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Network Centric Warfare in the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet

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Network Centric Warfare in the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet Network Centric Warfare in the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet Network-Supported Operational Level Command and Control in Operation Enduring Freedom Dr. Mark Adkins Director of Research Ph.D Human Communication [email protected] Dr. John Kruse Director of Programming Ph.D Management Information Systems [email protected] Outline • Environment • Theory • Investigation • Findings • Other Lessons • Implications • Questions 2 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Environment Who: U.S. Navy’s Commander Task Force Fifty (CTF-50) aboard the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) – Carrier Group Three (CARGRU3) – Air Wing Eleven (CVW11) – Destroyer Squadron Nine (DESRON9) 3 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Environment When: Operation Enduring Freedom, July 2001 – January 2002 Mazar-e Qandahar Sharif Falls Falls CARL VINSON Armed Move to Terror Kabul Departs Recon Close Air Homecoming Attacks Support Falls JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN Northern Port Visits War Tora Bora Alliance Begins CARL VINSON Offensive CARL VINSON Arrives in Begins Departs North Arabian North Arabian Sea Sea 4 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies TRANSIT Depart Anti-Sub 23 Jul Warfare Exercise Dual Battle Group 4-7 Aug Operations 17 Aug Farrallon de Medinilla 12-13 Aug Thailand Port Visit 23-27 Aug Carrier Qualifications Kaula Rock 27-29 Jul Wake Island 3-4 Aug 8-9 Aug North Arabian Sea 11 Sep Singapore Port Visit 28 Aug - 3 Sep EN ROUTE NORTHERN ARABIAN GULF FOR OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH / MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS VS IRAQ 5 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies COMCARGRU3 Org Chart 6 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies CTF-50 Org Chart CTF-50 7 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Envrionment 59 Coalition Ships (6 Aircraft Carriers in RED) USS Carl Vinson USS Antietam USS Ingraham JDS Hamana ITS Garibaldi USS O’Kane JDS Kirisame ITS Aviere USS Sacramento JDS Kurama ITS Zeffiro USS Key West JDS Towada ITS Etna USS Enterprise USS Olympia USS Nicholson USS Peleliu USS Obrien USS Comstock USS McFaul USS Dubuque FS Courbet HMAS Sydney USS Arctic USS John Young FS Var HMAS Anzac USS Providence USS Russell HMAS Kanimbla USS John Paul Jones USS T. Roosevelt HMAS Adelaide USS Kitty Hawk USS Leyte Gulf HMS Illustrious USS Curtis Wilbur USS Peterson HMS Southampton USS Gary USS Detroit HMS Kent USNS Rappahannock USS Hartford HMS Bayleaf HMCS Iroquois USNS Saturn USS Bataan HMS Triumph HMCS Charlottetown USNS Niagara Falls USS Shreveport HMS Trafalgar HMCS Halifax USNS John Ericsson USS Whidbey Island RFA Fort Victoria HMCS Preserver 8 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Missions Maritime Interdiction Operations Air to Ground Strike Tomahawk Land Attack Protection of Shipping Missile (TLAM) Strikes Anti-Air Warfare Anti-Submarine Warfare 9 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) • Multi-national maritime interception forces implementing sanctions against Iraq • An average of 200 queries, 100 boardings, and 10 diverts per month NCW Case Studies Munitions GPS-GUIDED BOMB LASER-GUIDED BOMB (JDAM) TOMAHAWK LAND-ATTACK MISSILE (TLAM) 11 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Scale of Operations 24,905 8,688 FLIGHT HOURS TOTAL SORTIES 2009 2,020,000 BOMBS DROPPED POUNDS OF ORDNANCE 12 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Distributed Forces MIO FUJAIRAH 370 NM FROM FUJAIRAH BAHRAIN 800 NM FROM BAHRAIN OPAREA 13 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies The Bottom Line 14 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies The Bottom Line Network Centric Operations (NCO) in CTF-50 – Increased information accessibility (Shareability) – Greater breadth/depth of information dissemination (Degree of shared information) – Improved quality of interaction – Greater quality of individual awareness – Greater degree of shared awareness 15 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies The Bottom Line • Other Findings (Social & Cognitive Domains) – NCW technology acceptance lessons – Establishing trust and collaboration in NCO – Cultural & organizational change for facilitating NCO success 16 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Theory • Decision-Making Theory • Network Centric Warfare • Technology Adoption – Technology Adoption Model – Technology Transition Model 17 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Making Decisions? People build mental models of the world and how it works 18 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Making Decisions? Decision-makers try to “recognize” a situation and match it to their mental model 19 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Making Decisions? Decision-makers try to “recognize” a situation and match it to their mental model 20 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Taking a Step Back • What are we really trying to do? • Why are these things important? • How do we make them happen? 21 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Making Decisions? Value Principles Image Potential Trajectory Goals Action Image Decision Strategic Plans Image A potential course of action must conform to three “images” – Beach & Mitchell 22 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Requirements for Decision Support • Current Situation - What is Happening? • History - What has Happened? • Plans – OPORDs, FRAGOs, etc • Goals – Commander’s Intent • Principles – Rules of Engagement •Also… – Accurate Information – Timely Information – Shared Information 23 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Boyd’s Decision-Action Cycle Advantage can be gained through faster tempo 24 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies NCW Theory • Network Centric Warfare theory expands on this by providing a means to the end 25 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies NCW Tenets • A robustly networked force improves information sharing • Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situation awareness • Shared situation awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command • These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness 26 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Shared Awareness …requires complete, accurate, relevant and timely information shared over a robust network 6/16/2004 27 NCW Case Studies 27 Collaboration Concerted Action Requires Concerted Thought 28 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies MIO Collaboration Video of boarded ship transmitted • Creates an from helo to frigate Information Advantage – working concurrently with shared information • Exploits an Information Advantage to create a Tactical Advantage Simultaneous chat discussion about boarding 29 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Technology Adoption Theory • Identify what influences people in using new NCW systems 30 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Technology Acceptance Model Perceived Usefulness (U) External Behavioral Actual Va ria b le s Intentions’ System (X) (BI) Use (AU) Perceived Eas e of Us e (E) 31 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Technology Transition Model 32 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Simplified Tech Transition Model 33 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Problem Formulation How did CTF-50 use of Network Centric Warfare capabilities to enable: – Self-synchronization – Speed of command – Mission effectiveness 34 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Variables of Interest Effectiveness & Efficiency • Speed of command • Breadth/Depth of information dissemination • Individual awareness • Shared awareness 35 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Variables of Interest Social Domain • Technology acceptance • Cultural & Organizational change 36 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies NCW Framework 37 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Procedure 1. Identify actors (ships, squadrons, staffs & individuals) 2. Gather qualitative data – interviews 3. Fit the data to framework 4. Gather supporting and triangulating data 5. Write the story 6. Develop conclusions, recommendations and implications 38 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies CTF-50’s Tools • Knowledge Web (KWeb) • CommandNet • Chat 39 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies How did it work? • Tailored information flow – Voice nets for imminent threat and orders – Secure chat for time-sensitive information to Tactical Action Officers (TAOs) – Web-based “CommandNet” logs for critical events – Web pages for analytical details and further information – Chat rooms for supporting administration 40 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Video Wall 2x4 Matrix of Projector Cubes K-Desks (3) 2x3 Matrix of LCDs 41 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies KWeb Hierarchy Overview Page Summary Page Content Page 42 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Knowledge Web (KWeb) • Web-Based Information Portal 43 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies KWeb Overview Page 44 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Typical KWeb Summary Page 45 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Sample Underlying Content Page 46 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Evolution of Data to Information to Knowledge: METOC Example Data: Typical Text-based weather product Information: raw and semi-processed data represented graphically Knowledge: weather data and info translated into usable, understandable Knowledge of immediate value to planners and pilots 47 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies 48 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Battle Damage Assessment Spreadsheet 49 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies CommandNet • Collaborative Logging Tool 50 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies CommandNet Entry Screen Entry Classification Area Select Priority Select Category Hyperlink 51 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies • USS Carl Vinson 13,880 Log entries – Battle Watch (4026) CommandNet Usage – Maritime Intercept Operation – Network(MIO) Centric Surge (1513)Feedback (28) 1400 1200 1000 Entries per Week 800 600 400 200 – Sea Surveillance Coordinator 9/22/2001 0 6/16/2004 (SCC) Watch Log (47) 9/29/2001 – Submarine Watch (559) – Tactical Flag Command 10/6/2001 Com m andNet Log Activity 10/13/2001 Center (TFCC) Watch 10/20/2001 – WarfareSupervisors CDR SITREP Log (986) (6730) 10/27/2001 11/3/2001 11/10/2001 11/17/2001 Week Ending 11/24/2001 12/1/2001 12/8/2001 12/15/2001 12/22/2001 12/29/2001 1/5/2002 1/12/2002 Total CCG3 CCG7 NCW Case Studies 52 Sources of Data Interviews Archival Data – CD-ROM of KWeb Site – CommandNet Logs – Unclassified Post Deployment Brief – Published U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Paper • “Network-Centric Intelligence Works!” - CAPT McKrell • “Knowledge Web plays big in transformation” - LCDR Majeranowski 53 6/16/2004 NCW Case Studies Sources of Data Interviews 1. Commander CTF–50 – Rear Admiral, USS Carl Vinson 2.
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