Cs 255 (Introduction to Cryptography)
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Argon and Argon2
Argon and Argon2 Designers: Alex Biryukov, Daniel Dinu, and Dmitry Khovratovich University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/Password https://github.com/khovratovich/Argon https://github.com/khovratovich/Argon2 Version 1.1 of Argon Version 1.0 of Argon2 31th January, 2015 Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Argon 5 2.1 Specification . 5 2.1.1 Input . 5 2.1.2 SubGroups . 6 2.1.3 ShuffleSlices . 7 2.2 Recommended parameters . 8 2.3 Security claims . 8 2.4 Features . 9 2.4.1 Main features . 9 2.4.2 Server relief . 10 2.4.3 Client-independent update . 10 2.4.4 Possible future extensions . 10 2.5 Security analysis . 10 2.5.1 Avalanche properties . 10 2.5.2 Invariants . 11 2.5.3 Collision and preimage attacks . 11 2.5.4 Tradeoff attacks . 11 2.6 Design rationale . 14 2.6.1 SubGroups . 14 2.6.2 ShuffleSlices . 16 2.6.3 Permutation ...................................... 16 2.6.4 No weakness,F no patents . 16 2.7 Tweaks . 17 2.8 Efficiency analysis . 17 2.8.1 Modern x86/x64 architecture . 17 2.8.2 Older CPU . 17 2.8.3 Other architectures . 17 3 Argon2 19 3.1 Specification . 19 3.1.1 Inputs . 19 3.1.2 Operation . 20 3.1.3 Indexing . 20 3.1.4 Compression function G ................................. 21 3.2 Features . 22 3.2.1 Available features . 22 3.2.2 Server relief . 23 3.2.3 Client-independent update . -
Cache-Timing Attack Against Aes Crypto System - Countermeasures Review
Edith Cowan University Research Online Australian Information Security Management Conference Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events 2014 Cache-timing attack against aes crypto system - countermeasures review Yaseen H. Taha University of Khartoum Settana M. Abdulh University of Khartoum Naila A. Sadalla University of Khartoum Huwaida Elshoush University of Khartoum Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ism Part of the Information Security Commons DOI: 10.4225/75/57b65fd1343d3 12th Australian Information Security Management Conference. Held on the 1-3 December, 2014 at Edith Cowan University, Joondalup Campus, Perth, Western Australia. This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ism/166 CACHE-TIMING ATTACK AGAINST AES CRYPTO SYSTEM - COUNTERMEASURES REVIEW Yaseen.H.Taha, Settana.M.Abdulh, Naila.A.Sadalla, Huwaida Elshoush University of Khartoum, Sudan [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Abstract Side channel attacks are based on side channel information, which is information that is leaked from encryption systems. Implementing side channel attacks is possible if and only if an attacker has access to a cryptosystem (victim) or can interact with cryptosystem remotely to compute time statistics of information that collected from targeted system. Cache timing attack is a special type of side channel attack. Here, timing information caused by cache effect is collected and analyzed by an attacker to guess sensitive information such as encryption key or plaintext. Cache timing attack against AES was known theoretically until Bernstein carry out a real implementation of the attack. Fortunately, this attack can be a success only by exploiting bad implementation in software or hardware, not for algorithm structure weaknesses, and that means attack could be prevented if proper implementation has been used. -
CASH: a Cost Asymmetric Secure Hash Algorithm for Optimal Password Protection
CASH: A Cost Asymmetric Secure Hash Algorithm for Optimal Password Protection Jeremiah Blocki Anupam Datta Microsoft Research Carnegie Mellon University August 23, 2018 Abstract An adversary who has obtained the cryptographic hash of a user's password can mount an offline attack to crack the password by comparing this hash value with the cryptographic hashes of likely password guesses. This offline attacker is limited only by the resources he is willing to invest to crack the password. Key-stretching techniques like hash iteration and memory hard functions have been proposed to mitigate the threat of offline attacks by making each password guess more expensive for the adversary to verify. However, these techniques also increase costs for a legitimate authentication server. We introduce a novel Stackelberg game model which captures the essential elements of this interaction between a defender and an offline attacker. In the game the defender first commits to a key-stretching mechanism, and the offline attacker responds in a manner that optimizes his utility (expected reward minus expected guessing costs). We then introduce Cost Asymmetric Secure Hash (CASH), a randomized key-stretching mechanism that minimizes the fraction of passwords that would be cracked by a rational offline attacker without increasing amortized authentication costs for the legitimate authentication server. CASH is motivated by the observation that the legitimate authentication server will typically run the authentication procedure to verify a correct password, while an offline adversary will typically use incorrect password guesses. By using randomization we can ensure that the amortized cost of running CASH to verify a correct password guess is significantly smaller than the cost of rejecting an incorrect password. -
Practical Homomorphic Encryption and Cryptanalysis
Practical Homomorphic Encryption and Cryptanalysis Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Naturwissenschaften (Dr. rer. nat.) an der Fakult¨atf¨urMathematik der Ruhr-Universit¨atBochum vorgelegt von Dipl. Ing. Matthias Minihold unter der Betreuung von Prof. Dr. Alexander May Bochum April 2019 First reviewer: Prof. Dr. Alexander May Second reviewer: Prof. Dr. Gregor Leander Date of oral examination (Defense): 3rd May 2019 Author's declaration The work presented in this thesis is the result of original research carried out by the candidate, partly in collaboration with others, whilst enrolled in and carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Mathematics at Ruhr-University Bochum as a candidate for the degree of doctor rerum naturalium (Dr. rer. nat.). Except where indicated by reference in the text, the work is the candidates own work and has not been submitted for any other degree or award in any other university or educational establishment. Views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author. Place, Date Signature Chapter 1 Abstract My thesis on Practical Homomorphic Encryption and Cryptanalysis, is dedicated to efficient homomor- phic constructions, underlying primitives, and their practical security vetted by cryptanalytic methods. The wide-spread RSA cryptosystem serves as an early (partially) homomorphic example of a public- key encryption scheme, whose security reduction leads to problems believed to be have lower solution- complexity on average than nowadays fully homomorphic encryption schemes are based on. The reader goes on a journey towards designing a practical fully homomorphic encryption scheme, and one exemplary application of growing importance: privacy-preserving use of machine learning. -
The Twin Diffie-Hellman Problem and Applications
The Twin Diffie-Hellman Problem and Applications David Cash1 Eike Kiltz2 Victor Shoup3 February 10, 2009 Abstract We propose a new computational problem called the twin Diffie-Hellman problem. This problem is closely related to the usual (computational) Diffie-Hellman problem and can be used in many of the same cryptographic constructions that are based on the Diffie-Hellman problem. Moreover, the twin Diffie-Hellman problem is at least as hard as the ordinary Diffie-Hellman problem. However, we are able to show that the twin Diffie-Hellman problem remains hard, even in the presence of a decision oracle that recognizes solutions to the problem — this is a feature not enjoyed by the Diffie-Hellman problem in general. Specifically, we show how to build a certain “trapdoor test” that allows us to effectively answer decision oracle queries for the twin Diffie-Hellman problem without knowing any of the corresponding discrete logarithms. Our new techniques have many applications. As one such application, we present a new variant of ElGamal encryption with very short ciphertexts, and with a very simple and tight security proof, in the random oracle model, under the assumption that the ordinary Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. We present several other applications as well, including: a new variant of Diffie and Hellman’s non-interactive key exchange protocol; a new variant of Cramer-Shoup encryption, with a very simple proof in the standard model; a new variant of Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption, with very short ciphertexts; a more robust version of a password-authenticated key exchange protocol of Abdalla and Pointcheval. -
On the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standardization
On the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standardization Meltem S¨onmez Turan NIST Lightweight Cryptography Team ECC 2019: 23rd Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography December 2, 2019 Outline • NIST's Cryptography Standards • Overview - Lightweight Cryptography • NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standardization Process • Announcements 1 NIST's Cryptography Standards National Institute of Standards and Technology • Non-regulatory federal agency within U.S. Department of Commerce. • Founded in 1901, known as the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) prior to 1988. • Headquarters in Gaithersburg, Maryland, and laboratories in Boulder, Colorado. • Employs around 6,000 employees and associates. NIST's Mission to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life. 2 NIST Organization Chart Laboratory Programs Computer Security Division • Center for Nanoscale Science and • Cryptographic Technology Technology • Secure Systems and Applications • Communications Technology Lab. • Security Outreach and Integration • Engineering Lab. • Security Components and Mechanisms • Information Technology Lab. • Security Test, Validation and • Material Measurement Lab. Measurements • NIST Center for Neutron Research • Physical Measurement Lab. Information Technology Lab. • Advanced Network Technologies • Applied and Computational Mathematics • Applied Cybersecurity • Computer Security • Information Access • Software and Systems • Statistical -
Item Box Subject Author Title Exps Pages Size Inches Pub. Date Grand
Item Box Subject Author Title Exps Pages Size Inches Pub. Date Grand Total: 3, 139, 369, 104, 343, 159, [and the 210 Namibian 51, 612, 191, 21, 44, 1, 39, 95, 428, docs so far is 2809] (2599) Central Africa:3 1 Central Africa—General Economics UNECA Subregional Strategies 19 32 8x11.5 Hints to Businessmen Visiting The London Board of 2 Central Africa—General Economics Congo (Brazzaville), Chad, Gabon 19 32 4.75x7.125 Trade and Central African Republic Purpose and Perfection Pottery as 3 Central Africa—General Art The Smithsonian Institution 3 4 8x9.25 a Woman's Art in Central Africa Botswana:139 National Institute of Access to Manual Skills Training in 1 Botswana—Bibliographies Bibliography Development and Cultural Botswana: An Annotated 9 13 8x11.5 Research Bibliography Social Thandiwe Kgosidintsi and 2 Botswana—Bibliographies Sciences—Information Publishing in Botswana 2 2 8.5x11 Neil Parsons Science National Institute of 3 Botswana—Bibliographies Bibliography Development Rearch and Working Papers 5 8 5.75x8.25 Documentation University of Botswana and Department of Library Studies 1 Botswana—Social Sciences Social Sciences 28 25 8.25x11.75 Swaziland Prospectus Social Refugees In Botswana: a Policy of 2 Botswana—Social Sciences United Nations 3 7 4.125x10.5 Sciences—Refugees Resettlement Projet De College Exterieur Du 3 Botswana—Social Sciences Social Sciences unknown 3 3 8.25x11.75 Botswana Community Relations in Botswana, with special reference to Francistown. Statement 4 Botswana—Social Sciences Social Sciences Republic of Botswana Delivered to the National Assembly 4 5 5.5x8 1971 by His Honor the Vice President Dt. -
TS 102 176-1 V2.1.1 (2011-07) Technical Specification
ETSI TS 102 176-1 V2.1.1 (2011-07) Technical Specification Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures; Part 1: Hash functions and asymmetric algorithms 2 ETSI TS 102 176-1 V2.1.1 (2011-07) Reference RTS/ESI-000080-1 Keywords e-commerce, electronic signature, security ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° 7803/88 Important notice Individual copies of the present document can be downloaded from: http://www.etsi.org The present document may be made available in more than one electronic version or in print. In any case of existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions, the reference version is the Portable Document Format (PDF). In case of dispute, the reference shall be the printing on ETSI printers of the PDF version kept on a specific network drive within ETSI Secretariat. Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status. Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at http://portal.etsi.org/tb/status/status.asp If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services: http://portal.etsi.org/chaircor/ETSI_support.asp Copyright Notification No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. -
Rifflescrambler – a Memory-Hard Password Storing Function ⋆
RiffleScrambler – a memory-hard password storing function ? Karol Gotfryd1, Paweł Lorek2, and Filip Zagórski1;3 1 Wrocław University of Science and Technology Faculty of Fundamental Problems of Technology Department of Computer Science 2 Wrocław University Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science Mathematical Institute 3 Oktawave Abstract. We introduce RiffleScrambler: a new family of directed acyclic graphs and a corresponding data-independent memory hard function with password independent memory access. We prove its memory hard- ness in the random oracle model. RiffleScrambler is similar to Catena – updates of hashes are determined by a graph (bit-reversal or double-butterfly graph in Catena). The ad- vantage of the RiffleScrambler over Catena is that the underlying graphs are not predefined but are generated per salt, as in Balloon Hashing. Such an approach leads to higher immunity against practical parallel at- tacks. RiffleScrambler offers better efficiency than Balloon Hashing since the in-degree of the underlying graph is equal to 3 (and is much smaller than in Ballon Hashing). At the same time, because the underlying graph is an instance of a Superconcentrator, our construction achieves the same time-memory trade-offs. Keywords: Memory hardness, password storing, Markov chains, mixing time. 1 Introduction In early days of computers’ era passwords were stored in plaintext in the form of pairs (user; password). Back in 1960s it was observed, that it is not secure. It took around a decade to incorporate a more secure way of storing users’ passwords – via a DES-based function crypt, as (user; fk(password)) for a se- cret key k or as (user; f(password)) for a one-way function. -
Balanced Permutations Even–Mansour Ciphers
Article Balanced Permutations Even–Mansour Ciphers Shoni Gilboa 1, Shay Gueron 2,3 ∗ and Mridul Nandi 4 1 Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, The Open University of Israel, Raanana 4353701, Israel; [email protected] 2 Department of Mathematics, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel 3 Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa 31015, Israel 4 Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata 700108, India; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +04-824-0161 Academic Editor: Kwangjo Kim Received: 2 February 2016; Accepted: 30 March 2016; Published: 1 April 2016 Abstract: The r-rounds Even–Mansour block cipher is a generalization of the well known Even–Mansour block cipher to r iterations. Attacks on this construction were described by Nikoli´c et al. and Dinur et al. for r = 2, 3. These attacks are only marginally better than brute force but are based on an interesting observation (due to Nikoli´c et al.): for a “typical” permutation P, the distribution of P(x) ⊕ x is not uniform. This naturally raises the following question. Let us call permutations for which the distribution of P(x) ⊕ x is uniformly “balanced” — is there a sufficiently large family of balanced permutations, and what is the security of the resulting Even–Mansour block cipher? We show how to generate families of balanced permutations from the Luby–Rackoff construction and use them to define a 2n-bit block cipher from the 2-round Even–Mansour scheme. We prove that this cipher is indistinguishable from a random permutation of f0, 1g2n, for any adversary who has oracle access to the public permutations and to an encryption/decryption oracle, as long as the number of queries is o(2n/2). -
Implementation and Evaluation of Secure Industrial Ethernet Communication
Implementation and Evaluation of Secure Industrial Ethernet Communication Master of Science Thesis, Communication Engineering KAN YU Department of Signals and Systems CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY Göteborg, Sweden, August 2010 Page 2/88 Abstract Automation network security becomes increasingly important due to the introduction of Ethernet- based fieldbus protocols and cryptographic algorithms play a vital important role in these protocols. Choosing the most suitable cryptographic algorithms under consideration of security and performance according to different application cases is essential. In this thesis, we first present a comprehensive survey of most commonly used cryptographic algorithms which can be applied in automation networks and then identify our candidates based on existing literature and related works for further evaluation in ARM platform for industrial purpose. Finally, according to our evaluation results, we choose suitable algorithms for different applications: for symmetric algorithms, Twofish is recommended for best performance and eXtended Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XTEA) and Corrected Block Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XXTEA) are recommended for the least footprint; for Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms, UMAC is strongly recommended for excellent speed; for asymmetric algorithms, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has much better performance than RSA at the same security level in our platform. Page 3/88 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. -
Some Comments on the First Round AES Evaluation Of
Some Comments on the First Round AES Evaluation of RC6 1 2 1 Scott Contini , Ronald L. Rivest , M.J.B. Robshaw , 1 and Yiqun Lisa Yin 1 RSA Lab oratories, 2955 Campus Drive, San Mateo, CA 94403, USA fscontini,matt,yiqung@rsa. com 2 M.I.T. Lab oratory for Computer Science, 545 Technology Square, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA [email protected] 1 Intro duction The rst round of the AES pro cess is coming to an end. Since August of 1998, the cryptographic community has had the opp ortunity to consider each of the fteen prop osed AES candidates. In this note, we take the opp ortunity to answer some of the questions and to resp ond to some of the issues that have b een raised ab out the suitabilityofRC6 as an AES candidate. 2 Encryption/Decryption Performance of RC6 Since the publication of RC6 a variety of researchers and implementors have examined RC6 and considered its p erformance in a wide range of environments. 2.1 32-bit architectures RC6 is one of the fastest AES prop osals on 32-bit architectures, particularly so on the NIST reference platform of a 200 MHz Pentium Pro. It is argued by many that the most reasonable way to assess the p erformance of an algorithm is to consider its sp eed in an assembly language implementation. We agree that this is the case. However it is also interesting to consider how the p erformance of RC6 compares when using di erent compilers. It is imp ortant to note that to take advantage of compiler-sp eci c optimizations the source co de provided to the compiler might need to b e changed.