TRENDS IN BELARUS 2021/1: January-April Quarterly analytic review LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS is an As- sociate Expert at the Eastern Europe Key points: Studies Center and Political Science at Vilnius University. His research A fragile status quo continues to be maintained in the country, focuses on political developments with neither side having the capacity to impose its will. and foreign policy of the Russian Repressions and backing from Russia allows the Lukashenko Federation and post-Soviet coun- regime to keep protests in check. tries. He holds a PhD in Internation- The shape and size of protests is changing: to evade al Relations from Vilnius University. crackdown, the protests have become small in size, He teaches the courses ‘Russian spontaneous, and unanticipated. Studies’, ‘Russian Politics and Econ- omy in a Post-Modern World’, and The regime and the opposition are gearing up for a ‘Ukraine and Belarus Studies’. He transformation of power relations, with Lukashenko initiating worked as a foreign policy adviser to a constitutional reform and the opposition, which does not the President of the Republic of Lith- support this process, on the lookout for alternatives. uania from 2009–2014 There is a surge of new opposition parties. Public opinion polls: The legitimacy of the regime can no longer be restored. Russia continues negotiations with Lukashenko for a political and military integration but does not expect a rapid shift from the status quo. Oil flows are being rerouted to Russian ports, with some 9.8 million tonnes of Belarusian oil products planned to be sent for transhipment to them. Western countries have so far introduced sanctions against 327 Belarusians; new sets of sanctions are expected to follow. LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TRENDS IN BELARUS 2021/1 2 DOMESTIC PROCESSES The opposition has prepared its own draft of a new constitution2 and has no intention of tak- ing part in Lukashenko’s reform process. The Constitutional reform opposition’s draft includes: On 11-12 February, the 6th All Belarusian Peo- Transitioning from a presidential to a parlia- ple’s Assembly (Всебелорусское народное mentary system (the parliament appoints собрание) was held in Minsk. This is an ex- the prime minister and their cabinet and has tra-constitutional body usually used by legislative power); Lukashenko to provide a veneer of legitimacy for his decisions. Despite the expectations of Presidents can serve a maximum of 2 five- Lukashenko announcing specific plans of re- year terms; solving the current crisis, the Belarusian pres- A proposal to change local government elec- ident’s hours-long speech contained only ab- tion procedures (more rights and liberties); stract remarks on how he sees the situation: A proposal to create a National Council of Justice and strengthen the role of the Na- the constitution needs reforming as too tional Bank; much power is concentrated in the hands of a single person; Belarusian and Russian languages ​​are to be named state languages – with the view Lukashenko will step down only if: (a) all to expanding the use of the Belarusian lan- protests in the country stop; (b) the former guage; president and his allies receive certain guar- antees. Pahonia is to become the country’s coat of arms and the white-red-white flag, the state The new system would give a greater role flag. to the All Belarusian People’s Assembly and political parties; These diverging constitutional reform drafts indicates a parallel development of two alter- A constitutional commission is being es- native notions of social reality in Belarus – tablished (comprising 36 members; the one pushed by the government and the other decree for establishing it was signed on 16 conceived by the opposition. They essentially March1), tasked with preparing a draft for deny each other’s existence, thereby making the new constitution. The draft has to be any agreement (or pact) between the govern- ready by the end of 2021 and a referendum ment and the opposition fairly unlikely. on the new constitution is set to take place in early 2022. Another example of such trends is the initiative Lukashenko’s talk of a constitutional reform by the former presidential candidate Svetlana and its highly abstract blueprint seem to sug- Tikhanovskaya, announced on 18 March, to gest that the president expects to be able start negotiations with constructively-minded to keep the current processes in check and regime officials on a new election, which would wants to retain as much room for manoeuvre be overseen by the OSCE and the UN. The in- as possible given possible shifts of his public ternet platform Golos is organising an online perception in Belarus and relations with Rus- vote in support of this initiative.3 The initiative sia and the West, as well as the country’s so- aims to demonstrate how many Belarusians cio-economic situation at the time. want talks to begin on holding a new election. LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TRENDS IN BELARUS 2021/1 3 More than 773,000 Belarusians (as of 15 April Although it remains unclear, which of the 2021) have expressed their support via Golos newly-established parties will be allowed to for such negotiations to start. Belarus has officially register, this surge of new parties around 6.88 million citizens with a right to vote, shows that various political players do expect which means that around 11 per cent of eligi- Lukashenko to formally step down (even if it is ble voters are in favour of the negotiations. The anyone’s guess as to when and on what condi- regime has not reacted to this offer. It appears tions). The formation of several different par- that Lukashenko has no intention of accepting ties or movements in a reform-prone segment any initiatives from the opposition or involving of the society may well be a sign of pluralism the West and will continue to steer the situa- and diversity of views, but there is a danger tion in the direction that benefits him alone. that these differences of opinion, especially It bears mentioning that Tikhanovskaya and in the absence of a clear and fair playing field, her allies are facing criminal proceedings and could potentially stoke division and disagree- international arrest warrants issued by the Be- ment on the means and direction of the trans- larusian government, and opposition members formation needed. have been added to the list of ‘extremists’.4 A party titled ‘Union’ (Союз) and favo- uring complete integration into Russia Surge of new political parties (Союз) was established on 6 March. At the backdrop of a possible constitutional re- Yuri Voskresensky, the former Viktor Ba- form, preparations are also under way for the bariko campaign manager (and later, a time when the new constitution is (possibly) defender of Lukashenko’s position), and put in place. There is talk of creating at least Andrey Lankin, the former Valery Tsep- several new parties. On 9 April, Lukashenko kalo campaign manager, announced confirmed that a new law on political parties they are going to create a party titled will be adopted in 2021, and that current parties ‘Democratic Union’ (Демократический will have to re-register.5 On 11 November 2020, союз). Its role is likely to be that of qu- the Ministry of Justice issued warnings to 10 asi-opposition. political parties regarding the resolution they Representatives of the pro-presidential had signed on 11 September 2020 on holding movement White Rus (Белая Русь), for a new election.6 Currently Belarus has 15 offi- the part, are talking of forming a par- cially-registered political parties. Registering a ty again, too. Should this happen, this new party requires a minimum of 1,000 found- party (with a proposed title of ‘National ers. Additionally, it must have founders repre- Union’) would be Lukashenko’s key ally senting each region of Belarus as well as the in the new system. city of Minsk. The party must have offices in Minsk and each region, registered with region- The former presidential candidate An- al justice departments. All party offices must drey Dmitriyeu has also announced his have valid lease contracts, which presents a plans of establishing a party, titled ‘Our serious obstacle because a good number of Party’ (Наша партия). even currently-registered parties struggle to secure a lease (especially in Minsk). LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TRENDS IN BELARUS 2021/1 4 periencing a fear of violence. However, the re- On 29 March, the former presidential gime has so far been able to keep the waves of candidate Babariko issued an announ- protests in check, and the punishments faced cement on the need to create a party by protesters are getting more severe. On 1 titled ‘Together’ (Вместе), which, accor- March, a new Code of Administrative Offences ding to him, is the most effective way came into force in Belarus. Under the new code, towards a victory. The founding con- organising gatherings and expressing views gress of the party is scheduled for May, will incur more severe punishments, with fines and its founding committee claims to increased by several magnitudes and longer ar- have collected more than 4,000 signa- rests for repeat offenders.8 By way of summary tures of prospective founders. Babariko it can be said that the nature of protests has first announced of his plans to form a changed as of early 2021, becoming smaller in party back on 31 August 2020. numbers, spontaneous, and unexpected in or- On 8 April, plans of forming a political der to the evade crackdown by security forces. party were also announced by a mem- ber of the Coordination Council, Pavel Latushko.7 Pressure against Poles in Belarus The end of March saw arrests of Polish minor- ity leaders (including Andrzej Poczobut and Andżelika Borys) taking place in Grodno and the wider Grodno region.