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Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters Prior to a Cabinet

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Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters Prior to a Cabinet 1182 June 26 / Administration of William J. Clinton, 1993 when action is required. That is precisely dam? And what message do you think this what we have done today. sends also to other countries and to the mili- Thank you, and God bless America. tary here about your resolve in your capacity as Commander in Chief? NOTE: The President spoke at 7:40 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House. The President. Well, the action I took I thought was clearly warranted by the facts. And I think other terrorists around the world need to know that the United States will do Remarks and an Exchange With what we can to combat terrorism, as I said Reporters Prior to a Cabinet in my statement on Saturday evening. It is Meeting plainly what we ought to be doing. June 28, 1993 Q. ÐÐthe events last week in New York and the attack over the weekend in Baghdad, The President. First, I want to say that should the American people be concerned this morning I received a report from the about terrorism on American shores in the National Security Adviser about the action next few weeks? in Iraq over the weekend, confirming that The President. I think the American peo- we did in fact cripple the Iraqi intelligence ple should be reassured that theÐin the New capacity, which was the intent of the action. York instance, that the Federal authorities Our allies have been quite positive in their and the New York Police Department did response. And I want to say a special word a good job. I think the American people of compliment to Ambassador Albright for know enough about terrorism to know that the work she did at the United Nations yes- it is always a potential problem, but we are terday. I thought it was an excellent job. going to be very aggressive in dealing with I think it's very important today at this it, and we're going to do everything we pos- Cabinet meeting that we move on to other sibly can to deal with it. matters, that we go back to the domestic agenda. We have to prepare for the con- Q. Mr. President, how does the decision ference on the budget and the economic to have gone ahead and bombed Baghdad plan. We need to think about and talk a little on Saturday, how will this impact your Presi- about the upcoming G±7 summit in Tokyo dency both in terms of how you're seen do- and what that means for our economic pros- mestically and by foreign leaders? pects here at home. And there are a number The President. I have no idea. I did my of other issues that I want to discuss today, job. It was my job, and I did it the best I including our efforts to seek rapid passage could. of the national service act. Q. Don't you think it will have some politi- So I'm anxious to go forward. I do want cal effectsÐÐ to acknowledge, the first time as a confirmed Q. Any political considerations, Mr. Presi- member of this Cabinet, Lee Brown. He was dent, at all? here last time, but he's been confirmed since he was here before. Tom Glynn, the Deputy The President. I have no idea. It's my job. Secretary of Labor, is here, for those of you I did exactly what I said I'd do in the cam- who don't know him, because Mr. Reich is paign when confronted by circumstances like moving his family to Washington today. I this. The evidence was clear. And we took suppose that means he's going to stay on for the appropriate action. And it was the right a while. [Laughter] thing to do for the United States, and I feel quite comfortable with it. Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters Q. Mr. President, what kind of message were you sending, first of all, to other terror- NOTE: The President spoke at 10:16 a.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White House. ist nations, given what we now know about the possibility of Iran and potentially Sad- VerDate 14-MAY-98 13:59 May 26, 1998 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 1244 Sfmt 1244 W:\DISC\P26JN4.028 INET01 Administration of William J. Clinton, 1993 / June 28 1183 Letter to Congressional Leaders on poses a continuing threat to United States the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence nationals and shows utter disregard for the Headquarters will of the international community as ex- pressed in Security Council Resolutions and June 28, 1993 the United Nations Charter. Based on the Government of Iraq's pattern of disregard for Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) international law, I concluded that there was Commencing at approximately 4:22 p.m. no reasonable prospect that new diplomatic (EST) on June 26, 1993, at my direction, U.S. initiatives or economic measures could influ- naval forces launched a Tomahawk cruise ence the current Government of Iraq to missile strike on the Iraqi Intelligence Serv- cease planning future attacks against the ice's (IIS) principal command and control United States. complex in Baghdad. This facility is the head- Consequently, in the exercise of our inher- quarters for the IIS, which planned the failed ent right of self-defense as recognized in Ar- attempt to assassinate former President Bush ticle 51 of the United Nations Charter and during his visit to Kuwait in April of this year. pursuant to my constitutional authority with This U.S. military action was completed upon respect to the conduct of foreign relations impact of the missiles on target at approxi- and as Commander in Chief, I ordered a mately 6 p.m. (EST). military strike that directly targeted a facility Operating under the United States Central Iraqi intelligence implicated in the plot Command, two U.S. Navy surface ships against the former Chief Executive. In ac- launched a total of 23 precision-guided cordance with Article 51 of the United Na- Tomahawk missiles in this coordinated strike tions Charter, this action was reported imme- upon the key facilities in the IIS compound. diately to the Security Council on June 26. The USS PETERSON (DD 969) launched On June 27, Ambassador Albright provided 14 missiles from its position in the Red Sea, evidence of Iraq's assassination attempts to while the USS CHANCELLORSVILLE the United Nations Security Council, which (CG 62) in the Arabian Gulf launched nine had been convened in emergency session at missiles. The timing of this operation, with our request. missiles striking at approximately 2:00 a.m. I am certain that you share my sincere local Iraqi time, was chosen carefully so as hope that the limited and proportionate ac- to minimize risks to innocent civilians. Initial tion taken by the United States Government reports indicate that heavy damage was in- will frustrate and help deter and preempt fu- flicted on the complex. Regrettably, there ture unlawful actions on the part of the Gov- were some collateral civilian casualties. ernment of Iraq. Nonetheless, in the event I ordered this military response only after that Iraqi violence, aggression, or state-spon- I considered the results of a thorough and sored terrorism against the United States independent investigation by U.S. intel- continues, I will direct such additional meas- ligence and law enforcement agencies. The ures in our exercise of the right of self-de- reports by Attorney General Reno and Di- fense as may be necessary and appropriate rector of Central Intelligence Woolsey pro- to protect United States citizens. vided compelling evidence that the operation I remain committed to ensuring that the that threatened the life of President Bush in Congress is kept fully informed regarding Kuwait City in April was directed and pur- significant employments of the U.S. Armed sued by the Iraqi Intelligence Service and Forces. Accordingly, I am providing this re- that the Government of Iraq bore direct re- port on the U.S. military actions of June 26, sponsibility for this effort. consistent with the War Powers Resolution. The Government of Iraq acted unlawfully I appreciate your thoughts and continued in attempting to carry out Saddam Hussein's support as we address these important con- threats against former President Bush be- cerns. cause of actions he took as President. The Sincerely, evidence of the Government of Iraq's vio- lence and terrorism demonstrates that Iraq William J. Clinton VerDate 14-MAY-98 13:59 May 26, 1998 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 1244 Sfmt 1244 W:\DISC\P26JN4.029 INET01.
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