A hold up waiting to happen

It will soon be the 50th anniversary of the mail train robbery that took place on the WCML at Ledburn, Buckinghamshire on 8 August 1963. Using information, which has only been recently released by the authorities, Fraser Pithie provides an objective summary about a crime that for too long has been glamourised and mythologized rather than understood it only succeeded because largely on the night luck outweighed incompetence.

Christmas 1962 saw the number one position in the pop music charts taken by a record with a postal theme, Elvis Presley’s “Return to Sender”. Also in that same chart was Rolf Harris with “Sun Arise”. at the time the song seemed a cruel joke as from Boxing Day until late March 1963 Britain saw very little sun as it became gripped in a fierce and relentless cold weather system. Industry was hit with some on short time, others brought to a standstill and whole communities were cut off for weeks and some for months.

As the thaw came in March it provided a welcome, if overdue, relief for many. For those working on the railway they hardly had time to draw breath when a hammer blow was dealt to their working world. The infamous “Reshaping of British Railways” report by BR Chairman Dr Richard Beeching was published. If implemented, the Reports’ recommendations would see nearly a third of the railway network axed. It was a depressing time for many who had worked in an industry that was increasingly struggling to compete with road hauliers and the motorcar.

“The robbery of mail It was 18 years since the end of the Second World War from the railways had and the austerity of the post war years was at last and become an increasing finally waning. It had been 1957 when the then Prime problem for several Minister, Harold Macmillan, told Britons “we have never years leading up to 1963” had it so good’ so some six years later more and more people were increasingly anxious to better themselves. This included those classed as the ‘criminal fraternity’. They held the same aspirations for betterment as the law abiding, the only difference being they were prepared to break the law to realise their dreams.

Reynolds, Goody, Edwards, Wilson and James were the names of five such offenders who had been involved in what some would describe as daring raids, but in reality were violent wage snatches in 1962. These men would go onto become some of the most notorious criminals by virtue of the audacity of a crime they, along with eleven others, would commit in 1963.

The robbery of mail from the railways had become an increasing problem for several years leading up to 1963. It was proving relatively easy for the criminals to commit, with the rewards for success putting it ahead of committing other crimes to obtain cash. In August 1960 a robbery of mail bags took place on the to Brighton express netting the thieves £7,500 (about £146,200 today). A month later a further attack along the same line, this time by ‘rigging a lineside signal”, netted robbers £9000 (about £175,000 today).

A third event in 1961, again along the same route involved robbers walking off from Brighton station with registered mail sack containing £15,000 (about £282,700 today). Putting this into context today, its three separate events in less than a year amounting to the robbery of £603,900.

Little wonder then that Mr C G Osmond, the then Controller of the Post Office Investigation Branch stated in a memo to the Postal Services Department on 21 September 1960 “I am most anxious that urgent attention should be given to a further review of security precautions that are taken generally on each Travelling Post Office (TPO) and sorting carriage particularly when the train is brought to a halt (genuine or otherwise) outside a station”.

Yet some two years later in January 1962 a raid on a mail train was only foiled through incompetence with detonators stopping a freight train at Marks Tey rather than the intended TPO. Consequently, Mr Osmond found himself still troubled by the issue and once again addressed the Postal Services Department “I think we should urgently ensure that TPO security is as good as it should be – particularly when the train is brought to a halt on some pretext.”

It’s quite likely that had more attention been given to Mr Osmond’s advice and requests the most audacious robbery of mail in transit on the railway that took place some 7 months after this statement would have been foiled

The crime was to rob the overnight TPO that ran between Glasgow and London Euston. It would be in the early hours of Thursday 8th August 1963 that this event would unfold. The TPO left Glasgow at 1850hrs on 7 August and was booked to stop at Carstairs, where four coaches from Aberdeen were added. At Carlisle a further three coaches were added taking the train up to its final consist of 12 coaches. The locomotive was English Electric Class 40 D326.

It was one of 200 built by English Electric as part of the British Railways 1955 Modernisation Plan. Constructed and introduced from 1958 onwards, these locomotives soon found themselves working on the East Coast Main Line. However, their time on the ECML was short lived after a comparison with BR “Britannia’ Class steam locomotives showed the Class 40 to have little advantage.

Consequently, London Midland region that operated the West Coast Main Line, which had been starved on investment for many years, was pleased with the fact that the Class became available for their use. Under-investment in the WCML meant that overall line speeds were much lower than the ECML and this gave the Class 40 a much better chance to make a difference. A Class 40’s better acceleration than steam locomotives could be utilised but they would not be expected to hold high speeds for lengthy periods of time which was why the Eastern Region had rejected their continued use preferring to wait for the much more powerful Class 55 Deltics.

The TPO’s unique identity that night (its headcode) was “I think we should 1M44. It called at Preston, Warrington, Crewe, Tamworth urgently ensure that and Rugby. These stops were made either for crew TPO security is as changes, for mail sacks to be taken onboard or both. Some good as it should be – particularly when the of these sacks were known as HVP (High Value Packages) train is brought to a sacks. These would always be loaded into the second coach halt on some pretext.” of the train, as that was the “HVP” coach.

Typically, HVPs were largely registered post and that meant cash in transit. On the night in question, following a Bank Holiday, there was an unusually greater volume of HVPs. This was mainly money for the Bank Holiday that had been surplus to local banks’ requirements and there were also some old type five-pound notes that were being withdrawn from circulation.

At Crewe there was a staff changeover. With over 21 years’ experience it would be 57-year-old Crewe driver, , along with 26-year-old David Whitby joining him as fireman that would take 1M44 on the final leg of the journey from Crewe to Euston. Their lives would never be the same after boarding D326 on that warm summer August night. Further, they had no idea of the value of the consignment that would be in their charge.

At Rugby, the last sacks were loaded. On board, in the HVP coach, were 128 HVP sacks containing 636 packets of five pound, one pound and ten shilling notes. They weighed some two and a half tons and their value amounted to £2,595,997 and 10 shillings. Today, worth about £42,400,000.

As Jack Mills opened the power controller of D326 and 1M44 ‘Things were already left Rugby and eastern Warwickshire, telephone wires had going wrong for the already been cut along the WCML south of Leighton robbers and their Buzzard. A gang of some 16 robbers lay in wait at two plans would need to locations for the arrival of 1M44. They had two Land Rovers increasingly rely on luck’ and an Austin flatbed lorry. For the robbery to have any chance of success 1M44 had to be stopped. The method was to feign the aspects of two colour light signals.

The first would show a yellow ‘caution’ aspect with the subsequent signal showing a red, ‘stop’ aspect. The location of the feigned yellow aspect preceded the planned and feigned red aspect on a gantry at Sears Crossing approximately just over 2 miles north of Cheddington station in Buckinghamshire. Once brought to a halt the train would be split with the locomotive, first coach and HVP coach taken south by approximately half a mile from Sears Crossing to Bridego Bridge (Bridge 127). Here the gang would come together and offload their haul into a waiting lorry and two Land Rovers. The operation was timed to take no longer than 30 minutes.

Unbeknown to them at the time, things were already going wrong for the robbers and their plans would need to increasingly rely on luck for the success they sought in the criminal enterprise they had embarked upon. The signal tampering was not carried out as instructed by one of the main gang members Roger Cordrey. A gang member, John Daly, had been instructed to carry this out at the signal that was to be feigned showing the cautionary aspect of yellow but rather than use a glove to cover the correct green aspect, as he’d been instructed by Cordrey, he unscrewed the bulb and threw it onto the track below.

Daly’s actions immediately initiated an alarm at Leighton Buzzard signal box. The signalman at Leighton Buzzard, Thomas Wyn-de-Bank, immediately called out a Signal and Telecoms engineer to check out the ‘failed signal’ alarm. This was after a telephone exchange operator had also called out a GPO engineer due to line faults at 0245hrs in the Leighton Buzzard area, these being caused by the cutting of the telephone wires earlier. Had either, or both, these individuals who had been called out arrived in the area within the next few minutes the criminals would be witnessed in the act.

At just 03.00hrs Jack Mills spotted the yellow aspect and started to slow his 12-coach train, he could see the next signal was red at Sears Crossing gantry. That was not all he could see though, with the line being dead straight for a distance of just under three miles he could see subsequent signals set at green ‘clear’ aspects. This was strange and suggested some sort of fault. Nevertheless, he brought 1M44 came to a halt at the Up Fast signal near Sears Crossing.

David Whitby went to call the signalman from the lineside phone as per the regulations required at the time. He was unable to make contact as the telephone did not work, he soon noticed that the wires had been cut.

At this stage neither he nor Jack Mills had any reason to suspect what was going on. On making his return to the locomotive Whitby noticed a lone figure between the second and third coach and assuming it was railway worker he told Driver Mills there was someone by the train and he would go and see what was wrong. David Whitby approached the figure a couple of coaches down the side of the train.

Meanwhile, Jack Mills noticed two figures appear from the east side of the embankment and assumed they were permanent way workmen. On reaching the lone figure fireman David Whitby was grabbed by the individual and bundled down the embankment where others lay in wait. He was told “If you shout, I will kill you”

Two of the raiders, James and White, commenced to uncouple the train between the HVP coach and the third coach. Their lack of railway knowledge was another element that nearly thwarted the robbery. The uncoupling was a botched affair; they simply did not understand the braking principles involved with a train. Consequently, whilst they did uncouple the train they failed to seal the vacuum brake pipe at the rear of the HVP coach. Meanwhile, Jack Mills remained in the cab of D326 waiting for David Whitby to return, He heard the noise of someone coming up the steps of the locomotive and was on his feet when he was confronted by a man in a boiler suit and balaclava armed with a length of iron piping.

It’s a testament to the decency and courage of Driver Mills that he tackled this intruder and nearly managed to force him off the locomotive steps. Unfortunately others entered the cab via the opposite side of the locomotive and from behind his back overpowered him. Mills was struck by blows to his head and this, as well as possibly injuries sustained by his falling as a result, led to him sustaining five head wounds. He required 14 stitches and one of the wounds was measured as being half an inch deep. His life would change forever because he tried to save his train from a bunch of determined and violent criminals.

With the train stopped and locomotive occupied by villains the pressure was on to move it the half-mile or so to Bridego Bridge. The gang had brought along their own driver who, much older than the gang and their number, was called “Pop”. The gang member whose job it had “Time was ticking away been to look after Pop was the now infamous Ronald and with it the increased potential that the raid Biggs. With Jack Mills and David Whitby on the floor would fail” and in the hot engine compartment of D326 the robbers attempted to move the train.

At this point Pop made his inadvertent contribution towards nearly causing the whole criminal enterprise to fail. He couldn’t get D326 to move. The fact was Pop had no knowledge of Class 40 locomotives, or indeed any diesel electric locomotives operating on British Railways outside the Southern Region. It was unbelievable but the gang had recruited a person who had a long service on the railway, but entirely on the Southern Region as a shunter. Consequently he had worked with air braked stock but was not exposed or experienced enough with vacuum braking and its requirements. No matter what “Pop” did as he bumbled with D326‘s controls he couldn’t move the locomotive and its reduced consist of two coaches.

By now it was about 0310hrs and the signalman at Cheddington telephoned Thomas Wyn-de-Bank at Leighton Buzzard to ask “Where was 1M44?” Wyn-de-Bank told him that it was in his section but he believed there was a signalling fault at Sears Crossing.

Within another five minutes Wyn-de-Bank would notice from the track indicator that the train had passed Sears Crossing but the track indicator was still also showing the previous section before Sears Crossing as still occupied. This suggested that the train may have become separated or the signalling fault was more complex and extended to the track circuit system.

Wyn-de-Bank immediately telephoned London Euston Control and told the Cheddington signalman. He then requested the Signal & Telecoms engineer to go to Sears Crossing. His next action, that of a professional and experienced railwayman, was to close the Up Fast line to any further trains. He stopped a southbound parcels train travelling on the Up Slow line and asked it to proceed to Sears Crossing and report back on the situation with 1M44. He had done all he should and could.

Back at Sears Crossing panic was setting in, time was ticking away and with it the increased potential that the raid would fail. The more strident members of the gang lost their temper and ordered Biggs to get Pop off the footplate. They then visited the engine compartment of D326 and ordered Driver Mills back to the controls of his locomotive and told him to move the train forward. Bleeding quite profusely from the head and badly shaken Mills had little option but to comply. He had first hand personal experience that the mob on his train would use violence and should he try and thwart them in anyway he would run the serious risk of having a second dose meted out on him. In any event he knew that he and Whitby were outnumbered.

It was only through Mills’ vast experience as a long serving driver that he was able to move the train at all. He opened up a large elector as he sensed in uncoupling the train the raiders could not have plugged the vacuum pipe properly. Progress was slow and the train kept shuddering to a virtual stop. White later claimed he realised, through noise coming from the rear of the train, that air was escaping through a pipe. He ran and kicked what he called the air pressure valve shut. If his account is correct, what he had done was restore the vacuum and thus release the brakes.

Certainly something like that did happen as eventually D326 and the now two coach consist made its way through the balmy night air some eleven hundred yards south to Bridego Bridge. At this point Mills was ordered to bring it to a stop. The attack upon the HVP coach then commenced. It was about 03.15hrs.

It had been agreed by the gang prior to the robbery that they would leave no later than 30 minutes from initially stopping the train. At 03.30hrs another gang member, , called time even refusing to allow a couple more minutes to seize a remaining 8 HVP sacks in the HVP coach.

Mills and Whitby had been handcuffed together and were removed from D326. In what was to turn out to be one blunder too many by the gang, Mills and Whitby were then walked along the embankment and were told not to look up so Whitby looked down. He saw the loading going on below Bridego Bridge with Land Rovers and an Austin lorry. Mills and Whitby were placed in the HVP coach with the GPO staff and told not to move for 30 minutes or they would be hurt as two men were being left behind. Whitby’s recollection of the vehicles he had seen played a major part in the ultimate apprehending of the offenders by the police.

The situation that now existed on the WCML at 0330hrs was the Up Fast line was blocked in two places by D326 and two coaches at Bridego Bridge and some eleven hundred yards behind were ten mail coaches stationery at Sears Crossing. It had been closed to traffic by the diligent Wyn-De-Bank at Leighton Buzzard. The telephone lines in the area had been cut and a signal fault alarm had operated at Leighton Buzzard signal box. A GPO and railway signal and telecoms engineer had been called out but as yet were not in the area.

The TPO Guard, Tom Miller stated he got to the front of the remaining coaches train after 6 minutes of the train stopping at Sears Crossing. This varies to other accounts. The botched uncoupling, the incompetence with D326‘s controls by Pop and then Jack Mills trying to move the uncoupled front consist without a proper sealed vacuum was likely to have taken more than 6 minutes before the move to Bridego Bridge was finally underway. Miller found the telephone wires were cut, the locomotive and two coaches were gone. His first action was to protect his train. This meant the 61 yr old running back north and placing detonators on the line at a quarter, half and full mile as per the regulations to warn any approaching train of an obstruction. Miller then set off south passing the stranded coaches. He met two men from the HVP coach walking north towards him who told him what had happened. He then reached D326 and the robbery scene, he could see Driver Mills was potentially seriously injured. He said he would go and get help and continued on foot south towards Cheddington station. He stopped a slow goods train heading north, explained what had happened and asked them to proceed to Bridego Bridge and render first aid to driver Mills. He stopped a second train, this time going south on the up slow line. The driver said he’d been asked by the Leighton Buzzard signalman to ascertain the situation with 1M44 and report. Having just passed the stranded train and hearing Miller’s story, he instructed his fireman to take the first aid box and walk back to Bridego Bridge to offer assistance. Miller then travelled on the loco to Cheddington, and raised the alarm. Len Kinchin was the signalman on duty at Cheddington and upon the arrival of Guard Miller and Driver Cooper he heard what must have been an incredulous story. He immediately telephoned London Euston Control and reported it. The call was logged as received by Euston at 04.15hrs. It was just an hour from when the attack had commenced on the HVP coach at Bridego Bridge. Scotland Yard were informed some nine minutes later at 04.24hrs.

It’s easy with the benefit of hindsight to criticise the actions of those involved in the early stages of the event. I do not level such criticism. They were dealing with an unfamiliar and unraveling situation that was unprecedented. Their concern would naturally default into ensuring safety, the rendering of first aid, the protection of trains and notification. It also needs to be taken into account that all of this was taking place in the early hours of the morning. Shift work, particularly overnight, is well known to test many a person’s attention and alertness and something out of the routine can easily lead to confusion, delay or oversight.

So whilst it was understandable that D326 and the two coaches were moved this action did not help to preserve any evidence at what was undoubtedly a major crime scene. However, much less excusable were the actions of a BTP Detective Superintendent at Cheddington Station who instructed that D326 and its two coaches be moved again into a siding on the west side of the station before any forensic examination of the locomotive and coaches had taken place.

Seemingly not content with his actions of instructing the moving of D326 and its coaches into the siding, a much bigger bungle was to take place later that day. The same BTP Detective Superintendent, with the agreement of a Detective Sergeant of Buckinghamshire police, released D326 and the parcel coach back to traffic.

That weekend, Britain was reeling with the news of the robbery. As police mounted one of the biggest manhunts in its history at number one in the pop charts was a group, ironically called “The Searchers”, with a song ‘Sweets for my Sweet’.

Back on the fateful night neither Jack Mills, nor his fireman David Whitby, could have imagined that what was about to take place would place them in a worldwide spotlight, but more importantly, have such a devastating and lasting effect upon their lives and that of their families.

Yes the Post Office and British Railways had been totally complacent through a mixture of incompetence, the lackadaisical and a corporate arrogance. The practice of dumping mail sacks, including HVP sacks on railway station platforms waiting for mail trains to collect them seems incredulous when we read it now.

The condition and standard of the HVP coaches, and there “The robbery of 1M44 were only a handful of them, were woeful when it came to was not a ‘derring do’ security. This had been highlighted by C G Osmond of the event or operation Post Office, but complacency led to his representations carried out with military prowess.” largely being ignored. All of this came together and represented what honest folk would describe as a risk. To criminals it represented the converse, it’s the one key element crucial to their success, opportunity.

Yet for all what would be termed ‘corporate incompetence’ these days it was a front line railwayman one of the victims, Fireman David Whitby, whose presence of mind at a time of fearing for his own life, enabled him to observe what was vital information about the vehicles used by the robbers. It proved crucial in linking those responsible to the events at Bridego Bridge and the subsequent gang hideout at Leatherslade Farm. Ultimately it was this that delivered the convictions.

The robbery of 1M44 was not a ‘derring do’ event or operation carried out with military prowess. Many aspects of it were bungled and as we have read several of these elements came very close to thwarting the desired outcome of the criminals. Robbery is defined as taking the property of another, with the intent to permanently deprive the person of that property, by means of force or fear. Both these railwaymen were going about their job and the shock and trauma they encountered as a result of the robbery was not deserved.

Over the years, books, films and some documentaries have sought to mythologise and glamourise the event and particularly the robbers. Most of these accounts have paid little or no attention to the victims. One of the gang, , the subject of a romanticised feature film “Buster”, said of violence in 1994 “ If it’s got to be used, it’s got to be used”

8 August 2013 will mark the 50th anniversary of the Great Train Robbery with no doubt TV programmes, media coverage and copious references to the event. One must hope that with time the reporting of this event has matured. There was nothing ‘Great” about the Train Robbery, it was a cold, callous and violent robbery of the Royal Mail and it was not victimless.

The Judge, Mr Justice Edmund Davies, who sentenced the majority of the robbers, was quite clear “Let us clear out of the way any romantic notions of daredevilry. This is nothing less than a sordid crime of violence inspired by vast greed.”

Driver Jack Mills, whose son said his Dad was never the same man afterwards, died some 7 years later on 4 February 1970 suffering from leukaemia. His Fireman, David Whitby, survived him by only two years dying on 6 January 1972 at the young age of 34 after suffering a heart attack.

The decision to rename Bridego Bridge “Train Robbers Bridge’ is regrettable as its outcome, unintended as it maybe, gives notoriety to a serious organised and violent crime. If the bridge where this crime took place had to lose its Bridego name then it surely would have been much more appropriate to have left it simply as Bridge 127 or renamed it Mills Whitby Bridge. Whilst we have come to accept parts of our media have become dumbed down, and at times seduced by myth, our railway and its people certainly should not be.