D0006773 Exd-5 General Ndindiliyimana's Document
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D0006773 EXD-5 GENERAL NDINDILIYIMANA’S DOCUMENT WS05-422(E) D000-1950-D000-1982 D0006774 CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK "Leavenone to te~the story. Genocide in Rwanda." By Alisondes Forges,a Consultantfor HumanRights Watch KarthalaPublishers, 1999 By Augustin NDINDILIYIMANA Major-General FormerMinister FormerChief of Staffof Rwanda’sGendarmerie [National Police] Brusseis,13 October1999 WS05.422(E) 2 D000-1950-D000-1982 D0006775 Rueau bois,488 1150Brussels 13 Oetober1999 MadamAlison Des Forges Consultant,Intemational Federation ofHumanRights (FIDH) 15, rue Campenhout 1000Brussels Dear Madam, Subject:My remarkson the contentof yourbook: "Leave none to tellthe story. Genoeidein Rwanda." Afterreading your book "Leave none to tellthe story. Genocide in Rwanda",published by Karthala(1999), I feelobliged to expressmy commentsand views to youin order contributetowards the discovery ofthe truth. It is, in fact, regrettable thatin spite of our discussionin Brusselson 19 October1997, you persisted in eanvassinginaccurate informationand interpretationsabout events that I witnessedfirst hand. In your voluminouswork, you positideas, concepts and argumentsthat, alas, need to be qualified,and even contradicted where they are truly baseless. I wouldlike to stressthat given the scopeof the Rwandantragedy and of its consequences,legally and humanly speaking, itis diffieult to approachthe issue in a neutraland objective manner. Since the tragic events of 1994,issues concerning Rwanda haveofien been approached partially and passionately. Furthermore,I note, with Prof. Filip Reyntjens in his letteraddressed to me on 1 December1998, that "clearly, there are people who are not interested inthe discovery ofthe truth and who, on the contrary, are pursuing political strategies ". Lastly,I also note that it isdifficult for Rwandan and non-Rwandan political leaders to acknowledgecertain factual realities, particularly when these facts implicate them in one wayor the other. Itis, therefore, vital that the reader be well informed and that counter arguments be made toavoid the risk of suggesting that some people have an interest instifling the truth. Youknow that I wouldhave liked to contributetothe siarch for the truth during the work of the Commissionspéciale du SénatBelge [The Special Commission of the Belgian Senate].I specially addressed a request, in writing,to theCommission to that effect. ws05-422(E) 3 DO00-1950-D000-1982 00006776 Youare also aware, since we talkedabout it, that some people hindered and denied me theright to testifypublicly, and launched a virulent defamation campaign against me in orderto discreditme and to preventme frombeing granted international refugee status. Thatrefusal was ail the more surprising if one recalls that my arrivalin Belgiumwas organisedin June1994 with the agreement of MinisterClaes himself, who expressed the wish,in writing,that I testifyon the murder ofthe 10 Belgianpeacekeepers. Mycounsel atthe time took numerous steps, in vain, to get the Commission togrant me a hearing. Itis importantthat the people of Rwandaand the international community know the truth aboutthe situation, sothat the Rwanda’s history can be written correctly. In thisdocument, I revert to issues that seem important to me, all the more so assome of thesefacts are relied on to supportthe view that the genocide was planned by the entire Stateapparatus. I also suggest questions that should be answeredin orderto conduct moredetailed investigations. Thetable of contents ofthe issues that I shalladdress inthis letter is as follows: 1. Listfound in the vehicleof the Army Chiefof Staff (pp. 99 and 100) ¯ .........°°....,,,°..° ..... °....» 2. Recruitmentandtraining of lnterahamwe(p.144) ............ 3. Informationprovided byLieutenant Nees ........................... 3.1 Themeeting ..................................... 3.2 Armscaches ........................ 3.3 Demonstrationof 8 January 3.4 Theattitude of thepeacekeepers andwhat lieutenant Nees refers to as"la réponse à lariposte des militaires belges" 4. Otherfacts incorrectly reported by MadamDes Forges and insinuating serious accusations............................................................... "17February: Senior officers of theNational Police meet with Habyarimana to expressfears that war might resume". .............. Youalso report (p.163): "Late February: Major Stanislas Kinyoni reportedly summonedthe heads of NationalPolice brigades and told them to preparelists (..)"........ 4.3 You write(p. 170):"17 March:A respectedsource in the NationalPolice (probablyChief of StaffNdindiliyimana) toldBelgian officers that the UNAMIR mandateshould be strengthened ...". ....... You write(p. 187)that Bavugameshi’s commander "General Ndindiliyimana couldhOt be round at home or at headquarters". ........ You write(p. 189):"At about10:30, the campcommander came to inform Bagosoraand General Ndindiliyimana thatthe Belgian soldiers were under attaek atthe camp, but they did nothing ...... " WS05-422(E) D000-1950-D000-1982 D0006777 Regardingthe death of thepeacekeepers, there are still uncertainties about the circumstancesoftheir death and the number of victims ....................... Youwrite (p. 192): "The afternoon of April7, both Bagosora and Ndindiliyimana toldDallaire that the killings at CampKigali showed that it might be best for the Belgiantroops to leave Rwanda.". ..................... [Sub-paragraphs4.8to 4.14 not included inthis translation] l° Listround in the vehicle ofthe Army Chief of Staff(pp.99 and 100) Sec: Rapportdu groupead hoc Rwandaà la Commissiondes affaires étrangères du 7.1.97[Report of the Ad hoc Group on Rwandato the ForeignAffairs Commission,dated 7 January1997], p. 68, "Constitution deslistes d’exécution"; Testimonyof A. Ndindiliyimanabefore the Commissionspéciale Rwanda [SpecialCommission on Rwanda],22 April1997, p. 15; Commissionspéciale Rwanda. Summary records. Hearing of Nsanzuweraon 22 April1997, p. 321; Letter,Canon Dr. James K. Gasana,former Rwandan Minister of Defence,dated 8 August1998 (explanation on the list found in 1993); - AndréGuiehaoua (1996). "Les crises poliltiques au Burundiet Rwanda",1993- 1994,pp. 612-613, pp. 662-667; - ColetteBraeckman (1994). Rwanda. Histoire d’un génocide, p.226 - ProjustitiaCase-file No. 52.99.1726/98. Transcript 16525; - Mr.Nsanzuwera’s letter to theRwandan Minister of Justice,Brussels, on 20 May 1997; Commissionspéciale Rwanda, hearing of Mr. Nsazuwera,22 April 1997 (speakingabout a gendarmeinvestigating offîcer in the Gatabazi case). Thisis the famous "liste de personnes à tuer" [List ofpersons to be killed], presented by someresearehers and some media organizations as one of theirrefutable proofs thatthe genocide was planned. I amcited among the people who allegedly knew about that list but failed to warn the personstargeted. Onthis issue, you could (pp.121-123), atleast, have informed your readers that I was theone who found the list. WS05-422(E) 5 D000-1950-I)000-1982 D0006778 So,who better to talk to you about it than myself? Certainfacts need to be recalled.As I wasdriving in the saine direction as Geneml DeogratiasNsabimana, following his accident, I first drove the injured to the hospital. I cameback to thescene of theaccident and collectedthe weapons and documents aboardthe vehicle.An openenvelope drew my attention.When I checkedto see whatwas inside, I foundthat it containeda list. I foundthis envelope on 6 March 1993and not at theend of 1993as claimedby certainpeople, su¢h as theformer Prosecutor,Mr. Nsanzuwera. I took the envelope to theofficers of theGendarmerie StaffHeadquarters and, as wasappropriate in such cases, I handedit overto the Ministerof Defenee,James Gasana. Mr. Gasana,as statedby himin writing,took con¢retemeasures, particularly by instructingthe Gendarmerieto conductan investigationand by informingthe Prime Minister’s intelligence services. The investigationconducted by the Gendarmerie failed to determine the author of the list. Questionedby my officeaiter his convalescence, theArmy Chief of Staff,General Nsabimana,replied that the list came from RPF. Theinvestigations on the list was entrusted to two officers,namely Lieutenant- ColonelBavugamenshi, Commander of the VIP companyand MajorKayihura of the "Centrede recherchecriminelle et documentation[Criminal Research and DocumentationCentre], who was in chargeof theinvestigation into the murder of Mr.Gapyisi, an MDRpolitieian. Their findings were that the list and the murders werethe work of thesaine persons (without identifying them) whose aire was commitpsychological andselective terrorism. Whilethe Gendarmerie had still hOt concluded its investigation, onecould still wonder whohad an interest in thatpsychological andselective terrorism. Findinganswers to these questions will help clarify this case: Whydid RPF rush, after aceeding to power,to searchfor and recover these files on the murderofthe politicians, a faet acknowledged by the late Alphonse Marie Nkubito? In hisletter dated 20 May1997 to theRwandan Minister of Justice,the Prosecutor of Kigali,Mr. Nsanzuwera, wrote that some files on themurder of politicianshad been closed,including that of Mr. Gatabazi. He also stated that the report of thegendarmerie offieerin theinvestigation was hotof muchuse to the Prosecutor.Did thereport implicateRPF? If oneeould think, as didthe Gendarmerie, that the compilation of the list and the murders(1993) were probably the work of thesame persons, why are the investigations notdirected at thepeople incriminated by Prosecutor Nsanzuwera in Mr. Gatabazi’s murder.Is