D0006773
EXD-5
GENERAL NDINDILIYIMANA’S DOCUMENT
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CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK
"Leavenone to te~the story. Genocide in Rwanda."
By Alisondes Forges,a Consultantfor HumanRights Watch
KarthalaPublishers, 1999
By Augustin NDINDILIYIMANA
Major-General FormerMinister FormerChief of Staffof Rwanda’sGendarmerie [National Police]
Brusseis,13 October1999
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Rueau bois,488 1150Brussels
13 Oetober1999
MadamAlison Des Forges Consultant,Intemational Federation ofHumanRights (FIDH) 15, rue Campenhout 1000Brussels
Dear Madam,
Subject:My remarkson the contentof yourbook: "Leave none to tellthe story. Genoeidein Rwanda."
Afterreading your book "Leave none to tellthe story. Genocide in Rwanda",published by Karthala(1999), I feelobliged to expressmy commentsand views to youin order contributetowards the discovery ofthe truth. It is, in fact, regrettable thatin spite of our discussionin Brusselson 19 October1997, you persisted in eanvassinginaccurate informationand interpretationsabout events that I witnessedfirst hand. In your voluminouswork, you positideas, concepts and argumentsthat, alas, need to be qualified,and even contradicted where they are truly baseless.
I wouldlike to stressthat given the scopeof the Rwandantragedy and of its consequences,legally and humanly speaking, itis diffieult to approachthe issue in a neutraland objective manner. Since the tragic events of 1994,issues concerning Rwanda haveofien been approached partially and passionately.
Furthermore,I note, with Prof. Filip Reyntjens in his letteraddressed to me on 1 December1998, that "clearly, there are people who are not interested inthe discovery ofthe truth and who, on the contrary, are pursuing political strategies ".
Lastly,I also note that it isdifficult for Rwandan and non-Rwandan political leaders to acknowledgecertain factual realities, particularly when these facts implicate them in one wayor the other.
Itis, therefore, vital that the reader be well informed and that counter arguments be made toavoid the risk of suggesting that some people have an interest instifling the truth.
Youknow that I wouldhave liked to contributetothe siarch for the truth during the work of the Commissionspéciale du SénatBelge [The Special Commission of the Belgian Senate].I specially addressed a request, in writing,to theCommission to that effect. ws05-422(E) 3 DO00-1950-D000-1982 00006776
Youare also aware, since we talkedabout it, that some people hindered and denied me theright to testifypublicly, and launched a virulent defamation campaign against me in orderto discreditme and to preventme frombeing granted international refugee status. Thatrefusal was ail the more surprising if one recalls that my arrivalin Belgiumwas organisedin June1994 with the agreement of MinisterClaes himself, who expressed the wish,in writing,that I testifyon the murder ofthe 10 Belgianpeacekeepers. Mycounsel atthe time took numerous steps, in vain, to get the Commission togrant me a hearing.
Itis importantthat the people of Rwandaand the international community know the truth aboutthe situation, sothat the Rwanda’s history can be written correctly.
In thisdocument, I revert to issues that seem important to me, all the more so assome of thesefacts are relied on to supportthe view that the genocide was planned by the entire Stateapparatus. I also suggest questions that should be answeredin orderto conduct moredetailed investigations.
Thetable of contents ofthe issues that I shalladdress inthis letter is as follows:
1. Listfound in the vehicleof the Army Chiefof Staff (pp. 99 and 100)
¯ ...... °°....,,,°..° ..... °....» 2. Recruitmentandtraining of lnterahamwe(p.144) ...... 3. Informationprovided byLieutenant Nees ...... 3.1 Themeeting ...... 3.2 Armscaches ...... 3.3 Demonstrationof 8 January 3.4 Theattitude of thepeacekeepers andwhat lieutenant Nees refers to as"la réponse à lariposte des militaires belges"
4. Otherfacts incorrectly reported by MadamDes Forges and insinuating serious accusations......
"17February: Senior officers of theNational Police meet with Habyarimana to expressfears that war might resume"...... Youalso report (p.163): "Late February: Major Stanislas Kinyoni reportedly summonedthe heads of NationalPolice brigades and told them to preparelists (..)"...... 4.3 You write(p. 170):"17 March:A respectedsource in the NationalPolice (probablyChief of StaffNdindiliyimana) toldBelgian officers that the UNAMIR mandateshould be strengthened ..."...... You write(p. 187)that Bavugameshi’s commander "General Ndindiliyimana couldhOt be round at home or at headquarters"...... You write(p. 189):"At about10:30, the campcommander came to inform Bagosoraand General Ndindiliyimana thatthe Belgian soldiers were under attaek atthe camp, but they did nothing ...... "
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Regardingthe death of thepeacekeepers, there are still uncertainties about the circumstancesoftheir death and the number of victims ...... Youwrite (p. 192): "The afternoon of April7, both Bagosora and Ndindiliyimana toldDallaire that the killings at CampKigali showed that it might be best for the Belgiantroops to leave Rwanda."...... [Sub-paragraphs4.8to 4.14 not included inthis translation] l° Listround in the vehicle ofthe Army Chief of Staff(pp.99 and 100)
Sec:
Rapportdu groupead hoc Rwandaà la Commissiondes affaires étrangères du 7.1.97[Report of the Ad hoc Group on Rwandato the ForeignAffairs Commission,dated 7 January1997], p. 68, "Constitution deslistes d’exécution";
Testimonyof A. Ndindiliyimanabefore the Commissionspéciale Rwanda [SpecialCommission on Rwanda],22 April1997, p. 15;
Commissionspéciale Rwanda. Summary records. Hearing of Nsanzuweraon 22 April1997, p. 321;
Letter,Canon Dr. James K. Gasana,former Rwandan Minister of Defence,dated 8 August1998 (explanation on the list found in 1993);
- AndréGuiehaoua (1996). "Les crises poliltiques au Burundiet Rwanda",1993- 1994,pp. 612-613, pp. 662-667;
- ColetteBraeckman (1994). Rwanda. Histoire d’un génocide, p.226
- ProjustitiaCase-file No. 52.99.1726/98. Transcript 16525;
- Mr.Nsanzuwera’s letter to theRwandan Minister of Justice,Brussels, on 20 May 1997;
Commissionspéciale Rwanda, hearing of Mr. Nsazuwera,22 April 1997 (speakingabout a gendarmeinvestigating offîcer in the Gatabazi case).
Thisis the famous "liste de personnes à tuer" [List ofpersons to be killed], presented by someresearehers and some media organizations as one of theirrefutable proofs thatthe genocide was planned.
I amcited among the people who allegedly knew about that list but failed to warn the personstargeted.
Onthis issue, you could (pp.121-123), atleast, have informed your readers that I was theone who found the list.
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So,who better to talk to you about it than myself? Certainfacts need to be recalled.As I wasdriving in the saine direction as Geneml DeogratiasNsabimana, following his accident, I first drove the injured to the hospital. I cameback to thescene of theaccident and collectedthe weapons and documents aboardthe vehicle.An openenvelope drew my attention.When I checkedto see whatwas inside, I foundthat it containeda list. I foundthis envelope on 6 March 1993and not at theend of 1993as claimedby certainpeople, su¢h as theformer Prosecutor,Mr. Nsanzuwera. I took the envelope to theofficers of theGendarmerie StaffHeadquarters and, as wasappropriate in such cases, I handedit overto the Ministerof Defenee,James Gasana. Mr. Gasana,as statedby himin writing,took con¢retemeasures, particularly by instructingthe Gendarmerieto conductan investigationand by informingthe Prime Minister’s intelligence services. The investigationconducted by the Gendarmerie failed to determine the author of the list.
Questionedby my officeaiter his convalescence, theArmy Chief of Staff,General Nsabimana,replied that the list came from RPF.
Theinvestigations on the list was entrusted to two officers,namely Lieutenant- ColonelBavugamenshi, Commander of the VIP companyand MajorKayihura of the "Centrede recherchecriminelle et documentation[Criminal Research and DocumentationCentre], who was in chargeof theinvestigation into the murder of Mr.Gapyisi, an MDRpolitieian. Their findings were that the list and the murders werethe work of thesaine persons (without identifying them) whose aire was commitpsychological andselective terrorism.
Whilethe Gendarmerie had still hOt concluded its investigation, onecould still wonder whohad an interest in thatpsychological andselective terrorism.
Findinganswers to these questions will help clarify this case:
Whydid RPF rush, after aceeding to power,to searchfor and recover these files on the murderofthe politicians, a faet acknowledged by the late Alphonse Marie Nkubito?
In hisletter dated 20 May1997 to theRwandan Minister of Justice,the Prosecutor of Kigali,Mr. Nsanzuwera, wrote that some files on themurder of politicianshad been closed,including that of Mr. Gatabazi. He also stated that the report of thegendarmerie offieerin theinvestigation was hotof muchuse to the Prosecutor.Did thereport implicateRPF?
If oneeould think, as didthe Gendarmerie, that the compilation of the list and the murders(1993) were probably the work of thesame persons, why are the investigations notdirected at thepeople incriminated by Prosecutor Nsanzuwera in Mr. Gatabazi’s murder.Is that not the key to theproblem?
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ColetteBraeckman (1994, p. 226)expresses another view on thismatter by statingthat: "Lanuit, des patrouilles du FPR se glissent dans la ville:les jeunes soldats sont munis de listes,ils savant où se trouventleurs sympathisants, leurs partisans. Eux aussi connaissentl’adresse des Tutsi." [RPF patrols sneak into the town at night,the young soldiers,armed with lists, they know where their sympathizers are, their members. They alsoknow the address of the Tutsi]. In short,could it notbe possiblethat the list belonged to an RPFmember who was in Kigalitown?
In thatregard, the formerProsecutor, F. X. Nsanzuwera,who wasone of thosewho suggestedthe possibility that the list contained names of persons to be executed eould not adduceany evidence to thateffect. I would like to add that the list that was presented as evidencethat the genoeide was planned is thelist referred to in A.Guichaoua’s book and whichlists the namesof Hutuand Tutsifrom various parties, including MRND, who wereliving in Rwandaor elsewhere(Canada, Europe, Uganda .... ).
2. Recruitmentand training ofthe Interahamwe (p. 144)
Sec:
Testimonygiven by A. Ndindliyimanabefore the Commissionspéciale Rwanda on21 April1998, p. 14; Reportof F. X. Nsanzuwera- expertopinion, testimony, Rutaganda lrial, Brussels,21 June1997 (sent to Mr. Udo Gefing,ICTR Kigali, copy to the Presidentof ICTRin Arushaand TheHague).
Youmention the episode of thetraining oflnterahamwe in Gabiro in December1993.
At thatsame rime, the Commanderof the Gendarmerieunit in Kibungo,Major Havugiyaremye,hadsent a telegramto thestaff headquarters andto ailthe army and gendarmerieunits telling them that he hadheard that a buscarrying lnterahamwe fromMutura for military training, had passed through Rwamagana. I ordered that oftïcerto invesrigate thematter. He sentme a writtenreport staring that the persons on thebus were police park guards who had been on a trainingexercise. This case thatcaused a lotof sensationwas subsequently discussed by thecabinet of Prime MinisterAgathe Uwilingiyimana’s Government.
Therewas no armycamp between Gabiro and Kigali.The campin questionwas a gendarmeriecamp. The unit’s commander was a gendarme.I intervened personally andasked that a reportbe submittedto me on thematter, and I receiveda written reportas explainedabove.
Yourversion of events(p. 144) is, therefore, an extrapolationaimed at lending credencetoyour theory of a planinvolving the entire State apparatus.
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3. Informationprovided by LieutenantNees
See:
Destexhe:"Qui a tuénos pars?", pp. 17 and18 andthe programme: "Les oubliés de Kigali’,R.T.L.
I quote: "Lamise en placedu réseauNees: ... le 8janvier,Nees qui est néerlandophone rapportel’information suivante: Après que les militairesbelges.. Aient commencéà confisquer les armes, les munitions etautres explosif s, ily a de cela quatrejours, M. Ngirumpatse,président du MRND,a réunithier dans l"après- midi,les responsables des interahamwe pour étudier la ripostequi convient. Danscette réunion, il y avait,outre le ministre de la défensenationale, le chef d ëtat majordes FAR,celui de la Gendarmerie,les grandsresponsables politiquesdu MRNDet le présidentnational des interahamwe M. Robert Kajuga. Au termesde cetteréunion, outre la manifestationqui a étédécidée hier et organiséeen vuede contrerceux qui veulent mettre en place le gouvernementde transition,la réponse à la ripostedes militaires belges a étéla suivante:" [Establishmentof the Neesnetwork: ... on 8 January,Nees who speaksDutch gavethe followinginformation: Four days atter the Belgiansoldiers began confiscatingweapons, ammunition and otherexplosives, Mr. Ngirumpatse, the Presidentof MRND,convened a meetingof theInterahamwe officiais yesterday afternoonto eonsiderthe appropriate response. Present at thatmeeting were, apartfrom the Minister of NationalDefence, the Chiefs of Staffof RAFand the Gendarmerie,senior MRND political officials and the National President of the Interahamwe,Robert Kajuga. At the end of thatmeeting, apart from the demonstrationdecided on yesterdayand organized in oppositionto thosewho wantedto setup thetransitional govemment, the response to the Belgian soldiers’ actionwas as follows:
1. Neverto agreeto handover one’s weapon or weapons;
2. MRNDwill select from among the RAF officers,those in whose homesheavy weapons would be stocked,so thatthe ownerscould go andcollect them when rime came;
3. Changeall arms cache locations known up untilthen;
4° Sensitizethe Interahamwe to theabsolute necessity to defend themselvesin theevent the Belgian soldiers came to confiscate weaponsfrom one of theMRND members and, if needbe, to teach themto fight with stones (intifada);
Disruptthe collaboration between:
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The gendarmesselected to assistUNAMIR and UNAMIR; Thecivilian population and the Belgian soldiers and UNAMIR.
Mostof thepeople who subscribe to thetheory that the genocide was planned by the entireState apparatus rely notably on informationprovided by LieutenantNees in relationmainly to: The famousmeeting; Theamas caches; Thedemonstration of 8 January; Theattitude of theBelgian peacekeepers and whatLieutenant Nees presents as "laréponse à la riposte des militaires belges" [the response to the action by the Belgiansoldiers] of theRwandan military authorities and the MRNDpolitieal leaders.
3.1 The Meeting
See:
- Destexhe,"Qui a tuénospars?", p.17, pp. 82-83
- Rwanda.Documents sur le génocide,Ed. Luc Pire(sec the summonsof the Prosecutor,Mr. F. X. Nsanzuwera,quoted on p.69);
- La LibreBelgique, 7 August1997, "Génocide rwandais: Belgique terre d’accueil";
- Commissionspéciale Rwanda, Summary records. Hearing of ColonelMarchal, 7 March1997,p. 107 and 14 March1997, p. 172;
Commentsand observationsby Colonel Marchal on thereport of the Commission du sénatbelge, February 1998, pp. 39-40 (Opinion on Nees’sinformation);
GeneralDallaire’s statement in Le Soirnewspaper of 7 May 1996 (no UN intelligenceservice).
Thatmeeting was also cited to provethat the genocide was planned.
Itshould be noted that the date of that (hypothetical) meeting differs depending onwho tellingthe story. There is every reason to believe that the meeting is beingconfused - deliberatelyornot- with another meeting.
Thus:
Destexheputs the date in December1993; TheRapport du groupe ad hoc states that it tookplace on 7 January1994.
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I am convineedthat the meetingreferred to by Neesis the onethat took place on 7 February1994 (the date of theNees report!). That meeting was aimedat enhaneing trustand collaboration between the Rwandan authorities and UNAMIR.
ColonelMarchal acknowledges that that meeting took place.
Indeed,to the following question asked by Senator Destexhe: "General Ndindiliyimana is currentlycharged by theBelgian justice system and enjoys CPAS services in a commune of Brusselsregion. You ought tobe careful (sicl) because you are saying a lotof good thingsabout him whereas the ad hocreport highlights much more negative things about him.In hisreport of 7 February1994, Lieutenant Nees describes a meeting during which the responseto be givenwas defined.General Ndindiliyimana was presentat that meeting.Moreover, Professor Reyntjens also states that the General is not entirely truthful.What is vourreaction to LieutenantNees’s report (emphasis added)?". Colonel Marehalreplied:
"I do not knowof an),document, but I ara goingto sharewith you my four-month experiencewhich seems to me to havea certainweight compared to whatsome people whohad no contact in terres of collaborationwith the gendarmerie coordinators say.... It is obviousthat one cannot deny certain events, in particularfrom 7 Aprilonwards. Nevertheless,those who attended the meeting of 9 Aprilcalled to iron out the di~ïculties betweenthe governmentauthorities and UNAMIRwere the President,the Ministerof Defenceof Rwanda,Colonel Bagosora, Colonel Sagatwa, General Nsabimana as wellas commandersof the paramilitarybattalions of the PresidentialGuard." General Ndindiliyimanawasnot present at thatmeeting.
While ColonelMarchal confirms the ~ of the meeting(improving relations betweenUNAMIR and the Rwandanauthorities), he confuses the dates_.We were,in fact,not yet in April.However, that meeting did take place. I reckonit was held on the dateof theNees report, i.e. on 7 February1994. The President of theRepublie was presentat themeeting. I was hot.
Theflagrant contradictions pointed out in the foregoing invalidate Nees’s assertions.
Whyhas such confusion been entertained and broadcast in themedia?
In thiscormection, the 7 August1997 issue of theLibre Belgique wrote: "Several intellectualsareliving in Belgium.Augustin Ndindiliyimana wasChief of Staffof theGendarmerie nationale at the time of the genocide; heis accusedpartieularly of notintervening to prevent the perpetration of massacres although he hema positionof responsibilityin which capacity he attendedmeetings at whichthe massacreswere allegedly planned."
Thereporting of theevents is morethan muddled. Moreover, itis regularlyrelayed (by themedia, by yourself), thus lending it anair of authenticity.However, one has to accept
WS05-422(E) 10 D000-1950-D000-1982 00006783 thefact that these accounts aretruly flights offancy, riddled with lies, contradictions and untruths.
Infact, is it nota wonder that Nees gives information inFebruary about serious events thatreportedly tookplace in January, whEreas ittan be inferred from his hearings bifore theCommission that the zealous ofiïcer produced daily reports on theevents that took placein Kigali town? ThE facts reported byLieutenant Nees are so serious as to have requiredthe intervention ofthe Rwandan Government, andmore particularly thatof the PrimeMinister and the United Nations Force Commander. Itis unlikely, if the meeting tookplace as describEd by Nees, that neither Colonel Marchal, UNAMIR Commander in Kigalisecteur, nor GenEral Dallaire, never received any report from Lieutenant Nees.
Onthis topic, it is edifying toknow that Colonel Marchal, assessing the work donc by LieutenantNees, stated that: "Asa matterof fact, the party concerned did a lotin termsof information research,but he did not at ail do his job at the $2 battalion" (Col. BEMS Luc Marchal,Rapport Commission parlementaire Rwanda, commentaires et considérations[Report of theParliamentary Commission on Rwanda, Comments andConsiderations], FEbruary 1998, p. 39).
Moreserious still, General Dallaire, the UNAMIR Commander, recaUing that lais mission didhOt have the necEssary information network, admitted that:
"Itwas only through the press that I learnedthat the Belgians had a networkof informants... But nobody deemed it necessaryto inform me about if’ (Sec "Le Soir"of 7 May1996).
I am,therefore, convinced that the allEged meeting of7 Januaryisobscuring tlae actual meetingthat took place on 7 February1994.
The7 Februarymeeting, chaired by thePresident of the Republic, brought togEther, amongothers, the Minister ofDeîence, Mr. Augustin Bizimana, the Army Chief of Staff, GeneralNsabimana, General Dallaire and Colonel Marchal. The meeting was held in the wakeof somevery serious incidents between the Rwandan authorities and certain membersof theUN forces,including acts committed by UNAMIRmembers (throwing stonesat the CDR secretary’s residence anddisarming theArmy Chief of Staff).
Afterthat meeting, mEasures were taken by theUN ForceCommander, namely: changing thevarious missions of theUN units,withdrawing thegendarmes guarding the Prime MinisterUwilingiyimana andother VIPs and replaeing them with peacekeepers and withdrawinggendarmes from SEcurity duties at the Kigali airport.
Thesedecisions werE in force until 7April 1994 when RPF resumed hostilities.
Again,some questions remain unanswered:
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1. Why doesthe informationprovided by Nees seemto be accordedso mueh importancetoday and given so muchmedia coverage, for the benefit of theprosecution, whereasit has never been verified nor confirmed?
2. Howis that the information that came to light a longtime after the events, seem to castdoubt on thestatements of officers(including Marchal) who, above ail, were LieutenantNess’s direct superiors?
3. Lastly,who was LieutenantNees working for duringand aflerthe Rwandan tragedy?
3.2 Armscaches
See:
Operationalproeedure for establishingthe KigaiiWeapons Security Area, 20 December1993, No. KSHQ/OPS/3/2; Ndindiliyimana’stestimony of 21 April1997, p. 14; Rapportdu groupead hoc,p. 60; Destexhe,"Qui a tuénos pars?", p. 17; Rapportde la commissiond’enquête parlementaire [Report of theParliamentary Commissionof Inquiry] 1/61 l/p. 360; Nsanzuwera,Expert testimony: Rutaganda trial, p.4; Commissionspéciale Rwanda, Summary records, hearing of LieutenantNees on 7 Mareh1997, p. 118; FrançoisMisser "Vers un nouveauRwanda", Luc PirePublishers, 1995, pp. 18 and 155
WhenUNAMIR arrived, a protocolrelating to the WeaponsSeeurity Area was signed by the Ministerof Defence,Augustin Bizimana, the President of theAPR HighCommand, PaulKagame, and General Dailaire. The protocol set out the responsibilities andduties of the forcesin the Kigaiiarea as follows:"The Commander of Kigalisecteur /s responsiblefor establishing theKigali Weapons Secure Area, in collaborationwith the Gendarmerieand the local police. "
In thatregard, UNAMIR had sealedthe weaponsdepots of boththe Armyand the gendarmerie;in addition it hadail the power to searchfor arms at ailpossible cache areas.In faet,UNAMIR never reported any possiblearms cache, otherwise measures wouldhave been taken to seizethem. UNAMIR contented itseif with setting up checkpoints,i.e. waiting on theroad to apprehendpassersby who might have weapons. Thus,out of 900eheekpoints mentioned in the Ad hoc group’sreport, UNAMIR seized onlysix weapons from soldiers retuming from the warfront. Moreover, those weapons werereturned to theirowners.
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Concemingthe seareh operations, the Commanderof Kigalisecteur acknowledged that therewere difficulties.
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3. Wheredid RPF hidethe weaponsand ammunitionsmuggled into Kigali town? Sineesome peacekeepers were aware of this,why did they not seize them?
4. I corneback to thequestion I put to theCommission du sénatbelge: Who was to receivethe weapon that were secretly brought into Rwanda by theBelgian Army? Is this in anyway linked to the UN’s refusal to authorize the search for arms caches?
3.3 Demonstrationsof 8 January1994
See:
Rapportdu groupead hoc,p. 60; Hearingof ColonelMarchal, 7 March1997, p.10; 14 March1997, pp. 168and 171; Destexhe,"Qui a tuénos pars?", p. 17,pp. 83-83; - J.C.Williame, "Le parcours de la honte",p. 97; - My testimonyto theCOM-R on 2 l April1997, p. 20
LieutenantNees gave information that some people have used without verifying their accuracyand assessing their import. It could even be saidthat certain persons bave fallen intoa trapby aceordinggreater weight than necessary to thisinformation, which essentiallystates that the demonstration of 8 January1994 was aimed at preventingthe establishmentof the transitional institutions. Asa reminder,a rumour was going around thatday regarding the establishment ofthe transitional institutions.
Unfortunately,through intellectually dishonest and confused use of the information providedby Nees,some authors have suggested that the Gendarmerie and its chief did notdo theirdut/. These writings rely on thecircumstances of the demonstration to accusethe Gendarmerie of not doing anything to intervene(Des Forges, 1998, p. 148).
In the samevein, Jean ClaudeWilliame (1998, p. 97) who putsthe dateof the demonstrationat 8 February1994, writes: "On i February,the Interahamwe barricaded the roadin frontof the CND,that is the placewhere RPF was quartered,wrecking severalcars and thoroughlysmashing a jeepbelonging to the peacekeepers,lYhile acknowledgingthat the crowd movement was uncontrollable, Colonel Marchal refused to allowthe peacekeepersto support the Gendarmerie because, as he explainedto the Commission,maintenance of law and order was hot part of thetraining received (...)"
Thisis a goodexample of theconfusion and misinformationthat some protagonists convenientlytake advantage of, just like the Nees information.
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Thetruth about the demonstrations is as follows:
Thedemonstration took place on 8 January1994. It wasorganized at theroundabout of HôtelMéridien and the CND.The demonstrators were expressing their opposition to a ceremonyfor investiture andestablishment ofthe transitional institutions in the absence of theHead of State.A rumourhad been going round that the Head of Statewas not in town.I wasat my staffheadquarters, notfar from the roundabout, when I wasinformed aboutth¢ demonstration.I therefore telephoned the Commanderof the RoadSafety company,Major Munywera, at CampMuhima, to ask him to sendin his unitthat was assignedto collaboratewith UNAMIR on a permanentbasis. I thencontacted Colonel L. Marchalto inform him of the situation and to requesthis permission to deploy the (anti- flot)mobile squad that was at MountJari (over 15 km awayfrom the HôtelMéridien), pursuantto theprotoeol establishing theKigali Weapons Secure Area. I wasgranted the permission.
Aiterordering the Commanderof the mobilegroup to movein to intervene,I went personallyto the scene of thedemonstmtion.
WhenI arrivedthere, I inquiredabout the reasons for the demonstration. Having been toldthe reasons, I explained to the people who were surrounding me that what they heard wasonly a rumourstarted by irresponsiblepersons: as theycould sec, there was no ceremonyplanned for that day, and no foreigndiplomats and national officiais were coming.
I askedthe people to gohome.
At about10 a.m.,the Head of Statepassed by with his eseort without stopping, followed a littlelater by therepresentative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr.Booh Booh.On seeingthat, most ofthe people present at theroundabout left while others were coming.
Aroundmidday, the (anti-flot) mobile squad arrived.
It assembledat the roundaboutat the PrimeMinister’s Office, not far fromthe Gendarmerie.I contaeted Colonel L. Marehalagain and informed him that if thepeople at theCND roundabout had not ail dispersed by 1 p.m.,I wouldask the mobile squad to intervene.
Inthe end, that was not necessary because the demonstrators lefl.
Somewriters try to portraythe demonstration as having been violent: I must say that it wasnothing like that, because had it beenlike that, gendarmerie forces would have intervenedand any weapons carried by thedemonstrators seized.
Moreover,Colonel Marchal (at his hearing before the COM-R on 14 March1997), stated withrespect to thedemonstration that: "Sometime during the morning, I contacted the
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Gendarmeriewhich replied to me thatthe demonstration would end at midday,g"hen I contactedthem again later, the Gendarmerie informed me thatif thedemonstration had notended at 1.15 p. m. as agreed,it wouldsend in theanti-riot squad. At 1.15p. m., everythingended calmly."
Contraryto this, you try to suggestto the reader that the demonstration of8 January was violentand thatI allegedlyexplained to the UNAMIRBelgian officers why the Gendarmeriedid not intervene.
Theseare baseless, gratuitous assertions.
Contraryto your statements:
1° Thedemonstration of 8 Januarywas not at ail violent, I saw neither firearms, norgrenades; the gendarmes did not intervene, after I hadexplained what was happeningto them,and after they saw the situation, the peopledispersed calmly;this is confirmedby ColonelMarchal (COM-R, 14 Mareh1997).
2. Can you tellme, Madarn,the ofiïcersto whom I explained"that my gendarmesfailed to mtervene.
3, Yourefer (Note 35) to the "service de police judiciaire auprès de la justice [CriminalInvestigation Department of theMilitary Court] (in thecase of Dewezand Marchal,Annex A/S in Transcript1210 of 6 November1995). Yet,on 9 January1994, Dewez was not yet in Rwanda,according to the KIBATReport II. He onlyarrived in March1994.
Whatare the consequences oftlaese manipulations?
Justlike the incident of 5 January1994 (attempt by theBelgian peacekeepers to force factionof the Partilibéral into the CND,some people embarked on an adventure,no doubtmotivated either by falsestofies (cf. Nees), or as a biasedmeasure in favour certainRwandan politieal actors.
Similarly,some researchers and investigatorswho havestudied the Rwandantragedy havewrongly taken Lieutenant Nees to be a reliablesource of informationthat could justifythe accusations levelled at allegedplanners ofthe genocide.
In thefinal analysis, such writings rely on thistype of informationto assert that UNAMIR’sfailure was due to impedimentsput in theirway by thosewho were supposed tocollaborate with them.
Thefollowing questions, therefore, arise:
WS05-422(E) 15 D000-1950-D000-! 982 D0006788
I. Ifthe transitional institutions were te be establishedon 8 January1994, which peopletookthe dccision 2 tethat effect?
2. Howwere they going te organizethe ceremony, given that the Head of Statewas netinformed about it, as confirmed te me by theprotocol? Noinvitations hadbeen issued eitherte theauthorities ofthe country or tethe diplomatie corps, and the Gendarmerie Chiefof Staffhad net reeeived any instruction from UNAMIR about ensuring security.
3. By cndorsingLieutenant Nees’s information, did younet takea riskte lend credencetea planaimed at establishing institutions inthe absence of the President ofthe Republic?
3.4 The attitudeof the peacekeepersand whatLieutenant Nees refers te as "la réponseà la ripostedes militaries belges" of theRwandan military officiais and the MRNDpolitieal leaders.
See:
Rapportde la commissiond’enquête parlementaire, 1/611/7, pp. 365-368;
Commissionpermanente de recoursdes réfugiés(Permanent Commission of Assistancete Refugees), Decision No. 96/771/F629/cd.
(Testimonyof Colonel Marchal on collaborationwith the Gendarmerie).
Theacts of indisciplineeommitted by a fewpeacekeepers de nothing te bidetheir intentions.Today, one ean say that those acts were ultimately aimed at supporting RPFte accedete power.
Thefollowing incidents deserve a mention te enable the reader te assess the extent of the indiseipline,and te showwhy PresidentHabyarimana deemed it neeessaryte eonvenethe meeting of 7 February1994.
On 5 January 1994,seine Belgian peacekeepers tried, by force,te get some parliamentaryeandidates from the LiberalParty faction, headed by Landouald Ndasingwa(supported by RPF),into the CND,te the detrimentof the Mugenzi faction.As a resultof thatincident, only the President of theRepublic eould be swornin thatday.
On 3 February1994, the Belgianpeacekeepers threw stones at the CDR Party Secretary’sresidenee (Colonel Marchal said "at the glass door at the residence ofthe RTLMDirector").
2 A. Destexhe("Qui à tuénosparsT" Alrcady cite, d, p. 19):The authors put the date ofthe setting up of institutionsat 8 January1994
WS05-422(E) 16 D000-1950-D000-1982 0000678ç
On5 February1994, a Belgianpeacekeepers’ patrol provoked the guards at the home ofthe Minister ofDefenee’s chef de cabinet.
In January-February1994,near the Ngondore demarcation zone, the soldiers of Byumbasecteur wanted to verify if the trucks that were supposed totransport wood to theRPF contingent quartered at theCND was not transporting anyarms. The Belgianpeaeekeepers refused the search, considering itto be a formofharassment.
On6 February1994, the Belgian peaeekeepers thought they should "take action" by attemptingto disann the Chief of Staff of the Army in Kigali as he wasreturning froman inspection ofthe Byumba area.
It shouldbe notedthat the gendarmes witnessed these incidents that they did not necessarilyapprove of. They did not react, given that their mandate was to collaborate withthe peacekeepers. Theattitude ofthe gendarmes is hot comforting; theRwandans seeit as a laxattitude while the peacekeepers consider ittobe unreliable. Itis signifieant tonote that this type of critieism does hOt emanate from the UNAMIR’s top echelon but fromsome of its elements whose ambiguous role has already been mentioned. Infaet, theUNAMIR Commander and CIVPOL congratulated flac Rwandan gendarmerie.
Itwas, therefore, inthe wake of the aforementioned incidents, that the President ofthe Republic,convened a meeting with General Dallaire, Colonel Marchal, the Minister of Defence,A Bizimana, and the Chief of Staff of theArmy, General D. Nsabimanaand otherofficers ofthe Army on 7 February1994.
AlthoughI was in Kigali, I was not invited tothe meeting.
Afterthat meeting, General Dallaire withdrew the Belgian peacekeepers fromcheckpoint dutiesand replaced them with Bangladeshi peacekeepers. Asthe Bangladeshi were hOt effectiveindischarging that duty, they were redeployed alongside Rwandan gendarmes. GeneralDallaire also deeided to withdraw the gendarmes of the security eompany in chargeof VIPsfrom the places they were guarding: inparticular the home of Prime MinisterAgathe Uwilingiyimana. Fromthen on, the Prime Minister’s home was guarded byGhanaian peaeekeepers andfour Rwanda gendarmes until that fateful day of 7 April 1994.
Theseobservations incline meto ask other questions:
1. Whydoes one want to hide the fact that President Habyarimana metwith the seniorArmy and UNAMIR officers to finalizetheir actions whereas the seriousincidents that had taken place could cause things get out of control?
2, Whydoes one want to invent or suggest that another meeting with different objectiveswasheld on a differentdate?
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D0006790
3, It is staggeringto seethat some researchers and political leaders make a mistakeabout the date, tre circumstances, theperpetrators ortre events. Is hotthis a diversionarytactic? What are we coveringup?
4. Otherfacts reported incorreetly byMadam Des Forges and insinuating serious accusations.
4.1 "17 February:Senior officers of the NationalPolice meet with Habyarimanato express fears that war might resume"
Youreport wrongly (la. 162) on themeeting the gendarmerie officers had with the Presidentof tre Republie.
In actualfact, it wasI, in my capacityas Chiefof Staffof theGendarmerie, who requestedtre Rwandan Head of Statefor an audience in orderto explaintre security situationinthe country to him.It wouldhave been proper on your part to reporttre informationas I hadgiven it toyou on 19 October1997.
I was receivedon 16 February1994 together with the departmental heads of my headquarters(personnel, logistics, training, etc.) I requestedtre President of tre Republieto set up treinstitutions provided for under the Arusha Accords in order to getthe country out of crisisand to prevent a resumption of hostilities. I round a man tornbetween MRND, the opposition parties and the international community.
4.2 You alsoreport on (p.163): "Late February: Major Stanislas Kinyoni reportedlysummoned tre heads of NationalPolice brigades (...) and told themto prepare lists ...(...)." Sec:
Rapportdu groupe ad hoc, constitution deslistes, p. 68 Reportby F. X. Nsanzuwera- expert testimony, Rutaganda trial, Brussels, 21 June1997, p. 4, transmittedto Mr. Udo Gering, ICTR-Kigali, copy to theICTR President/Arushaand Tre Hague.
Youreomments on thisissue is similarto whatwas written by theformer Prosecutor of Kigali,Nsanzuwera, in the testimony reproduced below:
"The best known is Major StanislasKinyoni, former MRND memberof Parliamentand G2 o.~ïcerin 1993/94,who askedthe commanderof the territorialbrigades to compilelists of thosehe consideredto be accomplices of theRwanda Patriotic Front, namely the Tutsi, Hutu opponents. It should also be recalledthat the MRNDparty headquarters where MRND meetings took place andthe wild demonstrations were planned was located in a housebelonging to theGendarmerie Chief of Staff,General Augustin Ndindiliyimana."
WS05-422(E) 18 D000-1950-D000-1982 D0006791
Thecompilation of lists is mentionedand they want to implicatethe Gendarmerie Chief of Staff,Augustin Ndindiliyimana, by suggesting his possible connection with MRND.
Whatare the facts?
In fact,Major Kinyoni, the former MRND member of Parliament,had been appointed by theMinister for Defence,Augustin Bizimana, as a G2 offieerof theGendarmerie in placeof MajorKarangwa, who wasappointed liaison officer with CIVPOL. Right from hisappointment to theGendarmerie headquarters, Kinyoni was aceusedby the Remera Brigadecommander, Captain Mugabo, of notintervening in a murderthat took place in the vicinityof the CND.Captain Mugabo informed the UNAMIRCommander of the accusation.Thestaff headquarters ordered an investigation intothe case and the findings werecommunicated to UNAMIR.Kinyoni was foundnot guilty.
Thatofficer behaved in an aggressiveand undisciplined manner in May1994. I imposed a 10-daydiseiplinary arrest with access on him.
Didthe person concerned request the production oflists? This was certainly hot with the approvalof theGendarmerie Staff headquarters, mueh less that of hischier. He never toldme thatlists had been requested and produced. The commander of the Kigaliunit (adjudgedby theformer Prosecutor to be an honestofficer, anyway), as wellas the commandersof the .eompanyin chargeof the brigadecommanders and the commander of the Remerabrigade, Captain Mugabo, would not havefailed to telime about Kinyoni’saction.
4.3 You write(13. 170): " - 17 March:A respectedsource in the NationalPolice (probablyChief of StaffNdindiliyimana) told Belgian officers that the UNAMIR mandateshould be strengthened..."
See:
Rapportdu groupead hoc,"Procès verbal de la réunionde coordinationaffaires étrangères"[Minutes of theForeign Affairs Coordination meeting], p. 91;
Rapportde la Commissiond’enquête parlementaire, 1-611/7, p. 269and 1-611/8, p.58;
Youclaim that I spoketo theBelgian soldiers on 17 March1994.
Yet,on thatdate, I was in Uruguay,where I participatedin the meetingof the InternationalOlympic Committee members as GeneralSeeretary for zone 4 of theHigher Couneilfor Sports (OAU). In anycase, I hadto go backto my postin Banguias soon I wasretired, afler the setting upof the transitional institutions. Shortof having the girl of beingin several places at thesarne time, it would have been impossiblefor me toentrust any responsibiliùes whatsoever to the Belgian officers that day.
WS05-422(E) 19 D000-1950-I)000-1982 D0006792
On the contrary,from 7 to 13 March1994, I visitedBelgium where I met withthe Belgianauthorities, namely the Minister of Defence, Mr. L. Delcroix,the Chier of Staff, Lieutenant-GeneralCharlier and GeneralClosset of the BelgianGendarmerie. Given thatthe meetingswere official, the Rwandanambassador in Belgium,Mr. François Ngarukiyintwali,accompanied and assisted me in thediscussions.
The purposeof the missionwas specificallyto requestBelgium to reinforcethe peacekeepersmission in themaintenance of law and order in Rwanda,but also to obtain fromBelgium equipment that the RwandanGendarmerie did not havein suftîcient quantifies,suchas: truneheons, anti-hot shields, tear gas.
I wasgiven a favourableresponse, but nothing came.
GeneralCharlier acknowledges that this meeting took place since he statedto the Commission(p.269): "I talkedto him aboutthreats against the Belgian soldiers. He allegedthat the threats were isolated. However, I did hOt believe him." I hadactually repliedto GeneralCharlier, who asked me the questions about the relationship between RAF andUNAMIR, that they were good, with the exception of a few incidentsand the criticismsof CDR. However, I personally did not think that they affeeted the mission of theBelgian battalion.
Inthat connection, General Dallaire stated in an interviewgranted to ColetteBraeckman of the"Le Soir" Newspaper of 2 December1995 (No. 280): "’No, one could not say that therewas propaganda that was officially targeted at theBelgians in orderto make them vulnerableand incapable of fuljïlling their duties. Some elements gave us trouble,and wetook some actions atthe time, but I cannotgo into further detail ...... "
In histestimony to theCOM-R, General Charlier makes no mentionof the mainreason formy visitto Belgium.It is obviousfrom a readingof thestatements ruade by the authorities,sueh as MinisterDelcroix and Lieutenant-General Charlier to theCOM-R, thatthey have diffieulty acknowledging that General Ndindiliyimana came to Belgium withconcrete proposais, regarding the supply of adequatelaw and order maintenance equipmentand, for theirpart, the reinforeementof the missionof the Belgian peacekeepers;since the RwandanGendarmerie could not carryout ail the duties devolvingupon them in the context of theircollaboration with UNAMIR at thatrime.
If I had been,as statedby SenatorDestexhe, "the powerful boss of a powerful Gendarmerie’;I would hOt have approached the Belgian authorities on such matters. It is difficultfor these authorities toaeknowledge that I wentto requestassistance from them,and that they did nothing. That is why,in my view,the COM-R, preferred not to callme as a witness,at a rimewhen a slanderand defamation campaign against me was intensifyingtothe extent of accusing me, so as to put me on the defensive.
Thatway, no oneeould, under those conditions, ask why I couldnot testify as a prime witnessto theRwandan tragedy.
WS05-422(E) 20 D000-1950-D000-1982 DOOO6793
4.4 You write(p.187) that Bavugarnenshi’scommander "General Ndindiliyimana couldhot be found, either at home or atheadquarters."
See:
- My testimonyto theCOM-R, chronology of 6 to 9 April1994, p. 27 et seq.; - Bavugameshi’stestimony in thetrial of Col.BEM L. Marchal(Le Soir of 10 May 1996);La LibreBelgique of 10 May1996); CRDDR’sNote of 9 May to the Commissionerfor Refugeesand Stateless Persons; DossierPro Justitia, Case-file No. 52.99.17726/98, Transcript No. 23885/98 and No. 16525; FilipReyntjens (1995), "Rwanda, trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire", p. 36; - Myletter ofclarification dated 27 June 1997, addressed to Prof. Reyntjens.
Numeroussources bave it tbatsome people looked for me in the nightof 6 to 7 April 1994.The problem is tbatdifferent people are mentioned depending on thesource of the information;some bave even claimed to bavefound me at placeswhere I wasnot.
In his noteof 9 May 1995,Gasana Ndoba of CDDRwrote: "Gendarmerie o Oîcers, includingthe Commanderof the Kigaligroup, reportedly looked for General Ndindiliyimanain vain to begiven instructions on how to protect the civilian population in Kigali.Ndindiliyimana reportedly either disappeared atthe crucial rime or refused to takeaction. "’
FormerProsecutor Nsanzuwera stated that: "Colonel Munyakazi told me himselfthat he wasnot in contactwith the Chiefof Staffbecause he wasnot ableto reachhim on telephone."
Lastly,Mr. Nkubito personally told me that"it was RPF which looked for me in orderto involveme in its plan to takeover Kigali town ".
My testimonysent to theCOM-R amply sets out my timetablefrom 8.30 p.m. on 6 April 1994,the places I went to and what I did.On this issue, the facts are verifiable. Towrite thatI couldnot be found either at home or at thegendamerie headquarters seems to meto be moreof an accusationthan an observation.
Lieutenant-ColonelBavugamenshi who was in chargeof VIP securityand whom I interviewedmyself, never told me tlaatthey looked for me to askfor reinforcements. Followingthe normal procedure, hecontacted the United Nations authority to modifythe instructionsand sendreinforcements. To say thatBavugamenshi sent additional gendarmesto reinforcethe Prime Minister’s security is untrue.There were only four gendarmesthere who helped tlae Prime Minister to go acrossthe fente on herland when shefled. Moreover, if Bavugamenshihad looked for me,he wouldhave found me at the
WS05-422(E) 21 D000-1950-D000-1982 D0006794
Écolesupérieure militaire (ESM) at themeeting of 7 April1994, to whichmeeting hadbeen invited together with the other group and unit commanders.
Youasked me whether I contacted the people of theUnited States during the night of 6 to 7 April1994.
I toldyou I didnot.
MayI knowwhat you meant by thatquestion? Is it a wayof suggestingthat there were peoplein the United States who would have wished to implicateme in theRPF plan?
4.5 You write(p. 189):"At about10.30, the campcommander came to inform Bagosoraand General Ndindiliyimana that the Belgian soldiers were under attaek at the camp,but they did nothing ..."
See:
TestimonyofA. Ndindiliyimana to the COM-R, 1997, pp. 31 to 33 - KIBATdiary - 6 to 19 April1994.
ColonelNubaha did not retum during the meeting at ESMto reporton thesituation at CampKigali.
GeneralDaUaire arrived at themeeting, immediately after gunshots were heard for a few seeonds;he saysnothing about the Camp. He offershis condolences with regard to the attackagainst the President and calls on theArmed Forces to striveto implementthe peaceprocess. We eould,therefore, not have suspected that a tragedywas unfolding at CampKigali.
As I wrotein mytestimony (la. 22), it wasaround 1.45 p.m. and after the meeting that GeneralDallaire informed me tlaatsome of hismen were being held (emphasis added) the Camp.He did not speakto anyoneabout a massacre.He neverasked anyone to intervene.
Itis, unfortunately, onthe basis of sueh assertions that I ambeing accused of failure to actwith regard to the murder of the peacekeepers.
4.6Regarding the death of thepeacekeepers, there are still uncertainties about the circumstancesoftheir death and the number of victims.
See;
Hearingof FatherGuy Theunisby the Commissiond’information française (Autopsyof 16 bodiesin Nairobi); Élémentsdes faits et chronologie: Les lOO jours les plus noirs du génocidedu peuplerwandais, [Faets and chronology: The 100 darkest days ofthe genoeide of
WS05~422(E) 22 D000-1950-D000-1982 00006795
the peopleof Rwanda],SOS Rwanda,Bonn, Kigali, April 1999 by Gaharuru,p. 7; RPFmessage regarding the murder ofthe President picked up by theArmy; Compterendu analytique de la Réunionpublique de la Commission;Chambre des Représentantsde Belgique[Summary record of the PublicMeeting of the Commission,Belgian House of Representatives],11 April 1994; - TestimonyofGeneral Dallaire at ICTRon 25 February1998; - VénusteNshimiyimana, Prélude du génociderwandais, Quorum Publishers, 1996 (speaksof morethan 10 dead).
Somesources indicate that during the day on 6 April1994, hhe groupheaded by LieutenantLotin undertook an unauthofizedtrip to thearea located between Kanombe andKibungo; the saine sources indicate that he wasaccompanied by RPF elements.
Followingthe downing of thePresident’s plane, Lieutenant Lotin reportedly came across the firstroadblocks ereeted by someRwandan soldiers at KanombeCamp and the PresidentialGuard.
KIBAT’sreport indicates that the group was in Kanombe to refuel their vehicle.
Thereare questions about the itinerary that Lieutenant Lotin followed that day, the exact natureofthe mission, as wellas aboutthe person who assigned him that mission.
TheMinister of Defence,Delcroix, stated before the Chambre des Représentants de la Belgiqueon 11 April1994: "An in-depth investigation should be conductedto establish whetherthe section was acting independently. Anyassumptions that can be madeat this timeare premature. The bodiesare now in Nairobi.They are awaited in Brusselson Wednesdaynight."
Question:was the investigation conducted?
1. It is surpdsingthat no UNAMIRoftïcer reported the difficultiesfaced by LieutenantLotin and his team from that night until they arrived at CampKigali.
Everythinghappened as if havingbeen caught up in theinfernal events, the group was saerificed.Had it been involved in a casewith serious unforeseen eonsequenees?
2. Howdoes one explain the fact that the grenade explosions and gunshots were not heard,whereas the murderof the Belgianpara commando reportedly took place 200m awayfrom the ESM meeting hall, where General Dallaire and the other officers were?
3. Howdoes one explain the contradictions in the statements of General Dallaire and theBelgian Major Maggen on themurder of the Belgianpeacekeepers at Kigali Camp, whereasthey were together? One say that he sawthere was a massacrewhile the other clairesthat he did hot bave wind of any problem.
ws05-422(E) 23 D000-1950-D000-1982 00006796 GeneralDallaire responding to C. Braeckman’squestion in Le Soirof 2 December1995 that: "Whenyou passed in front of the piles of the Belgian peacekeepers’ bodies, did you count10 or 12 corpsesand who werethose two Whitemen whose bodies were seen at CampKigali?", stated:" This is oneof thequestions that I cannotanswer."
1. Whydoes General Dallaire not mention the number ofvictims?
2. Whydoes this number differ depending on thesource, whereas General Dallaire, ColonelMurasampongo and I countedeleven bodies (of white soldiers)?
3. It hasbeen said and written about that the Belgian authorities requested autopsies tobe conducted on16 bodiesin Nairobi, but they disclosed the nationalities ofonly 14 of them.Who werethe othertwo?
Itis understandable whythe families ofthe Belgian peacekeepers killed in Kigali are still hOtsatisfied with the explanation given on the eircumstances oftheir death.
Theywere eounting on ICTRto takeup the case,but the Tribunalseems not to be interestedin it.Hence, during his testimony in ,’lkayesu,General Dallaire was hot authorizedto answerquestions on thisissue. The followingpassage speaks volumes aboutthe issue:
Q.: Counselfor the Defence: Major-General, what do youknow about the death ofthe l O Belgianpeacekeepers ?
Mr.Stewart.. Mr. President. I wanted to draw the attention ofthe Tribunalto......
President."I wasgoing to dothat.
Mr. Stewart:Thank you.
President:Counsel, the case of theBelgian peacekeepers is part of another case.
Counselfor the Defence: What I wantedto knowwas the state of therelationship betweenUN.4MIR and FAR afler the death of the10 Belgianpeacekeepers.
TheWimess [Dallaire’s response] : The death of the10 peacekeeperswas not confirmedto me until about 9.30 on theevening of the 7th because throughout the daypeople continued to tellme thatnegotiations were under way at theKigali campto be able to pull them out of their d~cult situation, and it wasnot until l insistedthat I wouldnot leave the Kigali camp and go baek to my HQ untilI had seenthe Belgian soldiers who, at thattime it washOt confirmed whether it was 10,13 or 11.There were three numbers being thrown out. They had...
President:Major-General...
WS05-422(E) D000-1950-D000-1982 24 DOOO67ç7
4.7 You write (p. 192): "The afternoonof Mm’ch7 [sic],both Bagosoraand NdindiliyimanatoldDallaire that the killings at CampKigali showext that it might be best forBelgian troops to leaveRwanda."
Sec:
Reportof the Commission d’enquête parlementaire 1-611/7, p. 148; My testimony-ehronologyof events, p. 34 My letterdated 2 February1998 to the Presidentof theCommission d’enquête parlementaire,p.10; LeVif/L ’Express of 5 to 11January 1996 (Monde), F. J. D’Othée Le Soirof 7 Ma),1996 - C. Braeckman Testimonyof GeneralDallaire in Arusha,25 February1998.
TheWitness [General Dallaire]:
"Fromthe timethen when this was confirmedon thatevening, the relationshipwas strainedand became more and more tense, if noteven impossible. It was during that day thatit was the first ame that I hearddifferent authorities indicating tome that it would be verywise for the Belgian contingent to leave as soonas possible, toleave Rwanda, that is.ç’
As I havealread~ stated and written, I ara surprised atthe statement reportedly made by GeneralDallaire with whom I oftendiscussed ways of preventingthe massacresand protectingthe public by creatingseeurity areas. He gaveme thehope that the United Nationswas going to sendtroops. I alsorecall that Mr. Swinnen, the Belgian Ambassador, at his hearing on 20 June1997 beforethe Commission, admitted that I askedBelgium not to abandonRwanda (emphasis added).That the situation could not be broughtunder eontrol without UNAMIR and ils Belgiancomponent.
Questions:
1. Does one seek to minimizethe decisionof the Bel#anGovemment which decidedunilaterally towithdraw its contingent and, moreover, tried to influencethe other countriestodo thesame, according toDallaire?
2. In fact,when I sawGeneral Dallaire again on 7 April1994 at 3 p.m.,he was preoccupiedwith the disappearance oftwo men. Were these the two unidentified men?
4.8 Regardingthe events in Kicukiro(p. 227, p. 721ofthe French text
3 In September1994, General Dallaire asked that I be contactedto rejoinRPF. Some Belgian authorities didthe saine. Tlais is ampletestimony of hisconfidence.
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Sec:
GeneralRusatira’s letter [La lettredu généralRusatira "Kigali kuwa 10 Gashyantare1995, Kuli Nyakubahwa Ministri w’Ubutabera" Impanvu: Ibaruwa yo ku wa 04 Ukwakira1994. JournalLib’ration N° 33 avril-mai 1998 recensement de victimes. JournalLib ’ration, No. 33 Aprilto May1998, "recensement des victimes" [How manyvictims?].
I sentgendarmes to protectthe public. To interpret my actionin anyway, by talking, interalia, about the individual attitudes ofcertain gendarmes, amounts to a tendentious insinuationthat I tookno interest inthe actions ofmy men.
Thetruth of thematter is thatGeneral Rusatira telephoned me in thelate moming on 11 April1994; UNAMIR had not notifiedthe Gendameriethat it was withdrawingfrom Kicukiro,all the more so asone territorial company was less than 300 m awayfrom ETO. However,although the territorial company had already been placed under the orders of theArmy headquarters and was engaged in combatoperations, I immediately telephoned thecommander of thatunit, Captain Munyabarenzi, to ask him if he wasaware of the situationat ETOand whether he couldreplace UNAMIR in protectingthe people.
CaptainMunyabarenzi replied that he had fewmen but thathe woulddo theneedful. Aiîerverification, theorder was executed and the gendarmes went to ETO.
Whatyou do not seemto knowis thaton 11 April,around 5 p.m.,RPF launchedan intensiveattack on theKicukiro neighbourhood. Gendarmes were, therefore, deployed to providethe defence planned by the Army headquarters; thepeople at theschool had fled, theHum fleeing from RPF and the Tutsi trying to reaeh the area controlled by the saine RPF.It is outrageousthat nothing is saidabout the 20,000 people who, while fleeing fromKanombe and itsvicinity to Kigali,were massacred by theRPF troopswho had capturedthe area of Nyanza.Those people, who weretaking flight, were held up and massacredby RPFnear OPROVIA (OJ~îce de productionvivrière et alimentaire)(Food ProductionAgeney), following the withdrawal ofthe RAF to the capital.
4.9 You write(p. 194)that: "The Presidential guard numbered between 1,300 and 1,500men, (...) Ndindiliyimana commanded thousands of NationalPolice (...)
See: - KWSA-UNAMIR,headquarters, Kigali secteur, 20.12.93 No. KSHQ/OPS/3/2+ annexes; - Letterfrom Lt-Col.Munyakazi to the Vice-Presidentand Ministerof Defence, GeneralKagame. Gako, 6 August,and his note of 24 September1995.
It shouldbe specifiedthat in his addendum- annexB to fileno. KSHQ/OPS/3/2 of 20 December1993 "Security of sensitivelocations", the UNAMIRCommander set the
WS05-422(E) 26 D000-1950-D000-1982 D0006799 authofizedmaximum number of armedgendarmes responsible for ensuringsecurity at sensitivelocations in theKWSA at 715men. Right from 8 April1994, the secteur, army headquartersbrought in theHuye battalion from Mont Kigali to reinforcethe RPF having launcheda forcefulattack on theGendarmerie headquarters and theGendarmerie Camp atKaeyiru.
Followingthe RPF offensive, the Army headquarters had to withdrawthe Huye battalion and askedthe Gendarmerieheadquarters to senda companyof the Kibuyegroup to takeover the defenee positions held by the Huye battalion inKacyiru.
Fromthen on, at thetime hostilities resumed, the gendarmes in Kigalitown and its environswere distributed as follows:
715men underthe cornmandofthe Army headquarters for combatmissions; 250men who arrived as reinforcementsfrom Butare and Kibuye, under the orders of theArmy headquarters.
Out of about1,000 or so men,only the MuhimaCamp company, reinforced by a mobile squadwas under the orders of the Gendarmerie headquarters andresponsible for security missionsinKigali, that is a totalof about 120 gendarmes.
You write(p. 195):"RPF leader Tito Rutaremarahad wamedNdindiliyimana and Bagosorathat the RPF would ..."
See: My testimony,p. 34; . Misser,"Vers le nouveauRwanda", p. 18
In fact,the personwho spoketo me on the telephoneand who was introducedby GeneralDallaire, serving as intermediary,as Tito Rutaremara (I wouldlearn while in Belgiumthat it wasSeth Sendashonga) told me thatif theactions of thePresidentiai Guardwere not stopped, RPF would not stand idly by.
I informedthis person of my commitmentto do everythingpossible, incollaboration with the UnitedNations Force Commander (Dallaire) and the directeurde cabinet,Colonel Bagosora,to stabilizethe situation. Colonel Bagosora, in hiscommunication with the commanderof thePresidential Guard, Major Mpiranya, instructed him as follows:"Take a lorry and go and collectthe men and bring them to the camp." Another communication,received at thesaine time, informed us thatRPF had already attacked the campof the PresidentialGuard, the Gendameriecamp in Kacyiru,the Gendamerie headquartersand the Gendamerieterritorial company in Remera,90 % of whosemen weredecimated.
Already,smali-scale combats were going on in variousneighbourhoods of Kigali town.
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Itshould, in fact, be acknowledgedthat in addition to itsbattalion that was officially recognizedunder the Arusha Accords and installed at theCND, RPF infiltrated a large numberof meninto Kigali town and its environs. This was conformed in statementsby theRPF leaders, as wellas by theBelgian Lieutenant Nees to theCOM-R which stated thatRPF had sentmore men into Kigalithan providedfor underthe Accords. Nsanzuweraalso mentioned that problem in hisstatements.
JacquesCollet, for hispart, wrote in "Versle nouveauRwanda", p.19, that: "They infiltratedKigali like germs that invade the human body in groups of five. They did that at night.And in the morning,the Belgian parachutists who witnessed that discreet infiltrationreckoned that one or two companies had thus been brought in ... "
4.11 You write (p. 195):"General Kagame was receptiveand even sent Seth Sendashongawith an offerto createa jointforce composed of 300soldiers each from RPF,the Rwandan army units opposed to Bagosoraand UNAMIR,to bringan end to the massacres."
Sec:
Reportof theCommission d’enquête parlementaire 611/7, p.509. Message from GeneralKagame to Mr. BoohBooh; BernardDebr6 (1998), "Le retour du Mwami,la vraiedes génocides rwandais", EditionsRamsey, Paris, p. 119; Letterfrom Colonel Gatsinzi to ProfessorReyntjens; Dialogue"Les évènements d’avril-juillet 1994 Mensuel No. 177 Août-Septembre 1994.Testimony of FatherBille-Marius Dion, Dominicain, Kacyiru, Kigali; LeSoir of 16and 17 April1994; COM-RHearing of Nsanzuweraon 22 April1997, p. 321( trainingat CND)
I wasnever informed of thisoffer. If thisoffer was known, it was to bediscussed at the meetingseheduled to takeplace at theresidence of theUnited States Ambassador on 7 April1994 at 9.a.m.,and to which had been invited politicians, theambassadors invited by Mr. BoohBooh and thecommanders of theUnited Nations forces. However, no one turnedup.
Question:Was this offer aimed at creatingwhat General Dallaire referred to as a "new army"?Is thiswhy the persons invited to themeeting at theUnited States Ambassador’s housedid not turn up?
Whateverthe case, I do notknow anything about the ereation of "a newarmy". If this offerstems from an RPFidea, echoed by GeneralDallaire, it soundsvery strange to me, especiallyas it is knownthat General Kagame’s troops were already on themove well beforethe presidential plane was shot down.
In his book(1998, p. 119),the formerFrench Minister Bernard Debré mentions this movementby RPFprior to themurder of thePresident. Colonel Gatsinzi, Chief of Staff ws05-422(E) 28 D000-1950-D000-1982 D0006801
of the RwandanArmy a.i., wrote as muchin a letterte ProfesserReyntjens. The RPF soldierstold an expatriate,who was in theByumba area at thetime and who witnessed themovement on 6 April1994, that they were going te takeKigali. When he askedhow theywere going te de that,they replied that the ammunition and other logistical resources werein Rutongo.
FatherDion testified in thatconnection that: "Very early, Kacyiru )vas occupied by Inkotanyirebels (RPF) who set up a postin frontof our house,in the abandoned buildingsof theBaptist church. Our new neighbours remained discreet ail the time but werealways very attentive."
Thefact that RPF had for a longtime infiltrated Kigali town and elsewhere with men and equipmentwas also confirmed by theLe Soirnewspaper of 16 and17 April1994: "While theTutsi rebellion has undeniably gained ground, notes the military observers in Kigali, ithas net conquered the town, where the infiltrated elements de netseem te have the vital support,namely that of the majorityHutu population. The Hutu bave partly organized themselvesinto resistance militia against RPF... The battle for Kigali has new taken on thedual aspect of urban guerrilla and trench warfare. ’"
Duringmy meetingin Brusselson 13 December1996 with Mr. Alphonse-MarieNkubito, Presidentof ARDHOand former Minister of Justiceof Rwanda,the Ministerreported te me beforea witness,that in thenight of 6 te 7 April1994, the RPF leaders allegedly triedte contactme, in vain. He allegedthat the purpose of the call was te involveme in a cooperationplan te enableRPF forces te enterKigali town and te jointheir elements whohad already infiltrated the town. Thereafter, I would have been accused, dead or alive,of a coupagainst President Habyarimana, in the context of a so-calleddemocratic coupd’état. Up until then, I hadsuspected that there was a planin which I wassupposed te be a pawn.Nkubito somehow confirmed te me thatsuch a plandid indeed exist.
The Rwandantragedy and the concurrenceof severalplans and counterreactlons
1. RPF’sobjective and plans were te takepower through military victory without worryingabout the rate of itsmembers, its adherents and its sympathizers within the country:"You cannot make an omelettewithout breaking eggs," according te theirown statementte Professer Reyntjens!
2. Theplan of thosewho thought that the solution te theprotracted crisis was te eliminatePresident Habyarimana, a dictator accused of blockingthe implementation of theAmsha Accords. The supporters of thatplan worked jointly with the former for RPF te takeover Kigali town and thus get RAF te surrender.
3. The counterreactions related te thewar situationand a societyin disarray followingthe President’s murder, and undermined by divisions and economic problems.
Yourexplanations show, Madam, that at thecritical moment of thecrisis, the persons calledupon te managethe situationand withwhom we wereholding consultations
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regardingmeasures totake, for their part, had hidden plans that they were attempting to implementinaccordance withtheir interests.
Inhis letter dated 29 June 1995 to the international Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Mr. Lucde Temmerman,Counsel for Colonel Bagosora, wrote: "Colonel Bagosora assumed hisresponsibilities asa Rwandan civil servant, byreplacing theminister who was absent atthe time of the crash from lO p.m on 6 April1994 to 7p.m. on April 1994 following the refusalof General Augustin Ndindiliyimana toassume his responsibilities, perhapsdue tolack of courage."
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