Vancouver Model United Nations The 12th Annual Conference • February 1–3, 2013

Background Guide United Nations Security Council Vancouver Model United Nations The 12th Annual Conference • February 1–3, 2013

Zach Hauser & Stuart Warren Secretaries-General Dear Delegates. • My name is Liam St. Louis, and I am the director for the Security Council Eric Liu at VMUN this year. I am a Grade 12 student at Gleneagle Secondary, and I Chief of Staff have striven to be as involved in the MUN community as I possibly can. As your director, I am looking forward to watching you work to solve some of Catherine Chou Director-General the most pressing problems of the day. The two topics we have selected, and conflicts in South Asia, are • both important topics of concern to the entire international community. The Aliya-Nur Babul latter takes advantage of the fact that both Pakistan and India are currently USG Committees represented on the UNSC, providing a unique opportunity to discuss South Asian issues with the presence of those who the conflicts concern most. Be- Adam Chandani cause a lack of dialogue is one of the largest reasons these issues are still un- USG Conference solved, the opportunity for direct conversation will be a boon to our efforts Parker Nann to find a resolution. The first topic, Kurdistan, has to our knowledge never USG Delegate Affairs 1 been done in the Vancouver MUN circuit, and is very uncommon to see across the continent. It is our hope that you will be able to solve this import- Eden Lee ant but hitherto-little known problem. USG Delegate Affairs 2 If you ever have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me at Brian Kwok any time. I look forward to reading your position papers and watching you USG Finance find a resolution to these pressing problems, and I wish you good luck in your research. Andy Lee USG Marketing Regards,

Catherine Wang Liam St. Louis USG Marketing Director, United Nations Security Council Kevin Chien USG Simulations

Jennifer Yoon USG Sponsorship Position Paper Policy

What is a Position Paper? A position paper is a brief overview of a country’s stance on the topics being discussed by a particu- lar committee. Though there is no specific format the position paper must follow, it should include a description of the positions your country holds on the issues on the agenda, relevant actions that your country has taken, and potential solutions that your country would support. At Vancouver Model United Nations, delegates should write a position paper for each of the com- mittee’s topics. Each position paper should not exceed one page, and should all be combined into a single document per delegate. For the United Nations Security Council, position papers are mandatory. Formatting Position papers should: —— Include the name of the delegate, his/her country, and the committee —— Be in a standard font (e.g. Times New Roman) with a 12-point font size and 1-inch docu- ment margins —— Not include illustrations, diagrams, decorations, national symbols, watermarks, or page borders —— Include citations and a bibliography, in any format, giving due credit to the sources used in research (not included in the 1-page limit) Due Dates and Submission Procedure All position papers must be submitted by midnight on Friday, January 18, 2013, two weeks prior to the conference. Once your position paper is complete, please save the file asyour last name, your first name and send it as an attachment in an email, to your committee’s email address, with the subject heading as your last name, your first name — Position Paper. Please do not add any other attachments to the email or write anything else in the body. Both your position papers should be combined into a single PDF or Word document file; position papers submitted in another format will not be accepted. Each position paper will be manually reviewed and considered for the Best Position Paper award. The email address for this committee is [email protected]. Topic A: The Situation in Kurdistan

Overview Located in the Middle East, modern Kurdistan is the homeland of the , a 30-38 million strong people and the largest ethnic nation in the world without a state1. Since 1984, the Kurdistan Work- er`s Party (PKK) has fought and led insurgencies against the Turkish state, claiming to fight for an independent Kurdistan. populations in , , , and have been singled out for persecution, but there is increasing global awareness of the Kurds as a people striving for independence. The tense relations between Iraq and its , and the ongoing insurgency, are both causes of instability in the Middle East. While focus on the Middle East has largely been centered around the Israeli-Palestinian relations, a solution to the situation in Kurdistan is necessary to bring about long-lasting stability to the region. Only with this problem resolved can the Kurdish people begin to emerge from destitution and eliminate violent ethnic rivalry which has persisted in the region for many years.

1http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-worlds-largest-nation-without-a-state-seeks-a-new-home- in-the-west-692440.html — 4 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council Timeline 1920 The Treaty of Sevres is signed, dividing up the and creating an independent “Kurdistan” out of Turkish territory. Turkish military pushback against occupying forces means the agreement is never ratified. 1923 The Treaty of Lausanne is signed and ratified, splitting up the Kurds between Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq. 1937–1938 The occurs in response to Turkish resettlement efforts, prompt- ing military repression and 20000 deaths. 1962 A special census serves to strip 20% of Syrian Kurds of their citizenship, leaving them and their descendants stateless. 1979 The occurs. While initially promising to support Kurdish aspirations for rights and autonomy, it fails to follow through with its word and the government kills 10,000 Kurds in a response to a Kurdish Rebellion. 1984 The PKK, a Kurdish terrorist group based in Turkey, launches its first attacks. The resulting war has caused up to 40000 deaths since 1984. 1988 The Iraqi government conducts the against its Kurds, killing 100000 and causing millions more to flee in what has since been recognized as genocide. 1991 The UN passes Resolution 688, which France, the UK, and the US use to justify no-fly zones over Iraq to protect Kurdish and Shia populations in the country until the Iraq War. 1994–1998 Iraqi Kurdish political parties fight a civil war that divided the country in two. The peace agreement ended the fighting but left the country divided under two administrations. 1995 35,000 Turkish troops enter Northern Iraq to attack PKK bases in the region. 1999 The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, is expelled from his base in Syria and eventually captured by the Turkish government. 2003 Iraqi Kurds fight with coalition forces against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. 2005 An informal referendum suggests 95% of Iraqi Kurds support independence. Historical Analysis The Formation of Modern Kurdistan The Kurds have existed as a distinct people for over a thousand years. Descended from Caucasus mountain tribes, they formed principalities and kingdoms in the medieval period. While no sig- nificant “Kurdish Empire” has ever existed, large parts of Kurdistan enjoyed unity and reasonable levels of autonomy under the Ottoman Empire, from the 1600s until its collapse during WW1. At the conclusion of WW1, the Allied powers of Britain, France, and Italy agreed to divide up the territory of the Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Sevres. The Treaty created an independent

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Kurdistan, consisting mostly of the Kurdish regions of modern-day Turkey.2 Before the agreement could be ratified, however, Mustafa Kemal led the Turkish National Movement and fought back against the Allied forces then occupying Turkey.3 The success of this mission gave Turkey a stronger position from which to bargain, and it forced the creating of the Treaty of Lausanne. This treaty was signed, creating the borders of today and giving Iraq and Syria as mandates to Britain and France respectively, thus ending the possibility of an independent Kurdistan.

The PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) The PKK, a well-known Kurdish paramilitary insurgent group, began as a student group in the 1970’s under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan in the Turkish city of Ankara. The PKK moved into the Kurdish areas in south-east Turkey and Ocalan began to gather support from the peasants and farmers in the area. The organization faced its first major challenge during the Turkish military coup of 1980, where political parties were banned and the military instigated a severe crackdown on separatist groups. The leadership of the PKK, including Ocalan, fled to Syria, where the government used support for the PKK as leverage against Turkey and in other political disputes.4 Taking advantage of the freedom granted them by the Syrian government, the PKK began to build support, train fighters, and gather arms. In 1984, the PKK began launching attacks on police of- ficers5, the army, and members of the Presidential Guard in the Kurdistan region. At first, the government ignored the attacks, seeing the PKK as a fringe group that posed no significant threat.

2http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/treaty_of_sevres.htm 3http://www.erkutaldeniz.com/the-war-of-independence/ 4http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/p/PKK.htm 5http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1060741.html — 6 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council

However, continued attacks –particularly those on tourist resorts, designed to hurt Turkey’s major tourism industry - drew the attention of Turkish security forces. The first action taken against the PKK was an amendment of the “Village Law,” instituted in 1985. The Village Law allowed for the creation and maintenance of village guards and Kurdish commun- ities were required to join the village guard system, and submit volunteers to be trained and given positions on the guard. This put Kurdish communities at risk – those who obeyed and joined the village guard found themselves targets of the PKK who saw the volunteers as traitors to the Kurdish cause. Those communities that did not submit volunteers faced being seen by the government as PKK sympathizers and were then vulnerable to the Turkish military. The situation was exacerbated by a government declaration of a state of emergency in 10 southeast provinces (pictured below). This gave the government wide ranging military powers over the region, leading to a heavy mil- itary presence, restrictions on civil and political rights, and state powers to evacuate villages either permanently or temporarily. In an attempt to avoid government attacks, the PKK increasingly based its operations out of Syria, where the government gave them a safe haven, or in the Kurdish regions of Northern Iraq.

PKK attacks reached a death toll of 5000 per year by 1993.6 The violence prompted substantial de- population of rural Kurdish areas of Turkey, as villagers fled to the towns where protection could be more easily found. The Turkish government did not help matters – it is estimated that over 3000 villages were razed and almost 400,000 people were displaced from their homes in resettlements.7 Turkish military actions were not confined to the borders: in the late 80’s and 90’s, incursions into Northern Iraq were common, causing significant damage to the mountain bases of the PKK8 and the Kurdish governments in Northern Iraq sometimes supported these operations. The war continued to take a substantial toll on fighters and civilians until 1999 when the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured by Turkish forces. Until 1998, Ocalan had been relatively

6http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,MARP,,TUR,,469f38e91e,0.html 7http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/turkey0305/3.htm#_Toc97005223 8http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/turkish-raids-kill-dozens-in-iraq/2008/02/24/1203788120188.html?page=2 — 7 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council

secure in his base in Syria, but was finally expelled from Syria by the Syrian government because they were facing political pressure from Turkey. Soon after leaving Syria, Ocalan was captured by Turkish forces.9 Following a trial criticized internationally for its corruption, Ocalan was sentenced to death, though the sentence later became a life sentence when Turkey abolished the death penalty in 2002. Speaking from prison, Ocalan ordered an im- mediate ceasefire and a withdrawal of the PKK from Turkish territory.10 The capture of Ocalan coincided with increasing international support for Turkey’s war against the PKK — it and its vari- ous affiliated groups were recognized as terrorist groups by the US and the EU in the early 2000s11. This included raids of PKK ‘training camps’ in Europe, like a Dutch attack in 2004 that arrested 29 people in the city of Liempde.12 The instability in Iraq after the invasion by coalition forces gave the PKK an opportunity to with- draw to their bases in Northern Iraq and rebuild their forces. In June 2004, the PKK ended its call to ceasefire with Turkey and restarted regular attacks.13 Since then, there have been frequent attacks by both sides, including suicide and car bombings by the PKK.14 Turkey’s forces, frequently strike targets in Northern Iraq to root out the PKK bases stationed there. Current estimates put the PKK as having approximately 10000 fighters with 20000 more volunteers and sympathizers assisting them.15 The Republic of Turkey, at its establishment in 1923, was intended to be a free, multiethnic state in which Kurds and Turks would be equal.16 Unfortunately, this did not come to pass, and conflict between the Turks and Kurds has been continuous since the country’s founding. The first major example of violence between the Turkish state and the Kurds was the Dersim Mas- sacre, in the late 1930s. In 1934, the Turkish National Assembly passed a Law on Resettlement, aiming to resettle ethnic minorities throughout the country in order to Turkify the population. The Kurds of Dersim staged an armed uprising in 1937-38, only to be put down by 50000 Turkish troops. The death toll was estimated at around 20000, and the Dersim Rebellion stands as one of

9http://articles.cnn.com/2007-10-10/world/pkk.profile_1_osman-ocalan-kurdish-rights-pkk?_s=PM:WORLD 10http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/217/chronology-of-the-important-events-in-the-world-pkk-chronol- ogy-1976-2006-.html 11Ibid. 12http://www.expatica.com/nl/news/local_news/dutch-police-raid-pkk-paramilitary-camp-13898.html 13http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1023189.stm 14http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/26/us-turkey-explosion-pkk-idUSBRE84P0FZ20120526 15http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2007/10/turkeykurdistan1420.htm 16http://www.institutkurde.org/en/institute/who_are_the_kurds.php — 8 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council the first major backlashes to Turkey’s assimilationist policies.17 The rights of Kurds in Turkey have been in constant flux over the years, but they generally lack many of the basic rights accorded to large ethnic minorities. Most striking are Turkish policies on the Kurdish language – until 1991, speaking Kurdish (including the use of Kurdish names) was banned and punishable by fines and prison time. A similar ban on broadcasting in the Kurdish lan- guage was not lifted until 200418, and a 24-hour Kurdish language TV channel was only launched in 2009.19 Even that action did not escape criticism as it remains under the control of the Turkish state-owned broadcasting station, prompting accusations that it serves as a government propa- ganda tool. Restrictions on Kurdish cultural and language rights have extended to the political sphere. In 1991, the first Kurdish woman elected to Parliament stated I swear by my honor and my dignity before the great Turkish people to protect the integrity and independence of the State, the indivisible unity of people and homeland…I take this oath for the brotherhood between the Turkish people and the Kurdish people. She uttered the last line in Kurdish. As a result, she was banned from Parliament and sentenced to 14 years of prison for ‘engaging in PKK propaganda’20. While similar events have become rarer in Turkey, Kurds can still face punishment for using their language. Ethnicity-based political parties are expressly banned in Turkey, a law that is often used to justify the imprisonment of pro-Kurdish politicians speaking on Kurdish rights. Hundreds of associates and activists with the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) have been arrested under charges of having terrorist links, and treason.21 Turkish laws that seem to discriminate against the Kurds must be looked at through the Turkish context. There can be no overestimating the effect the war with the PKK has had on the way Turkey views its Kurds. It has prompted mas- sive public backlash against the Kurds as many saw, and continue to see, ex- treme PKK violence as an extension of the Kurdish community. Furthermore, Turkey came close to having signifi- cantly more of its land stripped away in the Treaty of Sevres, and was only able to avoid that fate with strong national- ism and calls for unity. Turkey’s history

17http://www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbruinessen/publications/Dersim_rebellion.pdf 18http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/jun/10/turkey.broadcasting 19http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10683033.asp?scr=1 20http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1115&context=curej 21http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-turkey — 9 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council can be very much defined in that struggle for unity and the bonding of different groups, wrapped up as it is at the crossroads between the East and the West, between religion and secularism, and between Turks and Kurds. As such, Turkey is often very sensitive to threats to its territorial integrity and national unity, and takes extreme steps to protect its national unity and integrity. Turkey has come a long way from the days when politicians could be imprisoned for saying “I am a Kurd, and there are Kurds in Turkey.”22 The Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, recently apologized on behalf of the Turkish state for the Dersim Massacre. He also declared that Kurdish language classes would be allowed as an elective after grade four23 — prompting less praise than criticism for continuing the ban on Kurdish-language schools and education. While steps are being taken, the ongoing war with the PKK continues to take its toll on Kurdish-Turkish relations. The “Kurdish Question” remains one of Turkey’s most difficult and most destabilizing internal conflicts. Like the Kurds of Turkey, Iraqi Kurds have fought since the founding of the state to be recognized and granted rights and freedoms. Kurdish rebellions against British and Iraqi officials were fre- quent throughout the 30`s and 40`s, and has resulted in a decade long war between the Kurdistan region and Iraq .24 The fighting only ceased in 1970 when the two sides agreed to a peace agreement that recognized Kurdish as an official language and amended the constitution to include the Kurds as an Iraqi founding people.25 Unfortunately, another Kurdish rebellion was unleashed in 1974 when the Iraqi government failed to implement the peace agreement. Though initially buoyed by Iranian support, Kurdish forces collapsed a year later. During these two wars, over 100000 were killed and 600000 displaced from their homes. since Saddam Hussein In 1980, Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, invaded neighbouring Iran. The war took Baghdad`s attention away from the northern Kurdish region, and the Kurds saw it as an opportun- ity to assert their autonomy and independence. With aid from Iran, Kurdish forces began to wage a guerrilla war against the Iraqi army in the north. After years of Kurdish guerrilla attacks, Iraq turned its military forces against the Kurdistan region. In what was known as the al-Anfal Campaign (The Spoils), Iraqi forces embarked on a campaign against the Kurds, using chemical weapons and gas attacks to kill indiscriminately. In what has since been recognized as genocide, Iraq dropped bombs containing mustard gas on Kurdish cities, including the city of , where 7000 people, mostly civilians, died in a single attack.26 The total number of deaths attributed to the al-Anfal Campaign is approximately 100,000, though hundreds of thousands more were evicted from their homes and resettled in an Iraq in an attempt 22http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-scandal-of-the-kemalist-mind-2007-11-17 23http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-unveils-kurdish-courses-at-schools.aspx?page- ID=238&nID=23031&NewsCatID=338 24http://www.historyguy.com/wars_of_iraq.html 25http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/2893067.stm 26http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/17/opinion/17iht-edjoost_ed3_.html — 10 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council to Arabify the region.27 International condemnation of al-Anfal, however, was slow to come, large- ly because the Western world still favoured Iraq in its confrontation with Iran. It took seven weeks for the UNSC to condemn the Halabja attacks, slowed by American reluctance to take a hard line against Iraq.28 World opinion turned against Iraq, however, during its invasion of Kuwait. After Kuwait had been liberated, President George H.W. Bush called for a coup against Saddam Hussein29, saying “There is another way for the bloodshed to stop: And that is, for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside and then comply with the United Nations’ resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.” Both the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South took up his call, staging a rebellion against the Iraqi gov- ernment. Despite the initial success, American and coalition troops refused to support the rebels, and Iraqi troops were able to crush the rebellion. As Iraqi forces rolled through Kurdistan, over 1.5 million Kurds abandoned their homes in face of the onslaught. Few made it across the border — Turkey closed the borders and hundreds of thousands ended up taking refuge in the mountains. On April 5, 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 688. The resolution recognized the re- pression by Iraqi forces and demanded that Iraq immediately allow international humanitarian organizations into the conflicted regions to help those in need.30 Though it was not explicitly men- tioned in the resolution, the US, the UK, and France used it as justification to establish no-fly zones over the northern and southern parts of the country, protecting the Kurds from Iraqi air support while allowing humanitarian aid into the region. Iraqi forces soon withdrew from the area, leaving the Kurdish region to function as a de facto independent state. A civil war between Iraqi Kurdish factions lasted from 1994 until the US sponsored a peace agreement in 1998, and even after that agreement, Iraqi Kurdistan was split between two sep- arate administrations.31 The 2003 Iraq War sparked a complete change in Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdish Peshmerga military forces fought with coalition troops to take control of the North, earning the approval of the coalition governments. Elections were held in the three provinces under con- trol of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 2005, and led to the formation of a stable and relatively peaceful government. In an interesting twist of fate, the leaders of the two belligerents during the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War have developed a strong relationship since — one has become the President of the KRG and the other the President of Iraq, a mostly ceremonial but

27http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb1d0.html 28http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/17/opinion/17iht-edjoost_ed3_.html 29http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/kurds/battle.html 30http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm 31http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/2893067.stm — 11 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council nonetheless influential role.32 The KRG and Iraqi Kurdistan have come far in the past years: they now have their own official mil- itary force-the Peshmerga, control over education, language, industry, transportation, and a host of other sectors accorded to Iraqi provincial governments. They have even established their own Department of Foreign Relations33, and have begun establishing diplomatic relations with other countries and lobbying for recognition of Kurdish rights34 However, the KRG still faces a number of major issues. Iraqi Kurds outside the KRG While most Iraqi Kurds live within the three prov- inces governed by the KRG, many do not. Particu- larly, oil-rich Province and Nineveh Prov- ince (especially the area around the city of Mosul) are thought to have significant Kurdish populations. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution requires a cen- sus of Iraq, and a referendum on whether or not these provinces wish to join the KRG. The referen- dum has been delayed since 2007 because of inter- national pressure and political reasons.35 The issue is complicated by the Arabization attempts of previous Iraqi governments, wherein Kurds were resettled in southern Iraq far from their homes — a referendum will in large part depend upon how many of them have returned. Tensions with Baghdad While the KRG and Iraqi central government usually have a cordial working relationship, oil rev- enues and foreign relations often create conflict. Recently, Baghdad has blacklisted companies such as Chevron and Exxon Mobil, both with large developments in the south of the country, for signing deals with the KRG.36 For their part, the KRG claims the deals lie within its constitutional authority. Baghdad has begun to withhold payments from oil companies operating in the KRG37, and though under the Constitution the KRG is promised transfers of a certain portion of the national budget, Baghdad has threatened to cut those payments if the KRG does not do as told. The KRG President has stated that such an action would be taken as a declaration of war by the Kurdistan region38, though he has repeatedly stated that he wishes to find a constitutional solution to the problem.39

32http://www.democracynow.org/2005/4/7/iraqs_new_president_jalal_talabani_ally 33http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=04080000&rnr=267&anr=19906 34http://www.theotheriraq.com/ 35http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/08/thank_goodness_for_iraq_s_census_disaster?hidecomments=yes 36http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/139339/ankara-baghdad-relations-tainted-by-kurdish-oil.html 37http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=44888 38http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/07/2012728173833768598.html 39http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=44888 — 12 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council Corruption and Oppression The KRG faces its own accusations of corruption and oppression. The two parties in control of government, the PUK and the KDP, are frequently accused of nepotism and corruption. The Inter- national Crisis Group has warned that the widespread corruption threatens to undermine the sta- bility of the region.40 In protests against corruption and government control in 2011, two people were shot and killed by police forces.41 These concerns are thought to be the driving cause for the increasing popularity of the Change Party, which took 25% of the seats in the last election. Independence In an informal referendum in 2005, 98% of Kurds supported outright independence.42 But while a nation of their own may be a dream for many Kurds, senior officials remember that they have never before been so stable and so prosperous. Independence could have negative ramifications on the relations between the Kurds and Turkey, Iraq, and the Western World. Still, even the most senior Kurds want to see an independent Kurdistan43 — so long as it doesn’t end up working against them. An estimated 12 million Kurds live in Iran, forming most of the population in the north-west bor- der regions but also a large portion of the population in cities across Iran44. The situation of Iranian Kurds is similar to that of those in Turkey, but is exacerbated by a more authoritarian government and state religious forces that discriminate against non-Shiites (most Kurds are Sunni). Iranian Kurds, who face abuse and oppression under the regime of Iran’s , enthusiastically supported the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The revolution, however, turned against them, and failed to grant them the rights and autonomy many Kurds had expected. Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, declared that the concept of ethnic minorities was contrary to and or- dered that Kurdish opposition be crushed. Scores of Kurdish villages and towns were destroyed and over 10,000 killed. While the conflict has since died down, Kurds in Iran still live in the poorest regions of the country, and seem to be specifically targeted for evictions and ex- propriations of land by government officials. The re- building from the Iran-Iraq War is continually stalled in the Kurdish areas, prompting accusations that the government is deliberately slowing down the process. Political rights are weak — estimates that hundreds of Kurds affiliated with pol-

40http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/10/corruption-scandals-destabilise-iraqi-kurdistan 41http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16475626 42http://www.economist.com/node/9769132 43http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=267115 44http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/088/2008/en/d140767b-5e45-11dd-a592-c739f9b70de8/ mde130882008eng.pdf — 13 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council itical groups are in prison or on death row after being convicted in unfair trials. Similar to other countries, the Kurds in Iran lack education and language rights. Religious rights are also denied to the Kurds as Sunni Kurds face discrimination and government obstacles. Since 2004, PJAK, an Iranian affiliate of the PKK , has launched attacks against the Iranian gov- ernment (PJAK is recognized by the USA and EU as a terrorist organization).45 46 PJAK fights in a similar style to the PKK, waging guerrilla war and targeting Iranian security and police forces.47 However, the stated aims of PJAK are not outright independence but a federal Iran with an autono- mous Kurdistan, similar to Iraq. The Iranian government has shown no sign of conceding. Kurds make up approximately 10% of the Syrian population, about 2 million people, and are con- centrated in the country’s north-east corner. The situation of Syrian Kurds is not unlike Kurds in other states – Kurds routinely face discrimination, oppression, and human rights abuses. Restric- tions on Kurdish rights have included bans on the Kurdish language, refusal to register children with Kurdish names, prohibitions of materials written in Kurdish, laws against Kurdish private schools, and other limitations on basic human rights.48

The light-shaded areas indicate Kurdish populations 45https://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/kurdish-man-imminent-risk-execution-iran-20100122 46http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34759&tx_ttnews%5Bback- Pid%5D=26&cHash=8c916b712f 47http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-factors-behind-rebellion-in-iranian-kurdistan 48http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Syria.htm — 14 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council

Syrian Kurds face a unique challenge in that 300,000 of them are in fact stateless, lacking citizenship to any country.49 In 1962, a census stripped 20% of the Syrian Kurd population of their citizenship, on the basis that they were alien infiltrators. Kurds in Syria had to prove they had lived in Syria since at least 1945 or be stripped of their citizenship — requirements that were ignored in favour of an arbitrary census, with brothers of the same family or sons and fathers being classified differently. Because the statelessness is hereditary, the number of stateless Kurds has only grown. Syria offers these stateless people special red identity cards, and denies them the right to vote, own property, and to have legal marriages. It is thought that the irregular census was an attempt to strip Kurds of their land and give it to Arab settlers, and so to Arabify the region and decrease Kurdish influence. The ongoing revolution in Syria has important implications for Syrian Kurds. Syrian Kurd organiza- tions and political parties have largely avoided supporting either the opposition or the government, preferring to remain independent while still working with the opposition.50 Turkish support and hints of Islamism in the opposition makes many Syrian Kurds skeptical about their future under any new Syria.51 Despite that, Syrian Kurdish groups have taken an active part in the revolution, taking over northeastern villages and ensuring that they remain off-limits to both government and opposition forces. Opposition forces refuse to recognize the Kurdish reality within Syria, insisting on an identification of Syria as an Arab nation. Few Kurds openly claim to seek full independence, speaking instead of an autonomous region like the KRG. Turkey, however, disputes this goal, and has threatened to send troops into Kurdish Syria if it suspects the PYD (a Syrian offshoot of the PKK) is active. UN Involvement Except for Resolution 688, which led to the creation of no-fly zones in Iraqi in 1991, there have been no other direct resolutions concerning Kurdistan. However, UN agencies and organizations have been involved in the region for a long time, including UNHRC, UNESCO, UNICEF, the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization, and other UN bodies.52 These groups help to develop the Kurdistan regions in various countries and publicize human rights abuses committed against them. Possible Solutions and Controversies A number of obstacles halt resolution of the situation in Kurdistan; chief among these is the con- flict with the PKK and affiliated groups, and fear by nations containing Kurdish populations that they will lose territory, resources, and regional influence as a if they concede to Kurdish demands. Resolution of these issues is essential to creating lasting stability in the region. In the thirty year war with the PKK, there has been no sign that ongoing military operations are bringing benefits to either side. Since 1984, 40000 have been killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. The continuing war with the PKK is the reason non-Kurds are reluctant to grant con-

49http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/syria/4003.html 50http://world.time.com/2012/08/06/how-the-kurds-have-changed-turkeys-calculations-on-syria/ 51http://www.meforum.org/3291/syria-kurds 52http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/11/state5588.htm — 15 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council cessions and rights to Kurds. Ending the conflict between the PKK and governments (particularly Turkey) must be a part of eliminating violence in the region and improving the Kurdish situation. It is also essential that the Kurdish people are afforded basic human rights. Only in Iraq do Kurds have living standards and rights comparable to the rest of the general population. In Turkey, Iran, and Syria, Kurds face limitations on their cultural, political, and linguistic rights, despite inter- national pressure to loosen control. An International agreement that outlines the steps these coun- tries should be expected to take in support of their Kurdish populations, in accordance with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, would give legitimacy to the Kurdish rights movement. The goal of the UNSC is to preserve international stability. In order to achieve this, it may be helpful to set expectations for the evolution of Kurdish communities. The KRG has been quite successful as an autonomous region of Iraq, and that area may serve as a model for Kurdish populations in other countries. While actual political changes must be left up to the countries concerned, a UN recom- mendation on what would be most effective may be influential in what direction these countries decide to go. Bloc Positions United States The United States currently has two major goals in the Middle East: to preserve stability and en- sure access to oil. This desire to maintain stability is evidenced by the USA’s relative reluctance to support Arab Spring revolutions. Historically, the US has hinted at support for the Kurds numerous times (such as after the Gulf War in 1991) but rarely followed through. The US does not, at present, claim to support an independent Kurdistan,53 but that may change if it considers autonomous or independent regions for Kurds as a path to eventual greater stability and oil sufficiency. Human rights for Kurds and the USA’s historic support for self-determination of nations and ethnicities must also be considered. Other Western Nations Other Western nations share the USA’s concern for continued stability in the Middle East, seeking to avoid another outbreak of violence in the region. Some groups have been assertive in pressing Kurdish rights – the EU has made it a key issue for Turkey to resolve in accession negotiations.54 Nations with Significant Ethnic Minorities Because of the precedent an independent Kurdistan would set for other stateless ethnic nations, some countries (China, Russia, and Pakistan, among others) may be hesitant to support an in- dependent or autonomous Kurdistan. These countries, however, wish to avoid being seen as ob- structing human rights and may support action taken on Kurdistan so long as it does not directly affect them.

53http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey_vol_13_no_2_-2011_gunter.pdf 54http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/turkeys-tigers/report-card-turkey-and-eu-membership/the- kurds/838/ — 16 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council Discussion Questions 1. What role should the international community take in the Kurdish question, insofar as it concerns international stability? 2. What actions should countries with Kurdish populations take to ensure human and pol- itical rights are protected? How can the UN influence the countries to take these actions? 3. How can fighting between the PKK and countries in the region be stopped? What role can the international community have in ending the warfare? 4. In the event of future warfare or military campaigns such as Anfal, what steps should the UN take to protect civilians? 5. What political state (autonomy, independence, the status quo) would most improve the prosperity and stability of Kurdistan and the region in the long term? 6. Would the instability of Kurdish regions transitioning to autonomy or independence be greater than the instability the status quo has caused and continues to cause? 7. Should the UN take different approaches to Kurdish populations and aspirations in each country? If so, what should these approaches be? Additional Resources http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/k/kurds/index.html http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Turkey_terrorism.pdf http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc06/edoc11006.htm http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-factors-behind-rebellion-in-iranian-kurdistan http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/088/2008/en/d140767b-5e45-11dd-a592-c739f- 9b70de8/mde130882008eng.pdf http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/17/irans_kurdish_question http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/d947a015-9505-421c-ae1d-c1c058e7d4a7/Re- port%20on%20Kurdish%20Question.pdf

— 17 — Topic B: Conflicts in South Asia

Introduction South Asia is comprised of nine countries, carrying 1.7 billion people and a quarter of the world’s population between them. It is also fraught with ethnic, religious, and histor- ical rivalry, is the home of two nuclear pow- ers, and is a major producer of illicit drugs. As such, conflicts in South Asia can have a sig- nificant impact on global peace and stability. Two conflicts in particular cause recurring problems and have no resolution in sight: the dispute over and the Durand Line, and the troublesome border between Af- ghanistan and Pakistan. The former has been the cause of multiple wars and the subject of some twenty-three UNSC resolutions mostly calling for ceasefires in said wars; it is also a flashpoint between two nuclear powers. The latter is a cause of continuing instability be- tween and Pakistan, separates tribes, clans, and families, and contributes sig- nificantly to extremism, terrorism, crime, and the illicit drug trade. The resolution of these conflicts would therefore be a substantial improvement for the stability of the region and would improve the human rights situations of the peoples involved. Timeline 1893 The Durand Line Agreement is signed between British India and Afghanistan. 1947 British rule in India ends and the subcontinent is partitioned into two states, India and Pakistan. 1947 Afghanistan casts the only vote against Pakistan’s accession to the UN, largely because of disputes over the Durand Line. 1947 The Maharajah of Kashmir signs the Instrument of Accession, making the state of Jammu and Kashmir a part of India. War breaks out between Pakistan and India over the issue. 1948 India brings the issue of Kashmir to the United Nations. Subsequently, UNSC Resolution 47 (S/726) calls for the withdrawal of troops and a referendum in the region. However, the resolution is never implemented.

— 18 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council

1951 Elections held in Indian-controlled Kashmir back accession to India. While the Indian government claims that this makes a referendum unnecessary, the United Nations disagrees. 1962–63 China goes to war with India and takes control of the Aksai Chin region of Kash- mir. Pakistan cedes a small parcel of land to China as well. 1965 A war is fought between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. No substantial change in land occupation results from the conflicts. 1972 After another war between Pakistan and India, the two nations sign the Simla Agreement, which turns the Kashmir ceasefire line into the Line of Control and commits both sides to resolving their differences through negotiations. 1980 Along with other nations, Pakistan supports the mujahedeen fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The mujahedeen formed much of the basis for the later Taliban. 1987 Disputed elections in Indian-held Kashmir give rise to a pro-independence insur- gency movement. The insurgency intensifies through the 1990s, but loses much of its power and influence in the 2000s. 2003 Taliban sheltered in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) begin cross- ing the border into Afghanistan. 2004 80,000 Pakistani soldiers enter FATA to search for al-Qaeda operatives. 2010 Hundreds die in Kashmir protests against Indian forces during the summer. First Area of Focus: The Kashmir Conflict Historical Analysis The conflict over Kashmir has its roots in the 1947 of British India. The region was divided into two coun- tries, a Hindu India and a Muslim Pakistan, each containing the territor- ies where their own religion was dom- inant. At the time of partition, much of British India was in the form of so- called princely states, or states ruled by princes under the auspices of the Brit- ish Empire. Theoretically, these princes had power to decide which of the new states to join, or to remain independ- ent. In practice, most princes followed the wishes of their people, which were often expressed through violent pro-

— 19 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council tests if the prince hesitated in making his decision.1

Religious Groups in Indian-Administered Kashmir Region Buddhist Hindu Muslim Other Kashmir Valley — 4% 95% — Jammu — 66% 30% 4% Ladakh 50% — 46% 3%

Religious Groups in Pakistani-Administered Kashmir Region Buddhist Hindu Muslim Other Northern Areas — — 99% — Azad, Jammu, — — 99% — and Kashmir The largest of these states, Jammu and Kashmir, lay on the border between India and Pakistan. The state had a 75% Muslim population but was governed by a Hindu ruler who, unable to make up his mind, chose to try and remain neutral. However, aided by rebels from within Kashmir, Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen invaded the state, fearing that if left to his own devices, the prince would choose to accede to India.2 While India accuses Pakistan of sanctioning the invasion and sending in the troops on purpose, thus violating a non-aggression agreement, the degree to which the Pakistani government was involved is unknown.3 Feeling threatened, the prince of Jammu and Kashmir appealed to the Indian government for mil- itary support. In exchange for help to defeat the invaders, the prince signed the Instrument of Accession, formally acceding the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Pakistan declared the ac- cession illegal, and in late 1947, war broke out between the two nations over the issue, with direct confrontations between the militaries of both sides.4 In 1948 India referred the issue to the UN, which, in Resolution 47, ordered the withdrawal of Pak- istani forces from Jammu and Kashmir; ordered a reduction of Indian forces to the level required to maintain law and order, contingent on the withdrawal of Pakistani forces; and called for a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir to determine whether the people wished to accede to India or Pakistan.5 Pakistan, however, ignored the UN mandate and did not remove its troops, thus violating the terms of the agreement.6 In 1949, the two countries signed a ceasefire drawing a boundary between those regions controlled by Pakistan and those by India. In 1951, state elections in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir backed accession to India. While India claimed this made a plebiscite unnecessary, both Pakistan and the UN disagreed, saying the UN requirement for a referendum would only be fulfilled by taking into account the wishes of voters

1http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399992/A-brief-history-of-the-Kashmir-conflict.html 2http://www.kashmirlibrary.org/kashmir_timeline/kashmir_references.htm#fn17 3Ibid. 4http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/07/2011727134530154224.html 5https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kashun47.htm 6http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1766582.stm — 20 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council throughout the former princely state.7 In the 1960s, another player entered the Kashmir dispute: China. In 1962, China and India went to war over a number of boundary disputes, including a mountainous section of Kashmir. China quickly won the war, annexing the northeastern territory of Aksai Chin. A year later, Pakistan ceded to China the Trans-Karakorum Tract, a section of land made up almost entirely by inhospit- able mountain range, in exchange for Chinese withdrawal from other territories in Kashmir. War broke out yet again in 1965, after 30,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the boundary line in Kash- mir.8 The war ended in stalemate, after five UNSC resolutions calling for a ceasefire, and the two countries agreed to return to their pre-conflict positions and to solve their disputes peacefully in the future.9 The peace did not last long though, with a 1971 war between the two nations resulting in the surrender of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and in that region gaining its independence. While Kashmir was not at the centre of this war, fighting did occur in the region. The Simla Agreement, signed in 1972, put an end to the war and explicitly declared the ceasefire line as the Line of Control, a de facto border but not a legally recognized international boundary. The Simla Agreement also bounded the two to “settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations,”10 though the provision has not stopped the outbreak of conflicts since. Since then, conflicts and cross border shootings have been common; as an example, in 1999, the Kargil Conflict broke out after Pakistani troops occupied unmanned watchposts on the Indian side of the Line of Control.11 The last 20 years have been marked by a growth in insurgency and militancy in Indian-held Kash- mir. Disputed elections in 1987 led to the formation of pro-independence and pro-Pakistan guer- rilla groups, which terrorized the local population and caused an exodus of the local Hindu popula- tion.12 India accused Pakistan of sponsoring the insurgency with weapons and training, but Pakistan claimed to only be providing the militants with “moral and diplomatic” support.13 The insurgency reached its peak in the 1990s, with insurgents training in Pakistani Kashmir and India deploying hundreds of thousands of troops in the region.14 Since 1990, the conflict has caused 60,000 deaths,15 and accusations of human rights abuses by both militants and Indian forces run rampant. Current Situation Both countries claim Kashmir in its entirety, though Pakistan no longer includes those territories controlled by China in its definition of Kashmir.16 Positions in Kashmir have changed little between

7http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-16069078 8http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965.htm 9http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1965.stm 10http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/simla-agreement/ 11http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm 12http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399992/A-brief-history-of-the-Kashmir-conflict.html 13http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1989.stm 14http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-16069078 15http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/kashmir/index.html 16http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/05/indian_pakistani_and_chinese_border_disputes — 21 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council

India and Pakistan since the ceasefire of the 1947 war, with the border remaining mostly the same and UN resolutions for a plebiscite still going unheeded. Tension between the two countries, how- ever, has decreased since the beginning of the twenty-first century, though periodic acts of terror- ism serve as a considerable damper on diplomatic relations. The insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir has declined dramatically in recent years, largely as a re- sult of two factors: improving rapprochement between India and Pakistan and declining Pakistani support. 2003 saw a restoration of diplomatic ties between the two, and since then India and Pakistan have engaged in frequent diplomatic talks, attempting to resolve the Kashmir conflict as well as other matters of bilateral concern.17 While this progress can be derailed quickly — as in 2008, when India accused Pakistan of supporting the bombings in Mumbai by a Pakistani terrorist group18 — the two countries are generally getting along better than before. In July 2012, the Indian foreign minister praised Pakistan for its “new mindset” toward India, which he described as “frank and candid.”19 In addition, Pakistan, historically supportive of insurgent groups in Indian-held Kashmir, has taken significant steps to end their continued activity. In 2006, it declared that it had ended all funding for militant operations in Indian Kashmir, despite protests by highly influential groups. In 2012, Pakistan also slashed in half the administrative funds it grants these groups to pay for items such as transportation and office rent. These actions, combined with an Indian offer of amnesty for fighters who give up the militant lifestyle and return to their homes, have resulted in thousands of militants abandoning fighting and a corresponding decline in insurgent attacks.20 These improvements in situation, however, do not change the basic conflicts surrounding Kashmir. Opposition to Indian rule in Kashmir remains strong, as hundreds have been killed by Indian forces during protests over the past few years and citizens grow increasingly disgruntled with curfews and stringent regulation of the .21 While the situation in Kashmir has been improving, the conflict is far from resolution and continues to be a potential flashpoint for another war in South Asia. UN Involvement The UN has been involved in Kashmir since India first brought the matter to its attention during the First Kashmir War. Numerous resolutions on the topic were passed during that year, but the most important was Resolution 47, which called for a ceasefire, a withdrawal of troops from the region, and a UN-supervised plebiscite in the state to determine the fate of Jammu and Kashmir.22 Other resolutions around that time created the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), which was tasked with mediating between the two countries, observing the ceasefire, and developing an implementation plan for the plebiscite. The UNCIP suggested numerous proposals for the plebiscite, including giving a Plebiscite Admin-

17http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-18700904 18http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8528204.stm 19http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10537286 20http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18270058 21http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11553695 22http://www.countercurrents.org/ahmad270808.htm — 22 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council istrator quasi-sovereign powers over the state immediately prior to the vote in order to reduce bias, and holding the plebiscite on a regional basis (potentially partitioning Kashmir); all suggestions were rejected by either India or Pakistan, however. Eventually, the UNCIP was disbanded and re- placed by the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which was tasked with monitoring the ceasefire line. UNMOGIP maintains its presence in Kashmir today. The last meaningful resolution passed was Resolution 122 in 1957, immediately after the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir adopted a constitution ratifying its accession to India. The resolution reiterated earlier resolutions and its support of a plebiscite, noting “that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.”23 Effectively, it deemed any constitutional or legislative changes made con- cerning Kashmir irrelevant to the resolution of the conflict, and reiterated the UN requirement of a free and fair plebiscite in the region. No resolutions have been passed on Kashmir since 1971, largely because India has been resistant to international involvement and to the idea of a plebiscite. Second Area of Focus: The Durand Line Historical Analysis The Durand Line is a 2700-kilometre-long unrecog- nized boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was drawn in 1893, after the Amir of Afghanistan and representatives for Great Britain agreed upon a boundary fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence.24 The line removed from Afghan control a number of territories it had previously governed; most importantly, it arbitrarily divided the Pashtun population in the region between Afghanistan and British India, separating tribes and families that had been together for generations. The Line has been a major factor in Pakistani-Afghan acrimony since Pakistan gained its independence in 1947. While Afghanistan tacitly accepted the Line as a de facto border with British India at its independence in 1919, it renewed its objections when Pakistan was 25 created in 1947. Afghanistan’s objection to the line is The Pashtun and Baluch populations are in blue, based largely on three arguments: and the Durand Line is in red. —— Pashtun regions of British India should have had the option of joining Afghanistan at the 23https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kasun122.htm 24http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905 25http://www.bu.edu/aias/reports/durand_conference.pdf — 23 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council

time of independence, rather than only a choice between India and Pakistan, —— Agreements between Afghanistan and British India were not transferable to successor states like Pakistan once the British Empire left the region, and —— Because Afghanistan had been coerced into signing the agreement, the Durand Line was illegitimate regardless of whether or not it was passed on to Pakistan. Because of these beliefs, none of Afghanistan’s widely varying governments (monarchical, repub- lican, Communist, Islamist, democratic) has ever accepted the Durand Line. Tension between Af- ghanistan and Pakistan can largely be attributed to this conflict, as it forms the basis of relations between the two. Notwithstanding diplomatic disagreements, however, the Durand Line has had very little relevance on the ground. Running through rugged mountains and populated mostly by subsistence farmers who often have friends and family on the other side, the Line has scarcely ever been policed, and people cross the border at will. The result has been that even as the governments of the two coun- tries publicly spar over the border, it generally has had very little actual effect on the residents in the region. Current Situation The dispute over the Durand Line continues today. However, the conflict is not limited to sim- ple disagreement over the boundary – it is also closely linked to extremism and poor economic development in the region. Because the ongoing dispute precludes discussion of further issues that affect both Pakistan and Afghanistan, a resolution of the Durand Line conflict is essential to improving the economic situation and limiting extremist violence in the area. Central to the issue are the Pakistani Federally Ad- ministrated Tribal Areas (FATA). The FATA refer to a semi-autonomous region on the border with Af- ghanistan that is populated mostly by Pashtun tribes, where national Pakistani law does not apply and the central government only has indirect control over the citizens. The region is known for being a hotbed of international terrorism and jihad, as the tribes often provide protection from international and Pakistani authorities; notably, both the Taliban and al-Qaeda have major bases of operations in the FATA.26 27 This in turn contributes to significant extremism among the local population, making them ideal re- cruiting and training grounds for militant groups. The stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan is threatened by insurgent groups based in the tribal areas. The FATA are descended from British policies over the region, which sought to give the tribes au-

26http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf 27http://tribune.com.pk/story/200204/al-qaeda-safe-havens-in-fata-still-pose-threat-us/ — 24 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council tonomy and to provide a buffer between British India and Afghanistan.28 Pakistan continued these policies and takes very little responsibility for the area. This arrangement raises questions about the legitimacy of the Durand Line; as one observer notes, “Why should Afghanistan recognize a border for which Pakistan refuses to take responsibility?”29 The Line’s arbitrary division of Pashtun populations forms another problem. As mentioned pre- viously, the Line is often irrelevant on the ground, and locals frequently cross the border without obstacle, as they have for hundreds of years. This complicates any eventual enforcement of the line, as instituting tight border security would have damaging effects on the cross-border economy of the region. The insecurity of the border, however, means that smuggling and crime runs rampant in the re- gion. Afghanistan produces 90% of the world’s opium supply, a third of which is transited through Pakistan.30 The drug trade, in addition to being a major source of income for extremist groups and warlords on both sides of the border, is also a cause of regional instability. Arms trafficking across the Durand Line is yet another concern, as it gives insurgent groups like the Taliban and al-Qaeda access to weapons.31 Finally, the ongoing dispute over the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan is a factor in regional conflict and instability. Cross-border fighting is common, as attempts to target militant groups on the either side often result in the death of civilians.32 Furthermore, because there are sim- ilar conditions on both sides of the border, economic development and anti-insurgent campaigns require comprehensive, cohesive strategies by both governments to be effective — something that is nearly impossible while the very legitimacy of the line is still being debated. Possible Solutions and Controversies Improving border security and eliminating conflicts in South Asia requires a two-pronged ap- proach; both comprehensive solutions that will have positive effects throughout the region and specific solutions aimed at particular disputes are needed. A successful resolution of the problems will take into account the reasons UN intervention has had limited effect in the past, and will ad- dress the varied diplomatic, political, economic, and humanitarian facets of the issues. Pakistan, at the centre of both major issues examined, is obviously a source of concern. Its internal instability and domestic policies, especially those with regards to the FATA, have effects that ripple throughout the entire region. While the UN cannot directly alter these realities, it can provide a framework for Pakistan to do so, by way of offering incentives or disincentives, or both, for the actions the Pakistani government takes. There are a number of actions Pakistan could carry out. First and foremost are those affecting the FATA. Asserting governmental control over the region would be a step towards eliminating ex- tremism, instability, and crime in the region. With that, however, must come substantial economic

28http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905 29Ibid. 30 http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=410 31Ibid. 32http://www.undispatch.com/civilians-trapped-in-undeclared-afghanistan-pakistan-border-war — 25 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council development. The UNDP has been involved in the region since 2011,33 but little progress has been made. The need for economic development suggests the role other state actors could play; already, the United States has given over 18 billion dollars in aid to Pakistan from 2001 to 2010.34 Suggesting target programs and initiatives for international aid to Pakistan would serve to direct aid money to where it is most needed. Jihadist and extremist groups also play a significant role in South Asia’s conflicts, and finding ways to decrease their influence will be important in defusing the tension in the region. Pakistan’s sup- port of these groups is a hindrance to better relations with its neighbours, and greater international understanding of its dealings with these groups will be essential to limiting their strength. Indian control and oppression of Indian-held Kashmir has led to violent protests and insurgent attacks,35 and international involvement in the region may be able to play a role in lowering the risk of de- stabilizing events. Kashmir The Kashmir dispute has avoided resolution for over fifty years. All sides have shown little propen- sity for deviating from their original positions: Pakistan holds that there must be a plebiscite for the entire region, and India declares that Kashmir affirmed its accession to India in state elections. However, in the wake of improving relations between the two and a declining focus in the region in favour of other problems, alternative solutions may be more successful. One possibility that has been largely ignored thus far is that of independence. Support for independ- ence has been growing among Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control. One poll found that almost 90% of people in the Kashmir Valley supported independence; the same study found that almost half of Pakistanis supported Kashmiri independence.36 While many pro-independence groups exist in the state, there are concerns as to the viability of an independent Kashmir. The new state would be landlocked and reliant on India and Pakistan for access to the rest of the world. That said, the UN principle of self-determination may support this outcome, if the people so desire it. There are a number of other possible futures for Kashmir, as detailed in this BBC report. Many of them are variations on partition — that is, splitting up the region. Support for accession to India, Pakistan, or for independence vary throughout the former state of Jammu and Kashmir, and recog- nizing these regional differences may lead to a compromise all sides can accept. The most important consideration in determining Kashmir’s future is what would be acceptable to India and Pakistan. Both states wish to avoid a solution that could be construed as a surrender and will be averse to any situation that would reflect poorly upon them. Thus, any potential resolution will have to be fair and equal, or else compensated for in other ways. Durand Line While the actual recognition of the Durand Line as an international border is a bilateral issue

33http://undp.org.pk/images/projects_facts/cpru/FATA-CPR.pdf 34http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-02-23/pakistan/28138643_1_civilian-aid-counterinsurgency-cap- ability-fund-civilian-assistance 35http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/13/us-kashmir-poll-idUSDEL29179620070813 36Ibid. — 26 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the UN has a role to play in framing the conflict’s successful resolution. With NATO’s impending withdrawal from Afghanistan within a few years, maintaining Afghanistan’s stability and cohesion is of the utmost importance. The border is too long and ragged to be fully policed along its entire length, but areas where insurgents are particularly active may benefit from UN assistance, in whatever form that may come. The Line’s current status as a gateway for illicit drugs further indicates the need for greater clarity and security on the issue. The UN may also wish to consider the populations that the Line is dividing and provide a clearer definition of the Line. A hard border, desirable for some security and crime related reasons, would have severe negative implications on the cross-border economy and lifestyles of the region. On the other hand, a soft border would make transit across the Line for militants and smugglers simple. Methods of addressing both these problems must be found in order to provide a clear resolution of the issue. Bloc Positions Pakistan Pakistan clearly has strong positions on the issues facing South Asia. Pakistan strongly supports UN calls for a plebiscite in Kashmir and disputes Indian claims that Kashmir’s accession to India was ratified by state elections.37 On the Durand Line, Pakistan has always taken the position that the Durand Line is a formal international boundary and resists Afghan claims to the contrary.38 Pakistan’s relations with the West have been shaky for some time now,39 but offers of aid and as- sistance have proved persuasive in the past. Pakistan may be willing to make needed reforms and compromise on important issues if it can be done in manner that does not make it seem as if it is backing down — as much to keep its own people happy as to avoid international embarrassment. India India argues that, by voting in successive state and national elections, Kashmiris have confirmed their accession to India,40 and that those elections left a plebiscite unnecessary. For India, the dis- pute must be seen as part of its ongoing rivalry with Pakistan, and it too seeks to avoid losing face with both its own people and in the international community. Seeing stability in Afghanistan as key to both the prosperity of the region and its own regional influence though, India has expressed the belief that Afghanistan should accept the Durand Line and respect the borders.41 India’s economic growth, relative stability, and much larger population give it a stronger starting position than Pak- istan, affording it greater flexibility in the actions it can take. United States The USA has two main concerns in South Asia: influence, including its access to quick-growing markets, and the preservation of regional stability. Generally, it tries to take a balanced approach

37http://www.pakun.org/kashmir/history.php 38http://www.hollingscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/07-2007_Durand_Line.pdf 39http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13398281 40http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11693674 41http://www.aspenindia.org/pdf/durand.pdf — 27 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council to the Kashmir question, supporting the principle of Kashmiri self-determination but in practice maintaining the status quo and the sanctity of the Line of Control.42 The USA is also concerned about the future of Afghanistan after its troop withdrawal and will look for actions that will help preserve that country’s fledgling government. Illicit drug trafficking is another major concern of the US, and it has been putting significant funds towards fighting the practice.43 Combating the Durand Line drug trade is an important objective for the USA. China The two giants in Asia, China and India, have had a tumultuous relationship, fighting numerous wars and skirmishes and claiming territory under each other’s control. China, of course, maintains that the Kashmiri territory it controls belongs to China,44 but appeals for restraint from both sides, aware of the effects a potentially nuclear Indo-Pakistani war would have on its own stability and economy. Pakistani-Chinese relations, however, are among the best in the world. China will be intent on maintaining its influence in Pakistan without harming its growing economic relationship with India. Russia Russia has long been a friend to India, and supports its position that Kashmir is an integral part of India.45 One of Russia’s main concerns in the region is the growth of Islamic extremism, which poses a threat to Russia in areas where Muslims make up the majority of the region. Thus, Russia will look to actions that will provide stability in the region, though it is always wary of growing US and Western influences in South Asia. European Union & Other Countries The EU has long held the position that India and Pakistan should work towards reconciliation, and that the Kashmiri people should be involved in the conflict’s eventual resolution.46 Human rights violations and violence in the region are another major concern, and the EU urges both sides to take steps to find peaceful solutions to the dispute. This stance generally sums up the positions of most other countries, though all nations must keep in mind their own economic and political in- terests in the region. Discussion Questions 1. What actions with regards to the Durand Line would be both effective and acceptable to the Afghan government? 2. How can the economy of the trans-border Durand Line region be protected while simul- taneously improving security?

42http://www.gatewayhouse.in/publication/gateway-house/features/present-situation-kashmir-favours-india 43http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/27/us-announces-shift-in-afg_n_221826.html 44http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/05/24/aksai.chin/ 45http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sam59.pdf 46http://www.articlesbase.com/politics-articles/eu-calls-for-kashmiri-peoples-involvement-in-resolving-kashmir- issue-3898762.html — 28 — Vancouver Model United Nations 2013 United Nations Security Council

3. What actions can the international community take to combat crime and drug trafficking over the Durand Line? 4. What role can the international community play in combating extremism in South Asia? 5. What steps can Pakistan and India reasonably be expected to take on Kashmir? What should the United Nations do, if anything, if the two countries fail to implement the actions called for by a resolution? 6. Short of a formal agreement on Kashmir, what actions can be taken to improve the human rights situation in the area? 7. How can long-term stability in the region be improved? Additional Resources http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/05/indian_pakistani_and_chinese_border_dis- putes http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11693674 http://www.gatewayhouse.in/publication/gateway-house/features/present-situation-kashmir-fa- vours-india http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf http://www.bu.edu/aias/reports/durand_conference.pdf http://www.usip.org/publications/resolving-pakistan-afghanistan-stalemate http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905#p3 http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/kashmir/index.html

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