IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin 2011 REVIEW
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
SEPTEMBER | 1 IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin 2011 REVIEW 3 ANGOLA IN 2011: WEST AFRICA, ASIA, AND SECURITY EXPORTS Vasco Martins IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin: 2011 Review | 3 Angola in 2011: West Africa, Asia, and Security Exports VASCO MARTINS Researcher, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) 2011 has been a year of change in the African continent. the slogans “32 é muito” (32 is too much), in reference When pundits and observers pondered African politics in to the number of years Angolan President José Eduardo 2010, most pointed to the upcoming elections in Angola, dos Santos has held power.1 Even when the acquisition, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Zimbabwe manifestation and usage of power in Africa begs for a as a source of political conflict. However, apart from the different analytical approach than the western model of Côte d’Ivoire, change and political conflict erupted not power or state power, African leaders are nevertheless in sub-Saharan Africa but mainly in northern Africa. not ambiguous to manifestations of popular discontent, Instead, a revolt in Tunisia in December 2010 triggered a which ultimately provide feedback on the acceptability wave of regime change that is having a profound impact and legitimacy of each leader. The possible succession of on how countries like Angola and Zimbabwe arrange President José Eduardo dos Santos – although unclear their foreign policy and organize their political inclination as to who would replace the decade long leader – might in the international arena in 2011. Before the Arab open pockets of conflict, as a disgruntled population is Spring, Africa had a number of authoritarian leaders who faced with the opportunity of overturning the regime. had been in power for decades. Yet, in less than half a Inserted in a climate of possible political instability with year only Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Uganda elections, successions and several demonstrations, the and Zimbabwe in sub-Saharan Africa were under the Angolan government was forced to invest more of its rule of long standing leaders. Such an intense decrease political resources and time in dealing with potential in- in number had deep consequences inside each country. ternal situations than in raw foreign policy, even though The revolts’ quick pace, images of popular mobilization certain vectors of it, namely security exports – related to and a sense of inevitably that change would indeed come, military missions and the passing of security know-how provoked a counter-current of containment by many to other countries –, financial investment and a focus on African governments, both domestically and externally. new and old regions was maintained. Angola is a somewhat politically closed country. Besides exhibiting features of profound social trauma its Angola and West Africa government is accused by many of having authoritarian The foreign policy of Angola toward West Africa in 2011 tendencies that underpin the reasons for the social revolved around the electoral conflict of the Côte d’Ivoire, agitation of late. Angola and Zimbabwe have presidential opposing Alassane Ouattara to Laurent Gbagbo, and in elections scheduled for 2012, which under the present the establishment of a security sector reform mission in circumstances will have to provide some degree of change Guinea-Bissau. British ambassador to Angola Richard inside each country. Even though it is hard to speak of an Wildash stated that “the international community until Arab precedent as an inevitable foreign paradigm hitting now does not understand the importance of Angola in the sub-Saharan African countries, perhaps even following region and the world”,2 while pointing to the country’s ca- any type of domino-theory, these events must not be pacity to settle and negotiate conflicts, as currently wit- disregarded by the slightest, as the possibility of achieving nessed in the Côte d’Ivoire.3 Indeed, ambassador Richard political change in Angola is already at work in the minds of a discontent, though traumatized, population. 1 “Centenas de mensagens SMS contestam José Eduardo dos Santos” (Voice of Following the Arab revolts, youth protests began to be America, 26 August 2011). organized and started taking the streets of Angola, often 2 “International community should understand importance of Angola” (Angola- Press, 17 January 2011). meeting violent police crackdown. The demonstrations 3 See Paulo Gorjão, “Côte d’Ivoire: A test tube for Angola’s regional policy?” (IPRIS which began on 7 March 2011 carried among others, Viewpoints, No. 29, December 2010); and, Vasco Martins, “An unshaken alliance: Angola’s stance in the Côte d’Ivoire” (IPRIS Viewpoints, No. 41, March 2011). IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin: 2011 Review | 4 Wildash is very close to the truth. Angola had a very im- with the first joint commission between the two countries portant role in the unraveling of the Côte d’Ivoire crisis, on 9 April 2011,6 a meeting mostly based on energy coop- mainly due to old connections between the party in power eration. With regard to Guinea-Bissau, the country rep- in Angola, the MPLA, and Laurent Gbagbo. Many leaders resents a stronghold of Angolan presence and influence and international organizations flew to Luanda to seek in West Africa. With the signing of the technical-military President José Eduardo dos Santos and gauge his posi- assistance protocol which created a joint military mission tion regarding the crisis in the Côte d’Ivoire. The results to Bissau (MISSANG), to support Bissau’s security sector of these meetings would show reform, both countries have en- the more attentive observer of hanced their bilateral relations Angolan politics the magnitude Before the ‘Arab Spring’, significantly. On 26 December of the country’s influence in MISSANG had its first challenge, African affairs. As mentioned Africa had a number of with troop movements absent above, although having an elu- of clear leadership provoking sive position on the subject, authoritarian leaders what seemed to be an attempt Angola did support Laurent at coup d’état in Bissau.7 Re- Gbagbo for the most part, even who had been in power portedly, Angolan troops fired attempting to convince other for decades. Yet, in less shots at the insurgents who African leaders to change their were attempting to kidnap the position against Ouattara, an than half a year only Prime Minister, Carlos Gomes endeavor which had its de- Júnior, who sought shelter at gree of success. Many are the Angola, Equatorial Guinea, the Angolan embassy in Bissau. reports of African leaders vis- The involvement of the Angolan iting Luanda and suddenly an- Cameroon, Uganda and military forces in the crisis was nouncing their country’s posi- greatly criticized by the political tion towards the Côte d’Ivoire Zimbabwe in sub-Saharan opposition in Bissau, arguing it electoral crisis had changed, Africa were under the rule was unacceptable for a Prime recognizing a degree of legiti- Minister to rely on foreign ‘oc- macy in Laurent Gbagbo’s ac- of long standing leaders. cupation’ forces rather than tions, a claim which matched the country’s military as a se- Angola’s stance. Benin and Such an intense decrease curity detail.8 Even though the Equatorial Guinea changed situation remained peaceful, their position and stood beside in number had deep Angola’s role in the crisis was Angola in solving the crisis in seen as crucial in maintaining a pro-Gbagbo fashion. Guinea consequences inside each the very fragile political stability Conakry’s Alpha Condé praised country. of Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, only Angola’s stance on the crisis countries with excellent rela- as pushing towards a peaceful tions with their partners would solution. These countries, along with Cape Verde and São not only allow and cherish a foreign military presence Tomé and Príncipe, had several meetings with high-level on their soil but also sponsor its capacity to intervene if Angolan politicians, mostly with President José Eduardo needed. Such is the case between Angola and Guinea- dos Santos, Foreign Minister George Chicoti and National Bissau. Assembly President António Paulo Kassoma. Nonethe- Angola is increasingly seen as a rich country, with re- less, the international political game does not come free spectable economic growth estimates and a very strong of charge, as Angola would have to compensate its part- presence in the oil business scene in Africa. Many African ners for their political support in the Côte d’Ivoire file. countries understand that dealing directly with Angola – Hence, after Alpha Condé praised Angola’s efforts in the thus bypassing the textbook international organization Côte d’Ivoire on 28 January 2011, on 17-18 March both approach – can provide new and profitable frameworks countries held a bilateral commission meeting, discuss- for cooperation in the short term, taking into consider- ing topics related to defense and security framework ation the quick pace at which Angola is able to project cooperation.4 Equatorial Guinea applied the same mo- political and financial power in order to celebrate new dus operandi, revealing its support to Angola on the Côte 5 d’Ivoire question on 10 February 2011 and was rewarded 6 “Angola: Govt. and Equatorial Guinea join commission deemed as positive” (An- golaPress, 9 April 2011). 4 “Angola: nation, Guinea Conakry finalise defence, security talks” (AngolaPress, 7 “Troops fire weapons in Guinea Bissau capital” (Voice of America, 26 December 18 March 2011). 2011). 5 “Angola: Equatorial Guinea supports peaceful solution in Côte d’Ivoire” (Ango- 8 “Guiné-Bissau: Angolanos são “força de ocupação estrangeira” (Voice of Amer- laPress, 10 February 2011). ica, 28 December 2011). IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin: 2011 Review | 5 deals. Recently, Angola has been opening new political as a ‘check and balance’ to Angolan diplomatic activity and economic opportunities in Africa – especially in West in the region, which explains why Angola as so far been Africa – by exporting stability through enhancing secu- interacting only with smaller, less influential countries.