DOCSLIB.ORG

Rhere Were Also Rumours in Early 1967 (Eg in El Bahar) About the Brawidjaya

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Rhere Were Also Rumours in Early 1967 (Eg in El Bahar) About the Brawidjaya Liem Bian Kee (Jusuf Wanandi) 11 February 1971 At first no one in Kap-Gestapu thought of opposing BK, including Subchan. It was only in February when BK criticised the demonstators along with Chaeral and Subandrio at a Front Nasional meeting that they became anti-BK. Chaerul Saleh was strongly anti-PK!. But he was not strongly with the Kap-Gestapu. In November Ali Murtopo went to him for money for the big Kap-Gestapu rally. He asked Chaerul whether he was pro or anti-Suharto. Eventually Chaerul gave the money. Earlier he had refused LBK when LBK asked. Various Partindo people such as Amunanto (and one other who was more important?) were behind the ideal of the Front Nasional Gaya Baru, which was to be organised like the army with Seksi/lntell, Seksi II? Etc. It was to be the Barisan Soekarno setjara fisik. Ultimately the political parties would e greatly weakened in such a Front. This was put forward by Chaerul in the rally in Feb 66. Ruslan was a rival of Subandrio. Unlike Chaerul, Ruslan cultivated good relations with Yani. After the coup, Ruslan was often used by Suharto to make approaches quietly to Sukarno, especially in the field of foreign policy. When Nasution was dismissed from Cabinet in Feb 66, Suharto told him to refuse; however Nasution was not prepared to force a showdown. Thus Suharto was forced to go slowly. The SUAD decided on a plan to metjulik and maybe kill Subandrio, Jusuf Muda Dalam and some other ministers. Suharto was present at the meeting. The implementation was left to Kemal, Sarwo and Ali Murtopo. Suharto did not know of the details. It was decided to move at the cabinet meeting on 11 '" March. Suharto was sick at home. The ministers were to be arrested as they left. However Suadi had already 'botjor' to Sukarno about the plan (This is why he was arrested in 1969). Thus when the troops appeared in front of the palace, BK was very startled as he did not quite know who was to be 'ditjilik'. He fled to the KKO camp at Tji. .. but they were not prepared to take action. He then went on to Bogor. Meanwhile a startled Amir Mahmud reported to Suharto who then took the steps that led to Supersemar. At the time a number of Siliwangi battalions were in Djakarta to assist in maintaining order. Earlier Adjie had been approached to provide 'backing' for an action in Djakarta but he always replied 'belum siap'. Thus the plan had to be postponed until it went ahead without a guarantee from Adjie. Adjie did nothing positive to aid BK but also did nothing to help Suharto. The PETIR movement was headed by Kol Bambang Supeno. Those involved were arrested before the Sidang lstimewa MPRS although the announcement followed much later. There were rumours of a plan to mentjulik BK in Surabaya but no one knows what the real plan was. Possibly it was just psywar on the part of the AD itself so that they would have a reason to prevent B going to Surabaya. ;rhere were also rumours in early 1967 (eg in El Bahar) about the Brawidjaya. In fact the Brawidjaya was firmly in the hands of Sumitro who appeared to be pro PNI Asu onjy because of the need to balance the Muslims .(including KAMI which was dominated by Muslims). Thus the Brawidjaya would not have taken action in support of BK in 1967) .• Sukendro had been a rival of Ali Murtopo for a long time. BK sent him to the Thai border to meet Ghazali in order to request Malaysian accession to Indonesia's demands. Ali Murtopo confronted Subandrio in Bangkok. Then Sukendro accused Ali Murtopo of being invoved in smuggling from Malaysia (in the early part of 1965) Sukendro-was 'sakit hati' in 1967 and spread reports about opposition to Suharto in Dutch newspapers. He was arrested in mid-67 as a warning. At the time of the 1967 MPRS the danger of civil law was very real. The navy placed the Armada in Teluk Djakarta and trained missiles from the KKO camp at Tji... on the RPKAD camp at Tjidjantung. The RPKAD was then evacuated. In addition the KKO had about 20,000 men (about two divisions) in Djakarta, Tjirebon etc. (Altogether the KKO had about 40-50,000 throughout Indonesia. In addition in Djakarta, the Police could have mobilised 10,000. On the other hand, the army had about 50-60,000 or more troops in Djakarta. Suharto's line at the MPRS must be seen against this background. Suharto refused to take the oath as Pd President but only as Pengen ... Tap 33. In the disussions before the MPRS Suharto arranged a meeting between the Panglima and the parties to show each side how he was being pushed by the other side. BK could have hung on as President even as late as December 1966. Earlier at the time of the 1966 MPRS Suharto had suggested that BK hand over his powers but remain as President. BK refused. Jn the latter part of 1966 BK saw all his policies being revised so became more aggressive, especially for the August 17 speech onwards. Kemal Idris was very close to PSI. Dharsono was also influenced by PSI. They were the most strongly anit-party. Others like Witono and Solihin were also anti-party but were not prepared to take a line in conflict with the AD. Sarwo Edhy is bodoh and follows anyone. Ishak Djuarsa was influenced by Masjumi. He was not so much pro-pembaruhan but anti-PNI. Jasin is very different again. The independent group was encouraged but it was made clear that the PSI would re-emerge. However Omar Khayyam (who knows nothing about politics but was completely influence by 'Koko) went ahead to form the Gerakan Pebangunan without such people as Mochtar Lubis, Mashuri Bujung, Nasution etc with the result that the Gerakan simply became the PSI again. For this reason it was stopped. The AD hasil? were accepted because of the influence of Suwato but they were not properly considered. In 1967 they were pushed aside. Suharto did not want to implement the RU Pemilu by decree because this would be undemocratic and also the parties had some influence. Suharto realised that Indonesia was not Djakarta and Bandung. Achmad Wirahadinata (?) was Kas Kostrad under Soeharto. He was replaces by Kemal. He then became Ass I of KOT! Gaya Baru. However he was pushed side because he would not take a firm line on BK. Ali Murtopo was under Yani at Boolali from 1952-56. Then he was brought to Semarang by Suharto where he became Wakil Assistan V. In 1958-59 he was sent to Bukittinggi as Kepala Staf below Yoga. Then in 1960 (?Suharto was digeser and Ali went with him to the newly formed (Kostrad) under its old name. At the time of the coup, Sudjono was Kepala one of the Bogor (?) of Ass VIII. Then he became Wakil Ass VII under Alamsyah. Then he entered SPRI. Sudirgo was in CPM, then Ass I, then BAKIN. After the arrest of Rukman, it was revealed that he knew of G-30-5 in advance. Thus he was arrested in 1968. He was not suspected before then. Similarly Rukman, as lnspektor-Jenderal AD had access to all papers in AD until 1968. Buiung Nasution, 5 February 1971. The Independent Group was formed shortly after the MPRS Sidang lstimewa. The first meeting was held at Bujung's house. Among those present were Bujung, Omar Khayyam, Mashuri, Fuad Hassan and Suleiman Soemardi. The purpose was to form a new political party. The group had the support of generals like Dharsono and Kemal. At their July meeting in Malang, the Panglima Se-Djawa agreed to support the formation of the Independent Group. Also Adam Malik sent representatives to the meetings. The split in the independent group occurred in about January 1968 over the issue of new seats in the DPR. Would the Independent Group as a group demand seats in the DPR? Bujung was opposed on the ground that the independent group was still in its early stage with a strong basis only in Bandung and Djakarta. Omar Khayam wanted to go ahead with the foundation of the 'Gerakan Pembangunan' with himself as leader. Mashuri did not want to accept Omar Khayam as leader so he opposed the plan. Eventually Omar Khayam was left without support and the group faded away. Bujung says that Opsus played a big role in the break-up. Immediately afterwards parties appeared in front of his house dismissing the Independent group as an effort to revive PSI. The final meeting in which the split occurred was held at Mashuri's house and attended by 7 leaders including - Mashuri, Omar Khayyam, Sudjatmoko, Bujung and three others. lmron Kadir from Universitas lbnu Chaldur played a big role in KASI in 1967. It had been decided to organise KASI Banking, KASI Higher Education etc. In the case of higher education, the universitas swasta were invited to send representatives without checking whether they in fact were members of KASI. lmron Kadir entered in this way and quickly became Ketua of KASI Pedidikan Tinggi. There he used KASI as a forum to struggle for the interests of the private universities. He also issued anti-Chinese statements. Eventually the KASI Pusat had to remove him from power. Johny Naro is a good friend of Bujung's but B admits that Naro had a 'nama yang kurang baik' as a Djaksa (possibly as a result of pemerasan).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 50 Years Since 30 September, 1965: the Gradual Erosion of a Political Taboo
    ISSUE: 2015 NO.66 ISSN 2335-6677 RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE SHARE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT EVENTS Singapore | 26 November 2015 50 Years since 30 September, 1965: The Gradual Erosion of a Political Taboo. By Max Lane* EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This year marks the 50th anniversary of the events of 30 September, 1965 and its aftermath. Amidst heightened discussion of the matter, President Widodo, on behalf of his government, stated that there would be no state expression of being sorry for the large scale massacres of 1965. He attended conventional activities on the anniversary consistent with the long-term narrative originating from the period of Suharto’s New Order. At the same time, there are signs of a gradual but steady erosion of the hegemony of the old narrative and an opening up of discussion. This is not driven by deliberate government policy, although some government decisions have facilitated the emergence of a generation for whom the hegemonic narrative holds less weight. The processes weakening the old hegemony have also been fostered by: a) Increased academic openness on the history of the period, both in and outside of Indonesia. b) More activity by lawyers, activists, researchers as well as former political prisoners demanding state recognition of human rights violations in 1965 and afterwards. c) A general attitude to educational processes no longer dominated by indoctrination concerns. 1 ISSUE: 2015 NO.66 ISSN 2335-6677 Hegemony may be slowly ending, but it is not clear what will replace it. *Max Lane is Visiting Senior Fellow with the Indonesia Studies Programme at ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute, and has written hundreds of articles on Indonesia for magazines and newspapers.
    [Show full text]
  • Guide to the Asian Collections at the International Institute of Social History
    Guide to the Asian Collections at the International Institute of Social History Emile Schwidder & Eef Vermeij (eds) Guide to the Asian Collections at the International Institute of Social History Emile Schwidder Eef Vermeij (eds) Guide to the Asian Collections at the International Institute of Social History Stichting beheer IISG Amsterdam 2012 2012 Stichting beheer IISG, Amsterdam. Creative Commons License: The texts in this guide are licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 license. This means, everyone is free to use, share, or remix the pages so licensed, under certain conditions. The conditions are: you must attribute the International Institute of Social History for the used material and mention the source url. You may not use it for commercial purposes. Exceptions: All audiovisual material. Use is subjected to copyright law. Typesetting: Eef Vermeij All photos & illustrations from the Collections of IISH. Photos on front/backcover, page 6, 20, 94, 120, 92, 139, 185 by Eef Vermeij. Coverphoto: Informal labour in the streets of Bangkok (2011). Contents Introduction 7 Survey of the Asian archives and collections at the IISH 1. Persons 19 2. Organizations 93 3. Documentation Collections 171 4. Image and Sound Section 177 Index 203 Office of the Socialist Party (Lahore, Pakistan) GUIDE TO THE ASIAN COLLECTIONS AT THE IISH / 7 Introduction Which Asian collections are at the International Institute of Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam? This guide offers a preliminary answer to that question. It presents a rough survey of all collections with a substantial Asian interest and aims to direct researchers toward historical material on Asia, both in ostensibly Asian collections and in many others.
    [Show full text]
  • Perspective of the 1945 Constitution As a Democratic Constitution Hotma P
    Comparative Study of Post-Marriage Nationality Of Women in Legal Systems of Different Countries http://ijmmu.com [email protected] International Journal of Multicultural ISSN 2364-5369 Volume 7, Issue 1 and Multireligious Understanding February, 2020 Pages: 779-792 A Study on Authoritarian Regime in Indonesia: Perspective of the 1945 Constitution as a Democratic Constitution Hotma P. Sibuea1; Asmak Ul Hosnah2; Clara L. Tobing1 1 Faculty of Law University Bhayangkara Jakarta, Indonesia F2 Faculty of Law University Pakuan, Indonesia http://dx.doi.org/10.18415/ijmmu.v7i1.1453 Abstract The 1945 Constitution is the foundation of the constitution of Indonesia founded on the ideal of Pancasila that comprehend democratic values. As a democratic constitution, the 1945 Constitution is expected to form a constitutional pattern and a democratic government system. However, the 1945 Constitution has never formed a state structure and a democratic government system since it becomes the foundation of the constitution of the state of Indonesia in the era of the Old Order, the New Order and the reform era. Such conditions bear the question of why the 1945 Constitution as a democratic constitution never brings about the pattern of state administration and democratic government system. The conclusion is, a democratic constitution, the 1945 Constitution has never formed a constitutional structure and democratic government system because of the personal or group interests of the dominant political forces in the Old Order, the New Order and the reformation era has made the constitutional style and the system of democratic governance that cannot be built in accordance with the principles of democratic law reflected in the 1945 Constitution and derived from the ideals of the Indonesian law of Pancasila.
    [Show full text]
  • Indonesia and the Mass Killings of 1965-1966 Indonesia Indonesia
    Indonesia and the Mass Killings of 1965-1966 Indonesia Indonesia Location: Southeast Asia; consists of 5 large islands and about 13,677 smaller islands; Capital city: Jakarta Fourth largest Asian country after China, India, and Saudi Arabia – by 2050, will have the 4th largest world economy Topography: Islands filled with active and inactive volcanoes; earthquakes and tsunamis often devastate Indonesia (1992, 2004) Indonesia Population: 221,932,000; #4 in population among the 193 nations in the world Primary language: Bahasa Indonesia; secondary languages: Malay, Javanese, English, Dutch, among many others Indonesia Religion: Islam (over 88%) Protestant (over 5%) Roman Catholic (over 3%) Hindu (almost 2%) Buddhist (almost 1%) Indonesia Colonial influences: Dutch; Portuguese Beginning 20th century – first steps were taken to give Indonesians participation in government 1945 – Independent republic of Indonesia under leadership of Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta Indonesia Sukarno became the first President of Indonesia; Hatta, Vice- President in 1949 In the next two decades, communist leadership and agitation would increase, resulting in the Mass Killings of 65- 66 September 30th Movement, 1965 Claimed to be protecting President Sukarno from right-wing faction of the army planning a coup of their own After Yani’s death, Major General Suharto took command of the army and on October 1st, launched a counter-attack Suharto’s success in removing rebel forces launched the decline in Sukarno’s leadership and the rise of Suharto Suharto and the Killings Suharto accused the Communist party (PKI) of masterminding the coup and used this rationale to exterminate anyone associated with the PKI Suharto’s military rounded up more than a million and a half people who were accused of being involved with the PKI (Roosa 4).
    [Show full text]
  • Management of Communism Issues in the Soekarno Era (1959-1966)
    57-67REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL GEOGRAPHICAL EDUCATION ISSN: 2146-0353 ● © RIGEO ● 11(5), SPRING, 2021 www.rigeo.org Research Article Management of Communism Issues in The Soekarno Era (1959-1966) Abie Besman1 Dian Wardiana Sjuchro2 Faculty of Communication Science, Universitas Faculty of Communication Science, Universitas Padjadjaran Padjadjaran [email protected] Abstract The focus of this research is on the handling of the problem of communism in the Nasakom ideology through the policies and patterns of political communication of President Soekarno's government. The Nasakom ideology was used by the Soekarno government since the Presidential Decree in 1959. Soekarno's middle way solution to stop the chaos of the liberal democracy period opened up new conflicts and feuds between the PKI and the Indonesian National Army. The compromise management style is used to reduce conflicts between interests. The method used in this research is the historical method. The results showed that the approach adopted by President Soekarno failed. Soekarno tried to unite all the ideologies that developed at that time, but did not take into account the political competition between factions. This conflict even culminated in the events of September 30 and the emergence of a new order. This research is part of a broader study to examine the management of the issue of communism in each political regime in Indonesia. Keywords Nasakom; Soekarno; Issue Management; Communism; Literature Study To cite this article: Besman, A.; and Sj uchro, D, W. (2021) Management of Communism Issues in The Soekarno Era (1959-1966). Review of International Geographical Education (RIGEO), 11(5), 48-56.
    [Show full text]
  • Special Open Forum USINDO History Series Indonesia's September 30, 1965 Movement and the Beginning of the Suharto Era: Enhancin
    Special Open Forum USINDO History Series Indonesia's September 30, 1965 Movement and the Beginning of the Suharto Era: Enhancing our Understanding Drawing on Recently Released U.S. Records November 29, 2017 Speaker: Dr. Bradley Simpson Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Connecticut Founder and Director, Indonesia and East Timor Documentation Project National Security Archive Discussants: Dr. Barbara Harvey Retired Foreign Service Officer and USINDO Advisor Ambassador Robert Pringle Historian of Southeast Asia, Retired Foreign Service Officer, former Ambassador to Mali www.usindo.org Introduction and background: It has been over 50 years since September 30, 1965, a date that dramatically changed Indonesian history. A small group of Indonesians identifying themselves as the September 30 Movement, believed to be working in collaboration with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), launched an overnight strike against Indonesian generals whom they alleged were planning a coup against President Sukarno. Six top generals were killed, but General Suharto, who was not targeted, thwarted the September 30 Movement and subsequently began a military-led program to crush the PKI, which resulted in the execution of both its leaders and followers. In the ensuing power struggle with President Sukarno over Indonesia's political and economic future, Suharto consolidated his control, leading to his New Order government that lasted for 32 years. The domestic and international environment in the period leading up to September 30; the events of the night itself; the extent and nature of the actions that followed; the roles and motivations of the parties; and the knowledge, stance, and actions of the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Professionalisation of the Indonesian Military
    The Professionalisation of the Indonesian Military Robertus Anugerah Purwoko Putro A thesis submitted to the University of New South Wales In fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences July 2012 STATEMENTS Originality Statement I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged. Copyright Statement I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. Authenticity Statement I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis.
    [Show full text]
  • INDONESIA's FOREIGN POLICY and BANTAN NUGROHO Dalhousie
    INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND ASEAN BANTAN NUGROHO Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia September, 1996 O Copyright by Bantan Nugroho, 1996 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibbgraphic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant a la National Lïbraiy of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distn'buer ou copies of this thesis in microfom, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous papa or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/fïim, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substautid extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. DEDICATION To my beloved Parents, my dear fie, Amiza, and my Son, Panji Bharata, who came into this world in the winter of '96. They have been my source of strength ail through the year of my studies. May aii this intellectual experience have meaning for hem in the friture. TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents v List of Illustrations vi Abstract vii List of Abbreviations viii Acknowledgments xi Chapter One : Introduction Chapter Two : indonesian Foreign Policy A.
    [Show full text]
  • Contemporary History of Indonesia Between Historical Truth and Group Purpose
    Review of European Studies; Vol. 7, No. 12; 2015 ISSN 1918-7173 E-ISSN 1918-7181 Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education Contemporary History of Indonesia between Historical Truth and Group Purpose Anzar Abdullah1 1 Department of History Education UPRI (Pejuang University of the Republic of Indonesia) in Makassar, South Sulawesi, Indonesia Correspondence: Anzar Abdullah, Department of History Education UPRI (Pejuang University of the Republic of Indonesia) in Makassar, South Sulawesi, Indonesia. E-mail: [email protected] Received: May 28, 2015 Accepted: October 13, 2015 Online Published: November 24, 2015 doi:10.5539/res.v7n12p179 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/res.v7n12p179 Abstract Contemporary history is the very latest history at which the historic event traces are close and still encountered by us at the present day. As a just away event which seems still exists, it becomes controversial about when the historical event is actually called contemporary. Characteristic of contemporary history genre is complexity of an event and its interpretation. For cases in Indonesia, contemporary history usually begins from 1945. It is so because not only all documents, files and other primary sources have not been uncovered and learned by public yet where historical reconstruction can be made in a whole, but also a fact that some historical figures and persons are still alive. This last point summons protracted historical debate when there are some collective or personal memories and political consideration and present power. The historical facts are often provided to please one side, while disagreeable fact is often hidden from other side.
    [Show full text]
  • Adam Malik (Deppen) in MEMORIAM: ADAM MALIK A917-1984)
    144 Adam Malik (Deppen) IN MEMORIAM: ADAM MALIK a917-1984) Ruth T. McVey The great survivor is dead. Though Adam Malik was by no means the only politician to hold high office under both Guided Democracy and the New Order, he was by far the most distinguished and successful. Others were political hacks with no true political coloring, or representatives of specialized con­ stituencies not involved directly in the conflict between Sukarno and the army; but Malik had been a central figure in the formulation of Guided Democracy and a close counsellor of Sukarno. Moreover, having chosen against that leader in the crisis following the coup of October 1965, he was not thereby completely discredited in the eyes of his former colleagues. For many of his old leftist associates he remained a patron: a leader who would still receive and could occasionally aid them, who could still speak their language, if only in private, and who still—in spite of his evident wealth, Western admirers, and service to a counter-revolutionary regime—seemed to embody what remained of the Generation of ’45, the fading memories of a radical and optimistic youth. To survive so successfully, a man must either be most simple and consistent, or quite the opposite. No one could accuse Adam Malik of transparency, yet there was a consistency about the image he cultivated. From early youth he appeared as a radical nationalist, a man of the left; and however unsympathetic the regime to that viewpoint he never allowed the pursuit of ambition completely to cloud that picture.
    [Show full text]
  • Democracy in Indonesia
    Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1994-06 Democracy in Indonesia Kusmayati, Anne Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/28094 DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Democracy In Indonesia by Anne JKusmayati Civilian Staff, Indonesian Department of Defense Engineering in Community Nutrition and Family Resources, Bogor Agricultural University, 1983. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June, 1994 David R. Wfiipple, Jr.,j£hairman REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204. Arlington. VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 1994. Master's Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA 6. AUTHOR(S): Anne Kusmayati 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.
    [Show full text]
  • Sudargo Gautama and the Development of Indonesian Public Order: a Study on the Application of Public Order Doctrine in a Pluralistic Legal System
    Sudargo Gautama and the Development of Indonesian Public Order: A Study on the Application of Public Order Doctrine in a Pluralistic Legal System Yu Un Oppusunggu A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2015 Reading Committee: John O. Haley, Chair Michael E. Townsend Beth E. Rivin Program Authorized to Offer Degree School of Law © Copyright 2015 Yu Un Oppusunggu ii University of Washington Abstract Sudargo Gautama and the Development of Indonesian Public Order: A Study on the Application of Public Order Doctrine in a Pluralistic Legal System Yu Un Oppusunggu Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Professor John O. Haley School of Law A sweeping proviso that protects basic or fundamental interests of a legal system is known in various names – ordre public, public policy, public order, government’s interest or Vorbehaltklausel. This study focuses on the concept of Indonesian public order in private international law. It argues that Indonesia has extraordinary layers of pluralism with respect to its people, statehood and law. Indonesian history is filled with the pursuit of nationhood while protecting diversity. The legal system has been the unifying instrument for the nation. However the selected cases on public order show that the legal system still lacks in coherence. Indonesian courts have treated public order argument inconsistently. A prima facie observation may find Indonesian public order unintelligible, and the courts have gained notoriety for it. This study proposes a different perspective. It sees public order in light of Indonesia’s legal pluralism and the stages of legal development.
    [Show full text]