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India-Terrorism India - Terrorist, insurgent and extremist groups Jammu & Kashmir Inactive Proscribed Terrorist/Extremist Active Terrorist/Insurgent Terrorist/Insurgent / Groups /Separatist Groups Separatist Groups 1. Al Badr 1. All Parties Hurriyat 1. Al Barq 2. Al Umar Mujahideen (AuM) Conference (APHC) 2. Al Jehad 3. Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM) 2. Jammu & Kashmir 3. Al Jehad 4. Front Organisations of Terrorist Liberation Front (JKLF) Force (AJF, Groups Active in Jammu and 3. Lashkar-e-Jabbar (LeJ) combines Kashmir 4. Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO) Muslim Janbaz 5. Harkat-ul Mujahideen [(HuM), 5. Mutahida Jehad Council Force and previously known as Harkat-ul- [(MJC) , also known as Kashmir Jehad Ansar (HuA)] United Jehad Council Force) 6. Harkat-ul-Jehad-i-Islami(HuJI) (UJC)] 4. Al Mujahid 7. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) 6. Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen Force (AMF) (TuM) 8. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) 5. Al Mustafa 9. Jamait-ul-Mujahideen (JuM) Liberation 10. Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front Fighters (JKIF) (AMLF) 11. Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) 6. Ikhwan-ul- Mujahideen (IuM) 7. Islami Inquilabi Mahaz (IIM) 8. Islami Jamaat- e-Tulba (IJT) 9. Islamic Students League (ISL) 10. Jammu & Kashmir National Liberation Army (JNLA) 11. Jammu & Kashmir Students Liberation Front (JSLF) 12. Kashmir Jehad Force (KJF) 13. Mahaz-e- Azadi 14. Muslim Janbaz Force (MJF) 15. Muslim Mujahideen 16. People's League 17. Tehrik-e- Hurriat-e- Kashmir (TeHK) 18. Tehrik-e- Jehad (TeJ) 19. Tehrik-e- Jehad-e-Islami (TeJI) Total 11 6 19 Punjab In Peace Talks / Proscribed Active Inactive ceasefire Terrorist/Extremist Terrorist/Insurgent Terrorist/Insurgent (groups/ Groups Groups Groups congrolamates 1. Babbar 1. All-India Sikh Khalsa Students International Federation (BKI) (AISSF) 2. International 2. Bhindrawala Sikh Youth Federation Tigers Force (ISYF) of Khalistan 3. Khalistan (BTFK) Zindabad 3. Dashmesh Force (KZF) Regiment 4. Khalistan (DR) Commando 4. Khalistan Force (KCF) Liberation Front (KLF) 5. Khalistan Armed Force (KAF) 6. Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA) 7. Khalistan Liberation Organisation (KLO) 8. Khalistan National Army (KNA) Total 4 8 NORTH EAST Proscribed Active Inactive In Peace Talks / Terrorist/Extremist Terrorist/Insurgent Terrorist/Insurgent ceasefire (groups/ Groups Groups Groups congrolamates Arunachal Pradesh 1. Nationalist 1. Arunachal Socialist Dragon Force Council of (ADF) Nagaland-Isak- 2. United Muivah (NSCN- People's IM) Democratic 2. Nationalist Front (UPDF) Socialist 3. National Council of Nagaland- Liberation Khaplang Council of (NSCN-K) Tani Land (NLCT) 4. Tani Land National Liberation Tigers (TLNLT) Total 2 4 Assam Proscribed Active Inactive In Peace Talks / Terrorist/Extremist Terrorist/Insurgent Terrorist/Insurgent ceasefire (groups/ Groups Groups Groups congrolamates 1. Kamtapur 1. Communist 1. Adam Sena 1. Adivasi Cobra Liberation Party of India- (AS) Force (ACF) Organisation Maoist (CPI- 2. Adivasi also known as (KLO) Maoist) Security Adivasi Cobra Military of 2. IK Songbijit 2. Harkat-ul- Force (ASF) faction of Mujahideen Assam National (HuM) 3. All Assam (ACMA) Democratic 3. Jamaatul Adivasi 2. Adivasi Front of Mujahideen Suraksha People’s Bodoland Bangladesh Samiti Army (APA) (NDFB-IKS) (JMB) (AAASS) 3. All Adivasi 3. United 4. Muslim United 4. Barak Valley National Liberation Liberation Youth Liberation Front of Tigers of Liberation Army Asom- Assam Front (AANLA) Independent (MULTA) 4. Birsa (ULFA-I) (BVYLF) 5. Bodo Commando Liberation Force (BCF) Tigers (BLT) 5. Hmar 6. Black Widow People's (BW) Convention- 7. Bengali Tiger Democracy Force (BTF) (HPC-D) 8. Dimasa 6. Kuki National Liberation Democratic Army (KLA) Front (DNDF) 7. Karbi Longri North Cachar 9. Dima Halim Hills Daogah (DHD) Liberation 10. Dimasa Front (KLNLF) National 8. Kuki Revolutionary Revolutionary Army (KRA) Front (DNRF) 9. National 11. Gorkha Tiger Santhal Force (GTF) Liberation 12. Harkat-ul- Army (NSLA) Jehad 10. Pro-Talks 13. Hill Tigers faction of Force (HTF) United 14. Islamic Liberation Liberation Front of Army of Asom (ULFA- Assam PTF) (ILAA) 11. Ranjan 15. Islamic Daimary Sevak Sangh faction of (ISS) National 16. Islamic Democratic United Front of Reformation Bodoland Protest of (NDFB-RD) India (IURPI) 12. Santhal Tiger 17. Karbi National Volunteers Force (STF) (KNV) 13. United 18. Karbi Kukigram People's Defence Front (KPF) Army (UKDA) 19. Koch- 14. Pro-Talks Rajbongshi Faction of Liberation National Organisation Democratic (KRLO) Front of 20. Muslim Bodoland Liberation (NDFB-PTF) Army (MLA) 21. Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA) 22. Muslim Security Force (MSF) 23. Muslim Tiger Force (MTF) 24. Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) 25. Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF) 26. People’s United Liberation Front (PULF) 27. Rabha National Security Force (RNSF) 28. United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) 29. Rabha Viper Army (RVA) 30. Revolutionary Muslim Commandos (RMC) 31. Tiwa National Revolutionary Force (TNRF) 32. United Liberation Front of Barak Valley United Liberation Militia of Assam (ULMA) 33. United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA) 34. United Democratic Liberation Army (UDLA) 35. United Liberation Front of Barak Valley (ULFBV) 36. Karbi People's Liberation Tigers (KPLT) Total 3 4 36 14 Manipur Proscribed Active Inactive In Peace Talks / Terrorist/Extremist Terrorist/Insurgent Terrorist/Insurgent ceasefire (groups/ Groups Groups Groups congrolamates 1. Kangleipak 1. Coordination 1. Chin Kuki 1. Kuki National Communist Committee Revolutionary Organisation Party (KCP) (CorCom) [six Front (CKRF) (KNO) [11 2. Kanglei valley based 2. Hmar militant Yawol Kanna groups] People's groups] Lup (KYKL) 2. Manipur Naga Convention 2. Kangleipak 3. Manipur Revolutionary (HPC) Communist People’s Front (MNRF) 3. Hmar Party- Liberation 3. National Revolutionary Lamphel Front Socialist Front (HRF) (KCP- (MPLF) Council of 4. Indigenous Lamphel) 4. People’s Nagaland -- Revolutionary Isak-Muivah People's 3. Military Party of (NSCN-IM) Revolutionary Defence Kangleipak 4. Nationalist Alliance Force faction (PREPAK) Socialist (IRPA) of Kanglei 5. People’s Council of 5. Iripak Kanba Yowel Kanna Liberation Nagaland- Lup (IKL) Lup (KYKL- Army (PLA) Khaplang 6. Islamic MDF) 6. United (NSCN-K) Revolutionary 4. United National 5. People's Front (IRF) Revolutionary Liberation United 7. Islamic Front (URF) Front (UNLF) Liberation Front (PULF) National [five KCP 6. Zeliangrong Front (INF) militant United Front 8. Kangleipak factions] (ZUF) Kanba 5. United Kanglup People’s (KKK) Front (UPF) 9. Kangleipak [eight militant Liberation groups Organisation (KLO) 10. Kom Rem People's Convention (KRPC) 11. Kuki Defence Force (KDF) 12. Kuki Independent Army (KIA) 13. Kuki International Force (KIF) 14. Kuki Liberation Front (KLF) 15. Kuki National Volunteers (KNV) 16. Kuki Revolutionary Front (KRF) 17. Kuki Security Force (KSF) 18. Manipur Liberation Tiger Army (MLTA) 19. North East Minority Front (NEMF) 20. People's Republican Army (PRA) 21. Revolutionary Joint Committee (RJC) 22. United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA) 23. United Islamic Revolutionary Army (UIRA) 24. Zomi Revolutionary Volunteers (ZRV) 25. United People’s Party of Kangleipak (UPPK) Total 6 6 24 6 Mizoram Proscribed Active Inactive In Peace Talks / Terrorist/Extremist Terrorist/Insurgent Terrorist/Insurgent ceasefire (groups/ Groups Groups Groups congrolamates 1. Bru National 1. Hmar Liberation People's Front Convention- Democracy (HPC-D) Total 1 1 Meghalaya Proscribed Active Inactive In Peace Talks / Terrorist/Extremist Terrorist/Insurgent Terrorist/Insurgent ceasefire (groups/ Groups Groups Groups congrolamates 1. Garo 1. Achik National 1. Achik 6. National Liberation National Liberation Army (ANLA) Volunteer Army 2. Achick Songa Council (GNLA) An'pachakgipa (ANVC) Kotok (ASAK) 2. Achik 3. Achik National National Liberation Co- Volunteer's operative Council - Army Breakaway (ANLCA) (ANVC-B 4. Achik Tiger 3. Hajong Force (ATF) United 5. Achik National Liberation United Force Army (HULA) (ANUF) 4. People’s 6. Hynniewtrep Liberation National Front of Liberation Meghalaya Council (PLF-M) (HNLC) 5. United Achik 7. Liberation of Liberation Achik Elite Army (UALA) Force (LAEF) Total 1 7 5 Nagaland Proscribed Active Inactive In Peace Talks / Terrorist/Extremist Terrorist/Insurgent Terrorist/Insurgent ceasefire (groups/ Groups Groups Groups congrolamates 1. National 1. Federal 1. Naga 1. National Socialist Government National Socialist Council of of Nagaland- Council Council of Nagaland Non-Accordist (Adino) – Nagaland (Khaplang) – (Isak-Muivah) (FGN-NA) NNC (Adino) NSCN (K) – NSCN(IM) 2. National 2. Federal 2. Nationalist Government Socialist Council of Socialist of Nagaland - Council of Accordist Nagaland- Unification Nagaland- (FGN-A) (NSCN-U) Khole-Kitovi 3. Non-Accordist (NSCN-KK) faction of 3. Nationalist Naga National Socialist Council (NNC- Council of NA) Nagaland- 4. Naga National Reformation Council- (NSCN-R) Accordist (NNC- Accordist) Total 1 4 2 3 Tripura Proscribed Active Inactive In Peace Talks / Terrorist/Extremist Terrorist/Insurgent Terrorist/Insurgent ceasefire (groups/ Groups Groups Groups congrolamates 1. All Tripura 1. All Tripura 1. Biswamohan Tiger Force Bengali Debbarma (ATTF) faction of 2. National Regiment National Liberation (ATBR) Liberation Front of 2. All Tripura Front of Tripura Bharat Tripura (NLFT) Suraksha (NLFT-BM) Force (ATBSF) 3. All Tripura Liberation Organisation (ATLO) 4. All Tripura National Force (ATNF) 5. All Tripura Volunteer Force (ATVF) 6. Bangla Mukti Sena (BMS) 7. National Militia of Tripura (NMT)
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