened the essentially ‘simplified’ network during Pedro II’s regency.

The Portuguese, however, did not rely on military supremacy alone to establish and maintain the Estado. The term “soft power” was coined by Joseph Nye and is used in modern international relations theory to describe the ability of a political body to indirectly influence the behaviour or interests of other political bodies through cultural or ideological means. The basic idea is to get others to “want and subsequently do what you want” by co-opting them. This factor has the best chance of working when the actor has a widespread reputation. Contrasted with the more quantitative realist measure of power (the number of soldiers, amount of monies or even population size, etc.), soft power relies on intangibles like the spread of culture, values or language. 99 Applied within a territory to regulate those under control, this thesis designates instruments or determinants associated with “soft power” as “soft factors”.

There is ample evidence for the use of soft power in the Portuguese case. In the Portuguese overseas empire, the religious motive in the initial and expansion period was overlapped with, according to Boxer, politico-strategic concerns. First, religion was part of the crusading drive against the Muslims to liberate the Iberian

23 peninsula and beyond. Second, and extending from the first point, a scheme was hatched to look for a mythical ally to envelop the Muslims from the rear in Africa and further afield. In fact, the reputation for violence of Vasco da Gama and even Afonso de Albuquerque might be rationalised from this religious context, in conjunction with their values and mission. 100 This fanaticism was toned down in the face of the strong reactions and resistance they encountered. Hence, governance of the Estado da ĺndia during the early years was characterised by religious tolerance. This was reversed in Goa in 1540 with a change in policy.101 The increasing dissatisfaction with the imposition of their Catholic religion probably accentuated Portuguese weakness in competition with the more religiously-apathetic northern Europeans who arrived at the turn of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, religious establishments have been partly credited with the propagation of the , which in turn contributed to the survival of Portuguese settlements.102 While the Portuguese survival in the East might, in the long run, be ascribed to religion, the short-term impact from measures regulating faith needs to be weighed up in terms of their positive and negative effects. In Ames’ work, the contribution of religiosos (members of monastic orders) to the revival appears mixed, as reports of their activities depended on the perception of incumbent viceroys.103

Aversion to absolutist studies and Portuguese sources, preoccupation with success, (past) glory and Brazil have largely diverted research away from the Estado da ĺndia in the first half of eighteenth century. Among some non-Portuguese historians of the field, a preoccupation with decline in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries contributed to the further avoidance of study of the next half (eighteenth) century. This thesis is situated in an overlap of

24 several areas of specialised historiography. It is part of the historiography of decline or survival literature; part of the historiography of the first half of the eighteenth century Portuguese- Indian studies; part of empire or colonisation studies; and part of centre-periphery studies. While several sub-areas of the study of the Estado da ĺndia have been undertaken in part and individually, there is no single monograph on the Estado da ĺndia in the first half of the eighteenth century.

In terms of the present study, this opening chapter has reviewed the literature on decline and survival. It has shown that the determinants identified in the Portuguese decline are potentially the same ones that could act as an impulse for revival and prolongation. The gaps in our knowledge and investigation of the survival factors for the first half of the eighteenth century will form the crux of this thesis.

To reiterate, the main hypothesis of this thesis is that the Estado da Índia in the first half of the eighteenth century survived as a result of leadership emanating from the centre (including direct Crown representatives dispatched to the theatre), and the instruments of state wielded by it. To test this hypothesis, this thesis will examine the effects of politico-administrative changes in metropolitan Portugal on the management of India. It will also examine the tools employed by the leadership at the centre (Lisbon) and on the ground (in India). These tools include diplomacy, war, trade, and revenue extraction as well as interventionist measures in religion and culture.

This work will fill current gaps and omissions in the literature and contribute to the wider debate on a number of significant areas -

25 decline and survival studies, centre-periphery studies, eighteenth century Luso-Indian studies, and empire as well as colonial studies.

26 Endnotes

1 See introduction and conclusion in K. Maxwell and M.H. Haltzel (eds.) Portugal – Ancient Country, Young Democracy (Washington, 1990). 2 It must be qualified that liberalism, generally taken to be open-mindedness associated with the right-inclined, is itself complex and hardly a coherent body of ideas. Classical liberalism is anti- imperialist; mid-20th century liberalism is anti-totalitarianiarn. 3 From a discussion with staff and research students at CHAM of Universidade Nova de Lisboa during a visit from October to December 2004. 4 I.S. Wiarda, Handbook of Portuguese Studies (np, 1999), pp. 198-213 on the “Far East”. 5 P.M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Power 1500-2000 (London, 1989). 6 See chronology in M.T. Barata and N.S. Teixeira directed, Nova História Militar de Portugal II (Lisbon, 2004), pp. 369-75. 7 G. Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975 (Manchester, 1985), p. 3. 8 G. D. Winius, “India or Brazil”, in G. D. Winius, Studies on Portuguese Asia (Aldershot, 2001), I, p. 1. 9 G. J. Ames, Renascent Empire (Amsterdam, 2000). 10 J. B. Sykes (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Oxford, 1978). 11 J. Osterhammel, Colonialism (Princeton, 1996), pp. 13-22; see also D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires (London, 1965), pp. 372-94. 12Ibid., p. 22. 13A. Loomba, Colonialism /Postcolonialism (London, 1998), p. 6. 14 Osterhammel, Colonialism, see discussion on p. 22. 15 A. Disney, “The Portuguese Empire in India” in J.S. Correia-Afonso (ed.), Indo-Portuguese History – Sources and Problems (Bombay, 1981), p. 154. 16 M. Lobato, “Guerra dos Maratas” in Barata M.T. et al directed, Nova Historia Militar de Portugal II, pp. 317-29. 17 E. Shils, “Center and Periphery” in The Logic of Personal Knowledge (London, 1961), p. 117. 18 Ibid., p. 117. 19 Ibid., p. 121. 20 Ibid., p. 124. 21 Ibid., p. 123. 22 Ibid., p. 127. 23I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York, 1980). 24See compilations in C. Daniels and M. Kennedy (eds.), Negotiated Empires (New York, 2002). 25C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Society in the Tropics –1800 (Madison, 1965). 26G. J. Ames, “Colbert’s Indian Ocean strategy of 1664-74 – reappraisal”, French Historical Studies, 16, 3 (1990), p. 537. 27 M. Newitt, A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1400-1668 (Abingdon, 2005), p. 252. 28 For instance, S. Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700 (London, 1993), see chapter 4. 27

29 Ibid., chapter 4. 30 Newitt, Op. cit., p. 162-65. 31 J. Cortesão, O Ultramar Português Depois da Restauração (Lisbon, 1971). 32 See for instance, A. H. de Oliveira Marques’ work, Breve História de Portugal (Lisbon, 1995). 33 C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825 (London, 1969), see chapters 5 and 6. 34 Newitt, Op. cit., p. 254. 35 See introduction in M. Newitt (ed.), The First Portuguese (Exeter, 1986). 36 Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, this is hinted on p. 148, chapter VII details of developments in Brazil. 37 Subrahmanyam, Op. cit., pp. 195-96. 38 M. Caetano, O Conselho Ultramarino (Lisbon, 1957). 39 Ibid., for relevant period, see pp. 37-46. 40 E. de Sousa Barros, “Negocios de Tanta Importancia”, unpublished PhD thesis, Universidade de , 2004. 41 E. L.. Myrup, “To rule from afar – Brazil and the making of Portugal’s Overseas Council 1642- 1833”, paper presented at the “Imperial (Re)Visions: Brazil and the Portuguese Seaborne Empire” seminar, Yale University, 1-3 November 2002. 42 A. J. R. Russell-Wood, “Governantes e Agentes”, in F. Bethencourt and K. Chaudhuri (eds.), Historia da Expansao III (Lisbon, 1998), pp. 169-92. Also, C. R. Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola (London, 1952), pp. 160-63. 43 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, pp. 160-63. 44 Russell-Wood, “Governantes e Agentes”, p. 169. 45 Myrup, Op. cit. 46 A. da Silva Rego, O Ultramar Português (Lisbon, 1970). 47 A. V. de Saldanha, A Índia Portuguêsa e Politica do Oriente de Setecentos (Lisbon, 1989); M. de J. dos M. Lopes, Goa Setecentista – Tradição e Modernidade (Lisbon, 1999). 48 A. Lobato, Relações Luso-Maratas, 1658-1737, (Lisbon, 1965). For P.S. Pissurlencar, for instance, The Portuguese and the Marathas (translated by P. Kakodkar) (Bombay, 1975). 49 Lobato, Relações Luso-Maratas, p. 98. 50 H. K. Jacob, The Rajas of Cochin 1663-1720 (New Delhi, 2000); S. J. Stephen, Portuguese on the Tamil Coast 1507-1749 (Pondichery, 1998). 51 52 H. Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient (Minneapolis, 1976). 53 P.P. Shirodkar, Researches in Indo-Portuguese History (Jaipur, 1998), entry on “Trade Strategy in 18th Century”, pp. 115-36. 54 Ames, Renascent Empire. S. Monteiro, Batalhas, Combates de Marinha Portuguesa (Lisbon, 1996). 55 See, for example, V. L. G. Rodrigues, “A organização militar da Provincia do Norte durante o século XVI e principios do século XVII”, Mare Liberum 9 (1995), pp. 247-59; “Da Goa de

28

Albuquerque á Goa seiscentista: aspectos da organização militar da capital do Estado da ĺndia”, Revista Militar, 51, 1 (1999), pp. 59-93. 56 C. R. Boxer and A. de Azevedo, Fort Jesus and the Portuguese in Mombasa (London, 1960); J. Strandes (J.F. Wallwork trans.), The Portuguese Period in East Africa (Nairobi, 1968); M. D. Newitt, Portuguese Settlements on the Zambesi (London, 1973). 57 G.B. de Souza, The Survival of Empire (London, 1986). 58 A. T. de Matos, Timor Português (Lisbon, 1974). 59 D. do Couto / A. Farinha de Carvalho, O Soldado Pratico (Lisbon, 1979). See also J. B. Harrison, “Five Portuguese Historians” in C. H. Philips (ed.), Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon (London, 1961/1967) pp. 159-161 and 163-164 for discussion of early Portuguese chroniclers. 60 F.C. Danvers, Portuguese in India – Being a History of the Rise and Decline of Their Eastern Empire (London, 1894) I-II. R. S. Whiteway’s work, Rise of Portuguese Power in India (London, 1899), falls into this category, too, as a result of relying on the same sources. 61 J. Duffy, Shipwreck and Empire (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 165-68. 62 J. Cortesão, O Imperio Português no Oriente (Lisbon, 1968), pp. 188-202 and his O Ultramar Português depois da Restauração, pp. 11-84. 63 V. Magalhães Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial I-IV (Lisbon, 1963-71). 64 Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, pp. 106-49. 65 G. D. Winius, The Fatal History of Ceylon (Cambridge, 1971). 66 A. Disney, Twilight of the Pepper Empire (Cambridge, 1978). 67 J. I. Israel, The and the Hispanic World (Oxford, 1982). 68 J. Hermano Saraiva, História Concisa de Portugal (Lisbon, 1979), p. 197. 69For example, A. Pimenta’s work, Elementos da História de Portugal (Lisbon, 1937). Oliveira Marques’ work, Breve Historia de Portugal. 70 Subrahmanyam, Op. cit. 71 E. Van Veen, Decay or Defeat? An Inquiry into the Portuguese Decline in Asia 1580-1645 (Leiden, 2000), pp. 227-42. 72Ames, Op. cit. 73 Ibid., see chapter V. 74M. Caetano, Colonising Traditions, Principles and Methods of the Portuguese (Lisbon, 1951). A. da Silva Rego, Principios e Métodos da Colonização Portuguesa (Lisbon, 1943). 75D. L. Wheeler, “Portugal, India and the Goa Question” in A. Disney and E. Booth (eds.), Vasco da Gama and the Linking of Europe and Asia (New Delhi, 2000), p. 456. 76Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, p. 26. 77J. B. Ferreira, A Evolução do Conceito Estratégico Ultramarino Português (Lisbon, 2000), p. 206. 78 Ibid., refer structure and topical division in contents page. 79M. Newitt, “Prince Henry and Origins of Portuguese Expansion” in M. Newitt (ed.), The First Portuguese Empire, p. 33. 29

80J. V. Amaro Pissarra, e Diu (Lisbon, 2002), pp. 8-9. See also L. F. Thomaz, “Factions, Interests and Messianism” in Indian Economic and Social History Review 28 (1991), pp. 97-109. G. D. Winius, “The Building of Portuguese India – Few Thanks to the King” in A. Disney and E. Booth (eds.), Vasco da Gama and the Linking of Europe and Asia (Oxford, 2000), pp. 484-95. In this chapter entry, Winius took the opportunity to rail at the role of the monarchy in Portuguese eastern overseas expansion and at the end of the article, credited any remaining part the king might have played to his fortunately unsuccessful “fumbling”. Winius reminded the reader that, even during its heyday, Portuguese India was secondary in consideration when weighed against enterprises nearer home. Yet, under Manuel I, the Crown insisted on an expedition in the east arising from his rivalry with the Catholic kings (his parents-in-law) of the neighbouring Spanish monarchy. Given the inadequate support, it was the gung-ho and opportunistic people on the ground who carried the day and established the Portuguese foothold in the east. Winius goes into further detail about meddling from the centre – for example, the attempted division of the Estado to assert the Crown’s hold on factions, or the move to squeeze more revenue, which led to the adoption of the concession system. Both schemes either did not take permanent shape or, if tried, did not yield much result. In the end, Winius asserts that it was able people in the lower social scale, as well as those “not recognized”, who helped to sustain the empire. The kings and their councillors from home were more of a liability than a help. As Winius asserts, the structure created by “all others little associated with the centre” might have lasted indefinitely; “had not the Dutch (and to a lesser extent, the English) arrived with hostile intent and superior resources to dismantle it” (p. 495). 81Biographies have appeared on Vasco da Gama, Afonso de Albuquerque and even Francisco de Almeida, but no such work has been done on Lopo Soares de Albergaria. 82A. Disney, “The Estado da Índia and Young Nobleman Soldier”, Mare Liberum 5 (1993), pp. 65- 75. 83Ames, Op. cit. 84 G. D. Winius, The Black Legend of Portuguese India (New Delhi, 1985). 85 Ibid. See also A. Disney, Book Review of Black Legend of Portuguese India in South Asia (Jun 1987), pp. 91-93. 86K. Polanyi, “The Economy as an Instituted Process” in C. Arensberg, H. Pearson and K. Polanyi (eds.) Trade and Market in Early Empires (London, 1962), pp. 243-70. There were other scholars, for example J. Hicks, who differed on aspects of the thesis, who conjectures that, for instance, the pre-modern mercantile economy period was longer than that suggested by Polanyi. 87 See N. Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution of Seventeenth Century (London, 1973). 88O. Prakash, New Cambridge of History of India – European Commercial Enterprise in Pre (Cambridge, 1998), p. 48. 89 J.C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society (The Hague, 1955). 90C. A. Bayly, “Van Leur and Indian Eighteenth Century” in L. Blusse and F. Gaastra (eds.), On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History (Aldershot, 1998), pp. 289-302.

30

91M. Newitt, “Plunder and the Rewards of Office in the Portuguese Empire”, in M. Duffy (ed.), Military Revolution and the State (Exeter, 1980), pp. 15-16. 92Ibid., pp. 23-27. 93Steensgaard, Asian Trade Revolution of Seventeenth Century, see conclusion of book. 94See J. Glete, War and State in Early Modern Europe (London, 2002). 95See J. C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs (London, 1993). The limits of this work are discussed in O. Prakash, New Cambridge History - European Commercial Enterprise in Pre Colonial India, pp. 339-40. 96Ames, Op. cit., pp. 111-12. 97D. Costa, “Indo-Portuguese Relations” in P. M. Joshi and M. A. Nayeem (eds.), Studies in Foreign Relations of India (Hyderabad, 1975), pp. 150-155. 98 Ames, Renascent Empire, see conclusion. 99J. Nye, “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power”, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ updated 28 Nov 2005. Book by the author, Soft Power – Means to Success in World Politics (New York, 2004). 100See A. Disney, “Vasco da Gama’s Reputation for Violence”, Indica 32, 1 (1995). 101 M. Pearson, New Cambridge History – The Portuguese in India (Cambridge, 1987), p. 170. 102A. L. Ferronha (ed.), Atlas da Lingua Portuguesa na História e no Mundo (Lisbon, 1992), pp. 110-11. 103Ames, Op. cit., pp. 67 and 74.

31 CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND TO THE ESTADO DA ĺNDIA IN THE 18TH CENTURY

Portugal and its empire received a new lease of life after the Restoration of 1640.1 This chapter will outline the situation at home in Portugal and in the Portuguese East during the half-century background prior to the turn of the eighteenth century, with added attention being given to the last twenty years. How early modern overseas empires were governed before the Industrial Revolution has always been a subject of fascination for historians of empire. In this respect, the constraints of distance vis-à-vis technology and other difficulties will be taken up. While this thesis has chosen to focus on the Portuguese East in the eighteenth century, Portuguese activities in the Americas and rest of the empire will be discussed in the context of symbiosis with the East.

Portugal and the Estado up to 1700 The innovative spirit of Ames’ work has been raised in the introductory chapter. This impact is conveyed in different arenas of his main argument. 2 The stabilisation and reliance on councils established the modus operandi at the heart of the attempted Portuguese resurgence. High policies were decided in the Council of State in Lisbon. His study also describes the early operations, advice, and limits of the Overseas Council. Another facet highlighted in his study was the jostling of court politics: Queen Marie Francoise’s pro-French faction which tussled with the remnants of those associated with the dominant minister under Afonso VI (the Count of Castelo Melhor) and those who helped to depose that king

32 in the 1667 palace coup. Beneath this, the grandees aligned themselves to gain favour and influence. Ames reveals that the nobility became more distinctly differentiated, and that those at court also grew to be more dependent on the Crown. In the colonies in the East, the government of the Estado da ĺndia reflected “centralising tendencies of the late medieval and absolutist period”.3 Here, Ames asserts that the traditionally-held view that the administrative structure of the Estado was unsophisticated is misleading. Given the reduced territories of the Estado, he argues that this structure was “adequate and necessarily simple”.4 Evidence for a revitalized land and sea force in the Estado is marshalled to prove the point. On the economic front, Ames points out that the economic history of Portuguese Asia is fraught with a similar problem to the general historiography of Portuguese colonial history, that is, there is an excessive focus on the ‘glorious’ period and that of the disastrous seventeenth century. Ames affirms the Crown’s continual participation and goes on to argue in support of the stabilisation of the Carreira da ĺndia. At the end, he argues that the Pedro II (regent, later king) had intended that the East was going to be as important as gold-producing Brazil!5

The main criticism of the work, as pinpointed in several reviews of his book, is that the events in this work are seen largely from the viceroy’s desk, and that he neglects those who preferred to remain at arms-length from Goa.6

The views of Ames can be supported with the unpublished thesis of Edval Barros, who focuses on the overseas struggles of Portugal in the early Restoration period from the perspective of the Overseas Council.7 In a period when the Crown was possibly still trying to decide which theatre to forfeit, the thesis reveals not only the early

33 operational problems of the Overseas Council, but also the lengthy period needed to arrive at decisions, for example, on the dispatch of reinforcements to India vis-à-vis the other theatres. In the same period, the formation of a company whose functions overlapped to some extent with those of the nascent Overseas Council, further complicated the decision-making process of the centre. On top of this, there were inputs from the Junta do Comércio and the Câmaras in the colonies. As if this was not enough, the Treasury Council (Conselho da Fazenda) in Lisbon, which originally had considerable influence over these matters, and which continued to control aspects of finance, insisted on having a say in matters. Finally, the king might arbitrate on the outcome without consultation with some or all of these bodies.8 From this, it can be seen that many interested parties participated in the process of making a particular decision at home, and that an image of India can be constructed from the perspective of some of them.

The last years of Pedro II’s rule in Portugal and developments abroad receive very little treatment in the available literature.9 When considered together with his years of regency (1668-83 as regent, 1683-1706 as king), Pedro II’s rule over Portugal came close to forty years. For a new dynasty consolidating its authority, his long tenure of power was beneficial. 10 Despite evidence indicating a strong centre-led revival, the period of his monarchical rule (1683-1706) seems to pale a little in comparison with his term of regency (1668- 83). The period of Pedro II’s kingship saw the service of six governors (of whom four were viceroys) and two interim governments in India (see list of governors etc. in appendix B). In the transition from regency to kingship, the viceroyalty in India under D. Francisco de Távora, Count of Alvor (1681-86), witnessed the overrunning of the fort at the island of Jua by Shivaji (ruler of one of

34 the main Hindu peoples on the west coast), and the invasion of Salcete and Bardez by his son, Shambaji.11 In terms of defensive measures, this prompted the creation in 1686 of the first cavalry unit in the provinces under threat.12

The death of Shivaji in 1680 coincided with the decision of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707) to push into the Deccan the following year. For Aurangzeb, the impulse for the move came primarily from prince Muhammad Akbar’s moves (son of Aurangzeb) to rally the Maratha and other Deccan powers, along with dissatisfied Mughal officials, against his father. Within a decade, the Mughals had succeeded in killing Shambaji (Shivaji’s son) and propped up his grandson under queen regent Yesu Bai. 13 Opposition continued under Shivaji’s brother, Rajaram; and afterwards, under the latter’s son, Shivaji II. In short, the Maratha polity was unstable from 1680, and the settlement which extended into the 1700s followed the line of Shivaji’s grandson with concession given to the Rajaram faction (that of Shivaji’s brother) to appease the latter.14 Hence, Shambaji’s offensives, though menacing, were intermittent; the Portuguese were saved by their other vacillating enemy, the Mughals.

The effects of Maratha raids, however limited, were felt by the Estado. From documents of sessions of the Conselho do Estado at Goa, it is clear that the Province of the North also apparently came under attack by the Marathas.15 An entry authorised the fifty-sixth governor (D. Francisco de Távora) in his capacity as general of the Straits and Ormuz to mount an amphibious operation to aid Chaul.16

Viceroy D. Francisco de Távora’s other external ventures included attempts to re-establish a commercial link with Japan. He also sought the help of a fidalgo (nobleman) to initiate friendly relations

35 with Cambodia, Siam and Cochin China. This is substantiated by documents of sessions of the Conselho do Estado at Goa in which the count met up with the Junta of Missions (Junta dos Missões) to discuss the augmentation of the padroado real (royal patronage over the church), as well as to exclude French clerics from those lands.17

The Count of Alvor’s term in office was also marked by the beginning of serious contemplation of shifting the capital from Goa to Mormugão (see appendix D map 1) because of the increased unsuitability of Goa. A voting session of the Conselho do Estado at Goa that took place in January 1684 in the fort of São Tiago on the island revealed all were in support of the move.18 Meanwhile, internal dissensions began to erupt – the clashes between different religiosos (members of monastic orders) came to a head during the viceroyalty of D. Pedro António de Noronha de Albuquerque, Count of Vila Verde (r. 1692-98), when it was decided that artillery pieces had to be mounted in convents! A session in June 1693 made a decision to “denaturalise” (i.e. expel) a padre (priest) for causing scandals and unrest (inquietude).19

While the governorships of D. Rodrigo da Costa (1686-90) and D. Miguel de Almeida (1690-91) were barely documented in the Assentos, the succession of D. António Luís Gonçalves da Câmara Coutinho (1698-1701), following the term of D. Pedro António de Noronha de Albuquerque (1671-77), once again shifted the attention of Goa abroad to the western part of the Estado da Índia. D. Rodrigo did authorise an expedition of socorro (aid) to Mombasa and engage the neighbouring local entities, as is indicated in a session of the Conselho de Estado at Goa in October 1688.20 The episode of the loss of Mombasa is amply covered by Boxer’s and Strandes’ studies.21 To sum up in relation to Mombasa, Boxer and Strandes

36 are in broad agreement about the numbers involved on the Portuguese side – 2,500 (Strandes) to 3,000 (Boxer) – Boxer’s total includes 2,500 armed men and 1,500 armed natives (Swahilis), while Strandes’ figure of 2,500 armed troops includes “others” (including women!), and his figure of 1,500 armed natives again includes “others”. They again differ slightly over the number of Portuguese in the fort: Strandes says there were more than 50 Portuguese soldiers and officers, while Boxer claims there were fewer than 100.22 Among some of the native participants and allies, evidence points to their frequently changing loyalties during the siege. As for the conduct of the enemy, Strandes writes that assaults of the fort were undertaken in an “undisciplined” way, devoid of “any knowledge or equipment of the science of war of siege”.23 The Portuguese had the opportunity of being re-supplied twice, but the situation continued to deteriorate over the period of three years. Both Boxer and Strandes also agree that there was a lack of “initiatives” and “decisive actions” on both sides. 24 Strandes appears to attribute the main causes of the Portuguese failure to the lack of leadership, especially in the relief force, and more to an underlying systemic failure, while for Boxer, the general ineptness of the Portuguese is the key issue, given they had been established there for a century.25 Boxer also attributes the problem to the misplaced strategy of the viceroy at Goa – namely the ineffective deterrence of the enemy in the Persian Gulf.26 Strandes thinks that the “constant bickering and wrangling” among leaders, among other lesser reasons, was a contributory factor. This was seen, for example, in the rivalry between the fidalgo commander of the relief fleet, Luis de Mello Sampaio, and the lieutenant-captain of sailor origin, Joseph Pereira de Brito. 27 In trying to explain the outcome, and perhaps to show that every effort had been made to save Mombasa, Viceroy D. António da Câmara Coutinho gave the losses as 1,000 Portuguese and 10,000 natives killed. The actual

37 figures for casualties, inferred from their original strength, must have been much lower. There was an attempt to relieve Mombasa when news of the catastrophe arrived in Lisbon – an expedition of 900 men, including qualified engineers and a siege-train, was dispatched. However, this was wrecked by bad weather after assembling at Aguada and the project was then abandoned. Nevertheless, both Boxer and Strandes are still full of praise of the ‘endurance’ and ‘spirit’ by which the defenders had dragged out the siege. The desperate attempt to revive commerce in the area of Mozambique was also never far from the minds of members of the Council of State at Goa.28

A survey of further documents of sessions of the Conselho do Estado at Goa reveals that there was a constant preoccupation with securing adequate finance for manning defence. During the tenure of D. Francisco de Távora (1681-86), the special committee of the Three Estates at Goa (Junta dos Tres Estados, representing, as it did the three estates of nobility, clergy and commoners in the metropolis) had to be convened to raise additional extraordinary sums. This was in addition to loans from religiosos and extractions from various other dues. At one point, concerns about manpower were also rife, and prisoners from Goa were offered the chance of freedom in exchange for participation in the wars. The cause of the inadequacy of manpower was raised in one session and blamed on “rising inflation”.29

In the metropolis during this time, despite efforts in the glass, textile and iron industries, the failure of the push for industrialisation driven by the fourth Count of Ericeira led to the indefinite postponement of this program. The fate of the attempted industrialisation was sealed

38 when, at the turn of the eighteenth century, the first trickle of gold began arriving from Brazil obviated the need for reform.30

Constraints A number of structural constraints inhibited the Portuguese enterprise in the East. Travel between the centre and the Estado was determined by the seasonal winds of the tropics. Leaving Lisbon, “India-bound vessels sailed south to Madeira and then were carried by north-east and Canary current”.31 From there,

they headed south-east and south from Cape Verde and swept westwards to avoid the doldrums and towards the coast of Pernambuco south of Cape São Roque. Then, they picked up the Atlantic gyre and Brazil current. The south-east trades carried them further west to about 20° south when they picked up the southern westerly which would carry them east- south-east round the .32

From there, the ship had the option of sailing through the Mozambique Channel, up along the coast of East Africa and east to India, or of sailing north-east from the south of Madagascar, then north-east and finally, east to India. Both routes relied on the southwest monsoon, which blows from May to September, to take them to India. Returning ships “more or less sailed their outward route in reverse as far as the Cape of Good Hope”, catching the north-east monsoon which blows from October to April. After the Cape, ships reverted to the south-easterlies which carried them north-west up to the equator. Here, “vessels were subsequently compelled to tack because of north-easterly winds. Then, the high pressure system would take them to the Azores”.33 En route home,

39 stopovers also included Santa Helena and Mozambique. The Azores and Santa Helena would increasingly give way to ports in Brazil in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was also not unknown for a ship to travel non-stop between Lisbon and Goa.34

In sailing to Goa, a ship would normally leave in the second half of March or first half of April, and would take about six to seven months to reach its destination. The return journey would take about the same time after roughly a four-month stay at Goa, with a ship reaching Lisbon in August or September the following year.35

Goa was not always the final destination for ships leaving Lisbon. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the few vessels sailing further for Macao or Timor would leave Goa in April or May. They would usually make a stop at Melaka and, if everything went smoothly, would arrive at Macao in June or August. Those going to Timor would still stop at Melaka, but leave for the place only in January of the following year, and take a month to sail to their destination. As for a ship coming back from Banda, a vessel returning from Timor probably departed in July and was back in Melaka by August. On the way, the ship could also stop at Batavia (headquarters of the Dutch VOC on the island of Java). For ships which did not have to return to Goa, they could also sail directly via the Sunda Straits for the Cape of Good Hope. At Melaka, as with ships from Macao, vessels would stay and wait to sail until the following January, and reach Goa in about mid-March. All in all, the extra leg beyond Goa took roughly another year. Naturally, there were variations in the time spent on such voyages and these could vary wildly, especially if the ships failed to catch the monsoons.36

40 Aside from distance, time and climatic conditions, communications with the Estado were also constrained by the technology available. There were significant scientific and technological developments in a number of relevant areas in the first half of the eighteenth century. This was the case, for example, with the search for longitude. Though the general principles of longitude were sufficiently well understood by the early eighteenth century, difficulties associated with its practical application were not resolved until well after 1750.37 In relation to ship design, the division and number of sails (in other words, the rigging) on ships were refined and became more complicated. Though it is harder to trace developments in hull design, one of the most important, by far, was the sheathing of the ship’s hull. Although copper sheathing had been suggested as early as 1708, the first serious experiment on an English ship only took place in 1761.38 With regard to Portuguese ships, there has been much discussion about their nature and design. Discussion initially revolved the vessel known as the “nau”. Although it is possible to distinguish between a nau and a galleon in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, and between a nau and a fragata () in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, in practice, that distinction was often blurred.39 The issue of ship type vis-à-vis its size is an issue of interest which overlaps with the broader trend in ship development and can be used to prove that the Portuguese were not retarded in this area during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Portuguese “Indiamen” (essentially carracks and galleons) before 1570 seldom exceeded 1,000 tons. During the Habsburg period (1580-1640), their tonnage is said to have spiralled “out of control”, reaching up to 2,000 tons.40 Parallel developments indicate that, as warships began to be differentiated from merchantmen during the course of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries. However, English East Indiamen defied this trend – they continued

41 to increase in size and armament. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, they displaced up to 1,500 tons, and carried as many as forty guns in a reaction to piratical activities and a continually hostile environment in the Indian Ocean. For comparative purposes, in 1650 a three-decker English ship-of-the-line was approximately 1,500 tons and only increased towards 2,000 tons by 1750.41 Portuguese experiments and their subsequent emulation of Dutch and English advances resulted in smaller and sleeker ship designs in the Restoration and post-Restoration period, as Ames and Monteiro have pointed out. 42 If the nau was not specifically distinguishable in the eighteenth century, the English case demonstrates that changes in the size of Indiamen were not necessarily an inferior development. Moreover (as will be discussed in chapter 4), the Portuguese did have ships-of-the-line (of more than seventy guns) going to the Indian Ocean, and a distinction was made for fragatas in cases where a fleet was assembled. In terms of the speed of the ship, Indiamen invariably travelled more slowly than a frigate or comparable ship-of-the-line, but it should be stressed that the initial design had given priority to cargo maximization. 43 Nevertheless, improving roteiros (sailing directions) probably continued to reduce the length of journeys, albeit in a miniscule way. Even so, incremental improvements should not be discounted because in 1817, heavily-laden English Indiamen astonished the world by sailing from the Canton River to the English Channel in a little over three months!44 On other aspects, as Parry indicates, there was little change on board ship for on sailing vessels, “sails, spars, boats and anchors [continued] to be manhandled with the help of elementary mechanical devices” (even in the nineteenth century).45 To sum up, although Portuguese experiments with Indiamen did not turn out well, they made improvements and caught up with developments in warships.

42

Whatever state of technology upon which a naval vessel is built to no guarantee of its safe passage because the latter is dependent on an array of factors. It is not clear whether shipwrecks became more severe in the first half of the eighteenth century.46 In view of the incomplete nature of records of the general letters of the Casa da ĺndia, where gaps have been noted from the 1710s to the 1730s, a more exhaustive source is required to uncover the exact number of ships dispatched, and ship wrecks.47 One entry specifically mentions a “burning ship” in Bahia around 1739.48 At other times, the letters make mention of “not having news from India for the previous year(s)”. In terms of classification, the general term “nau” was used except in cases where a smaller auxiliary vessel such as, a patache or churra was involved. In terms of departure and home-coming, ships left Lisbon mostly in March or April. The evidence indicates that ships returning from Goa usually left in the months of December and January. In terms of ships leaving from Lisbon, the timing given in the Casa’s letters fitted with the norms (i.e., departure in March or April) described at the beginning of this section. However, it seems from the letter that ships on the return journey tended to leave a little earlier (i.e., as early as December compared to the months of January or February quoted in Russell-Wood).49

At the heart of the issue is whether distance really did matter to communication and control in the early modern period. Beyond certain advancements, developments in ship technology were not able to overcome the problem of distance for some time to come. However, this was a constant with all the other operators in a given theatre. The enormity of delays in communications is well illustrated in the following. Given Philip II of Spain’s attention to, and investment in, the courier system in Europe and the Spanish empire,

43 the urgent news of his succession to the Crown of Portugal in 1580 was delivered via an overland courier to Ormuz before being taken on board a ship for Goa. The news took ten months to get to Goa, a little more than a year to reach Melaka, and one year and four months to reach Macao. 50 The overland courier arrangements already in place lapsed for a few years upon João V’s succession, although the secretary of state reinvigorated the system to facilitate communications in later years.51 Given that India had second priority, and on top of the constraints of the time, messages probably continued to take six months or more to reach their destinations during the first half of the eighteenth century.

Context of Empire When viewed on its own, the Portuguese East may not convey the full dynamics of the Portuguese overseas empire. There was no doubt that voyages to Brazil, or more precisely, those linked to the Atlantic trade, were capturing the attention of many of the available carriers and naval resources of Portugal. The rise of Brazil was already apparent in the half century before 1700. The Brazil fleet returning to in 1718 numbered sixteen naus. In 1720, the returning Brazil fleet consisted of 28 ships. In 1725, 34 ships from Brazil were registered.52 Another indicator to support this trend is the extent of emigration. Even in years of depression in the late 1670s, at least eighty peasants continued to embark annually for the New World. Ten years later, nearly 2,000 men headed for the West when signs of recovery were beginning to manifest themselves in the 1680s.53

In terms of commercial exchange, trade between the western and eastern parts of the Portuguese empire was tacitly understood to be closed from the beginning. This was due to the need to protect the

44 Crown monopoly and its benefits. After an initial period of settlement and cultivation (of sugar), a more sophisticated system of administration was put in place in Brazil only in the 1540s-1570s. In 1594, the increased hostilities with other Europeans prompted the Habsburgs to ban navigation and commerce from the East to the West of the Portuguese empire then under its control. Painstaking steps were taken to curb foreign and unauthorised Portuguese access – prohibited goods were to be confiscated, those involved could face banishment or even the death penalty; for their part, informers would receive half of the goods seized as a reward.54 In the immediate post-Restoration period in the 1670s, trade between Brazil (and Portugal) and Mozambique was freed up. However, up to the period covered by this thesis – that is, 1707-50 – the debate involving the wisdom and benefits of this measure continued to plague two generations of kings and his councils and advisers. Up until the end of the reign of João V, Mozambique was considered to be subsidiary and subordinated to the Estado da ĺndia. 55 One concern was whether the introduction of trade from Brazil would deprive Goa of the trade in ivory and gold that it increasingly needed. The other concern was over the loss of revenue that the Casa da ĺndia would suffer. The counter-argument was that the increased trade between Brazil and Mozambique, and possibly even with India, would be more beneficial than harmful for the Estado. In relation to the affected revenues of the Casa da ĺndia, a governor of Brazil proposed that Brazilian goods be purchased at a certain cost price and sold at a margin of profit to reimburse the Casa. Nevertheless, pessimists, such as those sitting on the Junta do Tobaco (Junta of Tabacco), remained skeptical about the reciprocal benefits of the exchange to Brazil.56 Evidence from an entry of March 1721 relating to Brazil in the collection of the Casa de Cadaval indicates a concern over the flow of commodities dispatched to the dominions. Concern

45 was also expressed about an overlap in jurisdiction between the Conselho da Fazenda and responsibility of the Casa da ĺndia. The view was that, in the absence of decision by the king on the matter, a certificate would be sufficient, hand-in-hand with checks by the guarda-mor (chief guard). Meanwhile, contractors (in other words, tax farmers) were to be diligent and ensure the proper collection of the dues and taxes granted to them.57

In the eighteenth century, it is said that “the Crown continued to be more liberal” – a law of November 1709 permitted viceroys and governors to be involved in trade activities “under certain relaxations”, while a resolution of March 1734 allowed Portuguese ships sailing from the Estado to sell their merchandise at Bahia. In the latter case, ships involved had to pay a ten per cent customs tax, as well as a security deposit (to the Casa da ĺndia at Lisbon).58

In his Golden Age of Brazil, Boxer describes how the triangular trade of 1695-1750 between the metropole, Brazil and Angola in west Africa involved manufactured products from Portugal and Europe, African commodities, and goods from India. The main two main commodities from Angola were slaves and ivory. 59 From Brazil, sugar had ceased to be a main product after the hike and slump in prices in the third quarter of the seventeenth century. After 1680, tobacco began to emerge as a main export from Brazil, in tandem with the recovery of the world economy. 60 Aside from tobacco, woods, hides and precious metals from Brazil were also traded.61 Exchange might be carried on in any direction. Goods from India like cloth and spices came partly from mounting smuggling activities, as well as through authorised traders. The heavy duties on the trade went to maintain the garrisons and pay the salaries of the officials, as well as to provide subsidies to the clergy.62

46

The discovery of precious metal and minerals in Brazil and its contribution to the metropole is worthy of mention here. For a start, it should be noted that not all of Portuguese Brazil was thriving equally. In the province of Maranhão-Pará, Pará was relatively prosperous while Maranhão was struggling. Paraiba was “booming and povertised” at one and the same time as well.63 In the area of Ceará, sugar production was abundant; yet back payments to its soldiers persisted.64

A survey of documents on Brazil in the collection of the Casa de Cadaval reveals that officials from Brazil petitioned the centre on issues roughly similar to those received from India – on the desertion of soldiers, on not raising enough money (from sugar production) to pay for soldiers, and on coordination with padres who were entrusted with local defence. 65 Throughout the eighteenth century, the production of gold in Brazil is said to have amounted to one hundred million pounds sterling, from which Lúcio de Azevedo estimates the Crown took 22 of a hundred of a fraction. As for diamonds, an equivalent of nine million pounds sterling was produced. After 1750, however, the output of gold and diamonds was drastically reduced. Cortesão has estimated that for the reign of João V, the Crown reaped eleven million pounds from the “royal fifth” and from capitations from a total of one hundred million pounds of minerals produced. 66 Overall, the benefits of the wealth to metropolitan Portugal were not all that clear. While it boosted the personal extravagance of João V and his pet religious projects, as well as some grandiose public works, the progress and “modernisation” of the state was not appreciably advanced.67 The reasons for the less than effective exploitation of this windfall, and for the failure of

47 industrialisation in the second half the seventeenth century, lie in a web of complex causes that are beyond the scope of this thesis.

What is of concern to this thesis are the effects and resulting linkages for India of the rise of Brazil. Despite the prevailing logic and other evidence (discussed in the earlier section on Portugal to 1700), instances involving both continents (i.e., that of south America and the sub-continent of India) sometimes lead one to re-question the priority given to India. In one instance cited by Boxer during the viceroyalty in India of the Count of Assumar, a decision was made to send aid from the centre to India when simultaneous troubles also erupted in a region of the Americas; this affected the reinforcements which were supposed to head for Sacramento.68 In another instance concerning a debate to open up trade from Brazil to India dated in February 1700, a governor of Bahia raised the prospect that Lisbon could dispense with the costs of regular reinforcements to India if it was willing to free up trade in the ports of Bahia, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro. There were, as he said, many “idlers” and “wanderers”, nobles and other poor there who were “ready and desirous” of serving in India. In addition, at the time of writing, the governor reported that he had “four colonels, each having 900 to one thousand men”, who could be sent to India on a rotating basis. More importantly, he declared, these could be paid for by revenues generated from trade, if it was liberalised. Furthermore, the trip from Brazil to India would take only three months, which would reduce the number of deaths and sick arriving there. This would translate into savings for royal revenue, even if the Crown had to pay for expenses in the first place.69 In yet another instance of a proposal to send aid to the Estado in the 1690s, merchants from Salvador made a similar offer to pay not only for troops, but also for the cost of clothing them if the governor-general would take up their petition.70 In an unusual

48 example of an actual military contribution, Shirodkar, quoting from Pissurlencar, writes of a ‘Joan of Arc’ from Brazil who disguised herself as a male, and fought against the Bounsulos in military campaigns in India during 1705-06, just prior to D. João V’s ascension to the throne!71 Increasingly, ships voyaging to India were also being built in Brazil. During the viceroyalty of the Count of Galveas (1735-49), for example, an order was made for the construction in the ribeira (dockyard) of Salvador of a nau with 60 artillery pieces that was to sail in the Carreira da ĺndia. In this case, the cost was also to be defrayed from the donativo real (donation to the king) and the royal fifth raised from gold production in Bahia. Calculations from a historian of Brazil reveal that of at least thirty ocean-going vessels built in the Bahian shipyards between 1665 and 1822, “at least fourteen saw service on routes to Asia”.72

Turning the tables, it is now time to consider what impact India had on Brazil. Attempts were made to transfer Indian skills and crops to Brazil relatively early on, although the results were equivocal. The initiatives for this can be traced to as early as 1588, when Philip II asked for the viceroy of India to send settler-weavers to Brazil because “there were good prospects in cotton materials which could be made into sails there”. 73 Such a conception was proposed secretly during the reign of João V’s father (the main protagonist of Ames’ renaissance) with the aim of making Portugal a “considerable” economic power. The plan called for spice plants such as cinnamon, clove, pepper, nutmeg and ginger “to be procured with great care” and sent to the governor of Brazil.74 This was given its first trial at the beginning of 1680, and was pursued by at least two viceroys. At a later date, expert cultivators were also dispatched from India to Brazil. The first wave of ships which brought the plants there were not to sail freely to any other ports and were “to be brought back” to

49 Portugal if they were found “roaming”. 75 The secrecy is understandable when one considers how Portugal’s fortunes might have been revived (in a period of crisis) if the plan had been successful. Despite Dutch control of the Maluku islands, Portugal would have regained its role as arbiter of these valuable commodities, as well as the markets for them.76

Towards the end of seventeenth century, the proportion of Brazil’s share in colonial commerce had gradually become so important that one source even asserts that the Junta do Tobaco actually controlled Portugal’s trade with India.77 While India never came to be so run down, the idea of using Brazil to boost the wealth and status of the king and state of Portugal was a realistic measure to adopt. As one recent study has revealed, Luis da Cunha advocated in a memorandum of 1735-36 that the king take on the title of emperor and move to Rio de Janeiro so that an

integrated empire with European, American, African and Asian components hand-in-hand with an articulated commercial network of supply and demand involving the Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean and seas of East Asia.78 could materialise. João V, however, did not take up the idea; consequently, as a talented member of the Overseas Council prophesised before his death in 1732, Brazil, which would “weigh far more heavily than [Portugal]”, would “not consent to be ruled by the smaller and poorer”.79

It would appear, then, that despite some evidence for the stabilisation and even revival of Portugal and its empire, the latter

50 part of Pedro II’s reign seems to have stagnated or slipped back into some decline, especially in India. From a more holistic perspective though, India need not be seen in isolation, nor need it be seen as a backwater. While the relative reality of the riches and importance of Brazil cannot be denied, the Portuguese empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a cosmopolitan empire, and there were ample opportunities for interaction and mutual benefits. Given the distance and other limitations of the early modern period, the continued survival of the Portuguese enterprise was an admirable feat, despite the lack of progress in many places. The dynamics of that effort will be discussed in detail in the next few chapters.

51 Endnotes

1 For an overview of the Restoration, see for instance, J.V. Serrão, História de Portugal (Póvoa de Varzim), part I. 2 G. J. Ames, Renascent Empire (Amsterdam, 2000), pp. 39-58 and 93-148. 3 Ibid., p. 116. 4 Ibid., p. 119. 5 Ibid., pp. 93-148. 6 See reviews of this book by J. Lorimer in The Canadian Journal of History (2002), p. 601; M. Pearson in The International History Review (Sep 2001), pp. 657-59, and S. Subrahmanyam in The American Historical Review (Dec 2001), pp. 1756-57. 7 E. de Sousa Barros, “Negocios de Tanta Importancia : O Conselho Ultramarino e a disputa pela condução da Guerra no Atlântico e no ĺndico (1643-1661)”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2004. 8 Ibid., pp. 60-80, 140-82 and 314-337. 9 Aside from disparate works listed following this narration, the most comprehensive treatment is contained in a brief analysis to 1720 by V. M. Godinho, “Portugal and Her Empire” in J. Bromley (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History VI (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 509-39. 10 His son, D. João V’s long rule stretched over 43 years. Linked to an illegitimate offshoot of the founder of the Avis dynasty, the Bragança family had been a plausible source of contention for the throne, it was ostracized, and even exiled for suspicion of treason during D. João II’s reign (1481- 95). 11 A.E. Martins Zuquete, Tratados de Todos os Vice-Reis e Governadores da India (Lisbon, 1962), pp. 163-69. 12 P. P. Shirodkar, “Development of Military Services in Goa during Portuguese Regime 1510- 1750” in Researches in Indo-Portuguese History II (Jaipur, 1998), pp. 57-60. 13 J. Richards, New Cambridge History of India –The Mughals (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 217-224. 14 S. Gordon, New Cambridge History of India –The Marathas (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 95-112. 15 Conselho do Estado – administrative body, akin to Council of State at home, advising the viceroy. 16P. S. Pissurlencar, Assentos do Conselho do Estado IV 1659-95 (Goa, 1956), document 157. Here after, referred to as ACEG. 17ACEG IV, document 154. 18ACEG IV, document 160. 19ACEG IV, document 168. 20ACEG IV, document 164. 21 See C. R. Boxer and C. de Azevedo, Fort Jesus and the Portuguese in Mombasa (London, 1960); J. Strandes, The Portuguese Period in East Africa (Nairobi, 1968). 22 Boxer and Azevedo, Portuguese in Mombasa, pp. 60-61; Strandes, Portuguese in East Africa, pp. 215 and 235. 23 Ibid. 52

24 Boxer and Azevedo, Portuguese in Mombasa, p. 72; Strandes, Portuguese in East Africa, p. 236. 25 Ibid. 26 Boxer and Azevedo, Portuguese in Mombasa, p. 72. 27 Strandes, Portuguese in East Africa, p. 236. On similar problems linked to the social and professional origins of naval appointments in Spain, see D. Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 1589-1665 (Cambridge, 1997), especially chapter 7. 28ACEG, document 166. 29ACEG, documents 155, 158, 159, 162 and 163. 30See Godinho, “Portugal and Her Empire”, pp. 509-39. See also Oliveira Marques, I (New York, 1972), pp. 379-93. 31 A. J. R. Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire – A World on the Move (Baltimore, 1998), p. 35. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., in addition, pp. 36 and 37. 34 C.R. Boxer, “Carreira da India” in C.R. Boxer (ed.), From Lisbon to Goa (Aldershot, 1984), I, pp. 55-56. 35 Ibid. 36 Russell-Wood, A World on the Move, pp. 37-39. 37 J. H. Parry, Trade and Dominion (London, 1971), pp. 222-25. One of the methods for establishing the local and standard meridian time of an astronomical event, for example, was that of measuring the moon’s position and distance; tabulation tables were submitted and tests carried out in the 1750s. Competition from the clock-makers resulted in a watch-type chronometer being submitted to the British Board of Longitude in 1761. 38Ibid., pp. 208-11. 39C. R. Boxer, “The Carreira da India” in C. R. Boxer, From Lisbon to Goa (Aldershot, 1984), p. 34. In “Navigation between Portugal and Asia in 16th and 17th Centuries” in C.K. Pullapilly et al (eds.) Asia and the West – Encounters and Exchanges (Notre Dame, 1986), p. 9, T.B. Duncan is more specific about the classification; it is the users who are non shipping list compilers who “use the word in its generic sense, referring to any ship whatever. 40 See Ames, Renascent Empire, chapter V and S. Monteiro, “Decline and Fall of Portuguese Sea Power” in The Journal of Military History 65, 1 (2000), pp. 9-22. 41 J. L. George, History of Warships (Annapolis, 1998), p. 52. See also A. Lambert, War at Sea in the Age of Sail (London, 2000), chapter 2. 42Ames, Renascent Empire, chapter V and Monteiro, “Decline and Fall of Portuguese Sea Power”, pp. 9-22. 43 Parry, Trade and Dominion, p. 214. 44Ibid. 45Ibid.

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46 Duncan, “Navigation between Portugal and Asia”, p. 12. According to the month in which the ship left for the East, Duncan quotes figures reflecting a surprisingly high incidence of arrival at destination – above 80% (departure in February and March), 64% (departure in April). 47AAL, 47, Cartas Gerais que vão / vem da India, survey of, ff. 15r-90v. 48AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais…, ff. 86r-v. 49AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais…, ff. 15r-90v. 50G. Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (London, 1998), p. 50. 51J. Veríssimo Serrão, História de Portugal V (Póvoa de Varzim, 1982), p. 364. 52Ibid., pp. 398-401. 53C. R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil (Manchester, 1995), pp. 10 and 239. The author quoted the figures from the Anais da Biblioteca Nacional de Rio de Janeiro and an overseas council memorial published in the Revista do Historico e Geografico Brasileiro. 54P. Shirodkar, “Brazil and India – Centuries Old Contact” in P. Shirodkar (ed.), Researches in Indo-Portuguese History (Jaipur, 1998), p. 138. The Spanish Crown took similar measure to keep out non-Iberian Europeans as well. 55 After two unsuccessful attempts during D. Manuel I and D. Sebastião to separate commands in the Indian Ocean into three regions i.e. India, east Africa and east of Melaka. 56Shirodkar, “Brazil and India – Centuries Old Contact”, pp. 141-52. 57V. Rau and M. F. da Silva, Os Manuscritos do Arquivo da Casa da Cadaval respeitantes ao Brasil, II (, 1955), document 391. Here after, referred to as MCCB. 58 Shirodkar, “Brazil and India –Contact”, pp. 152-53. 59Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, p. 25. 60Hanson, Economy and Society in Baroque Portugal, pp. 215-217 and 239-240. 61Russell-Wood, World on the Move, table on p. xxxii 62 Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, pp. 26-27, 155-156, 294, 300 and 321. 63 Ibid., p. 299. 64Ibid., pp. 26-27, 155-156, 294, 300 and 321. 65MCCB, documents 380-81 and 386. 66Cited in Serrão, História de Portugal V, p. 312. 67 Ibid, pp. 312-13. 68Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, pp. 26-27, 155-156, 294, 300 and 321. 69P. Shirodkar, “Brazil and India – Centuries Old Contact”, pp. 143-44. 70A. J. R. Russell-Wood, “Brazilian Commercial Presence beyond Cape of Good Hope” in P. Malekandathil and J. Mohammed (eds.), Portuguese, Indian Ocean and European Bridgeheads (Tellicherry, 2001), p. 196. 71Shirodkar, “Brazil and India –Centuries Old Contact”, p. 146. 72Russell-Wood, “Brazilian Commercial Presence beyond Cape of Good Hope”, p. 198. 73Shirodkar, “Brazil and India –Centuries Old Contact”, p. 138. 74 Ibid., pp. 142-43. 75Ibid. 54

76Ibid. 77 Russell-Wood, “Brazilian Commercial Presence beyond Cape of Good Hope”, p. 196. 78Ibid., p. 191. Duncan in “Navigation between Portugal and Asia”, p. 17, is of similar opinion, this coincided with phase IV of his analysis. 79Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, p. 325. The council member was António Rodrigues da Costa. Boxer apparently showed much admiration for this figure, calling him a “true prophet” for his prediction.

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CHAPTER 3

LEADERSHIP FROM LISBON TO GOA

The previous chapter provided a brief background for the period immediately preceding the time frame of this study. This chapter will start out exploring the general political setting and apparatus of Portugal in the early Baroque period. In terms of the Overseas Council, its developments (especially 1707-50), make-up and administrative functions will be taken up. As far as communications from the centre were concerned, the Crown maintained channels outside the Overseas Council to make its wishes known. In this regard, the context and importance of the instructions given to the viceroy will be discussed. Finally, the appointees, their prospects and stakes in the overseas appointments will be examined.

Early Baroque Government The study of the early modern political history of Portugal since around the 1990s has increasingly been moving away from the “absolutist” studies of D. João V, as shown by state-of-studies surveys.1 However, as Hespanha admitted in the volume of História de Portugal which he edited, the study of Portuguese history is still rather skewed towards “traditional” areas.2 In relation to the early Baroque polity, there is a tendency to subsume the politics of the Joanine period under the category of the seventeenth century or (second-half) of the eighteenth century discussions.3

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Outside Portugal, works on early modern politics have begun to take a fresh look at “traditional” areas, involving not only a critical re- examination of the idea of absolute monarchy, but the associated issues of court society, factionalism and office-holding. In this direction, works from specific local geographical areas, rather than “centre-initiated” studies, are filling gaps on the early Baroque period.4

The early Baroque court of D. João V was an emulation of the grandeur of the Versailles of Louis XIV. 5 In a re-evaluation of European courts, Adamson gives three defining criteria for a contemporary court – first, it was the “constant regular dwelling of the ruler”; secondly, it was both the actual seat of the court and departments of government; finally, it was the “venue where the ceremonial and ritual surrounding the prince could be observed”.6 In terms of the system of patronage, the court was the “nerve centre of brokerage”.7 This patronage was also intricately bound up with the shaping of factions, if these could be identified with any certainty. In this court, the king sometimes appeared “severe and unpredictable in order to emphasize his position as the supreme arbiter”. 8 Depending also on the style of leadership, the first minister might also be the fulcrum of equilibrium. When the latter was present, the king might be “isolated from political conversation with other courtiers” to a certain degree.9

Where the administration was concerned, the court was the original form of the conseil (council).10 The administration was “sometimes interwoven and sometimes running parallel” with politics and factionalism, this was definitely “a far cry from the administrative monarchy”. A minister, when appointed, had to take care to harness his own network, even if he had the grace and favour of the

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monarch. Hence, few ministers were foolhardy to attempt any reform that was too radical.11

For Portugal, the memoirs of the Count of Povolide covering the period 1707-28 reveal aspects of D. João V’s court.12 Except for occasional trips and an “impulsive urge” to travel (for example, he went to Se in 1708, was at Salvaterra in 1712, and had a strong desire to travel across several European countries incognito in 1714), the king spent much time in the palace, preoccupied with a wide variety of business. This ranged from matters relating to the royal household, high nobility, updates of war, advisory bodies and personages, to ceremonies and festivals, as well as routine matters like the seasonal departure of fleets and ships. Although factions may not be easily discerned in the memoirs, this court was an important point of brokerage in that merĉes, marriages of the aristocracy and pardons were granted there. The unpredictability of the king was at times exhibited through the exclusion of certain nobles, for example, the exclusion from court of the Marquises of Niza and Cascaes. This was sometimes expedited through the secretary of state, as on the occasion in December 1726 when more than a dozen nobles were “banished”.13

In terms of the emergence of first ministers in Europe in the period 1600-60, Berenger raised the idea in a seminal article in 1974 where he attributed the rise of this trend to the “growing complexity of the early modern state”.14 The discussion has evolved since – the rise of this first minister was also observed to coincide with the ascendancy of favourites in European courts; hence, the term “minister-favourite”. While issues remain unresolved, the periodisation has gradually extended fifty years backwards to cover a time frame from 1560- 1650, coined as the century of the minister-favourite.15

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A system inclined towards the use of a few personal aides or ministers naturally skewed the type of information reaching the king according to what these confidants deemed to be important. A more capable monarch like Philip II or Louis XIV, it seems, might still sway matters in accordance with his wishes, but even then whether the outcome conformed to their initial conception or to the interest of the state was an entirely different issue. What can be ascertained from the memoirs of Povolide is that, by 1725, the count recorded that the king had not met his Council of State for a long time, even though (aged) members continued to be sitting on it in 1726. In addition, certain tribunals like the Overseas Council had not had a president appointed since the (old) Count of São Vicente had completed his three-year term in 1714.16

The Council of State was created in 1563 as a central organ of high policy. Except probably for the initial period of its creation, the Avis kings had retained extra-conciliar avenues, and thereafter had added other channels by which policy decisions were deliberated. The experimentation with the secretarial system by D. João III and D. Sebastião were instances of this. The Habsburg period saw a further layering of the system; for example, the creation of ad-hoc councils (known as juntas) to deal with particular crises whenever the occasion demanded. The Council of State seemed to have revived some of its vital functions during the Restoration, especially under Pedro II. At the same time, D. João IV also appointed a secretary of state from the inception of the new dynasty.17

In an article on the topic of early eighteenth century Portugal, an authority on eighteenth century politics and aristocracy believes that the nature of politics during the reign of Pedro II could be used to

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typify the first twenty years of Joanine politics. During this time, João V continued to rely on the conciliar bodies (and on the high nobility who served on them) to a large extent. The end of the saw the shifting to another phase in which the king relied more on favoured personages. Monteiro points the external reason for this change to the War of Spanish Succession. The war exposed the incompetence of the nobility through their conduct as military field commanders in many instances.18 Hence, the war reduced the king’s reliance on the nobility.

From the beginning of D. João V’s reign, an additional post of the Secretary of State of Dispatch of War and Public Business was created to “refine” the work undertaken by the Secretary of State of Rewards, Dispatches and Signature.19 The person who occupied this position, Diogo de Mendonça Corte-Real, gradually came to dominate many important matters pertaining to the governing of the kingdom for the first half of D. João V’s reign. As the first minister, one can assume that important matters, domestic and overseas, were channelled through him to the various councils for further follow-up.20 In the consultations of the Overseas Council, specific notes were sometimes made of the secretary’s advice into matters ranging from ecclesiastical appointments and petitions as well as the granting of licences in India and Macao.21

D. João V’s reign was deemed to be highly personal, even though Oliveira Marques assessed the king to have enlarged the bureaucracy and intelligentsia.22 Without entering into the theoretical debate about absolutism, it is sufficient to say that the adoption of the secretarial system need not necessarily equate to greater centralisation. 23 The two developments need not be contradictory because João V’s base of consultation could have narrowed at the

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apex while the middle and lower administration expanded simultaneously to facilitate the execution of orders and policies. P.S. Martinez affirmed in his História Diplomática de Portugal that the “personalised” nature of D. João’s rule left his son with “little” instrument for government.24

Deeply religious and spiritual, D. João followed the French system of employing cardinals as ministers, although there were times when the king had his differences with Rome.25 Hence, the Cardinal da Cunha, who was serving as president of the Council of State, was addressed as the first minister in the memoirs of Povolide for 1714.26 More than that, the cardinal was also referred as a valido (favourite); this signified that he belonged to the small circle of trusted confidants of the king.27 Other religious personages, in whom D. João V placed his trust, were João da Mota e Silva and Gaspar de Encarnação. The Cardinal da Mota took over as first minister from 1736 and was entrusted with even more responsibilities after João V failed to recover fully from an epileptic stroke in 1742. Fr. Gaspar, uncle of the fifth Marquis of Gouveia, was said to have risen to power through his close relations with an illegitimate son of João V. Apart from Diogo de Mendonça, Cardinal da Mota and Fr. Gaspar were cast in a bad light for their period in office.28 In the subsidios for D. João V’s reign, the correspondence with Cardinal da Mota, as expected, touched on dealings with foreign courts, conferment in appointments and merĉes, overseas matters pertaining to aid and appointments there, household business to do with the latter’s health and that of a princess, as well as the cardinal’s private consultations regarding religious matters. On India, contrary to prevailing notions that this theatre might have been marginalised, about one-third of the sampled exchanges mentioned dealings with appointments and

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rewards, as well as the dispatch of aid and fleets leaving for that particular theatre.29

In terms of emulating other areas of French ‘splendour’, it was raised earlier that D. João V had no urgent desire to carry out reforms or put in place competent officials to implement mercantilism with its associated industrialisation.30 Hence, personages like Luís da Cunha (and lesser protégés) were kept at arm’s length in ‘important’ diplomatic assignments abroad. In part, it must be remembered that favourable and unfavourable external circumstances also inhibited reforms – the discovery of gold in Brazil and the signing of Methuen Treaty with Britain.

A controversial personage who served in a personal capacity (as private secretary) to the king, but who had wide influence was Alexandre de Gusmão. His rise is of interest because he came to the court as an ‘outsider’ from a non-grandee origin in Brazil. Born in 1695 in Santos in Brazil, Alexandre was the ninth son of a minor official there. Like any father, Francisco Lourenço tried to maximize opportunities for his offspring by securing prestigious and influential godparents for them at baptism. Alexandre had a classic Jesuit education, learning subjects such as grammar and Latin, in which he excelled. An opportunity to leave Brazil to further his education brought the youth nearer to the centre of power at the age of fifteen. There, for reasons yet to be uncovered – probably a combination of the patronage of his brother, exposure to valuable contacts, and his own merit – Alexandre was chosen as a secretary to accompany the Count of Ribeira Grande to a proposed pre-Utrecht settlement. 31 This, however, did not materialise and Alexandre was sent instead on a mission to Rome for several years to participate in negotiations with the papacy.32 He probably handled this aptly, even though João

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V decided to terminate relations with Rome in 1728. In the process, he was also likely to have enhanced his skills as a negotiator.

Appointed as private secretary on his return in 1730, Alexandre’s rise was rapid. The re-eruption of Portugal’s conflict with Spain from 1735, coinciding with death of Mendonça de Corte Real a year later, saw important assignments passed to Alexandre, most notably those relating to the Portuguese-Spanish conflict in the New World, which had again been unsatisfactorily resolved at Utrecht. 33 For this assignment, Alexandre was appointed as a member of the Overseas Council, and performed splendidly in charting out the vast territories of the Americas for the purpose of negotiation. The Treaty of Madrid, orchestrated largely by Alexandre, especially after the death of Cardinal da Mota, and whose terms laid the geographical boundary of present-day Brazil brought to a closure the problems that had arisen as a result of an unsatisfactory arbitration by the Pope in 1493, and in 1494 (under the Luso-Castilian ).

Despite the king’s bouts of depression, an eminent authority on Portuguese studies tries to convince that D. João V was not a “drooling bigot” before his critical illness.34 Almost as pretentious and extravagant as D. Sebastião, D. João V at least possessed some of the characteristics of Sebastião’s more capable uncle, Philip II, that is, he was hardworking. The same expert talked about this as a king trying to tighten control; hence, this generated a lot of paperwork in, for example, colonial matters, from the “high policy of viceroys to petitions of obscure widows”.35 The Overseas Council’s complaint in 1724 of overwhelming paperwork confirms this.36

Returning to the subject of the minister-favourite in conjunction with what has been discussed so far about the aides of João V, they fitted

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some of the pre-requisites discussed in Elliott and Brockliss’ edited book, even though the first half of the eighteenth century was deemed to be a ‘non-century’ as far as this kind of patronage went. D. João V made use of persons who came from non-traditional (i.e., non-grandee), as well as traditional sources (i.e., the councils, although at times, a ‘non-traditional’ personage, like Alexandre, might be appointed to a formal body where expedience required it). They took care of business of the court and state. Even for a small country like Portugal, there was an attempt at transformation into a modern state, and minister-favourites helped with the demands of this (although the present assessment of Portugal’s effort in this direction is often unfavourable 37 ). Nevertheless, other than the tenure of Castelo-Melhor under the reign of João V’s uncle (Afonso VI), a first minister would not appear in Portugal until the appointment of Pombal in the reign of João’s son, José I.

In the context of a maturing early modern government, it is noteworthy that an area of interest was not given up at the whim of the king, but was instead weighed according to the cost-benefit outcomes and other calculations it might bring to the state. It is also pertinent, at this stage, to ask what constituted matters of high policy? At the turn of the seventeenth century, the preoccupation of a typical European Crown and court entourage was still, to a large extent, with dynastic claims and issues of territories as well as loyalty values enmeshed with the former. A further distinction to be made is that diplomatic matters of continental Europe were seen separately from colonial business. Colonial business was secondary, at least at the beginning of seventeenth century. However, given elite participation in the top echelons of government and the increasing resource and economic stakes involved, colonial matters were slowly

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getting their share in matters of high policy past the mid-eighteenth century.38

For the Portuguese in India, the collection of beachheads and tracts of territory that made up the “empire” had ceased to be lucrative even before the Habsburg Union. The Count of Povolide recorded randomly in his memoirs instances of twin ships leaving for India and the Brazil fleet of over thirty setting out during the seasonal months in 1714, 1724 and 1725.39 Nevertheless, remnants of the records of the Casa da Índia, to be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5, show that returning naus continued to bring back a certain quantity of spices and other goods accrued to the king’s cabedal.40

In the first half of the eighteenth century, D. João V continued to style himself “by the grace of God, King of Portugal, and of Algarve, and of that beyond the sea in Africa, master of Guiné, and of the conquests, navigation and commerce of , Arabia, Persia and of India etc.”. It was a title which had changed little since the time of Manuel I.41 The use of nominal titles is linked to the “mode and system” of regime the Portuguese were able to impose on the place in question. The Portuguese continued, and attempted, to be active in areas no longer under their influence (for example, Malabar). This was either because they were crucial lifelines to the Estado da Índia or the nature of the Portuguese diarchy necessitated such intervention (for example, support for the Bishop of Cochin). The former case showed that the Portuguese were prepared to take action to salvage their nominal claims. Monteiro believes that India had slipped to being a place of nostalgia, former glory and heroism, where the reluctant nobility continued to be appointed to serve.42 Pearson called Portuguese India an opera bouffe – “still strong on titles and pomp but of no wider significance”.43 Even if (as will be

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shown later) the high nobility no longer coveted positions in India, the place remained an outlet and livelihood for the second and third tier nobility – interest groups which the king could not ignore at home. The point of discussion from the last two or three paragraphs (to be corroborated with further substantiation in the next few chapters) is that India continued to be of some use and not purely an opera bouffe.

In terms of the other interest groups in Portugal, the expansion of the administrative structure meant further reliance on the letrados. Myrup traces a typical letrado’s career before he entered service in the Overseas Council – he normally

had years of experience climbing through the ranks of Portugal’s judiciary bureaucracy, first as a juiz de fora, then subsequently as an ouvidor or a corregidor, and finally as a desembargador in a Relação in Brazil or India and later in the Casa de Suplicação. Additionally, he also often assisted the Treasury abroad serving as a provedor simultaneously.44

To a certain extent, the rise of this lettered class was ‘permitted’ at the expense of the aristocracy. For the older military families, they would still not consider anything but ambassadorial appointments, ministerial posts, or other positions of the “high robe”. On the whole, the independence afforded to D. João V from his Brazilian wealth, in addition to the “willingness” and co-option of the service nobility, reoriented the influence and position of the nobility to a more submissive role.

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One thing that was certain was that, after the first fifty years of the Restoration, new entrants into the nobility, and titles granted during what was still a period of consolidation, were limited and stabilised.45 This state of affairs would continue until the “rupture” in the Pombaline period after the mid-1700s.46 One of the main messages in an authoritative work on the aristocracy is that the high aristocracy, as is to be expected, used marriages to gain influence and wealth. In this direction, even though ecclesiastical appointments were becoming more popular, it was still preferable for daughters to be married off, as this could result in the extension or consolidation of a network. 47 Marriages were almost always arranged and the protagonists had little voice in the matter.48 No efforts were spared at attempts to preserve inheritance (of wealth or to offices) within a house. Hence, a second-born and even an illegitimate offspring was allowed to succeed to offices and wealth.49

In a survey of thirteen families of grandees on whom were conferred the title of marquis, patterns in marriage, if any, are not readily discernable in the reigning title-holder of each family. Each family tried to extend itself into whatever direction possible. The dukes of Cadaval (Melos) were linked to three families – the marquises of Asseca (Sás), Alegrete (Silvas) and Távora (Távoras). The Melos were also intimately linked to a French noble family of the rank of duke – the Lorenas. The marquises of Távora (Távoras) were linked to the marquises of Minas and Gouveia (Mascarenhas). The linkages of the other families, for example, that of the Marquis of Niza, were more disparate.50 The marginalisation of the aristocracy may have been caused by the more uncertain factionalism, as much as the style of D. João’s leadership. The multifaceted nature of the nobility, including its inter-familial linkages during D. João V’s period,

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need to be studied more broadly to better discern factionalism. This will probably require a thesis-length study by itself.

Overseas Council Closely intertwined with politics and court was the administration. The administration in the form of councils, as discussed previously, underwent an evolution during the period of D. João V. At the beginning, the administrative body dealing with overseas India handled a core of activities involving the dispatch of ships and reinforcements, trade in crown goods, staffing of the Carreira and even the Estado; and for a time, it also handled ecclesiastical and matters of (moral) conscience. However, these activities were not equally highlighted at all times; nor did their conglomeration conveniently come together with equitable importance from the beginning. In fact, the object of the above-mentioned activities did not even originate with India.

The Casa da Índia had its predecessors in the Casa da Guiné and Casa da Guiné e Mina dating from Portugal’s exploration and consolidation on the western coast of Africa.51 Probes were made into the Indian Ocean in 1498 and 1502. By the ninth expedition in 1505, the Avis court of Manuel I had decided on a viceregal system as a recourse to manage this vast and potential ‘milch cow’ area. At home, the initial business of India was dealt with under Casa da Guiné e Mina; this evolved into the Casa da Índia, Mina e Guiné (or Casa da Guiné e Índia or Casa da Mina e Índia or just the Casa da Índia).52

The fused structure housed under its roof three sub-bodies – the Casa da Índia, Casa da Guiné e Mina and Casa dos Escravos. These took charge of the commerce of India, Africa and trade in

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slaves respectively.53 Although the Portuguese landed in Brazil in 1500 and the Casa’s jurisdiction was supposed to cover this area, Portuguese America did not experience a rapid rise there in the manner of the Spanish New World. The early slave traffic was mainly directed to Portugal and its Atlantic island colonies.54 The overall leadership was assumed by the feitor from the Casa da Índia; the other two Casas only had only a treasurer, a tax-collector and a few scribes.55

The Casa da Índia, Mina e Guiné assumed a few important functions for overseas matters during the period of the Portuguese first empire. First, it took care of matters pertaining to commerce and its control. Goods traded passed through the feitorias or outposts worldwide which served as custom houses where duties were collected. Inspection of the ships was conducted before and after the loading of goods to prevent contraband. Even goods from European markets had to pass through here. In this way, links were made with the rest of the empire where the feitor was an important personage apart from the captain (of the feitoria). Secondly, the Casa acted as the king’s agent to ensure a royal monopoly. The king held the monopoly of several commodities, although these would vary over time. Lastly, in accordance with anticipated trade, the Casa was to make requests for the ships and fleets needed. In this, it was to work in close cooperation with the Armazem (or Armazem de Guiné e Índia or Armazem de Mina e Índias) headed by a provedor mor with his team of superintendents (provedores).56

Provedores undertook the actual preparation for getting the vessels ready – they looked into everything, from the wood needed for constructing the ships, personnel, food supplies and even arms required to adequately feed and defend the fleet on the journey.

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Expenses for the preparation would come from the treasury of the Casa, staffed by a vedor da fazenda, with whom the provedor worked closely.57 Judicial issues came under the Desembargo do Paço which functioned as the High Court of Appeal. The Casa had its own judicial official – the juiz da Guiné e Índia, who dealt with theft and offences committed in the Casa and Armazem. Ecclesiastical affairs came under the Mesa da Consciência e Ordens, which also took care of matters pertaining to the military orders.58

In this way, the above mode of operation continued till the union with Habsburg Spain (1580-1640) marring some brief experimentation with a secretarial system during the reigns of D. João III and D. Sebastião. Both these kings created the positions of Secretário dos Despachos e Coisas da Índia and Secretário dos Negócios e Coisas da Repartição da Índia, Mina, Guiné, Brazil e Ilhas, respectively, to handle the business of India and overseas. 59 Otherwise, crucial matters involving overseas were discussed in the Council of State.

In his PhD thesis, J. Newcombe Joyce (Jr.) traced the origins of the vicegeral and conciliar rule in Spain, as well as the evolution of the Casa, Amazem and Fazenda system in Portugal.60 Joyce deduced that the reform and creation of the Conselho da Fazenda in 1591 was not just a Spanish initiative. Instead, it reflected Portuguese continuity in the desire for change as well, even though, from a certain perspective, it was an effort by Philip II at centralisation via a readily known means – conciliar rule.61

The attempt at centralising finances pulled together several agencies under this newly formed council. The Casa Real, Casa da Moeda, Casa dos Contos, Casa da Índia e Mina and Armazem da Guiné e

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Índia, among others, came under the Treasury Council. 62 The founding regimento of 20 November 1591 designated that matters that came to the Council be classified under the sub-tribunals of “Kingdom”, “India” and “Africa and Contos”. For the scribes attached, there existed, therefore, a section of paperwork called “Repartição da Índia e Armazens” or “Repartição da Índia e Ordens”.63 Hence, the preparation and equipping of ships came under the Council via the Casa and Armazem da Índia. The records under the Casa, documenting the arrivals, departures, as well as construction of ships were unfortunately destroyed in the 1755 Earthquake in Lisbon.64

To say that centralisation was achieved by conciliar rule under the Habsburgs would be to present only a part of the picture. Owing to the inherent drawbacks of the conciliar system, the Habsburgs had evolved a “secretary of state” model as early as the reign of Philip III’s great grandfather (Charles V). Along with this trend, Philip had created a Secretary of State of India in 1600. Mendes da Luz commented that, prior to the creation of the Council of India in 1604, the incumbent secretary had exercised his responsibility competently but he was getting old.65 At the same time, Philip’s dependence on the rise of a valido-minister also compromised the councils to a certain extent.66

Despite its brief existence, the creation of the Council of India was not an exercise in futility. The council seemed to have a more eminent position compared to other councils, in accordance with the importance of overseas empire, in that it attempted to concentrate in this body “every sphere of colonial affairs – legislative, financial, judicial, military, ecclesiastical and commercial”.67

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In practice, the nineteen-point 1604 regimento of the Council of India was neither all that clear, nor would it be implemented smoothly. The Councils of India and Fazenda each made complaints against the other. In a specific incident, the councils were of different opinions as to the value of spices that were to be remitted to the metropole. The issue of getting ships ready to sail was not specifically clarified either. This ambiguity led to the inadequate stores in the often run- down fleets. This led to an inquiry by the king and culminated in reform and promulgation of a new regimento with reduced involvement by the Conselho da Fazenda among one of its capítulos. On the religious front, attempts by bishops and archbishops, like D. Pedro de Castilho and D. Frei Aleixo de Meneses (viceroys of Portugal), to restrain the powers of the Council of India led to its extinction on 21 May 1614.68

The Overseas Council, founded in the regimento of 1642, also found it difficult to implement its operating procedures. At the same time, the larger developments of Joanine politics could be seen to have an impact on the regimento (on which the functioning of the Overseas Council depended). The opening part of the 1642 regimento pointed out that the absence of a tribunal to handle matters of the Estado da Índia and overseas was causing many “inconveniences”. Hence, the justification for the creation of the council. At the beginning of the Restoration, the newly installed Bragança dynasty under D. João IV was fighting for its life at home and overseas. The Overseas Council was created to assist and manage the fight abroad. Meanwhile, the dearth of resources was also dictating the priorities of overseas commitments and favouring Brazil over India, although the king continued to waiver on what was to be dispatched in practice. 69 Myrup suggests that the creation of the Overseas Council, with its

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more neutral name compared to that of the Council of India, reflected the shift in emphasis.70

Still engaging with the War of Restoration under the regency of D. Pedro, Ames believes that: “overall delegation of resources to various components of empire was usually reserved for the more powerful Council of State” even though the Overseas Council advised the regent on routine matters and operations.71 On the issue of military reform in the Estado, the Overseas Council made a number of recommendations – these included sending as many men as possible, getting experienced soldiers from the War of Restoration to join the service in India, forming a permanent military unit in Goa, and making suggestions for avenues of finance.72 Ames also draws attention to other ventures, such as the revival of the Straits fleet and various expeditions. In the end, the naval measures, hand-in-hand with reforms in the treasury, seem to have ensured a healthy state of finance, which in turn helped field a credible military presence which contributed to the revival of the Estado da Índia up till the 1680s.73

In terms of its overall importance in the administrative structure of the Bragança monarchs, the Overseas Council never attained the status of its peer agencies (or the 1604 tribunal), even if it might deal with matters of high policy or some of its clauses might dictate privileges (akin to those enjoyed by other administrative bodies and councils) for its members.74 Myrup highlights two instances where the council had to fight for a pay increase for its porters in 1644 and for bonuses-in-kind for its members in 1659. 75 In terms of its regimento, which was adapted from the 1604 nineteen-point document of the Council of India, the roles and responsibilities of the Overseas Council were largely analogous with its predecessor,

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except for the ecclesiastical part. Point Seven of the 1642 regimento stipulated that the paperwork of all channels (involving relevant business) was to go via this council.76 However, alternative means of communication, some in use before the inception of this council, continued to be relied on. The Monsoon Books, effected directly between the Crown and the viceroyalty in Goa, were clearly one such exchange. The exclusive instructions to the viceroys were not conveyed through the council, although these were likely to have been drafted in consultation with the secretary of state.

The problems faced by the Council of India were never totally resolved in the Overseas Council, even though a number of points in the regimento, especially the fourteenth, tried to delineate the business of the council and urged other bodies not to interfere. The problem was not specific to this conciliar body but was endemic to the entire bureaucracy of Portugal in that the continual layering (i.e., including the addition of ad-hoc councils or juntas to deal with particular exigencies) of the administration, without addressing some basic issues, was perhaps a contributing factor to Portugal’s failure to make the transition into modernity. João V tried to be prodigious, but the political will to effect more radical changes was not present, in part because the environment he inherited was not as averse, and in part perhaps because the time for change was, indeed, not ripe. In terms of matters handled by the Overseas Council, the sixth point in the regimento covered a range that would be presented in the council – from India, Brazil, Guiné, the offshore islands and places in Africa, but fazenda was to be administered by the Conselho da Fazenda. One can imagine problems involving financial flows cropping up again even though point nine was meant to alleviate this.77 In the ninth point, the Overseas Council was to be consulted about ships leaving for India and places of conquest, about the men

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and arms, as well as specificities of timing for the departure of the ships. It was also responsible for providing advice to the Treasury Council as the latter was to undertake the expenditure. The Overseas Council was also responsible for handling requests by viceroys, governors and captains, as well as bishops and members of the religious orders. The early solution of appointing the Vedor da Fazenda da Repartição da Índia from the Treasury Council as president, to resolve issues arising from the overlap between the two councils (i.e. overseas and treasury), did not continue beyond the second presidency.78

In terms of staffing and working conditions, the second point of the regimento listed the membership of the council. It included a president who, as was just noted, was the Vedor da Fazenda da Repartição da Índia, two council members of the rank of capa e espada, one letrado, one secretary who also served as scribe in the section of Repartição da Índia in the Treasury Council, and two porters. A survey of the Relaçam dos Conselheyros, e Officiaes do Conselho Ultramarino of 1730-1 reveals an increase in personnel – eight to nine ‘executives’ (more than half of whom were desembargadores). Other personnel at this date included one to two porteiro(s), a tesoureiro, an executor and an escrivão (scribe, to the treasurer). There was also a secretariat of eight to ten secretaries, including a senior official and one to two aposentador(es). The other personnel were the meirinho and his escrivão, a solicitador das causas, a fiel (to the tesoureiro) and two youth-pages. 79 In conjunction with the shift in style of D. João V’s government, the council was gradually fulfilling more of an administrative than an advisory role; hence the expansion of administrative staff. The third point of the regimento detailed the working hours when the council would meet in a room in the palace, and for how long – three hours

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in the morning (including holidays), commencing at seven in summer and at eight in winter. The increase in and complaint about working hours has already been noted. The trend was perhaps ameliorated slightly towards the end of João V’s reign when the newly appointed Marquis of Penalva asked for the working hour in the morning to start at eight on all days of the year.80

Despite the fact that João V was more apt to rely on non-traditional and ad-hoc avenues, traditional groups like the nobility required continued patronage from the king in a still consolidating period of the dynasty. Another group, like the letrados filling the ranks of the middle bureaucracy, was slowly becoming more prominent. These subtle transitions were reflected in the founding document and make-up of the Overseas Council. The fourth point of the regimento described the seating arrangements of the council in session, in a way indicating the importance of certain members over others. The president was to be seated at the head, was followed by council members seated bancos colateraes – capa e espada members on the right, with the most senior in the first seat; and the letrado taking the first place on the left. It was further added that a letrado, no matter how senior, would not surpass the capa e espada members; and in absence of a president, a senior capa e espada member was to preside without “taking the position”. The tenth point of the regimento dwelt further with the tasking of work – capa e espada members would take care of matters of war and papers of the viceroys, etc., while materials dealing with justice were reserved for the letrados. Merĉes and requests presented to the president from overseas were to be expedited by the secretary of merĉes. The numerical superiority of the letrados was not necessarily significant, especially as their duties were carefully circumscribed, while the capa e espada members continued to assert their superiority by

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presiding during the absence of the president. An earlier point of the regimento touched on the process to be followed during a session- in-sitting: votes were to be taken starting from the junior to senior members, and finally the president. The differences in votes were to be declared and taken down by the secretary, and rubrics entered by the president and members. Finally, if there was no other matter to be discussed, the president gave a parting reminder about the care to be taken in the respective tasks.

Other points detailed the enumeration and storage of records, as well as some miscellaneous procedures relating to the president.81 The last point in the 1642 regimento summarised the information that needed to be disseminated to various agencies, as well as giving the date, place and authority by which the founding document had been made and written.82

With further reference to the profile of the members of the Overseas Council, seventeen of the 26 members appointed during the reign of D. João V (including two presidents) were letrados. These letrados normally served in career tracks, as discussed in the previous section. Some underwent a shorter route, others longer, before being appointed to the Overseas Council. For example, Francisco Monteiro de Miranda alternated for several terms between a juiz de fora and a corregedor before taking up two disjunctive appointments as desembargador and finally being appointed a council member of the Overseas Council in May 1711. In another example, Manuel Fernandes Vargas had only prior experience as a desembargador of the Casa da Suplicação before taking up appointment as a council member.83

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Of the seven capa e espada members appointed (excluding the presidents), most did not have any substantial administrative or overseas experience. Except for Alexandre de Gusmão, who was relatively more accomplished, one capa e espada member had served as an ambassador and another as an official in the Treasury Council.84

More may be said about the presidents from information contained in the Memorias Genealógicas. As one of the oldest lineages in Portugal, the Távoras were present at the turn of the first millennium. D. Fernando and D. João I made doações and merĉes to them and to a related branch of the house, which had made a contribution at the Battle of Aljubarrota (1385). Nevertheless, this branch of the Távoras was only granted its first title of Count of São Vicente during the Habsburg period by Philip III in 1611. Miguel Carlos de Távora (second son of the second Count of São João; 1641-1726) married Dona Maria Caetanha de Cunha (daughter of the first Count of São Vicente) and inherited the title of the second Count of São Vicente.85 Like his predecessor, Miguel Carlos saw service in the Wars of Restoration and was appointed to positions of command in the army. Although without overseas experience, he served in a few naval appointments, and had some experience on the Council of War. Of certain influence in the later years, Miguel Carlos served on the Council of State as well as being appointed president of the Overseas Council.86 It is also of interest to note that the counts of São Vicente had close ties with the Noronhas and other families intimately linked to service in the Overseas Council and with India (notably the Almeidas): when the fourth Count of São Vicente married Dona Maria Sofia. 87 Even if factions appear somewhat elusive, it would seem that individual families were clearer about where they were heading.

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Another member of the Távora family was D. Francisco de Távora. He was granted the title of Count of Alvor by King Pedro II in 1683 while serving as viceroy in India (1681-86). This branch of the Távora family descended from the lineages of the counts of São João and Linhares. At the beginning of D. João V’s reign, D. Francisco had served for 13 years as president of the Overseas Council. He ended his term a year later.

As for the last president appointed by D. João V after a long vacancy, not much is revealed from the Memorias Genealógicas. The fifth Count of Tarouca assumed the presidency of the Overseas Council from 1749 and was conferred with the revived title of Marquis of Penalva the following year.88

In the long period of absence of a president, the business of the council was split up amongst the members, and a senior ‘minister’, acting in accordance with the regimento (1643) presided in the president’s place.89 In the original spirit that “a letrado can never claim tenure over those of capa e espada”, a Relaçam dos Conselheyros, e Officiaes do Conselho Ultramarino recorded at the top of the list the leading “minister” as a capa e espada member, António Rodrigues da Costa, even though letrados were beginning to outnumber capa e espada councillors in the course of the period 1707-50.90

Linking up developments in the council with trends at the level of the empire, we find some patterns being projected in both the eastern and western hemispheres. Brazil was important for the council during the reign of D. João V in that non-aristocrat officials who had served there were participating more widely, not only in the council,

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but throughout the entire Portuguese colonial bureaucracy. These letrados were also largely concentrated in judicial and fiscal capacities. Being a privileged domain, the Overseas Council continued not to be involved in the appointment of viceroys to India, as decisions were input directly from the secretary of state to the king (and up to the 1720s, consulted with members of Council of State). Similar level appointments to Brazil, surprisingly, according to Monteiro, were an Overseas Council affair.91 The partial effect of the above left the council to focus on middle rung business staffing matters.

A further round of changes, imitating the French system, was effected on the Portuguese politico-administrative structure in the second third of D. João V’s reign. The reform of 1736, outlined in an alvará, pointed out that the division of business via the then existing two secretaries-of-state did not “result in usefulness and instead, led to grave inconvenience setting the need for an alvará to reorganise into three Secretaries of State – one for “Business of the Kingdom”, one for “Foreign Business”, and the last for “Overseas Dominions”. The last-mentioned was to be concerned with all dispatches on armadas (including administration of the fazenda of their warehouses, military posts, etc.); “pertaining to him [would also be] the nomination of viceroys, governors and captain-generals of India, Brazil, Angola, Madeira and Açores, as well as fortresses of [north] Africa”. The Secretary for “Foreign Business” was to deal with appointments of ministers and diplomats in foreign courts, treaties of peace, war, marriage and alliance, as well as the overseeing of military troops and their logistics. Finally, the Secretary of “Business of the Kingdom” was to look into the conferment of titles and offices (include the nomination of prelados), merĉes, military orders, the fazenda real, and the administration of justice and police. All

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consultations, petitions and letters were to go via the secretaries to whom the relevant business pertained, and replies and resolutions were to be remitted by the same. The books and papers of the three ministers were also to be divided up for the purpose of documentation to avoid confusion.92

D. João’s ‘personalized’ approach on top of exceptions on the ground means an institutional study may not convey the actual situation in reality. In theory, for instance, appointments of diplomats, as well as issues of war, peace and alliance dealt with by the Secretary of “Foreign Business”, were understood to apply to the orbit of the European theatre. In terms of implementation, Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho did not take up this position until 1739, during which time his duties were covered by Secretary António Guedes Pereira who also oversaw the office of the Secretary of State of “Overseas Dominions”. In the consultations of the Overseas Council, Marco António also advised on matters touching as far as Timor.93 At times, a valido like Alexandre de Gusmão, in his capacity as private secretary and council member of the Overseas Council, might be charged with overriding powers to deal with a foreign power on a colonial matter, as in the Treaty of Madrid of 1750. On a final note, not all communications necessarily went through the secretaries, even if they might be consulted afterwards. The effect on the Overseas Council was that it was relegated even further to an administrative role.

If any factionalism can be observed here, brief remarks have been made about Alexandre de Gusmão’s hostility towards Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (the future Marquis of Pombal); who was thought to be a “satellite” of Cardinal da Mota.94 Associated with Carvalho e Melo was the more prominent D. Luis da Cunha. Both

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were marginalised in their advocacy of Colbertism during the reign of D. João V.95

Viceregal Institution On the ground at the periphery, the viceregal institution has a long tradition in the Iberian peninsula. J. Lalinde Abadia traced it to the beginning of fourteenth century. The title was also adopted in Spain’s Italian territories in the sixteenth century.96 A. Garcia Gallo traced the use of the title to fourteenth and fifteenth century Castile. A. Rumeu de Armas pinpointed the use of the designation to Aragon. The title became “more commonly known” in the fifteenth century when the Catholic Monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabel, vested it in Christopher Columbus in his maiden voyage to the New World.97 The initial conception was for the Castilian king to have a royal representative in a ruled territory while guarding the local essence and institutions of that place through the appointment of a council.98 Columbus not only had his mission to explore new lands in his capacity as the Almirante do Mar Oceáno, but also had to act as the king’s representative and government during the discoveries. Where the eastern enterprise of the Portuguese kings was concerned, Vasco da Gama was granted the title of admiral of India in 1500 after his pioneering voyage to India; D. Francisco de Almeida was bestowed with the title of viceroy of India four years after.99

The powers of the viceroy in India were conveyed in a few types of documents accompanying his departure. There was the carta de poder or carta patente which stipulated his powers in general. An example of the carta de poder given in 1505 to D. Francisco de Almeida as captain-major:

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advised and commanded all… to obey and comply with his requirements and commands with diligence and care… as though we [D. Manuel I and advisors] in person had spoken it, and those who do otherwise [not fulfill their duty] shall do us a disservice and we shall mete out to them those punishments that such cases merit… and in order that punishment [be] meted out either on sea or on land in any part where our peoples may be, whether of our nations or subjects in India, we confer upon him full authority… in all cases civil and criminal and even in the death penalty… We bestow upon him our full power over all the affairs of our revenues whether be it in buying and selling of our merchandise […] or anything else… Furthermore, we confer upon him full power to contract for us in our name treaties of peace and friendship with all the kings and lords of India… [or] to wage war… We ordain this power and authority to be conferred upon him by these letters patent signed by us and sealed with… the seal of our arms.100

More than a century later, the carta patente from King Philip IV to the Count of Linhares for his appointment as viceroy in 1629 was couched in similar terms. 101 Eighteenth-century viceroys were granted similar documents.

Because of the concurrent appointment of the viceroy as commander of the outgoing fleet, Almeida also received a regimento, or set of instructions, which went into detail regarding the minutiae of the trip. This included things such as signalling and what to do in the event of the separation of ships. On arrival, directions with regards to

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building a fortress, constructing a local fleet, conducting relations with local kings and inhabitants, and protecting Christians, as well as appointments, were also provided. 102 Otherwise, part of this regimento, also known as the sailing-orders, would be issued to any captain-major on the Carreira da Índia or, increasingly by the eighteenth century, to a professional seaman with the rank of capitão de mar e guerra.103 A similar document in 1740, dispatched with the viceroy Count of Ericeira as “the first person in the fleet”, dwelled on ‘usual’ things like hygiene and care for the sick (including the duties of the barber), where to “take water” and remuneration for those on board. 104 By the first half of the eighteenth century, great concern was shown in the regimento over the manning and maintenance of artillery on board ships, in tandem with new dangers – pirates and the French at Mozambique. The crucial nature of the socorro expedition probably heightened the tension of the voyage as there was a reminder to keep up with the drilling of the troops. Finally, persistent concerns remained with the registration of Carreira personnel and soldiers, as well as potential smuggling problems.105

Subsequently in the course of the sixteenth or probably seventeenth century, certain viceroys in India might receive from the king a separate set of personal instructions briefing them on the king’s perception of the situation on the ground, as well as the parameters within which he was to act. In the second quarter of the eighteenth century after 1736, this was drafted by the king with his secretary of state (for Overseas Dominions). An examination of the set of instructions reveals that it was up to date about the situation in India – from the strength of troops in the Estado da Índia, enemy threats, and receipts of Estado, as well as revenues from commerce. It also provided strategic guidelines in different areas; in terms of foreign relations, on the reestablishment of friendship with Persia, on war

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with the Marathas, on ways to increase revenue, and possibility of even forming a company. At the end, “[in] anything that is not in [the] regimentos and exceeds [the] jurisdiction conceded by me, [the viceroy is to] take arbitration as long as it has no grave prejudice”.106

What about the rest of that ‘exported state’, posited by J. Borges de Macedo? In brief, the Estado da Índia was modeled upon the reformed structure of the home government at the end of the Restoration Wars. Policy was still laid down in general terms. The important executive organ beneath the viceroy or governor was still the Council of State. Matters relating to defence and war of the Estado were centralised under this Council through the control of roughly two dozen companies (still classified under the terço system) and a supply house of powder. In practice, only a few companies of troops would remain in the city of Goa at any one time. A high sea fleet and a galley fleet, maintaining the system on the sea, came under this council too. The Conselho da Fazenda and associated agencies of accounts and custom-house exercised financial control. Still beneath this were the captains of the remaining outposts, farms and territories assigned to the fidalgos. Closely linked to this administration was the Senate of Goa who provided inputs at various levels on a number of matters. A parallel line of structure which dealt with justice was the Relação (or High Court).107

Reflecting the larger trend of things at home, a royal letter was sent to the Viceroy João Saldanha da Gama in Goa in March 1729 reminding him that the appointment of desembargadores and procuradores needed to adhere to prerequisites of candidates possessing for example, experience and a letrado background.108 Despite confirmation of clauses modeled upon that of Lisbon by the Crown which included reservation of municipal offices for casados

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and their descendants, Asians were eligible to serve towards and past the mid-eighteenth century. 109 From the consultations of the Overseas Council, the Council’s response to the chanceller of the Relação of Goa in February 1737 regarding petitions by officials for succession of their sons to offices showed that, despite certain promises by the previous viceroy, Saldanha da Gama, the king (advised by the Diogo Mendonça de Corte Real), was in favour of offices to be succeeded by those most qualified.110 Hence, those who petitioned for posts needed to qualify in terms of the number of years of service; otherwise, even a native might succeed to the position.111

The state of Portuguese administration in India at the end of D. João V’s reign was summed up in the instructions from the Marquis of Alorna to Távora – “por estar reduzido a breves limites” (being reduced to limited boundaries), along with a considerable reduction in rendimento (income).112

In terms of centre-peripheral analysis, the viceroys represented the embodiment of the central value system in India. However, there is never a perfect centre-to-periphery imposition, even at the core. At the periphery at Goa, the viceroy had personal, family and Crown agendas to fulfill, although these might overlap to some extent. Nevertheless, there was no recorded instance of rebellion linked with nobility in the first half of the eighteenth century at home. During the first half of the eighteenth century, the king possessed more requisites to press the nobility into service than at any other time during the Restoration. The only case of insurrection in India took place in 1787, past the period of even Pombal. 113 If the centre- peripheral fight was also to be determined in the locality of the latter, then viceroys were important agents of that struggle on the ground.

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Given the importance of the king’s representative in sustaining the Portuguese in India in the midst of severe constraints, the process and choice of candidacy for viceroy requires an examination by itself. In an article, Mafalda Soares da Cunha and Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro argue that, for the period 1651 onwards to the 1830s, the typical background of a chosen governor did not differ very much from that of the viceroy. For the period 1701-50, almost all came from Portugal, except for one who grew up in India. Specifically, many also came from the families of grandees and the first nobility. It is interesting to note that, until 1774, more of these governors came from an ecclesiastical background – although only one governed solely, several others were administering as part of interim councils (of which 1701-50 saw the most interruptions of this nature). Of the governors who succeeded in the period 1651-1774, almost all had experience in leadership and had mostly likely served in India.114 As for the experience of the viceroys who served in India, the majority had prior exposure in leadership positions and a number had seen colonial service in Brazil, although there were also quite a few who had not served overseas before. 115 On the whole, the heirs of grandees served most in military positions as opposed to services overseas and in the councils (two and three times more respectively).116

For the period 1701-50, the number of viceroys appointed outnumbered greatly that of governors (10:2). The period from 1651 has been described as the “aristocratisation of the title and appointment of viceroys”; viceroys who agreed to go to India were normally granted the title of marquis. Those who had made “accomplishments” there were granted further titles or given the chance of a second tenure of viceregalship (though the latter was

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not necessarily seen as a much sought after reward). The latter was none other than the celebrated Count of Ericeira who enjoyed certain favours in court. Detailed profiling of the viceroys in India reveals that of the seven viceroys appointed, three were conferred with extra benefits for going to the East. In terms of family background and linkages, the first viceroy appointed by João V descended from the counts of Soure, whose father had been president of the Overseas Council under Pedro II. As for the second viceroy, his lineage descended from the male line of César which stretched as far back as D. Dinis (r. 1279-1325). V.F. César de Meneses was the first of his house to be granted the countship of Sabugosa by D. João V in 1729 while serving in Brazil. The marriage link extended César de Meneses to the counts of Santa Cruz through his wife’s father’s side. As for the Ericeiras (who took up the third and seventh viceregalship), the family received their first title during the period of Habsburg rule and allegiance to the new Bragança dynasty was proven by the fourth count’s appointment to important positions. A marital link of the fifth count was made to the house of Rohan (counts of Ribeira Grande). The fourth viceroy (fifth governor) descended from D. Francisco de Sampaio and Dona Joana de Távora. The fifth viceroy (seventh governor) was descended from the marriage of D. Luis Saldanha de Gama and Dona Magdalena Mendonça. The sixth viceroy (eighth governor) descended from the marriage of Fernão Mascarenhas and Antonia Bourbon and was himself married to the Távora family of the counts of São Miguel. Finally, the fourth Count of Assumar and seventh viceroy of India, who was descended from the male line of the house of Almeida (associated with Francisco de Almeida), was allied to the Lancastres (counts of Vila Nova de Portimão).117

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On the issue of channelling second-born sons and lower nobility to India, they continued to be siphoned to the East. Regarding the five great families (the Castro, Coutinho, Mascarenhas, Meneses and Noronha) associated with the Estado in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a survey of D. António Caetano de Sousa’s Memorias Genealógicas dos Grandes de Portugal, which focuses on the high nobility, reveals little or no linkage of families associated with the first two names to India in the period of D. João V.118 The Noronha family of the counts of Vila Verde listed in the compendium of great families did not see any related assignment to India during the reign of João V. The closest for the Meneses came from the fourth Count of Cantanhede who had served in the Council of State of D. João V, as well as president of the Junta do Comércio (managing trade in East Africa).119 Of the five named families in the reign of D. João V, the Mascarenhas offers the clearest linkages to India as a number of the related sub-branches (Óbidos, Sandomil, Torre/Fronteira and Coculim) were conferred responsibilities or merçes to that place. The Sandomils, whose family stretches as far back as the reign of D. Duarte, was the one most linked to India during the reign of D. João V in that it included a member who served in the Council of State and in military positions before being appointed as viceroy to India. The third Count of Torre served as Vedor da Fazenda da Repartição dos Armazens e Índia (as well as the more esteemed positions of member of the councils of state and war) during João V’s period. A peer in the generation of the fourth count was appointed at a crucial time in 1740 to India as a commandante do socorro.120 This branch of the Mascarenhas family was also awarded with the title of count of Coculim. The title was first conferred during the reign of Afonso VI when Francisco Mascarenhas was made the lord of (the villages of) Coculim and Veroda in the Estado da Índia. Subsequent successors (up to the

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fourth count in 1750) continued to be made lords of the aldeias (villages) even though all were appointed to positions at home.121

Is it possible to gauge the perception of viceroys appointed to India? The outlook of viceroys was, it seems, never bright, even among the more celebrated appointees. With about a year to go until the completion of his first three-year tenure, the Count of Ericeira complained that the government of the Estado was (still) plagued with a variety of hostile threats and few means to alleviate them.122 In the letters of the Count of Assumar to his father while on duty in India, the viceroy indicated his disinclination to the assignment and lamented about the lack of opportunity to participate in great glory.123 In an authoritative work, Nuno Monteiro observes that from the mid- seventeenth century, viceroys were still able to amass great fortunes, as for example, did D. Filipe de Mascarenhas. This was disrupted after the fall of the Province of the North between 1737- 40. 124 In a study up to end of the seventeenth century, Mafalda Soares da Cunha indicates that India was still a proving ground, especially for the lesser nobility, although they tended to return and remain in Portugal once they had gained certain recognition and title. Mafalda Soares da Cunha also reveals, perhaps against the inner insecurity of most governors and viceroys, that incumbents were usually afraid that mistakes made in India would have an effect on their descendants; in reality, these would have little bearing.125

In terms of the leadership structure at the periphery, the local elites provided part of that input on top of the direction by the viceroy. While the Cortes at home last met in 1698, the Câmara of Goa overseas continued to raise issues on a variety of matters with the king – from the conduct of war and defence, and the behaviour of officials, etc. Feedback from the Câmara was taken seriously by the

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king, who was likely to have conceived this body to be part of the expedient of checks and balances. Indeed, the Câmara sometimes sent unfavourable reports to the king regarding the viceroy, though it never failed the latter when help was needed in times of crisis. On occasions, the Câmara even loaned monies to the king (requested via the viceroy). It also offered to contribute to the maintenance of sailors of the Carreira da Índia – normally the responsibility of the Casa da Índia.

The viceroy resented the Câmara’s privileged direct and free communication with the king and therefore strove at times to intercept and tamper with the documents. Inter-institutional rivalry also existed with other governing bodies in the Estado da Índia. For example, Câmara members were strongly opposed to a high legal official becoming its president. At the lower level, despite skewed representation by local elites who were invariably European or part- European in descent, the Câmara seemed to be closer and more sensitive to the people under its jurisdiction and cooperated with the Santa Casa da Misericórdia to help the poor and lowly. This was an important consideration in helping the Portuguese survive in a difficult period.126

From the perspective of centre-periphery studies, even though grandee governors and viceroys were as close an embodiment of the authority of the centre as could be, the king seems to have also allowed multiple channels of communication in order there should be monitors and checks against these direct appointees. Although matters submitted via the Câmara and tabled for consultation in the Overseas Council were few, their contributions can be seen in a few areas. In an entry for March 1717, for example, officers of the Câmara of Goa can be seen to counter the viceroy’s wishes

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regarding the appointment of an individual and other issues because of its dissatisfaction with the state and its neglect of the armada of the south.127 With regard to members of the religious orders, the Câmara sometimes wrote to complain about the Company of Jesus.128

Did leadership from centre matter to the survival of Portuguese India? For a start, distance and technological limitations prevented a more effective control of the “state” in the East. Even if that obstacle could be obviated, limitations in politico-administrative structure prevented a more effective supervision, as was the case with all other first imperial age empires. Nevertheless, the availability of resources and continual support from home mattered if colonial enterprises did not have the demographics to sustain themselves on their own.129 In this direction, Portuguese India was not stagnant, although there was always a drag exerted on it. Interest groups from home and local power groups made this so – even grandees, the most affiliated to the centre, had their own agendas to fulfill.

To conclude, D. João V’s court fulfilled all the criteria of a contemporary Baroque court proposed in a re-evaluative study of princely European courts. Evidence for this can be were verified in a memorial account of the Count of Povolide. The quirks of João V’s monarchical leadership were at the same time exposed. The impact of these on power groups and administrative bodies, namely the Overseas Council, was subtle yet telling. India continued to occupy a place in the king’s scheme of things and in the paperwork of this council. The king’s input and aura of authority were also communicated via alternative channels, while his physical presence was personified by the appointment of the viceroy. In a way, the

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vested interests and longing to return home bound men on the ground with the psyche at the centre. This business of India, spanning from high policy matters to interference in religion and geographical areas no longer under Crown control, conveys the continued usefulness of India, as recorded in official documents of the Overseas Council. It is this continual interest that makes the centre a factor not to be disregarded in the consideration of the prolongation of the Estado da Índia. The next three chapters will look at the business of India from the consultations of the Overseas Council and other documents in an effort to gauge the input and role of the centre on that periphery.

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Endnotes

1 For example, A.M. Hespanha, As Vesperas do Leviathan –Instituições e Poder Político em Portugal Seculo XVII (Coimbra, 1994), who coordinated História de Portugal – O Antigo Regime (general editor: José Mattoso) (Lisbon, 1992) which as Hespanha prefaced, was essentially a history of powers. A survey of the bibliography in História de Portugal Moderno – Político e Institucional (Lisbon, 1995) by the same author reveals some further listing of works. At the same time, writings like “Centralização e Estado na Historiografia” in pp. 129-58, Nação e Defesa 87 (1998) by P. Cardim, highlighted a possible dichotomy between research on “centralisation” and “other groups in society”, even as the latter blossomed. 2 See Introduction in re-edition of História de Portugal (Lisbon, 1998) coord. by A.M. Hespanha (general editor : José Mattoso). 3 Works by A.M. Hespanha, most notably As Vesperas do Leviathan (Coimbra, 1994). In terms of the eighteenth century, see the authoritative work by Nuno G.F. Monteiro, O Crepúsculo dos Grandes 1750-1832 (Lisbon, 1998). 4 From more generalised studies like N. Henshall, The Myth of Absolutism (New York, 1992), it is acknowledged that the historiography of absolutism is small, although there is an “immense amount of materials on rulers or regimes recognised as absolutist”. Works on 18th century France are still relatively neglected, except ‘in the area relating to the origins of the French Revolution”. Notably, see also P.R. Campbell’s Power and Politics in Old Regime France 1720-45 (London, 1996). It is also worth noting that “absolutism” is as complicated a term as “liberalism”; different groups conceive the appellation differently – for instance, the French distinguished themselves from Turkish and Russian despotism. Good comparative works are few. In terms of the first half of the 18th century, the polity of Portugal may be contrasted with Spain for the reason that both entities saw many cross influences and parallel developments – for instance, despite the transition to the ‘more efficient’ intendent system, is anyone aware that the Bourbon Spanish government continued to rely on non-traditional avenues analogous to João V’s more personalised structure? Is anyone aware that the Bourbons (or for that matter, any other Baroque monarchy?) were probably as expensive to maintain internally and externally as the Braganças? Is anyone aware that there was a tendency to rely on the “aristocracy of merit” both in Spain and Portugal? On a more trivial level, is anyone aware that both João V and Philip V were both afflicted by a ‘mental illness’? For 18th century Spain, J. Lynch’s Bourbon Spain (Oxford, 1989) provides a rather comprehensive view of colonial Spain as well as developments at home. 5 A. Filipe Pimentel, “Absolutismo, Corte, Palaçio Real – en torno dos Palaçios de D. João V” in História and Critica (ed.), Arqueologia do Estado (Lisbon, 1988), p. 691. 6 Adamson ed., The Princely Courts of Europe (London, 2000), p. 10. Earlier works like A.G. Dickens’ Courts of Europe and H.D. Molesworth’s Princes are still timeless in themselves. 7 Campbell, Power and Politics in Old Regime France, p. 24. 8 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 9 Ibid., p. 181. 10 Adamson, The Princely Courts of Europe, p. 79. 94

11 Campbell, Power and Politics in Old Regime France, pp. 23, 177 and 186. Recent research has shown that the centralisation of Louis XIV carried out by ministers such as Richelieu and Cobert might not have impacted as deeply throughout France – because newly appointed intendants faced a variety of local opposition and not all had possessed the personal relations to effect cooperation and impose a change at that level. 12 Drawing from several versions of the memoir in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, and the Arquivo da Torre do Tombo (versions TT1, TT2, TT3), the personal records of the Count of Povolide were transcribed and introduced by A.V. de Saldanha and C.M. Radulet in Memorias Históricas de 1° Conde de Povolide –Portugal, Lisboa e a Corte de D. Pedro II e D. João V (Lisbon, 1990). Here after, referred to as MHCP. 13 On the king going to Se and Salvaterra, MHCP, pp. 213 and 240. 14J.H. Elliott and L.W. Brockliss (eds.), The World of the Favourite (New Haven, 1999), p. 4 and concluding remarks. The colloquium, on which this book is based, has as its theme “The World of the Favourite 1550-70” and papers were presented a little over twenty years after Berenger’s inaugural article. The original article by J. Berenger was published in Annales 29 (1974) entitled “Pour Une enquête européenne: le problème du ministériat au XVIIe siècle”. 15Ibid. 16MHCP, pp. 25, 406 and 416. 17However, the loss of the Council’s documents in the Earthquake 1755 meant, as an expert in the area acknowledged, that scholars intending to research on the role and deliberations of this tribunal have to turn to scattered collections and other alternatives for a reconstruction. This message was especially clear in a discussion with Nuno G.F. Monteiro during my visit to Lisbon October- December 2004. 18Nuno G.F. Monteiro, “Identificação da Política Setecentista – Notas sobre Portugal no Inicio do Periodo Joanino” in Analise Social XXXV, 157 (2001), pp. 971, 975-6. 19Towards the end of his reign, this was split into two posts, one dealing with merĉes and related matters; another dealing with “assinatura de documentos regias”. See Serrão, História de Portugal 1640-1750, p. 324. 20In registers of consultations on India in the Overseas Council, some of these would record the presiding advice of the Secretary; others showed the king’s direct decision in the margin. 21AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 1r-v, 40r-v and 179v-80r. 22A.H. de Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal (New York, 1976), p. 396. D. Francis, Portugal 1715-1808 (London, 1985), p. 10. Paradoxically, the quality or size of the armed force was not appreciably increased. 23Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, p. 394. Writing at a time when absolutist studies were naturally equated with the Baroque polity, Oliveira Marques was clearly writing under the influence of this trend of thought. 24P.S. Martinez, História Diplomatica de Portugal (Lisbon, 1986), p. 196. 25D. Francis, Portugal 1715-1808 (London, 1985), p. 15. 26MHCP, p. 25. 95

27Ibid., p. 25. 28F. Mendes, D. João V, Rei Absoluto (Lisbon, nd), pp. 253-69. 29E. Brazão, Subsídios para a História do Seu Reinado (Porto, 1945), based on a survey of documents I-L. Here after, referred to as SSHR. 30 Prevalent and “most current” belief of the time was that mercantilism, which promoted the export of domestic products, could help to promote local industries (hence, industrialisation) and inflow of bullion (through trade of these). 31J. Cortesão, Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid (Lisbon, 1984), pp. 145-247. 32 Ibid., see part II in volume I. 33Ibid, pp. 578-95. 34 C.R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil 1695-1750 (Manchester, 1962), pp. 145-46. 35 Ibid. 36AHU, Administração Central / Conselho Ultramarino / 089 / Caixa 2 / Documento 143. 37 M. Newitt, A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion (London, 2005), pp. 268-72. 38K. Holsti, Peace, War and International Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 51, 59 and 95. 39MHCP, pp 250 (2), 364 (2) and 398 (2). In brackets, the number of naus are noted coinciding in order of the years listed. 40Survey of Códice 47, Registo de Cartas Gerais que Vão / Vem da India 1666-1784 in Arquivo de Alfandega de Lisboa. See footnotes in chapter 5 for more specific citations. 41D. João V’s titles are readily seen in a variety of documents. The titles quoted are commonalities from an assento do foro (1729) to an individual, a concessão de carta de armas (1731) to a military personnel, and a carta regia (1738) to a high level colonial official quoted from a website on European Titles at http://www.geocities.com/eurprin/portugal.html, updated 24 Sep 2005. 42Nuno G.F. Monteiro, “Trajetorias Socias e Governo das Conquistas – Notas sobre Vice Reis e Governadores Gerais do Brasil e da Índia nos Seculos XVII e XVIII”, in M.F. Bicalho, et al (eds.), O Antigo Régime nos Trópicos (Rio de Janeiro, 2001), p. 268. 43M. Pearson, New Cambridge History of India – Portuguese in India (Cambridge, 1987), p. 144. During the Baroque period, there were references to D. João V styling himself as an emperor or “king of kings”. 44E.L. Myrup, “To Rule from Afar – Brazil and the Making of Portugal’s Overseas Council 1642- 1833” presented at Seminar Imperial (Re) Visions 1-3 Nov 2002, pp. 19-20. 45See table/list 6 in Nuno G Monteiro, “Poder Senhorial, Estatuto Nobiliarquico e Aristocracia” in A.M. Hespanha coord. (general editor: José Mattoso) Historia de Portugal (Lisbon, 1993), p. 364. 46Nuno G.F. Monteiro, O Crepusculo dos Grandes – Casa e Patrimonio da Aristocracia em Portugal 1750-1832 (Lisbon, 1998), p. 35. 47Ibid., p. 146. 48Ibid., p. 157. 49Ibid., pp 144 and 151.

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50Caetano de Souza, Memorias Genealogicas dos Grandes de Portugal (4th Ed., Lisbon, 1933), 3rd edition of work made in 1755, hereafter referred to as MGGP. Mistakes in Caetano, noted by a few academics, need to be counter verified with an alternative source. 51The fort and of São Jorge da Mina do Ouro was set up in 1482. 52J. Serrão, Dicionário de História de Portugal I-VI (Lisbon, 1990), p. 401. 53 F.P. Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India (Lisbon, 1952), pp. 38-42. J.N. Joyce (Jr) in an unpublished thesis, Spanish Influence on Portuguese Administration (S. California, 1974), utilised Luz’ work to some extent. Also, the geographical division of the Casas was not to be strictly delineated, for example, the treasurer of the Casa da Guiné was supposed to deal with gold that came not only from São Jorge da Mina and Guiné, but from any other areas. On top of that, he was to receive goods for the trade of Mina and Guiné, as well as goods meant for India. 54The first African slaves were landed in Brazil in 1534 after the reconnaissance and establishment of the first captaincies. 55Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, pp. 38-42. 56Ibid., pp. 35-66. 57Ibid., pp. 61-64. 58Ibid., p. 46. See also M. Caetano, O Conselho Ultramarino (Rio de Janeiro, 1969), p 25. 59Caetano, O Conselho Ultramarino, pp. 19-20. 60Joyce, Spanish Influence on Portuguese Administration, see chapter 1. 61Ibid., pp. 118 and 165. 62Hespanha, As Vesperas do Leviathan, p. 243. 63ATT, O Conselho da Fazenda (Lisbon, 1995), pp. 11-13. 64G.J. Ames, Renascent Empire (Amsterdam, 2000), p. 104. 65Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, pp. 74-75. The Spanish titles for the Habsburg kings were adopted in this thesis since they are ‘better known’. Hence, the first Habsburg king is titled Philip II, in contrast to the Portuguese’s Philip I. 66See P. Williams, “Philip III and Restoration of Spanish Government 1598-1603” in English Historical Review 88 (1973), pp. 751-69. It would be well to note that the valido’s (Duke of Lerma) influence was extended through positioning his clients and relatives in important and high posts; for example, D. Estêvão de Faro as the incompetent president of Council of India. 67J. Lynch, The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change (Oxford, 1992), p. 25. 68Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, pp. 141 and 178-191. 69See G.D. Winius, “India or Brazil” in G.D. Winius (ed.) Studies in Portuguese Asia (Aldershot, 2001). Refer also to discussion on E. Barros de Souza, Negocios de Tanta Importancia – O Conselho Ultramarino e a Disputa pela Condução da Guerra no Atlantico e no Indico 1643-1661 (Rio de Janeiro, 2004) (unpublished thesis). 70Myrup, “To Rule from Afar”, p. 5. 71Ames, Renascent Empire, pp. 119-120. 72Ibid., p. 127. 73Ibid., pp. 136-146. 97

74Souza, Negocios de Tanta Importancia, p. 80. See also C.R. Boxer, Salvador de Sá (London, 1952), p. 162. Refer 15th and 16th points of the 1642 Regimento. 75Myrup, “To Rule from Afar”, p. 10. 76 Regimento, Conselho Ultramarino 1642 printed in Caetano, O Conselho Ultramarino, pp. 113- 23. 77Ames, Renascent Empire, pp. 78-80. 78Myrup, “To Rule from Afar”, p. 12. 79BN, Relaçam dos Conselheyros, e Officiaes do Conselho Ultramarino HG4549//8A, pp. 66-67 (r and v) and 68r. 80AHU, Administração Central / Conselho Ultramarino / 089 / Caixa 2 / Documento 143. Also, / 089 / Caixa 4 / Documento 401. 81 Regimento, Conselho Ultramarino 1642, pp. 113-23. 82Ibid. 83See table in appendix in Myrup, “To Rule from Afar”, pp. 26-27. 84Ibid., pp. 26-27. 85MGGP, pp. 417-423. Also, Various Editorials, Grande Enciclopedia Portuguesa e Brasileira (Lisboa, 1935-60), pp. 667-68. 86MGGP, pp. 417-423. 87MGGP, pp. 175-185. 88MGGP, pp. 149-53 and 387-95. 89 AHU, Administração Central / Conselho Ultramarino / 089 / Caixa 1 / Documento 107. Substantiated further in AHU, Consultas Mistas Códice 21, f. 51r dated in month of November 1714. 90Regimento, Conselho Ultramarino 1642 printed in Caetano, O Conselho Ultramarino, pp. 113- 23. BN, Relaçam dos Conselheyros, e Officiaes do Conselho Ultramarino HG4549//8A, pp. 66-67 (r and v) and 68r. 91Monteiro, “Trajetorias Socias e Governo das Conquistas”, p. 257. 92Alvará, Secretárias de Estado 1736, transcribed in Boletim do Conselho Ultramarino I (Lisbon, 1867), pp. 409-11. 93AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 16r-17r. 94J. Barreto, Escritos Economicos de Londres (Lisbon, 1986), p. xviii. Alexandre de Gusmão himself would experience a downslide in his career with the passing of D. João V. 95C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire (London, 1969), p. 46. 96 See J. Lynch, The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change (Oxford, 1992). 97 A.V. de Saldanha, Iustum Imperium – Dos Tratados como Fundamento do Imperio dos Portugueses no Oriente (Lisbon, 1997), pp. 337-38. 98Joyce, Spanish Influence on Portuguese Administration, pp. 15-16. 99Saldanha, Iustum Imperium, p. 335.

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100Letter Patent, delegating Powers of Captain-Major / Carta de Poder 1505, transcribed and translated in Documentos sobre os Portugueses em Moçambique e na Africa Central I by ARN and CEU (Lisbon, 1962), pp. 147-53. 101Letter Patent, delegating Powers of Viceroy 1629, transcribed in Assentos do Conselho do Estado da Índia I by P.S. Pissurlencar (Goa, 1953), pp. 210-13. 102 Regimento, to Captain-Major 1505, transcribed and translated in Documentos sobre os Portugueses em Moçambique… I by ARN et al, pp. 156-259. 103C.R. Boxer, “Carreira da India” in C.R. Boxer (ed.), From Lisbon to Goa (Aldershot, 1984), I, p. 44. 104AHU, Códice 170, Registo de Regimentos, ff. 90v, 89r, 92r and 95r-96r. 105AHU, Códice 170, Registo de Regimentos, ff. 89r-v, 90v-91r and 94r. 106Instructions, to Marques de Alorna 1744, originally from personal collection of J.F.J. Biker, transcribed in Collecção de Tratados que o Estado da India Portugueza fes com os Reis e Senhores da Asia e Africa Oriental VI by Biker (New Delhi, 1995), pp. 243-62. Hereafter, referred to as CTEA. 107Ames, Renascent Empire, pp. 115-148. See also Pearson, Portuguese in India, pp. 34-35. 108AHU, Códice 204, Carta Regias etc para Viso Reis da India, f. 298r. 109C.R. Boxer, Portuguese Society in the Tropics (Madison, 1965), pp. 12-41. The decline of Goa began at the end of sixteenth century. 110AHU, Códice 204, f. 298r. 111AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 320v-21v. 112 Instructions, to Távora, from CTEA VI, pp. 329-44. 113 F.A. Dutra, “The Wounding of King José I – Accident or Assassination?” in Mediterranean Studies VII, 1998, pp. 221-29. In the article, Dutra writes that plotting and attempted assassination among the nobility was common in Portugal (p. 226). However, he questions that the widely believed assassination of José I in 1758 was directed at the king. 114M. Soares da Cunha and N.Gonçalo Monteiro, “Vice-Reis, Governadores e Conselheiros de Governo do Estado da India 1505-1834” in Penélope 15 (1995), pp. 105-109. 115Ibid., pp. 102-105. 116Monteiro, O Crepúsculo dos Grandes, p. 524 table 55. Figures given for period 1701-50 to be 66 : 43 : 20. 117 The counts of Avintes also originated from the same origins with the second count serving in the council of state during João V’s reign. They were linked by marriage to the counts of Arcos (the Noronhas, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter under the survey of counts). 118 The counts of Monsanto and Galveas are, at first sight, related to the Castros. The latter-named did not appear to have any links to India. The former, related to the Braganças and later elevated to the rank of marquis, did not have linkages either. The counts of Redondo (family name: Coutinho) also appear not to have any thing to do with India during the period of João V. 119MGGP, pp. 95-103. 120MGGP, pp. 75-81. 99

121MGGP, pp. 239-43. 122AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 112r-v. 123Selection of letters transcribed by Nuno G. Monteiro in Correspondencia do Conde de Assumar Para seu Pai – Meu Pai e meu Senhor muito do meu coração (Lisbon, 2000), pp. 67 and 79. Here after, referred to as CAPP. 124Monteiro, O Crepúsculo dos Grandes, p. 148. 125Mafalda S. da Cunha, “Portuguese Nobility and Overseas Government – Return to Portugal 16th-17th Centuries” in E. van Veen and L. Blusse (eds.), Rivalry and Conflict (Leiden, 2005) pp. 35-49. 126Boxer, Portuguese Society in the Tropics, pp. 12-41. 127AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 89r-v. 128AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 52r-v. 129 It can be observed, in hindsight, from parallel French colonial experiences as well as later post World War Two decolonisation experiences that propping up an unprofitable and dependent colony with a large input of resources from home is a relatively inefficient way to retain that place. Nevertheless, the degree of ‘worth’ is tied to what the country or state in question wishes to achieve in the first place. It is apparent that France still supports many of its former Polynesian colonies on the understanding that the latter will continue to adopt French as a major or official language.

100 CHAPTER 4

BUSINESS OF THE ESTADO DA ĺNDIA: WAR AND DIPLOMACY

The previous chapter attests to the fact that the structure of government and related aristocrat politics were undergoing a transition as the Bragança monarchy evolved and produced a more mature period of dynastic rule under D. João V. These shifts marginalised the bureaucratic apparatus dealing with overseas matters. Prior to this, the weight and importance of various dominions under the empire were also undergoing change at the turn of the seventeenth century, a trend which had begun in the late sixteenth century. As we shall see, the ‘leftover attention’ of the king to India remained generous, as witnessed by the relatively voluminous registers of the Overseas Council. This chapter will detail and analyse the matters brought up for deliberation by the centre in matters of war and diplomacy to prove there was continual engagement to sustain India in a fluctuating and tense period there during the first half of the eighteenth century. The Portuguese colonies there were able to be sustained because a framework had been put in place on the ground headed by a direct representative who identified closely with the centre. In terms of the overall thesis, this chapter will show that the instruments of state continued to be important in propping up the formal Estado da ĺndia, so often overlooked in the study of eighteenth-century Portuguese India.

Diplomacy in India A number of works by prominent and emerging scholars in the area seem to advance the opinion that Portuguese involvement in the

101 East was, by and large, peaceful. In the regimento issued by King Sebastião to Viceroy D. Luís de Ataide, Saldanha reveals how “peace” and “friendship” were to be counselled rather than war.1 Pearson and Furber also believe that the Portuguese approach in the Indian Ocean was one of more cooperation than conflict. Subrahmanyam, being more reserved, considers the term “contained conflict” as a more accurate reflection of their approach. 2 More traditional sources also tend to see colonial relations, for that matter, the colonial enterprise, as an extension of European international politics.3 Colonial relations in India were actually undertaken by the viceroy, as specifically delegated to him in the royal appointment to office, the carta patente, or in a separate carta de poder. On occasions, a state like China might receive more than the usual attention from the king. However, negotiations and treaties signed with the Great Mughals and other local powers were deliberated by the Overseas Council during the negotiations (if they were drawn out), or usually after they had been settled by the viceroy. When matters involved disputes with European powers, the link with the centre meant that these were often coordinated and taken up by ambassadors in the respective courts in Europe.

The Portuguese world view and classification system with regards to the people they encountered is a focal area of Saldanha’s thesis. The Greco-Roman and Catholic religious cultural roots and beliefs played an important role in the classification system. Because of the many peoples encountered in Asia (compared to Africa), classification was also multi-variant. For example, the Chinese seemed to be categorised by the Greco-Roman standard of civilisation to be “superior”. Reciprocally, the Chinese overcame their own protocol by according the Portuguese the status of the Russians, who were not denigrated to tributary standing. From a

102 Jesuit perspective, the people encountered were seen in terms of their convertibility. As a result, the Japanese were considered to be a people of high potential in this sense (the Jesuits in the East acted in official and diplomatic roles for the Crown in many instances). With regards to the Mughals, the situation was not straight-forward either. The Mughals conceded their inferiority on the seas and were content to ask “permission” from the Portuguese in the form of cartazes for travel. At times when a land enemy was so powerful as to threaten coastal ports, the Portuguese at Damão, for example, were “happy” to pay the “chouto” to the Mughals or their vassals. At other ports, the Portuguese strove to collect the “moqarraryas” and “tenças” (forms of tribute) from Ormuz and Cochin respectively.4

Following from the above, it seems valid to ask whether the Portuguese operated some form of feudal vassalage system in the Indian Ocean. Saldanha is correct in saying that the investigation is multi-dimensional and spans political, social and economic areas of human societies. 5 In the context of the rising early modern international system, even feudalistic relations were sealed by contractual and judicial agreements, preferably backed up by the power of enforcement. Whether a relation is described as one of lord-vassal is also dependent on the degree of volunteerism and mutual obligation in such an interaction. In short, there is no one system to describe the relations the Portuguese encountered in the Indian Ocean. The arrangements were composed of interaction between Portuguese “idealism” and diverse cultural systems in contact.6

Deliberations of the Overseas Council reveal that, the Mughals were never accorded the same status as the Chinese – the Portuguese would only acknowledge the emperor as “King of Mogor”, never

103 emperor, as they did with the Chinese. However, the Mughals were not ranked alongside other “petty kings” for they were acknowledged to be powerful and able to start a war with the Portuguese in India. In 1707, for example, the king urged the viceroy to diligently observe previous agreements made with the Mughals. On one occasion when one of the Mughul emperor’s fortress commanders breached diplomatic immunity by arresting and robbing a Jesuit ambassador sent by the viceroy to negotiate with the emperor, the viceroy sent the almotacem-mor to seek a peaceful redress (by offering 500 rupias and “other things” for his release). He also accepted the offer of a “great favourite” of the emperor to negotiate and “achieve everything that the viceroy wanted”. However, the Council advised the king to order the viceroy to confirm if the Mughal emperor had given “satisfaction” to the Estado for “the injury made to the ambassador, and if the fortress captain had been punished”. The Council pointed out it expected that the “immunity which was customarily followed throughout the world for ambassadors” be observed.7 The viceroy kept the centre closely updated with news about the death of the Mughal king and the succession, and passed on condolences, congratulations and gifts where they were due.8 Rather surprisingly, the Portuguese took some time to recognise that the Mughals were in decline. Although Mughal decline in the eighteenth century was variously dated to 1707, 1712 or 1739, obvious disintegration only took place towards the last-mentioned date.9

Despite the long-standing conflict and tension (from Pedro II’s reign), relatively little is found in the consultations of the Overseas Council on Luso-Maratha relations during the early years of the eighteenth century. In contrast, relations with Maratha offshoots and other minor

104 powers such as Bounsulo, Angria and Sunda account for a number of entries in the registers.10

In 1724, the instructions of the out-going viceroy, the Count of Ericeira, to his in-coming counterpart, D. Francisco José de Sampayo e Castro, noted the losses that had been sustained against Angria. On Shahu Raja, the count had continued to watch the rise of the Marathas from the time of the former’s grandfather whose power had, by then, extended to Nababo. Shahu was a grandson of Shivaji (1674-80). The dispute with this power was over territories and the rents associated with these lands. The viceroy correctly assessed that the Mughals did not have much regard for naval power and that their prowess might have been over-estimated by Europe. Ericeira also indicated that the Mughals and some of their allies were concerned that the commerce and activities of some of its hostile vassals had caused losses for merchants. Also mentioned in Ericeira’s instructions were other minor powers like the Sangane and Mellumdim. With regards to places no longer under their influence, like Meliapor and São Tomé, Ericeira wrote as if the Portuguese still owned the places and mentioned special projects to regain them. He also spoke of the need to “play politics among the mouros [Muslims] and the Europeans”.11

Relations between the Portuguese and Marathas have been studied in detail by Lobato and Pissurlencar. Lobato’s survey starts with the advent and rise of two persons – Shahu in 1708, and Bajirão in 1721.12 Pissurlencar reveals that the strife between the Marathas and the Portuguese in Bassein began during the reign of Shahu. The Marathas began to demand a number of concessions from the Portuguese, but the latter only gave way on some.13 Treaties, big and small, were made, and violations led to revised and new

105 versions. These agreements revealed the situation at any point in time to be in flux – for example, the Bounsulos started off as vassals of the Marathas. When the viceroy called for a meeting of his Council of State in 1708, the Portuguese agreed to support the Marathas against the Bounsulos. By 1716, it seems that the Bounsulos had become a “feudatory” of the Estado da ĺndia, although the Portuguese had also decided not to help them against their former overlord. In the same “rectified” treaty, the Portuguese had by then pledged munitions to the Marathas against Angria (another recalcitrant vassal of the Marathas).14

The Portuguese made an agreement in 1721 (adjusted in 1722) with Great Britain for a joint effort against Angria. In 1723, a Maratha invasion of Portuguese Bassein led to temporary peace in 1724 and 1728. In the settlement of 1724, the Marathas obtained concessions from the Portuguese on a number of economic issues, namely on the décima which the Marathas were ‘granted’ and authorised to collect in Bassein, as well as the waiver of taxes [direitos] and freedom of passage by merchants who passed through Portuguese territories to reach Maratha territories.15 Whatever brief respite came from the 1728 armistice was soon put into disarray by a series of incursions and counter-incursions by the Marathas, as well as the Portuguese. Peace was only restored in 1732 by the Treaty of Bombay (Bombaim) which was mediated by the English. The thirteen-point document confirmed the granting by the Portuguese of concessionary direitos to the Marathas and, more importantly, negated any allusion there might have been as to why the Portuguese villages should be paying tributes. On the final point, the treaty also absolved each party from entering into a mutual defence pledge against any third party (including against any recalcitrant tributary of the Marathas).16

106

Despite concluding the 1732 Treaty, hostility between the Portuguese and Marathas re-erupted from 1734 and continued intermittently until the eve of the “great” invasion in 1737. Here, the local populace, disaffected as a result of religious discrimination, had a part to play in the collaboration with Bajirão.17

In relation to the war of 1737-39, a few points merit attention. First, though the 1737 aggression represented a major Maratha initiative with an associated commitment in resources, it was by no means a break from the trend of constant shifting hostility and armistice experienced in the multi-angled relations with the large and small powers in contact with the Portuguese in India. Furthermore, a secondary war was on-going at Goa, almost irrespective of conflict in the north. Chaul had already been taken by April 1737 when the Marathas began their attack on the island of Salsete (in Bassein). This move was also a precursor to the taking of the fort of Tana – an important key to the defence of the Province of the North. In 1738, the Marathas invaded Damão. Peace was eventually signed in 1740 after a course of negotiation.18

It is worth while taking a closer look at a treaty signed between the Portuguese and Bounsulos in 1712. In this treaty, the Portuguese sought to ensure that their territories and those of their vassals (namely those of Cuddalle) would not be subject to harassment by the Bounsulos. Safe passage through Bounsulo territories by land and sea was also sought for merchants of the Estado. A reminder was given not to raise extra or further dues, either on the traders or vassals of the Estado. If death arose from transgression or robbery, the culprits from Bounsulo were to be handed over to the Estado. Furthermore, the Bounsulos were not to trade with the Arabs, and

107 the Portuguese were to be free to attack or confiscate anything related to the latter. For its part, the Estado was to give restitution for Bounsulo captives in caravans that were seized by the Estado. Finally, the Bounsulos were to present two Arab horses (or 1,000 xerafins) as a feudo (tribute) to the Estado each year in order to secure its protection. On two further points, acting in their padroado role, the Bounsulos were also ordered to pay for the cost of rebuilding a certain church. Finally, lançado Portuguese or those without licence passing through Bounsulo lands were to be handed over to the Portuguese General of the North.19

Such a comprehensive treaty was reminiscent of many others that the Portuguese signed with other Asian potentates. The allusion to tribute and the feudalistic modus operandi needs to be seen in the context of the nascent background of contractual or Westphalian international institutions. Others, like Winius, think that early modern contracts can only be seen as conveying intentions (and shades of meaning), rather than as strictly adhered-to and legally-binding documents.20 The truth, as raised earlier, probably lies somewhere between the two extremes. The so-called “feudalistic” system, together with some form of proto-indigenous contractual arrangement, was likely to have meshed with the more Westphalian -inclined structure, so as to come to a working agreement in the still “trial and error” environment of the early modern world.

In fact, the Portuguese made what seemed like “early modern” extra- territorial arrangements with some vassals under their influence. During the brief patch-up with Paté in 1728, the king of Paté was to pledge payment of a perpetual tribute to the Portuguese king. The king of Paté and his successors were to declare Mascate an enemy and not to permit entry of any of its vessels or commerce. The king

108 was also obliged to give help when needed to the fort of Mombasa and other praças of the area. In return, the governor of Mombasa and an assigned colonel were to protect and defend the king of Paté from his enemies. If needed, the king of Paté would be supported with aid (socorros) from Goa. The king of Portugal was to have an absolute monopoly over the commerce of ivory. The king of Paté was to promise “good [i.e. safe] passage” to ships of the king of Portugal, and to supply their needs at moderate prices. He was also obliged to admit an alfândega (custom house) for the collection of the fazenda real. In return, the ships of Paté were to be allowed to do business (fazer contrato) in all the dominions of the king of Portugal, including any part of Africa or Asia (but not with the Arabs of Muscate). A part of the revenue from ivory was also to go to the king of Paté. As for religious matters, the king of Paté was to allow the construction of a Catholic church and propagation of the faith by the Portuguese padres. All Portuguese who resided in Paté and those guilty of apostasy were to be the responsibility of the Portuguese commander. Finally, traitors and conspirators were to be executed according to the law of the .21

The actions of Europeans in the colonial world did not necessarily have to conform to what had been agreed in treaties concluded in Europe. Their conduct may be described as “Machiavellian”: they were inclined to take opportunities to profit from feuding parties (effectively disregarding the treaties concluded at home). This is exemplified by Anglo-Portuguese relations in the Indian Ocean. The English alliance (which was initiated by the 1630 treaty) had been a mixed blessing for the Portuguese. One of the focal points of subsequent Anglo-Portuguese relations in India was centred on the drawn-out affair of Bombay. Pledged as part of the dowry of the marriage of D. João V’s aunt (Catherine of Bragança, daughter of D.

109 João IV) to Charles II, and effectively transferred in 1665, a residual issue (involving the place in the first half of the eighteenth century) revolved around the jurisdiction of the Archbishop Primate (primaz) over ecclesiastical appointments and the welfare of Catholics in Bombay, as well as other “violations” of the terms of the 1661 treaty that the English were said to be guilty of. These issues prompted the Portuguese Crown to take a tough stance for fear that the “prestige” and “interest” of the Crown might be compromised.22 A deliberation of the Overseas Council in 1715 listed these violations and proposed to resolve the issue through “our minister who resides in the court of London”. This minister was to try to ensure that “th[ese] bad relations [correspondencia] that the English have in India with the vassals of this Crown [are] improved”.23

Explicitly detrimental to Portuguese interests was English support for its enemies, for example, the English dispatch of military supplies to the Arabs of Muscate in 1694. In 1715, reporting on a letter from the viceroy, the Overseas Council went so far as to say that the English “make special efforts to find ways of helping all our enemies”. It added that “they are continually selling and lending arms and munitions to the pirates and rebels (levantados) just so they can offend (insultem) our territories and ships”.24 Not surprising then at a later date, Lobato writes that the Maratha success was owed partly to the supply of English arms during the 1737-39 war.25

However, it was not in the English interests to break completely with the Portuguese, as the latter themselves recognised. In its deliberations of 16 October 1715, for instance, the Overseas Council declared that, though the English “only practice their insolences with us, it is not because they fail to recognise that we have the means to punish them, but because they realise that it would not be easy to

110 break [with us]”.26 Indeed, there were occasions when the English went out of their way to assist the Portuguese. For example, the English Governor of Bombay helped to mediate between the Portuguese and Marathas during the re-eruption of hostilities from 1728 to the conclusion of the Treaty of Bombay in 1732 (signed in favour of Portuguese interests). Pissurlencar’s narrative of a particular episode of the struggle at Bandora (on the island of Salcete) in May 1737 reveals how a certain chief captain “avail[ed] himself of the facility of carrying the necessary aid from Bombay, [and] afforded by the nearness of that island and the good will of the Britons on account of ready payment and on account of their desire to avoid the Marathas in close vicinity, ordered out, from there, some artillery of heavy calibre and other material he felt useful for the defence”.27 It can be surmised from this that, whatever pledges the English undertook for the Portuguese in India, protection was not really extended except in cases where the English themselves were threatened, or where obvious profits could be gained. In other instances, the seeking of profits by the English had damaged or threatened Portuguese political interests in the area. In 1724, the Portuguese monarch turned to his minister in London to lodge a complaint against English violations of their treaty commitments.28 In addition, the English found some use in sailing under the Portuguese flag, that is, they did this to avoid French attacks.29 For their part, the Portuguese also sailed under the English flag when this helped to avert Dutch harassment.30

For the first fifteen or so years of the reign of D. João V until about 1720, French activities were centred on and Pondicherry. The French assessed both places to be stagnating or even going into decline. However, the failure of financial viability sealed the fate of the company-cum-state enterprise at Pondicherry. At Surat, the

111 French faced potentially threatening situations from the Marathas and Angria - as did other European powers - on top of liquidity problems.31 One has to assume that the French did not have too much energy or sufficient resources to engage the Portuguese, let alone implement Louis XIV’s wishes for expansion.32

As for the Dutch, they were content to leave remnants of the Portuguese Estado alone after a few unsuccessful attempts to besiege Goa. In fact, so confident were the Dutch that, even in areas conquered from the Portuguese, they failed to mop up and consolidate their hold. This allowed other Europeans a chance to insert themselves into the theatre. Significantly, among the places they took over, the Dutch tried to impose a more ruthless control and monopoly than the Portuguese. In Malabar, the VOC made use of the cartaz-cafila system, as well as military coercive force. 33 However, Dutch inability to engage in Malaban and Cochin politics, together with dissension among collaborators, could well have created opportunities for the Portuguese to scheme and sabotage. Increasingly, the Dutch also found the financial outlay for military expeditions and the maintenance of garrisons to be unjustifiable in terms of the available profitable gain.34

The consultations of the Overseas Council reveal one instance where the Dutch provided assistance to mouro (Muslim) ships in Portuguese waters. This came on top of an English violation, prompting the Council to propose sending ambassadors to The Hague to address the matter. Another entry raised the transgressions by two French in the seas of the south.35

The 1724 instructions of the outgoing viceroy, the Count of Ericeira, to his successor, D. Francisco José de Sampayo e Castro, noted the

112 bases and trade of the Dutch.36 Ericeira even acknowledged that the Dutch in the South China Sea and Seas of the Sunda and Maluku islands depended to a great extent on the moradores (residents) of Macao. In this direction, he tried to create legislation specifically directed at Macao and at ships visiting Dutch ports in order to diminish their prosperity. Concerning the English, Ericeira was also aware of their bases and commercial activities. He noted in particular how the Province of the North had come to rely on Bombay. With regard to upholding the Crown’s padroado real, the count urged the incoming viceroy to hold his ground, and even to make war on the English to punish their expulsion of (Portuguese) religiosos, if this was necessary. For both the Dutch and English, Ericeira noted that they displayed the same inclination to help Portugal’s enemies. As for the French, Ericeira provided a summary of their bases and noted the strength of their company, which he described to be strong even though it was weak in capital. Lastly, he provided brief information about the activities of the Danes and Germans in India and the surrounding area.

Despite being evicted from Canara by the Dutch in the previous century, some form of negotiation and reconciliation was made between the Portuguese viceroy and the king of Canara in 1714. The Portuguese petition started with a reminder and affirmation of the long-standing friendship and support of Canara. The conditions of the agreement asked for the installation of a feitoria with support (including a small garrison force) at Mangalor. They even included a request for the king of Canara to help pay for the expenses involved in the Portuguese armada cruising in the south! In an issue relating to the livelihood of Goa, capital of the Estado da ĺndia, Canara was to supply a quantity of “white and clean” rice on top of the previous 3,150 fardos of the usual variety. Preposterous demands were also

113 made that Canara not accept Arab ships in its ports, and that the Portuguese should have the right to use force on these ships. Ships from Canara were even advised not to trade in Arabic ports. As was customary, cartazes were to be issued to ships sailing from Canara. Finally, the Portuguese also requested a number of religious privileges relating to the protection, rights and behaviour of Christian fathers and their followers.37

The agreement was not one-sided, however, as Canaran interests were also represented in issues pertaining to security and trade. In security, Canara welcomed a cessation of hostilities during the period of negotiation. Also, while Canara was willing to come to the aid of the Estado against some groups in Asia, principally the Arabs, it would only do so as long as the Estado was obliged to reciprocate. In terms of trade, Canara asked that ships other than those accompanying the regular convoy carrying rice have free access, and that its vessels be able to trade with Arab counterparts (namely Mascate), as well as visit other ports. At the same time, a guarantee [of safety] was to be given to Canaran ships in the harbours of the Estado.38

In the king’s alvará to the viceroy (D. V.F. Cesar de Meneses) issued via the Overseas Council, the viceroy was told to treat the prince (of Canara) with the respect he merited. Prior to the issuing of the alvará, the king declared in a resolution that he would be served if peace with Canara was adjusted with conditions that were favourable to the reputation of the Estado. Although a search of the archives has not yet uncovered the outcome of the negotiations, such diplomacy provides evidence of Portuguese initiatives and activities in a geographical area and at a time when they were no longer the dominant power.39

114

Even more illuminating is a treaty concluded with a local southern power which had never been on amicable terms with the Portuguese. In 1724, articles of peace were discussed between a captain of sea and war (capitão de mar e guerra) and the king of Calicut. In the agreement, Portuguese merchants were to receive assistance if they met with trouble or hostility. Furthermore, Portuguese vessels would also receive the necessary effects (and paying for some of these) while harbouring in the ports of the Samorin. The other articles related to the building of a feitoria, as well as a church. Mutual protection and privileges were also conferred on both Christian and Muslim followers. 40 This 1724 document further demonstrates the initiative taken by the Portuguese to engage any side (even those with whom they had long-standing feuds) to maintain - and even to assert - some form of presence.

War and Reinforcements Saldanha’s work has revealed how, on a number of occasions, Portuguese secular-religious rationale for the use of force invoked the idea of ‘just war’. Where necessary, the Portuguese usually exercised the option of war when a foreign potentate did not submit to the tributary system, or else when it had violated the interests of (Catholic) Christendom and its adherents. The extent to which war was undertaken to protect commerce or profit is an issue that has been studied and debated by many. For Chauduri, even the more “capitalistic” English might have decided on war in order “to make the English nation great […] in India”. Moreover, the English did not make a distinction between the use of force against the Great Mughals or a petty local warlord merely on the basis of economic considerations.41

115

A trend of organisational change and professionalisation seems to have taken place from the outset of the eighteenth century. This was after what Shirodkar has described as a “slow start” after the inception of the Portuguese State of India, as well as two other landmark events in the “institutional history” of the Portuguese military in India. The first of these was the creation of a terço in 1630. The second, the creation of the first regular cavalry unit by Viceroy D. Francisco de Távora (1681-86), was mentioned earlier in chapter 2.42 As the eighteenth century unfolded and as part of the process of reform, Shirodkar lists Viceroy Francisco José de Sampaio e Castro’s (1720-23) attempt to create more terços, Viceroy João de Saldanha da Gama’s venture to raise a number of native companies in Salcete and Bardez, as well as Viceroy Pedro Mascarenhas’ (1732-41) improvement to indigenous recruitment. By 1750, Shirodkar affirms that the “maturity” of the native forces “probably prompted the Crown to regiment all its forces in India”.43

Shirodkar’s analysis outlines the military status of Portuguese India in 1708, a year after D. João V’s succession: it comprised 23 “companies of terços” and seven companies of “local Brahmans and Chardos”. The companies had a total strength in excess of 1,200 soldiers, of whom two thirds were Portuguese, European or mestizo stock, while the remainder had been recruited from the native communities of the islands of Salcete and Bardez. In terms of deployment, only a little more than one tenth of the force was retained in Goa; the rest was “deputed on various assignments far and near”.44

By the middle of D. João V’s reign (1728), a detailed update of Portuguese defence at Bassein (capital of the Province of the North)

116 reveals that its bastions (baluartes) housed 90 pieces of artillery and that it was garrisoned by two companies of 80 men, many of whom were natives. Between Bassein and Saybana, deployment was scattered in a couple of small settlements at Cassahe, Nilla and Separa. 45 The next locus of defence seemed to be centred at Saybana. The feitoria and defence outpost at Pragana fielded 250 men in five companies. Saybana itself was defended by a great tranqueira (stockade) as well as three reductos or ramparts, and garrisoned by a “tezo” (terço?) of 50 men. Following on from Pragana, an irregular pentagonal presidio erected at Sabayo was garrisoned by four companies of 180 men and defended by fourteen cannon. North of Pragana was Salsete, encompassing an area occupied by 91 villages. Within the confines of the island were various fortes (forts, for example, S. Peiro and S. Jerónimo) and minor fortifications erected in villages such as Versava and Caranja.46 Asserim featured a plan embodying defence by a body of 1,500 men. As a praça or stronghold of major consideration, Damão was, rather surprisingly, defended by only 70 men in a single company, together with 74 cannon. Before reaching “ancient” and revived Chaul, there were the three small settlements of Parery, Muhim and Trapor, each hosting defences commensurated with their size. 47 Chaul itself was defended by eleven baluartes and four reductos, as well as 58 cannon, and garrisoned by three companies of 62 men each. Lastly, at Morre, there were seven baluartes with 20 cannon and 130 soldiers.48

The instructions from outgoing Viceroy Ericeira to D. Francisco José de Sampaio e Castro in 1724 provide more information on the Portuguese military status in other parts of the Estado. 49 A substantial part of the document was still preoccupied with the establishment and strength in the north. Outside India, some

117 planning had already begun with regard to the reconquest of Mombasa. Among the problems mentioned by Ericeira was the state of poverty of the soldiers there. Ericeira also thought that Damão in the Province of the North could help raise part of the resources. Congo in Persia potentially served as a stopover for the Mombasa project, even though the Portuguese had little military commitment there. In the end, Ericeira’s plans were shelved due to a lack of necessary ships and other means. Further afield, Ericeira also noted the run-down defence of Macao, as well as the minimal garrison maintained at Timor.

The consultations of the Overseas Council show that the king’s “approval” was sought on upgrading and other issues relating to defence and fortifications in India - for instance, whether a certain fort should be torn down and rebuilt near Diu in 1725, and on the progress of works at Mormugão in 1711, or those at Panjim in 1739.50 The welfare of the soldiers was not overlooked, although the problem did not receive a satisfactory solution – as early as 1708, issues regarding the fulfilment of service by soldiers were raised in relation to a list of deserters submitted by the viceroy. In another entry for 1728, the socio-economic conditions of soldiers, especially their poverty and the persistent problem of desertion, were highlighted once again. In 1732, when the Archbishop of Goa petitioned for his prelates to return home, he also asked that the degredado (convict) soldiers be allowed the same concession in view of the condition in which they had arrived.51

Lobato has described the nature of war between the Portuguese and a major enemy like the Marathas as being more guerilla-like than regular.52 Taking into account developments on the Maratha side, the period 1680-1720 was one of internal and external strife.

118 Internally, the death in 1680 of the founder of the Maratha empire, Shivaji (r. 1674-80), sparked a succession struggle. Externally, Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb began an offensive on the Marathas which ended in the death of Shambaji (r. 1680-89). Factional struggle continued, however, with intermittent settlement and Mughal attacks. The Marathas only consolidated their position after 1720 with the rise of an influential military leader, Bajirão. By this time, one or two branches of the local chiefdoms had also seceded from the Maratha Confederation. In between treaties, fighting, albeit irregular, errupted between two or three shifting parties, as outlined in the section above. The intensification in Maratha aggression towards 1739 seems to have been aided, opportunistically, by the Persian sack of the Mughal capital at Delhi, which weakened Mughal imperial defence.53

The 1737-39 campaign has been narrated in Pissurlencar’s works.54 A brief analysis needs to be made of the factors affecting the Portuguese in the course of the conflict. For a start, the quality of the top military leaders sent from home needs to be affirmed, even if the outcome of events on the ground was not to the Crown’s liking. D. Pedro Mascarenhas, Count of Sandomil, had served as mestre de campo of the terço of infantry in the Algarve, and in 1695 led these troops in a relief mission to Ceuta. In this expedition, he had exhibited “great bravery and military competency”. In the War of the Spanish Succession, he was charged with a number of responsibilities and saw action in Catalonia, and led a relief expedition to Campo Maior (one of the main fortresses in the Alentejo guarding the border) before being appointed to India.55 As the longest serving viceroy of India during D. João V’s reign (see appendix B), the count’s efforts in building up the defence in India was admirable. First, the disbanded cavalry was reformed in Salcete

119 and Bardez in 1733.56 Secondly, new troop types were instituted – four companies of grenadiers in Salcete and Bardez, along with the expansion of artillery units (in Goa).57 Thirdly, and perhaps the most important contribution, the count was able to galvanise civilian support and improve indigenous incorporation into the military. In July 1733, midway through João V’s reign, Sandomil issued an alvará ordering that 1,000 men from the ordenanças of each of the three provinces (Goa, Salcete and Bardez) be chosen to form two regiments (terços) of auxiliary troops (auxiliares). Each terço was to comprise 500 men who, he declared, “will all be drawn from amongst the natives of the land, except for the sergeant major and two adjutants, who will be paid [that is, serve full-time] and be knowledgeable in manoeuvres and military discipline”.58 In an effort to encourage the natives to serve in the auxiliary regiments, Sandomil offered a number of enticements. First, acknowledging the “great attention of the natives of this country to their different castes”, to ensure that they were kept separate, Sandomil ordered that “one [terço] will be of Bragmanes, and the other of Charadós”. As the viceroy added, this was “so that they can serve His Majesty with less repugnance, and more usefulness [utilidade]”. Secondly, the officers of the regiments were to be given habits of the Military Order of Santiago, “according to their merits [merecimentos]”.59 Finally, the viceroy exempted the soldiers from the onerous municipal obligations and contributions relating to defence that the rest of the population was subjected to. Among these obligations, Sandomil declared that “they will not be obliged to provide billets, nor contribute any household tools [alfaias de casa] to anyone… nor will they have their oxen or buffalo, or beasts [of burden] taken for any service”.60

120 In another move to increase indigenous participation in defence, two companies of married civilian (casado) artillerymen were also established in Salcete and Bardez. Though natives had been employed in expeditions as early as Albuquerque’s time, the improvement of conditions and opportunities for appointment marked the beginning of a process that would lead to their regimentation in 1750. It is worth noting that this occurred some decades before the appearance of the British sepoys.61 In fact, a certain Maratha general went so far as to praise Portuguese defence in the Province of the North in the aftermath of the fall of Bassein, calling it “formidable”.62 The final loss of Bassein took place under a series of interacting circumstances, including possible intrigues suffered by Sandomil at home, which could not be attributed to the count alone.63

Still on the factor of leadership, might the shortfall in leadership in 1739 be attributable to the strategic decision to commit to the ill-fated 1730 expedition to recapture Mombasa? A remark in a letter of the Casa da ĺndia, brought on a ship returning to Lisbon, reveals that the storehouse of the Goan shipyard (ribeira) was running low due to repeated expeditions to Mombasa.64 It was also noted for a couple of years after 1730 that “the warehouse of the ribeira in Portugal had no stock of arms, munitions and other requirements as they were exhausted by the expedition of Mombasa”.65 However, as much as the Portuguese were stretched, the Marathas involved themselves in multiple objectives. Towards the final months of 1737, Bajirão was ordered by Shahu Raja to focus on Hindustan as a result of developments at Delhi, thus depriving troops engaged against the Province of the North of further support.66

On fortifications, state-of-the-art defences seem to have been erected at certain points. Although not fully completed, the bulwarks

121 built at Thana linked together as a pentagon of the sort that was the most modern seen in Europe. The town of Thana even had “circumvallation” lines to protect it from the enemy. In terms of tactics and discipline, the report card is somewhat mixed though not dismal. In an attack on Dongri in 1738, Portuguese grenadiers repelled Maratha cavalry with musket fire on more than one occasion – something that could only have happened when some discipline was involved to produce a coordinated discharge. Earlier, their landing on Dongri shores was supported by naval fire and these freshly-arrived troops were able to execute an organised march to capture the first hill they encountered.67 This description seems to convey a picture of a reasonably organised amphibious operation, a far cry from Boxer’s depiction of a panicky and unprofessional force.68 Yet at other times, as at Tivin in 1739, the grenadiers’ repelling and pursuit of a retreating enemy cavalry turned into a disorganised affair, giving the enemy a chance to counterattack. 69 To be sure, desertion still presented a severe problem among native and increasing numbers of degredado Portuguese soldiers, especially in the face of overwhelming enemy odds. Nevertheless, despite the bias against native auxiliaries, they were routinely incorporated with some Portuguese soldiers to make them “more fit”.70 For the rest of the campaign, despite the arrival of better quality reinforcements from home, some of these ended up in hospitals after long voyages, and shortages would continue to present a great challenge in the deployment against a land-based power like the Marathas.

On the sea and related to the course of this same campaign, the Portuguese were locked in a fight against Angria, which after 1729 no longer remained a vassal of the Marathas. Although not necessarily on the side of the Marathas, the growing strength of Angria and its piratical activities clearly had a considerable impact on

122 the Portuguese ability to reinforce their defence in the north. Originally, and ironically built against the Siddis by the Portuguese, the Maratha (later Angria) fleet of a few hundred vessels consisted of ships of up to 300 tons burden capacity and 30-40 gun armament each. The threat from Angria prompted the Portuguese to seek an alliance with the English as early as the 1720s (when Angria was still loyal to the Maratha). In isolated combat, as an incident of March 1739 reveals, the action of a lone frigate seemed to prove that the Portuguese still retained certain naval prowess when this vessel repelled about a dozen enemy galleys and other boats.71 Following on from the consultations on Angria, there are several entries in the form of situation updates and on-going negotiations. When peaceful efforts failed, resort was made, expectedly, to war.72

From the perspective of the centre, intermittent updates on the war with the Marathas and other minor powers before the 1730s can be found in the registers of the Overseas Council. 73 Of particular interest is the relatively scant mention in the deliberations of the Overseas Council of the Bassein campaign. A survey of the registers of deliberations from 1738 to 1740 revealed no more than five or six entries.74 By contrast, a survey of the episode at Mombasa for 1728- 30 uncovered at least a dozen entries.75 The deliberations on the war in India included updates on the state of defence (for example, fortifications at Goa), on the enemy (namely, the Marathas and even the Mughals), threats, and on certain successes in the north, as well as requests for socorros (aid or relief forces) in the form of munitions and materials, along with personnel (for example, a carpenter) to sustain the on-going war. The reason for the disparity in attention (i.e. more entries on East Africa compared to north India) can be attributed partly to a shortfall in one of the outgoing annual voyages from Lisbon (the outgoing Carreira). This is mentioned in a letter by

123 the Casa da ĺndia to the vedor da fazenda of India in two outgoing ships. In terms of reinforcements, the same letter also revealed that each of the two naus would carry two more boxes of one hundred swords and scabbards in each ship.76 Not knowing that help was coming soon, a general letter from the vedor da fazenda in Goa raised the problem that, as a result of the continuous wars, the warehouse of the ribeira of Goa had already exhausted its munitions and other provisions. The outgoing letter of the Casa, dated May 1740, acknowledged the situation in India. More importantly, the special expedition (accompanying the letter) carried generous socorros with the newly-appointed viceroy to redress the setback and crisis that had befallen India the year before.77 Reinforcements were sent in four battalions totalling 2,000 armed men. This is worthy of note because the battalion as a unit of organization was introduced in metropolitan Portugal only in 1735. Also consigned with the expedition was artillery of “new invention” which was able to “fire 20 rounds a minute”. 78 With the involvement of European powers in the region, it is easy enough to understand why the centre undertook the fairly rapid introduction into the Estado of emerging military technologies and organisation. There was, however, another reason to ensure that the latest innovations were introduced, for the regional powers were clearly “catching up”, as a letter of 1722 from the viceroy reveals. On 12 December Francisco José de Sampaio e Castro informed the king that:

India is so encircled by enemies who are so powerful […] and so war-like [guerreiros] that in determinations [resoluções] they no longer seem like Asians, and if they possessed good discipline, they would be no different from the Europeans.79

124 The royal instructions accompanying the new viceroy, the fifth Count of Ericeira (who had been granted the title of Marquis of Louriçal), indicate that the Crown had rather accurate information on what was going on in India. Although it was not known if Goa was in immediate danger, the document advised Ericeira, as incoming viceroy, that if the capital was not in danger, he was to make plans as he saw fit to retake the Province of the North. Even if terms had already been signed, Ericeira was to consult with the outgoing viceroy and others to reassess the need for these to be overthrown if they were prejudicial to the Estado. The final decision was to be entrusted to the marquis.80

As late as April 1740, correspondence between D. João V and the secretary of state, the Cardinal da Mota, reveals that the king was still toying with the idea of sending 2,700 men to India aboard six naus, but the exchange also mentioned that this socorro be reduced owing to the “non-urgent” nature of the war. 81 While the Crown seemed informed about the on-going crisis, it also appeared somewhat nonchalant about the situation.

Back in India, however, the crisis was deepening. For the outgoing viceroy, the Count of Sandomil, and his councillors, events in the year 1739 were causing mounting concern. The records of the Council of State in Goa show that there was not a month passed where the count and members of Council were not concerned with developments in the north. The simultaneous commencement of the war in the surrounding provinces and islands of Goa meant that they were also putting out a fire on their own doorstep. Records of the Council for March show that the enemy was already in Bardez, and that last minute arrangements were being made to reinforce the fort of Rachol at Salcete. In fact, in the previous month (February), the

125 Council had gone so far as to call upon religiosos to help man the defences at Goa. The battle for supply and provisioning also extended the theatre of conflict to the southern sea of India, where Angria’s fleet prevented rice from reaching the city. By April, it seemed that peace negotiations had been re-initiated, and by the following month (May), adjustments of treaties with the Marathas and Bounsulos were progressing in earnest. However, given the uncertain nature of the situation, the governor of Chaul was given instructions and contingency plans to “abandon” the town to the English, if the need arose.82

Under normal circumstances, socorros to India were made in a single or twin-ship voyage carrying an average of 20 officers, 10-20 despachados (those appointed to public office), 40-50 mariners, 15- 20 grumetes (cabin boys or ship hands), 20-30 artillerymen, and 150-200 soldiers in each vessel. On rare occasions, a ship might carry more than 300 soldiers. Accompanying the military personnel were the cabedal (monies or property) of the king, uniforms, munitions, swords and scabbards and other materials which must have included some gunpowder and weaponry.83 The consultations of the Overseas Council show that requests for socorros (aid in the form of reinforcements) were unceasing, with each subsequent petition being labelled as “more crucial”. Beyond the regular aid it dispatched, given the secondary role of India, the Crown was not willing or able to commit more resources other than in exceptional circumstances. However, as we saw earlier in terms of military technology and organisation, the type of troops requested also reveals that the Portuguese were well aware of the need to keep abreast of the military advances of its local enemies, and also that modern siegecraft was now an integral feature of warfare in the East. In a letter of 12 December 1722, the viceroy expressed the hope that

126 the king would send the “one thousand men that I have asked for, and a company of 70 miners (mineiros), artillerymen and bomb specialists (bombeiros), because without this [aid] it is impossible to conserve India”, adding, as we saw earlier, that the Asians now fought more like Europeans.84

In an earlier letter of January 1717, Viceroy Ericeira had indicated the need to send veteran specialist troops instead of men of “such poor quality that one can have no confidence in them”. This, as he reminded the king, was because most of the men sent to the Estado were convicted criminals who were routinely deported there. The viceroy went on to ask that “in the first monsoon”, the king “send at least 50 artillerymen, and 20 bombeiros and miners, all with their officers, from the artillery regiment of Alentejo”. His letter went on to reveal just why these veteran, specialist troops were needed, declaring that:

in this entire Estado there is no one who knows how to attack with a mortar, let alone set a bomb to the required elevation, and with this manner of attack [expugnação] some useful enterprise could be achieved, because of the horror the Asiatics have for this instrument.85

When regular trips failed to follow their routine, as can be seen in an instance in 1715 when gunpowder did not arrive, prompting the viceroy to write and ask that the deviation be addressed. During longer campaigns, a petition was also forwarded to ask that the locally born (Portuguese) be recruited, even though this seemed to have been within the viceroy’s autonomy. Only on rare occasions can one see an entry in the registers complaining of excessive

127 personnel, as occurred in 1730 when the procurador (procurator) of the Crown wrote regarding the surplus employment of mercenaries.86

On the Seas / Outside India By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Brazil was becoming an important pillar of the metropolitan economy. Marginalised to a significant extent, India, nevertheless, continued to bring back small profits for the Crown on an annual basis. Although viceroys found it increasingly difficult to gain fama da cabedal (the glory of wealth), both the Crown and its principal representatives in the Estado tried to increase revenue there, if only so that the ports and strips of land there might continue to be sustained on their own. To this end, after the fall of Ceylon in 1658, Mozambique had increasingly become a support for the Estado da ĺndia. Commerce at Mozambique was to undergo a further crisis with the fall of Mombasa (in 1698) and the Province of the North in India (in 1739). Accounts and interpretations of the Mombasa campaigns have been detailed to a large extent by prominent scholars such as Boxer and Strandes. The strategic fort Jesus itself has been studied in depth by Azevedo in the authoritative joint volume with Boxer. This section will focus on the centre’s input to the expeditions and attempted control of the area in the midst of the ups and downs. First, a brief account of the background is needed to set later events in context.

After the 1698 loss and attempted (but unsuccessful) relief of Mombasa, the fort remained in the hands of Muscate until 1727, when a large-scale expedition was prompted, in part, by the death of the Omani sultan. The initial success was rather brief, and a series of efforts which led to the capture of the fort in March 1728 was reversed when the “tactlessness” and “inefficiency” of the

128 Portuguese ushered in the final round of siege and surrender of the fort in April 1729. A further expedition in February 1730 under the leadership of Luis de Mello de Sampaio (commander of the successful 1728 expedition) failed to produce a decisive outcome, and the fleet was wrecked by bad weather on its way back to Goa. In his analysis, Boxer was of the opinion that the Portuguese campaigns in East Africa in the first quarter of the eighteenth century were jeopardised primarily by inept leadership and, secondly, by an incompetent system of support. This interpretation differs – as Boxer himself acknowledges - from that of Strandes, who thought the reverse, that is, that the system was the main culprit.87

From the accession of D. João V to the early 1720s, the deliberations of the Overseas Council include a number of entries concerning Mombasa prior to the actual undertaking in 1728. These ranged from intelligence updates, exploration of the possibility of retaking Mombasa, and recommendations on this matter.88 On the larger stage, the inconstancy of international relations was once more demonstrated when an alliance was negotiated by the Portuguese with the Islamic Persian state against the “Arabs” of Muscate.89 Other than Mombasa, there were also communications relating to administrative matters and requests for socorros from the fort at Mozambique, for the Portuguese did not collapse en masse after the loss of Mombasa. Further south, there was affirmation of the friendship with the ruler of Monomotapa, as well as an update of defence works at .90 The year of the expedition, 1728, and the following two years were an intense period for the Portuguese, as witnessed by the shift in events outlined above. Before the actual reconquest, an inflated proposal by the general of the armada of the Estreito (Straits) included a grandiose plan to retake not only Mombasa, but also to defeat Muscate and even to retake Ormuz!91

129 When news of Mombasa’s collapse in 1729 was known and an expedition thought necessary, the viceroy admitted to reluctance even as preparations were being made. 92 This is corroborated in Strandes, who states that Goa was, by then, having its clerics armed for patrol!93 Up until the failure of the February 1730 expedition, the deliberations of the Overseas Council continued to be preoccupied with the mobilisation of men for socorros, although by that time a proposal to abandon Paté had also been considered.94 This is in contrast to Strandes’ notion that the administration at Goa had no further news of Mombasa or Paté.95 A request to co-operate was made by the French shortly after the debacle in 1732, as revealed in one entry in the Council registers. As Strandes points out, the French continued to push the Portuguese to give up their claims in Mombasa and Paté - in 1739, 1744 and also on other occasions.96 In partial confirmation of Strandes’ observation, the deliberations of the Overseas Council on this area were sparse only after 1730, with entries being mainly concerned about some hopes that the Junta do Comércio would succeed in making a profit.97 However, in view of the uncertain intelligence on the area, in addition to declining trade, it seems that the Junta was not able to do much either.

On the seas, the 1727-28 Portuguese-Omani struggle constituted an uneven standoff. On top of a crisis at home, Muscate was threatened externally by Persia and was only able to raise a small naval force of one galliot and five terradas against two naus (warships), a frigate and four other smaller ships. One reason why D. Luís de Mello de Sampaio did not act in the subsequent Mombasa expedition in 1730 was because the Portuguese encountered a much stronger Omani naval opposition, which consisted of a number of naus and frigates against which the Portuguese could only field two naus and three minor ships.98

130

In terms of naval resources, the naval command at Goa had under it a number of elements: a ribeira real (royal dockyard), a warehouse, an armada de alto bordo (high seas fleet) and armada do remo (galley fleet, powered by oarsmen). The galley fleet was a development that began after the Portuguese had established themselves in the region in the sixteenth century to handle local-level threats and tasks. Every season, a fleet would also be scraped together as either the armada do norte (northern armada) or the armada do sul (southern armada). The southern armada, for instance, might even be distinguished according to the different destination to which it was going, for example, to Malabar or Canara, etc. At times, naus (armed Indiamen) on the monsoon trip from home would be requested to assist in missions while they were in Goa.99 As at home, shipbuilding did not receive a separate budget in Goa. Instead, the viceroy was instructed by the king to set aside a certain sum from the cabedal sent from home. The difference, especially if there was a shortfall, had to be raised from reserve funds or even from the Misericordia. 100 In the first half of the eighteenth century, naval resources continued to be stretched. A letter from Goa revealed that all of the existing ships were either in repair or occupied in tasks related to the “conservation” of India.101 The letter then asked for two more 70-80- and 45-50-gun ships needed to replace and supplement a “corroded” ship that had been purchased in Holland for India. In line with naval development and technology, the request can be taken as an indication of the Portuguese endeavouring to keep up with developments. However, it also attests to the Estado’s very limited naval strength. When Goa was threatened at one point, the indigenised fleet of vessels under its purview was exhibited - palas, galvetas, galias, manchuas, etc. - when these ships were sent out to patrol the rivers around the

131 islands during an alert against enemy attack.102 During the period under investigation (1707-50), there seems to have been a slight professionalisation of the service seen in the increased appearance of the captain of sea and war (capitão de mar e guerra), vis-à-vis the captain-major (capitão-mor) of a sea voyage. The difference between them is that the former were professional seamen, while the latter were fidalgos who rarely saw permanent service in the navy. This is verified by a survey of consultas mistas (mixed consultas or deliberations) of the Overseas Council.103

Turning now to shipbuilding, during the period under investigation up to 1739, Goa and Bassein continued to build some ships that were comparable to those being built in Brazil from cheaper raw materials there, while Damão continued to be contracted to build vessels for the country traders of Bombay, right up to the dawn of the nineteenth century.104 The deliberations of the Overseas Council and general letters of the Casa da ĺndia reveal that carpenters were, at times, sent to India, and that the viceroy occasionally even issued personal orders and urged them to construct more ships.105 At other times, the viceroy wrote regarding the “incapacity” of the naus built. In most cases, if not all, aid (socorros) was sought from the Council.106

Despite having dropped to a third rate and relatively insignificant power, support from home, along with local infrastructure in the eastern colonies, kept the Portuguese on the margins of survival. In one engagement against the French in the Straits of Melaka, a 34- gun Portuguese frigate was pitted against two French frigates of 54 and 36 guns respectively. Though the Portuguese frigate emerged requiring urgent repairs after the engagement, the French 54-gunner was also badly mauled in the process. Monteiro uses this example to argue that the quality of Portuguese personnel and artillery was

132 comparable to the best of the period. In fairness, it must be said that the French commander seems to have made a tactical mistake at one stage in the battle by having the Portuguese “sandwiched”; a move which allowed the Portuguese to use both their broadsides against the French ships.107

In other examples of clashes in the south seas of India, a lone 74- gun Portuguese nau encountered and dispersed seven palas and eleven galvetas. However, another squadron of thirteen Portuguese parangues failed against six palas and nine galvetas from Angria, which then prevented supplies of rice from reaching Goa. At Mangalor, a single Portuguese frigate, in conjunction with a galliot and two manchuas, met several Omani frigates as well as three or four terranquins, and inflicted severe losses on the latter. In the Persian Gulf and nearer to the Muscate home base, three Portuguese naus and a frigate were pitted against two Omani naus and two frigates. However, the two Omani naus were 80- and 76-gun warships, while the best armed Portuguese counterpart was armed with only 66 guns; overall strength was therefore comparable on both sides. The outcome of the battle was a serious setback on the Omani side, so much so that serious contemplation was given to mounting an invasion of Muscate. Only the limitations in experienced hands and finances on the Portuguese side prevented the implementation of the proposal.108

The deliberations of the Overseas Council for the period under review reveal that the Portuguese continued to use naval power in an effort to reassert, not merely to maintain, their presence in Asia. In early 1719 the viceroy reported that an armada had been sent up to Persia to enforce the cartaz system. Meanwhile down south, in January 1717, the viceroy reported that plans had been mooted with

133 the Samorin to expel the Dutch, though this action had resulted in some losses.109 Around Cape Camorin, writing in January 1728, the captain major (capitão-mor) of São Tomé argued, and even asked for, soldiers for the continued “conservation and augmentation” of the Portuguese there! This entry is of interest because the register reveals that on 9 April 1729, two days before the Council met to deliberate, Secretary of State Diogo Mendonça Corte Real gave his (personal) advice on the matter, among other issues. This brings one back to the question of what constituted a matter of “importance”, as it was noted that the secretary of state could discuss remotely- related business as long as it concerned the king’s prestige or the State’s interest.110

Five years earlier, the 1724 instructions of the outgoing viceroy, the Count of Ericeira, to his successor, D. Francisco José de Sampaio e Castro, reveal that the armada de alto bordo and armada do norte had not been experiencing success in the north because of the actions of their enemies, and that this had led to the ruination of commerce. As for the armada of the south, the lack of maintenance and supplies continued to cripple the fleet. More importantly, the reluctance to participate and lack of trade led on one occasion to the cancellation of its voyage. With regard to Bengala and even Siam, Ericeira raised the possibility that these places might serve as support bases for the armada of the south.111

Finally, we turn to the perennial issue of the Portuguese fortified network in the Indian Ocean. The question of how wide a network of naval posts was needed was not a straightforward one, or one that had only just been raised. The debate had been raging since the time of D. Francisco de Almeida and Afonso de Albuquerque; the latter had seen the need for a more extended network. Indeed, even

134 a great naval strategist and historian of the history of sail like Mahan could not be more specific, stating that:

[f]ortified bases of operation are as needful to a fleet as an army … the number of points must be reduced as much as can be … the multiplication of [which]… as you pass the limits of reasonable necessity, [will make the situation] become a source of weakness, multiplying exposed points, and entailing division of force.112

However, it was not that the Portuguese had much free choice as to where they could establish their bases; this was determined by circumstances and by the “generosity” which local land powers and later European powers showed towards them.

While the securing of vital straits, passages and choke-points is important in the maintenance of sea power, the value of each key point has to be balanced in terms of its benefits and liabilities.113 In Renascent Empire, Ames argues that the loss of several outposts to Dutch aggression did make the network “more slimline and affordable”.114 In a proposal by Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo in 1741-42 to revive commerce and set up a company, the future Marquis of Pombal suggested that a web of well-equipped points be maintained. This network would have presumably tapped into whatever remaining infrastructure Portugal possessed in the Estado. 115 In his instructions to the Count of Assumar, the king declared in 1744 that he was “glad” that the dominions were reduced to Goa and the surrounding provinces with two other ports in the North, as this could presumably cut down on the governance and,

135 hence, costs of maintenance.116 The other way that an aspiring naval power can hope to increase its operational capability is to acquire alliances so that the naval infrastructure and the outposts of allies may be accessible. In this respect, the Portuguese attempt to secure the help of England appeared, at times, to have landed them with more headaches than relief.

In an embryonic early modern international world, Portuguese diplomacy and alliances, even with its closest European ally, had not worked satisfactorily to help preserve, let alone extend, the Estado da ĺndia. However, during the period under investigation, diplomacy and alliances had provided a respite at severely threatening moments for the Estado and allowed it to survive. Treaties were sealed with European and local potentes, although the degree to which they were followed to the letter depended on the self interest that could be gained at that moment. Where “civilised talk” could not solve issues, Portuguese arms engaged in a life-and-death struggle against overwhelming odds, often against a multitude of threats. On land, the Portuguese continued to hold their own till 1739, despite being stretched and under equipped. On the sea, they routinely carried out convoying and other protection activities, and were far from being debilitated. In terms of the overall thesis, the “proactiveness” of diplomacy and use of war against an array of foreign entities demonstrates these were important instruments in the preservation of the Portuguese in the East for a large part of the first half of the eighteenth century. The issue of wealth and monies in the tightly-strapped Estado da ĺndia, so crucial to diplomacy and war, will be the focus of the next chapter.

136 Endnotes

1 A.V. de Saldanha, Iustum Imperium – Dos Tratados como Fundamento do Imperio dos Portugueses no Oriente (Lisbon, 1997), p. 200. 2 See M. Pearson, The Portuguese in India (Cambridge, 1987), H. Furber, Rival Empires of Trade (London, 1976) and S. Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia (London, 1993). 3 S. Howe, Empire (Oxford, 2000), p. 62, 4 Saldanha, Dos Tratados como Fundamento do Imperio dos Portugueses no Oriente, pp. 228-34. 5 Ibid., pp. 399-403. 6 Ibid., p. 200. 7 AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India, ff. 418v-19r. 8 AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India, ff. 427r-v and 437r. Also, letter from king to viceroy via Overseas Council, originally from Livro das Monções N° 81 fol. 43 formerly in Archive of India, transcribed and printed in Collecçao de Tratados que o Estado da India fez com Reis com quem teve relaçoes nas partes da Asia e Africa Oriental V by J.F.J. Biker, (New Delhi, 1995), pp. 319-21. Here after, referred to as CTEA. 9 V. Berinstain, Mughal India - Splendour of the Peacock Throne (London, 1998), p. 114-18. Another date in the nineteenth century is given as 1857 – after the breakout of a sepoy mutiny. Queen Victoria, however, was not crowned as empress of India until 1877. 10 AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India : f. 435r; Códice 213 : f. 316r. 11 BN, Instructions to D. Francisco José de Sampayo e Castro, Códice 1455, ff. 33v-40v. 12 Bajirão was a Maratha military commander who rose to full prominence in the 1720s. S. Gordon, in The Marathas (Cambridge, 1993), gives some background of him. An instance of a full monograph on the personality can be found in an Indian-published work by R.D. Palsokar, Bajirão I – Outstanding Calvary General (New Delhi, 1995). However, care has to be taken in consulting this work as it is couched, at points, in “nationalistic” fervour. 13 A. Lobato, Luso-Marata Relações to 1737 (Lisbon, 1965), pp. 50-52. For example, the Marathas demanded territories from the Portuguese, Sundas and Bounsulos of which the Portuguese promised support against the last said. No response was made to the request regarding exemption of customs on merchants through Portuguese lands to Maratha dominions, but freedom was to be given as before. 14 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 15Ibid., pp. 79-80. 1728 peace not appended. 16Ibid., pp. 119-121. 17Ibid., pp. 150-169. 18M. Lobato, “A Guerra dos Marathas” in M.T. Barata and N.S. Texeira directed, Nova História Militar de Portugal (Lisbon, 2004), pp. 327-28. 19CTEA V, pp. 221-23. Originally from Livro de Pazes 1° fol. 424 in formerly Archive of India. 20G.D. Winius and M.P. Vink, The Merchant-Warrior Pacified (Delhi, 1991), p. 75. 21CTEA V, pp. 55-56.

137

22P.P. Shirodkar, Researches in Indo-Portuguese History (Jaipur, 1998), entry “Bombay and the Portuguese” pp. 14-16. 23 AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 66r-v. 24 AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 66r-v dated 16 Oct 1715. 25Lobato, “A Guerra dos Maratas”, p. 328. 26 AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 66r-v dated 16 Oct 1715. 27P.S. Pissurlencar, translated by P.R. Kakodkar, Portugueses e Marathas (Bombay, 1975), p. 199. Original material drawn from Successos da India and Oriente Português 28Shirodkar, “Bombay and the Portuguese”, p. 15. 29 K. McPherson, “Enemies or Friends? Portuguese, British and Survival of Portuguese Commerce” in F.A. Dutra and J.C. dos Santos (eds.) The Portuguese and the Pacific (Santa Barbara, 1995), p. 229. 30Winius and Vink, The Merchant-Warrior Pacified, p. 58. 31A. Ray, Merchant and the State – French in India 1666-1739 I (New Delhi, 2004), pp. 453-503. 32 See J.H. Geller, “Towards New Imperialism in Eighteenth Century India – Dupleix, La Bourdonnais and French Compagne des Indes” in Portuguese Studies 16 (Jan 2000), pp. 240-56. 33C.R. Boxer also noted this in Dutch Seaborne Empire (London, 1965), pp. 187-214. 34Winius and Vink, The Merchant-Warrior Pacified, p. 61. Substantiated further by H.K. Jacob, The Rajas of Cochin 1663-1720 (New Delhi, 2000), p. 170. 35AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India: ff 419r-v; Códice 213: ff. 76v-77v. 36See BN, Instructions to D. Francisco José de Sampayo e Castro, Códice 1455, ff. 41v-44r. 37CTEA V, pp. 281-85. Originally from Livro de Pazes 1° fol. 269 in former Archive of India. 38Ibid., pp. 285-88. 39Ibid., pp. 289-90. 40CTEA VI, pp. 16-17. Originally from Livro de Pazes 1° fol. 296 in formerly Archive of India. 41I. Bruce Watson, “Fortifications and the Idea of Force in Early EIC Relations with India” in Past and Present 88 (Aug 1980), pp. 70-87. 42P.P. Shirodkar, “Development of Military Services in Goa during the Portuguese Regime 1510- 1750” in Researches in Indo-Portuguese History II (Jaipur, 1998), pp. 57-60. “Slow start” because the first semblance of a standing force was established 56 years after the inception of the Estado da Índia. 43Ibid., pp. 66-69. 44Ibid., pp. 60-61. 45 “Do estado em que se acha a infantaria etc. da Provincia do Norte em 1728 por Feitor de Baçaym ao V Rey”, transcribed by A.B. Coutinho in Chronista de Tissuary I (1866), pp. 29-35. Nilla had one cannon and six soldiers; Separa had four watch-towers / sentinels and two undermanned cannon. 46Ibid., p. 32. Versa had a small run-down fort garrisoned by one company of 50 men and ten cannon. Caranja also had one company of 50 men, and six cannon; more pertinently, 400

138 inhabitants “de espingarda” (armed with espingardas, a type of arquebus), helped to defend this place. 47Ibid., pp. 34-35. At Parery, 40 men in a company with five pieces of artillery; at Muhim, 60 soldiers in a company with 15 pieces of artillery; at Trapor, 60 men in a company with 21 pieces of artillery. Ericeira wrote about “re-glorified” or revived Chaul, which I have interpretated to be – a resurgence in activities and livelihood in the city from a decline set in during the late 16th century. 48Ibid., p. 35. 49BN, Instructions to D. Francisco José de Sampayo e Castro, Códice 1455, ff. 10r-11v, 24v-26v and 27v-29r. 50AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India: ff. 418v-19v; Códice 213: ff. 9v-10r, 182r-v and 327r-v. 51AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India : ff. 423r-v; Códice 213: ff. 199r-v and 263v. 52 Lobato, “A Guerra dos Maratas”, pp. 317-29. 53 Berinstain, Mughal India - Splendour of the Peacock Throne, p. 117. 54 Pissurlencar, The Portuguese and the Marathas. 55Afonso Zuquete, Tratados de Todos os Vice-Reis e Governadores da Índia (Lisbon, 1962), pp. 180-81. 56 These were areas most susceptible to more mobile Maratha threat. 57 F. Bethencourt, “O Estado da India” in Bethencourt and Chaudhuri directed, História da Expansão Portuguesa III (Lisbon, 1998), p. 266. 58J.H. da Cunha Rivara, Archivo Portuguez Oriental (New Dehli, 1992), p. 415-18. Transcribed from Livro de Serviço fol. 41v. Here after, referred to as APO. 59 On the Order of Santiago in India, see F. Dutra, “The Order of Santiago and the Estado da India, 1498-1750”, in F. A. Dutra and J. Camilo dos Santos (eds.), The Portuguese in the Pacific (Santa Barbara, 1995), pp. 287-304. 60APO, pp. 415-18. 61Shirodkar, “Development of Military Services in Goa during Portuguese Regime”, pp. 60-61. 62Ibid., p. 69. 63Zuquete, Tratados de Todos os Vice-Reis e Governadores da India, p. 181. 64AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais que vão / vem da India, ff. 45v-46v in the year 1730. 65Pissurlencar, The Portuguese and the Marathas, p.194. 66Ibid., p. 211. 67Ibid., pp. 223-24. 68Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 117 “After disembarking, the soldiers seldom waited to form up properly but rushed forward impetuously. If the enemy did not flee, the first soldiers would be too exhausted to fight but turn tail”. 69Pissurlencar, The Portuguese and the Marathas, p. 271. 70Ibid., p. 230.

139

71Ibid., p. 286. For more details of the development of Maratha navy, see “Shipbuilding and Maritime Activities with reference to Maratha Power” by A.R. Kulkarni in K.S. Mathew (ed), Shipbuilding and Navigation in the Indian Ocean Region to 1800 (New Delhi, 1997), pp. 1-11. 72AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India: ff. 439r-v 1709. 73AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India: ff. 426v-27r in 1708 against Colle; Codice 213: ff. 77r-v in 1716 against Sanganes, 187r-88v in 1725 against Sahau Raja, and 199r in 1728 against Fondo Saunto. 74AHU, Códice 213, Registo de Consultas acerca India: ff. 324r-29v, Codice 214: ff. 1r-2r. 75AHU, Códice 213, Registo de Consultas acerca India: ff. 194v-232v. 76AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais…, ff. 82r-83r. 77AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais…, ff. 86r-v and 89v-90v. 78C. Selvagem, Portugal Militar (Lisbon, 1931/1994), pp. 470-471. 79 APO, p. 267. 80Instructions, to Ericeira, transcribed from Livro das Monções No 111B in Pissurlencar, The Portuguese and the Marathas, pp. 459-60. 81E. Brazão, Subsidios para a História do Seu (D. João V’s) Reinado (Porto, 1945), document XLV, pp. 133-38. Transcription of communication between D. João V and Cardinal da Mota. Here after, referred to as SSHR. 82P.S. Pissurlencar, Assentos do Conselho do Estado V (Goa, 1957), entries for 1739, pp. 476-563. 83AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais…, survey of ff. 15r-117v. 84APO, p. 267. 85APO, p. 245. 86AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India , ff 50r, 204v-205r and 225v-26r. 87C.R. Boxer and C. (Carlos) de Azevedo, Fort Jesus and the Portuguese in Mombasa 1593-1729 (London , 1960), pp. 57-85. 88AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India: f. 429r; Códice 213: ff. 8v-9r, 183r-184r and 201v- 202r. 89AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India: ff. 418r-v; Códice 213: ff. 60v and 120r-21v. 90AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India: ff. 418r-v, 426r-v and 429v; Códice 213: ff. 61r-v and 209v-210r. 91AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India , ff. 210r-12v. 92AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India , ff. 214r-v. 93J. Strandes, translated by J. Wallwork, The Portuguese Period in East Africa (Nairobi, reprinted 1968 1st ed 1899), pp. 255-56. 94 Strandes, The Portuguese Period in East Africa, see conclusion; pp. 260-80. 95 Ibid., see conclusion. 96 Ibid., see conclusion. 97Ibid., pp. 262-63. 98S. Monteiro, Batalhas e Combates da Marinha Portuguesa VII (Lisbon, 1996), pp. 138-39.

140

99Ibid., p. 148-51. The nau Nossa Senhora da Vitoria, for example, was deployed against ships of Angria that were trying to blockade Goa. 100See V.L.G. Rodrigues, “Military Structure of in the Indian Ocean in the 16th Century” and K.M. Mathew, “The Economics of Portuguese Shipbuilding in Goa to 1773” in K.S. Mathew (ed.), Shipbuilding and Navigation in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi, 1997), pp. 89-93 and 140-46. See also chap V in G.J. Ames, Renascent Empire (Amsterdam, 2000), pp. 115-48. 101BN, Códice 4407, Cartas que Conde Ericeira escreve á D. João V, Conselho Ultramarino e Secretaria Estado, ff. 112r-v. 102Monteiro, Batalhas e Combates da Marinha Portuguesa, p. 148. See an earlier publication on the subject by Esparteiro, Tres Seculos no Mar (Lisbon, 1974). As a reminder, this assembly of vessels is a reflection of the indigenisation of the Portuguese navy in India undertaken in the course of the sixteenth century. 103AHU, Códices 21-24, Consultas Mistas, indexes. It should be noted that the number appointed for captain of voyage still exceeded that commissioned for captain of sea and war in sampling and survey. 104C.R. Boxer, “The Carreira da India” in Boxer, From Lisbon to Goa (Aldershot, 1997), I, pp. 37- 39. See also R.D. Silva, “Shipbuilding in Portuguese Bassein” in K.S. Mathew (ed.), Shipbuilding and Navigation in Indian Ocean (New Delhi, 1997), pp. 94-97. 105AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais…, ff 43r-v. Also, AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India , f. 324r. 106AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India , ff. 111r-v and 324r. 107Monteiro, Batalhas e Combates da Marinha Portuguesa, pp. 81-83. 108Ibid, pp. 65-66, 111-15 and 148-56. 109AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India : ff. 79v and 110v-11r. 110AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India , ff. 209r-v. 111BN, Instructions to D. Francisco José de Sampayo e Castro, Códice 1455, ff. 6r-8v. 112 Quoted from AT Mahan, Naval Strategy – Compare and Contrasted with Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston, 1911), pp. 191-192. 113 See for example, an analysis on Goa in Pearson, The Portuguese in India, p. 89. 114Ames, Renascent Empire, pp. 205-13. 115J. Barreto introduced, Escritos Economicos de Londres by Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (Lisbon, 1986), p. 154. 116 Instructions to Assumar, originally from personal collection of JFJ Biker, transcribed and printed in CTEA VI by Biker, pp. 243-262.

141 CHAPTER 5

BUSINESS OF THE ESTADO DA ĺNDIA: COMMERCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

The previous chapter looked at how the Estado da ĺndia needed to stretch its diplomatic adaptability as well as its meagre military resources to ensure its survival. Despite hints that might be conveyed in the title of this chapter, it will not try to provide a pure economic analysis of the trade structure of the Estado, nor will it undertake an in-depth study of the book-keeping methods of the treasury. Instead, it will explore how the Estado continued to extract and manage resources in a shifting economic environment within its reach, and as a whole. Specifically, this chapter will ascertain the trend of the rising contribution of rents to the revenues of the Estado vis-à-vis customs collection in the first half of the eighteenth century. In view of the hopes harboured by the Crown on Mozambique, as revealed in the increasing number of entries on the matter in the registos, the development and contribution of this western periphery of the Estado will be examined. A recenseamento from the first quarter of the eighteenth century will provide some substantiation on the above. On other economically related issues of the Estado, the registos also provide clues to the concerns and preoccupation of the Crown. In terms of the overall theme of the thesis, aspects of matters discussed will give an idea that the Estado, despite being associated with feudal vestiges and pompousness, was not detached from the fundamental issue of survival.

Arising from constraints in the evidence, the analysis will not delve into pure economic or financial topics but into issues of the political economy. Strictly speaking, the term “political economy” is employed to study the phenomenon of modern contemporary political activity 142 on economic decision and outcome. 1 The invariable number of perspectives available at times cloud rather than clarify the term. An attempted definition of “political economy” began at the dawn of the discipline of economics – notably in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776).2 After a long period of evolution, by the end of the twentieth century, “political economy” had been given three broad differing meanings – first, for one group and especially the economists, the term referred to “all types of human behaviour not classified as economic, of the methodology of formal economics or of the rational actor model of human behaviour”.3 For another group, it meant the application of an economic theory to the study of a social behaviour or phenomenon. For the political scientists who believe that “social and political affairs cannot be reduced to a sub-field of economics, political economy refers to ideas and questions generated from economic and political activities”.4 It is this last group, which is most “eclectic” about their choice of subject matter and methods, that is adopted in this thesis for the investigation of the present chapter.

Trade Activities The Portuguese came into the Indian Ocean to look for spices and trade. Even after these no longer became as profitable, the structure of the Estado da Índia continued to be based on this network of commodity flow. The structure of commodities and the larger direction of trade routes probably experienced a lesser shift than the change of hands and players. When the Portuguese came into the area, they attempted to ‘redistribute’ benefits for themselves. However, their imperfect control meant that contraband activities either continued on the old routes or sometimes emerged in new alternative routes.5 In terms of exchanges between transcontinental economic regions, India continued to be “surplus accumulating” until the 1750s.6 Within India, the sub-zones of structure and direction of

143 trade on the western coast of India can be divided as follows – Gujarat, Konkan, Kanara and Malabar. From Gujarat, cotton, cloth and silk were the principal textile exports, although bulk items like rice and wheat were also part of the outgoing cargo.7 A part of the imported goods brought to Gujarat was for re-export, mainly to West Asia or the Middle East. Konkan also exported a variety of textiles and its orientation was also towards West Asia. In exchange, horses and precious metals came from Persia and Arabia. The main item from Kanara and Malabar was (black) pepper, although a certain amount of rice as well as textiles were also exported from the former. Connections here stretched both ways north to Gujarat as well as down to Ceylon and around to the eastern coast of India (see map- statistics in appendix C).8

On the eastern coast, there were two main zones, Coromandel and Bengal. The principal exports from these two areas were rice and textiles. Imports to these areas came from the western coast of India, Ceylon and Southeast Asia. Between them, there was also exchange, and it is worth noting that both regions exported a significant amount of weaponry and related products (namely, Coromandel swords and Bihar saltpetre), as well as ironware.9

The distinction to be made about the trade is whether it was oceanic or coastal. This may be done in terms of the goods carried, as well as the distance of the trips. However, Chaudhuri and Furber have conceded that the differentiation is more obfuscated on the ground: while intercontinental or oceanic trade usually carried luxuries, it could also include bulk items like agricultural produce and textiles.10 Furthermore, oceanic carriers might carry bulk goods and be involved in country trade in their stopovers along the long distance routes. Pertaining to the flow of commodities outside India, whether

144 a certain area was a net exporter or importer depended on its imbalance.11

It was the above commerce that the Portuguese tried to control when they came into the Indian Ocean. They attempted this through the use of the cartaz system. Thomaz has identified three or four types of functions for this pass, namely:

for strategic control, aimed at embargoing spice; for political control, aimed at harming enemies of the Estado; for fiscal control, aimed at protecting Crown monopolies and maintaining social control, with the object of restraining the activities of private and illegal Portuguese merchants.12

A fee was paid to Portuguese officials for the issue of the cartaz. This fee varied with the range of the trade activity undertaken by the trader. The permit for long range overseas activities cost more than those limited to specific geographical regions. An overseas permit was also only obtainable at Goa, while a local one could be obtained at any feitoria.13

Although the Portuguese found it hard to enforce their cartazes from 1680-1740, these years were equally challenging for the Dutch in that they were experiencing shifts in the trade structure in the Indian Ocean. Despite the variability of data, what can be ascertained for the Portuguese is that the long-term percentage proportion of pepper in the return cargoes to Lisbon had been declining. 14 More importantly, as a major investor, the Crown’s profitability in this good had been dropping, too, first as a result of the revival of the Red Sea trade, and later, because of increasing north European competition.

145 Furthermore, the Crown divestment of profits led to a liquidity crisis which gradually forced it to contract this trade to private consortiums. By the time of the Habsburg Union (1580-1640), most of the revenue from each year’s voyage was already absorbed in paying off existing debt and interest.15 Other than pepper and luxury goods, the Crown had also begun to participate in the intra-Asian trade to carry goods such as textiles from other parts of India, as well as tin from Southeast Asia.16 However, the Crown’s participation in this trade was brief. Inducted into the system by a Tamil group from Melaka, the scale and quantity of the activity was already contracting by the 1530s-40s, and it completely ceased by the 1570s, with only an isolated voyage from Goa to the Banda islands surviving in the 1580s.17 An important if unintended reason for the decline can be attributed to the concession system. This was a reward system whereby their employees or dignitaries (later even private casado individuals) were granted a monopoly over a limited commodity, or received a special rate of customs over a Carreira route (for instance, the lucrative China-Japan leg). With the passing of time, holders of this privilege began to hoard freight space to carry the best goods for themselves, to the detriment of Crown customs. This, added to what Magalhães Godinho termed the “Atlantic Turning”, greatly diminished the role and participation of the Crown. 18 The Habsburgs even made a forlorn but earnest attempt in setting up a Portuguese India Company to salvage the situation and meet competition.19 The reasons for the Portuguese decline and failure to rebound have been attributed partly to systemic factors (reinforced by an aversion to engaging in business).20 This has been, and will be discussed in greater detail in the thesis (namely, chapter one and seven).

146 Other than the decline factors brought up above, the competition was also decided by the number of ships the Portuguese or Dutch were able to bring into the Indian Ocean. It has been widely acknowledged since Parry wrote his Trade and Dominion in 1971 that the number of out-going ships from the kingdom had dwindled to two or three by the beginning of the eighteenth century. 21 An important work published in 1976 looks at the Portuguese decline in terms of ships leaving Lisbon for India over an extended period, and in 50-year blocks. In the first half of the eighteenth century, they numbered over one hundred for this fifty-year period. This figure is close to that of the second half of the seventeenth century, which had dropped from over 250 in the previous two fifty-year periods. This figure was to fall further after D. João V’s reign. In relation to chapter two, it may be noted that the drop in figures for Portuguese ships might be compensated in part by increased tonnage in the second half of sixteenth and first half of seventeenth centuries. On the eve of the seventeenth century, the reduced number of arrivals was not compensated for in tonnage by more streamlined ships.22 On the Dutch side, the number of ships sent to India shows they were also going into decline, although at a slower rate. From 1680- 1740, Dutch hegemony was, undoubtedly, achieved by the superior number of fleets they were able to send to the East. The gradual decline of the Dutch in the transitional period may be corroborated by the decreasing number of carriers and warships dispatched there – the figure dropped from slightly over 120 in the decade of the 1670s to slightly over 80 in the 1700s and 30 in the 1770s.23

From 1600-80, the direction of European-controlled trade in Asia was slowly channelled to the Indonesian archipelago (from India where the Portuguese had been operating) even though the structure of commodities exported was probably the same. This is in

147 part due to the fact of the Dutch decision to base themselves at Batavia. As one economic historian pointed out:

While small quantities of textiles from Surat went to the Middle East, the bulk of the exports from the south- western coast of India, Ceylon, Coromandel and up to Bengal were directed at Batavia.24

It should be noted that the Dutch had attempted to set up their headquarters in south India, although this did not end in as great a success as they hoped for (despite inflicting defeats on, and besieging the Portuguese; moreover, there were other Europeans to fend off).25

Economically, and from a maritime perspective, the European- controlled trade in Asia shifted back to India from 1680-1740. 26 Basically, the changes in the last two decades of the seventeenth century were intensified in the first half of the eighteenth. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, although spices continued to “capture the imagination of Europeans”, 27 their proportion in the overall volume of goods brought back to Europe had declined appreciably. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company’s (VOC’s) annual sale of spices was slightly over a million pounds. Near the end of the eighteenth century, the figure was reduced by about one third.28 Revisiting the example of pepper, the VOC’s share of pepper came down to 23 per cent of total imports between 1698 and 1700 (down from 43 per cent between 1668 and 1670). By 1738-1740, it came down further to just 14 per cent.29 As was mentioned earlier, textiles from India were rising in the proportion of total Dutch imports. Another shift that had been taking place over time was the importance of intra-Asia over

148 Asia-Europe trade. Prior to the 1700s in Bengal, the ratio of Dutch cargo of the former (i.e. Bengal and rest of Asia) to the latter (i.e. Bengal and Europe) in the 1670s was 80:20, with this proportion almost reversing in the 1690s.30 Between 1680 and 1740, India, and increasingly China, also became more important foci of Asian trade. Within India, Bengal in the East was also becoming increasingly important vis-à-vis western India, where the British had a more solid foothold.31 In another example, the diamond trade was shifting from the Goa-Lisbon to the Madras-London axis.32

Meanwhile, the Portuguese continued to try to maintain their influence through the cartaz system. More permits were issued to merchants of Canara after 1700. The varied destinations of the southwestern traders (to Congo, Ormuz and Aden, as well as Bengal) show that the Portuguese were still involved in a wide trading network.33 It is worth noting that the system of cartazes was only formally ended in 1774.34

The Portuguese activities in India and the Indian Ocean did not, however, rely solely on trade and cartazes. In handing over the baton of authority, the instructions of D. Luis de Menezes to D. Francisco José de Sampayo e Castro in 1724 give a brief survey of the status of Portuguese coastal fortresses and trade outposts: Chaul was still important; Damão lacked inhabitants and local officials were urged to revive the industry there; Diu was short of monies to undertake trade; and all the three ports in the north were linked to commerce at Mozambique, as well as to the increasingly prosperous English settlements. With regard to the inland villages of Bassein, these were described as being “rich”, yielding revenues of more than one million xerafins, and were to be defended. Here, the challenge was also to get people to return to re-cultivate the lands.35

149 In the south, the Portuguese had a feitoria along the coast of Malabar, although there was not much commerce there. Around the eastern coast of India up to Bengala, the influence of the Catholic religion was present and still strong in some places, and cartazes could be issued to ships travelling there. Outside India, Congo in Persia contributed receipts to Goa. Mozambique was still useful through the benefits of commerce and the ivory that could be obtained from there. The potential of Solor and Timor in the sandalwood trade was noted, although payment of the king’s share had been delayed as a result of disruption and unrest there. Finally, the livelihood of Macao was dependent on the Mandarins, and ships from there sailed to Manila, Siam, Goa, and even Surate.36

Specifically, in relation to revenue generation in the Estado, Shirodkar described in a seminar paper published in 1998 that forms of poll and business taxes were charged on the local inhabitants – a new tax of half a furo was imposed from 1705 onwards in place of the half dízimos levied on those living in Tiswadi, Bardez and Salcete. On specific goods, for example, a half xerafin was levied on every thousand coconuts, as well as one xerafin on every khandi of copra shipped out of Goa. Furthermore, a two and a half per cent transfer tax was charged on the buying and selling of property, and on the rice business. In times of exigency, average native residents were to pay an impost of two xerafins, with goldsmiths and merchants paying three and five xerafins respectively.37

By then, in view of the declining tax receipts from commerce, the Portuguese Crown had also allowed ships from Brazil to visit India. From 1709, the Crown also liberated trade by allowing governors of the conquests to engage in business, although this was to be revoked in 1730 (as a result of scandal and corruption). Up until

150 1739, the reliance on decreasing customs receipts was shifted and made up for in part by the Province of the North in terms of rents. Viceroy João Saldanha da Gama (1725-32) suggested that the Crown form a company to reap profits from goods from Mozambique and even from Timor. What followed thereafter is unclear, but Viceroy Pedro Mascarenhas (1732-41) did propose that more experienced persons be appointed to increase profits associated with Mozambique.38

A point touched on by Shirodkar in a quote from the Livro dos Monções is worth highlighting, for it reveals the king’s interest and attention in 1717 to losses in commerce arising from evasion of customs at Goa as a “serious matter” because of its implications for royal revenue.39 The inferences and questions arising from this are interesting – first, even if revenue from India no longer enriched the treasury, the Crown was concerned to ensure that “infertile” Goa would survive. Secondly, it was also obvious that the liberalisation of trade by sanctioning more places for commerce (the latest till then being Bengal) did not help to generate more profits, as the scheme was subjected to the persistent vices that had plagued the concession system in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.40

We can cross-refer the records of the Casa da ĺndia for a situational update in relation to the volume and frequency of ships travelling between Portugal and Asia. From the extant records, a survey of ships leaving Lisbon in the period 1707-36 reveals an average of one to three naus (Indiamen), as mentioned before. Occasionally, a patacho or churrua would accompany a big ship. Outgoing ships not only carried socorros (aid) for India (see chapter 4), they also carried some quartos of wine – part of these were set aside for the master of the nau, part for the men of the lotação or men-of-sea serving on the

151 ship, while the rest were sold on arrival, with receipts going to the king’s cabedal. Sometimes, pipes of wine would be granted to the viceroy. Returning ships would bring back a certain quantity of drugs and spices, barrels of saltpetre and other goods. An entry in December 1724 lists pepper in the quantity of 101 quintais, one arroba and 16 arrateis accrued to the king’s cabedal; the average number of barrels of saltpetre remitted averaged slightly more than one hundred barrels for each returning trip.41 Cross referencing to, and a rough calculation based on a table from Prakash’s Cambridge History of India volume on European commercial enterprises, reveals that imported pepper figures were at least ten times more in the early seventeenth century.42

Deliberations of the Overseas Council reveal that external aggression and threats in the Province of the North naturally culminated in the dismal state of Portuguese commerce and their territorial losses. 43 Despite the increasing reliance on the north, another entry noted that officers in the armada of the south and Canara were asked to keep up their efforts and activities there.44 In essence, Portuguese trade in the Indian Ocean had not changed in its nature, that is, it remained militarised. In the period 1680 to 1740, when Dutch hegemony was being challenged, Portuguese needs and their demand for goods on the southern Indian coast, supported by their cartaz system, were backed up by whatever naval power they could muster for their reconstituted fleet of the south. Yet, brute force was not the only way by which the Portuguese tried to re- establish their presence. Apparently, in between the formation of Portuguese companies for trade in India (1720-53), the Portuguese seemed to be employing any means to undermine the Dutch position in India. This is revealed in a deliberation of the Overseas Council dated 8 October 1725. Officials in India had reported that the Dutch

152 were hard-pressed along the southern coast, “withdrawing into their strongholds (praças) with provisions of food and war and stepping up their patrols”. The officials had also reported that “they [the Dutch] were prevented from trading with Asia by our Company of Hostinde [sic]”. 45 This company must have alluded to the Company, chartered in 1722 by the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles VI, in which the Portuguese, by referring to it as “our company”, seemed to have had some vested interest (D. João was the emperor’s brother-in- law). In line with the observations of Prakash, this also confirms that as the early modern international economy became increasingly globalised, the monopolies of the chartered companies “could be skirted” and infiltrated.46

Outside India, the armada of the north was routinely ordered to Persia to enforce the cartazes which were issued in Diu. This, for instance, brought in revenue amounting to 32,000 xerafins to be paid by the Diicão to the Estado. In its deliberations of 8 August 1719, the Overseas Council considered the viceroy’s reasons why he did not need to dispatch the armada, in part because of the high expenses. More importantly, there was no urgent motive for the expedition because, after the Diicão had refused to pay the sum owed for the cartazes, the viceroy had ordered an attack on the port of Porpatame. The alfandega (customs house) and 400 houses and vessels were burned, and more than 400 enemy were killed.47 At the other end to the East, a complaint was lodged regarding ships having to pay extra fees at Melaka and that follow-up action would be taken to raise the issue at Batavia.48

The situation of the Portuguese further east beyond the Indian Ocean and covering the South China Sea and Seas of the Sunda and Maluku (Moluccas) islands has been extensively researched by

153 G. Bryan de Souza. 49 In this south-eastern corner of Asia, the Maluku islands had traditionally been the exporters of the “three famous spices” (cloves, nutmeg and mace) while cinnamon was produced in Sumatra. Portuguese traders brought cotton, apart from metals, from Goa and the southwestern coast of India. The fall of Ceylon and the Dutch attempt to establish a monopoly at the Moluccas led the Portuguese to scour the other islands for spices. Having also been ousted from Macassar in Celebes, the Crown and private Macanese traders were, in fact, involved in local factional politicking in an attempt to carve out a monopoly of pepper at Banjarmasin in lower Borneo. On the eve of the eighteenth century, however, they were also expelled from there. The rise of Timor was another episode of “collaboration” between the Crown and Macao. The aim was to enforce a monopoly of sandalwood.50 The Crown’s attempt at pacification in Timor will be taken up further in chapter six.

On Timor, one of the challenges facing Portuguese traders was competition from overseas Chinese traders who were based in Dutch Batavia. This, along with the still considerable Dutch power, meant that ships were forced to call at Batavia and other controlled ports. This system was, of course, slowly eroding. For a start, the Dutch did not manage to establish any measure of trade monopoly on the Chinese coast and the South China Sea in the course of the seventeenth century. Where the Portuguese Crown was concerned, sporadic voyages were organised to Macao to bring back silk, and other luxury items in exchange for European and Indian goods. Tea, an item increasingly demanded by the English in India, was carried, in addition to other goods, by private Portuguese traders. From the Koloniale Archieven sources, Souza reveals the frequency of shipping arrivals as they stopped over at Batavia and Melaka. From 1707-50, the number of ships which arrived and

154 departed from Goa totalled about twelve. Apparently, after 1732, no more ships arrived at or set off from Batavia to Goa. Ships that came all the way from Lisbon numbered four.51 By contrast, ships which arrived and departed from Timor totalled 45-60, while ships that came from and set off for Macao numbered over 180. In terms of shipping arrivals computed for 1715-50, the Portuguese figure was roughly equal to the English total. From 1707-42, Portuguese ships which stopped over at Melaka from Goa and Macao totalled about 10-15 and 35-45 respectively. Clearly, private Portuguese shipping dominated a sizable portion of the trade in the South China Sea and Seas of the Sunda and Maluku islands. Those which transited from Goa numbered only a dozen or a little more. The Crown must have tried to extract revenues on this private shipping via Macao or Timor.52

Revenue Collection An account of receipts and expenses for the first third of D. João V’s reign (1716-22) gives an idea of the financial situation in the Estado.53 For a start, a distinction needs to be made between the transactions for the Carreira da ĺndia and that for the Treasury of Goa. On the whole, the Estado seemed to be largely self-sufficient as the total deficit was miniscule (see table 3 in appendix C). The receipts of Goa constituted the largest individual entry, deriving in part from revenues not only from its own feitoria but also from the adjunct provinces of Bardez and Salcete (less expenses), as well as from Congo. The next largest receipt came from Bassein. In fact, the combined figures for the other three ports of the north (Chaul, Damão and Diu) made up a slightly larger or equivalent amount. The total receipts for the north were at least three times as much as those of Goa and the adjacent provinces (including Angediva). From the south, receipts from Mangalor and the Câmara-sponsored

155 convoys to Canara amounted to slightly more than the revenue entry of Bardez alone. The receipts from Congo were roughly equal to the contribution of the Câmara-sponsored convoys to Canara. Further afield, Mozambique contributed an amount in the range of that provided by Diu alone.

At Goa, one-quarter of the revenues came from the alfandega (custom-house) of Goa or from related feitor activities. Of the large single items in the range of 100-200,000 xerafins, one of these sums came from the administrators of tobacco in Goa. There was also an average of twenty-five entries in the categories of 10-50,000 xerafins, 1,000-10,000 xerafins and below 1,000 xerafins each. In the main, these were received from Bassein, Damão and the feitor of Goa. At Salcete, at least two-thirds of receipts came from the foros of villages and propriedades (properties). Of the other sums, an amount of 10-50,000 xerafins came from the procurador (procurator) for the supply of cavalry horses linked with the Câmara Geral (general municipal council). At Chaul, the two biggest sums (comprising one-quarter and one-sixth of total receipts), were contributed by Damão and Bassein, respectively.54 Another tenth of Chaul’s receipts came from the tobacco contract.55 At Bassein, royal rents were collected on hemp, olive oil, afião, protas, tobacco and tobacco leaves from there and the surrounding settlements (Canabe and Agaçaim), as well as on salt passing through Galiana and Biundim. In addition, rents collected from other settlements like Dunos, Mandoim, Caranja, Veriava, Rin and Cabras, contributed to more than half of the receipts there. Another third of total receipts came from the foros of the villages and propriedades of Bassein, as well as from collections of lands near Bombay. Other sums in the 1,000-10,000 xerafins category were contributed by the feitor of Damão, the Company of Jesus (the Jesuits) and those dealing in the

156 Arab horse trade. At Mozambique, the biggest receipt came from the Junta Geral de Mozambique. Two sums in the 1,000-10,000 xerafins category came from the feitor of the town. Of the smaller sums, these originated from the dízimos and sales of the Junta Geral. At Congo, two sums of 10-50,000 xerafins were paid by the sibandar of the town. Finally, revenue from Mangalor originated from the rent of lagimas, as well as from foros.56

Further analysis of these entries for receipts reveals a number of significant features about revenue collection in the Estado. First, while the port of Goa continued to rely on custom-related revenues, the province of Goa also extracted land taxes from its surrounding territories. This was especially so in the immediate adjacent provinces, for example, Salcete. Conversely, ports in the Province of the North also continued to draw upon receipts from customs, despite the rising proportion of land rents in terms of overall revenues for that province (see table 1 in appendix C).

The years covered by the account (above) overlap with the last years of D. Vasco Fernandes Cesar de Menezes’ viceroyalty, and the initial years of those of D. Francisco José de Sampaio Castro (see footnotes in appendix C). The account also covers the few months of the transitional leadership of Sebastião de Andrade Pessanha and the three-year tenure of D. Luís Carlos Inácio Xavier Menezes. A survey of the general letters of the Casa da ĺndia touching on this period (1707-40) reveals one instance where the thesoureiro (treasurer) of the Casa entrusted a loan of 1,200,000 reis from the Fazenda Real (Royal Treasury at Goa) to the Archbishop of Goa (D. Ignácio de Santa Teresa) for the Estado.57 Unfortunately, other sums of the royal cabedal (monies, etc., belonging to the king), which might have accompanied viceroys on their maiden trips to

157 India were not recorded. In the instructions from the king to D. Pedro Miguel de Almeida Portugal, the viceroy was told to keep the amount of monies raised from home “separate from the rents of the Estado da ĺndia”.58

In relation to the account of receipts and expenses of the Estado da ĺndia, it is interesting to note that, even at Goa, reliance on the adjacent provinces of Bardez and Salcete meant that a sizeable portion of the revenue was drawn from rents, and this exceeded the sums contributed via the custom houses. The revenues of Bassein were drawn in large part from rents in various forms. From a cross examination of the instructions by Ericeira, in conjunction with the account of receipts and expenses, it is clear why Ericeira was quite keen to revive the tax-farms and industries. Chaul, once great, had grown to rely to a certain extent on revenues generated in Damão and Bassein. Although a lot of hope was placed on Mozambique, the town relied to a large extent on injections of money from the Junta Geral of Mozambique, which had been set up to manage trade activities there.

An examination of expenses shows that at Goa, the biggest sums were charged to the viceroy, the vedor geral da fazenda (inspector general of the treasury), and to various military personnel for the day-to-day business and defence of the eastern capital. For the other ports and settlements, part of what they collected had to be transferred to Goa. A significant part of these expenses was also retained for military maintenance and defence. By comparison, a relatively smaller amount was dedicated to non-military transactions. At Bassein, a shipbuilding centre, one-fifth of total expenses was absorbed in the purchase of materials – iron, azeste, bria, cutunias, dotins, carros, petrechos de guerra (war supplies) and other

158 materials for the storehouse and ribeira (shipyard). Mangalor, Congo and Mozambique, which also served as stopover points for armadas and carreiras, also spent a variable fraction of their revenues on ship stores and maintenance. Of these three ports, the latter two also set aside small amounts for the clergy and church administration.59

In terms of expenses, those places which derived the bulk of their revenue from customs spent a relatively larger sum of their expenses on naval matters and maintenance. Places which relied on land revenues allocated a relatively lower proportion of their expenses to naval matters, even though Bassein, for example, was a ship-building centre. (see table 2 in appendix C)

What if the Estado did lapse into occasional financial insolvency? Entries in the recenseamento show that when, for example, an army needed to be maintained in times of insufficient funds, loans could be extended by individuals or bodies like the Company of Jesus. The assentos of the Council of State of India (at Goa) recorded sessions in which new taxes and impositions were debated in times of acute threat.60 In particular, a Junta dos Tres Estados (Committee of the Three Estates), similar to that which had been established at home at the time of the Restoration, was convened to decide on extra contributions from the people.61 Other religious affiliated bodies, like the Misericordias, were also raided for additional funds.62

The losses and reverberations of the of Ceylon and Malabar in the previous century, in addition to the intermittent lack of success in the revival of trade in the early eighteenth century, increased the Crown’s dependence on the renda system.63 However, sources and data relating to the investigation of economic revenue or demographic topics - as scholars past and present have lamented

159 – are scarce. 64 For a roughly three-year period prior to 1707, Pearson identified 37 renda holders. This figure is slightly higher compared to the average 34 different types of renda, each of which was let out 23 times over the seventy-year period from 1600-70. In overall terms, this represents a term of around three years for each contract. For this same period, Pearson calculated the value of these rendas to be over 500,000 reis, which amounted to slightly less than one third to one half of the total revenue of Estado. An interesting characteristic of the renda holders is that for some reason, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, about four times more Saraswats (an indigenous group), vis-à-vis Christians and Muslims, held rights to rendas compared to the earlier periods for which information is available.65

In relation to revenue collection for the first half of the eighteenth century, can anything be gleaned about the population in lands under Portuguese control? Undeniably, this was the source from which revenue was extracted and taxed. In a recent eminent work on Goa in the second half of the eighteenth century, Lopes gives the state of demography in 1753. We could take this as a good approximation of the condition of Portuguese India at the end of D. João V’s reign. As shown in table 4 in the appendix C, the population of the Islands, Bardez and Salcete were around 58,000, 76,000 and 73,000 inhabitants respectively. In these three places, 80 to 95 per cent of the population was classified as Christians (native, mixed and white). The actual white population ranged from 0.2 to 2.0 per cent, with the highest numbers in the Islands standing at around 400.66 In an earlier figure for 1721, about one third of the way through D. João’s reign, the populations of the Islands, Bardez and Salcete were about 70,000, 65,000 and 73,000 inhabitants respectively.67 The rise and ebb of emigration from Portugal coincided closely with

160 the increase and decline of Portuguese participation in trade in Asia. In Asia, the “official” or “formal” Portuguese India was losing its people (both white and indigenous) to the more prosperous surrounding territories.68

Mid-way through his reign, the king ordered a redress to pleas (in a letter) from the Câmara Geral of Salcete relating to a new contribution expected from this province in a provision that passed through the hands of the secretary of state and the Overseas Council. In the letter from the Câmara, complaints were made that the annual foros of 48,000 xerafins, proposed from the days of Viceroy Vidigueira (D. Francisco da Gama, who was viceroy in 1622- 28) were:

[already] very excessive given the limited territory under jurisdiction, mostly comprising land that cannot be cultivated with one and a half out of four legoas occupied by hills and outeiros… since then, we have been burdened with seven rendas, and now a new one…69

The Câmara claimed that the rendas already imposed included: tobacco worth 75,000 xerafins, powdered tobacco (tabaco do po) worth 50,000 xerafins, urraca worth 18,000 xerafins, salt and verde worth 10,000 xerafins, as well as copra and areca whose value was not specified. The letter went on to make a calculation of all the people (aged over seven years) in the province of Salcete, which totalled 80,000, and total rendas of 600,000 xerafins. Leaving aside the Namacins, the Câmara claimed that if these rendas “[were to be] divided out, each [person would] not have five xerafins for his sustenance”.70 The response of the viceroy, after conferring with the

161 vedor geral da fazenda, called for an inspection and survey. More importantly, the vedor geral pointed out that the Câmara had made a mistake about the origins of the original foros agreement with Vidigueira, and had also exaggerated their burdens. In terms of the centre-periphery analysis, this document highlights the gap between representatives of communities at the periphery and the centre. The views of those at the periphery were exacerbated by their own self- interests and perceptions of an incompassionate centre.

As claimed in the letter, the impositions ordered by the centre not only created dissatisfaction and protests, but in many cases led “owners [of tax farms] to abscond into Canara, and other lands of the infidels”.71 In this instance, the suggestion by the procurador of the Crown for the lands of those who had absconded to be incorporated into the fazenda real was overruled in favour of a proposal by the Câmara that their lands be divided up amongst those who remained in the communities; and for the lands already seized or put under “deposit” to be released to the community.72 Clearly, the benefits of increasing the fazenda of the Crown did not outweigh the priority that the inhabitants of Portuguese settlements in India ought not to be alienated.

From the general letters of the Casa da ĺndia, it is clear that the administration of the Carreira da ĺndia was still plagued with persistent problems. A letter to the captain general of Macao (then en route from Goa) and the officials of the Casa da ĺndia went through the procedure by which persons of “quality” (calidade) and their goods were to be registered so as to improve the collection of dues pertaining to the fazenda real and to prevent losses.73 In 1723 and 1725, two letters were directed to the vedor da fazenda of the Estado regarding omissions in entries and the theft of goods

162 respectively. 74 A letter from officials of the Casa of March 1730 revealed that pleas of ignorance of a royal order would not be accepted as an excuse for goods being “loaded without permission or knowledge”.75 Another document raised in April 1732 by the same officials revealed that even the liberdades (liberty allowances) of the Marquis of Niza were not properly registered. 76 Two more letters were raised in 1732 and 1735 to remind officials to tighten their control of registers and remove the confusion experienced in the dispatch of fazendas.77 Obviously by 1740, the full value of the dues accrued to the liberdades was still not able to be collected, as is revealed in a letter from the vedor da fazenda of the Estado of February 1740.78

Other consultations of the Overseas Council reveal that the administration of revenue collection was fraught with the difficulty of tallying documents issued by the Casa da ĺndia. In some instances, the viceroy inquired into the list of goods (namely, diamonds) to be sent back to Portugal, and the associated diversion and loss which was incurred as a result. Another questioned how some ships tried to evade payment of the cartaz at Goa and at São Figune.79 Another entry of 1728 highlighted the loss of Crown fazenda as a result of relaxing control over ships, and carelessness in administration. 80 Entries as early as 1715 were concerned with disparities in the fazenda. An entry of 1728 pointed out that the rents of the Estado were not able to support the maintenance of soldiers.81 In another entry, the vedor geral da fazenda highlighted the “decline found in tracing the excess of expenses over receipts and reasons for this error”.82

There was also no lack of entries advocating an improvement of the system itself. In January 1725, for instance, there were discussions

163 about the regimento (standing orders) and the “appointment of capable persons for the governance of feitorias”. Again, in March 1730 the Council discussed the amendment to the regimento and its execution.83 It is clear from such discussions that there were many persistent and unresolved problems – officials reported the difficulty and inconvenience of implementing the law that prohibited captains of praças to trade. 84 In the meantime, the list of entries in the registers is dotted fairly regularly with feedback on shortages in the warehouse and ribeira of Goa, as well as requests for supplies to be sent in subsequent monsoons. 85 This is also corroborated by documents of the Casa da ĺndia, which reveal a continuing need for support from the centre.86

Mozambique An area that was to become the centre-piece of the Crown’s attempt to re-establish trade in the Indian Ocean in the first half of the eighteenth century was Mozambique. Prior to the eighteenth century, the main items of trade between Mozambique and India had been ivory and gold. By the second half of the seventeenth century, an increasingly obvious feature of trade in Mozambique was the growing Indian and mestizo investment there. The right to import Gujerati cloth was granted to a merchant guild from Diu in the 1680s.87 The Portuguese attempt at monopoly, however, was broken at the end of the seventeenth century when Mombasa fell to the Omani Arabs. The fall of such an important strategic point led to the occupation of a number of Portuguese feitorias in the vicinity, including Kilwa.

In response to the loss of Mombasa, the ivory caravan was diverted to ports still under Portuguese control further south down the Swahili coast, in particular, to the port of Mozambique. Although a special

164 law was promulgated in November 1709 to allow the governors of the conquests more freedom to trade, this was revoked in April 1720 when royal revenue suffered as a result.88

Regarding the special committees or boards set up to manage trading activity in the region, a couple had evolved from the reign of Pedro II. In an attempt to increase trade during his reign, a Junta do Comércio Livre de Mozambique (Junta of Free Trade of Mozambique) had been formed. This seems to have changed its name to the Junta do Comércio Geral de Mozambique e Rios (Junta of General Trade of Mozambique and the Rivers) by the time it was abolished in 1680 (when trade was also liberalized). In time, another Junta (do Comércio Geral de Mozambique e Rios) formed, but it, too, was dissolved when in 1739, autonomy was entrusted to the Junta da Fazenda (Treasury Board) in Goa, headed by the viceroy.89

The previous chapter touched briefly on the continued Portuguese political manoeuvering in the region. In addition to Omani competition, the challenge from the Dutch and other Europeans contributed to the continued decline of trade in Mozambique in the early eighteenth century, which did not revive until after the 1750s.90 Whatever gold was discovered in the rios and Zambezi, it did not exceed 250 to 300 kilogrammes.91 Hence, the fragmentary Indian dominance continued until the Indians themselves were disrupted by the threats to, and then the fall of, the Portuguese Province of the North in India in 1739.

The maladministration of the Junta do Comércio has been a source of allegations as to why it was not possible to boost trade at Mozambique. The consultations of the Overseas Council provide ample evidence of the undesirable state of affairs. An entry dated

165 March 1732, for example, reveals that the officials of the Câmara of Goa wrote to explain the causes of the decline of commerce in Mozambique, and stressed the seriousness of the matter. They attributed to the decline to:

the lack of commerce resulting from the failure to send any ships [from this port] to other ports or an armada to the Straits [of Mozambique] [which has led to] the coast being infested with corsairs [so] merchants [are unable] to depart freely … [also] the Junta [do Comércio] is delaying its payments and not fulfilling the contracts to them [i.e., their business partners in the Province of the North]… [if the Junta was] to have good administration in the ports [because at present it is bad]… [and open-up] the said Rios [de Senna and]… put [in them] two alfandegas because these will make the fazenda of Your Majesty be well-served, and [leave] the people free to make trade…92

In effect, the Câmara was indirectly complaining about the monopoly of the Junta do Comércio and the Crown, but in the process, it also highlighted other issues.

On occasion, particular members of the Junta do Comércio were singled out for criticism. Between 1708 and 1742, two entries relate to requests to remove a particular governador and official of the Junta. The king was asked to remove them from office because of the mistakes and negligence they committed.93 In another entry of 1725, a complaint was directed against the superintendent of the

166 Junta do Comércio regarding inept administration and its effect on commerce.94

Besides the sometimes biased complaints of its critics, the Junta suffered from a number of internal problems that impacted on its profitability. In an entry of 1725, for example, deputies of the Junta do Comércio raised concerns about the problem of a shortage of monies for the conservation of the Estado and commerce.95 Within the empire, it seemed that the introduction of ivory associated with metropolitan Portugal also led to complications such as a fall in prices. 96 Externally, French activities in Mozambique continued to result in losses in revenue, and as late as 1740, a plea was made for efforts to take measures to resolve the problem.97 An entry of 1727, which once again illustrates that the key personnel at the centre took an interest in developments, pressed for the recruitment of people at Diu to help in the conservation of Mozambique. In this instance, the secretary of state added his particular concerns about this matter.98

The Estado da ĺndia in East Africa was not limited to the coast. There, the situation was analogous to the frontiers of Brazil in some respects. By the second half of the sixteenth century, the post of captain of Mozambique and Sofala was associated with a lucrative monopoly that was either granted as a reward by the king, or sold for a three-year term.99

Before the Portuguese arrived in the area, the Muslims had been having trading fairs in the interior of East Africa. As with other areas of trade in the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese sought to replace the Muslims and other players in the position of middlemen. Beneath the captain, responsibility for establishing trade fairs or prospective mining enterprises was given to the capitão-mor, who was appointed

167 by the viceroy. It is of interest to note that Indians, possibly of mestizo origin, were involved in the pioneering of these ventures.100 It is also worth noting that the Portuguese setback at Mombasa at the end of the seventeenth century was also repeated in the interior of Zambesi; uprooted by the inland power of Changamire (Changamire was also known as Batua – see map 5 in appendix D). This probably explains why trade activities on the lower Swahli coast failed to revive.101

It seems clear that, for the reign of D. João V, inland Portuguese East Africa was “informal”. There, “neither captains nor viceroys were able to hinder or promote” the Crown’s or Estado’s receipts, as these were collected by agents or semi-agents beyond the control of the centre at home or in Goa.102 At various times, the Crown tried to tap into and revive the coastal trade. Although trade on the coast was dependent on inland activities, it seems that the centre’s preoccupation with inland Zambesi was very limited: a survey of consultations from 1707 to 1750 reveals only one entry in October 1715 relating to an adjustment of peace with Changamire. 103 An earlier entry of November 1707 makes reference to friendship with another inland power, Monomotapa.104

Despite continuities with the previous half century, the beginning of the eighteenth century intensified the trend towards a transition that had begun in 1680 – the slow decline of the Dutch and the rise of the English. At the same time, the increasing participation of the Europeans also created an early modern international economy. The effect of this was that the Crown would find it even more difficult to maintain any monopolised area or sailing route. On the impact of internationalisation on the regional economy, the Portuguese Crown

168 realised, for instance, that a large volume of the English trade (linked to east India) was carried on private Portuguese ships associated with Macao, although its attempt to extract more benefits from this was largely unsuccessful. Within India, the challenge to and gradual breakdown of Mughal hegemony did not necessarily mean an onset of recession on the sub-continent. At times, the Crown remained idealistically optimistic about a rather dismal area, East Africa (after the loss of territories on the coast as well as inland). Although the Crown’s wishes for more income would be frustrated in Mozambique and Macao, the Estado da ĺndia was solvent, despite the ‘inefficiency’, as is revealed by an account dating from the mid-reign. Continuing from a trend in the mid-seventeenth century, rents would provide an important source of revenue, although receipts from customs would still be sizeable. In terms of the overall thesis, the Estado da ĺndia’s struggle to boost income is important in explaining why it continued to survive, even though the Crown’s treasury would gain little from the new enterprises. Whatever “hard power” (including wealth) could not accomplish, more “informal” measures were also adopted by the Estado, and this will be the focus of the next chapter.

169 Endnotes

1 R. Gilpin, “Nature of Political Economy”. in H. J. Wiarda (ed.), Comparative Politics, pp. 357- 75. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 361. 4 Ibid. 5 Either side saw each other as “piratical” and “usurping”. This is reflected in the discussion of M. Pearson, “Corruption and Corsairs in 16th Century Western India” in a compilation of his own papers and essays, Coastal Western India (New Delhi, 1981), pp. 18-40. 6 See A. Gunder Frank, “Modern World System Revisited” in S.K. Sanderson (ed.), Civilisations and World Systems (London, 1995), p. 174 in conjunction with I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System (London, 1974). “Surplus accumulating” refers to India being a net exporter in terms of the inter-continental trade as well as with the large economic entities in the eastern region. 7 Cotton itself can be classified as a luxury or bulk good depending on its quality, i.e., whether it was fine or coarse. See discussion in chapter 6, H. Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in Orient (London, 1976). Also, refer chapter 9, K. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean (Cambridge, 1985). 8 O. Prakash, New Cambridge History of India – European Commercial Enterprise in Pre- Colonial India, (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 14-18. 9 Ibid., pp. 18-22. See also map-statistics in Appendix C, drawn from Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean (Cambridge, 1985), map 18, pp. 186-187. 10 See Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in Orient, p. 265. Also, Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, pp. 189-91. 11 Research on how the different newcomers (especially Europeans) tried to exploit and benefit from this gap has been undertaken by many prominent scholars: H. Furber on the English and Dutch in 1976; O. Prakash on the various players in the early modern period in 1998; and K. Chaudhuri in a more general work in 1985. 12 N. Rao and P. Sudarshan make indirect reference to L. P. Thomaz in “Statistical Analysis of Historical Data – Study of the Livro dos Cartazes” in Portuguese Studies Review 12, 1 (2004), p 118. 13Ibid., p 118. 14 Prakash, New Cambridge History of India – European Enterprises, tables 2.2 and 2.3 on pp. 35- 36. 15 J.C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under Habsburg (Baltimore, 1993), p. 26. 16 Prakash, New Cambridge History of India – European Enterprises, p. 50. 17 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 18 Ibid., pp. 54-57. Under the concession system, intra-Asian routes joining the Carreira, including the lucrative China-Japan leg, were contracted out to fidalgo or related personages in return for advance fixed payments; much as the pepper Carreira trade at Lisbon had been parcelled out. 19 On the company, see A. R. Disney, Twilight of the Pepper Empire (Cambridge, 1978). 170

20 See chapter 1, The Black Legend of Portuguese India by G. D. Winius (New Delhi, 1985). 21J.H. Parry, Trade and Dominion (London, 1971), p. 59. 22Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in Orient, p. 27. In the first fifty years and at the height of expansion in the east, the number of ships sailing to India was around 450. Raw data on tonnage, as pointed out by several specialists, is more readily found in non-Portuguese documents than Portuguese ones. It should be reiterated that much information was lost during the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755. The figures for Portuguese ships and tonnage in the second half of sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries are corroborated in M. Newitt, A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion (New York, 2005), p. 193. T.B. Duncan, in “Navigation between Portugal and Asia in 16th and 17th Centuries” in C.K. Pullapilly et al (eds.), Asia and the West – Essays in Honour of D.F. Lach (Notre Dame, 1986), p. 22, compiled for figures to the eve of 17th century. 23A. Das Gupta, “India and Indian Ocean in Eighteenth Century” in A. Das Gupta et al (eds.), India and the Indian Ocean (Oxford, 1987), p. 151. However, the Europeans did not yet have any extensive control over the intra-Asian commerce. This process was to speed up towards the end of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 24Prakash, New Cambridge History of India – European Enterprises, p. 193. 25 G.D. Winius and M.P. Vink, The Merchant-Warrior Pacified (Delhi, 1991), p. 61. 26 A. Das Gupta, “Dutch EIC and Indian Ocean Trade” in A. Das Gupta and M. N. Pearson (eds.), India and the Indian Ocean 1500-1800 (Delhi, 1987), pp. 185-200 and 240-275. 27 Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in Orient, p. 235. 28A. Das Gupta, “Maritime Trade of Indonesia” in A. Das Gupta, et al (eds.), India and Indian Ocean (Oxford, 1987), p. 268. 29 Prakash, New Cambridge History of India – European Enterprises, pp. 211-12. 30Ibid. 31Ibid. 32Ibid., pp. 216 and 242. 33Rao and Sudarshan, “Statistical Analysis of Historical Data: A Study of the Livro dos Cartazes”, pp. 118-19. 34 P.S. Pissurlencar, Portuguese-Maratha Relations (Bombay, 1983), p. 2. 35BN, Instructions to Francisco José de Sampaio e Castro, Códice 1455, ff. 14v-21v. 36Ibid., ff. 10r-14r, 24v-26v and 27v-33v. 37Prakash, New Cambridge History of India – European Enterprises, p. 116. 38Ibid,, pp. 116-22. 39Ibid., pp. 117-18. 40Ibid. 41AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais que vão / vem da India, survey of ff. 15r-52v; the specific quantity of pepper is traced from ff. 33r-v. 42 Prakash, New Cambridge History of India – European Enterprises, p. 36, table 2.3. Prakash had drawn his merged data from two tables (2.2 and 2.3) from an article contribution by N.

171

Steensgaard in Indo-Portuguese History – Old Issues, New Questions edited by Teotonio R. de Souza (New Delhi, 1985). 43See, for example, an entry for 1739 in AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, f. 20r. 44AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India, ff. 438v-39r. 45AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, f. 183r dated 8 Oct 1725. 46 Prakash, New Cambridge History of India – European Enterprises, p. 265. Naturally, this proposition worked as a double-edged sword, it also meant that the Portuguese Crown or the Estado da ĺndia were increasingly finding it difficult to keep infiltrators out of their areas of economic claims. 47AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 110v-11r. 48AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India, ff. 419v-20r. 49G.B. de Souza, The Survival of Empire (Cambridge, 1986). 50Ibid., pp. 125-27 and 181-83. 51It is presumed these would have stopped over at Goa. 52Souza, Survival of Empire, tables 6.2, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.15 on pp. 134-35, 137, 138-39 and 160-61. 53AHU, Códice 475, Recenseamento de Receitas e Despesas da India, ff. 49v-50r. 54 They were used to pay the soldiers in this town. 55 Among the sums in the 1,000-10,000 xerafins category, the Câmara of Chaul also contributed a sum for the maintenance of the companies of troops there. 56AHU, Códice 475, Recenseamento…, ff. 1r-49r. The contribution from foros was relatively smaller. 57AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais…, ff. 26r-v. Survey is done for the period spanning 1707-40. 58 Instructions to Marquis of Castello-Novo, from the personal collection of J. F. J. Biker, transcribed and printed in Collecção de Tratados que o Estado da India Fez com os Reis nas Partes da Asia e Africa Oriental, VI by Biker (New Delhi, 1995), pp. 245-46. Here after, referred to as CTEA. 59AHU, Códice 475, Recenseamento…, ff. 1r-49r. 60 P.S. Pissurlencar, Assentos do Conselho do Estado V (Goa, 1957), document 138. Here after, referred to as ACEG. 61 ACEG, document 128. 62C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire (London, 1969), pp. 292-93. 63Souza, Survival of Empire, p. 177. 64Pearson M., “Indigenous Dominance in Colonial Economy Goa Rendas”, Mare Luso Indicum 2 (1972), p. 67. Pearson claimed in 1972 that information is scant about those who held rendas at times other than 1600-70. M. de Jesus dos Mártires Lopes, Goa Setecentista – Tradição e Modernidade 1750-1800 (Lisbon, 1996), p. 76. Writing in the closing years of the twentieth century, Lopes indicated that charts and maps on demography are not available for the period prior to 1753. 65M. Pearson, Coastal Western India (New Delhi, 1981), pp. 97-100, in a compiled article on “Banyas and Brahmins”. 172

66Adapted from tables 1, 3 and 13 of Lopes, Goa Setecentista, pp. 79, 85 and 91. 67BA, 46-XIII-31, Sobre População de Goa e Angediva 1721, ff. 142r-43v. 68See BN, Instructions to D. Francisco José de Sampayo e Castro, Códice 1455, ff. 15v-16v. Pleas were made by Ericeira to woo settlers back to Baçaim and surrounding villages. 69J.H. Rivara da Cunha, Archivo Portuguez Oriental (New Dehli, 1992), p. 385. Transcribed from Livro dos Monções No. 102, f. 225. Here after, source by Rivara referred to as APO. Copy by Câmara in letter to king. 70Ibid., p. 385. 71APO, pp. 6-7. Transcribed from Livro dos Monções No. 76, f. 42. 72APO, pp. 6-7. Transcribed from Livro dos Monções No. 76, f. 42. 73AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais que vão / vem da India, ff. 21v-22r. 74AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais… , ff. 27v-28r and 30v. 75AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais… , f. 46v. 76AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais… , f. 50r. 77AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais… , ff. 51v-52v and 61r-v. 78AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais… , ff. 98r-v. 79AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India: f. 420r; Códice 213: ff. 200r-v. 80AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, f. 294r. 81AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 49v-50r and 197v-98r. 82AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 323r-24r. 83AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 180v-81r and 222r-v. 84AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 185v-86r. 85For instance, AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, f. 183r. 86 AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais… , survey of entries from 1707-40, ff. 19v-90v. 87 Newitt, “East Africa and the Indian Ocean Trade”, p. 216. 88P. P. Shirodkar, “India and Mozambique”, in Researches in Indo-Portuguese History I (Jaipur, 1998), p. 175. 89Ibid,, pp. 174-76. 90 Newitt, “East Africa and the Indian Ocean Trade”, pp. 215-18. 91Shirodkar, “India and Mozambique”, p. 176. 92AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 254v-55v dated 3 March 1732. 93AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India : ff. 433v-34r; Códice 214: ff. 8r-v. 94AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 181r-82r. 95AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 188v-89r. 96AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff.74v-75r. 97AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 1r-v. 98AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 193v-94r. 99 M. Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi (London, 1973), pp. 38-117. 100 Ibid., further from the pp. 38-117: “Up to 1752, anyone who wished to acquire a prazo petitioned the tenente-geral dos Rios, who after satisfying himself about the genuineness, issued a 173 provisional grant…”. This was confirmed in the form of a deed (of lease) by the viceroy after papers were sent to Goa. The system of the prazo itself had undergone a process of evolution. It probably began with Portuguese who were asked to arbitrate in tribal disputes, which then evolved into honours, privileges and authority accorded in return. In time, this formalised into land titles. With regards to the rank of lieutenant-general of the Rivers, on-and-off he had been put under the jurisdiction of Goa. Up to 1688, “the Rivers had been administered separately from Mozambique under Goa. From 1688, he was answerable to the captain general of Mozambique and Sofala. In 1709, a new set of standing orders conferred independence on him, with powers to make peace and war, and to correspond directly with the viceroy except with regard to military and civil patents (which still had to be consulted with the captain general)”. M. Newitt also reveals that Portuguese local politicking had acculturalized certain factions. 101Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi, pp. 38-117. 102 Ibid., p. 59. 103AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, f. 62r. 104AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India, ff. 418r-v.

174 CHAPTER 6

BUSINESS OF ESTADO DA ÍNDIA RELIGIOSOS, RACE, STATE AND THE EXTREME PERIPHERY

The previous two chapters examined two commonly dismissed factors of prolongation, that is, instruments of war and diplomacy as well as issues relating to economic issues involved with the survival of the formal Estado da Índia in the first half of the eighteenth century. In contrast, survival in the longer term is customarily attributed, to use a modern day term, to “soft power” – conversions, mixed marriages and the use of the Portuguese language. This is not to imply that those of the early modern period saw or perceived these instruments in the same way. Yet, even these activities required state support: on the ground, from the viceregal government and at its source, from the king, and in terms of monies and other resources. The first two parts of this chapter will demonstrate that the king’s interest had a part to play in seemingly unofficial business where the survival of the Estado da Índia was concerned. In another unlikely area, the last breath in an enterprise to consolidate and even extend a foothold in the Dutch-permeated (i.e. Timor), is examined and reappraised vis-à-vis the role of Macao. In terms of the overall thesis and theme, softer instruments and their role in the periphery, and as a whole, need to be re-emphasised as playing a role in the survival of Portuguese India.

‘Civilising Mission’ Commenting on the colour question at the Raleigh Lecture in 1961, Boxer believed there was never any doubt about the practice of discrimination by the Portuguese from the moment they set foot in Asia. This bias “assumed different forms at different times and

175 places”.1 With respect to soldiery, the Portuguese believed that most eastern peoples were “militarily useless”, except for the Japanese.2 In the first half of the eighteenth century, this observation was repeated by the Count of Ericeira – that Indiaticos were inferior to officers trained in Europe. 3 At times, “political factors intruded on race” along with religious criteria – “Blacks, namely Africans and south Indians were hopeless, inferior, incapable of improvement and stuck in superstition; Whites, Japanese and Chinese, on the other hand, met European standards, may even be superior in some areas, were good prospects for conversion”.4 This seems to bear a striking resemblance to classification by “degree of civilisation” which was the rationale used by the Salazar regime in the twentieth century to justify the retention of its colonies.5

Whatever bias the Portuguese might have shown towards the races they came into contact with, or which were under their control, the Portuguese exhibited idealism, some sensitivity and definitely pragmatism in dealing with them. Boxer felt that “the policy of the Crown towards the colour-bar in the Estado da Índia was not always clear and consistent”; nor was it practised most of the time in reality.6 It seems that the “Portuguese took [more to] the line that religion and not colour should be the criterion for Portuguese citizenship”. 7 Accordingly, the Portuguese view of superiority, as with the perception of the other Europeans, though perhaps less staunchly so, was tied intimately to the religious status of the individual, although Pearson cautions against stressing this too much.8 Ideally, the Crown had decreed that all Indian converts be allowed the same privileges as Portuguese (Goan) citizenry. Laws were passed on this as early as 1562 and 1572 but not implemented fully. Apparently after being baptised, converts would still not enjoy similar status as Portuguese citizens of Goa, as a legal commission admitted in the

176 early eighteenth century. An insignia of the Order of Christ granted, for example, to a Goan Christian was retracted in 1736 after strong protest from the viceroy. The problem of recognition extended to aspiring converts who wished to be part of the clergy. The colour bar would only be abolished (again) during the ministerial leadership of Pombal in 1761 for the brief period of his office.9

Within the vast expense of India, the idea of race (of which there are large numbers in India) is closely tied to the social structure of the caste system (as it is to the various religions, most notably, Hinduism). When the Portuguese first arrived, they tried to abolish the Hindu castes in the areas under their rule but found them to be too deeply ingrained in the indigenous people. A parallel system tolerated in the converts consisted of four main divisions: the Brahmins, the Chardos, the Sudras and other “lower” castes. The Brahmins were originally the priestly class, hence, the converted indigenous clergy came mainly from this group. The Chardos were originally the warrior class (Kshatriyas) in Hindu society; many switched to serve in the Portuguese native armies. Pissurlencar thought that under the Portuguese, “lower” castes were also recruited. In an alvará of July 1733, native soldiers were also drawn from the Bragmanes. Many were recruited as “professional soldiers” known as sipães;10 others were more loosely enlisted into the militias and ordenanças. For some reason, in Lopes’ work, the merchants did not feature as a group in the section on castes relating to areas under Portuguese jurisdiction. 11 It is quite certain that this group (sub-divided into further groupings along criteria of, for example, ethnicity or trade specialisation) constituted an important support to the continued Portuguese presence. For example, the Brahmins in the Province of the North, many of whom also had business dealings, provided crucial investments to the Portuguese East

177 African commercial enterprise. 12 The rest of the natives were classified as menial workers along different grades, with the Sudras at the top. The Sudras under the previous system were skilled workers such as metalsmiths and other craftsmen. Farmers who owned lands might have been grouped under here as well. Beneath this, there were landless workers and those doing the most menial jobs (for example, gravediggers, sweepers, etc.) who were ranked along a gradation of scale of “lower castes”.13

Afonso de Albuquerque, who had understood the impact of demography on the Portuguese enterprise in the East, actively pushed for inter-marriages between soldier-settlers and indigenous women during his governorship.14 Even at the peak in the sixteenth century, no more than two or three thousand able-bodied men emigrated from Portugal to India. Furthermore, unlike the plantation- settlement nature of Brazil, intermittent wars in Portuguese India since its founding meant that very few women came to this colony. While an early scheme to ship over orphan girls from Portugal lapsed with time, local intermarriages were relatively more successful with marginal indigenous group such as widows and Nautch-girls.

From the perspective of the civilisational-cultural construct, the adoption or imposition of a language is an ultimate expression of domination. Parry writes that “Portuguese was still the lingua franca of most commercial intercourse in which Europeans took part” for quite a period in the eighteenth century.15 This prevalence of the language was in part, a consequence of the Portuguese network in the Indian Ocean. Even when this, along with what little economic or political influence that remained, had declined by the mid-eighteenth century, Crown sponsorship of the spiritual enterprise enabled the

178 continuity of the language. 16 Yet, Pearson reveals that, in other ways, the state did not make much effort to spread the language outside cities like Goa until centuries later. A “notorious decree” of 1684 that made the use of the Portuguese language compulsory “became a dead letter”.17

A survey of the deliberations of the Overseas Council for the period under investigation reveals relatively little on the area of society, or any attempt to inculcate the use of language. As the preliminary assessment in chapter three highlighted, it is anachronistic to expect the Baroque overseas government to behave like a nineteenth- or twentieth-century colonial bureaucracy. Moreover, the viceregal administration was conceived, from the beginning, as a system of indirect rule (outside the cities). Nevertheless, a reference or two to do with race relates to the succession of office. 18 Deliberations regarding the locals were mostly raised via the Archbishop, and dealt with their customs in relation to religious violations. On these matters, the Holy Office exercised wide-ranging jurisdiction. In a deliberation of May 1717, the Inquisition was told to ease up on its campaign against the gentiles in this instance in relation to the form of marriage celebration, in case the desertion of these people brought about a loss to the royal treasury.19 Part of the acculturation issue is also closely tied up with the issue of immigration (from Portugal), settlement, or more broadly, with colonisation. One way that culture and values were transmitted was through cross marriage. However, social studies on this area are generally lacking. Nevertheless, it can be said that any attempt to diffuse the language was done more indirectly than directly.

179 The Proselytising Enterprise If the Portuguese were looking for spices, Vasco da Gama famously declared upon reaching the after an epic voyage, they were also searching for Christians. 20 The unique nature of early Portuguese expansion has also been the diarchical character of its accompanying colonial administration. Heavily supported by the state, this style of insertion can be identified with the French case.21 However, in terms of religious fervour, not even the French came close to what the Portuguese perceived to be their spiritual prerogatives – one that appointed the Portuguese Crown to be the “standard bearer of the faith”, and came to be encapsulated in the padroado real or “royal patronage”.22 Ames points out from the Livro das Plantas de Todas as Fortalezas that the Crown was responsible for the salaries, as well as other maintenance (mantimentos) and protection, of nearly 900 religiosos in Goa alone in the early seventeenth century, amounting to “at least 59,000 xerafins”.23 The Portuguese religious institution was a diametrical opposite to the Dutch counterpart, being less subjected to civil power – it was “a state within a state”. Pearson even goes so far as to say that the state might have been an ancillary of the church in rural areas, the former often being represented by a sole parish priest.24 Even where the influence of Crown or civil authority was greater, “viceroys typically served three years, archbishops could go on for decades; while captains were rotated, clerics usually made a lifetime commitment to India”. 25 Yet, this observation need not be contradictory to the centre-inclined argument. Early modern monarchies had gained significant autonomy from the Pope by the early Baroque period. In Portugal, the state appointed the judges and officers in the Holy Office of the Inquisition, even though Rome granted the foundation of its basis. For a time, the Pope rejected some of D. João V’s requests. 26 This led to a strain in the

180 relationship with Rome which was not eased until after 1730. Nevertheless, aside from using papal relations as a part of the leverage in an increasingly complicated international intercourse, João was also keen to match the “crusading zeal” of his brother-in- law (Charles VI) and other Catholic monarchs.27 The sponsorship of the Inquisition was part of the move to show that João was more zealous.

The role of the church was not limited to purely evangelical business. Linked to the ecclesiastical establishment were the Santa Casa da Misericordia and its charities and hospitals. Their duties included giving food and shelter to the needy, burying the dead, as well as ransoming captives. Although aid was supposed to be restricted to their own and related family members, help was extended to a wide range of people. In this way, the Misericordias helped to facilitate social integration and to retain elements of the Portuguese presence, long after the feitoria and garrison were evicted. Boxer, however, wrote that the golden age of the Misericordias had passed by the first half of the seventeenth century. “Raiding of their coffers in emergencies by viceroys and governors accentuated the decline” in the eighteenth century. 28 Nevertheless, in areas no longer under direct control, Misericordias and other church establishments continued to link the local population to the Portuguese. It may not be too wide off the mark to say that some of these religious establishments might even have served as a fifth column to fuel local power intrigues or to plot for a Portuguese return.

If any parochialism pertaining to, and oppression of the indigenous population, has been conveyed so far, the converted did get to enjoy certain privileges. For a start, widows were often able to seek refuge in churches and Misericordias to escape the sati tradition, although

181 certain customs probably continued outside the eyes of the authorities. Furthermore, Christian wives and daughters were entitled to inherit the family property. Released from more concrete confinement were also those held in prison for small amounts of debt. Upon conversion, local Christians were given exemption from taxes (from 1580 onwards), and received an array of gifts ranging from financial payments and social welfare assistance. Jobs and civil servant positions at the local level, not accessible to Brahmins and Hindus, were open to indigenous Christians, although the influence of Brahmins on native communities prevented the full exercise of this in practice. Intruding further into the governing system at the village and community level, prominent vote-holding non-Christian landowners were not to convene meetings in the absence of Christian counterparts. However, concerns from the centre about laxity and non-compliance with laws relating to conversion in India were not uncommon. In a letter dated 20 January 1711, a “father of Christians” had written to D. João V complaining of “the little zeal that was found in the ministers for propagation of the Catholic faith in this Estado [da Índia], and lack of observance of past laws” to which the king, on this occasion, ordered the viceroy to follow-up. 29 In an effort to draw attention to the failure of legislation to uphold the social privileges of Christians, the king stated in an alvará dated 8 April 1717 that,

the gentiles in this Estado [da Índia] are engaged against [the] past laws and orders in their mode of living, going about in the streets by sedan chairs… and with umbrellas; [and] celebrating their festivals in temples frequently.30

182 Beyond the material rewards, more influential to the lives of the converts was the increasingly Westernised lifestyle. For example, converts had Christmas dinners or adopted Western fashion in dress, which probably made them more sympathetic to the Portuguese cause.31

If the religious arm was credited for the long term survival of the Portuguese in the East, it was also a source of numerous problems. At times, whether the religiosos did good or bad was dependent on who was writing about them. Following from the immunity and privileges enjoyed by the church, Ames writes that, many times, the Archbishops, the Inquisitors-Generals and their henchmen exerted significant political power, and frustrated Crown attempts at reform.32 One group of religiosos who had been granted significant autonomy which led to many excesses was the Jesuits. Meanwhile, the increasing numbers of religiosos also burdened the Crown financially and deprived the Estado of serviceable military men.33 A letter from D. João V to a viceroy expressed his concerns with the high numbers of clerics and the presence of over thirty parishes in Goa and its adjacent areas, and asked him to undertake a census of the population to justify the need. On this occasion, the viceroy was on the side of the religiosos, replying that they could aid the king in his conquest and that the islands had many native Christians to take care of.34

Given the many overlaps between religious affairs and matters of culture, tradition and customs, the Inquisition impacted on many areas of lives in the capital of the Estado da India. Boschi noted in an encyclopaedic contribution that the Inquisition seemed to be still active in the eighteenth century. For the first half of the century after

183 the fall of Bassein, the sentences from about 1706-50 totalled 2,088 cases.35

The pervasiveness becomes clear when one considers a sample of the practices it forbade, these being all considered to be signs of continuing Jewish, Muslim or Hindu influence – sending of gifts on the day a married woman had her first menstrual period; cooking rice without salt; wearing a dhoti or choli or refusing to eat pork.36

Hand-in-hand with increased conversions (to Catholicism) which were supposed to have been part of the cause for the Maratha invasion in 1739, the New Conquests, initiated from 1741, was undertaken with a much more tolerant approach towards the inhabitants.37

To add to the civil-religious tensions, there were also conflicts between the various religious institutions. For instance, there were seething conflicts between the office of the Archbishop and the Jesuits. In one incident, a college Rector bypassed the Archbishop and appealed to the king to order an inventory check of lands passed to the Archbishop.38

The deliberations of the Overseas Council on religious-related matters are surprisingly numerous. The deliberations show, as confirmed by Alden in his investigation of the Jesuits, that developments of the various religious authorities did not escape the attention of the king, but were reported upwards via the Overseas Council to him.39 A number of entries touched on the abuses of the religiosos, and even of the Archbishop himself. The complaints were

184 generally about scandalous procedures and infringements and were submitted by the viceroy himself or other officials of the Estado.40 In an entry registered on 11 January 1715, the deliberation spoke of the “terrible consequences of remaining silent [that would result] if effective remedy is not put to resolve the absurdities generally incurring and continuing in a large part of the religiosos resident in all the missions in Asia”. In an even more critical vein, it pointed to the crux of the problem: “because [the prelates] at present take care in sending subjects [priests] who are more apt for mercantile business than in the commerce of souls”.41 In one entry, secrecy was mooted when reporting in relation to complaints against the Bishop of Melaka, bearing in mind that the town was by then under Dutch rule. 42 Apparently, the complaints were lodged by officials of the islands of Timor whose Catholic followers were under the religious jurisdiction of this bishopric. Although the outcome of the investigation was that the bishop was found to be “virtuous and zealous in the service of God, as of souls”, one can see how closely the secular and religious areas of society were affecting and intertwined with each other.43

Requests of religiosos asking for licence for possession of villages were also lodged through the viceroy, as can be seen in an entry dated in March 1707. 44 The Archbishop updated and asked the Crown for directions as well on a variety of matters – most notably, the disorder of the Estado which was leading to damage of Christianity there.45 Not surprisingly, there were deliberations urging religiosos to action, for example, the provincials of the Company of Jesus in Salcete, not to slacken or abandon their churches.46 The Archbishop also had to fend off foreign religious groups trying to establish themselves in areas of the padroado real – for example, in 1707, the issue of French missionaries in the “province” of

185 Malabar. 47 In 1738, the Bishop of Cochin also asked for help regarding the miserable state of his bishopric as a result of Dutch activities.

In light of the evidence and argument presented so far, we can rightly ask: how far was the factor of religion more important for the Portuguese in sustaining their presence compared to the approach by other Europeans? For instance, can the disciplined Protestant ethic not be seen to have made a similar contribution to the Dutch colonial venture? Boxer writes that at Batavia, the capital of the Dutch in the East, there were eight predikants in 1680, twenty-seven in 1725, and twelve in 1749, numbers that were miniscule compared to the Portuguese religiosos at Goa.48 There has been considerable debate about the Protestant Calvinist faith and its link to the rise of early modern capitalism. It is not the intention of this thesis to explore the full course of the debate sparked by Max Weber. Suffice it to say that evangelism was never a major thrust of the Dutch overseas enterprise.49 How far the “unconscious” ideals and value system of their religion formed part of the psyche that made the Dutch successful in the seventeenth century is debatable. 50 Returning to the Portuguese, the factor of religion has been argued to work “explicitly” for them in the sense that they were supposedly earnest enough to glorify the religion. This led to influences and legacies that remained after their “raw power” was gone. Weber and those who followed his line of argument argued for the “implicit” working of the religion in the Dutch in that it was the values that were associated with the religion that was at work in a person, even if he might not be a Protestant devotee.51 In any case, the Portuguese investment in the religious enterprise, as raised earlier, did not always buttress the Portuguese presence as sometimes it brought about negative effects in the short term.

186

It is not surprising that those involved in the spiritual enterprises should have claimed authority and commented on moral and even political aspects of governance and society. A treatise on India by a religioso in 1725 argued that there was an intimate link between the political decadence of the Estado and the moral and spiritual degradation of religious establishments. 52 However, whatever the contributions of religious bodies like the Jesuits, they were made scapegoats, as Alden asserted, in further moves towards centralisation during the ministerial administration of Pombal.53

Imperialism at Timor and the Extreme Periphery C.H. Ariher reported in an intelligence report that :

The native population of Timor had grown close to half a million while the Portuguese still numbered 300 along with other minorities of which the Chinese constituted the most sizeable. The administration was organised to encourage local commerce and produce by which the Portuguese could have a taxed share on top of extraction of head tax as well as other unpaid and forced labour. The garrison was numbered at 300 with only fifteen Europeans although there was expectation of reinforcements from Macao and even Lisbon. The locals continued to partake in rituals revolving around war and remained highly martial. Exports have since then shifted to rely more on other cash crops although sandalwood remained on the list. Education was rudimentary with the church providing it mainly to converts. 54

187 Such was the picture of Timor in 1941, although an unknowing reader might not find that it differed much from the situation two hundred years before in, say, 1741. Writing at the end of his survey (to 1700), Subrahmanyam observes that “the Portuguese in Asia survived in two forms: as private traders trying to keep a distance from Goa or as sub-imperialists still trying to carve out some form of colony at the periphery far from the centre at Goa”.55 In concluding his sweep of the Portuguese survival in the South China Sea area (to 1754), George Bryan de Souza thinks that “the empire appears to have been an abject failure… [reduced to] a responsibility that was retained for prestige, religion and an elusive hope for gain… irregardless of [what] temporary successes and gains of fidalgo administrators [might have reaped]”.56 Returning to the rather lengthy descriptive quote at the beginning of this section, the question is not only about how the Portuguese were able to secure the island of Timor, but how they were able to keep it, despite the apparent lack of progress? Far from trying to project the king as all knowing, in full control or wholly triumphant, this chapter will show that the Crown’s impulse to assert a more formal presence on Timor in the first half of the eighteenth century, fostered by alliances made with local chiefs, and in the long context of the foundation and expansion laid by religiosos, was what allowed the Portuguese to consolidate their stay, despite the overestimation, mistakes and inadequate support.

The initial Portuguese conquest of Timor was secured by missionaries. Civil authority during this period was also dispensed by the Dominicans. Subsequent Dutch competition, especially during the period of Habsburg Union, forced the Portuguese on the defensive but miraculously failed to oust them. The bid for survival also saw an increase in royal assertion over the island during this and the Restoration period. The first important treaty to secure the

188 right to build a fort at Cupão was signed by a friar in the Restoration period. If religiosos had been an important determinant for Portuguese survival so far, the first major rebellion in the post- Restoration period was launched by a bishop, supposedly against the bad practices of secular administrators.57

According to an authority on the area, the third phase of Portuguese presence began five years prior to the succession of D. João V. In 1702, a governor was appointed to the island to secure Crown control and its monopoly of the sandalwood trade. However, the issue at hand was far from being straightforward – Portuguese trade at Timor was apparently undertaken by private merchants from Macao. The shipping figures given in chapter 5 would seem to verify this. In terms of the centre-periphery discussion, Macao has been previously classified by Disney under the East Asian model. He described it as a settlement “mostly located… on the coasts of East and Southeast Asia. Typically, they [the “East Asian settlements”] were the outcome of non-official Portuguese action”.58 Alternatively, they were subjected to only a slight degree of control by viceregal authorities, they could sometimes evolve into a South Asian model settlement.59 In the case of Macao, it did not evolve into the South Asian archetype, being able often to resist or to pay lip service to demands from Lisbon or Goa.60 Hence, while the Crown was trying to turn Timor politically and administratively into a “South Asian” colony, it also had to co-opt the Macanese traders to enforce the monopoly on the commercial side.

In terms of the main export of Timor, the golden age of the sandalwood trade appears to have been during the Habsburg period. In 1630, a bishop estimated that profits averaged 150-200 per cent. This trade was carried by, and depended on, Macanese traders.61

189 From this angle, Lifão (the capital of Timor) can be ascribed a periphery of a periphery. On the political side, the reign of D. João V saw the beginning of instability on the island that was to stretch into the nineteenth century. 62 From the deliberations of the Overseas Council, the discussions centred on fighting and disturbances on the island, as well as occasional success there.63 In its deliberations for 1713 and 1719, the Overseas Council reported that the governor of the island attributed the “disquietude” to several groups of people – the Bishop of Melaka, other religiosos, certain princes on the island, those in the Portuguese governance (!), and particular individuals.64 Regarding the bishop, for example, Viceroy Fernandes Cesar de Menezes claimed that the cause of civil strife was “[the former’s] forgetfulness of his duties as a prelate, being only interested in those of the general or a politician”, adding that it was “a temptation to which many clergy succumb”.65

At the beginning of 1707, the Dutch still retained a foothold on the island, and conflicts with them must have been a source of constant perturbation for the Portuguese official rulers.66 In fact, the Dutch were accused of aiding the rebels on several occasions. Fighting continued to take place (in all likelihood aided by the Dutch), eventhough as recorded in the assentos of the Council of State of Goa, surrender was made to the Crown by an important non-native rebel leader in January 1708. 67 Fresh indigenous and mestiço uprisings re-erupted in the 1720s. Among the deliberations, the religiosos were highlighted as a source of concern, in most cases. A further deliberation also records the presence of hostile religosos on the island in 1720 along with two others lamenting their excesses in 1715 and 1720, respectively.68 Generally, the lack of ‘progress’ might be attributed to the religiosos. This can be verified in a case in the register associated with the Dominicans. 69 In a deliberation of 16

190 February 1720, the disorders committed were so “incredible and scandalous” that the Junta dos Missões was to be convened to look into the matter.70

The religious orders, predominantly the Dominicans, who came under the jurisdiction of the Diocese of Melaka, had shifted their base of operation to Timor in 1701. From that time onwards, the Dominicans were involved in some form of joint jurisdiction of certain localities on the island in a manner similar to that of the Jesuit governance in north India.71 Boxer, however, thinks that whether in terms of public or literary works, the Dominicans “afforded a sorry contrast to the Jesuits”.72

Despite the political volatility, the years from 1702 were also a period of administrative maturation. A regimento enacted in that year with the appointment of the governor spelt out the responsibilities of the ouvidor, provedor da fazenda, auditor da gente de guerra and juiz dos orfãos (judge for orphans), as well as the salaries of various personnel.73 In 1718, judicial matters were assigned to the Bishop of Melaka when a group of soldiers were found to be derelict in their religious obligations. 74 However, this re-assignment of jurisdiction was no doubt the cause of many incidents of unrest in Timor, as highlighted previously in the registers of the Overseas Council. The second-in-command under the governor was the tenente-general, a post exercised by a native. He commanded a largely indigenous body of troops organized in companies of fifty men each; the strength of this body was given as 815 in 1737. 75 In terms of reinforcements, the registers of the Overseas Council record little in the way of aid being sent from Goa.76 In fact, royal wishes might have been mixed or only half-hearted, as a letter to the viceroy from a newly appointed governor affirmed: the Crown was not sending

191 socorros to this harsh island in view of the likelihood of them being lost there. Native leaders who fought on the side of the Portuguese, who could easily raise “a few thousand men-at-arms”, were part of that balance of power which allowed the Portuguese to “control” so many with so few.77 Described by one viceroy, perhaps sarcastically, the inhabitants were “model subjects because they recognise the sovereignty of their monarch, when they are governed by men who oppress them in every possible way although without means to enforce their authority”.78

In a study on state formation in eastern Indonesia, although not writing to account for their subjugation, Andaya describes rulers in this part of the world as “becoming much more like the image the Europeans projected of kings… dressing like a Portuguese, speaking (the language) fluently, and governing his realm with assurance bred of familiarity with that nation”. He adds that this offers perhaps a good reason for the unlikely Portuguese presence in Timor.79 This feature is interesting because it shows that the local elites identified with the values and culture associated with the centre.

As indicated earlier, the administration tried to build various fortifications in their fight to quell unrest and defend against the Dutch. The construction at Lifão followed the style and construction erected at Mombasa. It was an indication of considerable investment and a certain level of sophistication in fortifications.80 Yet, the Crown tried to circumscribe ways the governor could levy revenue from the locals to fund it. This, on top of the lack of fiscalisation and abuses must have led to frequent frustration in the maintenance of defence and supplying of the campaigns.81 In relation to “soft factors”, it can be argued from the discussion, that while Portugal might not have

192 been hegemonic, it was able to apply “soft influence” as long as: i) it was able to achieve local supremacy over a period of time; and ii) its religious operatives were simultaneously working in the geographical areas of interest. It is also in this sense why it is apt that the coupling of the discussion on cultural-religious enterprises and Timor are brought together in this chapter.

The business of Timor was invariably tied to the interests of Macao. Aside from an attempt to set up a more formal administration on the ground, the Crown tried, among other commitments, to involve the Macanese in the venture to invest in the sandalwood trade, as well as to pay for the costs of subjugation. For some time, the Crown even attempted naval patrols in the vicinity of the island to prevent Chinese traders from Batavia from reaching Timor. Deliberations in the assentos of the Council of State at Goa reveal that an occasional frigate from Lisbon helped with the convoying of ships between Timor and Macao.82 Macao continued to oblige the dispatch of an annual voyage to Timor after 1727. It also asserted the unprofitability of the sandalwood trade (caused by the Crown’s customs duties). Macao also complained of financial impoverishment caused by the sponsorship of the embassy to Peking, and the loss of profits arising from the stoppage of the Manila trade.83

The trade and governance of Macao, including its relations with China, have been covered in depth in George Bryan de Souza’s definitive work. 84 From the Crown’s perspective, it tried to form companies and enrol traders from Macao in them. Realising that the Crown was merely trying to form a monopoly from which it could reap taxes, Macao successfully resisted this throughout the period under investigation. Nevertheless, right up to 1750, two companies, the Companhia de Macao and the Companhia da Fábrica Real da

193 Seda, were formed unilaterally by the centre in an attempt to trade in the “Far East”. However, the number of ships from the metropole continued to be sporadic, even though the Estado in India offered convoy protection against increasing European piratical activities during the period of the War of the Spanish Succession. In Ericeira’s instructions to the incoming viceroy, he indicated his awareness that the Dutch in the “Far East” depended on Portuguese residents at Macao who were trading increasingly in tea and other goods.85 As one of the more respected nobles, this information must have been conveyed to the king himself. Yet, for much of the time, the Estado da Índia’s preoccupation with its more immediate threats like the Marathas meant it could not spare any further resources to assert the Crown’s wishes to bring Macao and other more independent traders “more in line”. In fact, Boxer has noted that even prior to 1725, the supposed annual trip from Goa was “a purely paper arrangement… with only two or three instances of (actual) sailing”. A modern survey of the works and fortifications of Macao noted that defences had been neglected since the Restoration, and that this stagnation seemed to continue throughout D. João V’s reign.86 This observation resonates with the deteriorated Crown’s assertion of power over this far off colony. For example, while the captain general had a say over defences, the Senado da Câmara had wrestled control of the finances. The Crown’s control over revenue that was linked, for example, with the Manila voyages, was last imposed during the Habsburg period.87 The causal link between finances and the defences of Macao, limiting what the Crown and captain general were able to do, is obvious.

In spite of the remoteness, Luso-Chinese relations, as mooted in chapter 4, had all along experienced a special kind of interaction – despite military help being sent to the fallen Ming dynasty, the

194 Braganças gradually built a relationship with the succeeding Tartar Manchu dynasty, despite competition from the Dutch.88 In João V’s period, the relationship was sealed in the ambassadorial expedition of Alexandre Metello de Souza e Menezes. Alexandre Metello’s expedition to China, facilitated in part by various forms of assistance offered by Macao, exhibited “departures” from other embassies in terms of the size of the retinue, nature of the allowance paid to it (by the Ching court), as well as reception protocols. From the Chinese side, “imperial officials acknowledged to the Portuguese that the embassy (of the latter) could not be compared with (those) of the ordinary tribute bearers”, and Alexandre Metello was allowed to present his credentials (not a routine protocol permitted to other tribute bearers).89 In more “informal” business to do with China, the Crown strove to reassert its control (via the padraodo) over religious bodies evangelising there. An episode worth noting is disruption caused by the patriach of Antichio. Updates of this can be seen from the registers of the Overseas Council in the early months of 1707.90

Returning to developments in Macao, we can see from the deliberations of Overseas Council that the captain general and officials of the Câmara of Macao never failed to request aid in terms of soldiers and arms from the centre. An entry of 1719 noted the demise of the emperor and its possible implications - “the General and officials of the Câmara of Macao … have heard of the death of the emperor of China… his son who is likely to succeed him does not show the same love for the Portuguese nation…”, the entry ended with “Your Majesty must order aid for this city”.91 On the seas, the coming of an English barge and associated problems of defence was also raised.92 Viceroy D. Vasco Fernandes Cesar de Menezes, in an entry on the council’s registers, gave an update on the success of a frigate against pirates at Macao. Aside from interest of self-

195 defence, the above “action” would have contributed to “foreign relation” and economic benefits; however “informal” Macao’s status might have been as a colony.93

It has been argued to this point that active diplomacy and war, as well as the juggling of finances (and the not-very-savvy efforts at developing commerce), had underpinned the short-term factors and helped with the sustenance of the empire in the East. While softer factors like religion and culture have often been touted as explanations for long-term survival, state involvement in soft instruments has usually been overlooked. However, it must be said that the effects of these state-assisted factors were not always clear either. At Timor, religious bodies under the auspices of the Crown made a beachhead for a long-term presence. The increased squabbling between the Crown-appointed representatives (after increased commitment) and religiosos gave rise to some ambiguous results. In terms of the overall thesis, the uncertain outcome in the short term did not negate the long-term contribution. This is because, beyond a certain process of dynamics, the inculcation of sympathy in the people shifted the responsibility of the “sustainer” from the formal state to the people who unconsciously lived out a Portuguese- influenced habit or lifestyle which helped to prolong the Portuguese legacy and presence. Despite the efforts to maintain the Estado, external crisis in India during the last quarter of D. João’s reign almost eliminated this colonial front from the imperial inventory. How successful the effort at crisis management and reviving the Estado will be the preoccupation of the next chapter.

196 Endnotes

1 C.R. Boxer, The Colour Question in the Portuguese Empire 1415-1825 (London, 1961), pp. 113- 14. 2 G.V. Scammell, Ships, Oceans and Empire 1400-1700 (Aldershot, 1995), XII, p. 482. 3 Boxer, The Colour Question in the Portuguese Empire, pp. 102 and 106. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 C.R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Empire (Oxford, 1963), pp. 69-70. 7 Ibid. 8 M.N. Pearson, New Cambridge History of India (Cambridge, 1987), p. 105. 9 Boxer, The Colour Question in the Portuguese Empire, pp. 127-29. 10 The linkage between “sipães” and “sepoys” is undeniable, the latter is likely to be a derivation of the former after the British-organised Indian armies gradually became victorious against indigenous and other European-led armies in India. 11 M. de J. dos Martires Lopes, Goa Setecentista – Tradição e Modernidade (Lisbon, 1999), pp. 101-106. From one perspective, this gap may be understood when one observes that many who undertook trade did so on a partime basis because of uncertainties of the market. Ashin Das Gupta, in a compiled volume of his essays, Merchants of Maritime India (Aldershot, 1994), noted that while merchant groups in India might not be analogous to the guilds in Europe (defined by birth rather than occupation), the “fallen” in the group were offered help and charity in the community. See, in detail, essay entries “The Maritime Merchant 1500-1800”, III, pp. 1-15; “Changing Face of Indian Maritime Merchant”, IV, pp. 353-62 and “Indian Merchants in the Age of Partnership”, XIV, pp. 28-39. 12 M. Newitt, “East Africa and Indian Ocean Trade” in A. Das Gupta et al (eds.), Indian and the Indian Ocean (Oxford, 1987), pp. 216-17. 13 Personal conjecture following from Lopes, Goa Setecentista 14 Pearson, New Cambridge History of India, p. 101. 15 J.H. Parry, Trade and Dominion (London, 1971), p. 60. 16 A.L. Ferronha (ed.), Atlas da Lingua Portuguesa na História e no Mundo (Lisbon, 1992), see especially contribution by R.M. Loureiro on spread of the language in Asia, pp. 92-117. 17 Pearson, New Cambridge History of India, p. 123. Konkani continued to be the rural language. 18 As raised in chapter 3, AHU, Códice 204, f. 298r. 19AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 88v-89r. 20 A. Disney, “Vasco da Gama’s Reputation for Violence”, Indica 32, 1 (1995). 21Athough the French came in the form of a company, the French entity was sponsored heavily by the state. See D.K. Fieldhouse, Colonial Empires (London, 1965), pp. 152-56. 22 Pearson, New Cambridge History of India, pp. 118-119. 23G.J. Ames, Renascent Empire (Amsterdam, 2000), p. 61. 24Pearson, New Cambridge History of India, p. 120. 25Ibid., p. 126. 197

26 P.S. Martinez, História Diplomatica de Portugal (Lisbon, 1969), p. 67. Request, for instance, for the right to reward nunzio. 27H.V. Livermore, A New History of Portugal (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 209-10. 28C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire (London, 1969), pp. 292-93. 29J.H. da Cunha Rivara, Archivo Portuguez Oriental (New Dehli, 1992), p. 133. Transcribed from Livro dos Monções No 78 fol 58. Here after, referred to as APO. 30APO, p. 241. Transcribed from Livro dos Monções No. 83, f. 190. 31 M. de J. dos Martires Lopes, “Converts, Protegés and Assimilated Natives” in A. Disney and E . Booth (eds.), Vasco da Gama and the Linking of Europe and Asia (Oxford, 2000), pp. 224 and 228. 32Ames, Renascent Empire, p. 64. 33 Ibid. 34BA, 46-XIII-31, ff. 142r-43v. 35A. Baião, A Inquisição de Goa II (Coimbra, 1930-45), pp. 291-92. 36Pearson, New Cambridge History of India, p. 120. 37 C. Boschi, “Episcopado e Inquisição” in História da Expansão Portuguesa directed by F. Bethencourt and K. Chaudhuri, p. 385. 38D. Alden, The Making of an Enterprise (Stanford, 1996), pp 584-85. 39Ibid., survey of chapters 17 and 23. 40AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 63r-v and 326v-27r. 41AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, f. 63r dated 11 Jan 1715. 42AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 74r-v. Despite the loss of Melaka to the Dutch in 1640, the town remained under the religious jurisdiction of bishopric of Melaka. The bishopric was shifted to Timor at the beginning of the 18th century. 43AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, f. 74r dated 21 Feb 1716. 44AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India, ff. 413v-14r. 45AHU, Códice 212, f. 412v. 46AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India, ff. 420v-21r. 47AHU, Códice 212, ff. 417r-v. 48C.R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire (London, 1965), p. 140. 49 Ibid., see discussion in chapter 5(b). 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52AHU, Códice 1647, Tratado Politico, Moral etc. sobre India. 53Alden, The Making of an Enterprise. See discussion and analysis for developments leading up to the event, chapters 17 and 23. 54Robert Lee, “Portuguese Timor on Eve of Pacific War” in A. Disney and E. Booth (eds.), Vasco da Gama and the Linking of Europe and Asia, pp. 419-36. 55S. Subrahmanyam, Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700 (London, 1993), p. 215 56G.B. Souza, The Survival of Empire (Cambridge, 1986), p. 226. 198

57A. Teodoro de Matos, Timor Português 1515-1769 (Lisbon, 1974), pp. 77-87 and 103-104. 58 A. Disney, “Contrasting Models of Empire in South and East Asia in 16th and Early 17th Centuries” in F.A. Dutra and J.C. dos Santos (eds.), The Portuguese and the Pacific (Santa Barbara, 1995), pp. 27-28. 59 Ibid. 60Souza in The Survival of Empire gives a clear impression of this substantiated throughout the book. 61 Ibid., p. 109. 62Matos, Timor Português, pp. 77-102. Solor was given up at the beginning of the Restoration. 63AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India, f. 417v. 64AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 35v-37r. 65Cited in C. R. Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East (London, 1968), p. 191. 66Matos, Timor Português, p. 124. 67P.S. Pissurlencar, Assentos dos Conselho do Estado V (Goa, 1957), p. 221. Souza, Survival of Empire, p. 182. 68AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 50v-51r and 124v. 69AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India, f. 435v dated in 1709. 70AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, f. 124v dated 16 Feb 1720. 71Matos, Timor Português, pp. 41-70. 72Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East, p. 190. 73Regimento do Ouvidor, Auditor da Gente de Guerra, Juiz dos Orfãos, Provedor da Fazenda dos Defuntos e Ausentes das Ilhas de Solor e Timor e Taxas Salarios dos Oficiais de Justica das Mesma Ilhas”, transcribed in Matos, Timor Português, pp. 281-96. 74 Matos, Timor Português, pp. 122-23 and 128. 75 Ibid. 76AHU, survey of Códices 212-14. 77 A.F. de Morais, Subsidios para a História de Timor (Bastora, 1934), p. 112. 78 L.Y. Andaya, “Cultural State Formation in East Indonesia” in A. Reid (ed.), Southeast Asia in Early Modern Era (London, 1993), p. 35. 79 Ibid. 80“Planta da Fortaleza de Lifau” originally from AHU and printed in C.R. Boxer, Antonio Coelho Guerreiro e as Relações entre Macau e Timor no Coméco do Século XVIII (Macao, 1940), pp. 14- 15. Compare with the plans of fort Jesus in C.R. Boxer and C. de Azevedo, Fort Jesus and Portuguese in Mombasa (London, 1960), picture print between pp. 86-89. 81Ibid., pp. 121-28. 82Pissurlencar, Assentos dos Conselho do Estado V, p. 209. 83Souza, The Survival of Empire, p. 183. 84Souza in The Survival of Empire. 85BN, Instructions to Francisco José de Sampayo e Castro, Códice 1455, ff. 42r-43r.

199

86 F. da Silva Amaro, “Obras de Fortificação de Macau” in Boletim Eclesiástico da Diocese de Macau. LIX (1961), pp. 540-41. 87 Souza in The Survival of Empire, see discussion in chapter 2. 88 Refer to rivalling ambassadorial missions sent by both Portuguese and Dutch to the Chinese court in J.E. Wills, Embassies and Illusions (Massachusetts, 1984). 89Relação da Embaixada que D. João V mandou no anno de 1725 ao Imperador da Tartaria e China, in J. F. J. Biker (ed.), Collecção de Tratados que o Estado da India Fez com os Reis nas Partes da Asia e Africa Oriental, vol. VI (New Delhi, 1995), pp. 60-172 (CTEA). See also commentary in J.E. Wills, Embassies and Illusions (Massachusetts, 1984), p. 183. It should be noted that despite being given “preferential” treatment, Alexandre Metello had voluntarily performed the kowtow (a series of bowings and prostrations, lying flat on the ground). On the more “informal” business in China, the Crown strove to maintain its influence on religious bodies there. An episode worth noting is the upheaval caused by the patriach of Antichio, prompting advice from the Overseas Council to boycott (see for instance, 4 entries in Códice 203 dated on 2 April 1708). Coincidentally, the Portuguese and the Chinese experienced a change in dynasties at around the same time i.e. 1640s. On the ground, Macao was probably trying to adjust to changing political realities there, as well as at home, when it dispatched help to the Mings. The Manchus tried to court the Dutch in the war against Coxinga but did not seem to bear an obvious grudge against the Portuguese for the assisting gesture to the preceding dynasty. 90AHU, Códice 212, Consultas acerca India, see for instance, f. 413v. 91AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, f. 103v dated 18 Jan 1719. 92AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, f. 9v. 93AHU, Códice 213, Consultas acerca India, ff. 59r-v.

200 CHAPTER 7

BEGINNING OF A REVERSAL? 1741-50

The previous three chapters have attempted to look at the efforts of the centre through the consultations of the Overseas Council and other sources in order to understand the survival of the Portuguese Estado da Índia. The last decade of João V’s reign, ironically when he was rather incapacitated, seemed to witness some revival for the Estado. However, even this apparently hopeful construct has to be seen in context. Following on from chapters 4-6, this chapter will examine Portuguese initiatives from the centre mainly in terms of measures relating to war and the political economy and, briefly, “soft factors”, in order to come to a better understanding of the Portuguese struggle for survival in the 1740s.

Origins Given the heavy commitments in materiel, men and ships, the failure of the Mombasa expedition culminating in 1730 dealt a severe blow to the Estado. Within a few years of the Mombasa debacle, the Marathas re-initiated hostilities. On the economic front, the company formed for commerce in India was dissolved in 1720. Other than the Junta do Comércio Geral, which had been set up to take care of trade at Mozambique, the previous chapter mentioned of two attempts to form companies for the trade at Macao. In the wake of the loss of the Province of the North in 1739, the 1740s saw two special injections of reinforcements for India. This period is said to mark the beginning of the New Conquests. In terms of commerce, serious thought was given to the formation of an East India company. However, the Estado could ill afford to boost other parts of its eastern dominions.

201 Significantly, while the New Conquests (which are generally defined as the territories comprising Pernem, Bicholim, Satari, Ponda, Embarbacem, Cacora, Chandrovadi, Astagrar, Bali and Canacona), were acquired between 1765 and 1788, 1 the recently-published Nova Historia Militar de Portugal dates the beginning of New Conquistas to 1741. This date coincides with the arrival of the Count of Ericeira, and the reconquest and stabilisation of the “Old Territories” during his second viceregal term (1741-42). 2 The instructions given to Ericeira by D. João V, dated in May 1740, certainly did not preclude the possibility of retaking the North, for the king advised him that if:

Goa and its districts are [still] not in disgrace and under threat […] [you are] to put in efforts to remove [the enemy] [...] as early as possible […] [and to take] the most suitable measures to dislodge the enemy in the North […] even if a peace treaty has been adjusted by the time you arrive, [you are to] inquire into and examine the articles and […] see that not a part of the lands usurped by the enemy is ceded to them […] [and] if a war ensues, keep it up until everything comes back to the State.3

The king’s instructions to the Count of Assumar in 1744 were more circumspect. They expressed awareness of the besieged state of the Estado around Goa and recognised that the restoration of the North might not be possible in view of the superior strength of the Marathas.4 Assumar’s proposal for the reconquest of the North was rejected by the king on the grounds that the English might intervene (having acted as intermediaries in the truce of 1739). On the Goan

202 front, the count unveiled a project to extend the borders as far as Gates.5

Campaigns and Diplomacy The short tenure of the Count of Ericeira saw the retaking of parts of the districts of Bardez and Salcete (sealed in the Treaty of 1742). The force of the enemy attack also seemed to have slowed on the news of the death of their de facto military commander, Bajirão. The state of defence was maintained by the succession of a dynamic viceroy, the third Count of Assumar (1744-50), who around the middle of his extended term also initiated his own campaigns.6

Assumar solicited the opinions of his councillors on possible ways to recover the North.7 One of these proposals, forwarded by a captain (Caetano de Sousa Pereira), briefly described the array of ideas that had been debated. Some were in favour of making a payment to buy the fortresses of Thana and Bassein, while others wanted to use force of arms to wrest them back. There were other debates involving the choice of location to be assaulted and the extent of resources required for such an enterprise.8 According to the captain who forwarded this report, the expedition could be mounted with no more than 2,000 men. Including auxiliaries and support, the armada carrying this expedition would comprise two frigates, four pilot boats, six machwas and galleys. It would be manned by 600 Portuguese and 1,000 sipães or native Christian soldiers serving in various capacities, together with the necessary arms and munitions.9

Captain Sousa Pereira also suggested how the finances required for the enterprise might be raised, and then went on to argue why the enemy could not be bought over. It is interesting to note that, to finance the expedition, reliance was to be made on the commerce of

203 Mozambique. He also pointed out that, if peace could be adjusted with the Marathas, revenues could also be raised from the lands returned. Finally, he advised that men and monies could be solicited from local allies like the Bandarins.10 Regarding the futility of trying to retake the territories by offering money, Sousa Pereira felt that the key Maratha commanders in the North were confidants of the successor of Bajirão and that they did not need money as they were wealthy themselves. Furthermore, he advised that previous experience had revealed that this method not only required a large sum of money, but included other costly gifts as well. Finally, in the captain’s opinion, there was nothing to prevent the enemy from engaging in treachery and the “usual deception” after payment.11

The captain’s background is interesting. Having followed a decent career earlier in his life, Sousa Pereira committed some sort of crime and was tried and imprisoned. However, he soon escaped, and then some years later surrendered and completed his sentence before spending the last few years of his life in poverty, it would seem. Prepared and signed in Goa in January 1745, the year of his death, one can speculate how much notice or influence this proposal would have had with the authorities.12

Having explored some debates and ideas on how to salvage the debacle in India, what were the king’s instructions to viceroy Assumar, and what concrete actions did they result on the ground? Orders were given to Assumar to draw on his capacity and experience; to observe with precise vigilance and caution the enemies’ movements and to find the means to foment differences between them.13 With respect to the restoration of the North, the king believed it was not possible to recover it by means of force at that moment. As the king noted, regular troops found in the Estado barely

204 exceeded 3,000 infantry divided into six battalions, in addition to two troops of cavalry, sipães, ordenanças (local militias), auxiliaries, sailors and artillerymen. Even if this had exceeded the allocation for sustaining the Estado (as permitted by the available finance), the king acknowledged that the Marathas were still incomparably superior. The viceroy was therefore to wait for an opportunity such as the death of a Maratha prince, rebellion or civil war, which would change the present situation, and then to recuperate peacefully some or all of the said praças. With regard to Persia, the viceroy was to re-establish the “ancient friendship”. In relation to the forces of ‘pirate’ Angria as well as the Bounsolos and Marathas who were uniting with the Melondins, the viceroy was not to take any less care, because they had numerous ships and were undertaking corsair activities. With respect to the Europeans, a survey was made of the different companies: the French and other Europeans were engaging in contraband trade at Mozambique and on the coast, while the Dutch maintained their insatiable and undiminished ambitions; finally, precautions were also to be taken against the English. All in all, the viceroy was to make alliances with or engage in hostilities against fellow Europeans when favourable occasions arose.14

As was the case with a number of other grandee viceroys, D. Pedro Miguel de Almeida Portugal, Count of Assumar, had accumulated a wealth of military experience in his youth. He had served in various military positions, from junior commands to general of the cavalry and governor of arms of one of Portugal’s frontier provinces. Before being appointed to India, he had also served as a member of the Council of War (Conselho de Guerra).15 As a prominent aristocrat, D. Pedro Miguel could demand a noteworthy reward for accepting the post of viceroy: just before embarking for India, the king bestowed on him the Marquisate of Castelo Novo. His military experience certainly

205 came in useful when the marquis had to stretch his capabilities in a still precarious India, and decide where to go on the offensive. He chose Alorna. According to a letter of 2 November 1746, the marquis described how Alorna was situated “by a river and was one of the enemy’s (Bounsulo’s) greatest strongholds”. 16 Its capture would allow the marquis to march on the enemy strongholds of Rarim or Bicholim. In the march up to Alorna, the marquis faced many logistical difficulties. Amongst these, he reported that men carrying supplies were “of a weak constitution [and] drop everything at the first report of a musket fire”.17 The operation to take Alorna consisted of a combined land and sea force advancing separately to make a simultaneous attack on the fortress. On land, D. Pedro Miguel gave command of the 4,000 men - organized into six companies of grenadiers and seventeen of light infantry, on top of 80 horse, 150 artillerymen, 1,000 sepoys and a company of sharp-shooters - to a French officer. Discounting any marginal changes in military technology, this force was comparable with that of Afonso de Albuquerque’s expedition to take Goa. On water, the marquis gathered twenty-seven vessels of various sizes for the expedition. The existence of various specialist troop types and the execution of an amphibious expedition go to prove that the Portuguese in India were not only maintaining their edge in land-water operations but also keeping up with the latest military developments in Europe (exhibited by the different troop types).

However, as D. Pedro Miguel had fewer than 5,000 troops and 1,000 sepoys, he judged his forces to be insufficient to execute a siege, and chose instead the much riskier and more costly - in terms of likely casualties - tactic of storming the fortress. Indeed, in deciding to storm rather than lay siege to Alorna, he was far less likely to succeed in capturing the stronghold. During the attack his troops

206 negotiated the trenches and forced their way through two strong gates, which exacted a severe toll on the Portuguese side. As D. Pedro Miguel himself reported, “[o]ur losses were enormous”.18 This was in part because the enemy was also armed with many muskets and cannon (which fired grape-shot deadly to infantry). Five hours of hand-to-hand combat – the “hardest fighting”, as the marquis admitted – eventually saw the castle fall into Portuguese hands.19 For this feat, the Marquis of Castelo Novo (or Count of Assumar) was granted a second title of Marquis of Alorna, after the namesake of his prize. The Portuguese losses (especially of officers) were so heavy at one point that the troops became rather panicky and disorganised, prompting the marquis to admit that “[t]he question of victory or defeat was now in the balance”. 20 Ironically, the same viceroy later lamented how the poor quality of the education and intelligence of the officers in war frustrated expeditions towards the end of D. João V’s reign.21 In his later campaigns, the viceroy went on to take the other enemy fortresses of Bicholim, Tiracol, Rarim, Neutim, and Carlim, along with a number of their surrounding villages.22

From the consultations of the Overseas Council, two entries dated July 1741 reveal that the Marathas was still menacing Bardez and Salcete, and that there was a need to raise new finances to sustain defence at a number of places, namely Rachol, Mormugam, Agoada, Reys and Magos.23 By July of the following year, there were even discussion to give up a locality to the Bounsulos.24 In the end, while negotiations were conducted to purchase peace with the Bounsulos, ideas were simultaneously mooted to form a new company of cavalry. 25 The homeward bound ship brought documents of the peace terms discussed to be ‘endorsed’ by the king, and an entry was made in the register of consultations in February 1743. Against

207 Angria, an entry noted that a culpable Portuguese Almirante surrendered four ships to the enemy. 26 Such incidents are a reminder of the flux and uncertainty of the situation, even though peace had just been made with the Marathas in 1740. On the broader front, it is also worth noting that the reconquests (and later expansion) were carried out on the promise and concession of religious freedom to the natives.27 Here, the involvement of the state in religious initiatives (in conjunction with more ‘secular’ use of raw power) is worth noting.

On the ground, it may be noted that the initiative to begin a war on the Bounsulos in 1746 was greeted with a unanimous response from members of the Council of State in India, although they had reservations about the justness of war and its timing.28 In a session of the Goan-based council in October 1748, the king’s approval of their 1746 decision, especially in view of the successes which followed, was noted. Acknowledgement was also made of the men the Casa da ĺndia had been able to send to India, although their numbers had diminished during the long voyage. By that time, the Bounsulos were already asking for peace and the viceroy indicated that troops would retire to Rarim to begin negotiations. For his part, the viceroy hoped to turn attention back to the North, against Nana (successor to Bajirão), and asked for suggestions on the matter.29

Though the Maratha threat was a very pressing issue in the Estado, the Overseas Council was also preoccupied with agendas and problems in other parts of the Estado. On Mozambique, an entry of March 1744 by a provedor-mor dos contos (director of accounts) asked that the Junta do Comércio Geral de Mozambique e Rios be extended (and not dissolved when its term expired), and that various items of trade be revived for commerce.30 In March two years later,

208 in an update on the praça of Mozambique, viceroy Marquis of Castelo Novo lamented the excessive dues that were stifling trade, and asked for supplies to remedy the lack of military resources. In 1748, an entry permitted the Treasury Council of India to increase the payments made for soldiers in Mozambique.31 At the same time, French activities in the area continued, as confirmed in two entries dated January 1746 and 1748. 32 Goa continued to monitor developments on the coast of Malabar, as can be seen in an entry in 1743 on the war between Travancor and the Dutch.33 The officials of the Câmara of Goa, who helped to finance and outfit the armada of the south, also raised concerns over the need to defend the rendas, and to protect the sea routes from foreign adventurers and ‘pirates’.34 On Timor at the periphery of empire, both the governor and the religiosos on the island wrote in two separate entries to ask for more money.35

With tensions between the English and French mounting in India, a session-in-sitting of the Council of State at Goa in May 1747 is worth noting because in it, the (English) General of Bombay registered a protest against a possible wintering of a French squadron at Goa. In asking for shelter, the French Governor of Pondecheri had also brought up the prospect of an alliance – pointing out that the Portuguese stood to re-gain their fortresses in the North after the French had captured Madrasta and the island of Bombay from the English. The council members decided unanimously not to give quarters to the French ships in view of the damage that might result (probably in terms of the relations with the English, though this is not specified).36

In terms of reinforcements, the general letters of the Casa da ĺndia for 1741-50 did not mention the additional reinforcements totalling

209 900 men in fifteen companies which were sent in 1748 in five naus.37 However, apart from these reinforcements, there was no change in the allocation of regular socorros.38 In terms of monetary assistance, the king’s cabedal allocated to the assistance of the Estado was recorded in two entries in 1742 and 1743. For these two years, it amounted to 171,872 and 148,480 reis respectively.39

To end this section, it is appropriate to give a brief survey of the status of the remaining garrisons in the North, which had suffered such an acute setback in 1739-40. The king’s instructions to the Marquis of Castelo Novo commented on the good state in which the praças of Damão and Diu had been conserved under the Marquis of Louriçal (the Count of Ericeira, viceroy from 1741-42).40 In Damão (including the small encampment of Damão Pequeno and stronghold of Jerónimo) in 1749, the number of white and native troops totalled 774 men. The summary table consulted is interesting because it makes a distinction between European and white soldiers, as well as between native soldiers and sipães. Their numbers were pegged at 58, 53, 420 and 130 respectively. The number of artillerymen was given as twelve. Nearby at Diu, the number of white soldiers, native soldiers and sipães were maintained at 13, 197 and 110 respectively.41 The differentiation can be seen in this way – in ‘white’ troops, the administration might have made a distinction between soldiers who were ‘pure’ and from Europe from those who were ‘white’ but ‘mixed’ and were casados. In indigenous troops, distinction was made between those who served as regulars (i.e. the sipães) and those who were conscripted irregularly (as in the local ordenanças or militia).

210 Commerce Despite the classification of 1680-1740 as a transitional period, scholars like Prakash acknowledge that:

at around 1740, the Dutch East India Company was still distinctly ahead of its English rival […] [and] in terms of overall trading operations […] the situation was only radically altered by 1789 or so […] with the greater part of the change taking place after 1760 […].42

Irrespective of whether the Indian economy was progressing or declining, the English were wresting it from the native hinterland and coastal powers in a way that neither the Dutch, and certainly no Portuguese power, were able to effect in their attempted redistribution. Just as Portuguese commerce there had long abdicated its share to the private traders, the English monopolistic company was also relinquishing its share of the market to the English privateers, whom Furber identifies as the initiators of the “great commercial revolution” in the Indian Ocean. Gradually, the English were able to use their newfound political and economic strength in India to open up other markets in the “Far East”, specifically China.43

Something of the state of “formal” Portuguese commercial activities in India is revealed in the opinions (pareceres) addressed to the king in January 1743 by the provedor and officials of the Casa da ĺndia in Lisbon (António de Andrada Rego, João Marques Bacalho, António Sanches Pereira and Diogo de Souza Mexia). From the beginning of

211 the account, the authors ascribed the costs and losses in the fazenda real and decaying commerce to the English and Dutch companies. Specifically, they claimed, the powerful and rich English and Dutch companies were reaping Portugal’s share of profits. One way they achieved this was frequenting other ports such as Coromandel with their ships. ’s experiences were also described. On top of the English and Dutch, French participation was also said to have an impact on trade with Brazil (causing a fall in the price of tobacco) and Angola. Because of this, the stated alfandega of Asia was short of money. Furthermore, whatever was carried on ships was also needed to pay the liberdades (liberty chests or custom-free allowances) and soldos (salaries) of the seamen and soldiers. The account also revealed that the purchase of expensive goods at Goa to satisfy the Carreira returning to Lisbon also caused losses. A suggestion was made that goods be allowed to go to Portugal so that prices would remain cheap (by avoiding having to go through numerous middlemen). The consumption of luxury goods was to be prevented by law or alvará. As it was, they claimed, the fazenda was reduced by a quarter because of purchases made at Goa in which the ships had to pay five per cent to the Casa da Índia, and three per cent to the consulado (a convoy tax). The remedy they proposed to prohibit foreign ships from entering Portuguese ports was in line with the regimento (standing orders) of the Casa da Índia. Liberdade or concessions could be granted for a certain period to certain ships. Restrictions were to be put on ships sailing from China and India via Brazil on the way home (to Portugal), taking into account the king’s liberdade. Furthermore, foreign companies were said to be trading in military-related items with enemies (the Marathas) who had taken Salcete.44

212 The pareceres also proposed some interesting ideas regarding the formation of a trading company modelled upon that established in 1728. Companies could be formed for certain areas or ports in imitation of other European models. It was argued that this company should not fall under the jurisdiction of a prince. A company was also to be established at Macao, and men of business sent there. However, it was pointed out that the alfandega (customs house) was not able to collect dues at Macao. Amongst the conditions proposed, foreigners would be given a period of grace to adjust to this prohibition, concessions were to be issued for three ships to sail from Brazil for India annually, and Macanese merchants were also to be allowed freedom to trade with Coromandel. To revive trade, it was suggested that freight arrangements on board ships needed to be reformed. Also, ships going to Portuguese ports were to get a reduction in dues or offered privileges and merĉes (rewards) by the alfandega and Casa da Índia. However, English and Dutch vessels were excluded from these proposals, otherwise, it was argued this would have implications on produce back in Europe and on goods produced by the Estado. Out-going ships would also be obliged to raise soldiers. In short, the pareceres indicated there was a need for ships, monies and experienced sailors for all ports in Africa and Asia. A remedy in the form of fazenda (here, referring to revenue) was also needed for the maintenance of fortresses. At Mozambique, it was argued that the Junta da Administração (Administrative Committee) managing trade there did not boost commerce a great deal. On the whole, in tracing the chronology of companies and committees formed (the Portuguese East India Company of 1628, the Company of Macao, 45 and the shortlived Junta do Comércio), the report argued that privatisation did not do well, and even asked if liberation of commerce was leading to disorder. In the end, the authors requested the company be permitted to carry powder and

213 arms, and they also asked for a concession for six years for the Estado da Índia to be exempted from making contributions from the fazenda of Asia.46

It may just be coincidental that the provedor and officials of the Casa da ĺndia had been asked to give an opinion about the formation of a company at this time (that is, some time prior to January 1743). As we shall see, shortly before this the ambassador to London had also submitted a report on the matter, though it is unlikely that the two submissions were directly linked.

The other preoccupations of the centre over India are revealed in the instructions of 1744 that João V gave to the Marquis of Castelo Novo (the Count of Assumar). The viceroy was told to apply the “necessary means” in order to re-establish the rents and decaying commerce of the Estado da Índia. Apparently, the ordinary and war expenses had exceeded receipts (which stood at 310,000 xerafins). The king also suggested that more procuradores (representatives) of the Three Estates (of nobles, clergy and commoners) be appointed in Goa to raise additional finances (a group of representatives had been established in the Province of the North). He made further suggestions about ways of raising money. The first was by introducing a tax on goods – on urracas and velorio (grapes) – while income could also be gained from tobacco. New taxes were also to be levied on goods from Mozambique (ivory and gold) in order to cover the shortfall in other areas. In a further measure to raise money, the viceroy was told to establish a cloth industry to augment public rents. Moreover, the Crown was puzzled as to why there was no excess monies to be remitted home, since the eastern dominions had been reduced to Goa, Salcete, Bardez, Diu and Damão. With fewer places to maintain, the king clearly expected to make some

214 savings from the royal fazenda. In an effort to reduce expenses, the viceroy was told to reduce all that was opulent. In terms of trade, the viceroy was to promote the interests of commerce for the conservation of the Estado, and brief mention was made of a project to form a company. The king suggested that commerce could be encouraged by prohibiting the consumption of fazendas (wealth) and generos (goods) from Asia. Specific instructions were also given to separate the receipts of aid and rents (rendas), as well as the rents of the Câmara of Goa from those of the general fazenda of the Estado. He ended by saying that a frigate of war might be offered to assist – clearly to protect – trade.47

In chapter 5, discussion was initiated regarding the admirable formation of a company in India during the Restoration, but support for it had been withdrawn at the end of that war. For the remaining almost half century of the rule of Pedro II, the company seemed to have lapsed into a defunct state, only to be abolished in 1720.48 Attention was then shifted to East Africa, despite the setbacks of 1698 and 1729, in the hope of reviving the Estado. This gave rise to a number of juntas directed at managing the commerce there. This was also achieved with Indian investments from the Province of the North. However, the crisis of 1739 disrupted the uncertain arrangements between north India and Mozambique. An interesting and detailed note written by the Secretary of State, Cardinal da Mota, reveals that serious thought was given in August 1743 to salvage commerce in India by forming a company, although what transpired thereafter is unclear.

Earlier, whilst still based at London, D. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (later Marquis of Pombal) had prepared a detailed report for the cardinal on the formation of a company. The issue, however, was

215 not taken up in the Overseas Council.49 The 1742 report began with a detailed survey of the experiences of privatisation (the formation of a company) in other states – England, Holland and France, as well as in the smaller players like Sweden and . Significantly, Carvalho e Melo noted the increasing reciprocal dependence between Robert Walpole and the directors of the English company, and how bills were passed in parliament to support the latter. Between the English and the French, the difference between success and failure was ascribed to whether they had practical and experienced men who were able to implement the plan (of the company) on the ground. Carvalho e Melo’s survey came to two conclusions – firstly, commerce in the East could only be revived by setting up a “powerful” company; secondly, the company could not be sustained without giving a free hand to the merchants (a monopoly was not feasible). Carvalho e Melo urged people to buy what was necessary directly (and not through a middleman) in order to avoid losing money. In essence, the “trick” was to sell more and buy less. He argued that the commercial venture had also to be grounded in laws and legitimacy. Finally, he pointed out that reliance on a network was important, and that Portugal’s remaining infrastructure would come in useful. The revenue gained, he argued, could be used to maintain ships and garrisons. In the end, even if Portugal could not match up to England or France, Carvalho e Melo asserted it could hold its own. The report shows that there were high officials who were in tune with the latest developments in commerce. Some of the ideas smacked of mercantilism.50

In his notes on a twelve-point proposal (1743) to establish a company, which was extensively detailed in parts, the Cardinal da Mota began by conjecturing the formation of a company that would be assured by royal documents, and have a constitution and royal

216 protection. The second point referred to the creation of two bodies to lead it: the Supreme Council of Commerce and a Junta of Directors, comprising a number of ministers for this commercial enterprise. Portuguese and foreigners were to be admitted into the company. For Portuguese nationals, all goods could be traded by anyone, with no special consideration given to nobles. The fifth point added that the directors in the Council of Commerce would have privileges and shared administrative duties. Within the junta, there was to be a president as well as advisors. The ninth point touched on the intermediary powers of the viceroy. Point 10 related to the appointment of a secretary. Six further sub-points related to aspects of trade and expenses. The last point suggested the possibility of creating a system to open up commerce in Asia.51 Lack of capital, interested merchants and political will are some reasons, given in an entry of the História de Expansão Portuguesa, for the failure of the scheme to materialise. The formation of a company of commerce of Asia would only appear three years after the death of João V.

Meanwhile, the Estado continued to remit the usual requests for aid, and to pass on reports about trade and commerce (and tales of misdemeanour or corruption) to the Overseas Council. The consultations of the Overseas Council reveal an occasional entry asking for aid to be sent for the Estado as a result of the effect of war on its rendas.52 Between 1741 and 1750, the general letters of the Casa da ĺndia reveal that ships continued to carry ivory from Mozambique to India, and that beads and precious stones were carried in the opposite direction for the feitor of Mozambique.53 The king maintained his monopoly of spice, but in one entry a reminder had to be given to the master of a nau that he was not allowed to have any spice allocation on the voyage home.54

217 Before ending this section, it is appropriate to present some analysis of the stagnant or failed outcome of “attempted” company formation. Of the three reasons given above (i.e. to do with the availability of capital, people and determination), it seems there was no lack of capital. This capital was available to the king and various communities at home and abroad (for instance, New Christian and lançado traders). At home, chapter 3 revealed that D. João V had little incentive to reform the economy (as a result of the windfall from Brazil). Much of the new-founded wealth was preoccupied with grandiose building and religious projects, as well as ventures of interest closer to home. If the king was not too keen to dwell or invest in mercantile activities himself, neither his initiatives nor those of his advisers, it seems, were geared to tap into communities where financial resources were available. A large part of this failure has to do with the cultural mentality of the Portuguese (not exactly the same as the systemic corruption raised by Winius). Where the king was concerned, his Catholic religious affiliation naturally precluded the New Christian community, where capital was most available (in contrast to the more liberal policies undertaken by Pedro II). For the rest of the Portuguese, any commercial activities they undertook were afflicted with a “heavier” bureaucratic tinge.55

The argument so far links to the second and third reasons (i.e. lack of people and political will) offered in the História de Expansão Portuguesa for why a Portuguese company did not materialise during João V’s reign. The king or native merchants were either more interested in other things or interested in trade from a certain paradigm. 56 Some, like Newitt, refer to this mindset as patrimonialism. 57 Those who argue on the reason of absence of political will may be clouded by “progressive” Whiggish thinking. The “enlightened” and “efficient” Pombaline regime was most aggressive

218 in trying to regain markets and businesses encroached upon by foreigners. Yet, this ended in failure partly because foreign opposition to this reclamation of ownership was too strong (native Portuguese, colonial and foreign commercial interests were revealed to be closely intertwined in the immediate reign after João V).58 The point here being that, developments in the period of Pombal could not have materialised instantly. In the same vein, more needs to be done on the process of the Portuguese privatisation process in the East during the reign of João V, rather than concentrating on the outcome and the superficial explanations associated with it (although this will involve a sizeable project on its own, as chapter 8 will argue).

D. João V’s Demise Did the demise of D. João V in 1750 matter to the Estado da Índia? For most natives, the closest experience they had with the Crown was when the local administrators of the Estado needed to raise more taxes (for financing projects and wars), or hasten the production of goods in fulfilment of deadlines for trade and the king’s liberdades (liberty chests) in homeward-bound ships. Many administrators and casados engaged in some form of trade to supplement their income. For the most distant – in other words, those in Macao – the king’s wishes were heard but not necessarily obeyed most of the time. Yet, the colony was never totally detached from the centre. Another deeper way in which native inhabitants identified with the centre was through the king’s sponsorship of the padroado (Crown patronage of the Church). Aside from personal motivations, grandee viceroys probably experienced the closest connection with the Crown. The demise of the king meant that aides and appointees of the previous monarch might be disfavoured, as occurred for example, in the downfall of Alexandre de Gusmão and

219 the rise of Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (later, Marquis of Pombal) with the succession to the throne of José I (r. 1750-77).

D. João V’s stakes in India have been discussed earlier in chapter 3. Stemming from the consequence of the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which determined that was to be discovered in the New World was divided along the meridian 370 leagues west of Cape Verde,59 the issues between Spain and Portugal were not resolved satisfactorily at the Peace of Utrecht (1715). Only under the dynamic leadership of Alexandre de Gusmão, the Treaty of Madrid concluded in 1750 traded exchanges in privileges and territories in the Americas; beyond the New World, Portugal would give up its claims in the East in the Philippines. On the whole, the 1750 treaty concerned the New World, and it seemed to show the extent to which any remaining and secondary aspirations or interests in the East might be given up to secure as much of the Americas as possible. However, from a gain- loss perspective, the Portuguese did not have a foothold in the Philippines and the ‘exchange’ did not really mean much. Significantly, the tensions between Macao and Manila did not affect former’s status.60

At the end of D. João V’s reign, a glimpse of the overall situation of India can be seen from the instructions of the Marquis of Alorna (1744-50) to the Marquis of Távora (1750-54): the coast of Canara and Malabar remained important because of their resources. With regard to the Estado’s more immediate neighbours, the report was clear about who were its enemies and who were its friends – Sunda was friendly, Angria “reasonable”, Maratha received a mixed reaction, while Bounsulo was the enemy or potential enemy. As for the Europeans, Holland was portrayed as the irreconcilable enemy, England was “not good”, France was friendly and Spain was “good”.

220 On the economic situation and the periphery, Alorna indicated that useful commerce was undertaken by Macao and involved the exchange of silver from China and fine cloth from Bengala, as well as Coromandel, for which the Portuguese had neither treaty nor correspondence.61

Despite on-going tensions, India had been effectively stabilised, even though the Provinces of the North could not be regained. The “reconquest” had secured Goa and its vicinity from total collapse. The Portuguese remained in Mozambique and Timor in spite of increasing hostility and unrest by both Europeans and natives. The attempt to form another company in India to revive trade had failed to progress beyond the drawing board.

As for the Overseas Council, it had finally been given its president after going through nearly two-thirds of João V’s reign without one. The Council had experienced a change in its role in the period 1707- 50. It was to be further marginalised in the second half of the eighteenth century.

In summing up, the last decade of João V’s reign saw the service of three viceroys and an interim administration. Barely a century after the Restoration, the Estado da Índia faced another life-threatening crisis, this time, from an indigenous enemy – the Marathas. At a grander strategic level, the Portuguese continued to collaborate with Persia outside India. Although not obvious, the challenge from other Europeans in depriving the Portuguese of trade had affected revenue adversely, both for the Crown and for the sustenance of the Estado. This was in addition to the significant loss of revenue from the collapse of the Portuguese Province of the North. Ideas to

221 establish a company for increasing trade and revenue failed to progress beyond a detailed proposal. The reconquest and stabilisation of the “Old Territories” begun in 1741 may be seen as a precursor of the 1765-88 “New Conquests”, but in reality, it was not coherently conceived in conjunction with the latter. João V’s instructions to Castelo Novo, as well as the consultations of the Overseas Council on a range of matters, show that the king was interested in India only as a statesman would attend to routine business. For reasons of personal enrichment and nostalgia, the king was unwilling to give up these lesser-priority dominions, but neither would he invest much more in them. At the end of João V’s reign, the external environment facing the Portuguese in India was not any less vicious compared to the seventeenth century (a supposed period of nadir for the Portuguese in the East), but the Estado da ĺndia had staved off total disintegration, due in no small part to the administration on the ground, as well as to the crucial aid provided from the centre during the last decade of João V’s reign.

222 Endnotes

1 M. Lobato, “A Guerra dos Maratas” in A.M. Hespanha (ed.), Nova Historia Militar de Portugal (Lisbon, 2004), p. 329. See also M. de Jesus dos Mártires Lopes, Goa Setecentista (Lisbon, 1999), p. 17. 2 Lobato, “A Guerra dos Maratas”, p. 373. 3 P.S. Pissurlencar, Portugueses e Maratas (Bombay, 1975), p. 460. 4 Instructions of D João V to Count of Castelo Novo, in J. F. J. Biker (ed.), Collecção de Tratados que o Estado da India Fez com os Reis nas Partes da Asia e Africa Oriental VI (New Delhi, 1995), p. 247. Here after, referred to as CTEA. 5 M. Lobato, “Guerra dos Maratas” in Barata M.T. et al directed, Nova Historia Militar de Portugal II, p. 328. 6 A. Zuquete, Tratado de Todos os Vice-Reis da India (Lisbon, 1962), p. 183. 7 Pissurlencar, Portugueses e Maratas, p. 463. 8 C. R. Boxer, “O Plano de Reconquista da Provincia do Norte”, Boletim do Instituto Vasco da Gama, 29 (1936), pp. 4-5. 9 Boxer, “O Plano de Reconquista”, pp. 9-10. 10Ibid., pp. 6 and 9. 11Ibid., pp. 4-5. 12Ibid., p. 2. 13Instructions to Castello Novo, in CTEA VI, pp. 243-62. 14 Ibid. 15Zuquete, Tratados de Todos as Vice-Reis e Governadores da India, pp. 182-83. 16 A partial translation of Assumar’s letter can be found in F.C. Danvers, Portuguese in India – Being a History of the Rise and Decline of Their Eastern Empire (London, 1894), pp. 418-21. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21Instructions to Távora, in CTEA VI, pp. 329-44. 22Lobato, “A Guerra dos Maratas”, p. 328. 23AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 3r-4r. 24AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 5r-v. 25AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 7r-8r. 26AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 13v-14r. 27See Boschi C, “Episcopado e Inquisição” in História da Expansão Portuguesa directed by F. Bethencourt and K. Chaudhuri, pp. 372-92. 28Originally from the Livro das Monções No. 119, f. 217, from the then Arquivo Histórico do Estado da India Goa (now the Historical Archive of Goa). Transcribed and printed in Pissurlencar (ed.), Assentos do Conselho do Estado (de Goa), V, pp. 590-96. Here after, referred to as ACEG V. 223

29 ACEG V, pp. 600-605. Originally from Livro das Monções No. 121A, f. 239. 30AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 21v-23r. 31AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 40v-42v and 51r-52v. 32AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 37v-38v and 49r-50v. 33AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 17v-18r. 34AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 29v-30v. 35AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 37v-38v and 49r-50v. 36 ACEG V, pp. 596-600. Originally from Livro das Monções No. 120B ff. 444r-46v. 37C. Selvagem, Portugal Militar (Lisbon, 1931, republished in 1994), pp. 470-471. 38AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais que vão / vem da India, survey ff. 91v-139v. 39AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais…, ff. 99r-100v and 109r-110r. 40Instructions to Castello-Novo, in CTEA VI, pp. 243-62. 41BN, Reservados, Códice 4179, “Colleção de Manuscritos acerca do Estado da Índia e suas Fortalezas 1741-50”. 42O. Prakash, New Cambridge History of India – European Commercial, p. 268. 43Ibid., pp. 286-97. 44BN, Reservados, Códice 675, “Parecer do Provedor da Índia sobre Decadençia do Comerçio da Asia”, ff. 235-51. 45 In an entry in História da Expansão Portuguesa (Lisbon, 1998), p. 46, the Macanese company (according to V.M. Godinho) was transformed into the “Company of Macao” and was still in existence in 1717. 46Códice 675, “Parece do Provedor da India…”, ff. 235-51. 47Instructions to Castello-Novo, in CTEA VI, pp. 243-62. 48G. D. Winius, “Portuguese companies in times of crisis 1628-62” in G. D. Winius (ed.), Studies in Portuguese Asia (Aldershot, 2001), II, pp. 119-34. Originally published in L. Blusse and F. Gaastra (eds.), Companies and Trade (The Hague, 1981), pp. 119-34. 49A survey of Códice 214 (AHU) containing entries from 1740-50 confirms this. 50S. J. de Carvalho e Melo, Escritos Económicos de Londres by Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo. Introduction and annotations by J. Barreto (Lisbon, 1986), pp. 133-58. 51BN, Collecção Pombalina, Códice 735, “Plano da Companha da India”, ff. 3-8. 52AHU, Códice 214, Consultas acerca India, ff. 24v-25r. 53AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais…, f. 117v. 54AAL, Códice 47, Cartas Gerais…, ff. 131r-32v. 55 Laisser faire ideas had not emerged prominently and even when they did, the English experimented with monopolies in the form of, for instance, the E.I.C, till the 1830s and beyond. 56 Viceroys and officials in the Estado da Índia took what opportunities presented to them to enrich themselves too. 57 M. Newitt, A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion (New York, 2005), p. 185. 58 See K. Maxwell, The Paradox of Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1995), see chapters 3, 4 and 5 detailing attempted reform developments. 224

59The Spanish were to have whatever that was to the west to this line and the Portuguese whatever to the east. 60See L. F. de Almeida, Alexandre de Gusmão, o Brasil e o Tratado de Madrid (Coimbra, 1990). 61A. da Silva Rego, O Ultramar Português no Século XVIII (Lisbon, 1970), pp. 89-94.

225 CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

The subject of this thesis lies at the intersection of several distinct – though at times overlapping – topics and themes relating to Portuguese India. The thesis began with a survey of the literature in these areas – in particular, decline and survival of Portuguese India, eighteenth century Luso-Indian studies, empire and colonisation studies and centre-periphery studies. A number of gaps were identified at the beginning of the thesis.

The Overseas Council has been insufficiently studied, and its association with the Portuguese East has often been under- emphasised, and as a result, its documents in this area have been under-utilised. Because the Council was part of the metropole, this means that either studies on linkages between the centre and the eastern periphery have been ignored, or else their arguments are assumed to have been dealt with adequately in terms of the ideologically-clouded developmental or world system theories.

Meanwhile, Portuguese and non-Portuguese historians have concentrated either on the glorious period or on the decline; it is only towards 2000 that study of the revival and the post-Restoration period have begun to receive attention. While area studies abound, there is no holistic treatment for the formal Estado da Índia in the first half of the eighteenth century.

226 Accordingly, this thesis had a number of objectives, namely: a) to analyse the centre and leadership in the first half of the eighteenth century according to Shils’ holistic framework; b) in terms of the formal Estado da Índia, to look into the instruments of state (diplomacy and war), issues relating to the general financing of the Estado and promotion of trade in Mozambique, as well as the “soft” instruments of intervention in culture, religion and language. c) to look separately at Portuguese sub-imperialism in Timor, as well as the Portuguese reconquest campaign in India.

Chapter 2 provided the background to the thesis. At a global level, the limits of technology which placed constraints on travel and communication, and hence on the degree of control, were highlighted along with other “transitional” technological developments. The chapter began by providing a brief background on metropolitan Portugal. More importantly, an analysis was made of developments during the last twenty years of the seventeenth century in the Estado da Índia, corresponding roughly to the monarchical rule of Pedro II (1683-1706). This period, incidentally, has also been relatively neglected. The Estado da Índia might have revived (as Ames has argued) or continued to decline, but the flurry of activities to keep its head above water remained undiminished. In the spirit of the more holistic approach advocated by Russell-Wood, the interactive links of the Estado with Brazil were explored – in particular, the debates arising from time to time on how India and Brazil could have possibly tapped into each others’ markets and resources, without compromising the interests of the Crown.

227 Chapter 3 highlighted the evolving nature of the politico- administrative structure during the reign of D. João V. The personalised nature of rule led to a narrowing of consultation at the apex, and expansion of the base (partly in tune with early modern bureaucratisation). This chapter revealed how the Overseas Council became ‘marginalised’ to some extent, although substantial matters continued to be delegated to this body via trusted favourite- administrators. At the same time, an examination of the founding regimento of the Overseas Council using available evidence to hand revealed that the Council faced its own internal struggles. The Council and its forerunners had undergone a long evolutionary process, almost in parallel with the discovery and exploration of the East (from the end of the fifteenth century). The viceregal institution was depicted as part of the centre, with the top echelons imbued with the “core values” of that centre, although the resistance and detachment correlating to the distance from the centre was also recognised (and substantiated in later chapters).

Chapter 4 analysed the diplomatic and military instruments of state that were used by the Estado da Índia to ensure its survival vis-à-vis those it came into contact with. While this thesis does not contradict earlier findings that the Estado was more prone to aggression, it found it was almost perpetually engaged in conflict because of powerful adversaries. These sometimes emerged simultaneously in different theatres – for example, the Marathas and the Omanis. Even Portugal’s allies, the English, were not to be trusted entirely in the periphery and colonies. Although external relations, war, economic issues and religion were treated separately in the chapters of this thesis, the treaties negotiated to secure advantages strove to secure territorial as well as economic and religion-related objectives. Forged in the still nascent Westphalian international system, the treaties

228 were also reminiscent of extraterritorial agreements imposed by nineteenth-century Western imperialist states. The analysis of military engagements within and outside India confirms that the Portuguese were not incapacitated, but kept up to date with some of the latest European practices, though they also found themselves incessantly constrained by shortages. In the end, it seems clear that it was this keeping pace with modern military developments, and juggling diplomacy with the option of war, plus some crucial reinforcements from home, which enabled the Estado da Índia to survive during the period under investigation from 1707 to 1750.

Chapter 5 looked in some detail at the instruments of commerce and revenue collection. It concluded that, although the Portuguese were located in the prosperous international economy of the Indian Ocean, because of their unchanging and complacent attitude they were unable to tap into it. Specifically, estrangeirados like Ericeira, along with the second and lower-tier nobility, expected to make their fortunes there. It is clear that, had it not been for the quest for personal gain, the Estado da Índia would have emerged with better balances. In terms of the structure of revenue, the shift in the nature of receipts which began in the second half of the seventeenth century continued – that is, rents formed a greater proportion of total revenue by then, although trade continued to occupy a sizeable, though diminishing, portion of receipts. At Mozambique, an important focus of the attempted revival along the coast and inland, the Junta do Comércio ended in dismal failure owing to the same commercial ineptitude.

Chapter 6 turned to the Portuguese state intervention in culture and religion. These are sometimes regarded as “soft instruments”. This chapter showed that the Portuguese state injected significant

229 resources into these. They had mixed effects in the short term on the fortunes of the Estado, but in the longer term, they laid the groundwork for colonisation. In the manner of a “civilising mission”, the Portuguese often did not make any distinction between religion and cultural identity and customs. Despite their presumption of superiority, the Portuguese cultural policy was one of expediency at times – for example, castes were tolerated when it was found they were too deep-seated to be changed, or when native soldiers needed to be recruited according to their sub-castes. If the Portuguese racial or cultural policy was in a state of self-denial, the religious institutions had stronger and clearer agendas, backed by state support (through the padroado real). In fact, it was religion (coupled with the lengthy stay of the Portuguese from the end of the fifteenth century) that facilitated the spread of language, which in turn helped to ensure the continued existence of small outlying communities. While in many cases the genuineness of the conversions to Catholicism might be questionable, the process, nevertheless, helped instil acceptance for the Portuguese to remain, long after the feitoria and fort had been dismantled. The case study of Timor shows that, aside from the more formal imposition of power by the centre at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the religioso-administrators formed important pillars for the Portuguese resilience on the island. This, hand-in-hand with cultural influence and alliance-forming, ensured that the Portuguese stay in an area relatively near to the Dutch centre of power at Batavia, even though Crown trade in the “Far East” might not be boosted appreciably.

Chapter 7 turned the focus back to India to re-examine the origins of the “New Conquests”, and found that they were not intentionally linked in any way to the major initiatives of Pombal in the post mid- eighteenth century, despite their beginnings being dated to 1741.

230 However, Ericeira (viceroy 1741-42) did put a halt to the complete collapse of the Portuguese presence in India in the immediate post- 1739 period. The impulse of his successor as viceroy, Assumar, to reach Gates presents the strongest evidence yet of the existence of a grandiose and coherent project. What can be said is that the viceroys were told to look out for opportunities, and to exploit the situation whenever the chance arose. On the economic front, discussions at the highest level to form a company in India did not progress beyond a mere proposal, even though notes by the Cardinal da Mota reveal details of what seems to be the standing order for one. The end of this chapter shows that, while D. João V’s death probably did not affect the local populace that profoundly, the Portuguese remnants in the East survived in no small measure due to the capable leadership he placed on the ground (especially military), as well as the rather generous support provided by the centre during the last ten years of João’s reign. It must be said that D. João V was probably as “fortunate” as he was “magnanimous”. Without the wealth from his South American empire, he would not have been able to engage in any grand scheme, let alone sustain a dilapidated East which was probably not earning a substantial return for the cabedal he invested in it. That said, no concrete evidence has yet been found to show that the riches from the West were actually channelled to support the East.

In terms of the overall study, the nature of the sources employed, largely those from the archives in Lisbon, presented certain limits in itself. The approach of the study in seeing events from the centre and those closest to the core meant that the large number who operated “informally” outside royal sanction did not receive fair treatment. Had time permitted, material from the Goan archives,

231 particularly the Monsoon Books, would have allowed a more complete picture to be built up of the rule of the individual viceroys.

Needless to say, the process of research in this largely virgin area has opened up other potential research topics: a) From chapter 3, the linkages of the nobility and their factional alignment in the first half of the eighteenth century requires further research to see if these had policy effects on the colonial enterprise in the East. b) From chapter 4, the rise of the native military, especially the sipães, as well as campaigns they were involved in, are worthy of further analysis. c) From chapter 5, further research is needed to reveal the process and detailed causes for the failure of the attempted Portuguese company to come to fruition. d) From chapter 6, the attitude of the Portuguese leadership towards the state and civilisation of China in the eighteenth century awaits further investigation, given the continued relations between them. e) Lastly, from chapter 7, the last ten years of D. João V’s reign require a deeper investigation given that certain aspects of state and colonial enterprise continued to be relatively “well run”, in spite of the king’s illness.

Returning to the main question posed at the beginning of this thesis – how can the survival of formal Portuguese India in the first half of the eighteenth century be explained? This study has shown that the

232 Portuguese leadership did play a significant role. While debates may arise about the degree to which groups at various levels of leadership embrace the “core values” of the centre, this thesis has also shown that formal instruments of state (war, trade and diplomacy) were partly responsible for the survival of the Estado. The scope of the study did not permit a wider investigation of the leadership itself, and at times, the outcomes of “soft” or “informal” instruments were far from clear. If these could be married with an illumination of the activities of private and informal enterprises east of India for this period, a fuller picture of the Portuguese East would emerge.

“E, se mais mundo houvera, lá chegara”1

1 Os Lusiadas, VII, 14, viii. An approximate translation would be: “And, if there were more to the world, they would have reached it”.

233 GLOSSARY

A Arroba Unit of weight; equivalent to 32 arrateis Arratel Unit of weight; equivalent to 14-16 onças or 2.2 kg Armada do Alto Bordo Fleet; of high sea; __ do remo refers to that of galleys Alfandega Custom-house Almirante Admiral Alvará Royal decree; valid for period of at least one year Aposentado Pensioner B

C Consulado Association of merchants Companhia da Fabrica Real da Seda Royal Company and Factory of Silk Candy Unit of weight; variable; equivalent to 3 heavy quintais 3 arrobas in Canara Cabedal Wealth Cartaz Ship’s license Cafila Convoy of merchants Chouto Capitão de Mar e Guerra Captain of Sea and War; rose to rank from non fidalgo origin Carta de Poder Commission; similar to Carta Patente Casa da Supplicação High court of appeal Conselho Council Casa da Moeda Royal mint Casa da Guiné House of Guine Casa da India India House; located in Lisbon Casa dos Escravos House of Slaves Carreira da India Round voyage between Lisbon and Goa Câmara (Senado da) Municipal or town council D Dízimo Tithe of one-tenth Degredado Exiled criminal or convict Desembargo do Paço Council of Justice Desembargador Magistrate or judge of high court Direito Due E Estado da ĺndia State of India; loosely applied to all Portuguese settlements between Cape of Good Hope to Japan Executor Person in-charge of collecting debts and rents Escrivão Scribe F Freguesião Parish Furo / Foro Land rent Fragata 40-50-gun warship in early eighteenth century; also refer to small oared vessel Fama Reputation; __ do valor refers reputation for fame Feitoria Factory; trading agency or settlement, sometimes fortified Feudo Feudal benefice; tribute Fidalgo Nobleman Fazenda a) treasury; b) property –goods etc Fortaleza Fortress Fiel Servant G Grande High noble H

I

J Junta de Administração Ad hoc committee of administration Junta do Comércio Geral de Mozambique e Committee for commerce of Mozambique and Rivers Rios Juiz do Guiné Legally-trained magistrate of Guine Juiz de Fora Judge of lowest rank K

234 L Liberdade Concession granted in the form of space onboard ship; likened to duty free cargo Lançado Fugitive Letrado University graduate; usually a lawyer Libra Pound weight M Manchua Small vessel used by Portuguese in the east; “resembling little frigate” Misericórdia, Santa Casa da Holy House of Mercy; a lay fraternity providing charity Mouro Moor; loosely used by Portuguese to refer to all Muslims Morador Settler or colonist Mesa da Consciência e Ordens Board of Morality and (Military) Orders Merĉe Royal gift Mestiço Mixed blood Meirinho Bailiff; legal official with certain powers of arrest N

O Onça Unit of weight; equivalent to 28 g Ouvidor Senior Crown judge in high court P Prazo Land or right granted in a contract; use of term specific to Zambesia Praça Fortified stronghold Presidio Fortress Padroado Real Royal patronage of church overseas Pimenta Pepper Provedor Superintendent or comptroller Procurador Person with power of attorney Processo Suit; conducted by Jesuits in Inquisition Porteiro Porter Q Quintal Unit of weight; heavy quintal = 128 arrateis of 16 onças each or 58.7 kg R Religioso Member of monastic order Real (plural : reis) Smallest Portuguese monetary unit Relação High court of justice; Mesa da __ refers to the Board Regimento Standing orders; instructions; rules and regulations Repartição da India e Armazens Department of India and Warehouse Ribeira Shipyard Roteiro Sailing directions S Sipãe Native soldiers on regular or more permanent employment by Portuguese Socorro Aid or relief Secretário dos Despachos e Coisas da India Secretary of Dispatch and Things of India Sibandar Administrative head of town T Tenente-General Lieutenant-General Tença Tax or tithe of one-third Terço Military regiment; at full strength = 3000 men Tesoureiro Treasurer U

V Vedor da Fazenda Superintendent, comptroller or treasurer Valido Confidant of king W

X Xerafim Indo Portuguese monetary unit; equivalent to 300-360 reis

235 LIST OF GOVERNORS AND VICEROYS 1668 – 1750

Luís de Mendonça Furtado e Albuquerque 1671-1677 Pedro de Almeida Portugal 1677-1678 Francisco de Távora 1681-1686 Rodrigo da Costa 1686-1690 Miguel de Almeida 1690-1691 Pedro António de Noronha de Albuquerque 1692-1698 António Luís Gonçalves da Câmara Coutinho 1698-1701 Caetano de Melo e Castro 1702-1707 Rodrigo da Costa 1707-1712 Vasco Fernandes César de Meneses* 1712-1717 Sebastião de Andrade Pessanha 1717 Luís Carlos Inácio Xavier de Meneses* 1717-1720 Francisco José de Sampaio e Castro 1720-1723 Cristovão de Melo 1723 João de Saldanha da Gama 1725-1732 Pedro Mascarenhas* 1732-1741 Luís Carlos Inácio Xavier de Meneses 1741-1742 Pedro Miguel de Almeida Portugal* 1744-1750 Francisco de Assis de Távora 1750-

*Vasco Fernandes César de Meneses – first Count of Sabugosa; Luís Carlos Inácio Xavier de Meneses – fifth Count of Ericeira; Pedro Mascarenhas – first Count of Sandomil and Pedro Miguel de Almeida Portugal – forth Count of Assumar, Marquis of Castelo Novo as well as of Alorna.

236 TABLES (For Chapter 5)

Table 1 Revenue (ix) Alfandega Rendas & Camara Ecclesiastical Others (i) Relating to Foros Miscellaneous Feitor Goa 421,492 169,383 1,233,028 Salcete 48,757 217,525 21,533 Chaul 127,268 15,913 1,033 Bassein (ii) 302,441 585,523 Mozambique 71,033 (iii) 655 (iv) 139,362 Congo (v) 84,000 Mangalor (vi)27,443

Table 2 Expenses Defence Naval / Non-Military Ecclesiastical Others / Military Maintenance Transactions Miscellaneous & Maintenance Goa 333,424 503,357 30,575 14,314 Salcete 20,923 260,695 Chaul 116,765 11,850 9,304 3,043 Bassein 372,676 39,150 54,200 Mozambique (vii) 211,135 2,886 10,190 Congo 8,251 57,268 Mangalor (viii) 1,824 12,498 12,125

Table 3 Total / Tally Receipts Expenses

01 from feitor Goa 1823903 1823903 of feitor Goa 01 02 from thezoureiro Estado 830384 830384 of thezoureiro Estado 02 03 from Salcete 287616 287616 of Salcete 03 04 from Bardez 106580 106580 of Bardez 04 05 from Chaul 153616 153616 of Chaul 05 06 from Baçaim 907449 907449 of Baçaim 06 07 from Damão 684750 684750 of Damão 07 08 from Dio 240278 240118 of Dio 08 09 from Mossambique 225774 225774 of Mossambique 09 10 from Congo 84000 84000 of Congo 10 11 from Mangalor 27443 27444 of Mangalor 11 12 from Senna 39499 39796 of Senna 12 13 from Angediva 64975 64975 of Angediva 13 14 from Senn°’s convoy Canara (x) 84654 84654 of Senn°’s convoy Canara 14 Total 5560927 5561064 Total Source : Recenceamento Receitas e Despesas da India Cod 475 AHU i Figures are not entered unless they relate to notable persons or institutional bodies of interest. Gaps in totals are accounted for here. ii The figure includes non-custom related transactions and business of the feitor. iii Figure presumably excludes revenues from inland prazos. iv This figure was contributed by the Junta do Comerçio. v This figure was contributed by the sibandars of Persia. vi Rents were collected from lagimas and foros collected from chaos and vagas. vii Figure omitted here because overall add-up does not tally; possibly due to inherent flaw in records viii Duration covered : Mangalor (Dec) 1719-23 (Jan); Congo (Jun) 1716-19; Mozambique (Mar) 1717- 20 (Feb); Bassein (Mar) 1719-22 (Feb); Chaul (Feb) 1718-21; Salcete (Jul) 1717-20 (Aug); Goa (Sep) 1719-22 ix Figures rounded off to nearest whole values in xerafins. x Senn° - Sennado 237 Table 4 Census Year 1721 1753 Place Islands 70,000 58,000 Bardez 65,000 76,000 Salcete 73,000 73,000 Source : Sobre a População de Goa e Angediva 46-XIII-31 BA M. Lopes, Goa Setecentista (Lisbon, 1999), pp 79, 85 and 91; tables 1, 3 and 13.

Map-Statistics Please see print copy for image P l e a s e s e e p r i n t c

Source : K. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean (Cambridge, 1985), map 18, pp. o 186-87. p

Legend y bulk and low-value goods luxury and high-value goods f gold and silver o Further Details 1 silk, arms, glass, pottery, paper wheat, fruits, timber, etc. r 2 ivory, precious stones, incense, etc. fruits, nuts, coffee, indigo, etc. i 3 silk, pearls, *horses, brocades, etc. salt, fish, dates m 4 silk, beads, muslins, cloth, onyx wheat, rice, tobacco, indigo, etc. 5 cloth, cinnamon, sandalwood, etc. *pepper, nuts, timber, coconut a 6 cloth, diamonds, swords, steel, etc. rice, dyewood, etc. g 7 silk, cloth, opium, etc. rice, sugar, saltpetre, etc. e 8 rubies, elephants, etc. timber 9 silk, porcelain, lacquerwork, etc. gold 10 copper silver 11 ivory, *horns, etc. gold 12 rice silver 13 rice, *pepper, tin, camphor, etc. gold 14 nutmeg, mace, cloves, sandalwood, birds’ nests etc 15 cinnamon, elephants

238 MAPS

Map 1: Goa and Surrounding Areas 1740 Adapted from Monteiro S., Batalhas e Combates da Marinha Portuguesa VII (Lisbon, 1996), p. 152

239

Map 2: Goa and Neighbors 1726 Adapted from Monteiro S., Batalhas e Combates da Marinha Portuguesa VII (Lisbon, 1996), p. 130

240

Map 3: Province of the North Adapted from Monteiro S., Batalhas e Combates da Marinha Portuguesa VII (Lisbon, 1996), p. 152

241

Map 4: Western Asia / East Coast of Africa Adapted from Monteiro S., Batalhas e Combates da Marinha Portuguesa VII (Lisbon, 1996), p. 11

242

Map 5: Interior East Africa Adapted from Newitt M., A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion (London, 2005), map 5

243

Please see print copy for image

Map 6: South China Sea From Souza GB, Survival of Empire (Cambridge, 1986), p. 7

244

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources (Lisbon) Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU) Recenceamento Receitas e Despesas da Índia, Códice 475. Registo de Consultas acerca da Índia, Códices 212, 213 and 214. Registo de Consultas Mistas, Códices 21-24. Manuscritos Avulsos da Secretária do Conselho Ultramarino, Caixas 1-4.

Arquivo da Alfândega de Lisboa (AAL) Registo de Cartas Gerais da Alfândega da Casa da ĺndia, Códice 47.

Biblioteca Nacional (BN) Decadencia de commercio na Ásia, parecer do Provedor da ĺndia, Códice 675. Plano de Companhia da ĺndia. Colecção Pombalina (PBA) 735. Relação dos Successos da ĺndia de D. Pedro Miguel, Parte 3 and Parte 4. Instrução que o Conde de Ericeyra… a FJ de Sampayo e Castro, Códice 1455. Cartas que o Conde de Ericeira escreve a D. João V, Conselho e Secretária Estado, Códices 4406-08 (same as Códices 6426-27). Colleção de manuscritos acerca da ĺndia e suas fortalezas, Códice 4179. Cartas relativos á ĺndia 1683-1713, Códice 9809. Relaçam dos conselheyros e officiães do Conselho Ultramarino, HG 4549//8A.

245

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A Note on the Archives Despite the increasing availability of guides to the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU), a high proportion of these are either a summarised re-hash of earlier descriptions pertaining to the East, or lopsided compilations on Brazil. An exception that may be mentioned here is Macao: sources on Macao in the AHU are categorised to some extent by the Cultural Institute of Macao. In the AHU, an updated catalogue of the registers is entitled Catálogo dos Códices do Fundo do Conselho Ultramarino relativos ao Brasil Colónia existentes no Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (itself an outcome of the Project “Resgate” – a joint venture by the governments of Portugal and Brazil to improve access to valuable archival materials of the Overseas Council pertaining to the Portuguese Americas). Where the East is concerned, reliance is still made on A Secção Ultramarina da Biblioteca Nacional by A. Fitzler. Although some distinction may be made of the materials on Mozambique, India, Macao and Timor, the fruits of the latest organisational efforts (an offshoot of Resgate) are still stored in the database of the archive

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and have yet to be made available in print (they may be requested on an individual basis). On the first half of the eighteenth century, two series on India and the East are useful: a) Registos de Consultas acerca Índia, Códices 212-214; b) Registos de Cartas Régias etc. para Vice Reis e Officiais da Índia, Códices 203-205. In terms of the more general registers, the Registos de Consultas Mistas from Códices 21-24 can also be consulted for entries in terms of the relevant period and geographical focus. In line with the “consulta” focus of this project, a) is more exhaustively and systematically examined relative to b). The actual documents corresponding to the entries in the registers are supposed to be in the uncatalogued mass of caixas and maços. From the inventory list for “India”, there are 4 caixas (No. 77-80) and 21 maços (No. 95, 120, 128, 131, 135, 141, 159, 186, 195, 198, 203, 206, 209, 225, 236, 245, 260, 274, 282, 283 and 285) which cover more intently the period under investigation. Of these, the investigator of this thesis was able only to search through the identified caixas and about two- thirds of the maços (in numerical order) in any detail. A relatively important catalogue listing items relating to the inner and administrative workings of the Overseas Council can be found in the Catálogo de Documentos referentes à Secretaria do Conselho Ultramarino, caixas 1-4, relevant to the period under investigation, was searched.

At the Archivo da Alfândega de Lisboa (AAL), undergoing renovation at the time research for this thesis was carried out, a letter of permission from the Ministry of Commerce (located several streets away) was required before access was granted. Fortunately, the assistant working in the archive was extremely helpful. The most up- to-date catalogue available (by Fonseca) was out of print and only available in a tattered copy there. Of the two sources mentioned in

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Ames’ research (in Renascent Empire), the assistant stated that the Registo de Ordens was either non-existent or that it might not be located. Since the archive is very short of funding, the reproduction facilities were not operating though researchers could be allowed to take photographs of documents upon making personal request. Although Códice 47 has been transcribed and published in volume IV of Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa by the Centre of Overseas Historical Studies, some errors in transcription and typography can be corrected by consulting the original manuscript.

At the Biblioteca Naçional (BN) and Biblioteca da Ajuda (BA), one got the feeling that some ground-breaking manuscript was probably still lying in a corner, even though these libraries do not specialise in the archiving of overseas or colonial documents per se. Searching for a manuscript was a process largely reliant on the hand-copied card catalogue in the BN and on the hand-copied folio catalogue in the BA. The published catalogue on India for the BA entitled O Índico na Biblioteca da Ajuda by F.G. Cunha Leão was not as exhaustive as the hand-copied one available in the library. Similarly, the published listing in the BN, entitled Inventario Secção XIII by J.A. Moniz only features part of the collection there. In the BN, entries on the replicas of correspondence (including a set of instructions) of the early Indian viceroys of João V’s reign were card catalogued and available for use in the manuscript reading room upon request. The same general manuscript catalogue also featured an intelligence report on the remnant Portuguese strength in the “Province of the North” in the 1740s. The Collecção Pombalina of the library (catalogue available) yielded surprising finds such as the “Plano de companhia da ĺndia” (utilised for chapter 7).

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