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Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: A New Frontline in the Global Jihadist Movement? In September 2014, al-Qaeda Central (AQC) launched its latest regional affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). The new group ICCT Policy Brief was created to operate across South Asia, however, with its centre of May 2016 gravity and leadership based in Pakistan. This paper is a background brief, designed for policy makers, to shed light on and increase Author: understanding of AQC’s latest affiliate AQIS. At first glance the lack of Alastair Reed successful action has led many to argue that AQIS is of limited threat. However, despite early setbacks, the group has not been eliminated and continues to organise and plan for the future. DOI: 10.19165/2016.2.02 ISSN: 2468-0486 About the Author Alastair Reed Dr. Alastair Reed is Research Coordinator and a Research Fellow at ICCT, joining ICCT and Leiden University’s Institute of Security and Global Affairs in the autumn of 2014. Previously, he was an Assistant Professor at Utrecht University, where he completed his doctorate on research focused on understanding the processes of escalation and de-escalation in Ethnic Separatist conflicts in India and the Philippines. His main areas of interest are Terrorism and Insurgency, Conflict Analysis, Conflict Resolution, Military and Political Strategy, and International Relations, in particular with a regional focus on South Asia and South-East Asia. His current research projects address the foreign- fighter phenomenon, focusing on motivation and the use of strategic communications. About ICCT The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) is an independent think and do tank providing multidisciplinary policy advice and practical, solution-oriented implementation support on prevention and the rule of law, two vital pillars of effective counter-terrorism. ICCT’s work focuses on themes at the intersection of countering violent extremism and criminal justice sector responses, as well as human rights related aspects of counter-terrorism. The major project areas concern countering violent extremism, rule of law, foreign fighters, country and regional analysis, rehabilitation, civil society engagement and victims’ voices. Functioning as a nucleus within the international counter-terrorism network, ICCT connects experts, policymakers, civil society actors and practitioners from different fields by providing a platform for productive collaboration, practical analysis, and exchange of experiences and expertise, with the ultimate aim of identifying innovative and comprehensive approaches to preventing and countering terrorism. 1. Introduction In September 2014, al-Qaeda Central (AQC) launched its latest regional affiliate, al- Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), building on the already existing affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) in Syria. The new group was created to operate across South Asia, however, with its centre of gravity and leadership based in Pakistan. It was formed through the amalgamation of numerous pre-existing al-Qaeda associated regional and local groups. The creation of this new al-Qaeda affiliate followed soon after the formal split between AQC and ISIS, with the latter’s declaration of a caliphate in Syria and Iraq and seemingly threatening to replace AQC as the leader of the global jihad. Timing which led many to perceive the creation of AQIS as merely a reaction to these events and an attempt to regain the initiative by AQC. As a result of the split, both AQC and ISIS started to compete for influence and the loyalty of Jihadist groups across the globe, which would in due course also reach South Asia. This paper is a background brief, designed for policy makers, to shed light on and increase understanding of AQC’s latest affiliate AQIS. This paper starts with outlining what AQIS is, which groups it was created from and who its leaders are. Second, the reasons for the creation of AQIS are explored. Third, AQIS’s narrative is dissected and examined. Fourth, the group’s operational strategy, through the terrorist attacks carried out by AQIS since its formation, are investigated. Finally, the rivalry between ISIS and AQIS in South Asia is addressed, before concluding with an analyses of the future prospects of AQIS. 2. Who is AQIS? According to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s announcement of the formation of AQIS, it was the product of more than two years’ work in recruiting fighters and uniting different pre-existing Jihadi groups in the Indian Subcontinent.1 As explained in the first edition of al Qaeda’s magazine Resurgence 2, “[t]he establishment of this organization is a direct result of the merger of several groups that have been engaged in Jihad in this region for several years. In guidance of their Ameer, Shaykh Ayman al Zawahiri, the leaders of these Jihadi groups have joined forces to coalesce into a single organisation, Jama’ah Qa’eda al jihad in the Subcontinent.” 3 However, exactly which Jihadi groups have been merged to form AQIS, has never been confirmed by the group. The topic is subject to some debate among analysts and below is a list of groups compiled from ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… different sources, elements of which are thought likely to have been included in the formation of AQIS:4 o Afghan Taliban (Afghanistan) o Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Pakistan) o Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) (Bangladesh and Pakistan) o Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) (disputed Kashmir region) o Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al Almi (HuMA) (Pakistan) o Brigade 313 (Pakistan) o Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) (Pakistan) o Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) (Pakistan) o Jundullah (Pakistan) o Ansar ut-Tawhid wa al Jihad in Kashmir (disputed Kashmir region) o Ansar al Islam Bangladesh (Bangladesh) o Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) (Bangladesh) o Indian Mujahideen (IM) (India) o Lanshkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Pakistan) o Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Pakistan) o Turkistan Islamic Party (Paskistan) 3. AQIS Leadership With the formation of AQIS, al-Zawahiri named Asim Umar the Emir of al Qaeda’s latest affiliate. A trained theologian and Pakistani native, Asim is known as a skilled orator who previously taught at a madrassa in Karachi and has written four books promoting Jihad.5 He has been associated with a number of Jihadi groups including Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI)6 and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and was a former commander in the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).7 Before going onto become a trusted lieutenant of al- Qaeda, and rose to be the group’s “internet propagandist and also head of Al Qaeda’s Sharia committee for Pakistan” before being appointed Emir of AQIS.8 The choice of Asim marks a change from al-Qaeda predilection for choosing Arab leaders, and it shows a clear strategic vision to choose a leader that is both well-known al Qaeda Central (AQC) but also well-connected to Jihadi groups across South Asia. As Abdul Basit notes, “[t]he emergence of AQIS and the appointment of a Pakistani jihadist ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 leader with anti-India credentials indicates that Al Qaeda wants to cement its place in the region on a long-term basis”.9 In addition, Ahmad Farouq was appointed as deputy-emir. He was previously al Qaeda’s head of preaching and media in Pakistan. Although AQIS has claimed he is from Pakistan, the U.S. have also stated that he was an American citizen. However Farouq was subsequently killed by a U.S. drone strike on 15 January 2015 in North Waziristan, Pakistan.10 Since its formation the leadership of AQIS have been consistently targeted by the US – less than half a year after AQIS’ formation, five senior leaders had been killed by the US, either by drone strikes or by US forces in al-Qaeda’s Afghan/Pakistan border regions.11 4. The Rationale for the Creation of AQIS The dominant initial interpretation by the media and security analysts of the announcement of the formation of AQIS, was that this was an attempt to regain the initiative from ISIS, after the latter began to challenge al-Qaeda as the leaders of the worldwide jihadi movement, following their announcement of the formation of the caliphate two months earlier.12 However, there is a debate over reasons behind AQIS formation, was it simply a reaction to ISIS? In a special addition of the Resurgence magazine published in Summer 2015, almost a year after the announcement of the formation of AQIS, Adam Yahiye Gadahn 13 answered accusations that the announcement had been contrived as an attempt to take back the initiative from ISIS. Rejecting this, Gadahn claims that the project was: spread out over a period of years and months. And I know for a fact that the actual formation of the branch was finalized in mid-2013, i.e. well before the break with the Iraqi branch. So the founding of the new branch had ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… absolutely nothing to do with any perceived or presumed rivalry between al- Qaeda and Islamic State.14 Similarly, security analyst Shreya Das argues that the process was set in motion before the rise of ISIS, but also that this was not the first time al-Qaeda had attempted to open a South-Asian branch, with a previous effort failing after the killing of senior operative IIyas Kashmiri in a U.S. drone strike in 2011.15 However, as Das points out, by lending the new branch the al-Qaeda brand name, this immediately put the new group in the front line of the war on terror, arguing that “[t]he interests of the group may have been better served by adopting a more innocuous name, which would allow it to fly under the radar and consolidate its position, while avoiding excess scrutiny”, and suggesting that “public image and bolstering the al-Qaeda global brand” may have been important reasons for the formation of AQIS.16 An alternative narrative regarding the formation of AQIS, is that it is driven by a long- term strategic re-adjustment to the drawdown of American troops in Afghanistan.
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