TRENDS in BELARUS 2021/1: January-April Quarterly Analytic Review

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

TRENDS in BELARUS 2021/1: January-April Quarterly Analytic Review TRENDS IN BELARUS 2021/1: January-April Quarterly analytic review LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS is an As- sociate Expert at the Eastern Europe Key points: Studies Center and Political Science at Vilnius University. His research A fragile status quo continues to be maintained in the country, focuses on political developments with neither side having the capacity to impose its will. and foreign policy of the Russian Repressions and backing from Russia allows the Lukashenko Federation and post-Soviet coun- regime to keep protests in check. tries. He holds a PhD in Internation- The shape and size of protests is changing: to evade al Relations from Vilnius University. crackdown, the protests have become small in size, He teaches the courses ‘Russian spontaneous, and unanticipated. Studies’, ‘Russian Politics and Econ- omy in a Post-Modern World’, and The regime and the opposition are gearing up for a ‘Ukraine and Belarus Studies’. He transformation of power relations, with Lukashenko initiating worked as a foreign policy adviser to a constitutional reform and the opposition, which does not the President of the Republic of Lith- support this process, on the lookout for alternatives. uania from 2009–2014 There is a surge of new opposition parties. Public opinion polls: The legitimacy of the regime can no longer be restored. Russia continues negotiations with Lukashenko for a political and military integration but does not expect a rapid shift from the status quo. Oil flows are being rerouted to Russian ports, with some 9.8 million tonnes of Belarusian oil products planned to be sent for transhipment to them. Western countries have so far introduced sanctions against 327 Belarusians; new sets of sanctions are expected to follow. LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TRENDS IN BELARUS 2021/1 2 DOMESTIC PROCESSES The opposition has prepared its own draft of a new constitution2 and has no intention of tak- ing part in Lukashenko’s reform process. The Constitutional reform opposition’s draft includes: On 11-12 February, the 6th All Belarusian Peo- Transitioning from a presidential to a parlia- ple’s Assembly (Всебелорусское народное mentary system (the parliament appoints собрание) was held in Minsk. This is an ex- the prime minister and their cabinet and has tra-constitutional body usually used by legislative power); Lukashenko to provide a veneer of legitimacy for his decisions. Despite the expectations of Presidents can serve a maximum of 2 five- Lukashenko announcing specific plans of re- year terms; solving the current crisis, the Belarusian pres- A proposal to change local government elec- ident’s hours-long speech contained only ab- tion procedures (more rights and liberties); stract remarks on how he sees the situation: A proposal to create a National Council of Justice and strengthen the role of the Na- the constitution needs reforming as too tional Bank; much power is concentrated in the hands of a single person; Belarusian and Russian languages ​​are to be named state languages – with the view Lukashenko will step down only if: (a) all to expanding the use of the Belarusian lan- protests in the country stop; (b) the former guage; president and his allies receive certain guar- antees. Pahonia is to become the country’s coat of arms and the white-red-white flag, the state The new system would give a greater role flag. to the All Belarusian People’s Assembly and political parties; These diverging constitutional reform drafts indicates a parallel development of two alter- A constitutional commission is being es- native notions of social reality in Belarus – tablished (comprising 36 members; the one pushed by the government and the other decree for establishing it was signed on 16 conceived by the opposition. They essentially March1), tasked with preparing a draft for deny each other’s existence, thereby making the new constitution. The draft has to be any agreement (or pact) between the govern- ready by the end of 2021 and a referendum ment and the opposition fairly unlikely. on the new constitution is set to take place in early 2022. Another example of such trends is the initiative Lukashenko’s talk of a constitutional reform by the former presidential candidate Svetlana and its highly abstract blueprint seem to sug- Tikhanovskaya, announced on 18 March, to gest that the president expects to be able start negotiations with constructively-minded to keep the current processes in check and regime officials on a new election, which would wants to retain as much room for manoeuvre be overseen by the OSCE and the UN. The in- as possible given possible shifts of his public ternet platform Golos is organising an online perception in Belarus and relations with Rus- vote in support of this initiative.3 The initiative sia and the West, as well as the country’s so- aims to demonstrate how many Belarusians cio-economic situation at the time. want talks to begin on holding a new election. LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TRENDS IN BELARUS 2021/1 3 More than 773,000 Belarusians (as of 15 April Although it remains unclear, which of the 2021) have expressed their support via Golos newly-established parties will be allowed to for such negotiations to start. Belarus has officially register, this surge of new parties around 6.88 million citizens with a right to vote, shows that various political players do expect which means that around 11 per cent of eligi- Lukashenko to formally step down (even if it is ble voters are in favour of the negotiations. The anyone’s guess as to when and on what condi- regime has not reacted to this offer. It appears tions). The formation of several different par- that Lukashenko has no intention of accepting ties or movements in a reform-prone segment any initiatives from the opposition or involving of the society may well be a sign of pluralism the West and will continue to steer the situa- and diversity of views, but there is a danger tion in the direction that benefits him alone. that these differences of opinion, especially It bears mentioning that Tikhanovskaya and in the absence of a clear and fair playing field, her allies are facing criminal proceedings and could potentially stoke division and disagree- international arrest warrants issued by the Be- ment on the means and direction of the trans- larusian government, and opposition members formation needed. have been added to the list of ‘extremists’.4 A party titled ‘Union’ (Союз) and favo- uring complete integration into Russia Surge of new political parties (Союз) was established on 6 March. At the backdrop of a possible constitutional re- Yuri Voskresensky, the former Viktor Ba- form, preparations are also under way for the bariko campaign manager (and later, a time when the new constitution is (possibly) defender of Lukashenko’s position), and put in place. There is talk of creating at least Andrey Lankin, the former Valery Tsep- several new parties. On 9 April, Lukashenko kalo campaign manager, announced confirmed that a new law on political parties they are going to create a party titled will be adopted in 2021, and that current parties ‘Democratic Union’ (Демократический will have to re-register.5 On 11 November 2020, союз). Its role is likely to be that of qu- the Ministry of Justice issued warnings to 10 asi-opposition. political parties regarding the resolution they Representatives of the pro-presidential had signed on 11 September 2020 on holding movement White Rus (Белая Русь), for a new election.6 Currently Belarus has 15 offi- the part, are talking of forming a par- cially-registered political parties. Registering a ty again, too. Should this happen, this new party requires a minimum of 1,000 found- party (with a proposed title of ‘National ers. Additionally, it must have founders repre- Union’) would be Lukashenko’s key ally senting each region of Belarus as well as the in the new system. city of Minsk. The party must have offices in Minsk and each region, registered with region- The former presidential candidate An- al justice departments. All party offices must drey Dmitriyeu has also announced his have valid lease contracts, which presents a plans of establishing a party, titled ‘Our serious obstacle because a good number of Party’ (Наша партия). even currently-registered parties struggle to secure a lease (especially in Minsk). LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TRENDS IN BELARUS 2021/1 4 periencing a fear of violence. However, the re- On 29 March, the former presidential gime has so far been able to keep the waves of candidate Babariko issued an announ- protests in check, and the punishments faced cement on the need to create a party by protesters are getting more severe. On 1 titled ‘Together’ (Вместе), which, accor- March, a new Code of Administrative Offences ding to him, is the most effective way came into force in Belarus. Under the new code, towards a victory. The founding con- organising gatherings and expressing views gress of the party is scheduled for May, will incur more severe punishments, with fines and its founding committee claims to increased by several magnitudes and longer ar- have collected more than 4,000 signa- rests for repeat offenders.8 By way of summary tures of prospective founders. Babariko it can be said that the nature of protests has first announced of his plans to form a changed as of early 2021, becoming smaller in party back on 31 August 2020. numbers, spontaneous, and unexpected in or- On 8 April, plans of forming a political der to the evade crackdown by security forces. party were also announced by a mem- ber of the Coordination Council, Pavel Latushko.7 Pressure against Poles in Belarus The end of March saw arrests of Polish minor- ity leaders (including Andrzej Poczobut and Andżelika Borys) taking place in Grodno and the wider Grodno region.
Recommended publications
  • Individual V. State: Practice on Complaints with the United Nations Treaty Bodies with Regards to the Republic of Belarus
    Individual v. State: Practice on complaints with the United Nations treaty bodies with regards to the Republic of Belarus Volume I Collection of articles and documents The present collection of articles and documents is published within the framework of “International Law in Advocacy” program by Human Rights House Network with support from the Human Rights House in Vilnius and Civil Rights Defenders (Sweden) 2012 UDC 341.231.14 +342.7 (476) BBK 67.412.1 +67.400.7 (4Bel) I60 Edited by Sergei Golubok Candidate of Law, Attorney of the St. Petersburg Bar Association, member of the editorial board of the scientific journal “International justice” I60 “Individual v. State: Practice on complaints with the United Nations treaty bodies with regards to the Republic of Belarus”. – Vilnius, 2012. – 206 pages. ISBN 978-609-95300-1-7. The present collection of articles “Individual v. State: Practice on complaints with the United Nations treaty bodies with regards to the Republic of Belarus” is the first part of the two-volume book, that is the fourth publication in the series about international law and national legal system of the republic of Belarus, implemented by experts and alumni of the Human Rights Houses Network‘s program “International Law in Advocacy” since 2007. The first volume of this publication contains original writings about the contents and practical aspects of international human rights law concepts directly related to the Institute of individual communications, and about the role of an individual in the imple- mentation of international legal obligations of the state. The second volume, expected to be published in 2013, will include original analyti- cal works on the admissibility of individual considerations and the Republic of Belarus’ compliance with the decisions (views) by treaty bodies.
    [Show full text]
  • EP Resolution of 26 November 2020
    European Parliament 2019-2024 TEXTS ADOPTED Provisional edition P9_TA-PROV(2020)0331 The continuous violations of human rights in Belarus, in particular the murder of Raman Bandarenka European Parliament resolution of 26 November 2020 on the continuous violations of human rights in Belarus, in particular the murder of Raman Bandarenka (2020/2882(RSP)) The European Parliament, – having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus, in particular those of 17 September 2020 on the situation in Belarus1, of 4 October 2018 on the deterioration of media freedom in Belarus, notably the case of Charter 972, of 19 April 2018 on Belarus3, of 6 April 2017 on the situation in Belarus4, and of 24 November 2016 on the situation in Belarus5, – having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on relations with Belarus6, – having regard to the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought 2020, which was awarded to the democratic opposition in Belarus on 22 October 2020, – having regard to the statement of the President of the European Parliament of 13 August 2020 and that of the leaders of the five political groups of 17 August 2020 on the situation in Belarus following the so-called presidential elections of 9 August 2020, – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 1 October 2020 and of 16 October 2020, and to the Council conclusions on Belarus of 12 October 2020, – having regard to the Council decision of 6 November 2020 to add 15 members of the Belarusian authorities, including Aliaksandr Lukashenka, to the list of sanctioned individuals, bringing the total number of Belarusians subject to a travel ban and asset 1 Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0231.
    [Show full text]
  • Evolution of Belarusian-Polish Relations at the Present Stage: Balance of Interests
    Журнал Белорусского государственного университета. Международные отношения Journal of the Belarusian State University. International Relations UDC 327(476:438) EVOLUTION OF BELARUSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS AT THE PRESENT STAGE: BALANCE OF INTERESTS V. G. SHADURSKI а aBelarusian State University, Nezavisimosti avenue, 4, Minsk, 220030, Republic of Belarus The present article is dedicated to the analysis of the Belarusian-Polish relations’ development during the post-USSR period. The conclusion is made that despite the geographical neighborhood of both countries, their cultural and historical proximity, cooperation between Minsk and Warsaw didn’t comply with the existing capacity. Political contradictions became the reason for that, which resulted in fluctuations in bilateral cooperation, local conflicts on the inter-state level. The author makes an attempt to identify the main reasons for a low level of efficiency in bilateral relations and to give an assessment of foreign factors impact on Minsk and Warsaw policies. Key words: Belarusian-Polish relations; Belarusian foreign policy; Belarusian and Polish diplomacy; historical policy. ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ БЕЛОРУССКО-ПОЛЬСКИХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ НА СОВРЕМЕННОМ ЭТАПЕ: ПОИСК БАЛАНСА ИНТЕРЕСОВ В. Г. ШАДУРСКИЙ 1) 1)Белорусский государственный университет, пр. Независимости, 4, 220030, г. Минск, Республика Беларусь В представленной публикации анализируется развитие белорусско-польских отношений на протяжении периода после распада СССР. Делается вывод о том, что, несмотря на географическое соседство двух стран, их культурную и историческую близость, сотрудничество Минска и Варшавы не соответствовало имеющемуся потенциалу. При- чиной тому являлись политические разногласия, следствием которых стали перепады в двухстороннем взаимодей- ствии, частые конфликты на межгосударственном уровне. Автор пытается выяснить основные причины невысокой эффективности двусторонних связей, дать оценку влияния внешних факторов на политику Минска и Варшавы.
    [Show full text]
  • Time Project Event Unite the Nations 3 May 2011
    Time Project Event 2011 May 3rd 2011 TIME PROJECT EVENT UNITE THE NATIONS 3 MAY 2011 Short instruction: 1) How many questions do I have to answer? There are 250 questions. Every Country has 25 questions. Every school HAS to answer 225 questions, which means you do not ANSWER THE 25 questions FROM YOUR OWN COUNTRY. For example: Russia: There are 25 questions about Russia. More than one school from Rusia contributed questions which means there may be some Russian questions some Russian students may not recognize (they came from the other school ). Schools from Russia do not answer the 25 questions about Russia regardless of who contributed the questions. You never answer the questions about YOUR OWN COUNTRY. 2) How do I find the answers? - Encyclopaedias, the Internet, the Library or other sources at school or in the community - Get in touch with other time participants to find answers to questions which are difficult for you. 3) Where and when do I send the answers? Questions have to answered on line at the ZOHO Challenge Site. https://challenge.zoho.com/unite_the_nations_2011 Test starts 00:00 GMT May 3rd 2011 - Deadline: 00:00 GMT/UTC 4 May 2011! Other questions?? Get in touch with Event Co-ordinator ! [email protected] phone: +01.519.452.8310 cellphone +01.519.200.5092 fax: +01.519.452. 8319 And now…the game! Time Project Event 2011 May 3rd 2011 ARTS Argentina 1) Who wrote the book "Martin Fierro"? a) Jose Hernandez b) Peschisolido miguel angel c) David vineyards d) Jorge Luis Borges 2) What is the typical dance of Argentina? a) quartet b) tango c) cumbia d) capoeira 3) Who was Carlos Gardel? a) a singer of cumbia b) a soccer player c) a singer of tango d) a former president 4) Who was Lola Mora? a) a model b) a sculptor c) an athlete d) a journalist 5) Which Argentine made and released the world's first animated feature film.
    [Show full text]
  • 2. Historical, Cultural and Ethnic Roots1
    2. HISTORICAL, CULTURAL AND ETHNIC ROOTS1 General features of ethnic identity evolution history, to develop autonomous state structures, in the eastern part of Europe their lives have mostly been determined by out- side forces with diverse geopolitical interests. Differences may be observed between Eastern The uncertain political situation of past cen- and Western Europe in terms of the ethnogenesis turies gave rise – along the linguistic, cultural of the peoples and the development of their eth- and political fault lines – to several ethnic groups nic identity. In the eastern half of the continent, with uncertain identities, disputed allegiances rather than be tied to the confines of a particular and divergent political interests. Even now, there state, community identity and belonging have exist among the various groups overlaps, differ- tended to emerge from the collective memory of ences and conflicts which arose in earlier periods. a community of linguistic and cultural elements The characteristic features of the groups have not or, on occasion, from the collective memory of a been placed in a clearly definable framework. state that existed in an earlier period (Romsics, In the eastern half of Europe, the various I. 1998). The evolution of the eastern Slavic and ethnic groups are at different stages of devel- Baltic peoples constitutes a particular aspect of opment in terms of their ethnic identity. The this course. We can, therefore, gain insights into Belarusian people, who speak an eastern Slavic the historical foundations of the ethnic identity language, occupy a special place among these of the inhabitants of today’s Belarus – an identity groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Constructions and Instrumentalization of the Past: a Comparative Study on Memory Management in the Region
    CBEES State of the Region Report 2020 Constructions and Instrumentalization of the Past A Comparative Study on Memory Management in the Region Published with support from the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies (Östersjstiftelsen) Constructions and Instrumentalization of the Past A Comparative Study on Memory Management in the Region December 2020 Publisher Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, CBEES, Sdertrn University © CBEES, Sdertrn University and the authors Editor Ninna Mrner Editorial Board Joakim Ekman, Florence Frhlig, David Gaunt, Tora Lane, Per Anders Rudling, Irina Sandomirskaja Layout Lena Fredriksson, Serpentin Media Proofreading Bridget Schaefer, Semantix Print Elanders Sverige AB ISBN 978-91-85139-12-5 4 Contents 7 Preface. A New Annual CBEES Publication, Ulla Manns and Joakim Ekman 9 Introduction. Constructions and Instrumentalization of the Past, David Gaunt and Tora Lane 15 Background. Eastern and Central Europe as a Region of Memory. Some Common Traits, Barbara Trnquist-Plewa ESSAYS 23 Victimhood and Building Identities on Past Suffering, Florence Frhlig 29 Image, Afterimage, Counter-Image: Communist Visuality without Communism, Irina Sandomirskaja 37 The Toxic Memory Politics in the Post-Soviet Caucasus, Thomas de Waal 45 The Flag Revolution. Understanding the Political Symbols of Belarus, Andrej Kotljarchuk 55 Institutes of Trauma Re-production in a Borderland: Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania, Per Anders Rudling COUNTRY BY COUNTRY 69 Germany. The Multi-Level Governance of Memory as a Policy Field, Jenny Wstenberg 80 Lithuania. Fractured and Contested Memory Regimes, Violeta Davoliūtė 87 Belarus. The Politics of Memory in Belarus: Narratives and Institutions, Aliaksei Lastouski 94 Ukraine. Memory Nodes Loaded with Potential to Mobilize People, Yuliya Yurchuk 106 Czech Republic.
    [Show full text]
  • Belarus Epr Atlas Belarus 110
    epr atlas 109 Belarus epr atlas belarus 110 Ethnicity in Belarus Power relations The demographic majority in Belarus are the Byelorussians, they operate as senior partners next to the largest minority, the Russians. The Russians are junior partners. Russians of Belarus represent an advantaged minority. The current regime of Alexander Lukashenka is decidedly pro-Russian in economic, political and cultural terms. The Russian and Belarusian languages are very similar. And most Belarusians hold a clear affinity to and identification for Russia and the Soviet Union in general. Many of the former differences between the Belarusian and Russian culture and languages were diminished during Soviet rule. A large part of the Belarusian population identi- fies with Russia (161). The Russian and Byelorussian languages have 161 [Eke Kuzio, 2000] equal legal status, but, in practice, Russian is the primary language used by the government (162). Russians have also a special status in 162 [U.S. State Department, 2005 - 2009] Belarus, because the country is dependent on Russia (trade, energy) (163). Therefore the Belarusian government adopted inclusive poli- 163 [Hancock, 2006] cies towards the Russian minority. The ruling party for example, is ethnically mixed and extremely pro-Russian (164). 164 [Eke Kuzio, 2000] The Polish minority was powerless until 2004, then they be- came discriminated. Starting in May 2005, there was increased governmental and societal discrimination against the ethnic Pol- ish population (165). The government interfered in the internal af- 165 [U.S. State Department, 2005 - 2009] fairs of the most important Polish NGO: The Union of Belarusian Poles held a congress to elect new leaders.
    [Show full text]
  • 100Th Anniversary of the National Flag of Poland 100Th Anniversary of the National Flag of Poland
    100th Anniversary of the National Flag of Poland 100th Anniversary of the National Flag of Poland The Polish white-and-red flag is only 100 tional colours was first used on a wider Face value: 10 zł Designer: Anna Wątróbska-Wdowiarska years old, even though it is the simplest scale in 1792, during the celebrations sign symbolising the White Eagle, which of the first anniversary of the passing of Metal: Ag 925/1000 Issuer: NBP has been the emblem of Poland for eight the Constitution of 3rd May. In 1831, the Finish: proof, UV print centuries. The upper white stripe of the Sejm of the Congress Kingdom of Poland Diameter: 32.00 mm The coins, commissioned by NBP, flag symbolises the Eagle, while the red adopted a white-and-red cockade as the Weight: 14.14 g were struck by Mennica Polska S.A. one symbolises the colour of the es- official national symbol. The design of the Edge: plain cutcheon. The flag in the form in which it flag used these days was only introduced Mintage: up to 13,000 pcs All Polish collector coins feature: is used these days was introduced only by the Legislative Sejm of the reborn Re- face value; image of the Eagle established after Poland regained its independence public of Poland on 1 August 1919. In the as the state emblem of the Republic of following the partitions. In the Middle first act on the coat-of-arms and the na- Poland; inscription: Rzeczpospolita Polska Ages, the ensign carried by knights of the tional colours of the Republic of Poland, year of issue.
    [Show full text]
  • Policing Protest the Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies 1St Edition Pdf, Epub, Ebook
    POLICING PROTEST THE CONTROL OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 1ST EDITION PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Donatella Della Porta | 9780816630646 | | | | | Policing Protest The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies 1st edition PDF Book The way in which content-related assessments have an influence on protest diagnoses, thereby creating political prognoses of danger , will subsequently be demonstrated using another sequence. The article first outlines the main protest actions involving young people in twenty-first century Britain. On 13 September, the "Heroes March" rally took place in Minsk. Police thus face groups with mixed and sometimes incompatible strategies operating in fluid interaction. These examples support predominantly bipolar oppositions. Kurban was brought to the surface and, accompanied by an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, taken to a psychoneurological medical centre where he was examined by medical staff and released. In this world, there is the typical middle-class nuclear family. American Behavioral Scientist 63 10 However, no details about the ongoing investigation were ever revealed. Riot police, as well as several water cannons one of which broke down , were employed to disperse the rally. If you call it interference, then those who do not recognize the election also interfere in the affairs of Belarus. Nevertheless, this interpretation uncovers aspects that are more or less taken for granted, not problematised or criticised in the discussions — in a nutshell: the implicit norms. American Journal of Political Science 57 4 Nordas, R. After police tried to detain her, protesters shouted "Nina! More communicative and managerial approaches to protest policing since the eighties as well as more selective policing styles relying on the attempt of differentiation between peaceful and non-peaceful can be traced back to this ruling.
    [Show full text]
  • Belarus Before Voting: the Referendum (Past, Presence and Perspectives)
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Policy Documentation Center CENTER FOR POLITICAL EDUCATION Miensk, Republic of Belarus -mail: [email protected] Gutta c a v at lapidem Belarus before Voting: The Referendum (Past, Presence and Perspectives) Introduction: This analysis was prepared from August 25-September 25, 2004 by Andrei Liakhovich, the head of the Minsk-based Center for Political Education (CPE), focusing on the referendum on a possible third term in office for President Alexander Lukashenka, which is scheduled – together with the parliamentary elections – on October 17, 2004. Since September 2003, the Pontis Foundation of Slovakia has been implementing a project in Belarus assisting think-tank and analytical groups mainly through exchange programs.1 As part of this project, Pontis is distributing two analyses before the parliamentary elections (and the referendum) to help increase the flow of analytical information. The views in the analysis are by the CPE. The Pontis Foundation does not necessarily share them. Summary: The democratic opposition could stop President Lukashenka’s bid for a third term only if it were to implement the “Yugoslav variant” in Belarus. However, there are no pre-conditions for such an approach. Most Belarusian voters believe that the elections will be falsified. Despite the fact that there is general disappointment regarding the democrats, the ideas of democracy and European Belarus are still popular among citizens.2 The problem is the lack of (personal) alternatives to Lukashenka, and the fact that Belarusian voters (including the traditional supporters of the democrats) are resigned to the up-coming falsification.
    [Show full text]
  • National Awakening in Belarus: Elite Ideology to 'Nation' Practice
    National Awakening in Belarus: Elite Ideology to 'Nation' Practice Tatsiana Kulakevich SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 40, Number 2, Summer-Fall 2020, pp. 97-110 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/783885 [ Access provided at 7 Mar 2021 23:30 GMT from University Of South Florida Libraries ] National Awakening in Belarus: Elite Ideology to ‘Nation’ Practice Tatsiana Kulakevich This article examines the formation of nationalism in Belarus through two dimensions: elite ideology and everyday practice. I argue the presidential election of 2020 turned into a fundamental institutional crisis when a homogeneous set of ‘nation’ practices against the state ideology replaced existing elite ideology. This resulted in popular incremental changes in conceptions of national understanding. After twenty-six consecutive years in power, President Lukashenka unintentionally unleashed a process of national awakening leading to the rise of a new sovereign nation that demands the right to determine its own future, independent of geopolitical pressures and interference. Introduction ugust 2020 witnessed a resurgence of nationalist discourse in Belarus. AUnlike in the Transatlantic world, where politicians articulate visions of their nations under siege—by immigrants, refugees, domestic minority popu- lations—narratives of national and political failure dominate in Belarus Unlike trends in the Transatlantic resonate with large segments of the voting public.
    [Show full text]
  • The Belarusian Minority in Poland
    a n F P 7 - SSH collaborative research project [2008 - 2 0 1 1 ] w w w . e n r i - e a s t . n e t Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities: Nations between States along the New Eastern Borders of the European Union Series of project research reports Contextual and empirical reports on ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe Research Report #10 Belarus The Belarusian Minority Germany in Poland Hungary Authors: Konrad Zieliński Latvia Magdalena Cześniak-Zielińska | Ilona Matysiak Lithuania Anna Domaradzka | Łukasz Widła Hans-Georg Heinrich | Olga Alekseeva Poland Russia Slovakia Series Editors: Ukraine Hans-Georg Heinrich | Alexander Chvorostov Project primarily funded under FP7-SSH programme Project host and coordinator EUROPEAN COMMISSION www.ihs.ac.at European Research Area 2 ENRI - E a s t R e s e a r c h Report #10: The Belarusian Minority in Poland About the ENRI-East research project (www.enri-east.net) The Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities: Nations between states along the new eastern borders of the European Union (ENRI-East) ENRI-East is a research project implemented in 2008-2011 and primarily funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. This international and inter-disciplinary study is aimed at a deeper understanding of the ways in which the modern European identities and regional cultures are formed and inter-communicated in the Eastern part of the European continent. ENRI-East is a response to the shortcomings of previous research: it is the first large-scale comparative project which uses a sophisticated toolkit of various empirical methods and is based on a process-oriented theoretical approach which places empirical research into a broader historical framework.
    [Show full text]