The Farm Policy Debate of 1949-50: Plains State Reaction to the Brannan Plan

University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln

Great Plains Quarterly Great Plains Studies, Center for

1993

Virgil W. Dean Kansas State Historical Society

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Dean, Virgil W., "The Farm Policy Debate of 1949-50: Plains State Reaction to the Brannan Plan" (1993). Great Plains Quarterly. 773. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/773

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Quarterly by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. THE FARM POLICY DEBATE OF 1949 .. 50 PLAINS STATE REACTION TO THE BRANNAN PLAN

VIRGIL W. DEAN

A storm of controversy arose in April 1949 tervention in the economy and particularly by when Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. their view of commodity stabilization as a form Brannan unveiled the Truman administration's of socialism. postwar policy for agriculture. The most con Grassroots reaction to the Brannan plan troversial aspect of the so-called Brannan plan varied widely: some of the farmers who wrote to was its production payments feature, a direct, Brannan praised him as a savior and the only undisguised farm subsidy designed to bring relief man in Washington who cared about their to producers and consumers alike. Other as problems; others were convinced that the vil pects of the complex plan also elicited both lainous secretary and his contemptible plan praise and blame, but disagreements during this threatened everything that was good about fractious time were not limited to farm ques America. Theodore]. Regier, a Newton, Kan tions. In a year of apparent victories for the sas, area farmer, encouraged the secretary to world's communist monolith, spy trials, and "Keep on working" and wrote: "We want secu labor unrest, discussions of farm policy on the rity on the farm, even if we have to control Great Plains and elsewhere were affected by the production and have less freedom. A man in the participants' general views of government in- middle of the ocean has a world of freedom but no security." ].]. Weber, an equally convinced north-central Kansas wheat farmer, wrote that as "a firm believer of supply and demand" he opposed the Brannan plan. "[M]y farm ... is all Historian and editor of Kansas History at the Kansas paid for and I do not need ... [or] want anyone State Historical Society, Virgil Dean completed his to tell me how many acres I can plant. [T]his is doctoral dissertation on the Truman-Brannan price suppose to be a free contry [sic] let us leave it support plan for agriculture and has published several that way."! articles in the field of agricultural history. In general, how did plains farmers react to this innovative policy proposal? And why did so [GPQ 13 (Winter 1993): 33-46] many oppose what, on the surface at least,

33 34 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1993 seemed like an extremely generous agricultural If price supports were simply extended, many program? Using Kansas as its primary example believed the cost of the system soon would and Brannan's correspondence as its primary become prohibitive, resulting in a consumer or source, this essay offers some tentative answers taxpayer revolt against the entire farm program. to these questions. Although scientific analysis Farmers' successes exacerbated the problem. In of this opinion (if indeed it is even possible) is the 1940s the nation was in the midst of what beyond the scope of this study, a sampling is Wayne Rasmussen calls the second agricultural instructive. Attitudes toward Brannan's pro revolution-"the change from animal power to posal came in all shades and degrees of elo mechanical power and the adaptation of chem quence. A look at these divergent viewpoints istry to agricultural production." Spectacular can provide a window on the depth of disagree gains in farm productivity were already quite ment on agricultural issues and, by implication, evident, and price-depressing farm surpluses a glimpse at attitudes affecting broader social loomed ever larger for the future.3 What was to and economic issues confronting postwar Ameri be done? In essence, this was the core of the cans. postwar debate. At issue was the "parity" concept, an idea EXISTING FARM POLICY that gained currency in the 1920s, was codified in the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of the Numerous domestic challenges confronted 1930s, and quickly became the cornerstone of the United States in the wake of the Second the national farm program. The formula used to World War as it sought to reconvert to a peace determine the level of support was a complex time economy. Agriculture was one of the many one, but, in its simplest terms, parity was the policy areas that demanded attention. Existing "ratio of equality" between the prices received programs were based on New Deal legislation by farmers for the commodities sold and the -most significantly, the Agricultural Adjust prices farmers paid for the goods and services mentAct (AAA) of 1938-and emergency war they purchased. A base period, initially 1909- time legislation designed to expire at the end of 14, was selected so the ratio could be deter 1948. Although the AAA was an omnibus mined in light of the constant fluctuation of agricultural measure, its most important legacy prices.4 to the Brannan plan was the price support Government price support programs based system based on a certain percent of "parity" for on a given"percentage of parity were particularly specified farm commodities; wheat and com important to farmers in the wheat producing were two of the so-called "basic commodities" states of the Great Plains where over-depen on the original list, a list that grew in response dence on one-commodity agriculture made to the United States' entry into the war. producers especially vulnerable to farm price In 1941 and 1942 Congress passed legisla fluctuations. Hard hit by depression and drought tion to encourage production of crops deemed in the "Dirty Thirties," plains farmers generally vital to the war effort and to guarantee farmers appreciated New Deal programs that alleviated some benefit from increased demand and war their suffering; but only favorable weather and time spending by supporting numerous farm the wartime demand of the early forties would commodity prices at 90 percent of parity. By return good times to their region. This boom the end of 1942, supports were guaranteed for period also brought a rapid increase in the "basics" (wheat, com, cotton, rice, tobacco, application of new technologies, a favorable and peanuts) and "non-basics" (milk, butterfat, economic climate for stock raising, a consider chickens, eggs, turkeys, hogs, dry peas, soybeans able expansion of wheat acreage, a concomitant for oil, flaxseed for oil, peanuts for oil, Ameri increase in production, and an acceleration in can-Egyptian cotton, sweet potatoes, and Irish the trend toward fewer but larger farms. The potatoes}.2 continuation ofprosperity during the immediate REACTION TO THE BRANNAN PLAN 35 postwar years notwithstanding, farmers feared another depression. At the very least, they demanded a support system that would put a floor under certain commodity prices.s Whether on or off the farm, virtually every one agreed with Secretary Brannan that farmers confronted "disadvantaging economic circum stances" because of "the serious hazards result ing from unfavorable weather, floods," and their inability to make quick production adjustments. Brannan, a forty-five year old attorney from Denver, Colorado, had spent thirteen years in the United States Department of Agriculture FIG. 1. Republican Congressman Clifford R. Hope, (USDA) administering New Deal action pro Sr. , of Garden City, addressing a meeting of the Lane County Farm Bureau at Dighton in December of 1949. grams before his appointment to the department's Photograph courtesy of Kansas State Historical top post in J.une 1948.6 Experience had taught Society. him that peculiar circumstances entitled the farmer to special legislative consideration and, if necessary, assistance. In addition, like others of his generation, Brannan held to a concept of agrarianism that maintained "that the prosper ity of our agricultural producers is closely tied up laundry list of previously uncovered commodi with the prosperity of our entire country."7 ties. The issue became the extent and level of Nevertheless, common ground on specific commodity price supports, not the viability of program choices was illusive. Congressional the concept. A few farm advocates called for ineptitude in this area can be partially ex government support at 100 percent parity, but plained by the fact that the so-called "farm the most common point of contention in the problem" was actually a myriad of different postwar farm policy debate occurred between problems, all of which resisted comprehensive proponents of a fixed 90 percent of parity and solution. As the former chairman of the House those who favored a more flexible support sys Committee on Agriculture, Clifford R. Hope tem. The question was no longer whether or !lot (R., Kans.), observed in 1949, it was, more government had a role in agriculture, but what accurately, "thirty-five or forty farm problems."8 that role would be; and "the principal question Hope, a widely respected congressional farm with most farmers," wrote Congressman Hope, spokesman from western Kansas, had been "is not whether they are entitled to 90% of searching for answers in behalf of farmers since parity, but the method to be used in giving it to the 1920s, and he was well aware of the problem's them."9 complexities. Not only did the problems differ Under the circumstances, it is not surprising for farmers from one commodity to another, but that the Agricultural Act of 1948 (Hope-Aiken they also varied from region to region for pro Act), the nation's first shot at a long-range, ducers of any given commodity. In addition, the postwar policy for agriculture, was at best a often discordant interests and opinions of pro hybridized piece of farm legislation. Title I, the cessors and consumers frequently compounded Hope portion of the new law, simply extended the problem and complicated the search for a existing legislation through 1949, while Titles solution. II and III, named for their principal sponsor, This long-standing reality was exacerbated Senator George Aiken (R., Yt.), implemented by the wartime legislation that had extended a long-range price support program based on a high, "rigid," price support guarantees to a new formula for computing parity and a plan for 36 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1993

sas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas went Republi can as they had in the previous election; but President Truman held many of the midwestern and western states that Franklin Roosevelt had carried and recaptured Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, which had gone back to the Republicans in 1944. Truman's surprising November victory, due in part to an aggressive farm state campaign, left many, including the president and the secretary of agriculture, with the impression that the admin istration had received a mandate to change the country's farm policy. II

FIG. 2. During the campaign of 1948, President THE BRANNAN PLAN Truman made an important farm speech and appear ance at the National Plowing Contest at Dexter, Iowa, Secretary Brannan interpreted and gave life on 18 September 1948. Here the President shakes hands with farmers Ronald H. Orr, Beatrice, Nebraska, to that mandate-whether it was real or imag and Charles G. Long, Bethany, Missouri, the defending ined. On 7 April 1949 he appeared before a and current plow champions. Associa ted Press joint session of the House and Senate agricul photograph courtesy of Harry S. Truman library. ture committees to discuss some of the administration's "views and recommendations" with regard to price supports, "the heart of our farm policy."12 The essence of Brannan's proposal contained four basic elements: 1) a new standard of a flexible or sliding scale ranging from 60 to 90 support based on income rather than price percent of parity for most major crops. Accord criteria, which represented "a realistic mini ing to Representative Harold Cooley, the con mum below which it is not in the interest of ference committee had labored for many long farmers or consumers to allow farm prices to hours only to bring "forth a monstrosity." As fall"; 2) a more recent, realistic, moving ten Stephen Pace, another Democratic opponent, year base period (initially 1939 through 1948) explained, "The House passed a bill, the Senate for computing the new income support stan passed a bill, and the compromise is to enact dard; 3) support accomplished through the use both of them." Even Congressman Hope, who of loans, purchase agreements, production pay had come early to the position that more time ments, and direct purchases; and 4) eligibility was needed to study changing conditions before for price support limited to producers who prac permanent legislation was passed, described the ticed good soil conservation and did not exceed Aiken bill as "a hastily gotten up concoction, a predetermined level ofproduction-"a volume full of contradictions and weak spotS."1O high enough to benefit most farms but one The failings of the Republican 80th Con which will not encourage the development of gress, the politicization of agricultural issues in extremely large, industrialized farming."13 the fall campaign, and the Democratic election Brannan's proposal was complex and many successes in 1948 made a renewed long-range faceted, but the new plan's most controversial farm policy search inevitable. Not only had component was the secretary's scheme for offer Democrats recaptured majority control of the ing relief to both consumers and producers. Congress, they had reelected a president. Kan- "Non-perishable" or "storable" commodities REACTION TO THE BRANNAN PLAN 3 7 were to be supported in much the same way as culmination of the lengthy and often politically they had been under existing legislation (loans, explosive postwar search for a solution to the purchase agreements, and direct purchases), but "farm problem."15 Instead the "Brannan plan" "perishable" commodities would be supported touched off a political firestorm. under a new system of "production" or "income payments." In practice, a support standard CONGRESSMAN HOPE AND RESPONSE TO would be determined by the Secretary of Agri THE BRANNAN PLAN culture, and a direct payment would be made to the producer to make up the difference between National reaction registered quickly. A New the standard and the market price of that com York Times editorial called the administration modity. This was an undisguised government plan a "political maneuver," and other news subsidy to the farmer, in itself a hard pill for agencies claimed that its real author was the many inside and outside farm circles to swallow, "radical" National Farmers Union (NFU). In and a consumer subsidy, anathema to most addition, a steady stream of letters and tele conservatives. grams began arriving at the USDA and the A second.provision, which also proved quite White House on the day following Brannan's controversial, was designed to encourage the committee appearance. Members of Congress "family-sized farm" by denying government sup were also understandably concerned. Congress port beyond a certain level of production. In an man Hope commented on the production pay effort to coopt those groups most likely to ment feature of the proposed plan in the first oppose this particular concept, Brannan wrapped letter he wrote after Secretary Brannan's pre his explanation in a cloak of American idealism sentation: "Farmers generally," Hope believed, and agrarian fundamentalism. "One bulwark of would "oppose the cash subsidy plan because democracy," Brannan proclaimed, "may be they will feel there is no certainty of it being put found in the prosperous rural community mainly in operation." It would be wholly dependent on composed of economically strong families farm annual appropriations and farmers would have ing in the traditional American pattern. It is an no way of knowing, at planting time, if pay ever-present answer to communism." By limit ments actually would be forthcoming. "Fur ing "eligibility for price support to a defined thermore, most farmers consider a payment of volume of production on each farm," Brannan that kind a consumer subsidy rather than a farm believed the government could avoid encourag subsidy." Nevertheless, Hope assured his ing "large, industrial farming" and still help correspondent that the House Committee on most farmers who were relatively small scale Agriculture would give all the secretary's rec producers. 14 ommendations careful consideration.16 In principle there was little new in Brannan's Although he later became a staunch oppo proposal, but in practice the plan's emphasis nent of the secretary's plan, Hope was undoubt and scope were significant departures from pre edly sincere in his promise of objectivity. The vious programs. The new support standard was congressman had been disquieted by the to be used to support a much longer list of administration's injection of partisanship into commodities at what amounted to 100 percent the farm policy debate during the previous of parity. At minimum, Brannan believed his campaign, but he was also "terribly disappointed "first-priority, or group 1" commodities should in Allan Kline," the conservative, "free trade" include corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco, whole president of the American Farm Bureau Federa milk, eggs, farm chickens, hogs, beef cattle, and tion (AFBF). Hope believed that Kline, who lambs. Other farm products would receive was philosophically opposed to all federal sub commensurate support if funds were available. sidies and accompanying regulations, was forc The secretary hoped that his plan would be the ing his position on the entire organization. "It 38 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1993 isn't simply a question of what the support levels The big differences were in emphasis, un will be but it is a question of whether a little precedented high levels of support and manda group of leaders who are entirely out of touch tory supports for many perishable commodities. with the thinking of people on the farms are As Congressman Hope explained, "It is the going to dictate farm legislation." Hope was not slant which the Secretary has put on the matter yet sure what should be done with regard to price that disturbs me."Z2 "[U]ntil Secretary Brannan policy, "but if we are going to have all the came along with his proposal," Hope reasoned, controls that are contained in the Aiken bill we "no one ever had any idea that payments would might just as well have 90% of parity price be used to the extent that he suggests."23 It was supports and let the farmer be getting something this "slant" that disturbed many and excited out of it."17 others, and a number of interested Kansans took These words, written in "confidence" less the time to express their considered opinions, than two months before Brannan's policy an both pro and con. These reactions ran the nouncement, reveal considerable common gamut of public opinion and, on the whole, ground between the congressman and the secre fairly reflect the many different attitudes ex tary of agriculture. Hope had previously ex pressed throughout the region, as well as the pressed support for production payments. 18 By nation. 1anuary 1949 he had come to the conclusion that farmers were willing to accept more con RESPONSES FROM KANSANS trols, although his mail was running in all directions; he was upset with the AFBF's in Taking a pro-administration line, 1. A. Meyer transigence; and, he was definitely committed of Riley informed the secretary that Allan Kline to changing the Aiken bil1. 19 Despite the parti and the Farm Bureau were under the influence sanship of the past campaign, Hope respected of the 2 percent of big farmers "that has least to Brannan and expressed considerable con benefit from the [new] program." Mrs. Thomas fidence in his efforts to find a solution for the Williams, from western Kansas, agreed: "We price support problem. "I know that Secretary have always paid Our Dues to the Farm Bureau Brannan is giving a great deal of though[t] and but cant see any benefit in it for us: the way I see study to the matter," he wrote on 3 February, that other plan [Aiken Act?] is to help the rich "and that he has the best brains in the Depart wheat farmer while it makes it harder every day ment working on it now. I am sure he wants to for the little man to have a lob or money to buy do everything possible to work out a solution to his groceries .... I know all the little people are the question."2o left holding the bag again: the rich are always This conciliatory tone notwithstanding, protected. "24 within hours of the secretary's initial committee This hostility toward the Farm Bureau, the presentation two months later, the battle lines most influential farm organization in the state were drawn, and Hope was in opposition. Al and the nation, was also reflected in a 6 May though the debate intensified as lawmakers and 1949 letter to Secretary Brannan from Hiawatha the general public began to focus on specific farmer Hugh Craig, who believed the Brannan legislation, the pros and cons remained surpris plan had the support of most dirt farmers. "It is ingly constant. Truman and Brannan labored to epochal and strikingly constructive and worthy convince the nation that the Brannan plan was of a place beside President Truman's declara not a new approach, but in many ways the tion of intention to fight global poverty," he administration's proposed program was in fact a wrote. "P.S. As a member of the American sharp departure from previous policy.21 The Farm Bureau Federation, I resent Allan B. Kline's controversial "production payments" were not utterances." Three months later, in a letter to new to the table, but in the Brannan plan they former Kansas Senator Arthur Capper, who was were a centerpiece. spending much of his first year of retirement REACTION TO THE BRANNAN PLAN 39

service by the state to the individual and that may entail compelling the wealthier of our citizens to bear a greater share of the national burden than they do now.

Craig believed the opposition's cry about "sa cred property rights" was a position "worthy of the Dark Ages" and insisted that "free lunch for school children" carried with it just as many "dangers of state socialism" as the farm plan under consideration. He closed this Populistic epistle as follows:

If our wealthier people would be willing to remedy injustice against human rights at some expense to themselves, they would not

FIG.~ . A Nebraska native, AllanB. Kline graduated need ro fear radical socialism or communism, from Iowa State College and subsequently established it seems to me. By opposing doing the above, himself as farmer/stockman in Benton County, Iowa. they are inviting everything they fear. He became active in the local Farm Bureau, served as The Republican Party is too much under vice-president and president of the state federation, and the influence of reactionary wealth and self was elected president of the AFBF in 1947. Photo graph courtesy of Kansas Farm Bureau. ish commercialism. It was founded as a liberal party and its great leader Abraham Lincoln typified that spirit. Unless it returns to its early principles, its days of glory are gone and its expectancy is short.26

Capper's rebuttal was based primarily on his attacking the Brannan initiative, Craig asked belief that it was not "healthy for the farmer, or why the farmer should not "have a fair share of for the consumer, or for the country, to have the the national income." His homey, handwritten farmer dependent upon the Federal Treasury for letter conveyed "liberal" views that nearly par his income, and the consumer dependent upon alleled those of the Farmers Union. Craig the Federal Treasury for part of his grocery bill." insisted that the "principle of parity" repre He believed "it a dangerous philosophy that sented a "price to the farmer that would give Government owes you or me a living" and that him approximately a fair share of the national income," and therefore he should receive 100 the Federal Treasury could [not] long stand percent of parity. He believed "subsidization" the load of supporting any considerable group had become "a cardinal principle of the Repub of people in this country. In times of distress, lican party," enjoyed by business through the we may yield to necessity. But to draw upon protective tariff for many years. 2S the Treasury to sustain the artificially high "The real objection to [the] Brannan Plan income levels of the war and postwar years among those who are fighting it for other than -it just can't [and "won't"] workY personal reasons," wrote Craig, Unfortunately for the administration, is because of its implications. They fear a Capper's judgment mirrored more public opin national policy that will adopt a broader ion than did Craig's. Across the Plains (and conception of human rights and of greater nation) many people found considerable 40 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1993 relevance in the opinions expressed by the proposal that so closely resembled the British former senator. A Chase County, Kansas, system. "It is in effect a subsidy to the con farmer informed the secretary that everyone he sumer," he reasoned, talked to opposed the Brannan plan and, al though he had voted Democratic all his life, he and apparently in England the consumers was making the switch. "If you want to make have gotten so fond of the subsidy that any regimented peasants out of the farmer," he talk about raising prices brings a threat of a wrote, "every man with a backbone will be your political revolt .... The thing that bothers foe." Mrs. Morris Campbell of Lamed insisted me is that if we start such a program here and that "no one, but a complete moron could consumers adjust themselves to the subsi believe you can have cheap food for consumers dized prices, the chances are we will never and high prices for producers .... You men in get rid of them. Washington yap about the Reds & are getting our country the same way."28 A week later Hope wrote "the Brannan plan ... Many other observers and participants in the would, in my opinion, bring about a situation farm debate echoed similar attitudes. One very much the same as the farmers in England western Kansas newspaper editorialized that the are confronted with at the present time, which government had a role in agriculture, but "Aid is total control of their farming operations."3l and assistance can't ... long be given without dictation of what to do and ... when to do it. If INFORMING THE FARMERS the administration's program gets through Con gress," editor Victor C. Leiker insisted, "the Throughout the farm policy debate of 1949 farmer of America will be the most regimented and early 1950, Secretary Brannan repeatedly group our country has ever seen.... If the plan expressed the belief that the public, especially goes through it will be just another step toward the farmers, would support his program if they socialization. "29 better understood the issue. This was an overly optimistic assessment, but some of the secretary's THE KANSAS CONGRESSIONAL mail did reflect a degree of understandable DELEGATION confusion, and there were some instances of "conversion" that undoubtedly reinforced the The entire Kansas congressional delegation department's belief that education was the key also espoused this attitude, opposing, without to success. One such "convert," D. H. Richert exception, the Brannan plan. Sixth District of North Newton, Kansas, wrote the secretary Representative Wint Smith of Mankato was expressing the commonly held concern that the obsessed with "creeping socialism" and the do new plan would lead to excessive regimentation mestic Communist threat. He disputed virtu or government control of America's farms. In ally all of the administration's foreign policy his reply Brannan thanked Richert for this "op initiatives and was "unalterably opposed to any portunity to discuss ... the bogey of regimenta of the so-called Fair Deal ideas about social tion." The secretary assured his correspondent legislation." The Brannan plan was just another that he "did not propose to the Congress that of these "socialistic scheme[s]," endorsed first farmers should be pushed around and regimented by organized labor "simply to get cheaper food" a lot," and made some general remarks about his at taxpayer expense.30 recommended program. Richert was convinced; Representative Hope thought "the matter a few days later he wrote that this was "a fine should be carefully studied in Congress" but was program" and only wished "there would be some "dubious about any farm plan which has to be way of bringing the truth to the farmers."32 carried out by means of payments to producers." Whether or not USDA officials were correct The congressman was apprehensive about a in assuming that the more people knew the REACTION TO THE BRANNAN PLAN 41 more likely they were to support the Brannan decried his state's Farm Bureau for "tagging all plan, polls seemed to indicate a definite need for of us as Anglophiles, [and] calling your more information. In late May national polls [Brannan's] plan the 'British' Farm Program. revealed that farmers still did not fully under We're steeping a cup of hot water in case there's stand the program and were not convinced of its another tea party."35 viability. Data also indicated that farmers were Republicans, Congressman Hope included, evenly split; they were not for the sliding scale were understandably concerned about these of the Aiken Act but did not yet understand the various alignments and the plan's political im Brannan plan. Lester F. Kimmel, a special plications. They were especially troubled by the correspondent for the Wichita Eagle, reported: active involvement of organized labor, which was second only to the NFU in its efforts for the Surveys being made by agrarian observers Brannan proposal. "Most of the support," Hope indicate that the farmer, as of now, is open wrote on 4 June, "is coming from the CIO minded. He is sitting back to see which party [Congress ofIndustrial Organizations] and there develops the program that seems most ad is no doubt but what it is a CIO bill from start vantageous to him.... In poker parlance the to finish. This very fact I am sure is going to Brannan plan sees the Republicans and raises make most farmers suspicious." Two weeks later them in almost every particular. he called the administration's proposal the "CIO Plan" and criticized the "so-called Farm Con The farmer was listening but had not yet re ference" held by the Democrats in Des Moines acted.33 the previous week. It was "mostly a rally by the Democrats and Labor leaders trying to get farm FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS AND THE ers to support the repeal of the Taft-Hartley bill, BRANNAN PLAN and incidentally to support the Brannan Farm Plan." Hope believed the Brannan plan, be On the Great Plains, as elsewhere in the cause oflabor's substantial influence, gave more country, the Farm Bureau, National Grange, to consumers than to farmers. "I don't think," and conservative cooperatives were inclined he wrote on 25 June, the new farm bill "should toward the Republican view. Since the Farm be the Brannan bill which is a CIO program or Bureau was the most influential agricultural the Aiken bill which is too much of a United organization in the central Plains and the corn States Chamber of Commerce program."36 belt, the Republicans were in the strongest position. Most livestock producers, fearing an DEFEAT OF THE BRANNAN PLAN increase in feed-grain prices, also opposed the Brannan plan.34 But farmers and stock growers Momentarily, in late June and early July, it were not known for their group loyalty, and appeared as if "a rather pale version of the organizational influences also pulled them in Brannan plan" had a real chance. The so-called the other direction. Pace-Brannan bill (H.R. 5345) provided for Most significant nationally, and especially Brannan's income support standard and 100 on the northern Plains, was the Farmers Union, percent supports for Group 1 commodities but which gave the secretary's plan its most enthu limited the application of production payments siastic support. Brannan received many hearty to no more than three commodities.37 Even this letters of endorsement from state and local was more than most Brannan opponents could Farmers Unions throughout the country, but tolerate, and they got behind Albert A. Gore, they were numerous from the northern Plains Sr.'s (D., Tenn) one year extension of the and upper Midwest-most notably the Dakotas, existing program, which passed overwhelm Montana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michi ingly. All upper plains state congressmen, gan. A St. Paul union official, for example, except Minnesota's, supported the Gore bill, 42 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1993

FIG. 4. President Harry S. Truman signing the rural telephone bill, 28 October 1949. Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan (third from left) looks on; as do other government officials (former secretary of agriculture and REA Administrator Claude R. Wickard, third from right) and representatives of interested farm organizations. USDA photograph courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library.

which was, in essence, a vote to kill the Brannan sentatives from the opposition camp, the politi plan.38 cal implications of the conference were clear. The administration's proposal was indeed Participants sought a GOP alternative to the dead for 1949, as it had even less support in the "Brannan or Bust" farm plan, but the party's Senate. But with the secretary and his support National Committee chairman insisted that ers looking toward 1950, the fight was still the farm problem "should not become the foot important. Proponents and opponents expected ball of partisan politics." Conference keynoter the plan to be a major issue in the next congres Clifford Hope repeated the charge that the sional campaign. In August Hope thought the Brannan program was actually the plan of orga Brannan plan was "dead for the time being," nized labor; that being the case, he asked, why but, he cautioned, the GOP must be ready to was it not tried on labor first? "If high incomes "meet it as an issue in 1950."39 and low prices are a good thing for the farmer, Republicans had no intentions of allowing why aren't high incomes and low wages a good themselves to be bushwhacked in farm states thing for working people?" The consumer would again and launched their drive for a 1950 farm benefit in many ways if government were to program at a Sioux City, Iowa, farm conference adopt a "low wage policy," and "if the Brannan in late September 1949. Although billed as a plan advocates are right, workers wouldn't lose non-partisan conference that did include repre- because the Government would give them a REACTION TO THE BRANNAN PLAN 43

check every so often to make up the difference lican delegation to Congress was reelected. All between actual wages and a fair wage rate to be were Brannan plan antagonists.44 determined by the Government."40 Back on Capitol Hill, a bill (S. 2522) intro SIGNIFICANCE OF FARM POLICY DEBATE, duced by former secretary of agriculture, now 1949-50 senator, Clinton P. Anderson (D., N.M.) was gaining momentum. The AFBF had lent its The farm policy debate of 1949 and 1950 did strong support to the Anderson bill largely not result in the enactment of an effective long because it managed to incorporate the principle range program, but it is of historical signifi of flexible supports, and Senator Aiken de cance. Certainly one cannot begin to compre fended it as a strengthening of the Agricultural hend the subsequent dialectic on farm issues Act of 1948. For the most part Congressman without first looking at this episode. The argu Hope agreed: "It is not too different from the ments that would dominate agricultural debate Hope-Aiken bill and I think it is an improve for years to come crystalized in 1949 and 1950. ment in some ways."41 As predicted, the Ander Plains state farmers who expressed support for son bill finally passed the Senate in mid-Octo the Brannan plan did so because they consid ber but the conference committee, in a manner ered the old approach wholly inadequate and reminiscent of the previous year, reported a saw the administration's plan as a step toward compromise package-the Gore-Anderson bill, greater social and economic equity. Those who which became the Agricultural Act of 1949. opposed it did so because they feared excessive The Brannan plan was dead, but high price government spending, "creeping socialism," supports lived on, as the Gore portion of the and the "regimentation" of the nation's agri compromise again postponed the implementa cultural industry. Most opposed the Truman tion of the sliding scale. It was, in essence, a administration's initiatives in other domestic victory for advocates of high mandatory price areas like federal housing, national health care, supports, southern Democrats and midwestern and aid to education for the same reasons. and western RepublicansY The result was a permanently refocused de Unbeknownst to the administration and its bate: not on whether the federal government Republican-Dixiecrat opposition, 1949 had been had a role in agriculture, but on what its role the first and last chance for the Brannan plan. should be. The "old liberalism," which in Truman and Brannan geared up for a renewed cluded New Deal farm policy, had become the battle for the secretary's proposal in 1950, but "new conservatism."45 A few, like the old anti other events-McCarthyism at home and the New Deal curmudgeon Dan D. Casement of Korean War abroad-were to attract far more Manhattan, Kansas, were consistent in their public attention and make another change in opposition to all government largess and saw no farm policy appear unwise. Brannan carried on fundamental difference between the old parity the fight, but by midyear President Truman was system and the Brannan plan. To this Great fully occupied in other areas. The Brannan plan Plains farmer-stockman, efforts to "walk a mid was an issue in some congressional campaigns dle course between statism and freedom" were that fall, but it was generally of secondary "damned unrighteous."46 Most Kansans, how importance. Even in Iowa, where the adminis ever, had reconciled their basically conserva tration sponsored the senatorial candidacy of its tive political ideology to the old methods of under secretary of agriculture, Albert J. Loveland, supporting farm prices-government loans, di the conservative Republican incumbent, Bourke rect purchases, acreage allotments, and market B. Hickenlooper, won handily.43 In Kansas, ing agreements. They were suspicious of the early speculation notwithstanding, the Brannan Brannan plan, which meant "junking the deeply plan had no perceptible impact, and the Repub- imbedded system" that had "met with general 44 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1993 favor among farmers" for "an untried one."47 hower," Agricultural History 53 (January 1979): 361- They could not handle this next logical step, 62. which included direct payments, more limits on 3. Wayne D. Rasmussen, "The Impact of Tech production, and consumer subsidies. no logical Change on American Agriculture, 1862- 1962," Journal of Economic History 22 (December Congressman Hope, for one, recognized the 1962): 578. inherent contradictions and, like many other 4. Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, farm legislators and their constituents, remained Encyclopedia of American Agricultural History in a quandary with regard to the "farm prob (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), lem." Hope was relatively conservative on most p. 261; Congressional Digest 29 (March 1950): 73; Lauren Soth, Farm Troubles (Princeton: Princeton issues but had supported the principles of New University Press, 1957), p. 29. Deal farm legislation. Although philosophi 5. Theodore Saloutos, "The New Deal and Farm cally opposed to government interference in the Policy in the Great Plains," Agricultural History 43 marketplace, he came to accept the necessity of (July 1969): 346; Michael W. Schuyler, The Dread of government price supports for agricultural com Plenty: Agricultural Relief Activities of the Federal Government in the Middle West, 1933-1939 (Man modities. In this respect, Hope reflected a hattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1989); general GOP dilemma. His was a pragmatic Tom G. Hall, "The Aiken Bill, Price Supports and position dictated by the realization that farmers the Wheat Farmer in 1948," North Dakota History had been unable to solve the "farm problem" on 39 (Winter 1972): 14; Harold G. Halcrow and Roy their own. Some type of federal support system E. Huffman, "Great Plains Agriculture and Brannan's Farm Plan, Journal of Farm Economics 31 (August seemed the only way to compensate for 1949): 497; John T. Schlebecker, Cattle Raising on agriculture's inherently unequal competitive the Plains, 1900-1961 (Lincoln: University of Ne position in relationship to the nonfarm sector of braska Press, 1963), p. 207. the economy.48 6. Unattributed two-page biographical sketch, One. can at least speculate that the majority filed "by Mr. Dawson" 2 June 1948, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Li of Hope's constituents, like people throughout brary (OF, TP), Independence, Missouri; Eleanora the region, found themselves in a very similar W. Schoenebaum, ed., Political Profiles: The Truman political and philosophical quandary. Their Years (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1978), p. 51; opposition to the Brannan plan was an expres Current Biography, 1948 (New York: H. W. Wilson sion of their philosophy; their continued accep Co., 1949), p. 57. 7. Brannan to Rev. Raymond Ryan, 17 August tance of the established farm support program 1949; Ryan to Brannan, 8 August 1949, FP6, RG16, was an exercise in pragmatism. Not surpris NA. See also: Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Years of ingly, the search for an effective long-range Trial and Hope (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, policy for agriculture, like the nation's struggle 1956) 2:262-63; Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry to come to grips with many of its social ills, has S. Truman, 1947 (Washington: Government Print ing Office, 1963), p. 8. been continually frustrated. 8. Hope to John Davenport, 3 June 1949, Finder File, Clifford R. Hope Papers, Collection 50, Manu NOTES scripts Department, Kansas State Historical Society (FF, HP, KSHS), Topeka, Kansas. 1. Theodore J. Regier to Charles F. Brannan, 16 9. Hope to Don L. Berry, 12 February 1949, FF, June 1949; J. J. Weber to Brannan, 12 June 1949, HP, KSHS; see also Virgil W. Dean, "America's General Correspondence 1949, Farm Program 6, Search for a Long-Range Policy for Agriculture: Record Group 16, National Archives and Records The Truman-Brannan Price Support Plan, Innova Center (FP6, RG16, NA), Washington, D.C. tive New Approach or 'Political Football'?" (Ph.D. 2. Wayne D. Rasmussen, Gladys L. Baker, and dissertation, University of Kansas, 1991), pp. 53- James G. Ward, A Short History of Agricultural 55; Allen J. Matusow, Farm Policy and Politics in the Adjustment, 1933-1975 (Washington: Economic Truman Years (Cambridge: Harvard University Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Press, 1967), p. 120; Hall, "The Aiken Bill" (note 5 Agricultural Information Bulletin, no. 391, March above), p. 14. 1976), pp. 7-8; Edward L. and Frederick H. 10. Congressional Record, vol. 94, pt. 7, 80th Schapsmeier, "Farm Policy from FDR to Eisen- Cong., 2nd Sess., House (Washington: Government REACTION TO THE BRANNAN PLAN 45

Printing Office, 1948), 9339-44; U.S. Statutes At Christiana McFadyen Campbell, The Farm Bureau Large, Agricultural Act of 1948, vol. 62, pt. 1, and the New Deal: A Study of the Making of-National P.L.897 (H.R.6248), 3 July 1948, 80th Cong., 2nd Farm Policy, 1933-40 (Urbana: University of Illi Sess., Ch.827; Harold D. Cooley (D., N.C.), Stephen nois, 1962); Samuel R. Berger, Dollar Harvest: The Pace (D., Ga.), Congressional Record 19 June 1948, Story of the Farm Bureau (Lexington, Massachusetts: p. 9346; Hope to Berry, 12 February 1949, FF, HP, D. C. Heath and Co., 1971). KSHS. See also James L. Forsythe, "Postmortem on 18. Hope to Frank Blecha, 25 January 1947, FF, the Election of 1948: An Evaluation of Congress HP, KSHS. Here, Hope was in good company; see: man Clifford R. Hope's Views," Kansas Historical Willard W. Cochrane, "Income Payments as a Sub Quarterly 38 (Autumn 1972): 341. stitute for Support Prices," Journal of Farm Econom 11. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Ab ics 28 (November 1946): 1029; T. W. Schultz, stracts of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy (New York: Bicentennial Edition, Part 2 (Washington: Govern McGraw-Hill, 1945); Condensed Committee Re ment Printing Office, 1975), p. 1075; Virgil W. port of the American Farm Economics Association, Dean, "Farm Policy and Truman's Campaign of "Toward a Better Parity," Farm Policy Forum 1 1948," The Historian, 55 (Spring 1993), forthcom (January 1948): 42. ing; Theodore Saloutos, "Agricultural Organiza 19. Hope to Merle E. Lambert, president of the tions and Farm Policy in the South After World Pratt County (Kansas) Farm Bureau, 4 January War II," Agri£ultural History 53 (January 1979): 1949; Hope to J. W. Morgan, 21 January 1949; Hope 390; Thomas G. Ryan, "Farm Prices and the Farm to John M. Browne, 4 February 1949; Hope to J. N. Vote in 1-948," Agricultural History 54 (July 1980): Tincher, Sr., 7 February 1949, FF, HP, KSHS; and 387; "Why Farmers Swung to Truman," U.S. News Hope to M. W. Thatcher,S February 1949, Legisla and World Report 25 (19 November 1948): 23-24; tive Correspondence, HP, KSHS. Harold F. Gosnell, Truman's Crises: A Political 20. Hope to Ed T. Hackney, 3 February 1949, FF, Biography of Harry S. Truman (Westport, Connecti HP, KSHS. See: Reo Christenson, The Brannan cut: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 410; Alonzo L. Plan: Farm Politics and Policy (Ann Arbor: Univer Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and sity of Michigan Press, 1959), pp. 158-59. American Liberalism (New York: Columbia Univer 21. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (note 7 above), sity Press, 1973), p. 303; Clarence Cannon to 2: 264; General Farm Program (note 12 above), p. Truman, 7 January 1949, OF, TP. 139. 12. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 22. Hope to John 1. Taylor, 16 April 1949; Hope Joint Hearings Before the Committee on Agricul to Russell Wilkins, 14 April 1949; Hope to H. K. ture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Thatcher, 20 May 1949, FF, HP, KSHS. Forestry, General Farm Program, 81st Cong., 1st 23. Hope to Samuel Guard, 14 May 1949; Hope Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, to Robert 1. Lupfer, 21 April 1949; Hope to Guard, 1949), pp. 138, 145; Brannan to Truman, 6 April 20 May 1949, FF, HP, KSHS. 1949, President's Secretary's File (PSF), TP; Con 24. J. A. Meyer to Brannan, 4 May 1949; Mrs. gressional Digest 29 (March 1950): 79. Thomas Williams to Brannan, 28 July 1949, FP6, 13. General Farm Program (note 12 above) pp. RG16, NA. 138, 145. 25. Hugh Craig to Brannan, 6 May 1949, FP6, 14. Ibid., pp. 143, 145. RGI6, NA; Craig to Capper, 7 August 1949, Agri 15. Ibid., p. 147; Brannan to Truman, 6 April cultural Correspondence, 1947 -51, Arthur Capper 1949, PSF, TP. Papers (CP), Collection 12, Manuscripts Depart 16. New York Times, 8 April 1949; B. S. Bercovici ment, KSHS; see also: F. D. Munsell to Brannan, 18 to Brannan, 10 April 1949, FP6, RGI6, NA; Hope August 1949, FP6, RGI6, NA. to C. N. Hiebert, 8 April 1949; and Hope to John D. 26. Craig to Capper, note 25 above. Murray, 13 April 1949, FF, HP, KSHS. 27. Capper to Craig, 11 August 1949, CP, KSHS. 17. Hope to Don L. Berry, 12 February 1949; see 28. Unknown to Brannan, 17 May; Mrs. Morris also, Hope to Roy Schrock, 15 February 1949, and Campbell to Brannan, 7 July 1949, FP6, RGI6, NA. Hope to Herb W. Hoover, 16 February 1949, FF, 29. Ellis County News (Hays, Kansas), 14 April HP, KSHS. For an example of Hope's attitude 1949. toward the "Aiken Act," see: "Long-Range Program 30. Wint Smith to Dallas W. Davis, 18 July for Agriculture," 21 March 1949, Columbus, Ohio, 1949, General Correspondence, Legislation (Vari Speech File, HP, KSHS; for his comments on parti ous Subjects); Smith to Carroll Newcomer, 28 June sanship in the 1948 campaign see, among others: 1950, General Correspondence, Agriculture, Wint Hope to George Carmichael, 12 January 1949, FF, Smith Papers (SP), Collection 41, Manuscripts HP, KSHS. For more on the AFBF and Kline see, Department, KSHS. 46 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1993

31. Hope to Samuel R. Guard, 14 May 1949; September 1949, Speech File, HP, KSHS; Chair Hope to Mrs. Hermie Kastens, 23 May 1949, FF, HP, man Guy Gabrielson's remarks quoted in New York KSHS. Times, 24 September 1949, p. 8; Hope to Benton J. 32. Richert to Brannan, 18 April 1949, Brannan Stong, 29 September 1949, and Hope to Richard P. to Richert, 28 April 1949, and Richert to Brannan, White, 21 October 1949, FF, HP, KSHS; Topeka 2 May 1949, FP6, RG16, NA. Journal, 23, 24 September 1949. 33. Will Lissner, "Survey Shows Both Parties 41. Hope to Steffens, 17 September 1949, FF, Fail to Clinch Farm Vote," New York Times, 22 May HP, KSHS. For Aiken's position see Congressional 1949; George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Record, vol. 95, pt. 10, Senate, 13 September 1949, Opinion, 1935-1971 (New York: American Insti pp. 12775-76. tute of Public Opinion, 1972), 2:837; Wichita Eagle, 42. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States 29 May 1949. (note 36 above), 481-83; Schapsmeiers, "Farm 34. Spencer A. Rich, U. S. Agricultural Policy in the Policy" (note 2 above) p. 367; Wayne D. Rasmussen, Postwar Years, 1865-1963: The Development of u.s. ed., Agriculture in the United States: A Documentary Farm Problems; an 18 Year Legislative Review (Washing History (New York: Random House, 1975) 4: 2960; ton, D. c.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1963). U.S. Statutes At Large, P.L. 439, Ch. 792, "An Act 35. Gordon Roth, Farmers Union Grain Termi to Stabilize Prices of Agricultural Commodities," nal Association, St. Paul, Minn., to Brannan, 7 June 31 October 1949, p. 1051. 1949; Roberts County South Dakota Farmers Union 43. "Test for Brannan Plan," Newsweek 35 (20 (FU) to Brannan, 8 July 1949; Ray Antonen, South March 1950): 26; Loveland to Truman, 27 March Dakota Wheat Growers' Association to Brannan, 4 1950, OF, TP; New York Times, 1 November, p. 32, June 1949; and many others from individuals and and 9 November, p. 37, 1950; Norman MacKenzie, local unions of Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, "After the U. S. Polls," The New Statesman and Iowa, the Dakotas, and Montana; and C. E. Perkins, Nation (18 November 1950): 450; Joseph G. editor, Kansas Union Farmer, to Brannan, 28 April LaPalombara, "Pressure, Propaganda, and Political 1949; Joy Hammett, Elbow Local, FU, Manhattan, Action in the Election of 1950," Journal of Politics Kansas, to Brannan, 29 August 1949, FP6, RG16, 14 (March 1952): 323. Loveland formally resigned NA. See also Dean, "America's Search" (note 9 his position at USDA on 27 March 1950 and won above) pp. 253, 261-63. the Democratic primary while strongly endorsing 36. Hope to Mrs. Kastens, 4 June 1949, Hope to the Brannan plan. But, like many Democratic A. H. Couch, 18 June 1949, Hope to Dale candidates in 1950, he shied away from many of the Richardson, 25 June 1949, FF, HP, KSHS; see more controversial Truman programs, including its Hamby, Beyond the New Deal (note 11 above), p. 306; farm plan, during the fall campaign. Christenson, The Brannan Plan (note 20 above), p. 119. 44. June G. Cabe and Charles A. Sullivant, 37. Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United Kansas Votes: National Elections, 1859-1956 States, 1790-1950: A Study of Their Origins and (Lawrence: Government Research Center, Univer Development (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, sity of Kansas, 1957), pp. 198-203; Wichita Eagle, 29 1953), p. 480; Brannan to Frank Pace, 21 June 1949, May 1949; Topeka Journal, 24 September 1949; New Legislation 2, RG16, NA. York Times, 3 August, 8, 9 November 1950. If 38. Hope to Herb Hoover, 28 June 1949, FF, HP, election results are an indicator, the Brannan plan KSHS; Congressional Record, vol. 95, pt. 7, House, had no electoral impact on the other states of the 20 July 1949,9838-70; and, vol. 95, pt. 8, House, 21 upper Plains. Biographical Directory of the American July 1949, Monroney, 9930, and Gore, 9934. For Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington: Government the "yeas and nays" on the Gore bill see vol. 95, pt. Printing Office, 1961). 8, 9962-63. I include Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, 45. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics (note 8 Iowa, -the Dakotas, Montana, and Wyoming; Min above), pp. 115-16. nesota's delegation split five to four in favor of Gore. 46. Topeka Journal, 24 September 1949; and 39. Hope to Dale Richardson, and Hope to Richard W. Robbins to Wint Smith, 11 April 1950, Herman W. Cramer,S August 1949, FF, HP, KSHS; "Stetson Hat Speech" folder, General Correspon and Hubert H. Humphrey to Brannan, 28 July 1949; dence, SP, KSHS. Brannan to Harold Cooley, and Brannan to Stephen 47. Wichita Beacon, 8 April 1949. Pace, 22 July 1949; Brannan to Leonard Denholm, 48. See James L. Forsythe, "Clifford Hope of South Dakota Farmers Union, 22 July 1949, FP6, Kansas: Practical Congressman and Agrarian Ideal RG16, NA; and, Kansas Union Farmer (St. Marys, ist," Agricultural History 51 (April 1977): 407; and Kansas), December 1949. letter from Clifford R. Hope, Jr., to author,S Febru 40. Sioux City Republican Farm Conference, 23 ary 1990.