Rhere Were Also Rumours in Early 1967 (Eg in El Bahar) About the Brawidjaya

Liem Bian Kee (Jusuf Wanandi)

11 February 1971

At first no one in Kap-Gestapu thought of opposing BK, including Subchan. It was only in February when BK criticised the demonstators along with Chaeral and Subandrio at a Front Nasional meeting that they became anti-BK.

Chaerul Saleh was strongly anti-PK!. But he was not strongly with the Kap-Gestapu. In November Ali Murtopo went to him for money for the big Kap-Gestapu rally. He asked Chaerul whether he was pro or anti-Suharto. Eventually Chaerul gave the money. Earlier he had refused LBK when LBK asked.

Various Partindo people such as Amunanto (and one other who was more important?) were behind the ideal of the Front Nasional Gaya Baru, which was to be organised like the army with Seksi/lntell, Seksi II? Etc. It was to be the Barisan Soekarno setjara fisik. Ultimately the political parties would e greatly weakened in such a Front. This was put forward by Chaerul in the rally in Feb 66.

Ruslan was a rival of Subandrio. Unlike Chaerul, Ruslan cultivated good relations with Yani. After the coup, Ruslan was often used by Suharto to make approaches quietly to Sukarno, especially in the field of foreign policy.

When Nasution was dismissed from Cabinet in Feb 66, Suharto told him to refuse; however Nasution was not prepared to force a showdown. Thus Suharto was forced to go slowly.

The SUAD decided on a plan to metjulik and maybe kill Subandrio, Jusuf Muda Dalam and some other ministers. Suharto was present at the meeting. The implementation was left to Kemal, Sarwo and Ali Murtopo. Suharto did not know of the details. It was decided to move at the cabinet meeting on 11 '" March. Suharto was sick at home. The ministers were to be arrested as they left.

However Suadi had already 'botjor' to Sukarno about the plan (This is why he was arrested in 1969). Thus when the troops appeared in front of the palace, BK was very startled as he did not quite know who was to be 'ditjilik'. He fled to the KKO camp at Tji. .. but they were not prepared to take action. He then went on to Bogor.

Meanwhile a startled Amir Mahmud reported to Suharto who then took the steps that led to Supersemar.

At the time a number of Siliwangi battalions were in Djakarta to assist in maintaining order. Earlier Adjie had been approached to provide 'backing' for an action in Djakarta but he always replied 'belum siap'. Thus the plan had to be postponed until it went ahead without a guarantee from Adjie. Adjie did nothing positive to aid BK but also did nothing to help Suharto.

The PETIR movement was headed by Kol Bambang Supeno. Those involved were arrested before the Sidang lstimewa MPRS although the announcement followed much later.

There were rumours of a plan to mentjulik BK in Surabaya but no one knows what the real plan was. Possibly it was just psywar on the part of the AD itself so that they would have a reason to prevent B going to Surabaya.

;rhere were also rumours in early 1967 (eg in El Bahar) about the Brawidjaya. In fact the Brawidjaya was firmly in the hands of Sumitro who appeared to be pro PNI Asu onjy because of the need to balance the Muslims .(including KAMI which was dominated by Muslims). Thus the Brawidjaya would not have taken action in support of BK in 1967) .• Sukendro had been a rival of Ali Murtopo for a long time. BK sent him to the Thai border to meet Ghazali in order to request Malaysian accession to Indonesia's demands. Ali Murtopo confronted Subandrio in Bangkok. Then Sukendro accused Ali Murtopo of being invoved in smuggling from Malaysia (in the early part of 1965)

Sukendro-was 'sakit hati' in 1967 and spread reports about opposition to Suharto in Dutch newspapers. He was arrested in mid-67 as a warning.

At the time of the 1967 MPRS the danger of civil law was very real.

The navy placed the Armada in Teluk Djakarta and trained missiles from the KKO camp at Tji... on the RPKAD camp at Tjidjantung. The RPKAD was then evacuated. In addition the KKO had about 20,000 men (about two divisions) in Djakarta, Tjirebon etc. (Altogether the KKO had about 40-50,000 throughout Indonesia. In addition in Djakarta, the Police could have mobilised 10,000. On the other hand, the army had about 50-60,000 or more troops in Djakarta.

Suharto's line at the MPRS must be seen against this background. Suharto refused to take the oath as Pd President but only as Pengen ... Tap 33.

In the disussions before the MPRS Suharto arranged a meeting between the Panglima and the parties to show each side how he was being pushed by the other side.

BK could have hung on as President even as late as December 1966. Earlier at the time of the 1966 MPRS Suharto had suggested that BK hand over his powers but remain as President. BK refused. Jn the latter part of 1966 BK saw all his policies being revised so became more aggressive, especially for the August 17 speech onwards.

Kemal Idris was very close to PSI. Dharsono was also influenced by PSI. They were the most strongly anit-party. Others like Witono and Solihin were also anti-party but were not prepared to take a line in conflict with the AD. Sarwo Edhy is bodoh and follows anyone. Ishak Djuarsa was influenced by Masjumi. He was not so much pro-pembaruhan but anti-PNI. Jasin is very different again.

The independent group was encouraged but it was made clear that the PSI would re-emerge. However Omar Khayyam (who knows nothing about politics but was completely influence by 'Koko) went ahead to form the Gerakan Pebangunan without such people as Mochtar Lubis, Mashuri Bujung, Nasution etc with the result that the Gerakan simply became the PSI again. For this reason it was stopped.

The AD hasil? were accepted because of the influence of Suwato but they were not properly considered. In 1967 they were pushed aside. Suharto did not want to implement the RU Pemilu by decree because this would be undemocratic and also the parties had some influence. Suharto realised that Indonesia was not Djakarta and Bandung.

Achmad Wirahadinata (?) was Kas Kostrad under Soeharto. He was replaces by Kemal. He then became Ass I of KOT! Gaya Baru. However he was pushed side because he would not take a firm line on BK.

Ali Murtopo was under Yani at Boolali from 1952-56. Then he was brought to Semarang by Suharto where he became Wakil Assistan V. In 1958-59 he was sent to Bukittinggi as Kepala Staf below Yoga. Then in 1960 (?Suharto was digeser and Ali went with him to the newly formed (Kostrad) under its old name. At the time of the coup, Sudjono was Kepala one of the Bogor (?) of Ass VIII. Then he became Wakil Ass VII under Alamsyah. Then he entered SPRI.

Sudirgo was in CPM, then Ass I, then BAKIN. After the arrest of Rukman, it was revealed that he knew of G-30-5 in advance. Thus he was arrested in 1968. He was not suspected before then. Similarly Rukman, as lnspektor-Jenderal AD had access to all papers in AD until 1968. Buiung Nasution, 5 February 1971.

The Independent Group was formed shortly after the MPRS Sidang lstimewa. The first meeting was held at Bujung's house. Among those present were Bujung, Omar Khayyam, Mashuri, Fuad Hassan and Suleiman Soemardi.

The purpose was to form a new political party.

The group had the support of generals like Dharsono and Kemal. At their July meeting in Malang, the Panglima Se-Djawa agreed to support the formation of the Independent Group.

Also Adam Malik sent representatives to the meetings.

The split in the independent group occurred in about January 1968 over the issue of new seats in the DPR. Would the Independent Group as a group demand seats in the DPR? Bujung was opposed on the ground that the independent group was still in its early stage with a strong basis only in Bandung and Djakarta. Omar Khayam wanted to go ahead with the foundation of the 'Gerakan Pembangunan' with himself as leader. Mashuri did not want to accept Omar Khayam as leader so he opposed the plan. Eventually Omar Khayam was left without support and the group faded away.

Bujung says that Opsus played a big role in the break-up. Immediately afterwards parties appeared in front of his house dismissing the Independent group as an effort to revive PSI. The final meeting in which the split occurred was held at Mashuri's house and attended by 7 leaders including - Mashuri, Omar Khayyam, Sudjatmoko, Bujung and three others. lmron Kadir from Universitas lbnu Chaldur played a big role in KASI in 1967. It had been decided to organise KASI Banking, KASI Higher Education etc. In the case of higher education, the universitas swasta were invited to send representatives without checking whether they in fact were members of KASI. lmron Kadir entered in this way and quickly became Ketua of KASI Pedidikan Tinggi. There he used KASI as a forum to struggle for the interests of the private universities. He also issued anti-Chinese statements. Eventually the KASI Pusat had to remove him from power.

Johny Naro is a good friend of Bujung's but B admits that Naro had a 'nama yang kurang baik' as a Djaksa (possibly as a result of pemerasan). He was very close to Astra which may have meant that he was known as a Partindo man, although this was not true. He was also close to certain Murba people.

The PETIR incident was probably planned at SUAS 1 (by Sudirgo?). There were some arrests at the time and even Bujung was mistakenly interrogated. David Napitupulu, 11 February 1971

Most KAMI supporters did not oppose BK at first. It was only later that attention turned to BK. However, some of the leaders were opposed from the beginning.

Sjarif Thayeb tried to bring GMNI into KAMI but GMNI refused.

Aside from Djakarta and Bandung, KAMI had little support at first. In Djakarta and Bandung, KAMI consisted of a balance between various groups while elsewhere KAMI was dominated by Islam.

David, Cosmas etc were arrested for about 5 days in February in February by Amir Machmud. Amir is a good, loyal prajurit.

After their release, Kemala told them them to move their headquarters to Ali Murtopo's unit in Taman Kebon Surah (?).

On September 30, 1966, KAMI visited Lubang Buaja. Afterwards they went to the istana. The KAMI leaders met and decided to continue the demonstrations at the palace. David personally was opp Slamet Ginting, PNI, 7-1-71.

Sia met was a member of the Central Committee of the PNI. He was Deputy Head of the organisation section under Hardi.

He approves of 'Marhaenism is Marxism diterapkan di Indonesia'. That does not mean communism. The second part of the definition is as important as the first. He also agrees with 'Kapitalism diterapkan di Indonesia'.

Hadisubeno has always ('dari tempat tidurnja') baru anti-Comm. Slamet is non-communist.

Basically both Ali and Hardi's group are anti-PKI. However Ali was 'alon2' in facing the PKI because stronger action could have upset the President's Nasakom concept. However Slamet was in favour of hitting the PKI hard although he was an Ali supporter. Ali's character is such that he does not take courageous action.

On 3rct PNI issued a statement condemning the PKI coup. Slamet among others signed it.

Slamet is not convinced about who was behind the coup.

At first the Hardi-Hadisubeno group had very little support.

The Bandung Congress was characterised by intimidation and terror. Only supporters of Osa-Usep were permitted to enter. Also many outsiders were permitted to enter to make a noise and heckle Ali supporters.

After Bandung, 'caretaker' leaderships of the regional branches were set up throughout Indonesia. In Medan this was done rather late when Sarwo Edhie came.

Sobiran adopted a 'hands off approach in clashes between PNI and KAMI-KAPP! etc. Thus the PNl's position was not really upset. It was when Sarwo came that the PNI was crushed.

Immediately after the coup the PNI was active in capturing PKI members and handing them over to the authorities. They did not take part in killing.

In 1966 Slamet and others took the view that the PNI had left its original philosophy of anti­ imperialism etc. Hadi had become too much dependent on the army. Slamet met BK and proposed the formation of the Partai Marhaen Indonesia with Sia met as Ketua. BK agreed with the plan. However the party never received a reply from him when they formally applied for recognition as a party.

At the same time BK was planning to recognise a new Muslim party based on Muhammadiyah led byl Muljano (?). However he also had no opportunity to recognised that party.

The PKl's 'Aksi Sepihak' mainly involved government-owned (and army managed) perkebunan. There was also a little aksi sepihak around Medan involving smaller peasants. Compared with Java, aksi­ pihak was small in Sumut. lmron Rosyadi (10 February 1971)

IR is from Tjirebon. He was Ketua of Ansor until 1964 when he could not be re-elected because he was in gaol. He had been Ketua IV of NU until 1959 but was pushed out by ldham etc.

In 1960-61, IR and Dahlan were the only NU leaders involved in the Liga Demokrasi. They were criticised by the other NU leaders.

In about 1961 lmron held a meeting of the Liga Demokrasi in Surabaya which was broken up by the PKI. A few days later a huge open air meeting was held. People came from near and far with golok2, sticks etc. This was not broken up. It proved that lmron had some support. Then in 1962 he was arrested on the grounds that he opposed the Development Plan.

After his release in May 66, he returned to Deplu (where he previously worked). He was sent on a secret mission to Saudi Arabia in search of credit.

Early in 1967 he was appointed to the DPR and took part in the MPRS Sidang lstimewa. The possibility of civil war was real at the time. The session was guarded by Kostrad. He did not see any evidence of a KKO attack on the session.

If an imam kentut in a prayer, he must withdraw and be replaced by another. In the case of the old NU leaders they made the mistake of supporting Sukarno and Nasakom. However, now they did not want to withdraw. At the party's Bandung congress in 1967, lmron was re-elected as one of the chairmen. In fact if he had been more active, he could have become Ketua Um um.

Q. 'Why are modernisers in NU unable to co-operate?' lmron puts agama above modernisation. He is not prepared to co-operate with those who do not put the same stress on agama. (Presumably he means Subchan).

lmron opposed Dharsono's idea of 'Dwipartai' but supports 'Dwigroup' (?)when the parties retain their identity. Because of this ldham said that lmron 'ngeker ABRI'. Zamroni, 4 February 1971

Z is from Kudus, Central Java. He was Wakil Ketua of PMll. PMll did not occupy a position of leadership in PPMI which they had only joined at the previous congress in the early 1960s. CGMI is co-operative with CMNI, dominated PPM!.

KAMI

Among the leaders of KAMI, anti-Sukarno feeling had been present even before the coup. However, for tactical reasons they pledged their support to BK. In its earliest actions until the end of December 1965 it appeared that KAMI did not represent the majority of Djakarta students who were still loyal to BK and influenced by GMNI.

Outside Djakarta and Bandung, KAMI did not develop until the beginning of 1966.

The early tactics of KAMI were to separate the followers of BK from the PK! - both in the parties as well as in the army.

Some generals were close to KAMI such as Sarwo Eddy. Witono, as Kas Kodam V, was close but Amir

Machmud remained loyal to BK. On 13th February when KAMI held a demonstration without permission KAMI leaders were arrested by Amir Mahmud and held for 5 days in a prison along with Gestapu prisoners. Those arrested included Zamroni, Cosmas and David. Hariyadi Darmawan was also arrested, although he was not a top KAMI leader.

In February Kemal Idris told KAMI to move their Markas from UI Salemba. They were unwilling to do this. Eventually they moved to Ali Murtopo's outfit at Taman Kebun Sirih. They held discussions each night in which Ali sometimes participated. This was their first contact with Ali. Zamroni and other KAMI leaders sometimes slept there.

At this stage (February) it seemed that the army including Suharto and also Nasution's staff were unwilling to take decisive action. It is very likely that the 11 March event took place without Suharto's direct knowledge.

Adjie was strongly anti-PK!. However, he was loved by BK. It was rumoured on 13th March that Adjie was preparing troops to move into Djakarta to release BK who was said to be a captive of Suharto.

Certainly many senior leaders of the NU supported BK and did not take a firm line against him until the beginning of 1967. Eg when ormas NU Bandung joined in condemning BK in August 1966 the central NU disapproved.

Subchan and lmron Rosjadi are the most modern NU leaders, but personally they are rivals. Dahlan was strongly anti BK (eg in Liga Demokrasi) but is not so modern. He is an expert politician in evaluating the relative strengths of various groups but is a poor administrator (eg Dept. Agama). At the 1967 Congress of the NU there was a Dahlan-Subchan alliance but they were defeated by the 'ulama'. At that time there had been an effort to suspend Subchan but this failed.

Zamroni personally did not agree with proportional representation. He prefers single-member constituencies.

In 1967 he led an anti-corruption campaign against Pertamina, perpadjakan and Bulog. However this brought him into conflict with AD. Medan Interviews, 1971

Effendy Nasution, 5-1-71.

Before the coup he was leader of Pemuda Pantjasila which had clashed with the PKI several times in that period.

Immediately after the coup the anti-PKI actions began. They were supported by Brigdjen Manua (?) Lubis. They attacked SOBSI and PKI buildings early in October.

Mokoginta told Effendy to help in capturing the PKI. The PKI were to be captured and handed over to ABRI. (It seems that Kemal did not have a big role in this).

Quite a number of Darjatmo's Kodam staff were 'terlibat'.

The killings were done largely by the youth led by Effendy. It took place over 5 or so months. It began in October but became intensive in November and went on to about March. All PKI elements were killed, maybe 25,000. (In Atjeh perhaps 3,500 were killed - including women and children).

Afterwards the military held a 'pendjatahan' of prisoners - 10 given to HMI, 10 to Pemuda Pantjasila etc to be finished off.

'10 December' incidents. This started with a demonstration at RRT Embassy. It spread to Chinese shops etc. 150 were killed.

After this Effendy was arrested by the CPM and held for about 20 days. In that time he was taken to Djakarta. There Brigdjen Sukandra took him along to the palace at about 8 am where he met the President who accused him of being 'racialist' and a leader of 'crossboys'. Effendy denied this.

In 1966 the campaign switched from the PKI to Asu. On June 2nct they 'arrested' 40 prominent citizens and put them in trucks and took them along to the Kodam. The citizens were accused of having co-operated with the PKI. They included NU and PSll leaders as well a judges, senior officials etc including the Governor's secretary. At the Kodam, these 'prisoners' were released and Effendy and his colleagues were arrested.

When Sarwo Edhy came, he took part in the anti-Asu campaign. Quite a number of them were arrested and in one area a lot of PKl-Asu were killed.

Sarwo was strongly opposed to PNI because once in Djateng, the PNI organised a demonstration (before the coup) in which one of the poster said 'Sarwo E - DI'.

In 1967 Effendy became a member of the DPR-GR and MPRS. He met Sarwo in Djakarta just after his appointment to Sumut was announced but before he left. He explained what the problems were etc

Sobiran was not always friendly toward Effendy.

Effendy's organisation was Komando Aksi Sumatra Utara. It co-ordinated a dozen or so Aksi. On the whole KAMI was weak. The strong elements in the command were the pemuda.

After Suharto's order legalising the LPNI, Kusno happened to be in Djakarta. Muskita was very active in putting Suharto's policy into effect.

In 1969 Effendy cs. were accused of illegal actions and in regard to the election of the walikota. A civilian defeated the army candidate. They were tried by a Hakim who had been among those 'arrested' in June 1966. In 1967 they organised a demonstration to 'arrest' Hardi who had been reported to be coming to Medan. However, in fact Hardi was in America at the time.

Effendy admits that he appeals to emotion rather than rationality.

Tambar Simadjuntak, Ketua KAMI 5-1-71

TS was Ketua of GMKI.

There had been dashes between PKI and non-PKI but not on a Javanese scale. Eg. In university and HMI there had been clashes between CGMI and HMI.

A number of senior officials were 'terlibat' including Walikota Medan and Sianter and the Bupati of Tapanuli Tengah.

On 10-10-65 a KAMP-Gestapu was formed (M for Mahasiwa). Later on 15-12-65 KAMI was founded.

PNI

There were PNI people killed when Sarwo conducted his 'pembersihan'.

Sobiran was 'objective' with the parties.

Sritua Arief

December incident in Medan began when a policeman guarding the Chinese consulate shot and killed a KAMI demonstrator. The story spread that the shot was fired from the consulate. Anti­ Chinese rioting followed but only about nine or so were killed. Perhaps 200 were injured. Ojarnarwi Hadikusuma, 17 January 1971

In 1966 Djarnawi was Ketua Ill of Muhamadijah. He was also head of the political bureau of Muhamadijah. (Muljadi Djojomartono was just an ordinary member).

In about February 1966 Muljadi (and someone else who is now - or then - Dirdjen Urusan Hadji) approached BK asking for approval to revive Partai Islam Indonesia. (The PI! had been founded in 1937 by Dr Sukiman and some others including Djarnawi's father. It faded away in the Japanese occupation). BK gave his approval. However the support of Mhdijah was required. In June 1966 a conference of regional leaders of Mhdijah met and rejected the idea because they favoured the rehabilitation of Masjumi.

In November 1966 Mhdijah decided to press for the rehabilation of Masjumi. Djarnarwi led a delegation to Suharto on December 9. Djarnawi made the request. Suharto was silent for two or three minutes. He then replied that the army could not accept the rehabilitation of Masjumi 'for psychological reasons'. Djanarwi then asked for permission to set up a new party other than the Masjumi. Suharto rejected this on the grounds that it was in conflict with Tap 22 of the MPRS. Suharto then suggested that Muhamadijah itself should become a political party, but Djanarwi could not agree to this.

At this time Hatta had formed a group (including Deliar Noer). However this was rejected by Suharto. After the rejection Hatta called Djanarwi and asked him to join a political education society. However Djarnarwi had his own plans. Djanarwi says Hatta's group put democracy above Islam while in fact Islam is above democracy.

Djarnarwi does not see the AD Seminar as pro-Masjumi although it permitted ex-Masjumi people to enter political life. However it opposed the rehabilitation of the party.

The three generals negotiating with the Parmusi (Alamsjah, Basuki and Sunarso) made the position clear. However the supporting organisations of Masjumi were fighting among themselves over the number of seats in the leading body. Mhdijah demanded 9 seats. Eventually Natsir intervened and with Djanarwi a leadership headed by Roem (?)was submitted to the government in November 1967. They were eventually called on Feb 5 1968 and told to alter this list. Eventually this was done and the party legalised. At that time Djarnawi met J. Naro for the first time. Naro was nominated by one of the supporting bodies. It is not impossible that Naro is ex-Murba.

Muhamadijah supported the proportional system in the election law. The crucial part of the Kepartaian law was the provision relating to the membership of recognised parties. The NU and PNI proposed very high levels while the small parties proposed very low levels.

At the 1968 MPRS session, the Sadan Pekerdja had accepted a reference to Piagam Djakasrta in the Garis2 Besar Haluan Negara. The Islamic parties fought to retain this while the non-Islamic parties parties opposed it.

In 1967 all! the other parties opposed the foundation of Parmusi. One party proposed to Suharto that the Parmusi should not be allowed to function in areas that the party was strong. However this was not accepted by Suharto.

The split sponsored by Naro in 1970 followed the election of the leaderships of the regional branches of Parmusi in Octobe 1970. Perhaps too many ex-Masjumi were elected. Prof Sarbini. 18 January 1971.

Sarbini was a PSI member. He was Kepala Biro Pusat Statistik until three weeks before the coup when Sukarno dismissed him. He was also Professor Luar Biasa in Fakultas Ekonomi, UI. He did not teach at SESKOAD (unlike most of the other 'technocrats').

He was close to Mashuri politically. In about November Mashuri brought an insignificant-looking Lt Kol called Sudjono Humardhani to meet him. Sudjono got him to do a paper on the economy for Suharto. Then he was taken to his 'first and last' discussion with Suharto.

Most of the civilian advisers at the AD Seminar were Seskoad instructors recruited by Sarwoto. The main exception was Sarbini. Originally Sarwoto proposed that Selo Soemardjan be Wakil Ketua of the Political Section but Suharto opposed this and suggested Sarbini. Sarwoto pointed out that Sarbini was PSI to which Suharto replied 'Well, so are you'. This was about 3 weeks before the seminar. (Sarbini and Sad Ii had studied engineering with Sarwoto at !TB in the late 1930s.)

The Seminar was divided into three sections - Hankam, Economy and Sospol. Civilians were invited in the latter two sections with Widjoyo as Wakil Ketua of Economy and Sarbini in Sospol.

Sarbini, in co-operation with Sudjatmoko, prepared an instroductory paper in which he called for dynamic as opposed to static stability. Most of the others were emphasizing stability by itself. Also Sarbini referred to the danger of 'creeping militarism'. This upset a number of generals including Alamsjah and Sumitro.

On the whole the generals accepted whatever the civilians suggested. The discussion mainly took the form of questions by the generals to the civilian experts. This was even more the case in the economic section where the generals understood nothing. Suwarto supported the civilians and Suharto responded to Suwarto. However the unanimous support was fairly superficial, especially in the political sphere.

After the seminar, many of the civilians were brought into SPRI. Originally SPRI consisted of 5 generals plus the economic and political ahli. The generals were Alamsjah (Koordinator), Sudjono Humardhani (Economy), Slamat Danudirdjo (Pembangan), Ali Murtopo (Intel Luar Negeri), Yoga (Intel Dalam Negeri). Later Surjo (Keuangan) was added, followed by another six in 1967 such as Sunarso (Politics). Eventually it became a kind of resting house eg Jusuf (ex Gubernur Djambi) joined with no real function.

The team for politik was responsible to Alamsyah and the economist to Sudjono HD.

The SPRI - both generals and civilians used to meet once a week as a group to discuss policy. They more or less worked as a team.

At first the emphasis was on the economy. In the first weeks the economic team often met Suharto while the political team never did. The political team prepared many memos but these were apparently ignored. At this stage Sarbini himself was greatly concerned with the immediate economic problem.

The immediate task was the Government 3 regulations. These were prepared by SPRI including Sarbini. He agrees with them except on one critical point. Apart from the SPRI ten, there was also a team from the Bank Indonesia which had contact with Widjoyo. They were under pressure from !MF to adopt restructuring credit and monetary policies. Sarbini opposed this. According to him, the inflation was due to supply problems, bottlenecks etc - not to demand. However, one point in the regulations bowed to the IMF and took steps to curb demand. According to Sarbini, this was very bad for development although it may have been difficult to get credit without it.

The politics team prepared papers on the Pemilu, Masjumi etc but got little response. Then in early 1967 Sarbini prepared a list of new members of the DPR. They consisted of PSI, Masjumi, and Murba people. This was scrapped and a new list prepared by Ali Murtopo. From then on Sarbini became fairly inactive and only occasionally attended SPRI although formally he remained a member.

On the election law, the AD Seminar proposals aimed at encouraging the modern elements within in the parties. However, it seems that the AD was not firmly committed to the proposals although on the whole, the AD was fairly anti-party in approach. Eventually the AD completely changed the Seminar proposals. Only a few, like Dharsono, continued to defend the former results.

On simplification, the Seminar proposed a category of 'Socialist Pancasila' for PSI, Murba etc. Later 'Socialist Pancasila' came to mean Golkar. Sarbini proposed a gradual simplification of the party system over a period of several pemilu. After each election, the smaller parties would be forced to merge with each other. However Dharsono wanted to create a two-party system immediately. Sarbini advised against this on the grounds that's it might bring forth a reaction from the more traditional generals-which in the end it did.

Sarbini supported the independent group although he was not actually a member of it. The group was destroyed by Ali Murtopo.

By 1967 the SPRI generals were active with their business links with Chinese and foreign investors. They put pressure to get back credit for certain firms to get investment permission etc. Omar Khayyam, 9 February 1971

Mashuri lived next door to Suharto. Omar Khasyyam was close to Mashuri so after the coup both Mashuri and Omar assisted Suharto in preparing papers on the PK! and their tactics. At that stage they could walk in and meet Suharto whenever they liked.

The idea of the independent group arose after the AD Seminar. While some PSI people took part, there were many others. As far as Omar knows, Mashuri was never in the PSI. He had his own Gadjah Mada group. (Omar was more or less a member of this group.) There were also KASI and KAMI people as well as Fuad Hassan and Sulaiman Soemadi from SPRI. Thus they had good contact with the government.

Suharto himself never actually blessed the formation of the independent group. He said he would not bless it and would not object to it.

The group had many discussions but nothing very concrete emerged. The Bandung group favoured the Dwipartai idea but Omar opposed it. He did not want too drastic action to be taken. In fact the discussions were often rather impractical.

Kemal and Dharsono (and Suwarto) had been close to independent group members for a long time. Sarwo became close in that period.

The meeting of the Panglima se-Djawa agreed informally to the formation of the independent group. Kamal and Dharsono supported it strongly while Surano told Omar that he had no objection and would protect it if need be. Omar Khayam felt that the group needed both vertical and horizontal aspects - ie virtual roots in the daerah and horizontal contacts with national leaders like the Sultan and Adam Malik. Adam Malik was contacted and he publicly expressed sympathy with the group.

'Others' did not accept people like Adam Malik and the Sultan.

Mashuri was pre-occupied with the question of 'legalitas'. He felt that nothing could be achieved without close links with the authorities. Thus he developed close contacts with OPSUS. Once Mashuri became a Minister, he no longer had time for the independent group.

The government seemed sympathetic to the independent group. However, eventually it had to choose between the modern intellectuals and the old parties. It realistically chose the parties. Suharto himself generally emphasised the upatjara of democracy. Thus the parties remained.

The AD accepted the Seminar results largely because of Suwarto's influence. Suwarto also greatly influenced Suharto.

The independent group never really got to the state where it was about to be officially recognised. Once the government had decided to work through the parties, the group no longer had any meaning.

The group became known as the 'Gerakan Pembangunan' because they didn't like the foreign implication of the 'independent group'. Saifuddin Zuhri, 1 February 1971=

SZ is from the western part of Central Java - from the same area as Jani. In the revolution SZ served for a while under Jani. SZ was in Hizbullah while Jani was in Peta.

SZ has one child married to Sjaichu's child.

He was appointed as Menteri Agama in 1962.

He does not regard BK as being especially pro-PK!. BK was a politician trying to get support and power.

Immediately after the coup, on 3'd October, NU was the first party to issue a statement condemning the PK!. The NU aim was always to separate BK from the PNI (PK!?). ldham and SZ met BK urging him to ban the PK!. BK asked SZ to be 'adil'. He said that PK! had 'banjak dosa.' SZ replied that Masjumi also had many 'djasa' but after the revolt it had to be banned. BK had no reply to this.

The NU leaders continued to try to get BK to condemn the PKI until a month or so before the Sidang lstimewa MPRS in 1967. After that the NU took the initiative in the DPR-GR to bring about the downfall of BK. They felt there was no point in continuing their tolerance.

In November 1966 there were rumours of a plan to kidnap BK in Surabaya. However BK did not want to take action leading to bloodshed. SZ was not sure whether the rumours were true.

The 1967 session of the MPRS was 'dikepung' by the KKO. Recently after Hartono's death, Mukayat (?)said that Hartono had proved his good faith by withdrawing the troops at the time of the MPRS session.

At the NU Congress of 1967 the issue of Subchan replacing ldham arose. Subchan and Zamoni are not sufficiently patient and realistic. The NU co-operated with Japanese, with Sukarno and Suharto. The main thing is to 'menyelamatkan massa' who are unprotected.

In 1966-7 the NU supported the rehabilitation of Masjumi but they did not want to support it too strongly because they were afraid that Suharto might identify them too closely with Masjumi. Aberson, GMNI, 19-12 1970

Aberson is a Batak (Protestant). He studied economics at UI.

Before the coup, GMNI was the dominant student group. Its main rival was HMI. CGMI was smaller but its leaders were clever and influential.

GMNI supported the demand for a ban on HMI because of its links with Masjumi. However they were prepared to accept a new organisation for Muslim students.

In August the PNI split. Hardi was considered 'kurang madju' (to some extent A agrees). Ali still had mass support.

When KAMI was formed, GMNI was still united. They decided not to join KAMI. Shortly afterwards GMNI (Osa) was formed which joined KAMI. Aberson joined the Hardi group because he saw that Ali's group could not succeed. He felt that it was necessary to have genuine PNI people around Hardi to prevent outside influences.

After Bandung, Aberson opposed Hardi's policy of expelling Asu people. Aberson refused to carry out this policy in GMNI.

Some KAMI leaders were opposed to BK from the beginning. However in general KAMI was united around the Tritura. It was only later that divisions appeared in KAMI on the issue of BK.

Aberson joined a KAMI delegation to BK in January 1966. BK was quite friendly. Aberson became involved in a debate with Ruslan. Aberson said that the question of Hardi v. Ali was an internal affair that should not be discussed in public.

Aberson supported the retention of BK because he has 'wibawa' to unite Indonesia. Actual government could be carried out by others but BK was still needed as President. Other KAMI leaders at MPRS strongly opposed this.

Although GMNI formally joined KAMI in Djateng-Djatim they never fully participated. At the centre GMNI never left KAMI. Maj.Djen Sutjipto SH 18/5/70

In 1966 Sukarno was considering disbanding the MPRS and re-establishing KNIP. However his plan had not reached a concrete stage. He was also wanting to fill the ex-PKI seats with his own supporters. One of the supporters of the plan to restore KNIP was Sartono of the PNI who was probably thinking that this was a way to 'menyelamatkan' PNI. Ketua Mahkamah Agung Wirjono was not involved with this. At this time Ruslan Abdulgani was not so close to the President. In fact since 1963, Subandrio had been much closer to BK than Ruslan. {When Ruslan was Menlu, Subandrio was Sekdjen Deplu; for that time, Subandrio tried to bypass Ruslan by going directly to the President. Ruslan and Subandrio had been opponents since then).

Pernjataan ABRI 5 Mei indirectly opposes the KNIP plan by proposing the strengthening of the MPRS etc in pasal 4 (c).

As far as Sutjipto remembers, BK only led two sessions of the Kab Ampera, one relating to the appointment of Dirdjen, Sekdjen etc and one other. Ruslan and Leimena continued to attend Kabinet sessions but their influence was slight.

Both Yani and Parman were 'dekat dgn Sukarno'.

Sutjipto was dismissed as Ketua G.V. Koti due to an order issued under the name of Sukarno to 'membekukan PKI dan ormasnya' on 14th October. When Sutjipto met BK, he said he would not get BK's prior approval because BK was always moving about at that time.

On 11rh March Suharto was sick. Sutjipto met him at his home on that day. He did not order troops to appear in front of the Palace.

Pranoto was arrested in 1968. Djuhardi was arrested; he mentioned Rukman; Rukman was then arrested and he mentioned Pranoto. It was very difficult for Suharto to sign the order to arrest Pranoto. Twice during the Revolution, Pranoto had been Suharto's Kas.

Suharto asked Sutjipto to become Men Pertanian. Satjipto said he knew nothing of pertanian. Suharto said his job was to clean up the Dep of Pertanian which was under the influence of the PNl-Asu.

It was extremely difficult for Suharto to get Sukarno's signature on UU 10/1966 re the MRS etc menjelang pemilu. Sundoro, ex-Ketua 1, PNl, Djatim, 2/11/1970

Sundoro was Bupati at Ngandjuk from 1960-1967.

Djatim was very tense in the period before the coup. PNI was the third party in the clashes between PKI and NU. On the whole, PNI opposed the PKI but in some areas, notably Surabaya, the PNI worked with the PKI. In Ngandjuk, for example, the PNI and PKI were strongly opposed to each other (in 1962 (?), for example, a clash took place over the occupation of a Bupati building). Usually the main issue was land.

Governor Wijono was strongly nationalist which meant that he was close to PNI. Satrio, while not originally PKI, became increasingly involved and dependent on the PKI.

In the post-coup killing, the Army adopted different policies in different areas. Sometimes they tried to moderate it, while in other areas they permitted it to go on. In the Madiun-Ngandjuk-Kediri area under Kol Willy Sudjono large scale killing occurred. Kol Willy was very 'keras' with PKI. Also a lot of killing occurred in Banjawangi. The PNI was also involved in the killings.

A split in the PNI Djatim had been developing before the coup. 9 members were expelled. After the coup, the pro-Ali group was headed by Muljono while the Hardi group was headed by Sutojo. The masses were mainly loyal to Ali. 'PNI masses are always loyal to leaders' - they are also loyal to BK.

ABRI intervened at the Bandung Congress to ensure a New Order victory. For example, AD guarded the congress and also had control over 'pengangkutan' so it could control who attended. Nevertheless, Ali supporters attended and Ali did not give up without a fight.

The Bandung Congress 'menundjuk' Sundoro to form a new leadership in Djatim. He tried to unite the Muljono and Sutojo wings. A meeting was held in the presence of Sunanjadi (?).However Muljono refused to take part in a congress. Sunanjadi was very angry. Eventually a congress (conference?) was held at Ngandjuk (?).Not much action was taken against the hard-line PNI until Jassin came.

In 1966-1967 the situation was very tense. The KKO had centres at Surabaya and Banyawangi and the Brimob was also strong.

In 1966 Sundoro and the NU leader (Muralis ?) issued a statement in support of BK but the NU attitude changes in 1967.

At the time of the 1967 MPRS, threats were exchanged between Jassin and the KKO leader (Sudjiarti?? Sudjadi?). Jassin said that he could clean up any revolt within a week.

In November 1966 Sumitro had refused to permit BK come to Surabaya. At the same time he refused to permit Nasution to visit Djombang. There were also rumours of a plan to 'mentjulik' BK. Probably there is some truth in these rumours.

In introducing the Orba to Djatim, Jassin worked through the Kesatuan Aksi. He ordered that the Kas Aksi be permitted to flourish. The Kes Aksi helped to move against the PNI. Visits were made at night and people beaten up in certain areas. Willy Sudjono was opposed to Jassin's policy of reliance on the Kes Aksi. He was also a follower of Mbah Suro. Willy Sudjono was very anti-PK! and pro-BK

Later the NU was demanding that Jassin be moved from Djatim.

There were a number of PKI bupatis eg Ngawi; also Walikota Surabaya. Dahlan Ranurhardjo, 22-12 1970

Dahlan was Ketua HMI in 1951-53. At that time he also became Ketua PPMI. Thus from that period he became a 'murid' Bung Karno.

HMI was under pressure in 1965. However it survived. BK told Dahlan that HMI would not be banned if 'counter-revolutionary' elements were kept out.

On a number of occasions D went to the palace in Ruslan Abdulgani's car. Ruslan also helped save HMI.

Kap-Gestapu was strongly supported by HMI. On 2nd October 1965 HMI leaders met at Dahlan's house and decided to join in with Subchan. On 4th a small demonstration was held. On 6th a delegation met Suharto who expressed his support. Earlier, a demonstration had been planned for 3rd but this was postponed a day. Umar was afraid of PKI granat throwing while the army was still looking for the dead generals.

On the 9th a big rally was followed by the burning of PKI buildings. The army was opposed to this but when it happened they did nothing.

Earlier a four-man Board of Advisors had been formed by HMI before the coup to protect HMI. It consisted of former chairmen of HMI, chaired by Dahlan. The other three were Ahmad Tirtosudiro (1948-9), Sanusi (now Parmusi) and a Djaksa (Imam Rahardjo?)

Achmad Tirto had close ties with Yani while Dahlan was close to Sukarno.

Even before the coup, Ruslan had contact with the army leaders. Chairul did not. Its was after llth March that Chairal tried to contact the army but then it was too late. Chairul was 'sial'. He was truly anti-PKI but too afraid of BK. However Ruslan is a man with 'isi' (content).

Suharto was pushed by demonstrators etc to take action on 11th March. When Dahlan went to Kostrad in late Feb-early-March, Kemal seemed very eager to act.

After 11 March - about 15th, Dahlan as one of the few members of Parliament with ties with KAMI, presented a KAMI statement to parliament. It was read by Sjaichu who left out the names of ministers under attack (including Priyono who was in attendance). Dahlan, who was sitting in front, impulsively jumped up and read the names of the ministers. Dahlan says there is no significance in his support for Ketua MPRS to take over if Pres. Berhalangan. He took this line at the MPRS session.

On about 30th May, Dahlan met BK and told him he would make criticisms at MPRS sessions. BK was rather bitter. 'Kalau kamu mau ikut menyeleweng dari Revolusi - boleh sadja !'

On the whole the MPRS still loved BK (including Dahlan). They genuinely did not want to take action against him. It was not just a tactic. However among the students there were those who were anti-BK.

Dahlan himself moved the amendment in which the forgiveness is requested from BK in the Tap about PBR.

Dahlan does not see much significance in BK's planned visit to Surabaya.

By 1967 it was clear that BK had to be dismissed at the MPRS. The ABRI draft was used as the basis but many independent amendments were accepted. Independents wanted Tap ttg Pemberhentian Sukarno but ABRI wanted Pentjabutan Kekuasaan etc.

Suharto at first refused to take the oath as Pd. Presiden. He felt he would be doomed if he expressed the word 'President' even if preceded by 'Pd'. Eventually Dahlan, Marie Mhd and some others worked out an oath in which the word President was avoided. Suharto promised to carry out duties entrusted to him in Tap 33. At that time Sudjono Humardhani was making regular trips back and forth to Semarang to consult the dukun.

The independents strongly supported the AD Seminar results. In the DPR they provided the arguments for the governnment's election law. However suddenly the AD reached agreement with the parties on the proportional system. This greatly disappointed the independents.

They were also opposed to rice and minyak price rises. They also criticised the working of SPR! where SPRI members often did things in conflict with the departments - eg making overseas visits. Agus Sudono, Ketua Parmusi

21 August 1970

On the evening of 1st October AS went to Subchan's house where he ate. There were two others there. Then they went out to see what was happening. Subchan went to a general's house to see what was happening. Subchan went to a general's house while Agus went to the gedung Postel. On their return they heard that Suharto had restored order.

At midnight they met Suharto who promised arms to the Muslim masses if this was necessary the next day.

On the 2"d Augus signed a statement prepared by Sutjipto SH at KOTI condemning Gestapu. Only PNI, Partindo and Perti refused to sign. However Perti's leadership was quietly replaced.

On the 3rd a meeting was held attended by Subchan, Harry Tjan, Agus, Lukman Harun and other Muslims at the Muhamadiyah University. They planned a meeting for the following day.

That night they met General Umar who advised them against it as he could not guarantee their safety. Anyway they went ahead and Umar provided 15 or so soldiers to guard them.

The rally on the 4th was held at Taman Sunda Kela pa. About 2000 attended. The only NU representative was Subchan. There were probably about 20 from PMKRI led by Harry Tjan while the rest were of the PMI aliran like Pemuda Muhamadijah, Pll, Gasbindp etc.

On the gth a big rally was held at Taman Surupati. About 50,000 attended. All parties except PNI and Partindo joined in. After the rally the plan was that they would go to the Front Nasional via Djalan Thamrin to demonstrate. However some of them ie Pemuda Muhamadiah, HMI and PI I led by Siregar Pau went to the PKI building while Agus led Gasbindo to the SOBSI building in Kramat. Both were burnt down. Siregar got a list of PKI addresses which were used in further attacks over the next few days.

Ali Murtopo was the man they usually had dealings if they had dealings with Suharto. (He got funds from Chaerul Saleh).

Kap-Gestapu became Front Pantjasila because the aim of crushing the PKI was achieved. However it was beginning to break up. The division was particularly the older party leaders and the non-party young men. The old men did not want to take tooo harsh action against BK.

BK tried to cause dissension in the FP by setting up the FN Gaya Baru (which never came into being) and by appointing some of the young FP men, including Agus, to the new DPA. However they rejected their appointment.

The FP eventually broke up when Suharto appointed the Ampera cabinet. They split over the struggle for seats.

Sarwo Ed hie gave this account to Agus about 11 March. Sarwo informed Suharto that the students might demonstrate at the Cabinet meeting. Therefore he should supply troops to protect the students. Suharto agreed. What actually happened may have been more than what Suharto had expected.

BK planned to disband the MPRS. He had three battalions of KKO to support him waiting at Tanjung Priok (May 1966).

Why was Nasution not taken back with Cabinet after Supersemar? Argus thinks that Suharto was concerned not to give offence to BK. Suharto and Nasution were still very close at that time. After the MPR session when Suharto went to the palace, BK seemed quite happy. He said he could work with Suharto, but if Nasution had been selected by the MPRS he could not accept the decision. At that time Suharto had no ambition to be President. However Suharto and his staff became aware of Nasution's possible ambitions when members of the MPRS proposed that Nasution should take over if BK 'berhalangan'. Some of these members die not like the idea of another Javanese taking over.

Nasution had been pleased to be appointed Ketua MPRS.

There was great tension at the Sidang lstimewa MPRS. Suharto was responding to pressure from the radicals on one side and the Panglima2 on the other. Muljadi and Sutjipto strongly supported BK while Rusmin was half and half. The term 'rintisan jalan' for the 'rintisan jalan' for the Pengumunan 20 Feb came from the Pengumunan 20 Feb came from Maj Djen Andi Jusuf (an 'opportunist'). At the time there were many KKO at Tanjung Priok. 24 August 1970

The military was not informed to the plan to burn down the PKI and SOBSI buildings. They were afraid if the ABRI knew, they would not agree. Even Subchan was not told. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 20 May 1970

Very pessimistic about present government. Suharto has surrounded himself with rich generals. The system now is as much a dictatorship as the Orla was. The press is freer because it has no influence. The government only survives because the international situation is favourable to foreign aid for Indonesia.

Suharto seemed to be favourably disposed to PMI at AD Semester II and in a letter to Prawoto. However since then he has fallen under the influence of a very anti-Islamic group, in particular Sudjono Humardani.

Sumitro is now acceptable because he has no mass support. Sumitro must know what is going on but he does nothing. The economists around the President and are not brave enough to stand by their principles. Hadisubeno, Semarang, 9-9-1970

Before the coup the situation in Djateng was completely different to that in the centre. The PNI and the PKI leaders could meet together at 'resepsi' in Djakarta but in the villages the PNI and PKI masses were in conflict especially over land. The conflict had been going on since the 1950s but became especially intensive during the Aksi Sepihak.

After the coup hundreds of PNI members were killed but with the support of the RPKAD etc, about 10,000 communists were killed after the coup. The killing of communists in Djateng went on for about 2 months (certainly more than one month).

In Djatim the conflict between PNI (led by Muljono (?))and PKI was not so intensive. The killings of communists after the coup was carried out by the 'ultra-kanan' in Djatim without assistance of the army.

Surachman was really a communist. Communists had also infiltrated the other parties and the ABRI so the PNI was not special in this case.

BK sympathised with the Ali faction but he did not intervene directly in the party's affairs. In Djateng Gub. Mochtar remained with Ali. He now regrets his action.

It was decided to use the term Osa-Usep rather than Hardi-Hadisubeno because Hardi was so ambitious to become a minister or Wakil Ketua MPRS etc.

On 16th March '66, Hardi telephoned Hadisubeno who was in Semarang asking him to come quickly to Djakarta. Sukarno had apparently asked Suharto to ban the PNI Osa-Usep. It was felt that Hadisubono would be the best man to approach Suharto. Hadisubeno went to Djakarta and talked with Suharto from 10.pm to 12.30am. As a result they decided to call the Bandung conference using the Panitiya lshaq.

At this time Suharto was also under pressure from other quarters to ban the PNI altogether.

In 1966 and early 1967 physical clashes occurred in Djateng involving PNI youth but these were not too serious.

In 1966-67 PNI wanted to menggeserkan BK but not to memetjat him. They wanted power to be handed to Suharto.

The leaders of the PNI had next to no contract with BK at that time as he did not support them. Maybe they met once.

From 1966 a small number of innocent PNI activists were arrested. By 1970 there were maybe 300- 400 throughout Indonesia. Many have since been released.

Several commanders in Sumatra took severe action against PNI. This was opposed by Suharto but at that stage many were demanding that the PNI be banned (Eg Subchan). Thus there was a delay before Keputusan No 16 ws issued. Meanwhile the Pangkoandah Kusno Utamo membekukan PNI right through Sumatra. This was aimed at preventing more severe action by the local panglima. Since then all the anti-Panglima have been transferred (Sarwo, Ishak Djuarsa, Dharsono).

Now the main leaders - Suharto, Panggabean and Sumitro have great faith in PNI. Djatim Jasin carried out a pembersihan of the PNI. In Djatim, Jasin carried out a pembersihan of the PNI. (Hadisubeno gave the impression that he thought this was necessary in Djatim) In Djateng, Hadisubeno got on well with Surano.

Hadisubeno was Governor of Djateng for two years until 1960. He resigned because he could not accept Manipol. He was replaced by Mochtar.

Hardi wants to oppose the govt but Hadisubeno feels that the govt is now stressing pembangunan desa so it should be supported. Agus Sudono, Ketua Parmusi, 21August1970

On the evening of 1st October, AS went to Subchan's house where he ate. There were two other there. They went out to see what was happening. Subchan went to a general's house while Agus went to the gedung Postel. On their return they heard that Suharto had restored order.

At midnight they met Suharto who promised arms to the Muslim masses if this were necessary the next day.

On I'.'.'.:, Agus signed a statement prepared by Sutjipto SH at KOTI condemning Gestapu. On PNI, Partindo and Perti refused to sign. However Perti's leadership was quickly replaced.

On 3rd a meeting was held attended by Subchan, Harry Tjan, Agus, Lukman Ha run and other Muslims at the Muhammadijah University. They planned a meeting for the following day.

That night they met Gen. Umar who advised them against it as he could no guarantee their safety. Anyway they went ahead and Umar provided 15 or so soldiers to guard them.

The rally on 4th was held at Taman Sunda Kela pa. About 2000 attended. The only NU representative was Subchan. There were probably about 20 from PMKRI led by Harry Tjan while the rest were of the PMI aliran like Pemuda Muhamadiah, Pll, Gasbindo etc.

On the gth a big rally was held at Taman Surapati. About 50,000 attended. All parties except PNI and Partindo joined in. After the rally, the plan was that they would go to the Front Nasional via Djl. Thamrin to demonstrate. However some of them ie Pemuda Muhamadijah, HMI and Pll led by Siregar Pau went to the PKI building while Agus led Gasbindo to the SOBSI building in Kramat. Both were burnt down. Siregar got a list of PKI addresses which were used in further attacks over the next few days.

Ali Murtopo was the man they usually approached if they had dealings with Suharto. (He got funds from Chaerul Saleh).

Kap-Gestapu became Front Pantjasila because the aim of crushing the PKI was achieved. However it was beginning to break up. The division was particularly between the older party leaders and the non-party young men. The old men did not want to take too hard action against BK.

BK tried to casue dissention in the FP by setting up the FN Gaya Baru (which never came into being) and by appointing some of the young FP men, including Agus, to the new DPA. However they rejected their appointment.

The FP finally broke up when Suharto appointed the Ampera cabinet. They split over the struggle for seats.

Sarwo Edhie gave this account to Agus about 11 Maret. Sarwo gave this account to Agus about 11 Maret. Sarwo informed Suharto that the students might demonstrate at the Cabinet meeting. Therefore he should supply troops to protect the students. Suharto agreed. What actually happened may have been more than what Suharto had expected.

BK planned to disband the MPRS. He had 3 battalions of the KKO to support him waiting at Tanjung Priok (May 66).

Why was Nasution not taken back into Cabinet after Supersemar? Agus thinks that Suharto was concerned not to give offence to BK. Suharto and Nasution were still very close at that time. After the MPRS session when Suharto went to the palace, BK seemed quite happy. He said he could work with Suharto, but if Nasution had been selected by the MPRS he not accept the decision. At that time Suharto had no ambition to be President. However, Suharto and his staff became aware of Nasution's possible ambitions when members of the MPRS proposed that Nasution should take over if BK 'berhalangan'. Some of these members did not like the idea of another Javanese taking over.

Nasution had been pleased to be appointed Ketua MPRS.

There was great tension at the Sidang lstimewa MPRS. Suharto was responding to pressure from the radicals on one side and the Panglima2 on the other. Muljadi and Sutjipto stongly supported BK while Rusmin was half and half. The term 'rintisan jalan' for the Pengumunan 20 Februaryi came from Maj.Gen. Andi Jusuf (an 'opportunist').

At the time there were many KKO troops at Tanjung Priuk.

24 August 1970

The military was not informed of the plan to burn down the PKI and SOBSI buildings. They were afraid that if the ABRI knew, they would not agree. Even Subchan was not told.

Both NU and IPKI were slightly pro-BK at MPRS ke-IV.

In his speech at MPRS, Agus pointed to Partindo and pro-PKI elements in the hall. Later he was called by Nasution and Sugiah Arto to agive their names. 17 were then excluded.

In general Suharto's assistants tried to make sure that BK was not too severely criticised at the MPRS. Agus was the first speaker to be critical but he had to tone it down.

After the MPRS BK tried a 'come back'. However when he refused to condemn the PKI, Suharto finally decided that he had to go.

It was planned that BK would go to Surabaya on 10/11/66. However Suharto heard of plans to ke ep him there to led the resistance to Djakarta. The KKO were said to be involved, but there were also stories that Brawidjaya was involved. Sumitro was regarded as 'pro-BK'. Agus says that Sumitro's position was not very good. Panggabean has the power.

Suhardiman, as ketua SOKSI, had been a strong supporter of BK in 1964, 65. ThK called him in January 1967.

Sarbini had no brains. He was close to both BK and Suharto.

Umar also is not clever. When he was Panglima Kostra, Kemal was the real ruler.

When Sarwo Edhie was moved to Medan, Kemal was promoted to Panglima Kostrad. But this was just a clever move by Ali Murtopo. His eventual goal was to push them all out.

Sukendro was arrested in mid-1967. Sukendro was head of military intelligence of the time of the PRRI. He quickly ..... people responsible for assassination attempts (the grenade attack). Thus he was close to BK. In 1967 he was considered as a rival to Ali Murtopo who had been arrested. At that time there had been meetings involving Sukendro, Jatidjan, Suadi, Mursjid but it seems that only Sukendro was arrested.

Once Agus discussed the Pertamina question with Suharto. Suharto said he could never forget that early in October 1965, Chaerul, Subadrio, Jusfu Muda Dalam etc refused to provide funds for the RPKAD to got to Djateng. lbnu Sutowo provided these funds. Sudjono Humardani was Ass 7 of Diponegoro when Suharto moved to Kostrad. (??) Kol. Abdul Kadir Besar, Sekretaris Umum MPRS. 11December1970

At the 1966 MPRS session the most crucial issue was Tap 13. The Komisi agreed to the contents of the Tap but on 4th July Nasution was called by BK. BK claimed to have the support of the people. Nasution told him that the Koramil were reporting that this was not so. Nevertheless Nasution was worried about BK's influence in ABRI. Thus Nasution agreed to the 'Penjelasan'. When this was read to the Pleno session, Bujung Nasution tried to object but the hammer fell before he could speak.

In 1967 the Kesatuan Aksi in DPR drew up the DPR Resolusi which was then given to the NU to propose, as the NU had more organised support. This Resolution had much support in the AD, but Suharto was worried about its effects on AL, AK and to a lesser extent AU.

Thus the PNI appointed BK in the process that led to the Pengumunan 20 Februari. Suharto was pleased to accept this but in the ceremony BK said something that 'menjinggung hati' Suharto. Suharto then referred to 'rintisan djalan'.

At the MPRS session, Suharto first presented the ABRI line followed by AL, AU and AK. Then Sugih Arto spoke for AD. The text of his speech was unfinished so he spoke extempore. The speech did not support the use of pasal 2. This caused a great stir, encouraging the Kesatuan Aksi.

In the Komisi, 4 drafts were put forward - two radical drafts for the Kesatuan Aksi and Golongan Islam, and two mild drafts from PNI and golongan Abri. In the komisi Awaluddin was the ABRI spokesman (after the session he told Adbdul Kadir that he did not really support the line he was taking but he was under orders). The Sukarnoists argued that pasal 6 of Tap 33 be placed after pasal 2, ie that he would still be called Pres. rather than lr. The radicals only agreed to the Tap with the Pendjelesan.

Suharto himself did not want to become Pd President. He had to be persuaded to take the oath. He would have preferred to remain Pelaksana or something like that.

According to Abdul Kadir, Suharto basically agreed with the Kes. Aksi but he was not wanting to provoke the rest of ABRI.

In early 1968 Suharto wanted to strengthen the MPRS to that he could be elected President.

He approached the DPR-GR leaders and asked them to agree to the Refreshing and Redressing. They agreed except Mursalin who resigned because he felt that the new parliament did not support him.

He then went to the MPRS leaders. Nasution refused on the grounds that UU 10 only permitted re­ calling of members. There could not be additions or changes in the balance between groups. Thus in the case of MPR leaders, Suharto had to use his powers under Tap IX. Considerable influence was applied to the parties in carrying out the re-call. , .