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Related-Key Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks⋆,⋆⋆

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Related-Key Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks⋆,⋆⋆ Related-Key Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks⋆,⋆⋆ Jongsung Kim1, Seokhie Hong2, Bart Preneel3, Eli Biham4, Orr Dunkelman3,5,7,⋆⋆⋆, and Nathan Keller6,7,† 1 Division of e-Business, Kyungnam University, 449, Wolyeong-dong, Masan, Kyungnam, 631-701, Korea, [email protected] 2 Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Anam Dong, Sungbuk Gu, Seoul, Korea, [email protected] 3 Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Department of Electrical Engineering ESAT/SCD-COSIC, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001 Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium, [email protected] 4 Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa 32000, Israel, [email protected] 5 Ecole´ Normale Sup´erieure D´epartement d’Informatique, 45 rue d’Ulm, 75230 Paris, France. 6 Einstein Institute of Mathematics, Hebrew University. Jerusalem 91904, Israel 7 Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science Weizmann Institute of Science P.O. Box 26, Rehovot 76100, Israel {orr.dunkelman,nathan.keller}@weizmann.ac.il Abstract. This paper introduces the related-key boomerang and the related-key rectangle attacks. These new attacks can expand the crypt- analytic toolbox, and can be applied to many block ciphers. The main advantage of these new attacks, is the ability to exploit the related-key model twice. Hence, even ciphers which were considered resistant to ei- ther boomerang or related-key differential attacks may be broken using the new techniques. ⋆ This paper is partially based on the papers [9, 10, 27] which appeared at EURO- CRYPT 2005, ASIACRYPT 2005 and FSE 2007, respectively. ⋆⋆ This paper was submitted to a Journal on October 2009. ⋆⋆⋆ The fifth author was partially supported by the Clore scholarship programme and in part by the Concerted Research Action (GOA) Ambiorics 2005/11 of the Flem- ish Government and by the IAP Programme P6/26 BCRYPT of the Belgian State (Belgian Science Policy). † The sixth author was partially supported by the Adams Fellowship Program of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. In this paper we present a rigorous treatment of the related-key boomerang and the related-key rectangle distinguishers. Following this treatment, we devise optimal distinguishing algorithms using the LLR (Logarithmic Likelihood Ratio) statistics. We then analyze the success probability un- der reasonable independence assumptions, and verify the computation experimentally by implementing an actual attack on a 6-round variant of KASUMI. The paper ends with a demonstration of the strength of our new proposed techniques with attacks on 10-round AES-192 and the full KASUMI. Keywords: Related-key Boomerang Attack, Related-Key Rectangle At- tack, AES, KASUMI. 1 Introduction Related-key differentials are an extension of differentials, where the adversary is allowed a control over the key difference along with control over the plain- text/ciphertext differences [23]. The additional control gives the adversary the possibility to cancel differences that enter the nonlinear parts of the cipher, and as a result, the probability of the differential is increased. While the use of related-key differentials in differential attacks has been stud- ied for more than a decade, the idea of using the related-key differentials in more complex attacks has not been as extensively studied. Although techniques like related-key impossible differential [22] and related-key differential-linear crypt- analysis [11] were used to attack specific ciphers, no systematic analysis was suggested. In this paper we examine the applicability of related-key differentials in the boomerang and the rectangle attacks. We show that it is possible to change the differentials into related-key differentials, and allow the adversary to enjoy the related-key advantage twice, using two related-key differentials at the expense of using four keys for the attack.8 1.1 The Related-Key Model The related-key model was introduced in [4, 28] and deals with attack scenarios where the adversary is given access to encryption under multiple unknown keys, such that the relation between them is known to (or even chosen by) the ad- versary. While this model might seem too strong, it has practical implications. Amongst the many issues, a block cipher which is not secure against related-key attacks might fail as a hash function (for example, a related-key attack on the block cipher TEA [40] used in Microsoft’s Xbox architecture as a hash function, was used to hack the system). Related-key attacks were intensively studied in the last decade, both from the theoretical [2] and the practical [11,12,19,22,43] points of view. Immunity to related-key attacks is considered one of the security goals in the design of modern block ciphers [16]. 8 We note that in some cases the number of keys remains two. 1.2 The Boomerang and the Rectangle Attacks The boomerang attack [38] is a differential-based attack that uses two short differentials (of few rounds each) rather than one long differential (of many rounds). In an adaptive chosen plaintext and ciphertext process, the adversary constructs boomerang quartets by exploiting the short differentials. The attack was later transformed into a chosen plaintext variant named the amplified boomerang attack [25] (and then renamed as the rectangle attack [7]). The transformation is done by a birthday-paradox argument, which leads to a higher data complexity, but still allows the use of two short differentials. All of these attacks treat the distinguished part of the cipher E as a decompo- sition into two sub-ciphers, E = E1 E0, where in each of these two sub-ciphers some (relatively) high probability differential◦ exists. If the probability of the differential of E0 is p and the probability of the differential of E1 is q, then the data complexity of the corresponding boomerang distinguisher is O((pq)−2) adaptively chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts and of the rectangle distinguisher is O(2n/2 (pq)−1) chosen plaintexts, where n is the block size. · In the more complex variants of these attacks the use of multiple differentials is supported as long as they share the input difference in the differentials for E0 (the first rounds) and share the output difference in the differentials for E1 (the last rounds). This improvement reduces the data complexity of both attacks significantly. 1.3 Our Contributions We consider the same conceptual division. Let the cipher E be a concatena- tion of two sub-ciphers, i.e., E = E E . Furthermore, assume that there exist 1 ◦ 0 high-probability related-key differentials in E0 and in E1 (not necessarily with the same key difference). We show that in this scenario it is possible to apply related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks. The basic related-key boomerang and rectangle distinguishers are summarized in the following theorem: n n Theorem 1. Let E = E1 E0 : 0, 1 0, 1 be a block cipher. Consider encryptions with E under a◦ secret{ key }K and→ { related-keys} whose differences with K are chosen by the adversary. Let 2 pˆ = max Pr [E0,K (P ) E0,K⊕∆K0 (P α)= β] , α6=0,∆K0 P ⊕ ⊕ s β X 2 −1 −1 qˆ = max Pr E1,K (C) E1,K⊕∆K1 (C δ)= γ δ6=0,∆K1 C ⊕ ⊕ s γ X h i 2 = max Pr [E1,K (X) E1,K⊕∆K1 (X γ)= δ] δ6=0,∆K1 X ⊕ ⊕ s γ X where E0,K (P ) denotes the partial encryption of P through E0 under the key −1 K and E1,K (C) denotes the partial decryption of C through E1 under the key K. Under independence assumptions between the differentials, for c > 0, given either – 4c/(ˆpqˆ)2 unique adaptively chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts, or – √c 2n/2+2/pˆqˆ unique chosen plaintexts, · encrypted under four related-keys of the form K,K ∆K0,K ∆K1,K ∆K0 9 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ∆K1, it is possible to distinguish E from a random permutation. The probability of success of the distinguisher is approximately 1 e−c/2 (when pˆqˆ is sufficiently high). − We present a rigorous treatment of the related-key boomerang and rectangle distinguishers. We devise the optimal distinguishing algorithms using the LLR metric, and compute their success rate. Using this analysis, we prove Theorem 1, along with an easy lemma allowing to calculate lower bounds forp ˆ andq ˆ in practical ciphers. As in other statistical attacks on block ciphers, the calculation of the success probability of our attack is based on some randomness assumptions. We state explicitly the assumptions we use and discuss their validity in various cases. To verify the validity of these assumptions we carried out computer experiments for the related-key boomerang attack on 6-round KASUMI [36]. We note that the analysis presented in our paper is also the first rigorous analysis of the boomerang/rectangle techniques themselves. Although these tech- niques were used many times in attacks, a rigorous analysis of them was not performed before. After the theoretical treatment, we consider several improvements of the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks: 1. The Use of Structures of Keys: We use structures of keys to overcome a wider range of key schedule algorithms. In ciphers with a nonlinear key schedule, a given key difference may cause many subkey differences, thus interfering with the construction of related-key differentials. Structures of keys can be used to reduce the effect of this event on the differentials. 2. The Use of Other Relations between the Keys: While XOR relations are common and inherent to the majority of differential-based related-key attacks, in some cases there are more suitable key relations (either due to the environment of the attack or in order to get higher probabilities of the differentials). We show that the proposed attacks are applicable when the XOR relations between the keys are replaced with different kinds of relations and discuss which relations induce feasible attacks.
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