Canadian Risk & Hazards Réseau canadien d’étude des Network des risques et dangers (Knowledge and Practice) (connaissances et pratiques) www.crhnet.ca

HazNet Special Edition = Winter 2014

These stories are based in the past, long

before the internet, Google, and electronic BLASTS FROM THE PAST data base searches were available. Researchers to day, all too often limit their The events presented in this special edition references to what is easily accessible on of HazNet are of great significance in line. George Santayana stated, “Those who Canada’s disaster history. Together, the cannot remember the past, are condemned Halifax Explosion, the Green Hill Park to repeat it." But to uncover the past, Disaster and the Gentle Bomber story, completing the research involves leaving although told by different authors and the ease and comfort of on-line searches covering different decades, illustrate the and heading down to local libraries, importance of, and the need for, checking microfilms, interviewing remaining investigative research. Research helped to witnesses, etc. It is hoped that the richness unravel the mystery, and in many cases the of these accounts will serve as a reminder secrecy, that served to protect the guilty. of the importance of conducting historical Research served to unveil the truths and research. dispel the myths. In particular, Joe Scanlon’s account of the These narratives bring out the human 1917 Halifax Explosion should be read by elements that were at play, the important every emergency management professional role of emerging leaders, the courage, and and disaster-related researcher. The article heroism of so many and the tragedies which is descriptive and includes prescriptive impacted many lives. All of these elements lessons that are very much applicable are vividly brought to light. These stories today. illustrate the importance of digging deep into reports, not accepting poorly done or The cargo vessel, The Green Hill Park, glossed over accounts, and unwinding fact exploded in Vancouver Harbor in March from fiction to discover the causes of what 1945. The blast did indeed provide many occurred, why it happened and what was opportunities for learning. But it took done (or not done) in an attempt to lead to ruined lives and wide-spread economic a better future. disruption to make people pay attention. A subsequent inquiry and new regulations,

1 | Page (with loopholes of convenience), did little to The US Air Force, as part of the Strategic Air drive these home. The true cause of the Command (SAC), had developed large explosion never came out in the inquiry and bombers capable of carrying an atomic was only learned 35 years later by a bomb and flying nonstop to targets in reporter from the Vancouver Sun. Why? Russia. In 1950 the largest Bomber of the Many people in the shipping system would day was the B-36, affectionately referred to have been implicated. as the “Gentle Giant.”Routine flights were carried out to test its operational capability. John Stanton the Lawyer for the Long These flights, originating from the US, were Shoremen’s Union made the point that triangulated over Greenland, Alaska and British Columbia had never experienced Canada and designed so that they could be anything like this explosion before. Stanton effectively altered for targets in Russia. said, “Our imagination of what could have happened cannot in itself, spark real High security and secrecy were the watch changes of behaviour that improve safety.” words of the program. Where and when This speaks to the sad truth that at every flights would depart and return was Emergency Management Conference I have classified information, as was information attended: “someone had to die first” before about their payload. change took place. Enter our resident atomic bomber! “When During the height of the Cold War, anxiety the giant aircraft slammed into a remote ran high not only in the general population glacial cirque in northwestern British Columbia during a late-night blizzard over but at all levels of government. Russia and 60 years ago, it was the first unplanned the US were rattling their sabres and destruction of an atomic bomb. It created building atomic weapons at an alarming both a mystery and a worry” rate. Bomb shelters proliferated the landscape and the Government of Canada Information was scare and no one was created a National Warning System that ready to speak. Ottawa had only sketchy incorporating emergency government information, but pointed out, “The highly bomb shelters across Canada. The program classified nature of this incident — would was referred to as the Continuity of lead one to assume either, that at the time Government Program and regional shelters we wanted to keep the degree of SAC were established to house government operations under wraps, or that this B-36 officials in event of an attack. Canada and was equipped with what SAC aircraft were the US were equal partners in establishing supposed to be equipped with.” the North American Air Defense Command A mystery indeed! This is the true story of a (NORAD). harrowing flight, a dedicated and tenacious flight crew, the heroic rescue of the flight crew by fisherman off the coast of BC and

2 | Page the determination and research of one man THE HALIFAX EXPLOSION to tell the story and uncover the mystery. By: Joe Scanlon CONCLUSIONS Professor Emeritus, Director of Emergency These articles, aside from being of general Communications Research Unit interest, underscore the importance of Reprinted with permission by the author investigative research, the documentation of lessons learned and to add to the In retrospect, it’s easy to see that Mont Canada’s history of disasters. Blanc was a bomb waiting to explode and I wish to thank those involved in bringing that the fire started by her collision with these events to light: Joe Scanlon for his IMO posed an enormous threat to Halifax and Dartmouth. It was not at all obvious at explosive description of the Halifax disaster and Bert Struik and Anne Kyler for gathering the time. In fact, to those who saw what the information on the Green Hill Park happened, the situation appeared explosion and finding the “Gentle Giant” innocuous. No one on either ship was killed account. or injured by the collision and neither ship was in danger of foundering. IMO had IN MEMORIAM pulled away from Mont Blanc and Mont Blanc though on fire was drifting along with It is with sadness that we learned of the the tide. From Halifax, it was clear that death of one of the frequent contributors to IMO’s bow was damaged but it appeared HazNet, Bill Anderson. Please see the end of Mont Blanc was unscathed: because Mont this edition for a summary of his life Blanc’s gash was in her starboard side, the achievements written by Joe Scanlon. side away from Halifax.

Best wishes for 2014. I hope you enjoy this However, the most important reason for special edition. this lack of reaction was that neither those in nearby ships nor those watching from the Larry Pearce shore had any idea of Mont Blanc’s cargo or the risk it posed to the harbour and to themselves. Spectators including children gathered along the waterfront and at windows in Halifax and Dartmouth to watch

Mont Blanc burning. They kept watching even when there were small, initial explosions: until the last moment those seemed like a wonderful display of

3 | Page fireworks. The only warnings to reach coal ship Storstad. But most collisions were anyone came from the crew of Mont Blanc minor. There were three in the Mersey the and no one understood them or paid same week as IMO collided with Mont attention. Even though the French sailors Blanc. There were several involving the were running, no one else was. Because no Dartmouth ferries a week or two after the one else was reacting, there was no cause explosion. Little is known about any of them for alarm. for they were unimportant. At first glance, the collision between IMO and Mont Blanc It may seem hard to believe that a collision appeared equally insignificant. Edward between two ships should have attracted so McCrossan, a sailor on Curaca who watched little attention but during the 12-month it happen, was so little interested that he period between October 1917 and went below for a smoke. The signalman on September 1918, 103 allied ships sank as a the Canadian navy depot ship Niobe told result of a collision with another ship. While the first officer, Allan Baddeley, that the a study by the British government incident was a minor one and the Master of suggested two reasons for this -- ships were Arms on Niobe commented, “I’d seen travelling without lights and ships were in vessels collide before. This one seemed no close quarters in convoys -- that same different.” If nothing else had happened, report noted something else: the 300,000 the incident would have faded from tons of shipping lost during the 12 months memory, much as “fender benders” studied represented only 50 per cent more between automobiles do today. tonnage than the 196,674 tons lost during the 12 months before the war started. At first, the only persons really concerned Collisions, in other words, weren’t about the collision were Mont Blanc’s crew: uncommon in the days before radar and they knew the seriousness of the situation. radio communications. In fact, they were so The collision had broken open the barrels of common that the White Star Line ignored gasoline and sparks had set the gasoline on the fact that Captain Edward J. Smith fire. The flaming gasoline was flowing into caused collisions in both New York and the forward hold where the wet and dry Southampton harbours before making him picric acid was stored. Soon the fire was out captain of Titanic. of control. Because Mont Blanc’s crew knew their ship’s cargo they knew it was only a True, a few collisions were spectacular. One matter of time before their ship exploded. was Titanic and the iceberg. Another was They could try fighting the fire -- given the the Empress of Ireland, which sank in 1914 speed at which it was progressing, that in the Gulf of St. Lawrence with an even seemed hopeless. They could open the larger percentage of passenger lives lost seacocks, hoping the ship would sink -- that than Titanic. She went down only 14 would take too long. They could try to get minutes after a collision with the Swedish Mont Blanc moving, hoping that forward

4 | Page motion would force water into the hold. It reasons why no one reacted to the shouts. was too late for any of those options. Their Those watching had no knowledge of Mont ship was doomed. When the captain gave Blanc’s cargo, no experience with high the order to abandon ship they scrambled explosives, no reason to think the burning into two lifeboats. ship was dangerous. When no one warned them of any danger, they assumed that all After a hasty count, Captain Le Medec was well. thought that his childhood friend, Chief Engineer Antoine Le Gat, was missing. OTHER REACTIONS When he realized that Le Gat was already in one lifeboat, he decided that it was a Because almost no one except the crew captain’s duty to stay with his ship. His crew recognized the danger, the other reactions shouted that that was foolish. Another to the fire were for different reasons. The childhood friend, second officer Jean Glotin, first reaction was simply one of curiosity. grabbed him by the arm and pulled him into Fires fascinate people and the burning Mont the boat. The crew then rowed towards the Blanc was a spectacular sight. At the Royal Dartmouth shore. The pilot said it was the Naval College, senior cadets watched from closest and safest place to go. As they their gunroom. At the Hollis Foundry, rowed, Mont Blanc’s crew yelled to others workers gathered at a window. Children to seek safety. Edward McCrossan again: paused on their way to school. Teen-ager Audley Griffin recalls his reaction when he Just as the IMO backed clear of Mont Blanc, saw the fire engines. (Because of the war I saw the Frenchie’s port lifeboat in the some classes didn’t start until 9:15 a.m. or water. They were pulling past the stern of 9:30.) their ship and were heading for the other shore. Two men were standing up in the I thought, ‘Oh, the heck with school. I am boat shouting. What they were saying, I going to see where the fire is.’ I raced down don’t know because I cannot speak French. the hill….

When the Mont Blanc’s crew reached Many North Enders watched from home. Dartmouth, they lined up as the officers did Because of the cold most stayed inside, a quick count to make certain that looking through their windows, something everybody was safe. Then they started that would cost some their eyesight, many running. Later, the captain and the pilot their lives. Despite the cold, officers at the were criticized for “not taking proper steps Wellington Barracks went outside for a to warn the inhabitants...of a probable better view. A number of soldiers watched explosion.” The sailors did shout a warning; until they were late to work. Later, some but it was in French. While language was were told that their injuries weren’t fully part of the problem, there were other covered since they weren’t officially on duty

5 | Page when Mont Blanc exploded. Employees of could see that Mont Blanc was drifting Acadian Sugar Refinery climbed to the toward the dock where she was being refinery’s roof: they had the best view of all. unloaded. Mont Blanc, herself, did not appear to be a threat but if she set Picton Seeing a story developing, Jack Ronayne of on fire that would be dangerous. Something the Halifax Mail called his office to say he had to be done. Even before that, Frank would cover the fire. Constant Upham Carew, the foreman supervising Picton’s phoned the fire department from his store. unloading sensed the same danger. He told Someone else pulled an alarm box. Hattie his men to start covering Picton’s hatches. Burrill wrote to a friend in Charlottetown: Later, Carew and his men were praised for I remember hearing the Patricia and the staying at their jobs as Mont Blanc drifted rest of the fire department go past the towards them. They did stay at their jobs corner & they were flying. I said to myself, but that was not because they thought “Gee whiz! There must be a big fire near Mont Blanc herself presented a danger. us.” They thought the real danger was fire on Picton. She wasn’t the only one to react to the sound of fire engines. John Cranwell, an While the longshoremen set to work, ensign with the Salvation Army, ran Lieutenant Allan Baddeley on Niobe asked downstairs to see what was happening. Like the acting boatswain, Albert Mattison, and Hattie Burrill, he saw the Patricia on the a volunteer crew to take the steam pinnace way to the fire. The Patricia was the and tow Mont Blanc away from the docks. department’s pride and joy, a new motor- (Volunteers were requested because of the driven pumper. As it arrived at the docks, danger from Picton, not because of a flames and smoke were belching out of perceived threat from Mont Blanc.) On Mont Blanc’s hold and shells were Highflyer, Acting Commander T. K. Triggs, exploding like fireworks. Patricia’s driver the executive officer, and Lt. James Billy Wells was struck by what he saw. “The Rayward Ruffles launched a whaler on the ship was almost alongside the dock and the same mission. Highflyer would have sent a multicoloured flames shooting from her larger boat but her steam cutter and sailing decks presented a beautiful sight.” pinnace were in Dartmouth with the chief engineer and his crew. Spotting this activity, However, while most persons were merely the captain of Stella Maris beached the fascinated, officers on both Niobe and scows he was towing and came to assist. Highflyer were alarmed at what was happening. That was not because of Mont One person did react to the real threat. He Blanc’s cargo – no one had told them what was Lt. Cdr. J. A. Murray, the Canadian who she carried – it was because of Picton. They had joined the Royal Navy Reserve when he knew that she carried ammunition and they came to Halifax from Sydney with Rear

6 | Page Admiral Chambers. Murray was on the Barracks or the general public, the convoy liaison tug, Hilford, returning from spectators including the children who were Bedford Basin when the collision occurred – now lining the waterfront. In fact, the he had gone to get some kippers for officer who took that call didn’t even call breakfast -- and on his way back he could Rear Admiral Chambers. About the only see the damage to Mont Blanc. There was a ones to learn of the danger were the crew wedge-shaped cut in her side through of Hilford – who had heard Mackey which could be seen the barrels of picric shouting to Murray -- and a few persons in acid. However, since neither Murray nor the North End station where Murray used Hilford’s crew knew what the barrels the phone. Even then, there was little contained, that didn’t seem cause for alarm. reaction. One of Hilford’s crew, Joseph In any case, the barrels had not broken Cogan, tried to get his captain to move the open. Their attitude changed when Mont tug further away from the Mont Blanc. The Blanc’s pilot, Frances Mackey, called across captain refused. In the station, telegrapher to them and warned them to get away. Vincent Coleman started to run for his life. Unlike the crew’s shouts in French which no Then, thinking of the danger to others, he one understood, Mackey’s message was in returned to his key and started to telegraph English and it was crystal clear: Mont Blanc a warning to incoming trains. Because that was in danger of exploding. may have cost him his life, he is now featured as a hero in a vignette on Canadian Murray told Hilford’s captain to head for television. As we will see later, his role in Pier # 9 where he disembarked and rushed what happened has been distorted but it to phone the port convoy office. He called was important to the early response. again just after 9 a.m. as Mont Blanc drifted into Pier # 6. Murray’s call came at a bad By the time the boats from Niobe and time. Since most persons started work at 9 Highflyer reached Mont Blanc, her plates a.m. they were en route to work when the were too hot to touch. The sailors could not collision occurred. They couldn’t be reached get a line on board so, driven by the at home or at work. Nevertheless, Captain outgoing tide, Mont Blanc drifted into Pier # Frederick Pasco, who was still at home, 6 and set the pier on fire. When the tug called and asked W. H. Lee, Gopher and Stella Maris arrived, her crew decided to try Musquash to respond and try and pump again. They, too, were unsuccessful. Seeing water on the fire. By then it was far too late. that nothing could be done, Acting Commander Triggs decided to transfer to Although Murray told the port convoy office Stella Maris. If he could do nothing about about Mont Blanc’s cargo, no one thought Mont Blanc, perhaps he should check up on to warn the sailors from Highflyer or Niobe IMO. He and the others were still unaware or the crew of Stella Maris. No one told the of the danger of Mont Blanc exploding. Only firefighters, the officers at the Wellington Lt.-Cdr. Murray and the crew of Hilford had

7 | Page been informed and they had headed the when there was a blinding flash, an awful other direction. shudder and a bang which made me think it was the end of the world.... There was a SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS momentary stillness then boiler tubes, rivets and jagged steel plates were flying all As the fire grew worse, the scene became around us. I saw a large piece hit the more spectacular. The barrels of fuel and foremost funnel of our ship and completely the shells piled by Mont Blanc’s guns flatten it.... started exploding, sending spurts of flame as high as 40 metres. At that point, the In Dartmouth, Mrs. A. C. Pettipas said she captain of the tug Wasper B guessed Mont counted nine minor explosions, each three Blanc’s cargo and headed to the dry-dock to seconds apart, before the main blast. warn those on shore. He was too late: Wondering what was happening; she raised her window and leaned out to call to two I heard the Belgian whistle blow and the women on the street below. only thing I remember after, was No. 1 hold of the munitions ship on fire on the …a blinding sheet of fire shot about a mile starboard side. We made an attempt to into the area and covered the whole sky. turn back towards the offices at the dry- Then a violent concussion rent the area…. A dock but, before reaching there, a shell great black ball of smoke rose up to about struck us. We had 80 gallons of gasoline in four or five hundred feet and out of this both tanks, which exploded when (the) shell came lurid cardinal-colored flames. It was a struck.... I think that I was the only one of magnificent though terrifying sight…. As I the five on board the Wasper to escape as leaned out to call I saw a blinding sheet of the ship was blown up. My son, Harold fire shoot a mile high in the air. It seemed to Prest, who worked at the dry-dock, was cover the whole sky. killed. Mrs. Pettipas was blown across the room Fred Longland on Niobe saw the same thing but, because her window was open, she as he was looking at the fire through a was not struck by flying glass. porthole: Others, even those well out to sea, had The next thing there was a series of minor similar descriptions: explosions as the Benzol drums ignited and I saw an immense volume of smoke shoot exploded. By this time the fire had begun to up to a very great height with two red, get a serious hold, and a large column of angry looking flames of fire projecting some black smoke rose from the desk of the distance above its summit. The smoke stricken ship. I turned to Jock standing looked like great balls of black wool but was beside me and said, “They'll never get that black in the center. The flames were visible fire out,” and I had hardly spoken the words

8 | Page but less than a second, like a flash of early winter morning.” Although it wasn’t lightning, and could be seen in several evident at the time, Chambers and the places thru the smoke. (The captain of the others who saw the explosion were Acadien 24 kilometres out to sea.) describing the arrival of a new age. Years’ later, American scientists on the Manhattan ...a great column of white smoke and flames Project would recognize that: they studied was observed, rising above the sea horizon what happened in Halifax so that they could in the direction of Halifax.... The morning better grasp the destructive potential of a was fine and clear. Smooth sea and no new weapon called the atomic bomb. clouds in the sky. The column of flame and smoke hung long enough for its character LESSONS FROM THE EXPLOSION and sources to be discussed and its bearing taken. A camera was sent for, to The story of the explosion continues to live photograph it, when the shock of a terrific not only in the memories of the small but explosion was heard, and the column of fire still vibrant group of survivors but also in turned to dense smoke. It was surmised the stories passed down the generations. that munitions ship had been blown up. Many persons can quote from memory the Tacoma, then more than fifty miles from stories of the explosion their parents and Halifax, heard the explosion so distinctly grandparents told them. Although the that she sounded to General Quarters. (The exhibits about the explosion are not as lookout on the US troop ship Von Steuben, popular as the ones on Titanic, thousands of 35 kilometres from Halifax.) persons annually visit the Maritime Museum and the Citadel in Halifax as well Audley Griffin, the young man who was en as the Dartmouth Heritage Museum to route to school when he saw the fire recall the events of 1917. At these engines, wasn’t sure what he felt. locations, they can see photos and read Suddenly there was this curious sensation.... about what happened for still another time. I slunk into a doorway right beside me and In Dartmouth, they can even see one of put my arms up over my head and all of a Mont Blanc’s two cannons. It was blown sudden the glass of the doorway collapsed about 3.2 kilometres to Albro Lake and on top of me and the little finger on my left passed through a number of hands – for a hand was hanging by some skin. while it was in front of former Mayor A. C. Johnston’s home – until S. C. Oland Many who watched the plume rise presented it to the Museum in 1967. thought it was beautiful. Rear Admiral Chambers described it as a “most wonderful The explosion also lives on in literature. The cauliflower-like plume of white smoke, first and arguably the most significant twisting and twirling, and changing colour in Canadian historical novel, Hugh the brilliant sunlight of a perfect Canadian MacLennan’s Barometer Rising, is set

9 | Page around the explosion, and there are three effectively his meagre supply of brandy and other novels, one short story and a Joan the little first aid that he knew; Roy Laing, Payzant’s delightful children’s book Who’s a the bank teller who started directing Scaredy-Cat?” that use it as a setting. An A military personnel when it was clear & E television special on the explosion someone had to take a leadership role; draws a reaction every time it runs. There William O’Reilly and the unknown warrant are also a number of significant works of officer from Niobe who rescued some of non-fiction including Michael Bird’s The those washed overboard by the tidal wave; Town That Died and Janet Kitz’s Shattered and Commander John W. Hopkyns, the City and new publications keep appearing. engineering officer of Highflyer, who put his Alan Ruffman and Colin Howell had no men to work helping others in Dartmouth in problem finding enough material to fill what is often called the best tradition of the Ground Zero in 1994. There is also a service. vignette that is repeated continually on Canadian television telling how Vincent There were the persons who ignored the Coleman returned to his telegraph key warnings of a second explosion to remain trying to warn incoming trains. on duty or keep assisting others. These included Private J. Eisner, who remained at Many individuals performed remarkably his post at the Wellington Barracks; Mrs. well in the wake of the explosion. There Albert Sheppard, who kept funnelling were women like Gladys Harris, who medical supplies into the North end when managed to help her four children escape others were fleeing and shamed men into from a wrecked house; Violet Smith, who, sharing her bravery; Edith Bauld, Ralph though seven months pregnant, found the Proctor and C. J. Burchell, who all kept strength to wrestle open a jammed door; driving their cars as ambulances in and out Annie Greenough Chapman, who forgot her of the North End; and the unknown own concerns to rescue her infant child; firefighters who stayed on duty despite the and Gertrude McAuley, who threw herself same warnings. There were the volunteers over her father so he would not be hit on who assisted with the gruesome tasks of the head by flying debris. There were men amputation and enucleation and just like J. J. Spruce, the gunner who suffered comforting the injured and dying, Marjorie severe burns when he rushed into a burning Moir and L. L. Maguire and James Crerar house and rescued a 10-year-old child; McKeen; Annie McIsaac at Mount St. Joseph Hinch, who, while on the way to his Vincent, who used her clothing to bandage children, stopped to assist others and even the wounded; Marylee MacAloney, the found time to splint the fractured leg of student from the Agricultural College who, Sister Cecilia Lawrence; Charles Clark, the despite her own illness, helped at the Truro passenger on the Boston Express who used Court House until she was exhausted; and

10 | Page Dorothy McMurray, who spent the night at as well as Thomas Davis and Robert Stone, Camp Hill, trying to comfort the injured and the seamen who took the same risks when the dying. they boarded Musquash and later received the Albert Cross from the King because of the risks that they took. There were the There were also those with skills or in persons who, with remarkable insight, saw positions of responsibility who lived up to that others got assistance that they needed, what is expected of such persons, like Avery persons like Claire McIntosh, Lady De Witt, the physician who risked his own Superintendent of St. John Ambulance, who health as he carried on for days assisting conceived and directed the first canvas of the injured and dying; Leo Tough, the police the impact area, and the volunteers, mainly officer who, though suffering from women and many of them Salvationists, tuberculosis, remained on duty day and who worked with her; Colonel Paul night at the morgue in the basement of Weatherbe, the retired military engineer Chebucto School; Henry Colwell, the quiet who designed a medical response system deputy mayor who put together a that is still impressive when viewed in the remarkable relief organization; and the light of all we know today; and Fred often abrasive R. T. McIlreith, who, despite Pearson of Massachusetts, who realized his own advancing years, accepted the there was something wrong with the way leadership role thrust upon him. There are relief was being administered and managed all the physicians who attended the injured to come up with a brilliant idea to make in their own homes, persons like Captain A. things better. McD. Morton, who not only assisted those who came to his home and later worked at Camp Hill, but even found time to end a There were also those who did what anyone grueling day by helping set type at the would have expected and would have been newspaper so there would be at least some embarrassed had someone tried to honour report of what had happened. Perhaps he them for it, persons like George Graham, was trying to find some way of doing the head of the Dominion Atlantic Railway something not directly related to the who walked through the debris and the carnage around him. dead to send out the first appeals for assistance; W. A. Duff, the civil engineer There are the more obvious heroes, men who sent out the crucial messages calling like Vincent Coleman and James W. for help, who got the rail line working to the Harrison, the Furness-Withy manager who, South end and who found time, even before after using his car to drive injured to that, to drive injured to hospital; Dr. C. C. hospital, boarded a boat loaded with Ligoure, who ignored the discrimination he explosives and persuaded others to assist had been subject to and treated all those him getting it towed away from the docks; who needed his help; H. D. Nicholas, the

11 | Page Pullman porter who helped him; and Dalhousie students. MacMechan knew General Thomas Benson, who never let the little about the North End, its people and bureaucracy force him to blame others for its social life, and made no attempt to the sufferings of his soldiers; and the Prime overcome his ignorance. Minister, Sir Robert Borden, who, though in the middle of a bitter election campaign, The reviewer might have added that cancelled his electioneering to be with the MacMechan didn’t even go to the North people he had represented in Parliament. end to see for himself the impact of the There are also the scores of women and explosion. men and children whose names will never be known because no one recorded their acts of compassion or bravery or whose NOT NECESSARY names never made it to someone collecting accounts of individual behaviour or Even while admiring those who performed someone writing a book about what so well in the wake of the explosion – those happened. whose names are well known and those whose stories are recorded for the first time in this book -- it is hard to avoid thinking Some persons are remembered because that what those persons did would not have stories about them were published at the been necessary if only the Americans had time or because Archibald MacMechan not loaded Mont Blanc with such a deadly collected their accounts when he began cargo, if only the British had sent such a work on his official history. Other accounts, ship to a safe anchorage in Sydney instead however, were not recorded except in of Halifax, if only the naval authorities had private memoirs or by word of mouth. They listened to the harbour master, if only emerged only as a result of the research for someone had made certain that when Mont this book. This was especially true of those Blanc entered harbour there was no of less prominence. A review of outgoing traffic, if only Captain Aime MacMechan’s work shows that his LeMedec had been in Halifax before and collection of anecdotes was somewhat had known how safe it was close to the selective: Dartmouth shore. While those “ifs” are all legitimate with the benefits of hindsight, it Even though most of the destruction is surely more productive to ask whether occurred in the North End, only twenty our own communities are better prepared of his 122 personal narratives came from today than the authorities and the citizens Northenders. By contrast, he took of Halifax were in 1917. Rather than search testimony from fifteen middle-class for scapegoats, it is also more useful to ask: female volunteers, including nine what does the explosion tell us about the

12 | Page way communities react to devastating There are other concerns. For one thing, events and what lessons can we learn from there is a lack of awareness of the crucial the explosion that might make us better need for public information about the prepared today? nature of threats and about appropriate response. There have been some impressive It is certainly true that in most western achievements: the children’s television countries, communities are better prepared show, Sesame Street, has done some than Halifax was in 1917. Most communities beautiful work on fires and hurricanes. Yet have reviewed the threats that face them even today, individuals die in destructive and most communities have emergency incidents because they do not know what to plans to deal with those threats and test do – yet the choice that is made may those plans on a regular basis. In fact, in determine who lives and who dies. In the many places hospitals must test their Tangshan earthquake in China, where at casualty plans in order to remain licensed. least a quarter of a million died, the chance There has also been a vast improvement in of survival went up if persons took warning systems, especially for immediate protective action, such as diving environmental hazards and those systems under a table or bed as soon as they felt the are tied into the communities that need the first tremour. Yet in a tornado in the United information. The Hurricane Warning Center States, many died because they tried to in Miami, Florida, for example, is linked to escape in their vehicles instead of emergency operations centres through the remaining in their homes. hurricane areas. Environment Canada was tied by computer to the Regional Roads There is also a lack of awareness that department in the Regional Municipality of disasters may come in different forms. In Ottawa Carleton and kept it fully informed January 1998, for example, an ice storm about the incredible series of storms that caused a buildup as great as 110 led to the 1998 ice disaster in Eastern centimetres on trees and power lines in Canada. There are also signs of increasing Eastern Ontario and parts of the attention to mitigation, first in the United neighbouring US states and left one-fifth of States, now, with the power of the Canadians without power. Although most insurance industry behind it, in Canada. communities opened shelters, most victims There are still problems, however, when preferred to stay at home, even when the legal requirements are not followed. After temperature dropped to well less than Hurricane Andrew it was discovered, for freezing. Disaster plans that assumed a site- example, that building codes were not specific incident and that persons in need of being enforced. The same allegations help would go to shelters proved surfaced immediately after the devastating inadequate. In Ontario, the response was earthquake in Turkey during the summer of hampered by the fact that the storm struck 1999. just days after a number of municipal

13 | Page boundary changes. Many community away – Chernobyl is a good example. Fifth, councils had yet to meet yet alone create our increased dependence on technology emergency plans. means that we will experience new types of disaster – the 1998 ice storm is one The story of Halifax also confirms something example. Fifth, many disasters – such as the world’s leading disaster scholar, E. L. volcano eruptions -- occur at long intervals. Quarantelli, has been arguing for some We have now been living long enough in years; that is that disasters are not large some areas to increase the chance that we accidents but something very different and will be exposed to a devastating event. This that catastrophes are very different again. is especially true for Canada and the United Emergency planners still keep planning for States. emergencies as if they will resemble air crashes, toxic spills and train wrecks. They Of course, many of the threats that the are still often caught short when there is future will bring will be so-called natural devastation over a wide area or when events – events caused by windstorms emergency services are themselves victims including tornadoes and cyclones and by of the incident. They are never fully floods and earthquakes, snow emergencies prepared to deal with thousands of dead. and other types of weather phenomena What happened in Halifax was very such as ice storms. Others will be human different from an air crash and very failures. However, it is becoming different from a tornado. The explosion not increasingly clear that the two are closely only had an impact on the city; it drastically linked. For one thing, many so-called reduced its response capacity. natural disasters are the result of human activity: destroy wetlands and you increase Unfortunately, those like Quarantelli who the chance of flooding; build homes in a study disaster predict that the future will flood plain and you increase the chance to bring us more severe and different types of widespread destruction during a flood. For emergencies. There are many reasons to another, there is now research that shows think those predictions are accurate. First, that natural hazards create other types of there are now more people living and that problems such as toxic spills even though means there are more people who can be this often goes unnoticed. affected by a disaster. Second, more of those people are living in urban areas Most important, what happened in Halifax increasing the chance that when a disaster in 1917 suggests that it is very difficult to does occur it will hit a population convince governments or individuals that concentration. Third, we are continually there are threats to their communities – inventing new and dangerous things that and to get them to do something. It is now can affect our survival. Fourth, events in known that there are now major one country can now affect others far, far earthquake threats, for example, in

14 | Page Vancouver on Canada’s West Coast and who came to assist, all show that. The way along the New Madrid Fault in the US the uninjured survivors looked after others Midwest, yet most persons continue to and the way rescue workers stayed on the think of California as the major place at risk job despite warnings of a second explosion in Canada and the United States. When also shows what scholars have also incidents do occur, these always seem to established – that panic is also a myth. In come as a surprise. People in Edmonton, for addition, the explosion did not – as media example, were in disbelief when a tornado stories often suggest – turn people into ripped apart the East Side of their city and criminals. If there was any looting, it was neighbouring Strathcona County in 1987 minimal. and people in Eastern Canada were Today, the same sort of positive community astonished when a series of ice storms response occurs when an incident affects caused devastation in 1998 as were people others. That was shown by how quickly in Calgary when floods rolled through their small seaport communities around Peggy’s community. Their reaction was much the Cove, Nova Scotia responded when a same as the reaction in Kobe, Japan and Swissair jet crash offshore in September Tangshan, China when earthquakes caused 1998 and how quickly effective links were enormous devastation. In both countries, made between the fishing vessels, the these communities were not thought to be Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast high-risk locations. Yet tornadoes are Guard. Yet, time and time again, the common in the Canadian prairies, ice response to major incidents -- no matter storms are far from new phenomena in how well meaning and how generous – is Ontario and devastating earthquakes have difficult to control. After the Tangshan often hit Japan and China, though not those earthquake in China, with a quarter of a precise locations. million dead, one of the major problems On the more positive side, the story of was caused by the fact that the Peoples’ Halifax also shows that no matter how ill Liberation Army responded in such large prepared people may be for disaster or numbers that the soldiers blocked the catastrophe they respond well once access roads. Moreover, they arrived something happens. The belief that victims without sufficient water and became a will be dazed and confused, unable to cope strain on the devastated community. They is a myth perpetrated by the media – and created exactly the same sort of problems the media did perpetrate those myths after that convergence created in Halifax more the explosion -- but they are only myths. than half a century earlier. The women of the North End, the There is another lesson from Halifax that passengers on the Boston Express, the was not mentioned at the start but must be individual soldiers, the sailors from the evident from the story that unfolded. various warships in harbour, the Americans

15 | Page Disasters and catastrophes do not strike that catastrophes shake up society and lead everyone equally. Some persons in society to change. He also said the disaster led to a are more vulnerable than others. It was the great deal of mixing among the classes. The poor who were the victims in Halifax, not records do not support such a conclusion. the rich. That is because the place where Even at the height of the housing problem you live has an enormous impact on your few persons in the wealthier parts of the exposure to threats. This lesson, too, is city welcomed the poor into their homes. being continually underlined. Recent The poor shared accommodation with each Japanese research done after the other. The wealthier took in visiting devastating Kobe earthquake has exposed physicians and nurses. It was also not long the special problems of those who were before those who were least affected hearing or visually impaired. The first had wanted to put the explosion behind them: problems hearing the announcements that was why the willingness of the federal about victim services; the second group had government to take over relief was so difficulty finding their way around a widely welcomed. changed community. In addition – the story Finally, it must be clear from Halifax that in of the explosion -- and this is only touched the wake of human disasters everyone on – shows that disasters and catastrophes wants to blame someone. In Halifax, the generate both losers and winners. That is fingers finally pointed to the crew of Mont not and is not meant to be a condemnation Blanc. It should be evident now that even if of those who gain, but it is a fact. The Mont Blanc’s captain, Aime Le Medec, merchants of Massachusetts, the ones who made the navigation errors that led to the provided the furniture for the victims, were collision, neither he nor his officers was in paid for their products. They were in every any way responsible for the cargo Mont sense winners. The families in the North Blanc carried or the way it was loaded. Nor End who lost their homes and quite often did they have anything to do with the their breadwinners were clearly losers. decision to come into Halifax or to anchor in While there is an outpouring of human Bedford Basin. Others -- the Americans, the kindness in the immediate wake of such French, the Admiralty and the authorities in events, before long there is increasing Halifax harbour -- made those decisions. pressure for a return to the way things were They were also a direct result of the war. before an incident. As the chapter on red Given all out war, the risks created by tape shows, there is also a return to the munitions traffic were to some extent normal operations of bureaucracy. understandable as the spillover effects from Everything must be accounted for and/or the bombing of Yugoslavia has shown so returned. It would not do to let generosity clearly – destruction that is now called go undocumented. In his doctoral “collateral damage.” Even if those risks dissertation, Samuel Henry Prince argued were unavoidable, they could have been

16 | Page accompanied by a program concerned agreement that the Serbian Army and about public safety in the event of a Police would withdraw from Kosovo. Even mishap. It is, of course, important to review today, more than 80 years after the 1917 events like the explosion and to learn from Halifax explosion, there are important them. It is of less value to start finger lessons to be learned and one of the most pointing: disasters, like all complex events, important one is that people have never result from a single cause. incredible resilience.

During the Second World War, when THE GREEN HILL PARK SHIP scientists from the Manhattan Project EXPLOSION OF VANCOUVER (builders of the atomic bomb) took a look at HARBOUR: 1945 what happened in Halifax their interest was in physical destruction, not in individual, By: Bert Struik and Larry Pearce group or community response. In retrospect, it might have been more Larry heard the thunder, felt the house productive if they had looked what shake and the windows rattle. When you're happened from a social science viewpoint. an 11 year old boy, it’s all an adventure; For the response in Halifax – and the clear sort of. He could figure out what happened evidence that a civilian population can later. Right now he had to answer the rebound under the most severe impact – phone. His mother, who worked at the could have helped military planners Terminal City club on West Hasting Street, understand why the bombing of England, was calling to make sure he was okay. She the bombing of Germany – even the fire was scared, because, like the whole city, storm in Dresden – would not be successful she heard the massive bang from the in destroying the will of a people. Yet it waterfront that day. Her son was home seems that lesson has not been learned. alone, in their apartment at the corner of World War II was followed by an incredible Dunsmuir and Georgia which was near the bombing campaign against the North port. Vietnamese, yet the people of Hanoi persevered. And even as this book was Many heard and felt the explosion that being edited, there were nightly reports on March 6. Those near the waterfront saw the news of NATO warplanes attacking windows blow out of buildings for blocks Yugoslavian and Serb forces in Kosovo and and blocks from the wharfs. Hundreds of continuing reports of the fact that these windows were blown out in downtown destructive attacks were not having the Vancouver. Whole office blocks had scarcely impact NATO planners had expected. If a pane of glass intact. Everyone was anything, they were uniting the people of running; running to the blast to see what Yugoslavia against their common foe happened and away from the blast to save though eventually they did lead to an their lives. The war against Japan was in its

17 | Page final stages and a lot of people thought the liquor. Well, when this was stowed Japanese had begun to bomb the city. away, a lot of general cargo was stowed in front of it, so it was well hidden. But it's impossible to keep anything like that secret from longshoremen and it wasn't long before a narrow passage was cleared back to where the liquor was stowed.

“One by one, the men would come down into that hold to draw off a drink, or fill a bottle to take home in a lunch box. A considerable amount of the liquor had been spilled out of the barrels onto the deck and that narrow passage was full of fumes.

The last man to do so had already had a few drinks and he couldn't see so well down in there. Green Hill Park during its explosions at Pier “So he struck a match.”1 Boom! B-C Vancouver Port, March 6, 1945. Vancouver Maritime Museum. It is not a good idea to light a match near flammable liquids in a confined space with The side and mid-deck of the Green Hill explosive material nearby. Nor was it a Park merchant ship had blown out and it good idea to put all these things together was on fire. It was at berth at the Canadian without letting everyone know. Pacific docks adjacent to downtown Vancouver. Its cargo was being loaded by The consequences of that blast taught longshoremen and the ship tended by crew Canada another lesson. It took ruined lives members. Others nearby worked on other and a disrupted economy to make us pay ships and the operation of the wharf. Eight attention. The lesson was partly learned of those people died in the blast and many through the subsequent inquiry and new others were injured. regulations (still with loopholes of convenience). The true cause of the “The main cargo of the ship was sodium chlorate but a fair amount of general cargo was loaded, too. And 1 Davis, Chuck, 2012: The History of known supposedly to only a few Metropolitan Vancouver; http://www.vancouverhistory.ca/archives_greenhill people was included some barrels of _park.htm

18 | Page explosion was learned 35 years later. It longshoremen were employees of the never came out in the inquiry because it Empire Stevedoring Company. Each of these implicated many throughout the shipping factors led to acts that increased disaster system. risk.

John Stanton was a lawyer for the union The ship's cargo space was divided into six during the inquiry and shared his story of compartments, five for cargo and one for the events in an article published in “The the boilers and engine. Each compartment Northern Mariner” (1992). This description was divided into a hold approximately 10 m of the event relies on his account, (30') deep and upper level 2.4 m high (8' of documentation by the Maritime Museum, the “tween decks”). No. 3 Hold was in the Chuck Davis, the journalist and historian, middle of the ship, under the bridge and in and articles in the Vancouver Sun and The front of the engines. It measured 15 metres Vancouver Daily Province from March 7 to square. Cargo of the ‘tween decks of No. 3 25, 1945. Stanton made the point that exploded on the right side of the ship, British Columbia had never experienced which happened to be opposite the pier. anything like this before. It appears that our The steel wall (bulkhead) between imagination about what could happen, compartments 3 and 2 was blown out, cannot in itself, spark real changes of killing five longshoremen in compartment 2 behaviour that improve safety. In the adage and a man escaping from compartment 1. of stories from every Emergency Two seamen in the cabin above the Management Conference I have attended: explosions were killed. Nineteen other “someone had to die first”. workers were injured, and seven firemen were hospitalized because they breathed The 7,168 tonnage SS Green Hill Park was ammonia fumes. 100 men were working on built during World War II as part of a the ship at the time it exploded. Canadian fleet of nearly four hundred merchant vessels. Finished and launched in The cargo being loaded that February 27, November 1943, the ship was owned and was acquired by the Australian government. operated by the Park Steamship Company Most of the cargo was lumber, newsprint Limited, itself wholly-owned by the and tin plate. Many other goods were Canadian government. Stanton describes included of which three would have management of the steamship line as an required special attention because they are incestuous relationship between those dangerous: 94 tonnes of sodium chlorate, operating the Park Steamship Company, barrels of over-proof whisky and distress private shipping companies (in this case the flares. Other cargo included pickles, cloth, Canada Shipping Company), other sunglasses, lamps, light bulbs, books, radio businesses and running the country. equipment, and knitting needles. Seaman worked for the Park Company and

19 | Page The sodium chlorate was packed in 1,785 explosive, and it was not in the records. The steel drums. It had been transported by rail British government's Ministry of War from Quebec and unloaded at the pier five Transport had recently sent a letter to weeks before being loaded on the ship. Canada Shipping Company asking that Some of the drums had faint stencilled dangerous cargos be properly handled. warnings saying: “Sodium chlorate, highly Regulations listed in the letter stated: inflammable under certain conditions. See “Notice to Ship-owners and Ship instructions inside”. Arthur Willoughby of Masters re Carriage of Dangerous the CPR had consulted explosives expert Goods in Ships: D.W. McNab who said that the substance was dangerous and each drum should have Not more than ten tons of sodium had a yellow warning label attached by the chlorate must be stowed in any one manufacturer. The barrels had crossed the hold; country without labels. Rules forbade storage of the sodium chlorate on a pier for Sodium chlorate must be stowed more than 48 hours, so it was shipped to away from explosives (such as flares), freight yards in rural Coquitlam to await with the ship's engine-room loading on the ship a month later. The compartment separating them; yellows labels were never added (“not my Sodium chlorate must be stowed function”). away from any combustible 2 The whisky was 60 proof and its vapour material.” highly explosive. Whisky caused lapses of Much discussion ensued at the inquiry good judgement amongst longshoremen as about how the sodium chlorate, whisky and they were apt to look for opportunities to flares ended up in the same compartment, make off with some of the whisky. Leaks in how basic instructions and knowledge the barrels, whether from poor design or about the dangers of the cargo were created, released highly inflammable ignored, and how the regulations around vapour. their storage were not followed. The In the meantime plans for the loading of the storage plans had passed through the hands ship were being drawn up by Thomas of several responsible officers who knew Heward of the Canada Shipping Company (a about the dangers of sodium chlorate and private shipping firm), commissioned to some who did not. Stanton (1992) manage the Canadian Government's Park described the role of each of the key players Steamship Company Limited. The CEO in the tree of responsibility for the cargo happened to be the same for both companies. Mr. Heward did not know sodium chlorate was inflammable and 2 John Stanton, 1991: The Green Hill Park Disaster; The Northern Mariner, p27.

20 | Page and makes it clear that the cause of the Before the first explosion, someone called disaster lay with all those men. “Everyone off the ship”. The longshoremen killed in Holds 1 and 2 were in the bottom Extensive, prying questions at the inquiry of the holds and had to climb up 10 m (30') about how the cargo could have been of vertical ladder to the ‘tween decks and ignited ended with the inconclusive then 2.4 m (8') to the main deck through judgement that a match ignited whisky the mast house. One of them, William Lewis fumes, even though the whisky had been from Hold 1, did reach deck level. He was packed behind much other cargo. From killed by the steel door of the passageway information shared many years later, it was he had to get through to reach the outside. the right answer. As he reached for the door the second explosion ripped it out of its frame and into THE FIRE AND EXPLOSION Lewis. The passageway was so small, only one door could be open at a time; in this As reported at the inquiry, longshoreman case it was the wrong door at the wrong George Pottinger, the foreman working time. Thomas Johnson and N.K. Weir had with Russell Drummand on No. 3 ‘tween been following Lewis up the ladder from deck, saw smoke coming from the Hold 1. They could not get out through the starboard side of the cargo. Chief officer passageway, it now being blocked by the John Adank also saw the smoke coming blast that killed Lewis. They retreated to the from the cargo. He had been outside on the smoked filled, ‘tween decks of Hold 1, and deck to catch some air and rushed back into shook hands in resignation. They ended up Hold No. 3. He moved an item of cargo and surviving the next explosions and eventually emptied a fire extinguisher toward the were able to climb to safety. smoke. After two empty fire extinguishers, he played out a hose across the cargo to the In Hold 2, the urgency of the call to get off smoke and sprayed water. Longshoremen the ship was not apparent, and some went Harry Buckholtz, Russell Drummand and for their jackets as if on their way to lunch. Stanley Harris helped Adank with the hose, Nine men survived this hold. Sickavish and which got out of control. It knocked Adank McLean crawled under a hanging load of down, who in the now thick smoke found lumber and over cargo to the solitary access his way to the ladder and climbed out of the ladder. McLean was the last to escape, hold. As he left he heard a “fierce sizzling having his face and hands burned as he got sound”. He got out of the hold at the first of out. the explosion. Everyone in Hold 3 eventually got out surviving the blasts. Six The sound of the exploding cargo attracted longshoremen in Holds 1 and 2 did not. many tugboats and the city fire department to the Green Hill Park. Fire engines poured water onto the ship from every possible

21 | Page direction and firemen rescued those who to remove the burning vessel. Nine workers had jumped or been blown overboard. and other crew aboard the Green Hill Park During the operation, flares continued at its stern, the area least affected, assisted bursting and shooting into the sky. the tugs Charles H. Cates 5, Kyuquot and RFM, to fix towlines. Despite the danger, the naval tug Glendevon came alongside several times to rescue men who escaped by sliding down ropes. First Officer Horsfield, Third Officer Stuart S. McKenzie, and crewman Clarence Wallace went back aboard the Green Hill Park to help the tugs get her out of the harbour. They worked on unbearably hot decks.

Green Hill Park as it is sprayed from fire The tugboat men did what they could, even boats. The Vancouver Sun Newspaper. though more explosions could occur. Cargo in Holds 2 and 3 still blazed fiercely. The plan was to beach the ship on mud flats across the harbour. On the way the vessel turned a complete circle, a consequence of being hauled from the stern. It could not be steered because the wheel house was over the fire. So the plan was changed from beaching the ship. Instead it would be taken out into English Bay (the outer harbour) and scuttled. That didn't work.

Starboard damage of the Green Hill Park as The tugs got it to Calamity Point in the First caused by the explosions, March 6, 1945. Narrows, where the ship turned again and The Vancouver Sun Newspaper. beached on the gravel. Eventually it was pulled off and towed into deep water under Tug operators rushed to clear the area of the Lion's Gate Bridge. After being pulled a ships and barges to contain the fire and to distance along the south shore the ship move the burning Green Hill Park away beached on the rocks at Siwash Rock along from the pier. Douglas Dixon, captain of the Stanley Park. Vancouver's fireboat, J.H. tug Charles H. Cates 5, recalled the struggle Carlisle, had by then arrived and pumped to tow away a blazing barge of lumber. sea water onto fires that still raged. Captain Other tugs went to work with hoses and Dixon used his tug to keep the fireboat in hauling away another ship to make it easier place because the pressure from the

22 | Page nozzles pushed the fireboat away from the amount to $20,000,000 of repairs (2013 ship. Canadian dollars). Repairs for the boat were most of that cost ($13,500,000 in 2013 Horsfield, McKenzie and Wallace were dollars). Estimates for replacing the taken off by a police boat a couple of hours windows were $350,000 (2013 dollars). later. Firefighting continued for three days. Locating the bodies trapped on the ship could only be done the next day. Once safe, the ship was towed back to the harbour. The Green Hill Park was sold for 9% of its original cost, repaired in 1946 and later sailed from Vancouver as the S.S. Phaex II under new ownership. In 1967, she was sold as the Lagos Michigan, to Formosan ship breakers for scrap.

The explosion damaged the CPR pier B-C and several nearby buildings, particularly parts of the CPR train station. Their blasts Damage along Pier B-C, CPR docks of the blew out windows and light bulbs of Port of Vancouver, March 7, 1945. buildings along the Vancouver streets and Vancouver City Archives. avenues near the pier. People rushing to the windows of businesses along those roads were hurt as subsequent blasts blew the windows onto them. Little appears to have been reported about the damage to the pier, buildings and the rail yards. Cargo shot into the air by the blasts was scattered through parts of Stanley Park and the nearby streets. Sunglasses, pickles, rolls of newsprint, flares; all were reported to have been blasted into the sky. Damage from this falling debris was not reported. Apparently an undamaged table cloth from the ships dining room landed on the Shell Gas barge with no effect.

In total it was estimated the day after the Windows blown out of the Bank of Montreal explosions that damage caused would Building on Granville Street, Vancouver, BC.

23 | Page The half-inch thick glass was not available in read the recent letter from the British town for replacement. Vancouver City Ministry of War Transport requesting safe Archives. stowage of sodium chlorate. He put that letter on the desk of his marine THE HAZARD superintendent, Alexander Gait.

Rules and protocols were in place at the Gait had instructed Heward that the sodium time to ensure safe shipping of dangerous chlorate must be stowed in the ’tween goods and loading them as ship's cargo. decks, though not why, which was for easier access in case of a fire. The ’tween decks of The drums of sodium chlorate were not Hold 3 was used with the flares and the labeled explosive by the manufacturer, as whisky and the ’tween decks of Holds 4 and required. Arthur Willoughby of the CP Rail, 5 were empty. Heward did not know the the shipper, asked explosives expert D.W. sodium chlorate was dangerous, and that McNab about sodium chlorate and learned CPR had stored it at Coquitlam for that it was dangerous and each drum should reason. Heward left copies of his plan for have had a yellow warning label. Captain John Wright and First Officer Alan Willoughby had the barrels stored away Horsfield, with no verbal summary or from habitations and did not affix the follow-up. required yellow labels. First Officer Horsfield had authority to Thomas Heward, superintendent of cargo overrule Heward's plan. He visited Hold No. (supercargo) of Canada Shipping, created 3 during loading but did not know that the loading plans for the SS Green Hill Park dangerous cargo was being loaded, from the cargo list. He was meant to ensure apparently trusting Heward's plan, rather that incompatible cargoes were stowed than having read it. apart and that the cargo would have the ship well-balanced. His plans were Carl R. Bissett worked for the federal approved by Alexander Gait, marine government as Vancouver's Port Warden, superintendent and Heward's direct responsible for checking the seaworthiness supervisor. In turn the plans were given to of certain ships before allowing them to go and assumed to be approved by the ship's to sea. He was a retired sea captain. He had First Officer, Alan Horsfield. two jobs, the other as private marine surveyor. As Port Warden, Bissett had no Canada Shipping's manager, Kenneth authority at all to issue certificates of Montgomery, had several key roles; make seaworthiness for ships with cargoes like sure the cargo was safe and that it was the Green Hill Park. Yet for nineteen years loaded quickly to minimize expenses and he had done so, and insisted at the inquiry maximize profit. Montgomery knew that sodium chlorate was explosive, and had

24 | Page that the Green Hill Park cargo, as stored, hospital. The other man, called Joe, was safe. did not expect to live. He told his friend that a narrow passage had TRIGGERS indeed been cleared back to the liquor. The hazard was created by decisions and non-decisions about the storage of the One by one men took a drink or filled dangerous cargo aboard the SS Green Hill a bottle. Whisky was spilled. One Park; the trigger for the disaster, as man, already tipsy, could not see well concluded by the inquiry, was: and struck a match. Joe had kept his own counsel for twelve years. His “a lighted match carelessly dropped friend guarded it for another twenty- by a longshoreman into spilled three.”4 whisky”3 ANALYSIS That conclusion, reached by interpretation derived from evidence about the ship and Stanton concluded the inquiry was unable by inference that longshoremen stole liquor to fully define the problem and to if they could. The person meant to guard recommend encompassing solutions the whisky, did not. The complete system of because certain personal relationships and people meant to ensure that whisky was actions were protected. Political not shared or sold from cargos, did not relationships were protected from exposure accomplish that job. Stanton concluded that by how the inquiry was established. since everyone profited from such pilfering, Relationships in petty crime were never that, in essence, everyone let it happen. fully shared, and mistakes and bad decisions The commission concluded a passageway were in part covered up. was made to gain access to the whisky. Hot It is difficult to learn lessons from a disaster water bottles found in a jacket and lunch when all the information is not available. pails that were soldered to hold liquid were Disasters themselves are often caused taken as clues that they were designed to when information is not available or is transport stolen whisky. ignored. Both appear to have been at play “Early in 1980 a ninety-one-year-old here. longshoreman told Vancouver The event was caused by risky behaviour, in newsman Chuck Davis what he part illegal. The risky behaviour included learned from another longshoreman ignoring the potential consequences of bad back in 1957 when both were in

3 John Stanton, 1992: The Green Hill Park 4 John Stanton, 1992: The Green Hill Park Disaster; The Northern Mariner, p. 33 Disaster; The Northern Mariner, p. 33-34

25 | Page decisions about handling and storing the • assumed cargo plans were done well cargo, and not reviewing the decisions. The and did not check as required, illegal behaviour that triggered the event • approved plans without authority or was hidden as much as possible. Each of due care, these situations in turn were symptoms of • cut corners to make more money, the cause: a trait to be self-serving and • had so much wealth and power that the government needed you and inconsiderate, augmented by a lack of your colleagues on their side, even if intelligent imagination. you condoned high-risk activity, This trait, which we manage with rules and • designed ships without sufficient protocols during regular operations, escape hatches or warning systems, • did not inspect harbour appears to disappear during times of direct management decisions and the adversity. Professional and volunteer decision processes, responders, even those who apparently • or other, proved selfish and inconsiderate during daily operations, act selflessly, bravely and they should understand they are one part of with determination to save their fellow a complex web of activity and decisions, citizens during a disaster. They end up that as a whole sets the stage for triggering saving their fellows from their bad decisions a disaster; or not. and indecision. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS One protocol which may still be considered, and which would be universally useful in Anne Kyler contributed to research and managing results of our traits would be improvement of the manuscript. some form of reconciliation for perpetrators of disasters who fully shared how they contributed to a disaster. REFERENCES Inquiries and legal proceedings with the aim of assigning blame and punishment create Davis, Chuck, 2012: The History of barriers to the release of the truth about Metropolitan Vancouver; the causes of disasters. Set the scene that http://www.vancouverhistory.ca/arch truth can be spoken. Whether it was the ives_greenhill_park.htm person who: Stanton, John, 1991: The Green Hill Park Disaster; The Northern Mariner, p23- • lit the match, 38. • stole the whiskey, Vancouver City Archives: Photos; • bought the whiskey, Williams, Donn B.A. • made cargo plans without http://www.vancouverhistory.ca/suns knowledge of material properties, pots_mar.htm rules or consideration,

26 | Page The Vancouver Daily Province, March 7 – on it were wholly unexpected, Engine No. 20, 1945 6! This was definitely not some bush plane Vancouver Maritime Museum: Green Hill which I was expecting; it was a very big Park; aircraft. Although a geologist, I was also a http://vmmuseum.xplorex.com/page2 pilot and had some knowledge of the 17.htm aircraft of the day. I was pretty sure I knew The Vancouver Sun, March 7 - 13, 1945 what it was. Lettering on a blister cover soon confirmed my suspicions:

THE GENTLE GIANT: OUR SPEC. NO. 98-26751-H MODEL B36B RESIDENT ATOMIC BOMBER CONSOLID. VULTEE AIRCRAFT CORP. DATE OF MANUFACTURE - 5/28/49 AIRFORCE - U.S. ARMY By: Jim Roddick No doubt now. I was looking at the remains Emeritus Scientist, Geological Survey of of a B-36 Peacemaker, the largest bomber, Canada in sheer physical size, ever put into service.

Reprinted with permission from the original At the edge of the crash scene, lay an publisher: Geostories Geological Association undamaged canister of incendiary of Canada – Cordilleran Section grenades, and another, full of dynamite When the giant aircraft slammed into a sticks with a parachute still attached. remote glacial cirque in northwestern Clearly, someone had found the aircraft British Columbia during a late-night blizzard before us. Furthermore, they had further fifty-three years ago, it was the first destruction in mind. unplanned destruction of an atomic bomb. I made a few entries in my Survey It created both a mystery and a worry, but I notebook: knew nothing about the incident when, six years later, we first came across the The wreck is located at El. 5500, Long twisted aluminum wreckage. 128°34’, Lat. 56°05’. The aircraft was apparently on a westerly course when it In the summer of 1956, one of my struck within 100 feet or so of the ridge Geological Survey of Canada field teams top. The fragments now visible are lower reported finding some aircraft parts during down the slope, probably thrown back by a routine ridge-traverse. Even though it was the explosion, or carried downhill by late July, most of the wreckage was encased subsequent snow slides. The wreckage is in glacier ice and covered by snow. I began concentrated in about a 1/4 mile circular checking it for possibly significant serial area, the upper part of which is covered by numbers. A fragment of aluminum cowling deep snow. The exposed wreckage shows was jutting out from the snow. The words very little linearity, except for a slight

27 | Page elongation down slope. Most of the pieces of Stewart, B.C., and we found, in the are very small, the largest being the three shack we were occupying, a 1951 propeller blades, several panel fragments adventure magazine. The cover story was from wing or fuselage, and a tail fragment. about the harrowing experience of a B-36 crew off the B.C. coast in February, 1950. There is considerable emergency gear, such as, canned goods, clothing, etc., also The story was heavy on anecdotes and armaments (incendiary grenades and 20 skimpy on facts, but the name of the pilot mm cannon shells). Although clothing is was Harold Barry. Clearly, it was our plane. quite common, there is no indication of The essence of the magazine story was bodies. One fragment of a duffel bag has a that during a flight south along the B.C. name attached to it, H.L. Barry Capt. AO- coast, the aircraft had engine problems, 808341. and the 17-man crew had to bail out. Twelve were rescued, five disappeared, Later, from our base camp radio, we made and the plane crashed into Queen contact with the RCAF base in Whitehorse. Charlotte Sound. We knew it had not. Yukon. The officer who answered was polite, but distinctly restrained, about what Armed with the date of the crash, I later we considered to be our exciting find. In went to the archives of old newspapers in fact, he clearly did not enjoy the the Vancouver Public Library. There I found conversation. He heard us out with that the incident had been headline news minimal comment. At the end he conceded during the Valentine week of 1950. In that they already knew about the fact, the articles were much more wreckage, but would say nothing more, informative than the magazine story. and concluded the conversation with a Interviews with the survivors, however, left terse, “Thank you. Bye”. no doubt that they believed the plane had crashed into the sea. There was no That was our first encounter with the speculation about the possible presence of military secrecy which shrouded this an atomic bomb. How and when the crash wreckage for decades. How had it got site was first discovered still remained a here? Was it carrying an atomic bomb? At mystery to me. the time we didn’t even know when the plane had crashed, except that it was ABOUT THE B-36 sometime between its construction in 1948, and our discovery of the wreckage. The B-36 can be traced back to the Battle of Britain in 1940, when it seemed that By pure happenstance, and before our field Britain might fall to a German invasion, season ended in September, we learned leaving the USA with no bases outside of the exact date of the crash. Our party was the western hemisphere. An aircraft was then based at a shut-down gold mine north

28 | Page required which from bases in North Originally, that engine had been designed America could reach targets in Europe and for tractor operation. When reversed, as it return. In April 1941, Boeing and was in the B-36, its enormous carburetors Consolidated Aircraft Corporation were with their 22-inch- diameter throats, were invited to design a bomber which could up front, riding shotgun, so to speak, in carry a 10,000-pound load to a target usually frigid air. Carburetor ice was a 5000 miles away and return. Also it must perpetual problem and a major factor in our be able to cruise at about 300 mph at crash. 25,000 feet. Easy today, but a remote To the pilots who flew it, the B-36 was a possibility then, only 14 years after flexible giant capable of absorbing Lindbergh’s first crossing of the Atlantic. horrendous damage, and yet returning the A preliminary design by Consolidated crews safely to base, commonly with two Aircraft (later the name became or more engines shut down. Test pilot, Consolidated Vultee, and eventually Beryl Erickson, who in 1946 flew the first B- Convair) was accepted. After many delays 36, stated in 1995 that, “I knew from the and threats of cancellation, the first B-36 beginning that the structure was too light emerged, but it was now 1946, and the weight. But no one listened. Everything war had ended. broke, but Convair kept improving the plane.” Yet the contracts were extended, mainly as a make-work project to counter a It may have been light weight for its size, predicted flood into the labor market by but it was still very heavy. The first B-36 returning soldiers. The plane escaped had only two main wheels. The tires were cancellation in 1948, thanks to the Berlin almost 10 feet in diameter and contained blockade (although it was never used in 700-pound inner tubes, which were almost that airlift operation). It escaped again impossible to balance. More troublesome, when the Korean War began in 1950, but only three runways in the country could never saw action there. Numerous handle the load. That landing gear was subsequent cancellation plans were later replaced with 4-wheel bogies which deflected by the continuing demands of spread the load. the Cold War. Against a slight crosswind, the huge, 40- The B-36 was a monster aircraft, with a foot- high rudder could not be humanly 230- foot wingspan and six engines in moved on the ground, and there were no pusher configuration. Each engine was an booster controls. In flight, however, only 8200-pound, 28-cylinder, Pratt & Whitney finger-tip pressure was required, as small R-4360, air-cooled radial, driving three 9- tabs on the control surfaces harnessed the foot propeller blades. energy of the airflow.

29 | Page Surprisingly, the maneuverability of the B- To the US Navy, the B-36 program always 36 at high altitude (eventually, above was that “God-damned aluminum 40,000 feet) was actually better than that overcast” which decimated President of the fighters of the day. Truman’s military budget, and trashed the Navy’s plans for modern aircraft carriers. Because of the enormous lifting capacity of its huge wings, the B-36 could make tight Between 1946 and 1954, 383 B-36s were turns which the thin-winged fighters could produced. Russia produced 6,000 MIG-15 not emulate without mushing out or fighters to go against them. In the lifetime stalling. The B-36, in its time, was best at of B-36s, 32 were destroyed in various everything: altitude, load, high-level mishaps; 22 of those were crashes from maneuverability, fighting capability, the air. In all, 136 crewmen died in B- 36 endurance and range. Everything, that is, crashes, but unlike the much smaller B-29, except speed and simplicity of which killed about two million people maintenance. during World War II, the B-36 was a gentle giant and purposely killed no one. To the ground crews, it was the most complex and incontinent aircraft ever built. In 1955 Paramount released the movie It continually leaked prodigious amounts of “Strategic Air Command” starring Jimmy oil. Each engine was supplied with 250 Stewart and June Allyson. The film contains gallons of oil, yet on long flights some some of the most dramatic shots ever engines had to be shut down because of made featuring an aircraft, in this case B- lack of oil. After touchdown, when the 36H 5734, the actual star of the movie. At propellers were reversed, oil was blown a function before the premiere, Stewart over the wings, and mechanics found them remarked that, “We weren’t sure we could almost impossible to walk on. use this title ‘Strategic Air Command’. We were afraid Louella Parsons couldn’t B-36s were flown in the northern part of pronounce it.” He went on to say that, the continent to prove them operational in someone suggested reducing the title to extreme cold and over vast distances, “SAC,” but he pointed out that that would fundamental requirements for striking have resulted in marquee signs, such as, targets in the former USSR. Ironically, the “See Stewart and Allyson in SAC”. B-36 was first tested for cold in Florida, where a large, heavily insulated hangar The B-36 was the Big Stick of the Strategic existed, and could be brought down to - Air Command between 1948 and 1958, 72ºF. Later northern bases were set up at before being superseded by the smaller all- Fairbanks, Labrador, Maine, and jet B-52. Gen. Goldworthy said it well, Greenland, where blowing snow and ice “Technology passed the honest B-36 by, fogs presented more realistic conditions.

30 | Page and left it outperformed, but never 27°F. The B-36 made a noisy, heavy-load outclassed.” takeoff. Capt. Barry said, at the post- accident inquiry, that he had had to use A NIGHT TO REMEMBER full nose-up elevator-trim, plus maximum stick pull-back, to lift the 329,570 pounds Documents of the Eighth Air Force, now off the runway at 140 mph. Seven hours declassified, detail most of what actually later they were off the coast of British happened to our plane, B-36B AF2075, Columbia, fighting a strong headwind. during a routine flight that, for the crew, Periodically, hail pounded against the became a nightmare. aircraft. The temperature outside was -17°F. Ominously, the propellers began to surge After a long flight from Fort Worth, Texas, erratically. The automatic pitch controls did the aircraft had arrived at Eielson AFB near not appear to be working. Barry realized Fairbanks before noon on February 13th, that icing conditions were being 1950. The temperature was -40°F. and the encountered and began to climb, but with plane remained on the ground for servicing difficulty. for about three hours. The engines were kept running, for if they had been allowed They were able to climb to about 14,500 to cool, the oil would have become solid. feet at the normal climb rate of 155 mph. The replacement crew had been flown into Ernest Cox, the flight engineer, noted Fairbanks a few days earlier. unusual readings, an increase in fuel flow, but a decrease in torque. For the first time, Capt. H.L. Barry’s flight plan stated that he applied carburetor pre-heat, but found they intended to leave Eielson and fly that it had been disconnected! According direct to Anchorage at 12,000 feet. From to an unnamed mechanic, “Why not? It there they were to head for Cape Flattery didn’t work anyway,” Normally, “carb-heat” (at the entrance to Juan de Fuca Strait) was used only at startup, because it along radio beam Amber 1 at 14,000 feet. actually decreased engine power, unless After reaching Cape Flattery, which they ice was actually present in the carburetor. never did, they were to climb to 40,000 The aircraft struggled up to 15,000 feet. feet and fly direct to Ft. Peck, Montana, Then no further climb was possible, and then south to the Gulf of California. From Barry leveled the aircraft. there, they were to turn to the Pacific coast and fly north, testing the California coastal defenses, and ‘bomb’ San Francisco. They were then to return home to Carswell AFB, in Fort Worth.

By 2:27 PM, Alaska Time (4:27 PM PST), the temperature had risen somewhat, to -

31 | Page dangerously low 135 mph. The weight of the aircraft was now down to about 270,000 pounds, yet it was losing altitude at a rate of 100 feet per minute.

At 11:45 p.m. (PST) Vancouver Air Traffic Control received a message that a B-36

on the north coast was encountering severe icing and had engine trouble; they Figure 1: XB-36 with B-29 parked close for were letting down over water, 194 miles size comparison. The B-29s killed about two northwest of Vancouver Island. million (mainly civilians) during World War II bombing of Germany and Japan. The ‘gentle The plane continued to sink. At about giants’ never saw battle, and bombed no 5500 feet Barry decided that he could not one, although 133 aircrew died in 22 save the aircraft and began bail-out mishaps. (photo credit: Consolidated Vultee) procedures. He swung the B-36 to the Suddenly Dick Thrasher, the left-side rear northeast on a bearing perpendicular to the gunner, could see a 4-foot flame coming coast. The crew members began checking out from No. 1 engine. He reported it to their parachutes and putting on their Mae the pilots, who, from the front West life preservers. Ray Whitfield, one of compartment, had no view of the engines. the co-pilots, checked those in the front They immediately shut it down and compartment to confirm that their Mae feathered the propeller to reduce drag. West straps were placed under, not over, Climb-power was reduced to cruise-power the parachute straps. on the remaining five engines. Those, 80 feet back, in the rear Soon after, Thrasher reported another fire, compartment were similarly instructed by this time in engine No. 2. It too, was Sgt. Martin Stephens. He was rushing them immediately feathered. With two engines and some, including Dick Thrasher, found shut down, the aircraft began losing it, “too difficult to get the damned Mae altitude. More bad news came only a West straps under,” so he just put them couple minutes later; engine No. 5 was over everything. reported on fire by Elbert Pollard, the right- Meanwhile up front, Lt. Paul Gerhart, the side rear gunner. Barry shut it down and radar operator, reported that they were feathered the prop. over land, then over water, then land Having no choice now, he applied again, more water, and more land. They emergency power to the remaining three were passing over small islands. When they engines, but the torque pressure did not reached the much larger Princess Royal increase. Airspeed dropped to a Island, Barry turned the aircraft southward,

32 | Page and issued the bail-out command. The jumped in the following order: Flt. aircraft was then flying slightly east of engineer, Lt. Ernest Cox; radio operator, south, against a strong head wind of about S/Sgt. Jim Ford; radar mechanic, Cpl. 55 knots. He set the automatic pilot for a Richard Schuler; another radio operator, gentle clockwise curve which he Sgt. Vitale Trippodi; engineer, Lt. Charles estimated would ditch the plane Pooler; passenger, Lt. Col. Daniel somewhere in Queen Charlotte Sound. The MacDonald; navigator, Lt. Paul Gerhart; time was five minutes past midnight on a co-pilot, Lt. Ray Whitfield; co- pilot, Capt. truly ‘dark and stormy night’, St. Valentine’s Ted Schreier; and that he, Capt. Harold Day, February 14, 1950. Barry, was the last to jump. Curiously, Schreier was never found. Seventeen jumped. Not all survived. Subsequent investigation showed that the IN THE NEWSPAPERS order of bail-out was crucial for survival. According to Barry’s testimony, the entire On Tuesday evening, February 14, 1950, crew bailed out within about 10 seconds. the front page headline of The Vancouver Our recent conversations with one of the Daily Province broke the news. few survivors still alive, Dick Thrasher, indicate, however, that it did not happen Storm Hides Fate of B-36, 17 Men. that quickly. Flaming Bomber Down Off B.C. Coast

The first to jump from the front The article featured a photograph of the compartment were the navigator, Capt. Bill aircraft with the caption, Phillips and the bombardier, Lt. Holiel A MIGHTY B-36 BOMBER, greatest Ascol. The first to jump from the rear global- bombing weapon of the U.S. compartment were S/Sgts Neil Straley and is feared down at sea off the B.C. Elbert Pollard, both gunners. None of coast with 17 persons. those first four were ever seen again. The wind apparently carried them north into The Vancouver Sun, came out with similar the raging waters of Whale Channel just headlines and speculative accounts. off the northwest coast of Princess Royal Forty Canadian and American air-sea Island. The remaining three in the rear rescue craft fought today through compartment left in the following order: gale winds and rain off the north tip gunner S/Sgt. Dick Thrasher; gunner Sgt. of Vancouver Island in a massive Martin Stephens; and observer Lt. Ray search for a lost B-36 bomber and its Darrah. Those three survived. crew of 17. Capt. Barry stated that the remaining ten The giant plane, with one engine crewmen in the front compartment ablaze and another acting badly,

33 | Page splashed into the sea at about 3:30 and put them to bed aboard our boat. I am today while winging southward never saw a braver bunch of men. I know I along the B.C. coast from Alaska wouldn’t bail out of any ship, let alone in a bound for Texas. [.....] Gales up to 40 gale, at midnight.” miles an hour envelope the search Later in the day a ground party from the scene in Queen Charlotte Sound. Canadian destroyer, Cayuga, found and [.....] Survivors, if any, would be rescued S/Sgt. Vitale Trippodi. He was the clinging to life rafts, drenched by eleventh man to be found, and the first charging seas, and their chances for with substantial injury (ankle broken). survival are uncertain. But a huge two-nation search force was speeding It was not until Thursday morning, to the scene. Thirty-four planes, February 16th, that the twelfth man, Lt. including seven Vancouver-based Charles Pooler was found and brought RCAF craft and 10 B-29 aboard the Cayuga. The 10 survivors picked up previously by the Cape Perry Superfortresses are covering the area were flown to Port Hardy at the north end from the air. of Vancouver Island (where a, now historic, The next day the 72-foot fish packer, Cape photograph of the survivors was taken). Perry, was heading northwest towards the The two aboard the Cayuga were picked herring grounds in Queen Charlotte Sound. up by an USAF Canso and flown directly Capt. Vance King, having heard over his to hospital at McChord AFB near Tacoma, radio about the search for the B-36 crew, Washington. diverted his course to a path nearer American security watchdogs had become Princess Royal Island. A few minutes past alarmed about the situation. Col. Knight in noon he saw some smoke rising from the Washington, D.C., ordered the US Coast shore. He dispatched a small rowboat and Guard to inform all involved with the found two survivors, and a short distance search, “Handle this with care. Pass (the away, a third man. Just as the boat was survivors) on without interrogation. Again, turning to leave the area, another wisp of handle this with care. No leaks.” smoke was seen on the shore. The papers of February 16 1950 were full In the words of Captain King, “We of photographs and stories related by the discovered seven guys, huddled around a rescued airmen: fire, and another hanging from a tree. I felt pretty good about getting those guys out. S/Sgt. Dick Thrasher, 28, gunner We had a bottle of rum and a bottle of scotch aboard and gave them some drinks. I knew we had heavy icing Then we gave them some ham and eggs conditions. I was in the aft compartment sweating it out. First

34 | Page thing I knew the pilot said we couldn’t We tramped an “SOS” in the snow hold our altitude any longer. He said and just started to build a fire when we were over Princess Royal Island, we heard a motor. At first it and to go ahead and bail out. sounded like a plane, then we decided it was a boat. Two men went ahead of me and then I jumped. I landed in a big tree in the Captain Barry and I walked down to dark. I could not get loose from my the shore and began shooting flares. parachute, so I cut myself free with a It was a Canadian fishing boat. I think knife. this was about 2:30 p.m. Wednesday.

I spent the rest of the night in my The Canadians really treated us fine. one-man life raft. I was all by myself. Aboard the boat were three others The raft kept me dry. Next morning I of our crew members. I was really was cold, so I climbed the tree to try happy to see that boat, for I fully to get my chute. I wanted to wrap expected to spend another night in myself in it. the snow.

When I got to the top of the tree, I Capt. Harold Barry, 30, pilot (as told to began yelling for all I was worth. The International News Service) navigator and radio operator I’m not sure just what happened. We answered. We found another gunner. were flying at about 5000 feet We Then we found another officer. We began losing airspeed and altitude were weak and decided to build a and I was pretty sure we were icing tent out of our parachutes and a life up. (It was evident during this raft. interview that he was under orders to After a lot of trouble, we finally got a convey as few B-36 facts as possible, little fire going. We were lucky. We and to talk only about “human had our lighters and some lighter interest” items, such as, the fluid, but everything on the ground horrifying parachute jump and the was wet. We had a hard time keeping ordeal on the ground.) the fire going through the second I asked our radar man to find the night. nearest land, and I put the ship over When morning came, we decided to what I hoped was it. I ordered the try to walk. On the way we found crew to bail out, and away they went. two sets of tracks and followed them I was last out. (This conflicts with a to the coast and found Capt. Harold 1998 statement by Whitfield, as we Barry, our pilot, and another man. shall see).

35 | Page The ship was on automatic pilot and We spent all that night trying to keep somehow it turned in the air and warm and looking for something to came back over us. There were three eat. Wednesday morning, Whitfield engines burning and I could follow the built a fire, and we threw a lot of ship’s progress as I went down in my wood on it. That was the smoke the chute. But I don’t know where she fishing boat saw. crashed. Lt. Ray Whitfield, 25, copilot I landed in a little pond with a thin ice I had it easy. I never thought it crust on it. I got pretty wet and so did could be so simple. I didn’t even get my chute. It didn’t do me much good scratched. In the morning I saw there for warmth during the rest of the were sharp stumps and trees all night. around me, but I had missed them all. I tried to build a fire but couldn’t. I I curled up on a dry ledge under my was pretty hungry and when I saw a parachute. I didn’t try to strike a ground squirrel, I fired at him twice match because I wanted to save with my .45 and missed both times. them. We were all as lucky as the day But my shots attracted Lt. Whitfield, is long. It was nothing short of a my navigator. (Probably a misquote; miracle. Whitfield and Schreier were co- Sgt. Vitale Trippodi, 23, radio operator pilots). He blew his whistle and we walked toward one another. I was hanging there in that tree, head down with a foot caught in a That afternoon Whitfield and I spent ‘chute strap. I had lost my right strap two hours freeing Sgt. Vitale Trippodi, on the jump. When I first landed in one of the ship’s radio men, from a the tree, I tried to shake myself loose. tree where he had hung head down I then fell headfirst. That’s when my for almost 12 hours. Trippodi was in foot caught. If I hadn’t lost that right pretty bad shape. When we got him strap, I would have had something to out of the tree, we just didn’t have grab, and never would have got hung the strength to move him down to up. the beach. When my pilot (Harold Barry) and Whitfield and I struck for the beach. my co- pilot (Ray Whitfield) pulled me During Tuesday we found seven other down Tuesday, and left me lying men (it was actually Wednesday, and there, I felt like I was dead. When the number found, only five, but they left me, I wanted to go too. I seven in total).

36 | Page was afraid they would get lost and FIRST DISCOVERY OF THE nobody ever would find me. WRECKAGE I laid there I don’t know how long. The B-36 wreckage was first found, not by Those Canadians who picked me up us, as we had realized in 1956, but by the were the swellest people I ever met. pilot of an RCAF Lancaster bomber in 1953, The first thing they did was to give while searching for the missing plane of a me morphine to kill the pain in my wealthy oil man, Ellis Hall. He had been foot. Then I drank all their cocoa. on a fishing trip in southeast Alaska and (Trippodi had a number of injuries, was returning to the US via Bellingham, but recovered without permanent Washington. Despite a $30,000 reward and damage). free gas for all private search aircraft, the Although the search continued during the Hall plane was never found, but on following days, none of the missing men September 2nd, a wreckage was spotted were found. near Mount Kologet, about sixty miles east of Stewart, B.C. It was identified the next day as the missing B-36.

The area was, and still is, very remote. Several attempts to reach the wreckage, using packhorses, were made in the fall of 1953, but they were unsuccessful. In early August, 1954, the USAF arrived at Smithers airport in the Bulkley valley, about one

hundred miles SSE of the crash site. There, Ten of the twelve survivors at Port Hardy, they commandeered the hangar of Skyway B.C., as they appeared in the February Air, a small charter outfit. Strong objections 16th, 1950 edition of The Vancouver Sun. by both Skyway Air and the BC Forest Absent in hospital were Sgt. Vitale Trippodi, Service were overruled by the Canadian radio op., and Lt. Charles Pooler, engineer. military. In such matters the military, on Missing and never found were: Capt. Bill both sides of the border, considered Phillips, navigator; Lt. Holiel Ascol, secrecy paramount, and diplomacy bombardier; S/Sgt Neil Straley, gunner; secondary. Curiously though, when the S/Sgt. Elbert Pollard, gunner; and Capt. American demolition crew were actually Ted Schreier, co-pilot. flown (by helicopter) to the crash site, a Smithers lineman for the BC Telephone Co.,

Hunter Simpson, accompanied them. He

37 | Page happened to be a personal friend of one of number on one of the RCAF air photographs the Americans. we were using during that field season.

Unfortunately for history, the crew blew up FORTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER THE any large pieces of wreckage they could CRASH reach, and recovered sensitive materials, such as, radar equipment, bomb sights and The question of whether an atomic bomb tail gunner electronics. The glacier and existed in the wreckage persisted. The USAF snow, however hid many parts, and they did maintained that no bomb was there, but not destroy it all. suspicions remained. Doug Craig, a retired consultant in Whitehorse, revived interest Surprisingly, the crash site, having been in the crash site in 1995. Craig had been the found, was then essentially lost again. Part junior assistant who accompanied Bob of the reason was described by Dirk Septer Baragar, my party’s senior assistant, on the in an article about the incident in a 1993 traverse team who came across the edition of B.C. Aviator. wreckage in 1956. His concerns were “Most of the people involved in reaching environmental. After all, the possibility that the wreckage are unable or unwilling to an atomic bomb lay festering in lands give much information. Captain Bailey, the claimed by the Nisga’a Indians seemed to only person who took part in both the require some sort of action. 1953 and 1954 trips, died around 1956 in Doug conducted a search for USAF and a plane crash while flying a T-33. Both the RCAF documents that had been local men who accompanied the US service declassified from TOP SECRET, and were men are dead now. Pioneer and well known now available under Freedom of guide, Jack Lee, who accompanied the first Information acts. He obtained a 24-page packhorse mission, died in February 1986. excerpt from a volume entitled HISTORY of Hunter Simpson, who watched the the Eighth Air Force: 1 January - 30 June demolition of the wreckage, died in the 1950, and a seven- page accident report, mid-1970s.” which contained a short narrative of the The location is a very remote, nondescript incident. The most gripping item appeared mountain ridge far from any settlement. in documents provided by the very helpful, The co-ordinates of the wreckage site Historical Records Agency of the U.S. Air recorded in both RCAF and USAF files were Force, at Maxwell AFB in Alabama. It was in agreement, but wrong. They were close, the loading manifest for the flight from but not sufficiently accurate to allow one to Eielson AFB. It identified an 11,000-pound fly directly there. The only accurate bomb in the forward bomb bay. location-data were in my old 1956 GSC notebook. It was also plotted as a station

38 | Page In Ottawa, the historian at National Defense I RETURN TO THE CRASH SITE IN Headquarters, Steve Harris, said he, 1998 unfortunately, had only sketchy information, but pointed out, “The highly For the first time since 1956, I revisited classified nature of this incident — would the crash site in the summer of 1998. lead one to assume either, that at the time That visit was organized by Scott Deaver, a we wanted to keep the degree of SAC B-36 enthusiast from Connecticut with an operations under wraps, or that this B-36 amazing store of knowledge about B-36s. was equipped with what SAC aircraft were He was already in Terrace, about 110 miles supposed to be equipped with.” south of the crash site, when I arrived in late July. CANADIAN MILITARY VISIT OF 1997 That evening we drove out to the airport to meet the incoming Dick Thrasher, whose Doug Craig’s concerns aroused the interest last entrance into Canada had been by of the manager of the Yukon Division of parachute from the B-36. The affable Environment Canada, Doug Davidge, and former rear gunner, then 78, had flown he, in turn, raised the interest of the from his Texas home to Terrace that day, Department of National Defense in but his baggage hadn’t. In the terminal Ottawa. In August 1997, DND decided to Thrasher commented, “Again, I land in provide personnel and a Bell 412 Griffon Canada, and I have nothing but what I’m helicopter from Cold Lake, Alberta, for an wearing.” examination of the site. Both Craig and The next day we drove to Stewart, a small Davidge accompanied the Air Force crew on but historic settlement at the head of this operation, the first, as far as we know, Portland Canal, on the border with purely Canadian investigation of the scene southeast Alaska. It is much closer than (not counting our own). I was unable at the Terrace to the crash site, and also to a time to accept the invitation to join the helicopter base. On the following day, we group, but provided them the correct co- were joined by Doug Craig, and the four of ordinates of the crash site. us flew out to the crash scene under clear The team measured alpha, beta and skies. It was dramatically different from gamma radiation over a close-grid pattern 1956. The glacier was entirely gone, and covering the crash area. In their view, the the cirque was practically free of snow. most dangerous item at the site was a pail We rummaged through the now fully of weathered sticks of dynamite left by the exposed wreckage. Only one, large, intact 1954 demolition crew. piece of fuselage was present. It happened to contain the very hatch, through which

39 | Page Dick Thrasher had exited from the left side He did not know how far above the of the rear compartment. It was very small. ground he was and thought he had better Dick reminisced about that fatal February stay put. When his eyes got use to the night in 1950. He thinks, now, that the dark, he discovered that the “big branch” Mae West straps may have saved his life, was a root. He was actually on the ground. because it delayed his pulling of the At dawn he had climbed the tree to ripcord. Otherwise, he probably would retrieve his parachute for warmth, and also have drifted into the water, as did Straley had started shouting. He got a reply, “I and Pollard, who jumped just before him. recognized Jim Ford’s (the radio operator) He told us that in exiting the plane, voice when he replied. He couldn’t have jumping technique was important. Straley, been more than a ¼ mile away. I made the first to jump, followed official my way toward him, heading for small procedures and rolled out in a tight crouch. clearings that looked like easier going, but His pack (which included the parachute they were actually slush ponds. At a larger and one-man life raft) got hooked on the slush pond, I inflated my life raft which I rim of the small hatch. Stephens kicked was packing with me. Then I sat in it but him loose. Pollard, who went next, had couldn’t make it move. I abandoned the life previously bailed out of a disabled aircraft, raft there. I went back to going over and over Germany during World War II, and under deadfall logs, and finally joined Ford. had become a POW. He knew what he was Paul Gerhart, the radar operator was doing and ignored the rules; he simply also there. We were a couple of miles dove out head first. In Dick’s words, “I from the shore. We found some tracks should have got the message, but I didn’t, and followed them to the shore, where we and went out in a tight crouch, like the book joined Barry and others.” said, and I got hooked. Stephens kicked me Dick felt a bit guilty about the Trippodi free. He saved my life. Later, Stephens incident. “Barry and Whitfield found Vitale blamed himself for the deaths of Straley Trippodi, who had hung from a tree all and Pollard, but it wasn’t his fault. It really night, and got him to level ground, but bothered him — if he hadn’t been in they could not carry him out. Tripoddi such a hurry to get them out, they might wasn’t happy about being left alone, and have survived. After a while, he wouldn’t wanted one of them to stay with him. But talk about it anymore.” Barry and Whitfield followed their training Dick, himself, almost didn’t make it. After instructions which were ‘to never go off his chute popped open he made just one alone’, the reason being, that if only one swing to the left and another to the right; went for help, and he broke a leg or then he was in the trees. It was dark, but something.so they both went. I’ve always he could feel a big branch with his foot. wished I had tried to get back up to him.”

40 | Page Probably the greatest moment of our day With a smile Dick Thrasher writes the at the crash site was when Scott Deaver letters, NRTS, that were customarily placed pulled a pipe framework out from under a on components which could not be fixed at slab of talus. It enclosed an 8-inch steel the base where the B-36 had landed. They cylinder about a foot long. Scott meant ‘Not Repairable (at) This Station’. immediately identified it: the container for (photo credit: Scott Deaver) a plutonium core! This meant that there About 6 PM the helicopter returned and had been an atomic bomb aboard. Or did flew us out, with the ‘plutonium–core’ it? The container was heavy (perhaps, 90 container. We were a bit worried that the pounds), but we were able to get it across helicopter pilot would question us about the coarse talus to the helicopter- landing our odd-looking freight, but he was in a spot. hurry and wasn’t curious. Scott had a Before we left the crash scene, Dick carpenter in Stewart build a box for the Thrasher scratched on one of the larger apparatus. Then we drove it back to fragments, NRTS. We asked him what that Terrace. It rode in the back seat with Dick, meant. With a big smile, he explained that because it was too large for the trunk. during routine flights, when the B-36s We were even more worried about flying landed at various air force bases, the the box to Vancouver, and about getting it flight crew would report any across the US-Canada border. Again, malfunctioning equipment. The list was however, there was a lack of interest in “a often long, and the maintenance crew at piece of plane wreckage, destined for a the base would fix what they could, but museum,” which it was. some required special equipment or technicians not available at that particular station. On those still defective components, they would place stickers bearing the letters, NRTS. It meant “Not Repairable at This Station”.

Dick Thrasher, 78, beside the actual hatch from which he jumped on the stormy night of February 14, 1950. (photo credit: Scott Deaver)

41 | Page EPILOGUE Doug Craig and the ‘Holy Grail’. This canister was normally attached to the The disappearance of the first four men to forward bomb-bay wall, and was designed jump can be accounted for fairly easily. to contain the spherical plutonium core They bailed out into a 60-mile-per-hour which, when inserted into the Mark IV ‘Fat headwind and were almost certainly blown Man’ atomic bomb, made it back into the water. That does not, operational.(photo credit: Scott Deaver) however, explain the disappearance of Whitfield was interviewed by Don Pyeatt, Capt. Ted Schreier. He was listed as being who maintains a B-36 website, on July 31st, the second-to-last to leave the aircraft. 1998, which, coincidentally, was the In his report on the incident, Harold Barry evening before we revisited the site. stated that he (Barry) was the last to bail Referring to the moments just before he out. In which case, Schreier should have bailed out, he said, “I pointed out to the landed somewhere near Gerhart, other copilot, Capt. Schreier, that he had his Whitfield, and Barry. It is possible that his floatation vest on over his parachute. At chute never opened and he disappeared in this time he, Barry and I were the last the hilly forest or in one of the small lakes ones on the plane. Capt. Schreier was of northwest Princess Royal Island. hurriedly removing his vest when Barry Perhaps, however, Schreier, not Barry, was ordered me out. Barry exited after me. I the last to bail out. Whitfield’s recent never saw Schreier jump, and he is one recollections support this view. of the missing men”. No one knows if he did or did not jump except Barry, and he is now deceased.

The possibility that Schreier never jumped had been suggested much earlier, and gave rise to an old rumor that a skeleton had been found in the wreckage, but as Dirk Septer noted in his 1993 article, Broken Arrow, the rumor seems to be unfounded. It would not make sense anyway. Had Schreier, an experienced pilot, decided to stay with the plane (which, in hindsight, would probably have saved his life), he certainly would not have flown almost due north, but would have tried to reach Vancouver. More likely, it took him a minute or so to readjust his May West

42 | Page straps so that they would not interfere number of stations, including the tower at with his parachute. By the time he did bail Vancouver airport. The signal was out, the aircraft, under automatic pilot, monitored until at least 3:05 AM. The was flying back towards the water. He distance of 212 miles between the bailout may not even have known that Barry had point and the crash site is consistent with set the automatic pilot to do just that. the wind strength and direction that night.

Another mystery concerns the aircraft itself. The wreckage lies at 5500 feet elevation, How did it reach a cirque more than 200 perhaps, a thousand feet higher than the miles north of the bailout area? Postulation bailout altitude. The automatic pilot, like a that the aircraft had a flown a huge arc far human pilot, could not control the over the Pacific Ocean before crashing in elevation of the plane while the engines the cirque still persist, but any pilot who were behaving erratically. Lessening of the had read Capt. Barry’s account, quoted by fuel load, possible de-icing (due to the International News Service (in probably drier conditions inland), and the Vancouver Daily Province, February 16, fact that Barry had left the engines at full 1950), would have concluded the obvious. throttle, probably caused the plane to He had stated that, “The ship was on climb. In fact, it must have climbed in order automatic pilot and somehow it turned in to clear the intervening terrain, much of the air and came back over us.” which is considerably higher than 5500 feet. That was a very important statement. The subsequent inquiry recorded that he had In April, 1951, just fourteen months after set the automatic pilot for a clockwise his harrowing BC experience, Dick Thrasher curve which he thought would lead it to was again in the rear compartment of a B- crash in Queen Charlotte Sound. It is clear, 36, piloted, as before, by Harold Barry. however, that his setting caused it to fly in Ernest Cox, the flight engineer, was also circles. The circle size was not large, as he there. They were flying at 20,000 feet over had seen the plane pass back over him Oklahoma on a training flight, where they before he landed. The overriding factor was assumed the role of an enemy bomber. the gale blowing northward about, 55 knots Four F-51 fighter planes were practicing per hour (about a mile per minute). It acted “nose passes,” diving from high above the like a river carrying the busy plane for B-36. Two swooped by, very close. Then about three and a half hours. That the wing tip of the next fighter sliced estimate is derived from the duration of directly through Barry’s cockpit. Dick said its radio carrier signal, created by Jim Ford the plane immediately went into a steep when he had screwed down the operating dive. There was fierce shaking and the key before jumping. The continuous carrier aircraft began breaking up. The nose was picked up and monitored by a section broke away first. Then a strong

43 | Page fishtail motion began throwing the crew reached the cirque. While they were still around the rear compartment. over Queen Charlotte Sound, before Barry had turned the plane towards land, the Five crewmen were there, but only Dick bomb was dropped, but without its went out the hatch. Before the others plutonium core. The core was supposed to could follow, the tail section broke off, and be kept stored in a container that was they were simply thrown out. One gunner, normally kept bolted to the bomb bay unfortunately, disliked wearing his chute wall. For a nuclear attack, which had to be during these long and mostly boring flights. authorized by the President, the core He was in the habit of just hanging it on the would be transferred to the center of the wall beside his position, and was reaching bomb. The bomb did, however, contain an for it when Dick left. Evidently, he didn’t uranium shell and a set of conventional get it on before being thrown out. For explosives to compress it onto the core. those whose parachutes opened, the ride Without the core, the bomb simply blew down was scary because of the all the apart when it reached the preset elevation debris swirling about them. Dick landed of 1000 metres (about 3000 feet). It did hard on an Oklahoma field, but was okay. and Dick saw the clouds light up. The He was one of only four who survived, all uranium fragments, now scattered on the from the rear compartment. The three floor of Queen Charlotte Sound, are mildly other survivors remarked about how slickly radioactive, but pose no threat. They do, Dick had dumped the pressure, opened the however, comprise the first Broken Arrow, hatch, and cleanly exited. He had done it all USAF code for an unplanned destruction of before, and it showed. Harold Barry, an atomic bomb. Ernest Cox and 10 others died. After returning to his home in Connecticut, DND’s 1997 examination for radiation at Scott opened the core container. He the crash site had yielded nothing reported it to be gleaming and pristine significantly above background levels. They inside, but empty. This confirmed what the concluded that neither the bomb, nor the Air Force had always maintained, but few plutonium core had made it to this cirque. believed. The B-36s did carry atomic But they had not found the core container; bombs on their practice missions, but the we had. plutonium cores were stored in Fort It is now known that the 11,000-lb bomb in Worth, entirely under the control of the the forward bomb bay was, indeed, an Atomic Energy Commission, not the atomic bomb, more precisely, a Mark IV, military. Our plane carried no plutonium Fat Man, only slightly modified from that core. dropped on Nagasaki in 1945. But, Dick

Thrasher confirmed that it had never

44 | Page In Memoriam – William Anderson

William Anderson one of the prominent and admired US disaster scholars died suddenly on December 29 when holidaying in Hawaii.

Bill was one of the early Ph.D.'s from Ohio State University when the Disaster Research Center was located there. His doctoral dissertation was on the 1964 Alaska earthquake and his later work included a study of floods in Ohio which led him to identify the concept of a "disaster subculture". He was one of the first to write about the role of the military in disaster and in 1970 published one of the first social science studies of tsunami warnings. He also co-authored -- with Russell Dynes -- a study of the 30th of May movement in Curacao.

After teaching at Kent State and Arizona state where one of his students was Ron Perry, another distinguished scholar in our field, Bill moved to the National Science Foundation where he was responsible for 26 years of funding US disaster research.

From June 1999 to June 2001, he served as senior advisor in the Disaster Management Facility in the Infrastructure Division at the World Bank while on leave from the NSF.

In 2010 Bill was awarded the Charles Fritz award by the International Research Committee on Disasters for a lifetime contribution to Sociology of Disaster.

Bill was known for the quite supportive way he dealt with scholars at all levels and he was respected, admired and loved by his colleagues.

Bill’s body was cremated in Hawaii and his ashes were returned to Maryland. There will be a service of remembrance on March 22. The location has not been announced as yet.

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