------19 Thus, embedded ideas may 2 Major-power Major-power competition is back—al But history exacts a price for hubris. The Normalized dysfunction infused Penta In many respects, America’s Cold War tri Cold In War many respects, America’s heritage.org/Military be hard to dislodge in the search for strate pathologies of victory remain. For America post–Cold War “unipolar moment” post–Cold as War anom over over the past 30 and years, the accompanying War Cold the after accrued military U.S. the of environment as it presented itself. As with gic reawakening. gon thinking, dialogue, and actions, resulting are deeply embedded and generational. It is all all is It generational. and embedded deeply are all things, strategic pragmatists who saw the alous were forced to swim against this bu aficted by a multitude of strategic viruses to rise to the challenge once again, we must though, of course, it never really left—but the tive advantages that caused America to prevail. prevail. to America caused that advantages tive they know. umphalism was not Winners exceptional. al reaucratic current, absorbing derision and marginalization. most most always fall prey to hubris; dramatic win victory. of pathology the is This do. always ners corrosions imperceptible almost incremental, competi basic the undermine to threaten now they enterprise, security national the in many in a general reluctance to accept the security U.S. nationalU.S. security bureaucracy has been Not Not all of these maladies are physical, and for ------The Heritage Foundation | Heritage Foundation The America won. The Soviet 1

or years after the ended,Cold itWar was hard to make the case in polite company

Given the fortuitous outcome, it was easy,

ble. Events had their own way of highlighting paranoid, to insist that the U.S. military should should military U.S. the that insist to paranoid, security experts to imagine the Soviet Union’s Union’s Soviet the imagine to experts security bloodless relatively the alone let demise, swift of representative governments had triumphed triumphed had governments representative of a over seemingly implacable foe, and weak au expedient, and popular to imagine that this ed Soviet ed military Soviet returned home and rapidly cus on major-power competition in its nation its in competition major-power on cus atrophied. The Soviet Union’s brutal atrophied. history The Union’s Soviet al security strategy. to prevail against the Red Army in Central that conclusion as America ejected Saddam the exceptional nature of this strategic turn thoritarian states suddenly seemed vulnera that the United States should continue to fo use these events as an opportunity to config the in powers major against prevail to itself ure using a blizzard of military technology built made it hard enough for American national ing point. Operation Desert Storm cemented marked the end of history. The global alliance The global the end of history. marked its client states went their own way. The vaunt The way. own their went states client its way it happened. way Union vanished, its republics flew apart, and Europe. It seemed entirely pessimistic, even Hussein’s Soviet-equipped army from Kuwait from army Soviet-equipped Kuwait Hussein’s 21st century. 21st

for Strategic Competition Strategic for F Thomas P. Ehrhard, PhD Ehrhard, P. Thomas

Victory: Hardening the Nation Nation the Hardening Victory: Treating the Pathologies of of Pathologies the Treating understand how the end of the Cold War led strategic dialogue that hamstring America’s the American defense bureaucracy to evolve competitive rebirth. ways of thinking that left America in a posi- The essay focuses on the Department of De- tion of competitive inferiority. In this essay, fense (DOD), for that is the center of gravity we will explore some of the most damaging of this publication and the epicenter for some pathologies and recommend prescriptions of the worst cases of pathological strategic to return the U.S. to a position of purpose- dysfunction. To be sure, the entire national ful competitiveness. security enterprise fell prey to these afflic- Although there are many, four pathologies tions, and they all deserve careful retrospec- of victory stand out: tive treatment, but we concentrate mostly on the Pentagon. l The triumphalism of the 1990s led to the The reader should be aware that this essay ultimately corrosive seduction of overseas contains challenges. It specifically calls into engagement and constant intervention; question deeply embedded ways of thinking that have been parroted by many national se- l After 9/11, strategic distraction delayed a curity commentators. Interestingly (and some- more comprehensive understanding and what ironically), many of these themes align reaction to China’s rise and Russia’s re- with propaganda coming from Russia and Chi- emergence as self-identified and seriously na, so the reader must retain a healthy skepti- dangerous enemies; cism, fight confirmation bias, and consider the consequences of how distortions in our collec- l The analytic focus of the Cold War atom- tive thinking afect strategic competitiveness, ized to the point where, as a nation, we all of which may lead the reader to conclude lost our ability to mobilize our brainpower that a fundamental correction is required. for major-power competition and, as a necessary precondition, to conduct deep, Pathology #1: Triumphalism strategically focused studies of our adver- The Cold War’s decisive end virtually guar- saries; and anteed triumphalism in America. Some com- mentators believe we overexploited our victory l As major-power competition reemerged, in foreign policy, for example, by expanding the a new and powerful brand of wishful North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) thinking surfaced that actively resisted into previous Warsaw Pact and even, in the strategic reform on the scale required by case of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, into the emerging security environment. formerly Soviet territories. From a broader perspective, however, history will treat Amer- This essay explores each of these Amer- ica as a remarkably forgiving victor. Perhaps ican post–Cold War pathologies, revealing more important, as a matter of rediscovering their deleterious, if unintended, effect on competitive discipline and focus, we must gain our ability to compete with Russia and Chi- greater awareness of and become more allergic na in the coming decades. The triumphalism to parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda. of the 1990s forms the foundational mindset. Externally, by any historical standard, Ameri- Its bookend, wishful thinking, infuses all of ca served as a magnanimous victor, but the in- the pathologies, so it can be thought of as the ternal efects of such a dramatic victory sowed key enabler. In the concluding section, six seeds of dysfunction that act as a competitive key strategic judgments about today’s secu- anchor restricting vital strategic reform. rity environment, resisted by a bureaucracy Bureaucratically, the remarkable end of bathed in this acquired mindset, demonstrate the Cold War led to the elimination of bed- the deleterious efects on our contemporary rock institutions by decisions that catalyzed

20 2020 Index of U.S. Military Strength a corrosion of our nuclear deterrence forces in Langley, Virginia. Conventional force lead- and set in motion a series of conventional force ers opined that the dramatic increases in con- distortions in force posture, war planning, and ventional military efectiveness created by the force modernization and recapitalization that, Second Ofset Strategy could supplant nucle- unless challenged and reformed, will hamper ar weapons.4 As a result, ofcers with nuclear our ability to compete efectively against two experience gradually found their careers cur- dedicated foes. More ominously, the 1990s tailed, and nuclear unit morale plummeted. served as a prime catalyst for the rise of China The dramatic anti-nuclear maneuvers of and Russia’s resurgence. the immediate post–Cold War period and The abandonment and subsequent neglect their aftermath now seem shortsighted in of our nuclear strength represents a clear ex- light of the atrophy and institutional neglect ample, and it happened quickly. In 1991, the within the Air Force’s nuclear enterprise. Af- George H. W. Bush Administration ordered ter a series of embarrassing incidents involv- dramatic, unilateral nuclear weapon reduc- ing the loss of control of a nuclear weapon tions (called Presidential Nuclear Initiatives or and related firing of the Air Force Secretary PNIs) in which Russian reciprocity was merely and Chief of Staf in 2009, the Air Force was “encouraged.” The entire PNI process occurred compelled to reincarnate a SAC-like insti- in a backroom manner with little consultation tution in the form of the Air Force Global or debate. Although the PNIs contained some Strike Command, led by a four-star general.5 strategic logic, such as attempting to induce Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, address- a reduction of Russian tactical nuclear weap- ing the obvious morale problem in the force, ons, the Russians never reciprocated. Thus, we declared that “we must restore the prestige were left with a massive Russian superiority in that attracted the brightest minds of the Cold tactical nuclear weapons that, together with War era.”6 Unfortunately, however, they had the rise of Vladimir Putin and the volatility of already, as airmen like to say, fallen behind his regime, presents a major threat to strate- the power curve on nuclear. No amount of re- gic stability. port-writing, fist-pounding, rhetorical assur- Additionally, the PNIs afected strategic nu- ances, or half-hearted stabs at institutional clear forces in a way that significantly exceeded reform could bring back the rather draconian, arms control agreements, including the uni- highly disciplined culture required to advo- lateral, accelerated retirement of the Minute- cate for, control, and operate nuclear systems man II ICBM and the cancellation of mobile that had been established over decades. Peacekeeper and small ICBM programs. PNIs Today, every important American nuclear also ended Peacekeeper production; capped system needs recapitalization, and the defense the B-2 stealth bomber program at a “plati- bureaucracy delayed each of those systems num bullet” level of 20 aircraft; terminated the until there is no more room to retreat.7 Due stealthy (nuclear) Advanced Cruise Missile; to bureaucratic triumphalism, the entire nu- and ended production of the advanced W-88 clear enterprise has been fighting a retrograde D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile action since the end of the Cold War with no (SLBM) warhead.3 Perhaps most important, relief in sight. the PNIs dissolved the Air Force’s venerable The assault on nuclear institutions created Strategic Air Command (SAC). a wasting strategic asset, but the bureaucratic Thus, on June 1, 1992, a mere five months efects of triumphalism also served to degrade after the December 26, 1991, dissolution of the America’s conventional force posture after the Soviet Union, SAC disbanded. Air Force nucle- end of the Cold War. The surprising overmatch ar capabilities lost their powerful advocate in in 1991 against the seemingly powerful Sovi- Omaha and were placed under Air Combat et-equipped Iraqi military in Operation Desert Command, a fighter-dominated organization Storm exacerbated conventional pathologies.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 21 Impact on Defense Modernization But that brief flowering of interest was soon and Recapitalization buried by the emerging “shaping” and “en- Two areas where triumphalism hurt our gagement” theory and its de-emphasizing conventional posture were defense modern- of warfighting. ization and recapitalization, which started on The Goldwater–Nichols Department of a decades-long hiatus in the 1990s from which Defense Reorganization Act of 19869 also cre- it never recovered. Less well-understood is the ated very powerful regional combatant com- complete reorientation of American war plan- manders who capitalized on peacetime engage- ning and force posture that left American forc- ment. U.S. European Command had always es geriatric, lacking in readiness, and stretched dominated the others for pragmatic reasons, far too thin. We are now asking those depleted but regionally focused shaping now provided forces to deter and potentially confront two increased status and purpose for others, espe- modernized, resurgent, acquisitive, self-con- cially U.S. Central Command. Threats posed by fident militaries, each of which has been la- Iraq and Iran during the 1990s, including the ser-focused on overcoming the U.S. military. post–Desert Storm Iraqi no-fly zone, allowed How did that happen? Central Command to grow in power and influ- The U.S. military had been oriented toward ence. General Anthony “Tony” Zinni in Cen- deterring and fighting the Soviet military in a tral Command and Admiral Dennis Blair in battle royal in the European Central Front and, Pacific Command capitalized on the regional to a lesser extent, in the Pacific. As the Soviet commands’ newly found diplomatic leverage, Union dissolved, each of the armed services filling a gap created by the Department of State, found itself groping for a new identity that which remained content to emphasize bilater- would support its people, forces, acquisition al, embassy-based diplomacy.10 In this new geo- programs, and budget. What ensued was a strategic environment, the State Department gradual separation from war thinking and found itself unable to match or control the war planning and a slide into “engagement” growth of the Defense Department’s regional and “shaping” the world. The Les Aspin-led shaping mission. 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) exemplified Numerous commentators have deplored this shift: this “militarization of foreign policy,” but with- in the DOD, this trend led paradoxically to the While deterring and defeating major “diplomatization” of the U.S. military senior regional aggression will be the most de- leadership and their stafs, who increasingly manding requirement of the new defense saw themselves as super-ambassadors rather strategy, our emphasis on engagement, than as war planners and fighters. The sine prevention, and partnerships means that, qua non of a regional combatant commander’s in this new era, U.S. military forces are power became the number of forces deployed more likely to be involved in operations in his theater, which supposedly provided short of declared or intense warfare.8 greater shaping leverage, but his schedule be- gan to look more like a diplomat’s. After the Not all was lost: Strategy always lurks in 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review,11 which dark corners of the Pentagon. During a brief enshrined shaping, regional stafs dedicated to period in the mid-1990s, spurred by the Ofce peacetime shaping ballooned at the expense of of Net Assessment’s concept of an ongoing operational war planners, and this trend con- Revolution in Military Afairs, the services tinued unabated in the ensuing decades. briefly revived their interest in thinking about As a result, the armed services found them- future warfare. A series of service-led annual selves having to supply more and more of their war games ensued that imagined what threats aging forces for regional shaping, and this drew might lurk in the future security environment. their attention away from global deployment

22 2020 Index of U.S. Military Strength and joint, combined-arms, operational war- Russian and Chinese military planners a con- fighting. Forces deployed and operated more venient, threatening, and easily analyzable and prepared for war less, causing a gradual de- target that intensified and focused their acqui- cline in warfighting readiness and an accelera- sition and reform eforts. Both militaries stud- tion of equipment and personnel wear and tear. ied each of the American campaigns carefully, Even the concept of fighting two simultaneous often sending advisers to observe. The reform “major theater wars,” albeit against weak oppo- and modernization incentive that these oper- nents, became a fiction as U.S. forces deployed ations provided our major-power competitors as “fight tonight” forces in various regions, or cannot be overstated. piecemeal to a series of non–war plan contin- gencies throughout the 1990s. These deploy- l For China, Operation Desert Storm, the ments sapped their ability to respond to the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, and execution of actual war plans. Operation Allied Force, the NATO op- The constant deployment strain also af- eration to stop the Serbian slaughter of fected military people and caused a troubling ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, provided a decline in retention, the bedrock of U.S. mili- powerful stimulus for modernization and tary expertise and professionalism. After a de- reform. Desert Storm showed the Chinese cade of strain, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense that they clearly lagged behind the U.S. Review noted the efect on the force pinched military in significant ways; the carriers by a lack of recapitalization and constant use: sent by the U.S. to tamp down the Taiwan “Excessive operational demands on the force Strait crisis hyperfocused their anti-car- have taken a toll on military personnel.”12 rier eforts, which resulted in the DF-21D Brookings scholar Michael O’Hanlon wrote medium-range ballistic missile system; that despite some positive changes, “[b]y far and Allied Force included the accidental the most troubling trend during the Clinton bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bel- era was the real and significant decline in grade—an event that made an impression. troop morale.”13 Those demands caused U.S. weapon sys- l For Russia, Desert Storm proved Admiral tems to atrophy as well. The George H. W. Bush Sergey Gorshkov’s14 prediction that the Administration believed it could curtail weap- U.S. had achieved a “military-technical on system procurement by “skipping a genera- revolution” that obsolesced the Russian tion” of systems, ostensibly to modernize more conventional forces that had seemed so quickly, but under the Bill Clinton Administra- ominous in the 1970s.15 Moreover, several tion, skipping a generation turned into the so- U.S. military operations in their Balkan called procurement holiday in which defense backyard (notably Operations Deliberate procurement was slashed to 50 percent of Rea- Force and Allied Force) cemented the U.S. gan-era levels. Those cuts made some sense as a deeply threatening aggressor that given the Cold War victory, but the procure- they could not deter and that essentially ment hiatus went on far too long. Essentially, did not respect their perceived zone of the so-called post–Cold War peace dividend influence. As Vladimir Putin retorted in came at the expense of military personnel and 2016 when asked whether Russian inter- procurement even as overdeployment of forces vention in Syria “aggravated” U.S.–Rus- caused the aging of key weapon systems. sian relations, “Think about Yugoslavia. This is when it started.”16 Exploitation by Russian and Chinese Military Planners Driven by those events, Russian and Chi- To make matters worse, constant U.S. pres- nese militaries set out to emulate and adapt ence and combat operations in the 1990s gave various aspects of U.S. operational concepts,

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 23 weapons, and organizational structures. It Pathology #2: Strategic Distraction: was not hard for the Russians, since we invit- 9/11 and Its Aftermath ed several waves of Russian military ofcers to This gradual atrophy of war planning and attend our joint warfighting and war planning focus, in addition to the high operational tem- schools during the 1990s. The Chinese down- po experienced during the 1990s, accelerated loaded what they needed through cyber-espi- after the attacks on 9/11. Operations in Afghan- onage and flooded academic institutions with istan and Iraq dragged on with no meaningful students and professors eager to capitalize on strategic gains to show for the enduring, costly our open system. efort. The theory of shaping should have been Yet within the Pentagon, those ripple ef- debunked by this time if evidence had anything fects barely caused concern. We were the to do with it, but instead of preventing war and champions, and the weak not only sufered leading to a more peaceful world, constant what they must,17 but were ignored. The 1990s deployment just led to a weary force engaged addiction to shaping and its later incarna- in constant operations. This accelerated the tion in the 2000s as “Phase Zero” continued worst aspects of 1990s force atrophy, prompt- unabated, caught in an inertial cul-de-sac. ed international observers to view the U.S. as Rather than providing a peace dividend for overly meddlesome, and stimulated unneces- the American people and its military, the sary frictions. The result: strategic distraction. post–Cold War period became an era of con- Throughout the celebratory 1990s, a small stant military operations, produced senior minority of strategists like Andrew Marshall leaders focused on diplomacy at the expense in the Ofce of Net Assessment (ONA) point- of warfighting, resulted in forces degraded by ed to the potential emergence of China as a corroding readiness and personnel strain, and strategic competitor. Working in and for that ofered precious little strategic benefit from ofce since 1996, I observed and supported a all the high-sounding, self-referential shap- significant analytical efort exploring that is- ing rhetoric. sue. Despite evidence from Chinese sources All of this happened for comprehensible that their economic resurgence and strategic reasons, but it was also based on the rather rise might accelerate, however, ONA remained non-strategic assumption that the unipolar a voice crying out in the Pentagon wilderness. moment would last indefinitely. Triumphal- Working in the ONA provided a catbird ism, a natural byproduct of a stunning victory seat from which to watch Pentagon bureau- in the Cold War and the evolutionary politi- crats, in uniforms and suits, actively resist cal dynamics in its aftermath, represented a the possibility that any nation, let alone Chi- seductive attraction that infuses the DOD to na, might emerge as a strategic competitor. this day. Pentagon insiders may point the fin- But even ONA was largely dismissive of the ger at others—and, indeed, the entire national storm brewing in Russia. In 1999, obscure security system contributed to the general de- Boris Yeltsin loyalist Vladimir Putin became cay—but if we are to rise out of the post–Cold the fifth Russian prime minister in less than War morass, the Pentagon bureaucracy must 18 months. Russia’s economy was in shambles, accept that it not only went along with, but also its demographic trends looked disastrous, and actively supported many of triumphalism’s its military was bogged down in a quagmire in most corrosive elements. Multiple genera- Chechnya. Meanwhile, the Pentagon was cap- tions of ofcers helped to create and support tivated by its operations in the Balkans, which the shaping narrative and exacerbated the drift served as an operational distraction. away from warfighting. Yet those years result- As a result, anyone arguing for China’s ed in the emergence of more pathologies than or Russia’s phoenix-like rise were easily dis- just triumphalism. patched by the Pentagon cognoscenti. The methods ranged from calling people Chicken

24 2020 Index of U.S. Military Strength Littles, accusing them of pining for the Cold funding rose slightly, increases came from spe- War, or more derisively charging them with at- cialized gear that has little or no utility in fight- tempting to create another major competitor ing a major power. Under Gates’ watch, even to revitalize a Cold War–like defense indus- talking about China as an adversary became trial base. It was common to hear the rather banned speech for Pentagon personnel in the strategically dubious retort (often from very years from 2009–2011, well after the Chinese senior ofcials), “Are you deliberately trying Second Artillery rocket forces had deployed DF- to turn China into our enemy?” The majority 21D medium-range anti-ship ballistic missiles felt secure in ignoring the mounting evidence designed to hold the aircraft carrier air wing of Chinese and Russian resurgence, in part well outside its useful combat radius.20 because they believed that American military The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review dominance and global engagement precluded identified China as a country poised at a “stra- or suppressed the rise of belligerent powers, tegic crossroads.” In retrospect, the 2006 QDR but also because their attention was occupied serves as a lodestar for bureaucratic distrac- by never-ceasing military interventions. tion: “U.S. policy seeks to encourage China to The 9/11 terrorist attacks made it dramat- choose a path of peaceful economic growth and ically easier for the bureaucracy to distract political liberalization, rather than military itself even though the years following that threat and intimidation.”21 The bureaucracy tragic event also included the acceleration of loved that language, but China was not at a both China and Russia as troubling strategic crossroads. It was marching down a very pur- competitors. Furthermore, the U.S. response poseful strategic path and would not be shaped. to 9/11 hastened military atrophy in real and Strategic distraction has a long half-life subjective terms, most tellingly for the pow- in the Pentagon. Even today, as the evidence er projection forces that would be critical pointing to the need to operate credibly against in deterring a rising China and revanchist burgeoning Chinese and Russian conventional Russia. Ground and special operations forc- military formations multiplies, the Pentagon es took center stage in Afghanistan and Iraq. retains a distracting obsession with the “gray The Rumsfeld 2001 Quadrennial Defense Re- zone,” a term created by Special Operations view, which was going to shine a bright light Command that describes sub-threshold irregu- on the rise of China, was hurriedly rewritten lar activities designed to destabilize a territory. at the 11th hour to emphasize counterterror- Rather than actively developing those lost or ism (CT).18 Counterterrorism ruled the day in atrophied aspects of major force employment, both ideological and budgetary terms, and the combined-arms operating concepts, heavy lo- focus on counterinsurgency (COIN) gradually gistics, and power projection against formida- cemented America’s extended presence in Iraq ble defenses, commentators and bureaucrats and Afghanistan. still reflexively talk about the gray zone. After When the refocus on CT and COIN did not almost two decades of dealing with occupation happen fast enough, Secretary of Defense Rob- and counterterrorism, the gray zone had be- ert Gates pushed it harder at the expense of come the comfort zone. power projection forces. As a seasoned veter- Again, former Secretary of Defense James an of D.C. political turf wars, Gates knew that Mattis teaches us: “The surest way to prevent advocating for new CT/COIN systems was not war is to be prepared to win one.”22 Chinese good enough: He had to denigrate others in the and Russian planners have carefully and zero-sum game of budgetary politics. Gates pre- painstakingly read our book and are becom- sided over what Center for Strategic and Inter- ing increasingly comfortable that they can national Studies defense budget analyst Todd prevail in major combat operations. If that Harrison accurately described as “the hollow continues, gray zone activity will be the least buildup” of the 2000s.19 Although procurement of our worries.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 25 All of these distractions combined with focus. China and Russia know one thing: Amer- 1990s triumphalism left the U.S. defense es- ica is their most compelling existential threat tablishment at a dramatic analytical disad- and must be overcome. Our victory in the Cold vantage as well, compared to our major power War and liquidation of authoritarian regimes competitors. Events conspired to hyperfocus thereafter put us squarely in their strategic their study of our military, whereas ours be- crosshairs. Our military employed an ever-ex- came ever more distracted. How did a deficit panding set of mind-bending innovations, in adversary analysis become yet another trou- seemingly without incentive, and was not shy bling pathology of victory? about showing it of—stealth aircraft, precision guided munitions, even more accurate cruise Pathology #3: Lack of Analytical missiles, and unmanned systems to name only Depth and Sophistication a few. China had been carefully studying us as Analytical depth and sophistication about the prime target of their ambitions far longer oneself and one’s adversary constitute the cor- than most Americans would like to admit, back nerstone of any strategic competition. In order to our normalization of relations in the 1970s to compete, you must know your adversary. To and Ronald Reagan’s acceleration of that rela- compete well, you must know your adversary tionship in the early 1980s.23 better than he knows you. The vast analytical By contrast, we atomized our analytical depth underpinning our understanding of the focus from one big thing, the Soviet Union, Soviet Union served as a critical foundation of to everything. Everything mattered, which our ability to conduct a purposeful strategic meant that as a practical matter, nothing competition. To be sure, analytical depth did mattered. The intelligence community, for not guarantee perfect understanding or trans- example, slashed its Russian analytical ca- late into a focused strategy. That is not how pability throughout the 1990s and then, after strategy works in America. But it is true that 9/11, gutted it, either retiring or repurposing the nation itself—its government, academic highly educated, top-level analysts to coun- institutions, journalists, and interested citi- terterrorism work. The result was that by zens—combined over decades to build a deep, 2015, when I was asked by Deputy Secretary elaborate, longitudinal body of knowledge of Defense Robert Work to catalyze the DOD’s about the Soviet Union. and the intelligence community’s Russian Above all, it is the relative depth, sophistica- analytical efort, I found what amounted to a tion, and competitive focus of that knowledge 15-year analytical black hole. When you lose base that provide competitive leverage. The longitudinal analytical depth, the rolling nar- objective is not to gain such analytical supe- rative about where they were and how they riority that you can anticipate an adversary’s got here, it is hard to bring it back. We sim- decisions and actions: We cannot achieve that ply had lost our focus on Russia and required even for our own government. The goal must crash rehabilitation. be to gain a more focused, more complex, more With respect to China, the defense commu- diverse understanding of the enemy than the nity sufers from a diferent analytical deficit. enemy has of us. In that important relative For the most part, the DOD ignored the rise sense, the American national security com- of China after the end of the Cold War. Start- munity sufers from an analytical deficit of ing with Admiral Dennis Blair, a succession such magnitude that only a serious, focused, of commanders of U.S. Pacific Command kept and well-resourced campaign can meet the the Navy interested, but the Chinese Sec- strategic need. ond Artillery’s development and testing of The first, most compelling analytical deficit the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile boost- for America in this triangular strategic com- ed the Navy’s interest in the middle 2000s, petition stems from a dramatic asymmetry of right in the middle of the Pentagon’s period

26 2020 Index of U.S. Military Strength of maximum distraction during operations in information about either nation tends to be Iraq and Afghanistan. highly compartmented and unavailable to or With the exception of eforts by the Navy, unknown by senior DOD leaders. which largely kept adversary intelligence com- The contrast between current eforts and partmented to naval issues and to itself, China the Cold War analytical efort within the aca- was not the subject of serious analytical efort demic community and among journalists and across the U.S. defense establishment until the specialist authors also bears mention. The evidence became overwhelming that its mili- Pentagon still exerts a powerful influence on tary rise constituted a looming threat. Unlike each group, so its own analytical loss of con- our approach to Russia, which benefitted from centration inevitably reverberated through intense analytical focus during the Cold War those communities as well. but then fell into obscurity, the China efort The Cold War academic and journalistic started very slowly and rose gradually over community constituted a diverse, curious, time, but always in lag compared to the pace strategically focused group who contributed to and magnitude of the People’s Liberation a sophisticated, deep analytical pool of knowl- Army’s military modernization over the past edge. Most important, those non-governmen- three decades. tal sources posed a challenge to government Today, intelligence and general analytical analysts, sharpening America’s analytical edge. interest with respect to either adversary sufer Investigative journalists dug for information. from an inadequate level of analytical supply Academics capitalized on strategic moments or demand across the defense community. The like the orbit of Sputnik in 1957, the Cuban intelligence community’s general disdain for Missile Crisis of 1962, or the defense reform open-source analysis continues unabated in debates of the 1980s to examine and critique an era when open-source information has ex- the defense issues of the day. Some of that work, ploded, leaving America with a perilous com- such as the work that led to a more nuanced petitive information deficit. understanding of the role of nuclear weapons, The Navy remains a demanding custom- happened entirely outside the government and er for China information, but the Air Force, proved to be groundbreaking. the other power projection service critical to Nothing approaching that diverse analyti- dealing with China’s rise, has largely neglect- cal ecosystem exists today to bolster our un- ed China analysis. Some individual exceptions derstanding of China and Russia as strategic exist, but for the most part, the Air Force still competitors. There is very little focus on how lacks the institutional interest or senior leader to prevail. During the years of distraction, demand for analytical services. The Navy, for the academic community shifted its focus to example, opened an open-source China Mar- counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, and itime Studies Institute at the Naval War Col- it has been slow to adapt to the re-emergence lege in the mid-2000s, whereas the Air Force’s of major-power competition. Online defense China Aerospace Studies Institute, modeled analysis generally lacks the weight and sophis- on the Navy’s, did not open until more than a tication of its Cold War antecedents, mostly decade later. Similarly, the Army has slowly in- because younger authors lack that compara- creased its demand for Russia-focused analytic tive lens. As a nation, we imagined away ma- support over the past several years, whereas jor-power competition. Now that it is back, we the Air Force, also critical to the European do not know what to make of it. theater, falls a distant second in its demand Blame is not the objective here. A natural for Russian intelligence. course of events, evolving bureaucratic incen- Finally, service-centered analytical demand tives, and social trends put us in this position. tends to be rather tactical. With the neglect of Well-meaning, patriotic Americans fell into open-source exploitation, broader strategic the post–Cold War vortex, leaving strategic

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 27 iconoclasts to keep the major-power compe- War wishful thinking in a striking if uninten- tition pilot light from extinguishing. But we tional manner by identifying the three phases are where we are, which brings us to our final of what he calls “the fantasy cycle.” First, he post–Cold War pathology: wishful thinking. observed that wishful thinkers experience the “dream stage” when “all things seem to go well Pathology #4: Wishful Thinking: for a time,” as in the triumphal 1990s. Then, The Insidious Pathology “because this make-believe can never be recon- Remediation of the three maladies de- ciled with reality,” a “frustration stage” sets in, scribed above constitutes a herculean task for “prompting a more determined efort to keep the American national security enterprise. Of the fantasy in being.”24 all the pathologies of victory, however, wish- After the 1990s, with the catalytic events ful thinking hurts American strategic compet- of 9/11 and the rise of China and resurgence itiveness the most and is the hardest to cure. of Russia, the Pentagon entered Booker’s Wishful thinking describes a broader, umbrella frustration stage, typified by Secretary Robert category that serves as a key enabler for all of Gates’ cutting power projection programs and the other pathologies. In the presence of dis- banning references to China as a competitor. tractions and analytical hollowness, it gains Then, as Vladimir Putin thrust Russia back on power. Ironically, wishful thinking also gains the stage and invaded Crimea, it took years for momentum as contrary evidence mounts. the Pentagon to come around to treating Chi- Perhaps most appallingly to hard-work- na and Russia as a problem requiring action. ing Americans, wishful thinking permeates The Pentagon’s frustration period accelerated, our national security bureaucracy, the very along with escalating eforts at denial, until fi- group entrusted with exploring and guarding nally catalyzing in 2018 with the promulgation against the worst scenarios. It drives bureau- of Secretary Mattis’s National Defense Strate- cratic behavior: The cheerful, positive bureau- gy, which declared that “we are emerging from crat makes the boss happy and gets promoted, a period of strategic atrophy.”25 while the brooding, pessimistic, reads-too- But are we emerging or still mired in stra- much-history, “Chicken Little” empiricist is tegic atrophy? The Mattis National Defense either confined to a dusty room or reorganized Strategy seems only to have toughened the out of a job. The Pentagon bureaucracy, like all Pentagon’s bureaucratic “sitzkrieg.” How long government bureaucracies, flourishes on in- will the dissonant “frustration stage” last? ertia and “go along to get along” attitudes that, More important, what is Booker’s third and from a strategic perspective, retard reform final stage in “the fantasy cycle?” He calls it when it is most needed. the “nightmare stage” when, as he puts it, “the Wishful thinking intensifies all of the other fantasy finally falls apart.”26 Our purpose must maladies like a competitive immuno-suppres- be to fight the resistance to strategic reform sive. Strategy is no place for happy talk, and caused by the pathologies of victory so that we when you are the world’s sole superpower, no can fend of the nightmare stage. matter how loudly we whistle by the strategy graveyard, the human condition dictates un- Six Embattled Strategic Judgments avoidably that everyone else in the world ei- Resistance comes in many forms, but it pops ther wants to take America down or would be up repeatedly in response to key competitive pleased if it happened. Someone must guard strategic judgments that are critical to enact- the strategic gates that Americans built over ing the organizational changes required to con- decades with blood and treasure, and they duct an efective competitive strategy against should not be smiling. Russia and China. To understand the stif in- British author Christopher Booker cap- stitutional resistance to these ideas, one must tured the dynamics of American post–Cold understand their institutional ramifications.

28 2020 Index of U.S. Military Strength Bureaucrats hate reform and understand that increase in analytic focus and resources, and to kill it, they must attack its arguments. Six a return to actual integration (i.e., jointness). strategic judgments represent the ideological Each of these choices rates high on the list of battlegrounds where this drama will play out. Pentagon institutional allergies. Strategic Judgment #1: Russia and Chi- Strategic Judgment #3: Russia and na present threats that are increasingly China represent highly volatile, crisis-un- global in nature. One often hears denigration stable nuclear threats. Conventional force of adversary military capability as being only types in the Pentagon, smug in their Second local or regional and thus not worthy of seri- Ofset afterglow and the walkovers of the 1990s, ous attention. Yet even though it has become thought they got rid of their former nuclear increasingly obvious that the Russian and Chi- overlords with the end of the Cold War. Re- nese militaries may have achieved local over- gardless of what those ofcials might desire, match, it is their increasingly global reach that our enemies believe that nuclear deterrence poses a fundamental organizational challenge represents the highest expression of national to the regional command stovepipes created by power. Moreover, the escalatory dynamics of the Goldwater–Nichols legislation and exacer- this age represent a clear, present, and truly bated by the end of the Cold War. existential danger to the American people. In recent decades, we have become a global The increasing incentive for preemptive power with only regional strategies. How does action in the space and cyber domains rep- the Pentagon coordinate and synthesize a re- resents a step-function increase in crisis in- sponse to global threats when each regional stability, and awareness of that threat exists commander and staf cares about only one re- only among a very small group of analysts who gion? In an age in which the space and cyber are able to translate the Cold War literature on domains, both inherently global and desta- this issue into 21st century geopolitical and bilizing, have become utterly indispensable military-technical terms. We must rediscover to American military operations, the reform a broader understanding of comprehensive question becomes how we rationalize a geo- stability in the 21st century and find ways to graphically divided, integration-resistant sys- compete that minimize the incentives for pre- tem of regional fiefdoms behind a global cam- emption and escalation on all three sides. paign against two major-power adversaries. Strategic Judgment #4: Russia and Chi- Strategic Judgment #2: Russia and na express clear, significant extraterrito- China represent enduring, multi-decadal rial ambitions. Modernists cling to the belief challenges. Naysayers talk about China’s or that territorial acquisitiveness is a vestige of Russia’s economy tanking as the end of those our barbaric past. They will often adopt ad- challenges, or that a change in leadership will versary propaganda to support their claims somehow lead either nation to go back into its that, for example, Crimea was a part of Russia non-threatening box. Those arguments are and contains numerous Russian citizens. Yet merely excuses to do nothing and ignore the we see strong evidence that China and Russia domestic politics of each country and the de- harbor territorial grievances and want to act sire of their people to rise up out of a nation- on them. al humiliation. Crimea is a “drop-the-mic” example, but If, however, you believe that China and/or new, militarized South China Sea islands, Tai- Russia are here to stay as adversaries, that ma- wan, and territorial coercion against India are jor-power competition is the historical norm just a few on a long list of Chinese claims. Most and our post–Cold War unipolar decade was egregiously, Russia’s numerous “frozen con- an anomaly, then you will advocate for signif- flicts” such as in Eastern Ukraine, Transnistria icant changes in force structure and posture, (Moldova), and Abkhazia and South Ossetia changes in operational concepts, a dramatic (both in Georgia) represent the aggressive

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 29 revanchist doctrine not just of Vladimir Pu- jobs. In the 1990s, the evidence concerning tin, but of the Russian people who applaud the chances of major-power competition was his actions.27 Under the umbrella of advanced there (albeit harder to assess) for those few anti-access, area denial systems taken from who would see it. Now that it is obvious, bu- America’s Second Ofset playbook, everyone on reaucratic naysayers and foot-draggers have China’s and Russia’s borders has reason to be responded by elevating their game. Resistance worried, and all represent escalatory dangers. to reform keeps escalating even as Putin and Xi Strategic Judgment #5: China and Rus- continue to solidify the case for it. sia represent a metasystemic strategic But the stakes for American national secu- challenge. That is, both have mobilized their rity must take precedence over the comfort re- nations to compete with America for primacy. quirements of “The Blob,” as the entrenched, Budgets must be modified, long-term invest- inertial bureaucracy has been called.29 In order ments made, institutions reimagined, and to support the 2018 National Defense Strategy institutional connective tissues built. Accept- and embark on a revitalized competitive tra- ing this in full requires a national commit- jectory, we must address the pathologies of vic- ment and a much higher degree of intra- and tory and act on Secretary Mattis’s admonition inter-governmental integration, which the to “pursue urgent change at significant scale.”30 unipolar-comfortable bureaucracy abhors. Integration is hard, but major-power compe- Conclusion tition demands it. Thankfully, we do not have The only antidote to the pathologies of vic- to be perfect; we need only to be better than tory is fear. In a bureaucracy as large as the China and Russia. Perhaps we should analyze Pentagon’s, collective fear must reach a point their integration activities to understand what at which it overcomes inertia. That this cer- we are up against. tainly has happened in China and Russia is evi- Strategic Judgment #6: The competi- denced by a series of real institutional reforms tion with Russia and China represents an in their national security establishments. ideological struggle. It becomes tiring to hear Moreover, we have done it before. We feared, wishful thinkers say that this is not an ideologi- in that serious, strategic, existential way, the cal struggle. Again, lack of analytical depth and British during the Revolutionary War and for sophistication seriously hampers this discus- decades afterward. We feared the Axis Powers sion. Very senior Russians and Chinese ofcials enough during World War II to mobilize the say repeatedly and with great passion that the nation. We feared the Soviet Union during the United States represents an existential ideo- Cold War, the first time since the Revolution logical enemy that is trying to penetrate and that we could have been utterly destroyed as a adulterate their cultures and liquidate their nation. In that extended conflict, both the First political systems. To them, this is ideological and Second Ofset Strategies came about as a on a deep level. result of accumulated, collective fear opening Is it also a reciprocal threat? Former Sec- the way to meaningful defense reform. retary Mattis thinks so: “Failure to meet our Yet even in the presence of self-declared, defense objectives will result in decreasing powerful nation-state enemies that pos- U.S. global influence, eroding cohesion among sess nuclear arsenals and aim to prevail over allies and partners, and reduced access to mar- us, our national security apparatus acts as kets that will contribute to a decline in our though we still lived in the bucolic unipolar prosperity and standard of living.”28 moment. They prefer business as usual today; These six strategic judgments represent about the future, who knows? Because of this just a few of the rhetorical debates that define bureaucratic sclerosis, the National Defense the struggle between those who desire stra- Strategy has not yet afected budgets or force tegic reform and those who like their current structure or war plans, nor has it catalyzed an

30 2020 Index of U.S. Military Strength across-the-board campaign to rebuild our ane- adapt them to the challenges of the 21st cen- mic analytic ecosystem. tury security environment. We must irradiate Thus, the wheel of strategy turns. If we as the pathologies of victory and, by doing so, help Americans do not want that wheel to roll over the defense community to rediscover its latent us, we can take positive steps to cast aside some but uniquely American competitive drive. of the more dysfunctional attitudes and orien- The 21st century presents advantages for tations that have accumulated over the past 30 authoritarian regimes and vulnerabilities for years. To prevail against self-declared enemies open, representative governments that we with focused national power and deeply held have already observed. We ignore them now historical grievances, America needs to redis- at our peril. cover some of the harder, sharper, more prag- matic aspects of our national character and

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 31 Endnotes 1. This essay uses the term “major-power competition” instead of the more common “great-power competition” for a simple reason: By any standard, China and Russia are not great powers. America ranks as the only great power today and for the foreseeable future. We should not ascribe great-power status to adversaries who do not measure up. 2. Among this aficted subgroup, the now-departed uber-strategist Andrew Marshall saw the potential emergence of China as a strategic adversary as far back as the 1980s and accelerated his analytical focus during the 1990s. Just one of his farsighted projects from the mid-1990s includes an investigation of a purported Chinese carrier-killing medium-range ballistic missile, for which he and his tiny staf were dismissed by a fleet of naval analysts as cranks. The author worked on this project for the Ofce of Net Assessment in the mid to late 1990s. 3. Susan J. Koch, “Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992,” National Defense University, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Case Study No. 5, September 2012, pp. 1 and 19, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/casestudies/ CSWMD_CaseStudy-5.pdf (accessed July 3, 2019). 4. The First Ofset Strategy countervailed the Soviet Red Army’s mass and proximity advantage by using nuclear coercion during the immediate post–World War II years. Then, as that competitive advantage waned in the 1960s and 1970s, American strategists conceived of the Second Ofset Strategy, which employed microprocessor-based systems to achieve conventional overmatch against superior Red Army numbers and proximity. In both cases, fear drove the defense bureaucracy against a phalanx of naysayers to overcome inertia and enact real reform. 5. The post–Cold War nuclear atrophy adversely afected the Navy’s nuclear deterrent forces as well. The efects of corrosive institutional drift in both nuclear services were captured with clarity in a special independent review for the Secretary of Defense authored by former Strategic Air Command Commander in Chief and retired General Larry Welch and retired Admiral John Harvey in late 2014. For that extraordinary document, see Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise, U.S. Department of Defense, June 2, 2014, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Independent-Nuclear-Enterprise- Review-Report-30-June-2014.pdf (accessed July 3, 2019). The author served as Executive Secretary for the high-level Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group charged by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel with addressing the many deficiencies found in that report. See U.S. Department of Defense, “Statement on the Nuclear Enterprise Review & Reforms as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Pentagon Press Briefing Room,” November 14, 2014, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech- View/Article/606634/statement-on-the-nuclear-enterprise-review-reforms/ (accessed July 3, 2019).

6. Eryn MacDonald, “Independent Review of DOD’s Nuclear Enterprise: Money, Maintenance, and Morale,” Union of Concerned Scientists, November 21, 2014, https://allthingsnuclear.org/emacdonald/independent-review-of-dods-nuclear-enterprise-money- maintenance-and-morale (accessed July 3, 2019). 7. For a good explanation of the price of delaying U.S. nuclear recapitalization, see Peter Huessy, “The 40 Year Nuclear Procurement Holiday,” Real Clear Defense, October 11, 2016, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/10/12/the_40_year_nuclear_ procurement_holiday_110195.html (accessed July 3, 2019). 8. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, U.S. Department of Defense, October 1993, p. 8, https://www. hsdl.org/?view&did=448259 (accessed July 3, 2019). 9. H.R. 3622, Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, October 1, 1986, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf (accessed July 4, 2019). 10. For a trenchant examination of the emergence of America’s new proconsuls in the 1990s, see Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York, W.W. Norton, 2003). 11. See, for example, “Section III, Defense Strategy: Shaping the International Environment,” in U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, pp. 9–10, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR1997. pdf?ver=2014-06-25-110930-527 (accessed July 6, 2019). 12. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, p. 8, https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/ qdr2001.pdf (accessed July 4, 2019). 13. Michael O’Hanlon, “Clinton’s Strong Defense Legacy,” Foreign Afairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November/December 2003), p. 133, https:// www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20031101.pdf (accessed July 4, 2019). 14. Sergey Gorshkov was Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, leading the U.S.S.R. navy and serving at the highest levels of the Soviet defense establishment for much of the Cold War. 15. Eliot A. Cohen, “Come the Revolution,” National Review, July 31, 1995. 16. Christian Snyder, “Analysis: How a 1999 NATO Operation Turned Russia Against the West,” The Pitt News, September 7, 2017, https://pittnews.com/article/121917/opinions/analysis-1999-nato-operation-turned-russia-west/ (accessed July 4, 2019).

32 2020 Index of U.S. Military Strength 17. In the Peloponnesian War, 431–404 BC, Athens embarked on a military expedition against the people of Melos, who stood neutral in the war. Facing subjugation or destruction, the Melians protested to the Athenians, who replied that “you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak sufer what they must.” See Chapter XVII, “Sixteenth Year of the War–The Melian Conference–Fate of Melos,” in Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm (accessed July 4, 2019). 18. See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, pp. 18–19. 19. Todd Harrison, “Defense Modernization Plans Through the 2020s: Addressing the Bow Wave,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, International Security Program Report, January 2016, p. 3, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/ legacy_files/files/publication/160126_Harrison_DefenseModernization_Web.pdf (accessed July 4, 2019). The labels can be both entertaining and revealing. In the 1990s, the triumphalist acquisition downturn was called the “procurement holiday.” 20. For a comprehensive analysis of this threat, its Soviet precursors during the Cold War, and what the Navy could build to ofset this anti-ship system efectively, see Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: The Case for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air Wing, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, 2008, https://csbaonline.org/ uploads/documents/The-Case-for-A-Carrier-Based-Unmanned-Combat-Air-System.pdf (accessed July 4, 2019). Despite building a representative prototype and flying it from a carrier in a series of historic flight tests, the Navy resisted procuring this system for the fleet in a classic case of failure to integrate a strategically leveraged, innovative system. To understand why, see Robert Martinage and Shawn Brimley, “The Navy’s New Museum Drone and Strategic Malpractice,” War on the Rocks, April 28, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/04/the-navys-new-museum-drone-and-strategic-malpractice/ (accessed July 4, 2019). 21. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 29, https://history.defense.gov/ Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2006.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-111017-150 (accessed July 4, 2019). 22. James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 5, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed July 4, 2019). 23. Jacqueline Deal, “The Fudan Fulcrum,” Ronald Reagan Institute, https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/354598/dr_ jacqueline_deal_fudan_university.pdf (accessed July 4, 2019).

24. Booker lists as one of the contemporary fantasies of our time “the belief that we can sort out the world’s trouble spots by reckless military interventions which fail to anticipate the bloody chaos they will unleash.” Christopher Booker, “What Happens When Great Fantasies, Like Wind Power or European Union, Collide with Reality?” The Telegraph, April 9, 2011, https://www. telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/christopherbooker/8440423/What-happens-when-the-great-fantasies-like-wind-power- or-European-Union-collide-with-reality.html (accessed July 4, 2019). 25. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, p. 1. 26. Booker, “What Happens When Great Fantasies, Like Wind Power or European Union, Collide with Reality?” 27. Russia maintains military bases in Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. See Robert Orttung and Christopher Walker, “Putin’s Frozen Conflicts,” Foreign Policy, February 13, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/putins-frozen-conflicts/ (accessed July 4, 2018). 28. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, p. 1. 29. Susan B. Glasser, “Trump Takes on The Blob,” Politico, March/April, 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/ trump-foreign-policy-elites-insiders-experts-international-relations-214846 (accessed July 4, 2019). 30. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, p. 11.

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