Philosophical Pursuit and Flight: Homer and Thucydides in Plato's

The International Journal The International Journal of the of the Platonic Tradition 8 (2014) 72-91 Platonic Tradition brill.com/jpt

Philosophical Pursuit and Flight: Homer and Thucydides in Plato’s Laches1

Steve Maiullo Hope College, Holland, Michigan, USA [email protected]

Abstract

This paper offers a new reading of Plato’s Laches that examines the dialogue’s philosophical approach not only to courage but also to two literary texts that both formed and questioned traditional Athenian views of it: Homer and Thucydides. In the middle of Plato’s Laches, the eponymous character claims that the courageous man “should be willing to stay in formation, to defend himself against the enemy, and to refuse to run away.” Socrates responds by wondering whether a man can be courageous in retreat. He cites Homer’s description of Aeneas’ horses that “know how to pursue and flee quickly this way and that” (191b), a quotation that appears twice in the Iliad: once at 5.222-3 when Aeneas refuses to retreat from the rampaging Diomedes and again at 8.106-8 when Diomedes retreats from Hector, despite their belief that to do so is cowardly. On the surface, it seems that the contexts of the Homeric line do not match Socrates’ argument. This paper will argue that Socrates’ apparent ‘miscue’ is both intentional and pur- poseful because it signals a correspondence between the Homeric scenes and Thucydides’ narrative of the Battle of Mantinea that invites criticism of Homer’s place in the value systems of contemporary Athens. Plato signals a philosophical reading of Homer’s Iliad and of Thucydides’ description of the Battle of Mantinea, through which we are invited to evaluate not only the traditional model of Athenian education,

1 Versions of this paper were read in April 2009 at the Annual Meeting of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South in Minneapolis, MN and in March 2011 at the Annual Meeting of the Classical Association of New England at Mt. Holyoke College. I have profited greatly from the comments, questions, and suggestions of both audiences. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Anna Peterson and Anthony Kaldellis whose insightful criticisms of earlier drafts have clarified my language and argument.

© maiullo, �� | doi ��.��/��-�� This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial 3.0. Unported (CC BY-NC 3.0) License, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/ brill.com/jpt Downloaded from Brill.com10/03/2021 03:00:00AM via free access Philosophical Pursuit and Flight 73 embodied by the former, but also its application in fifth-century Athens, as revealed by the latter. This paper, therefore, demonstrates that the philosophical and literary strate- gies behind Plato’s decision to ‘misuse’ Homer reveal a disjunction between wisdom and manliness in the Athenian cultural tradition that philosophy aims to resolve.

Keywords

Plato – Homer – Thucydides – Laches – Battle of Mantinea – courage – virtue – misquotation – poetry – history

Introduction

The last quarter century has witnessed a sea change in Platonic scholarship that has raised the consideration of the literary and rhetorical features of the dialogues—studies of character, setting, and genre, to name a few—to the same level as what used to be regarded the ‘strictly’ philosophical.2 New approaches have advanced our understanding of Plato’s corpus as a whole and his philosophical project in general, as well as of individual dialogues.3 One dialogue that has particularly benefited from new approaches is Plato’s Laches, which was originally viewed as one of the earliest and, in some cases, most awk- ward of Plato’s definition dialogues.4 It was counted among the early dialogues because it shares many elements in common with other so-called early definition dialogues: it is concerned with the virtues—in this case, andreia (‘manly courage’)—and their possible unity; it advances a series of definitions that are tested and ultimately rejected; it ends in aporia; and it lays the groundwork for proper education of the youth, to name a few.5 It was considered clumsy,

2 For a synthesis of how Plato has been read over the last two centuries by philosophers, see A. Bowen (1988) 49-65. Whereas Plato’s readers have attempted to outline what he thought and believed by focusing on arguments, he concludes that readers cannot strip away the dramatic elements of the dialogues because they are crucial to their meaning. 3 For a representative list of these approaches, see C. Griswold (1999) 361 as well as C. Zuckert (2009) 1-47. 4 On the ‘primitive form’ of the dialogue, see W.K.C. Guthrie (1975) 124. 5 The scholarly literature on the Laches has focused primarily on virtue, with particular attention to the unity of the virtues. See H. Bonitz (1871) 413-42; G. Santas (1969); M. O’Brien (1971) 303-25; D. Devereux (1992) 765-769; T. Penner (1992) 1-27; and T. Brickhouse and N. Smith (1997) 317-324. The different definitions of courage in the Laches have also been well studied.

The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionDownloaded 8 ( from2014 Brill.com10/03/2021) 72-91 03:00:00AM via free access 74 Maiullo moreover, because it takes so long for Socrates to enter, for the main problem to be outlined, and for the elenchos to begin.6 As an early and primitive dialogue, the Laches was believed to express the historical Socrates’ beliefs about virtue.7 But other readers, focusing less on claims about its date of composition, have recognized the Laches as a dialogue of greater depth than previously thought.8 This case has been made largely through historical and literary analysis. Socrates’ main interlocutors in this dialogue were well-known Athenian politicians and generals, Laches and Nicias, and scholars have argued that Socrates interrogates both traditional and radical views about warfare and courage and their application in fifth-century Athens. The ‘historical’ fatal character flaws of both Laches and Nicias—as recorded by the Greek historians themselves—are the very flaws that shape their initial views and then prevent their progress in the philosophical search for courage (on which more later).9 On this reading, in questioning Laches and Nicias, Socrates both questions traditional and sophistic notions of courage respectively and also

See S. Umphrey (1976) 14-22 for the view that Laches’ definition is crucial to the Socratic understanding of courage. See C. Emlyn-Jones (1999) 123-138 for the view that the definitions represent a progression from less (those of Laches) to more (those of Nicias) sophisticated definitions of courage. For the relationship between courage and education, with emphasis on self-knowledge, see C. Griswold (1986) 177-93. 6 To put it in perspective, the dialogue begins at 178, Socrates does not enter until 181d, the main question is not formulated until 185a, and the testing of the question does not truly begin until 189e. Compare this with another early definition dialogue, the Euthyphro in which Socrates appears on the first page. For discussion, see C. Emlyn-Jones (1999) 123-30. 7 Because the text has been viewed as early, some historicists suggest that the understanding of virtue found in the Laches can be attributed to the historical Socrates. See, e.g., C. Gould (1987) 265-66 and D. Devereux (1992) 767. Scholars of this school generally follow the work of G. Vlastos (1991) 45-80, who argued that the Socrates of the early dialogues was the historical Socrates. 8 An account of the traditional ordering of the dialogues by stylometric analysis and the diffi- culty of ordering the early dialogues specifically can be found in L. Brandwood (1992) 90-120. The limitations of this kind of organization have been articulated, and scholars instead have offered thematic solutions. See, e.g., C. Kahn (1997) 48-59. An overview of thematic approaches taken to organize Plato’s corpus is given in D. Clay (2000) 283-86 and C. Zuckert (2009) 1-47, esp. 1-7. A full and certainly stimulating treatment of the topic is C. Griswold (1999). In fact, Zuckert’s project to treat the dialogues in order of dramatic date is suggested by Griswold (he call this “fictive chronology”), but this approach too has its own limitations. 9 My focus in this paper is on Laches, since it is in Socrates’ discussion with him that we find the Homeric misquotation, but for a good discussions of Nicias, see W. Schmid (1992) 132-176 and C. Zuckert (2009) 247-57.

The International Journal of the PlatonicDownloaded Tradition from Brill.com10/03/2021 8 (2014) 72-9 03:00:00AM1 via free access Philosophical Pursuit and Flight 75 becomes a new paradigm for philosophical andreia himself.10 Plato, therefore, employs this tension between past and present views of courage to comment philosophically on the social, cultural, and political world of fifth-century Athens and to carve out Socrates’ place within it.11 Scholars have shown, moreover, the characters of Laches and Nicias in the dialogue represent parodies of their historical counterparts, particularly when Plato’s portrayal is compared with other sources, such as Thucydides and Aristophanes (and, to a lesser extent, Plutarch).12 Although literary approaches have allowed scholars to look beneath the Laches’ apparently simple exterior, the connections between Homer, Thucydides, and the Laches have not been fully explored or, for that matter, universally accepted.13 This paper seeks to present a new reading that shows how Plato connects Homeric and Thucydidean narratives with the philosophical interactions between Socrates and Laches, the character around whom this tension exists most clearly and for whom the dialogue is titled.14 I will argue that probing Socrates’ (mis)quotations of Homer in the Laches reveals that this dialogue provides a philosophical approach not only to courage and virtue, as has been argued, but also to the literary texts that affirm and question traditional Athenian value systems.

Dramatic Setting

Before I turn to the main thrust of my argument, we should first take a wider view of the dialogue itself and its historical context. The Laches is a dramatic (as opposed to a narrated) dialogue that is set, based on internal evidence, sometime after the Athenian defeat at Delium in 424 but probably before the defeat at Amphipolis in 422.15 But unlike other dramatic dialogues—such as

10 This is the overarching argument of W. Schmid (1992). 11 C. Emlyn-Jones (1999) 123. 12 A. Tessitore (2004). 13 In fact, the Homeric and Thucydidean connections in the Laches, first noticed by W. Schmid (1992) then reiterated and broadened more recently by C. Zuckert (2009), have not been accepted by all readers. One critic suggests that Schmid’s thesis that the extension of the “idea of ironic disjunction between [the] literary and historical context to the entire dialogue suffer[s], unfortunately, from inaccuracy and overinterpretation.” See C. Emlyn-Jones (1999) 133n30. 14 On Laches as the dialogue’s focus, see J. Nichols (1987) 269-80. 15 For general discussion, see R. Hoerber (1968) 95-105. The controversy surrounding dramatic date centers on whether the Clouds has been performed before this conversation or

The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionDownloaded 8 ( from2014 Brill.com10/03/2021) 72-91 03:00:00AM via free access 76 Maiullo the Euthyphro, the Meno, or the Gorgias—Socrates is nowhere in sight at the beginning of the dialogue. At the outset of the text, Lysimachus and Melesias— relatively unknown men from illustrious families—have invited Laches and Nicias to watch a performance of hoplomachia, a performance of martial arts, in order to ask their opinion about its value for the growth, development, and education of their sons. This is of particular interest to Lysimachus and Melesias because, as the opening lines reveal, both are able to recount the great deeds of their fathers, the politicians Thucydides and Aristeides respectively, but have no such deeds of their own to recount. It appears, then, that Lysimachus and Melesias have invited Laches and Nicias not only because they are famous generals, but also because they were the beneficiaries of an education that made them noble. Fundamentally these men relate as citizen-fathers discussing how best to educate their sons to be successful and productive citizens. The dialogue now enters familiar ground, the education of the youth, a favorite topic of Socrates. But the extended prologue allows the reader to focus on this contrasting pairs of parents, the lackluster and the distinguished, before Socrates enters the stage.16 But what Plato’s readers surely would have known and what the actors in the dialogue could not appreciate are the events of decade following this fictional conversation: namely, that the apparent fame of Laches and Nicias would soon turn to infamy and that the honor bestowed upon the generals by Lysimachus and Melesias was perhaps premature. Two years later, in 421, both Laches and Nicias would negotiate a supposed fifty-year peace with Sparta that put an end to the Archidamian War. Given that the terms of agreement dissatisfied many key players, including Corinth, Megara, and Thebes, the peace would be brief and, within ten years of the dramatic date, the two

after. Whereas W. Schmid (1992) 183n1 and C. Zuckert (2009) 248n61 suggest that the dramatic date is before the Clouds, C. Emlyn-Jones (1999) 125 argues that it is after. I would add that one should also wonder how Ameipsias’ Connus, which also portrayed Socrates (fr. 9 PCG) and which placed second in 423, or other comic portrayals (such as that of Eupolis) of Socrates may have impacted the Laches, but we cannot know this. Ultimately, however tempting it is to say that the silence about Ameipsias or Aristophanes in the dialogue suggests that the plays have probably not yet been performed, we need not expect that Plato refer to everything relating to Socrates’ public persona. The precise date of the dialogue does not affect my argument in any case. 16 The extended preamble reveals the character traits of Laches and Nicias. Laches is a man of action and judges men on that basis. Nicias, on the other hand, fancies himself a well- educated man, possibly even a gifted orator and quasi-sophist, who wants to test his train- ing with Socrates. For discussion, see W. Schmid (1992) 55-92.

The International Journal of the PlatonicDownloaded Tradition from Brill.com10/03/2021 8 (2014) 72-9 03:00:00AM1 via free access Philosophical Pursuit and Flight 77 men would be dead.17 The ‘shadow of death,’ as Diskin Clay put it concerning Socrates, that we find in dialogues such as the Republic, the Gorgias, and the Theaetetus, is here cast instead over his main interlocutors.18 For the moment, the focus of dramatic irony is not on Socrates, but on Laches and Nicias. The former would be killed at the battle of Mantinea in 418 because of his own poor leadership in what was arguably the most devastating land defeat in the war, and likely the result of the botched Peace of Nicias and its aftermath in the Peloponnese.19 The latter would be hunted down and killed in 413 after the ill-fated and devastating Sicilian Expedition when an eclipse slowed his retreat.20 By presenting Laches and Nicias to an audience that knew their fates, as well as the outcome of the war over which they presided, Plato invites us to examine them, their views about courage, and the world of the Athenian elite through the lens of the Laches. The dialogue, then, suggests that the education offered by the Athenian polis and the precepts upon which it is based were fundamentally flawed. Plato presents Laches and Nicias as symbols of both the Athenian cultural tradition and how that tradition was enacted in the leadership of the Peloponnesian War. An important component of the cultural and educational background was Homer, whose characters held beliefs about courage that, as we will see below, Laches shared. As Socrates questions Laches’ loosely ‘Homeric’ understanding of courage using competing views of courage also drawn from Homer, Plato invites his readers to reevaluate Homer and his place in traditional Athenian idealism.

Homeric Misquotation in the Laches

After an extended introduction, the elenchos about courage finally begins with Laches, and it is here that we find our first Homeric quotation. In his first definition of courage, Laches claims that “if a man should be willing to stay in formation, to defend himself against the enemy, and to refuse to run away, you may rest assured that he is a man of courage” (εἰ γάρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγοι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρεῖος ἂν εἴη, 190e). Even

17 On the terms of the peace as well as the opposition, see D. Kagan (1981) 19-32. 18 D. Clay (2000) 33-40. 19 For the potential causes for as well as a discussion of the battle of Mantinea, particularly with regard to the unraveling of diplomatic activity, see D. Kagan (1981) 78-137. 20 Nicias was famously superstitious as Plutarch notes in Nicias 23ff. On his retreat from Syracuse, he was slowed by an eclipse, which gave the opportunity for the enemy to catch and kill him. See D. Kagan (1981) 324-353.

The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionDownloaded 8 ( from2014 Brill.com10/03/2021) 72-91 03:00:00AM via free access 78 Maiullo though this definition rehearses common-sense notions of courage (and those expressed by Homeric characters, as we will see), Socrates tries to show Laches that this definition is insufficient because a man can be courageous in retreat as well. To support and clarify his point, Socrates cites the Scythians, who were able to defeat Darius by making good use of tactics in retreat, and Homer’s description of Aeneas’ horses that “know how to pursue and flee quickly this way and that” (κραιπνὰ μάλ’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἔφη αὐτοὺς ἐπίστασθαι διώκειν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι, 191b).21 The latter quotation appears, more or less as Socrates quotes it here, twice in the Iliad: spoken once by Aeneas at 5.222-3 when he refuses to accept Pandarus’ advice to retreat from the rampaging Diomedes and again by Diomedes at 8.106-8 when he accepts Nestor’s advice to retreat from Hector, though he considers his decision cowardly. When we compare what Socrates says about the possibility for courageous retreat with the contexts of the Homeric quotation, something is amiss: Why would Socrates quote a line from two Homeric characters, Aeneas and Diomedes, about (1) a character who decides not to retreat (Aeneas) and (2) a character who considered retreat cowardly (Diomedes) as support for his claim that one can be courageous in retreat? At first glance, it appears that Socrates has misquoted (or, perhaps, misre- membered) his Homer because the context of the excerpted line seems not to support his argument. The misuse of Homer in the Laches passage is, as I will argue, also intentional and invokes tensions between the philosophical nature of andreia in the Laches itself and the two mainstream “military” narratives to which Plato alludes in the dialogue: that of the Trojan War in the Iliad and that of the Peloponnesian War in Thucydides. The Laches triangu- lates itself between Homer and Thucydides, both to parody formulations of courage expressed by Homeric characters and their application in contemporary Athens, and to present its own philosophical approach to them. Plato’s use

21 On the Scythians, see Laches 191a and Herodotus 4. 97-142. According to Herodotus, the Scythians enjoyed success against Darius because of their cleverness and boldness. Upon hearing that the Persians were headed for them, the Scythians calculated that they could not repel Darius’ army themselves in a straight fight (4.102). They convened a conference with the area kingdoms and claimed that, without help, they must either evacuate or capitulate (4.118). Many kings refused to help, so they decided against fighting and retreated (4.119-20). But the retreat was formulated as an attack. They destroyed resources, purposefully led the Persians through undesirable land, attacked them when foraging for food, laid traps, and sent cryptic messages (4.121-28). This confusion gave the Scythians the opportunity to attack and, ultimately, to force Persian retreat. For a brief discussion of this passage in the Laches, see Schmid (1992) 102-3.

The International Journal of the PlatonicDownloaded Tradition from Brill.com10/03/2021 8 (2014) 72-9 03:00:00AM1 via free access Philosophical Pursuit and Flight 79 of his literary predecessors is not simply adversarial, it is also cooperative.22 Homer becomes a tool for philosophy and not just as a system of ideas to be overcome.23 When Socrates’ quotation is set next to the original, we find that very little has been changed:

A. Plato, Laches 191b κραιπνὰ μάλ’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἔφη αὐτοὺς ἐπίστασθαι διώκειν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι

Homer says that they (i.e., the horses) know how to pursue and flee quickly this way and that.

22 The simultaneously adversarial and cooperative relationship between Plato and the poets has been examined before: that the dialogues—especially the Republic—condemn poetry and, at the same time, exhibit a kind of poetic character and engage deeply with the themes of the poetic tradition. See, e.g., H. Gadamer (1980) 40; J. Elias (1984) 1-37; S. Rosen (1988) 1-26; D. Clay (2000) 117-149, esp. 129-30; and J. Mitscherling (2009) 15-16. R. Blondell (2002) 14-37 deals with Plato as dramatist, but also addresses the relationship between the dialogue form and poetry (see the following note). G. Fendt and D. Rozema (1998) allude to this point, too, both in the title of their book, Platonic Errors: Plato, A Kind of Poet, and on the first page of their introduction: “most so-called Platonic doctrines are errors caused by ignorance, incapacity, or unwillingness to read what Plato wrote: dialogues—fully formed poetic works.” The passage most often quoted in defense of an adversarial relationship is Republic 10, in which Socrates refers to “the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ, 607b), which has all but been dismissed as Plato’s own invention; see A. Nightingale (1995) 60-7. One may also note that even in the ancient world, as Aristotle reportedly claimed in the lost On Poets, there was the view that “Plato’s literary form is something between poetry and prose” (φησὶ δ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν τῶν λόγων ἰδέαν αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ ποιήματος εἶναι καὶ πεζοῦ λόγου, Diogenes Laertius 3.37). 23 Plato’s constructive use of the poets is well documented, and I can mention only a few here. A. Nightingale (1995) 60-92 argues that Plato uses the tragic subtext in order to cre- ate a new kind of hero, Socrates, to replace older models that perhaps clash with him. Through parody, Plato sets up philosophy as a “serious” rival to tragedy. R. Blondell (2001) 136 suggests convincingly that Hippias (in the Hippias Minor) “stands in for Homer” which characterizes him “as a mouthpiece for the unreflective common sense of ordinary peo- ple nurtured on a cultural tradition to which Homer was central.” This view is central to the Ion as well. Z. Planinc (2003) draws special attention to the relationship between the Odyssey and Plato’s cosmological dialogues. He argues that the main “literary” features of the Phaedrus, Timaeus, and Critias are taken from books 6-8 of the Odyssey, which recount Odysseus’ experience with the Phaeacians.

The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionDownloaded 8 ( from2014 Brill.com10/03/2021) 72-91 03:00:00AM via free access 80 Maiullo

B. Homer, Iliad 5.222-3 and 8.106-7 ἐπιστάμενοι πεδίοιο κραιπνὰ μάλ’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διωκέμεν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι

[the horses] know this plain, and how to pursue and flee quickly this way and that

As I have indicated in bold, other than the fact that the Homeric διωκέμεν is replaced by the Attic διώκειν, a perfectly natural switch, or that Socrates’ use of indirect statement after ἔφη forces him to exchange the infinitive ἐπίστασθαι for the participle ἐπιστάμενοι, we find only the genitive πεδίοιο missing and the word order reconfigured slightly.24 This hardly qualifies as a “misquotation” in the technical sense of the term—that is, Socrates misquoting or alter- ing specific words—but the problem with the allusion lies in the fact that the Homeric context does not seem to support Socrates’ claim. The fact that this misquotation is contextual rather than textual distinguishes it from oth- ers that have been studied. Studies of Homeric misquotations in Plato tend to focus on his ‘intentional’ changing or deletions of words, which raises questions about whether Plato was using a different edition of Homer than ours. La Barbe (1949) concluded that Plato followed a different edition of Homer, but Mitscherling (2005), in reviewing the various approaches to Homeric misquotation in Plato, rightly notes that the ‘variant text’ thesis remains provocative because it reveals a choice on Plato’s part to favor one reading over another. The question of authorial intention is therefore still at issue. Setting aside textual variants, Bernardete (1963) argues contra La Barbe that “all we can show is that the deformed lines when read with the vulgate in mind cohere more closely with the Platonic context than they would do by themselves.” He demonstrates that the changes that Plato made to the original text contribute to the philosophical message or literary point of the dialogue. Let us, therefore, examine the contexts of this line. The first time the line appears is in Iliad 5, which recounts the aristeia of Diomedes. The poet opens the book with a description of the hero:

δαῖέ οἱ ἐκ κόρυθός τε καὶ ἀσπίδος ἀκάματον πῦρ ἀστέρ’ ὀπωρινῷ ἐναλίγκιον, ὅς τε μάλιστα λαμπρὸν παμφαίνῃσι λελουμένος ὠκεανοῖο· τοῖόν οἱ πῦρ δαῖεν ἀπὸ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων (5.4-7)

24 On the Homeric (and Doric) preference for the ending –μεν in place of –εν (as in the con- traction of διώκε-εν to διώκειν), see Smyth §469n. On ἔφη “almost always” being followed by the accusative-infinitive construction, see Smyth §2017a.

The International Journal of the PlatonicDownloaded Tradition from Brill.com10/03/2021 8 (2014) 72-9 03:00:00AM1 via free access Philosophical Pursuit and Flight 81

There blazed from his helmet and shield unending fire, like Sirius, which, beyond all stars shone bright after being bathed in the ocean that’s how fire blazed from his face and shoulders

Presumably this is exactly how he would have appeared to Aeneas and Pandarus, the two Trojan heroes who play a central role in Diomedes’ aristeia. When the two men converse about Diomedes’ success, Pandarus complains that his own attacks have failed and concludes that Diomedes “is not on a ram- page like this without some god standing at his side, clothed in a mist” (οὐχ ὅ γ’ ἄνευθε θεοῦ τάδε μαίνεται ἀλλά τις ἄγχι / ἕστηκ’ ἀθανάτων νεφέλῃ εἰλυμένος ὤμους, 5.185-6). Aeneas invites Pandarus into his chariot, which will be guided by horses that “know this plain, and how to pursue and flee quickly this way and that.” Pandarus agrees to charge with Aeneas, despite clear signs that the gods are protecting Diomedes. The decision made by Aeneas and Pandarus to attack despite the better judgment to retreat is immediately followed by a similar decision made by Diomedes and Sthenelus. Upon seeing Pandarus and Aeneas, Sthenelus tells Diomedes: “come on, let’s retreat on our horses, and don’t rush, I beg you, to the front lines, or you’ll be killed” (ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ χαζώμεθ’ ἐφ’ ἵππων, μηδέ μοι οὕτω / θῦνε διὰ προμάχων, μή πως φίλον ἦτορ ὀλέσσῃς, 5.249- 50). Diomedes also refuses, claiming that he has the support of Athena her- self. Aeneas loses the battle, his horses, and he would have lost his life had his mother Aphrodite not whisked him to safety. And so, it appears, the initial context does not support Socrates’ claim that one can be courageous in retreat since neither Aeneas nor Diomedes retreats, and, moreover, the verse itself does not even mention courage. The horses of Aeneas appear again—as well as the description of their knowledge of pursuit and flight—in Book 8, this time driven by Diomedes (who now owns them). At this point in the poem, the tides of war have turned to favor the Trojans as Zeus promises to fulfill Thetis’ request.25 As Hector bears down on the Greek camp, many Greek heroes turn to flight: Agamemnon, the Aiantes, Idomeneus, and Odysseus are all mentioned by name (8.78-97). Nestor, we are told, would have fled as well, but his horses were wounded. The only man unwilling to retreat was Diomedes who both rebukes Odysseus for retreating and, like Aeneas did with Pandarus in Book 5, invites Nestor into his chariot (8.101-111). The two rush forward into the fray together to beat back Hector, refusing to retreat. Nestor is able to convince Diomedes that retreat is his best option only after Diomedes has killed Hector’s charioteer and Zeus

25 Book 8 closes the first cycle of the Iliad because Zeus’ will, first described at the end of Book 1, is finally revisited. See B. Heiden (1998) 68-81 and (2008) 106-119.

The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionDownloaded 8 ( from2014 Brill.com10/03/2021) 72-91 03:00:00AM via free access 82 Maiullo has thrown thunder and lightning at the horses, sending out flames and sulfur (8.133-6). Despite the wisdom of a retreat at this point, Diomedes worries that he will be called a coward:

Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ’ ἀγορεύων· Τυδεΐδης ὑπ’ ἐμεῖο φοβεύμενος ἵκετο νῆας. ὥς ποτ’ ἀπειλήσει· τότε μοι χάνοι εὐρεῖα χθών (8.148-50)

One day Hector will say in front of the Trojans: “I put Diomedes to flight and he ran to his ships.” That’ll be his boast. May the wide earth yawn open before me instead!

This fear is in fact confirmed just a few lines later when Hector taunts him: “They’re ashamed of you now! You’re no better than a woman!” (νῦν δέ σ’ ἀτιμήσουσι· γυναικὸς ἄρ’ ἀντὶ τέτυξο, 8.163). Diomedes struggles with Hector’s words, but ultimately settles on retreat. The problem here is that not only do the characters believe retreat to be cowardly, they believe it to be womanly. This simply does not support Socrates’ claim that retreat can sometimes be a manly and courageous action, although the prudent decision to retreat comes closer to Socrates’ argument (a point to which we will return below). To review then, Socrates quotes a line that appears twice in the Iliad and neither context appears to fit the argument in defense of which it was quoted: that one can be courageous (ἀνδρεῖος) in retreat. Its first occurrence in book 5 involves no decision to retreat at all, but rather compares two decisions to attack, foolish in the case of one (Aeneas-Pandarus) and wise in the case of the other (Diomedes-Sthenelus). The second occurrence in book 8 presents a Diomedes who first refuses to retreat, then does so begrudgingly because it is womanly (γυναικός), which becomes all the more ironic because Socrates is attempting to ask about the courageous and manly man (ἀνδρεῖος). Does Plato get it the context wrong or is he using Homer to some other purpose? In the following section I will show that Plato saw a parallel between the actions of Aeneas and Diomedes in the Iliad and those of Laches in Thucydides’ version of the Battle of Mantinea. Socrates, in his conversation with Laches, is in fact dealing with an Aeneas-Diomedes figure: one who would rather die (and did die) than be considered cowardly. Socrates, by drawing attention to the horses who have knowledge about pursuit and flight, horses that are smarter than either Aeneas or Laches, attempts to refocus Laches’ naïve “Homeric” understanding or courage, toward philosophy—a trajectory that Plato underscores by referencing history.

The International Journal of the PlatonicDownloaded Tradition from Brill.com10/03/2021 8 (2014) 72-9 03:00:00AM1 via free access Philosophical Pursuit and Flight 83

Thucydides and Athenian History in the Laches

Historical events provide the background for a number of the Platonic dialogues: the Peloponnesian War, the rise and fall of Alcibiades, the reign of the Thirty, the trial and execution of Socrates, and the presence of sophists in Athens are obvious examples. Interpreters of Plato, however, must take care not to use historical sources without taking into consideration the literary and rhetorical dimension of Greek historiography. The most important account of the Battle of Mantinea that Plato would have had at his disposal is Thucydides’ version, which many contemporary Athenians (and certainly future generations for whom Plato was writing) would have known, whether by reading him directly or from other sources or recollections. Just as Thucydides, in writing a history of the Peloponnesian War, is offering one interpretation of a battle in history, Plato, in writing a fictional conversation between Socrates, Laches, and Nicias set in 424/423 on the eve of the Peace of Nicias, is himself engaged in a similar project and, as I will argue, borrows Thucydides’ literary model of the Battle of Mantinea. Plato draws on a correspondence between the passages of Homer discussed above and Thucydides’ description of Laches’ behavior at Mantinea in order to bring decisions about flight and fight into the context of philosophical inquiry. Before turning to Plato’s restaging of the conflict between pursuit and retreat in the Laches, therefore, we must first review the salient features of Thucydides’ narrative. Just as we contrasted the two heroes Diomedes and Aeneas above, it will be instructive to contrast the two ‘leaders’ of the Battle of Mantinea: the Spartan king Agis and Laches. According to Thucydides, Agis’ early military career was marked by multiple failures. He abandoned attempts to ravage Attica in 426 and 425 because of earthquakes and poor planning (3.89 and 4.2). Later, in the expedition to Argos in 418, he was turned back by evil omens and did not secure victory over the Argives despite having superior forces (5.63). Mantinea was to be his last chance, and his entire reputation was riding on his success. Laches, on the other hand, was a trusted leader. In addition to his role in the Peace of Nicias, he successfully beat back an enemy ambush at Mylae, a victory which propelled the victory against Messina in 426, and, in the winter of the same year, he defeated a force of 300 Locrians (3.90 and 3.103). These two men would meet at Mantinea and their roles would reverse: Agis would be successful, Laches’ poor planning would result in his defeat. As Thucydides sets the stage in book 5, the period between 420 and 418 was critical in the crumbling of the Peace of Nicias. Difficult negotiations in the Peloponnese would put pressure on relations between Sparta and Athens, and, by 418, one of Sparta’s staunchest allies, Tegea, was on the verge of defecting to

The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionDownloaded 8 ( from2014 Brill.com10/03/2021) 72-91 03:00:00AM via free access 84 Maiullo the Athenians and their Argive allies. The Spartans, in response, called together their largest force to date (οἵα οὔπω πρότερον), about 11,000 men, to meet the enemy, which numbered around 16,000, at Mantinea. As Thucydides describes it at 5.65.2-3, Agis considered a swift attack, but considered retreat the better option because the Athenians were more numerous and held better ground:

καὶ μέχρι μὲν λίθου καὶ ἀκοντίου βολῆς ἐχώρησαν, ἔπειτα τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τις Ἄγιδι ἐπεβόησεν, ὁρῶν πρὸς χωρίον καρτερὸν ἰόντας σφᾶς, ὅτι διανοεῖται κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶσθαι, δηλῶν τῆς ἐξ Ἄργους ἐπαιτίου ἀναχωρήσεως τὴν παροῦσαν ἄκαιρον προθυμίαν ἀνάληψιν βουλόμενον εἶναι. ὁ δέ, εἴτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐπιβόημα εἴτε καὶ αὐτῷ ἄλλο τι ἢ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δόξαν ἐξαίφνης, πάλιν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ τάχος πρὶν ξυμμεῖξαι ἀπῆγεν.

They came within a stone’s throw or javelin’s cast, when one of the vete- rans saw that the enemy’s position was strong and shouted to Agis that he intended to cure one evil with another. By this he meant that he wan- ted to make amends for his retreat from Argos, for which he had been blamed, by his present badly timed enthusiasm to engage. Meanwhile Agis, whether because of what the veteran said or because he had changed his mind himself, quickly led back his army before it came to blows.

Agis’ ultimate decision to retreat and to flood the Mantinean territory in order to draw the Athenians and their allies down from their more advantageous position was based on a fair assessment of the situation. According to the passage, Agis originally planned to attack, but was advised by an older, wiser, and perhaps more experienced soldier to hold back. The key to the Spartan success was forethought. The Athenians, on the other hand, represent a stark contrast. Thucydides recounts that the Athenian and Argive leaders—among whom was Laches—did not immediately pursue because they feared a trap. They were pressured by their men to attack because the Argives made no effort to pursue the Spartan army which was retreating again, as they had done at Argos (5.65.5-6). The generals gave the order to attack against their better judgment, a course of action that ultimately led to their defeat. The Athenians suffered especially heavy losses, with twenty percent of their hoplites killed, including Laches himself (5.74.3). Thus this narrative is built upon two different decisions: one by the Spartans to retreat on the basis of prudent strategy, the other by the Athenians to pursue on the basis of bloodthirstiness and the desire to save face. If we could put it simply, we might say that the deciding factor in this battle was knowledge of when to pursue and when to flee.

The International Journal of the PlatonicDownloaded Tradition from Brill.com10/03/2021 8 (2014) 72-9 03:00:00AM1 via free access Philosophical Pursuit and Flight 85

We may now begin to see that Plato draws upon narratological similarities between Homer and Thucydides. Just as Nestor advised Diomedes to retreat, a veteran soldier at Mantinea advised the Spartan king Agis to retreat on the grounds that the Athenians had a more advantageous position and had greater numbers. Both Diomedes and Agis avoided devastating defeat as a result of their calculated decisions to retreat. Similarly, just as Aeneas attacked despite warnings that it would not be wise (and would have been killed were it not for divine intervention), Laches attacked despite his and his colleagues’ suspicion that it was not the best course. Both Aeneas and Laches were defeated. The connections that the reader draws, however, introduce another element to the opposition between “pursuit and flight:” knowing when it is prudent to do so, because while Aeneas and Laches made foolish decisions to their detriment, Diomedes and Agis made prudent decisions to their benefit. Plato borrows from Aeneas’ horses in Homer this premise of knowing when to pursue and flee, and offers a philosophical reading of Homer’s text because the virtue of Aeneas’ horses was their ability to pursue and flee on the basis of knowledge. Socrates’ quotation contrasts two decisions to retreat by Aeneas and Diomedes and by the Spartan King Agis and the Athenian generals. It is precisely the theme of “prudent pursuit and flight,” knowing when to flee and when to stand one’s ground, that provides the background to Plato’s narrative in the Laches— and it is this that determines success in philosophy as well.

Philosophical Pursuit and Flight in the Laches

Though there are no discernable signs that Thucydides had the contrasting decisions of Aeneas and Diomedes in mind in his description of Mantinea, Plato’s dialogue invites us to bring them together by the mere fact of Socrates’ ‘misquotation.’ The Homeric verse about Aeneas’ horses that “know when to pursue and when to flee” requires readers to consider its original context; to think about the actions of the characters in that context; and then to apply them to the characters in the battle of Mantinea and, by extension, to the positions taken by the generals, especially Laches, in the dialogue itself. As we have seen so far, of the two contexts of the Homeric verse, the second, Diomedes’ decision to retreat, comes closer to what Socrates is trying to dem- onstrate to Laches. Despite Diomedes and Hector’s language about shame and effeminacy, retreat was the prudent decision. There is, therefore, a disjunction between wisdom and “manly” courage, at least according to the views held by Diomedes, Hector, and Laches at Mantinea. The Homeric quotation is

The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionDownloaded 8 ( from2014 Brill.com10/03/2021) 72-91 03:00:00AM via free access 86 Maiullo protreptic because it asks Laches (and the reader as well) to rethink the visceral understanding that running away is opposed to manliness. By drawing our attention to the role of knowledge of action or inaction, of when to do what, the text turns to philosophy, and the reader must examine the actions of all these characters, and their own, in this light. The extended prologue of the Laches, in large part, addresses how these characters view the actions of Socrates. Whereas Nicias exhibits familiarity with Socrates’ peacetime activities, Laches admits that he has had no experience with Socrates’ words, but has had the pleasure of his deeds (Σωκράτους δ’ ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν λόγων οὐκ ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν ἔργων ἐπειράθην, 188e). Laches refers here to the fact that he served with Socrates during the Athenian retreat from Delium in 424, a crushing defeat according to Thucydides. Thucydides makes no mention of Socrates’ behavior at Delium, but Plato’s dialogues, the Laches, Apology, and Symposium specifically, play up Socrates’ role in the retreat.26 In our dialogue, Laches heaps praise upon him, claiming that if all the other Athenian hoplites had behaved like Socrates, “the city would have been upright and would not have suffered such a fall” (ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ μετ’ ἐμοῦ συνανεχώρει, κἀγώ σοι λέγω ὅτι εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι ἤθελον τοιοῦτοι εἶναι, ὀρθὴ ἂν ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἂνἔπεσε τότε τοιοῦτον πτῶμα, 181b). Though no more is said of Delium in the Laches, Socrates’ behavior there is mentioned in the Symposium, where Alcibiades tells those gathered at Agathon’s house that Socrates “was remarkably more collected than Laches” and actually saved Laches’ life in the way that he fought off the enemy during the retreat (πρῶτον μὲν ὅσον περιῆν Λάχητος τῷ ἔμφρων εἶναι . . . διὸ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἀπῄει καὶ οὗτος καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος, 221b). When we combine what we learn from both Alcibiades and Laches, Plato draws attention to the fact that Socrates’ retreat was measured, calculated, and therefore courageous. Moreover, it is likely that Plato’s Laches was quick to agree with Socrates that one can be courageous in retreat because of his own first-hand experience with Socrates’ courageous retreat at Delium rather than on Socrates’ Homeric misquotation. Plato, therefore, revises the Diomedean/Lachean assumption that retreat is cowardice by adding on the basis of Thucydides’ narrative that certain instances retreat may be courageous if that retreat is calculated and prudent. While Plato’s own description of Socrates at Delium serves as his own historical case-in-point, the theme of ‘prudent pursuit and flight’ is the philosophical target of the dialectic between Socrates and Laches.

26 For a full discussion of Socrates’ military career, see M. Anderson (2005) 273-89.

The International Journal of the PlatonicDownloaded Tradition from Brill.com10/03/2021 8 (2014) 72-9 03:00:00AM1 via free access Philosophical Pursuit and Flight 87

The allusion to Homer in Socrates’ response to Laches’ initial definition of courage, therefore, serves as a starting point for the interrogation of courage rather than proof for Socrates’ objection. Though Socrates’ suggestion about courageous retreat initially manages to provoke shallow agreement from Laches, based on his knowledge of Socrates, not Homer, the remainder of the discussion reveals that Laches is unwilling to accept Socrates’ revisions to his visceral understanding of manly courage. Socrates first attempts to convince Laches to rethink his understanding of courage and broaden its semantic sphere from virtue on the battlefield to include other pursuits: coping with sickness and poverty or resisting bodily pleasures and temptations, for exam- ple (191d-e). Absent from Socrates’ litany is courage in the face of philosophical challenges, although it is precisely in this direction that Socrates wants to lead him, as we will see below. Laches, however, is unable (or perhaps unwilling) to think outside the realm of warfare. His second definition, that courage is “steadfastness of soul” (καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς) amounts to little more than a rewording of his first, given that “steadfastness” is essentially “standing one’s ground” (192b-c). Recognizing this, Socrates concedes that steadfastness is certainly a quality of courage, but adds that it must also be accompanied by prudence. He thus implies that any good definition of courage must involve knowledge or calculated thought: knowing when to be steadfast and when not to be. It is this combination of prudence with steadfastness that Socrates points to in the Homeric misquotation—a philosophical ideal that Laches is unwilling to accept. When Socrates encourages Laches to be “steadfast in the search” (καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει ἐπιμείνωμέν τε καὶ καρτερήσωμεν), Laches admits defeat at the hands of the argument, claiming that he “is unaccustomed to such speeches” (καίτοι ἀήθης γ’ εἰμὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων) and though he “does perceive in his mind what courage is, it just fled away from him and cannot define it” (νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας ὅτι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δ’ ὅπῃ με ἄρτι διέφυγεν, ὥστε μὴ συλλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὴν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν, 194a-b). It is at this moment that the narratives of Aeneas horses, Mantinea, and the dialogue itself come together. Despite Socrates’ request for Laches to remain ‘steadfast’ in his argument, Laches casts his retreat as a victory. The definition of courage “fled away from him,” he did not flee it, and he is a man of action, not speeches. Like Aeneas and Diomedes, therefore, Laches is presented with the choice to pursue or flee the dialectic. He chooses flight. Reading this against Laches’ death scene in Thucydides, in which Laches impulsively pursued when he should have fled, we can see that in the Laches, Plato presents opposite scenarios: unlike the horses of Aeneas, Laches did not know when “to pursue and flee” because in the dialogue, he fled when he should have pursued and, in Thucydides, he pursued when he should have fled. This moment of

The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionDownloaded 8 ( from2014 Brill.com10/03/2021) 72-91 03:00:00AM via free access 88 Maiullo

Platonic irony, in which only Plato and his audience can fully appreciate the implications of Laches’ inability to make prudent decisions about pursuit and flight, raises the question about whether the result would have been different for Laches at Mantinea had Laches accepted Socrates’ challenge and actually “known when to pursue and when to flee.” Laches thus represents for Plato the perfect paradigm for restaging the normative ideas about courage found in Greek literature within the dialogue with the non-normative Socrates. Plato, therefore, by invoking these two narratives through the paradigm of Laches, employs both history and poetry as precedents for his own philosophical project.

Conclusion

This dialogue, as well as the above reading, shows that, for Plato, understanding the past is crucial for a philosophical understanding of future action. In a dialogue that begins with concerns about avoiding present errors and mistakes in future generations, as the text’s extended prologue evinces, Plato examines, through Homer and Thucydides, how traditional views about courage have influenced poor decisions in war and, in the case of Laches, in philosophy as well. At the end of the dialogue, after Nicias’ failed attempt to relieve Laches by defining courage as knowing good and evil for the past, present, and future, Socrates suggests that the men continue their search for a better teacher. He recognizes that their continued effort will make them appear ridiculous in the eyes of their contemporaries, but advises that they should “confront them with a saying of Homer: Modesty is not a good companion for a man in need” (τὸν Ὅμηρον δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι προβάλλεσθαι, ὃς ἔφη οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι αἰδῶ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι, 201a-b). This direct (changed only to fit the grammatical context) quotation from Odyssey 17.347 evokes Odysseus dressed as a beggar, about to be ridiculed and attacked by the suitors for asking for scraps of food. But, as any reader of the Odyssey will know, he is no beggar, but a hero waiting for the right time to exact his revenge and emerge victorious. Laches was no Odysseus, as my reading of Thucydides above suggests, because Odysseus knew when to act and when not to. But Socrates, armed with his Homer against those who ridicule his begging for knowledge and wisdom, shows that the true hero is the one who remains steadfast in the pursuit of what he needs: in this case wisdom and knowledge, food for the mind and soul. When we compare the Laches of Thucydides and Plato with Socrates, who showed in the Apology and Phaedo both unwavering courage in the face of death and a steadfast unwillingness to retreat from the philosophical challenges of fifth-century Athens, we see that

The International Journal of the PlatonicDownloaded Tradition from Brill.com10/03/2021 8 (2014) 72-9 03:00:00AM1 via free access Philosophical Pursuit and Flight 89 the Laches itself offers a paradigm for the sons of Lysimachus, Melesias, and, for that matter, any reader of the text, to take a hard philosophical look at the present and past not only in history, but also in literature. The Laches, therefore, represents an exercise in the philosophical reading of the texts and sources that shape the world views of its readers, who must determine for themselves which goals to pursue and which to flee. We should reject Diomedes/Aeneas- Laches in favor of Odysseus-Socrates and continue to search for the best possible life.

Bibliography

Anderson, M. 2005. “Socrates as Hoplite.” Ancient Philosophy 25, 273-89. Batstone, W. 2009. “Postmodern Historiographical Theory and the Roman Historians,” in A. Feldherr (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 24-40. Bernardete, S. 1963. “Some Misquotations of Homer in Plato.” Phronesis 8.2, 173-8. Blondell, R. 2002. The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bonitz, H. 1871. “Zur Erklärung platonischer Dialoge,” Hermes 5, 413-42. Bowen, A. 1988. “On Interpreting Plato,” in C. Griswold (ed.), Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings. London: Routledge, 49-65. Brandwood, L. 1992. “Stylometry and Chronology,” in R. Kraut (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 90-120. Brickhouse, T. and N. Smith. 1997. “Socrates and the Unity of the Virtues.” The Journal of Ethics. 1.4, 311-24. Clay, D. 2000. Platonic Questions: Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Devereux, D. 1992. “The Unity of the Virtues in Plato’s Laches and Protagoras.” The Philosophical Review 101.4, 765-89. Elias, J. 1984. Plato’s Defense of Poetry. Albany: SUNY Press. Emlyn-Jones, C. 1999. “Dramatic Structure and Cultural Context in Plato’s Laches.” The Classical Quarterly 49.1, 123-38. Fendt, G. and D. Rozema. 1998. Platonic Errors: Plato, A kind of Poet. Westport: Greenwood University Press. Gadamer, H.G. 1980. Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P.C. Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press. Gould, C. 1987. “Socratic Intellectualism and the Problem of Courage: An Interpretation of Plato’s Laches.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 4.3, 765-89.

The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionDownloaded 8 ( from2014 Brill.com10/03/2021) 72-91 03:00:00AM via free access 90 Maiullo

Griswold, C. 1999. “E Pluribus Unum: On the Platonic ‘Corpus.’” Ancient Philosophy 19, 361-97. ———. 1986. “Philosophy, Education, and Courage in Plato’s Laches.” Interpretation 14.2-3, 177-93. Guthrie, W.K.C. 1975. A History of Greek Philosophy: Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heiden, B. 2008. Homer’s Cosmic Fabrication: Choice and Design in the Iliad. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1998. “The Placement of Book Divisions in the Iliad.” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 118, 68-81. Hoerber, R. 1968. “Plato’s Laches.” Classical Philology 63, 95-105. Kagan, D. 1981. The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition: Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kahn, C. 1996. Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaldellis, A. 2004. Procopius of Caesarea. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Labarbe, J. 1949. L’Homère de Platon. Liège. Lombardo, S., trans. 1997. Homer’s Iliad. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Mitscherling. J. 2009. The Image of a Second Sun: Plato on Poetry, Rhetoric, and the Techne of Mimesis. Amherst: Humanity Books. ———. 2005. ‘Plato’s Misquotation of the Poets.’ Classical Quarterly 55, 295-8. Nichols, J. 1987. “On the Laches,” In T. Pangle (ed.), The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 269-80. Nightingale, A. 1995. Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Brien, M. 1971. “The Unity of the Laches,” in J. Anton and G. Kustas (eds.) Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Albany: SUNY Press, 303-25. Orwin, C. 1994. The Humanity of Thucydides. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Penner, T. 1992. “What Laches and Nicias Miss—And Whether Socrates Thinks Courage is Merely a Part of Virtue.” Ancient Philosophy 12, 1-27. Plancic, Z. 2003. Plato through Homer: Poetry and Philosophy in the Cosmological Dialogues. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Rosen, S. 1988. The Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry: Studies in Ancient Thought. London: Routledge. Santas, G. 1969. “Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato’s Laches.” Review of Metaphysics 22, 433-60. Schmid, W. 1992. On Manly Courage: A Study of Plato’s Laches. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

The International Journal of the PlatonicDownloaded Tradition from Brill.com10/03/2021 8 (2014) 72-9 03:00:00AM1 via free access Philosophical Pursuit and Flight 91

Smyth, H.W. and G. Messing (rev.). 2002. Greek Grammar, 21st printing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Tessitore, A. 2004. “Courage and Comedy in Plato’s Laches.” The Journal of Politics 56.1, 115-33. Umphrey, S. 1976. “Plato’s Laches on Courage.” Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 10.2, 14-22. Vlastos, G. 1991. Socrates, Ironist, and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Zuckert, C. 2009. Plato’s Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

The International Journal of the Platonic TraditionDownloaded 8 ( from2014 Brill.com10/03/2021) 72-91 03:00:00AM via free access