Why Did Weimar Fail?

Pamela Swett. Neighbors and Enemies: The Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929-1933. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 335 S. $75.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-83461-2. Reviewed by Corinna Treitel Published on H-German (June, 2005) How and why did Weimar democracy fail? By high politics began to emerge in the 1980s. One examining how Berlin workers experienced and line of revision has been to look to the action of participated in Weimar's collapse at the street lev‐ political parties, especially the SPD and KPD, for el between 1929 and 1933, Swett offers new an‐ the roots of failure. In Beating the Fascists? The swers to this old but still important question. German Communists and Political Violence Individuals may have experienced the repub‐ 1929-1933 (1983), for example, Eve Rosenhaft lo‐ lic's collapse as a natural disaster before which cated the failure of German communism to com‐ they were helpless, but historical scholarship pro‐ bat fascism effectively in the local politics and cul‐ duced after 1945 has sought more satisfying ex‐ ture of Berlin's urban ghettos. Rather than looking planations that emphasize the scope and limits of to the failures of the political left, a second line of human agency and responsibility. In his classic revision has emphasized the failure of the middle study Die Auflsung der Weimarer Republik (1955), classes to embrace republicanism in the 1920s as Karl-Dietrich Bracher portrayed Weimar's end as a key factor in Weimar's collapse. Such was the the cumulative result of many factors, among approach taken, for instance, by Peter Fritzsche in which were the weaknesses of multiparty democ‐ Germans into Nazis (1998). racy, the actions of the Reichswehr, the prolifera‐ Sometimes against and sometimes in concert tion of paramilitary groups and radical parties, with previous approaches, Swett uses the tools of and pressures brought on by the Great Depres‐ Alltagsgeschichte to glean a deeper understand‐ sion. Despite his careful attention to these struc‐ ing of how ordinary Berlin workers participated-- tural factors, Bracher assigned ultimate responsi‐ albeit unwittingly--in the transition from Weimar bility for the fnal collapse to the small group of republicanism to Nazi authoritarianism. Her fo‐ politicians and industrialists around the ailing cus is less on party politics than on the everyday President Paul von Hindenburg. Important revi‐ meanings of radicalism. Rather than taking party sionist challenges looking beyond the realm of affiliation with the KDP or NSDAP as a marker of H-Net Reviews radicalism, in other words, Swett digs below the tracking how this Kiez responded to socio-eco‐ level of party politics to uncover the causes and nomic crisis from 1929 to 1933, Swett seeks bot‐ context of radical behavior at the street level. Rad‐ tom-up insights into Weimar's collapse. Chapter 2 icalism, she argues, had less to do with economic investigates how the stability and autonomy of hardship or the competing ideologies of commu‐ the Kiez began to decay during the Great Depres‐ nism and National Socialism than it did with "the sion. Long-term unemployment challenged gen‐ day-to-day relationships between members of der boundaries and exacerbated generational ten‐ these communities and the methods they em‐ sions: resentment over being "feminized" by lack ployed for preserving some degree of familial and of work led older men to create a hyper-mascu‐ neighborhood autonomy in the face of catastro‐ line political sphere hostile to women, while phe" (pp. 7-8). On her account, then, the culture of youths unable to enter the work-force at all reject‐ radicalism emerged less out of party politics or ed the social democratic and trade union tradi‐ opposition to the state than it did out of grassroots tions of their elders in favor of more radical alter‐ action undertaken by locals to defend the security natives. Economic crisis, Swett shows, unraveled and independence of their community in the face socio-political stability at the neighborhood level of mounting national crisis. Grassroots activism first. Chapter 3 turns to an examination of how re‐ backfired, however, because the strategies em‐ publicans and radicals competed for the alle‐ ployed--especially when violent--pitted neighbor giance of Berlin's workers. Republicans, working against neighbor and thereby eroded the commu‐ through the SPD and the Reichsbanner (a prore‐ nal solidarity needed to confront the socio-eco‐ publican paramilitary group founded in 1924), nomic and political crisis after 1929. All of this, tried to convince workers that it was in their best she concludes, deepens our understanding of why interest to support Weimar democracy and op‐ Europe's strongest labor movement failed to pose the radicalism being espoused by the KPD mount an effective opposition to the Nazi triumph and NSDAP, but could not fnd a way to make in 1933. their message convincing. The radical parties also Drawing on an impressively varied source vied for workers' allegiance. Although they were base that combines published materials (city more successful in recruiting members, they also newspapers, novels, memoirs, and oral histories) had little success in enforcing party discipline: lo‐ with archival materials in police and political par‐ cals regularly disregarded party directives and, in ty fles, Neighbors and Enemies has a clear and many cases, seem to have had little interest or logical structure. After a long introduction situat‐ grasp of their party's goals. ing the project historiographically in the litera‐ Indeed, as Swett shows in chapters 4 and 5, ture of Weimar's collapse, the book is organized making a workers' revolution (the goal of the into fve chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the Kiez KPD) or building the Third Reich (the goal of the (small neighborhood) centered on Kreuzberg's NSDAP) were not the reasons that workers joined Nostizstrasse and examines how a sense of local the radical parties--rather, they joined and then autonomy and identity developed there during co-opted party structures to address local con‐ the 1920s. Although it would not have shown up cerns. In the two strongest chapters of the book, on an official map of the city, the Kiez was a local‐ Swett takes a close look at grassroots politics as ly recognized neighborhood within a neighbor‐ distinct from party politics: its sources, aims, and hood--a community created by crowded tenement methods (chapter 4) and its results (chapter 5). life and shared landmarks (local pubs, public Here, Swett's research yields rich new insights transport stops, etc.) and characterized by a into the meanings that Weimar politics had on the strong sense of local allegiance and solidarity. By street. Rather than reading street battles, local 2 H-Net Reviews protests, the proliferation of party uniforms, and communities. The strategies they chose, however, the like as signs of economic desperation or ideo‐ were incompatible with a bordered public sphere logical warfare between the KPD and NSDAP, and were seen as challenging to the authority of Swett looks to the day-to-day relationships be‐ the state. With the advent of the emergency de‐ tween the inhabitants of the Kiez to discern their crees, this challenge was criminalized" (p. 286). true meaning. Thus, whereas previous scholars With the Nazi seizure of power underway in early have emphasized how different in makeup the 1933, workers were in no shape to mount an ef‐ two radical parties were, Swett explores the inter‐ fective challenge, not just because--as previous mingling of communists and Nazis at the neigh‐ scholars have stressed--of the fatal ideological di‐ borhood level (see the suggestive photo on p. 205): vision between the SPD and KPD, but because radicals knew each other at the local level, in oth‐ workers were by 1933 so alienated from the par‐ er words, and were competing to solve local (not ties that claimed to represent their interests. In‐ national) problems such as hunger, turf encroach‐ deed, on the book's last page, Swett boldly claims: ment, and street safety for residents (especially fe‐ "It was not just the failures of the Weimar Repub‐ male ones). Through a fascinating use of denunci‐ lic that encouraged a local radical culture but the ation records as a source, both by locals to the po‐ freedoms of the republic as well. Though workers lice and by party members about their own com‐ did not articulate it as such and their actions rades, Swett suggests in chapter 4 that denuncia‐ worked largely to weaken democracy, they were tion functioned as a sort of "internal discipline" fighting to defend a local sense of power that (p. 230) in the Kiez, that is, as a way to curb the in‐ could have only developed during the republican fluence of outsiders. Turning from denunciation period. By 1933, the freedoms that had allowed to political violence in chapter 5, Swett makes in‐ for local radicalism no longer existed" (p. 300). novative use of welfare reports on youthful of‐ In Swett's fnely drawn portrait of how a fenders to excavate the motives behind small- working-class district of Berlin weathered the cri‐ scale neighborhood violence. Conflicts over mon‐ sis years of 1929-33, we can discern both the mer‐ ey and personal animosities played their role, but its and limits of Alltagsgeschichte as an historical mostly small-scale violence seems to have come approach. On the one hand, Swett's careful atten‐ out of a desire by young unemployed males to tion to the culture of everyday life yields a rich demonstrate that they still controlled their com‐ evocation of what life in a Berlin Kiez was actual‐ munities and lives: to protect women and friends, ly like for men as well as women, adults as well as for example, or to discourage public drunkenness children.

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