DOCSLIB.ORG

A Wahhabi Ethic in Saudi Arabia Power, Authority, and Religion in a Muslim Society

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Wahhabi Ethic in Saudi Arabia Power, Authority, and Religion in a Muslim Society sociology of islam 5 (2017) 278-302 brill.com/soi A Wahhabi Ethic in Saudi Arabia Power, Authority, and Religion in a Muslim Society Abdullah F. Alrebh Grand Valley State University, usa [email protected] Abstract This paper incorporates Weberian insights about religion, power, and bureaucratic au- thority to discuss a Wahhabi ethic in Saudi Arabia. The discussion considers similarities and differences between Saudi Wahhabism and this-worldly Protestantism, focusing on how religious idea systems contributed to the transformation of social, political, and economic institutions in their respective societies. A parallel is drawn between Calvin- ist Protestantism in the West and Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. Just as Calvinist Protes- tantism encouraged its adherents to structure their lives in accord with their religious beliefs, Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia aimed to bring society back to God and God back to society through the enforcement of Divine law (Sharia). The paper presents a discus- sion of the rise of the Saud family and the propagation of religious teachings, which served to legitimate the power and authority of the Saud monarchy. Keywords Wahhabism – Saudi Arabia – Calvinism – Protestantism – salvation – asceticism Introduction The term Wahhabi refers to the Sunni Muslims who have adopted Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab’s lessons in what he claimed to be the purifi- cation of Muslim practices.1 Wahhabism is not a distinct Islamic sect (ta’iffa) 1 Most of the Abdul-Wahhab’s lessons are listed in his short book Kitab At-Tauhid. All his other oublications were subjected to editing and revision done by contemporary editors, most of them with an Egyptian Muslim brotherhood background (c.f., Algar, 2015). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2017 | doi 10.1163/22131418-00504001Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 02:47:31AM via free access <UN> A Wahhabi Ethic in Saudi Arabia 279 in the same manner of Sunnism and Shiasm, nor is it universally recognized as a distinct Madhhab of the four Sunni jurisprudence schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali). Nevertheless, Wahhabis present themselves as Hanbali in terms of jurisprudence, insisting upon monotheism as their priority. Indeed, they present themselves as successors to the founder of the movement, Bin Abdul-Wahhab (1703–1792); they even object to the term “Wahhabis” as derogatory, preferring to be called Salafis or Ahl-sunnah wa al-Jama’ah,2 as the term came to refer to intolerant fanatics in many contexts. Thus, Wahhabism is a Sunni movement not representing the whole of Sunnism. Similarly, Calvinism is a Protestant movement not representing the whole of Protestantism. Broadly speaking, northern European Calvinist R eformation doctrine spread throughout the 16th Century throughout the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, France, and eastern Europe. Nevertheless, doctrine evolved as believers came to the New World in the form of the Reformed churches in the 16th and 17th Centuries, including a significant number of Puritans.3 After many years of hegemonic leadership, the New England Puritans were eventually “segregated” as being too conservative for much of the nation’s community of believers. However, in the 21st Century, New Calvinists have found a home for revival in the form of an evangelical, conservative American movement. As the birthplace of Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia is one of the most religiously conservative countries in the world (cf., Voll, 2009; Kraidy, 2009; 9–11 Commis- sion Report, 2004: 372). This conservatism influences both state control and societal customs, given that these institutions and social practices are based in revered religious texts. In addition, calls for a “more theocratic” (i.e., “re- deemed”) society may be heard in Saudi Arabia, while neighboring Muslim nations undergo a processes of modernization. For the most part, Saudi Arabia tends to apply religious views as a template for the best way to manage the country’s social, economic, and political institutions. The country also estab- lishes a top-down power structure and strict rules regarding gender roles and class. Since the establishment of the current kingdom on September 23, 1932, almost all political and social policies need to be legitimated by religion in Saudi society. Islam is the only religion practiced by Saudi citizens, and various Islamic sects can be found throughout the country. Saudi authorities assign all the positions of religious affairs in the government to the Wahhabi clergy, giving 2 cf. Commins, 2009; detailed in Blanchard, 2008, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf. 3 Perry Miller and Thomas H. Johnson, The Puritans: A Sourcebook of Their Writings, http:// academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/english/melani/english2/puritans_intro.html. sociology of islam 5 (2017) 278-302 Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 02:47:31AM via free access <UN> 280 Alrebh Wahhabism the status of the official doctrine of the country. In brief, Wah- habism represents a fundamentalist Muslim movement that began in the mid 18th century in Najd, the central region of the Arabian Peninsula, and was asso- ciated with the Saudi royal family and their adherents from the local tribes. The movement was used to “Islamize” Arabia by returning to what Wahhabis claim to be the only pristine version of Islam, and it attempted to challenge, often using physical force, any “heretical” alternate versions (Benoist-Mechin, 1957). Since Wahhabism is practiced in the highest echelons of power in the oil- rich state, it is important to understand how Wahhabis gained power, and how they continue to maintain that power and impose their hegemonic hold over Saudi culture. This paper applies Max Weber’s frameworks of power and authority to Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia in order to explain the rise of this group. Furthermore, the paper investigates parallels between Calvinism and Wahhabism and the role of religion in legitimating power in Saudi society and how Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia had a transformative effect on the lives of its adherents and on the organization of the society’s political, social, and eco- nomic institutions. Thus, this essay begins with Weber’s contributions to the understanding of the Protestant Ethic and its influence upon the believers, and develops a more detailed explanation of the theological contributions of expanding Calvinist dogma. It then moves to an historical review of the Wahhabi movement and compares the mechanisms of the rise of Wahhabism in Najd in central Saudi Arabia with that of Calvinist Protestantism in the western world. At this point, a literature review furthers these correlations along with tables illustrating common dominators among the theological schools. Finally, an exegesis— based on Weberian theory—of the Wahhabi success in Saudi Arabia is pro- vided with an analysis of governmental data. Theoretical Framework In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber highlights the de- gree to which a religious idea system could be a factor in the rationalization of the economic sector. Weber emphasizes that a religious ethnic could have important consequences in terms of affecting people’s beliefs and actions and contributing to the transformation and legitimating of social, political, and economic institutions. Although Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis has been the subject of continual debate and criticism, with scholars challenging many of Weber’s basic claims or rejecting the thesis outright (Samuelson 1961; Tawney 1962; Swanson 1967; sociologyDownloaded of islam from 5 Brill.com09/25/2021 (2017) 278-302 02:47:31AM via free access <UN> A Wahhabi Ethic in Saudi Arabia 281 Delacroix and Nielsen 2001; Becker 1997; Stark 2005; Sanderson, Abrutyn, and Proctor 2011), many of Weber’s critics acknowledge at least in the case of Cal- vinism it played a supportive role for Calvinism in the development of indus- trial capitalism (c.f. Johnsonte 2008, Tawney 1962; Collins 1980). In his discussion of Protestantism and capitalism, Weber points out three prime elements in the Calvinist theology that contributed to a spirit of eco- nomic rationalism in the West: 1. Predestination: The understanding is that God has already decided who would be saved (the “Elect”) or damned; saved people demonstrate some signs of grace, honoring God and responding to His call. 2. The Calling: This is associated with an injunction to exert restless effort for the glory of God in all worldly activity. The implication is that believers could demonstrate their worthiness through diligence. Success in a calling was interpreted as a sign of being one of the Elect, and hard work and sober conduct that resulted from living a life of strict discipline had the unan- ticipated consequences of promoting wealth accumulation for the faithful (Johnstone, 2007). 3. Obligation to Glorify God: The saved believers must respond to the Lord to prove their certainty and worthiness. John Calvin that considered it was the individual’s duty to believe God has chosen an individual for salvation with no doubt; individuals were then enjoined to work hard to serve God’s glory, demonstrating that “steadfast faith would produce salvation…. Work [in the secular sphere], and work alone, banishes religious doubt and gives certainty of one’s status among the saved” (Weber, 2009: 111). Such an “individualistic” approach dominated the Calvinist value system ( Mason, 1993; Macleod, 2009). Individuals could show their status as one of the God’s chosen through their productive activities. These elements in Calvinist theology highlight the importance of an “indi- vidualist” orientation to faith and social action. Weber argues that Protestant “asceticism” contributed to wealth accumulation by encouraging “hard work,” “business planning,” and “self-denial.” Weber (2009: 96) went even further by arguing that “the power of the religious movements, not alone but above all other factors,” played a large part in encouraging a spirit of capitalism in the West.4 Thus Weber emphasizes that religion is important in the legitimation of power relations; the significance of this shall become readily apparent.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam
    The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam Muhammad Iqbal The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam written by Muhammad Iqbal Published in 1930. Copyright © 2009 Dodo Press and its licensors. All Rights Reserved. CONTENTS • Preface • Knowledge and Religious Experience • The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience • The Conception of God and the Meaning of Prayer • The Human Ego - His Freedom and Immortality • The Spirit of Muslim Culture • The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam • Is Religion Possible? PREFACE The Qur‘an is a book which emphasizes ‘deed‘ rather than ‘idea‘. There are, however, men to whom it is not possible organically to assimilate an alien universe by re-living, as a vital process, that special type of inner experience on which religious faith ultimately rests. Moreover, the modern man, by developing habits of concrete thought - habits which Islam itself fostered at least in the earlier stages of its cultural career - has rendered himself less capable of that experience which he further suspects because of its liability to illusion. The more genuine schools of Sufism have, no doubt, done good work in shaping and directing the evolution of religious experience in Islam; but their latter-day representatives, owing to their ignorance of the modern mind, have become absolutely incapable of receiving any fresh inspiration from modern thought and experience. They are perpetuating methods which were created for generations possessing a cultural outlook differing, in important respects, from our own. ‘Your creation and resurrection,‘ says the Qur‘an, ‘are like the creation and resurrection of a single soul.‘ A living experience of the kind of biological unity, embodied in this verse, requires today a method physiologically less violent and psychologically more suitable to a concrete type of mind.
    [Show full text]
  • Who-Wants-The-Caliphate.Pdf
    2 | Who Wants the Caliphate? ​ ​ ​ Author Biography Dr. Ovamir Anjum is Imam Khattab Endowed Chair of Islamic Studies at the ​ Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Toledo. He obtained his Ph.D. in Islamic history in the Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison. His work focuses on the nexus of theology, ethics, politics and law in Islam, with comparative interest in Western thought. His interests are united by a common theoretical focus on epistemology or views of intellect/reason in various domains of Islamic thought, ranging from politics (siyasa), law (fiqh), ​ ​ ​ ​ theology (kalam), falsafa (Islamic philosophy) and spirituality (Sufism, mysticism, ​ ​ ​ and asceticism). Author of Politics, Law and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan ​ Moment (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Dr. Anjum has also translated a ​ popular Islamic spiritual and theological classic, Madarij al-Salikin (Ranks of ​ ​ Divine Seekers) by Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1351); the first two volumes to be published by Brill later this year. His current projects include a multi-volume survey of Islamic history and a monograph on Islamic political thought. Disclaimer: The views, opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in these papers and articles are strictly those of the authors. Furthermore, Yaqeen does not endorse any of the personal views of the authors on any platform. Our team is diverse on all fronts, allowing for constant, enriching dialogue that helps us produce high-quality research. Copyright © 2019. Yaqeen Institute for Islamic Research 3 | Who Wants the Caliphate? ​ ​ ​ Editor’s Note This publication was scheduled for release before the news of the death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.
    [Show full text]
  • 2. JIHADI-SALAFI REBELLION and the CRISIS of AUTHORITY Haim Malka
    2. JIHADI-SALAFI REBELLION AND THE CRISIS OF AUTHORITY Haim Malka ihadi-salafists are in open rebellion. The sheer audacity of the JSeptember 11, 2001 attacks, combined with Osama bin Laden’s charisma and financial resources, established al Qaeda as the leader of jihad for a decade. Yet, the Arab uprisings of 2011 and the civil war in Syria shifted the ground dramatically. More ambi- tious jihadi-salafists have challenged al Qaeda’s leadership and approach to jihad, creating deep divisions. For the foreseeable future, this crisis will intensify, and al Qaeda and its chief com- petitor, the Islamic State, will continue to jockey for position. In late 2010, the self-immolation of a despairing Tunisian street vendor inspired millions of Arabs to rise up against authoritarian governments. In a matter of weeks, seemingly impregnable Arab regimes started to shake, and a single man had sparked what decades of attacks by Islamists, including jihadi-salafi groups, had not: the overthrow of an authoritarian government. In the wake of this change, a new generation of jihadi-salafists saw unprecedented opportunities to promote their own methods, priorities, and strategy of jihad. Jihadi-salafists had very little to do with the Arab uprisings themselves, though they quickly realized the importance of capitalizing on new regional dynamics. The fall of authoritarian rulers in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt created contested political and security environments. New governments released thou- 9 10 Jon B. Alterman sands of jailed jihadi-salafi leaders and activists. This move not only bolstered the ranks of jihadi-salafi groups, but also provided unprecedented space for them to operate locally with minimal constraints.
    [Show full text]
  • I Am a Salafi : a Study of the Actual and Imagined Identities of Salafis
    The Hashemite Kingdom Jordan The Deposit Number at The National Library (2014/5/2464) 251.541 Mohammad Abu Rumman I Am A Salafi A Study of The Actual And Imagined Identities of Salafis / by Mohammad Abu Rumman Amman:Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014 Deposit No.:2014/5/2464 Descriptors://Islamic Groups//Islamic Movement Published in 2014 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq FES Jordan & Iraq P.O. Box 941876 Amman 11194 Jordan Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes-jordan.org Not for sale © FES Jordan & Iraq All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the original author. They do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung or the editor. Translation: Dr. Hassan Barari Editing: Amy Henderson Cover: YADONIA Group Printing: Economic Printing Press ISBN: 978-9957-484-41-5 2nd Edition 2017 2 I AM A SALAFI A Study of the Actual and Imagined Identities of Salafis by Mohammad Abu Rumman 3 4 Dedication To my parents Hoping that this modest endeavor will be a reward for your efforts and dedication 5 Table of Contents DEDICATION ........................................................................................................ 5 FOREWORD .......................................................................................................... 8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Hizb Ut-Tahrir Ideology and Strategy
    HIZB UT-TAHRIR IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY “The fierce struggle… between the Muslims and the Kuffar, has been intense ever since the dawn of Islam... It will continue in this way – a bloody struggle alongside the intellectual struggle – until the Hour comes and Allah inherits the Earth...” Hizb ut-Tahrir The Centre for Social Cohesion Houriya Ahmed & Hannah Stuart HIZB UT-TAHRIR IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY “The fierce struggle… between the Muslims and the Kuffar, has been intense ever since the dawn of Islam... It will continue in this way – a bloody struggle alongside the intellectual struggle – until the Hour comes and Allah inherits the Earth...” Hizb ut-Tahrir The Centre for Social Cohesion Houriya Ahmed & Hannah Stuart Hizb ut-Tahrir Ideology and Strategy Houriya Ahmed and Hannah Stuart 2009 The Centre for Social Cohesion Clutha House, 10 Storey’s Gate London SW1P 3AY Tel: +44 (0)20 7222 8909 Fax: +44 (0)5 601527476 Email: [email protected] www.socialcohesion.co.uk The Centre for Social Cohesion Limited by guarantee Registered in England and Wales: No. 06609071 © The Centre for Social Cohesion, November 2009 All the Institute’s publications seek to further its objective of promoting human rights for the benefit of the public. The views expressed are those of the author, not of the Institute. Hizb ut-Tahrir: Ideology and Strategy By Houriya Ahmed and Hannah Stuart ISBN 978-0-9560013-4-4 All rights reserved The map on the front cover depicts Hizb ut-Tahrir’s vision for its Caliphate in ‘Islamic Lands’ ABOUT THE AUTHORS Houriya Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC).
    [Show full text]
  • Al Muhajiroun and Islam4uk: the Group Behind the Ban
    Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence Al Muhajiroun and Islam4UK: The group behind the ban Catherine Zara Raymond May 2010 Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence is a series of papers published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). It features papers by leading experts, providing reviews of existing knowledge and sources and/or novel arguments and insights which are likely to advance our understanding of radicalisation and political violence. The papers are written in plain English. Authors are encouraged to spell out policy implications where appropriate. Editor Prof. Harvey Rubin University of Pennsylvania Dr John Bew ICSR, King’s College London Editorial Assistant Katie Rothman International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) Editorial Board Prof. Sir Lawrence Freedman King’s College London Dr. Boaz Ganor Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya Dr. Peter Neumann King’s College London Dr Hasan Al Momani Jordan Institute of Diplomacy Contact All papers can be downloaded free of charge at www.icsr.info. To order hardcopies, please write to mail@icsr. info. For all matters related to the paper series, please write to: ICSR King’s College London, 138-142 Strand London WC2R 1HH United Kingdom © ICSR 2010 1 Summary On 2nd January 2010, Islam4UK, an off-shoot of the extremist Islamist group Al Muhajiroun, announced their intention to stage a procession through Wootton Bassett, a town which is now synonymous in the eyes of the British public with the funerals of UK soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less than two weeks later the group was proscribed by the British government under the Terrorism Act 2000.
    [Show full text]
  • Al-Muhajiroun Brand
    Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 6 (1): 441 – 453 (May 2014) Ilyas, Al-Muhajiroun brand The “Al-Muhajiroun brand” of Islamism Mohamed Ilyas Abstract Although Al-Muhajiroun and its offshoots ‘no longer exist’ as organised groups in the UK because they have been proscribed by the British government, their ideology and worldviews have gained a constituency in a number of European countries such as Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and Norway. The evolution of these groups can be categorised into three generations, and parallels the commercialisation and the availability of new modes of communication technology. The first generation during the 1990s and early 2000s used VHS and audiotape, the second generation started to use personal computers, the Internet and CDs, while today’s third generation, continues to use personal computers, but now also takes advantage of Smartphones, iPad and the emergence of Web 2.0 technology – social media platforms. These groups are best known for their ‘shock and awe’ activism, which often resulted in members burning the flags of Western nations, especially the American flag. Flag burning has become an iconic image and a frame to understand the groups. It was a powerful symbol because it aimed to subvert and reject, as well as symbolically challenge everything that Western countries represent. Great attention has been paid to these groups over the last two decades by the British and international media, and some academics and think tanks. Although there has been ample media coverage of the groups and their members, there are only a few academic publications. Among these, the best known are those by Wiktorowicz (2005) and Baxter (2005), Pargeter (2008) and a report published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) (Raymond, 2010).
    [Show full text]
  • Do Islamists Have an Intellectual Deficit?
    Rethinking Political Islam: Ovamir Anjum RETHINKING POLITICAL ISLAM SERIES April 2016 Do Islamists have an intellectual deficit? Ovamir Anjum, Imam Khattab Endowed Chair of Islamic Studies, University of Toledo Editor's Note: As part of Brookings's Rethinking Political Islam project, we’ve asked a select group of outside scholars to react and respond to the overall project, in order to draw attention to potential blind spots, trends of note, and more. Although my primary area of research has been premodern Islamic tradition, my interest in “political Islam” in general and in reformists in particular goes back farther than that, and has been the subject of my more recent thinking. When interviewing the leadership of the Egyptian “revolution”—as it was then being called—during the summer of 2011 in Tahrir Square, I developed a suspicion that has since developed into something stronger, though not quite a coherent thesis just yet. It is that the reformists—by which I mean “moderate Islamists” who are, almost by definition, committed to working within the modern nation-state system—have been devoid of a well-grounded vision of Islamic politics, by which I mean a vision backed by a densely elaborated discursive tradition.1 Notwithstanding the debate concerning the extent to which social movements’ success depends on a coherent ideology (as opposed to just effective framing), a debate whose adjudication is beyond my scope here, I note that in the context of fierce competition from the militant, quietist and pro-establishment Islamic groups, it appears that this deficiency is taxing Islamists’ ability to deliver the goods they promise and prevent radicalization.2 1 By discursive depth, I simply mean that a set of ideas is widely and deeply explored in such a way that the implications of and tensions among the various key commitments of a given system or family of ideas has been explored sufficiently.
    [Show full text]
  • Defining Shariʿa the Politics of Islamic Judicial Review by Shoaib
    Defining Shariʿa The Politics of Islamic Judicial Review By Shoaib A. Ghias A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Jurisprudence and Social Policy in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in Charge: Professor Malcolm M. Feeley, Chair Professor Martin M. Shapiro Professor Asad Q. Ahmed Summer 2015 Defining Shariʿa The Politics of Islamic Judicial Review © 2015 By Shoaib A. Ghias Abstract Defining Shariʿa: The Politics of Islamic Judicial Review by Shoaib A. Ghias Doctor of Philosophy in Jurisprudence and Social Policy University of California, Berkeley Professor Malcolm M. Feeley, Chair Since the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s, many Muslim postcolonial countries have established and empowered constitutional courts to declare laws conflicting with shariʿa as unconstitutional. The central question explored in this dissertation is whether and to what extent constitutional doctrine developed in shariʿa review is contingent on the ruling regime or represents lasting trends in interpretations of shariʿa. Using the case of Pakistan, this dissertation contends that the long-term discursive trends in shariʿa are determined in the religio-political space and only reflected in state law through the interaction of shariʿa politics, regime politics, and judicial politics. The research is based on materials gathered during fieldwork in Pakistan and datasets of Federal Shariat Court and Supreme Court cases and judges. In particular, the dissertation offers a political-institutional framework to study shariʿa review in a British postcolonial court system through exploring the role of professional and scholar judges, the discretion of the chief justice, the system of judicial appointments and tenure, and the political structure of appeal that combine to make courts agents of the political regime.
    [Show full text]
  • The Meaning and Characteristics of Islam in the Qur'an
    International Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation, Vol. 24, Issue . 01, 2020 ISSN: 1475 – 7192. The Meaning And Characteristics Of Islam In The Qur'an Baharuddin Husin1, Supriyatin, SY2, Zaimudin3, Imron Zabidi4 Abstract--- Islam contain the meaning of submissiveness and total surrender to Allah SWT and to all His rules that have been revealed to His chosen Prophet, Muhammad (PBUH). Islam is a religion of nature, because Islam is something that is inherent in human beings and has been brought from birth through the nature of Allah’s creation, means that humans from the beginning have a religious instinct of monotheism (tawheed). Islam in accordance with its characteristics, is like a perfect building with a strong foundation of faith and pillar joints in the form of worship to Allah SWT and beautified with noble morals. While the regulations in the Shari'ah function to strengthen the building. While true da'wah and jihad are the fences which guard against the damage done by the enemies of Islam. Islam pays attention to worldly and ukhrawi balance. Islam describes a wholeness and unity in all aspects. Paying attention to peace, optimism in achieving happiness in life, managing personal life, family, society, country and the world as a whole. Set all the creations of Allah SWT in this nature to return to His law. Islam is the eternal religion of Allah SWT that was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). All previous celestial teachings are the unity of the divine teaching in various forms which are constantly updated in accordance with the development of the times, the world, humans, and the demands of preaching at that time.
    [Show full text]
  • The Meaning of the Hadith: “My Ummah Will Be Divided Among Itself Into Seventy Three Sects.”
    بسم هللا الرحمن الرحيم Series of Questions Addressed to Eminent Scholar Ata Bin Khalil Abu Al-Rashtah, Ameer of Hizb ut Tahrir through his Facebook Page (Fiqhi) Answer to Question My Ummah will be“ » َوتَ ْفتَ ِر ُق أُ َّمتِي َع َلى ثَ ََل ٍث َو َس ْب ِعي َن فِ ْر َق ًة « :Meaning of the Hadith divided among itself into seventy-three sects.” To Abdullah Omar (Translated) Question: Assalamu Alaikum Wa Rahmatullah Wa Barakatuhu I am Abdullah from Afghanistan, may Allah preserve you our Sheikh, My“ »ستنقسم أمتي إلى ثَلثة وسبعين فرقة وكلها في النار ما عدا واحدا« :The Messenger of Allah (saw) said Ummah will be divided among itself into seventy-three sects.” I hope you explain this Hadith. Answer: Wa Alaikum Assalam Wa Rahmatullah Wa Barakatuhu, Firstly: The hadith you are enquiring about is not narrated in the format presented in your question, and we had covered this hadith in a Question & Answer published on 24 Rabii’ ul-Akhir 1439 AH corresponding 11/01/2018 CE, in various narrations, some of which include different additions, and we concluded at the end of the answer that: (the hadith concerning the Ummah’s division into 73 sects without any additions is a sahih hadith… and that the first all of them are in hellfire except for one” has been considered“ "كلها في النار إﻻ واحدة" :addition all of them are in jannah“ "كلها في الجنة إﻻ واحدة" :hasan by many… as for the second addition except for one of them,” many have considered it weak, and only a few considered it sahih or "كلها :hasan; therefore, I find the most preponderant the opinion
    [Show full text]
  • Concept of Shūra in Fazlur Rahman's Political Ideas at Practical Level
    Concept of Shūra in Fazlur Rahman’s Political Ideas at Practical Level Navin G. Haider Ali Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, Karachi, Pakistan Abstract The term Shūra has become an important term in modern political history of Islam. Its importance and centrality can be gauged by the fact that Muslim modernists, traditionalists and fundamentalists use it equally to propound and promote their own political ideas. This term and concept were part of Fazlur Rahman‟s political thought and central to his overall idea of an Islamic State. However, with the passage of time his arguments changed corresponding to the changes in the prevailing situation. The current article focuses mainly on his thought on shūra in his early writings from 1950s and 1960s. Though in the first decade of his career he had no independent views of his own on shūra and he based his arguments on the subject mainly on the arguments of classical thinkers such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Shibli, Hali, Chiragh Ali, Amir Ali and Iqbal at home and Jamal al-Din Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Namik Kemal and Zia Gokalp abroad. On the contrary, during the 1960s he developed his independent thoughts on shūra. The current work will highlight the fact that his ideas were grossly influenced by the prevailing socio-political conditions in Pakistan at that time and he appears to contradict himself on some of the arguments about the authority of the head of the state. This situation also highlights the dilemma of a thinker who also has to play the role of a reformer at the practical level in a given political situation.
    [Show full text]