4. President Eisenhower, the Air Force, and the Demise of Preventive War
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Winged Defiance: The Air Force and Preventive Nuclear War in the Early Cold War by Edwin Henry Redman Department of History Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Claudia Koonz, Supervisor ___________________________ Dirk Bonker ___________________________ Anna Krylova ___________________________ Chris Gelpi Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Duke University 2012 ABSTRACT Winged Defiance: The Air Force and Preventive Nuclear War in the Early Cold War by Edwin Henry Redman Department of History Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Claudia Koonz, Supervisor ___________________________ Dirk Bonker ___________________________ Anna Krylova ___________________________ Chris Gelpi An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Duke University 2012 Copyright by Edwin Henry Redman 2012 Abstract This dissertation examines a continuum of insubordination in the Air Force during the early Cold War. After World War II, a coterie of top generals in the Air Force embraced a view held by a minority in American government and the public, which believed that the United States should conduct a preventive war against the Soviet Union before it could develop its own nuclear arsenal. This strategy contradicted the stated national security policies of President Harry S. Truman and his successor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This influential circle of Air Force leaders undermined presidential policy by drafting preventive war plans, lobbying the civilian leadership in the executive branch for preventive war, and indoctrinating senior field grade officers at the Air War College in preventive war thinking and strategies. Previous accounts of preventive war activity in the Air Force centered about the Air War College and its first commandant, General Orvil Anderson. In 1950, General Anderson disparaged President Truman and urged for preventive war against the Soviet Union an interview to a local news reporter. Syndicated newspapers reprinted General Anderson’s remarks, and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, relieved General Anderson from his command of the Air War College. The traditional interpretation views General Anderson’s firing as the termination of preventive war discourse and activity in the Air Force. iv Examining senior leaders’ private and public remarks, declassified transcripts from Air Force commanders’ conferences in the early 1950s, and student essays from the Air War College, I show that the preventive war behavior persisted in the Air Force long after General Vandenberg relieved General Anderson in 1950. The culmination of the preventive war movement came in 1954, when a preventive war strategy called Project Control, devised by the Air War College and sponsored by Air Force Headquarters, stalled before State Department opposition. After Project Control’s failure, Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan F. Twining finally began to direct the service to develop air power strategies that supported President Eisenhower’s nuclear policy of massive retaliation. The preventive war episode in the Air Force demonstrates an extreme example of the potential for the military bureaucracy to regulate and undermine the Constitutional authority of the president to determine national security policy. That this behavior was considered normal implies that active steps must be taken to ensure proper civilian control over the military. I argue that three prominent theories of civil-military relations--Samuel Huntington’s objective control, Morris Janowitz’s constabulary theory, and Peter Feaver’s agency theory—are notable contributions to U.S. civil-military relations; however, none of these approaches could have solved the breakdown in civil- military relations that allowed preventive war advocates in the Air Force to pursue their plans for nearly a decade. My concept for civilian control over the military proposes a v more active role by defense and service secretaries and their civilian subordinates to monitor the military for evidence of insubordinate behavior. As demonstrated by the Air Force’s preventive war episode, by the time military leaders make public outbursts against civilian policy, efforts may already be underway within the military to usurp those policies. I hold that the civilian leaders in the Department of Defense are responsible for investigating and correcting such behavior. Additionally, effective civilian control over the military requires liberal military education programs in order to help all military professionals to understand and accept the political limitations on the use of force. vi Dedication To the professionals in uniform who took an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, both foreign and domestic.” May we fulfill our obligation to defend the nation against domestic enemies by first examining our own actions. vii Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... xi 1. Introduction—The Dilemma of Cold War Security ............................................................ 1 1.1 The Air Force and Preventive War ............................................................................... 3 1.2 Historiography ............................................................................................................... 24 1.3 An Overview .................................................................................................................. 32 1.4 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 35 2. To Independence and Beyond: Making the Case for Strategic Bombardment ...... 37 2.1 World War II: Justifying the Independent Service .................................................. 42 2.2 Post World War II: Reducing the Force ..................................................................... 45 2.3 Unification and Independence .................................................................................... 48 2.4 Roles and Mission .......................................................................................................... 53 2.5 Resolving the Service Budgets, 1948 ........................................................................... 59 2.6 The Fight Over the B-36 ................................................................................................ 61 2.7 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 73 3. The Air Force and Preventive War During the Truman Presidency .............................. 76 3.1 Early Calls for Preventive War, 1945-1947 ................................................................. 82 3.2 Amplifying the Rhetoric, 1947-1948 ............................................................................ 91 3.3 A Shrinking Window of Opportunity: The Soviet Bomb ...................................... 101 3.4 Reprimand .................................................................................................................... 112 viii 3.5 The Air Force, Undeterred, 1951-1953 ...................................................................... 119 3.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 124 4. President Eisenhower, the Air Force, and the Demise of Preventive War .................. 127 4.1 A New Administration Renews Hopes for Offensive War ................................... 133 4.2 The New Look Presents Old Obstacles to Preventive War ................................... 137 4.3 Negative Progress at the Air University: The Air Power Historian .................... 163 4.4 Parry and Hit Back With Everything You Have: The Air Force Gets Behind Massive Retaliation ............................................................................................................ 166 4.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 169 5. Education Versus Indoctrination: The Air War College and Student Papers, 1951 .. 172 5.1 Similarities: Military Power and Collective Security............................................. 180 5.2 Contrasting Views of the Cold War: Ideology Versus Aggression ..................... 183 5.3 Naval War College Solutions—Revitalize, Inform, Unify, Protect ...................... 188 5.4 Air War College Solutions—Amass and Employ ................................................... 193 5.5 Exchange Students from Other Services .................................................................. 207 5.6 Explaining the Dogmatic View at the Air War College: Institutional Culture .. 210 5.7 Conclusion: ................................................................................................................... 215 6. Asserting Civilian Control Over the Military: A Preventive Approach ..................... 217 6.1 U.S. Civil-Military Relations