A Wahhabi Ethic in Saudi Arabia Power, Authority, and Religion in a Muslim Society

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Abdullah F. Alrebh Grand Valley State University, usa [email protected]

Abstract

This paper incorporates Weberian insights about religion, power, and bureaucratic authority to discuss a Wahhabi ethic in Saudi Arabia. The discussion considers similarities and differences between Saudi Wahhabism and this-worldly Protestantism, focusing on how religious idea systems contributed to the transformation of social, political, and economic institutions in their respective societies. A parallel is drawn between Calvin- ist Protestantism in the West and Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. Just as Calvinist Protes- tantism encouraged its adherents to structure their lives in accord with their religious beliefs, Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia aimed to bring society back to God and God back to society through the enforcement of Divine law (Sharia). The paper presents a discussion of the rise of the Saud family and the propagation of religious teachings, which served to legitimate the power and authority of the Saud monarchy.

Keywords

Wahhabism – Saudi Arabia – Calvinism – Protestantism – salvation – asceticism

Introduction

The term Wahhabi refers to the Sunni Muslims who have adopted Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab’s lessons in what he claimed to be the purifi- cation of Muslim practices.1 Wahhabism is not a distinct Islamic sect (ta’iffa)

1 Most of the Abdul-Wahhab’s lessons are listed in his short book Kitab At-Tauhid. All his other oublications were subjected to editing and revision done by contemporary editors, most of them with an Egyptian Muslim brotherhood background (c.f., Algar, 2015).

A Wahhabi Ethic in Saudi Arabia 279 in the same manner of Sunnism and Shiasm, nor is it universally recognized as a distinct Madhhab of the four Sunni jurisprudence schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali). Nevertheless, Wahhabis present themselves as Hanbali in terms of jurisprudence, insisting upon monotheism as their priority. Indeed, they present themselves as successors to the founder of the movement, Bin Abdul-Wahhab (1703–1792); they even object to the term “Wahhabis” as derogatory, preferring to be called Salafis or Ahl-sunnah wa al-Jama’ah,2 as the term came to refer to intolerant fanatics in many contexts. Thus, Wahhabism is a Sunni movement not representing the whole of Sunnism. Similarly, Calvinism is a Protestant movement not representing the whole of Protestantism. Broadly speaking, northern European Calvinist R eformation doctrine spread throughout the 16th Century throughout the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, France, and eastern Europe. Nevertheless, doctrine evolved as believers came to the New World in the form of the Reformed churches in the 16th and 17th Centuries, including a significant number of Puritans.3 After many years of hegemonic leadership, the New England Puritans were eventually “segregated” as being too conservative for much of the nation’s community of believers. However, in the 21st Century, New Calvinists have found a home for revival in the form of an evangelical, conservative American movement. As the birthplace of Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia is one of the most religiously conservative countries in the world (cf., Voll, 2009; Kraidy, 2009; 9–11 Commis- sion Report, 2004: 372). This conservatism influences both state control and societal customs, given that these institutions and social practices are based in revered religious texts. In addition, calls for a “more theocratic” (i.e., “re- deemed”) society may be heard in Saudi Arabia, while neighboring Muslim nations undergo a processes of modernization. For the most part, Saudi Arabia tends to apply religious views as a template for the best way to manage the country’s social, economic, and political institutions. The country also estab- lishes a top-down power structure and strict rules regarding gender roles and class. Since the establishment of the current kingdom on September 23, 1932, almost all political and social policies need to be legitimated by religion in Saudi society. Islam is the only religion practiced by Saudi citizens, and various Islamic sects can be found throughout the country. Saudi authorities assign all the positions of religious affairs in the government to the Wahhabi clergy, giving

2 cf. Commins, 2009; detailed in Blanchard, 2008, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf. 3 Perry Miller and Thomas H. Johnson, The Puritans: A Sourcebook of Their Writings, http:// academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/english/melani/english2/puritans_intro.html.

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Wahhabism the status of the official doctrine of the country. In brief, Wah- habism represents a fundamentalist Muslim movement that began in the mid 18th century in Najd, the central region of the Arabian Peninsula, and was associated with the Saudi royal family and their adherents from the local tribes. The movement was used to “Islamize” Arabia by returning to what Wahhabis claim to be the only pristine version of Islam, and it attempted to challenge, often using physical force, any “heretical” alternate versions (Benoist-Mechin, 1957). Since Wahhabism is practiced in the highest echelons of power in the oil- rich state, it is important to understand how Wahhabis gained power, and how they continue to maintain that power and impose their hegemonic hold over Saudi culture. This paper applies Max Weber’s frameworks of power and authority to Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia in order to explain the rise of this group. Furthermore, the paper investigates parallels between Calvinism and Wahhabism and the role of religion in legitimating power in Saudi society and how Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia had a transformative effect on the lives of its adherents and on the organization of the society’s political, social, and economic institutions. Thus, this essay begins with Weber’s contributions to the understanding of the Protestant Ethic and its influence upon the believers, and develops a more detailed explanation of the theological contributions of expanding Calvinist dogma. It then moves to an historical review of the Wahhabi movement and compares the mechanisms of the rise of Wahhabism in Najd in central Saudi Arabia with that of Calvinist Protestantism in the western world. At this point, a literature review furthers these correlations along with tables illustrating common dominators among the theological schools. Finally, an exegesis— based on Weberian theory—of the Wahhabi success in Saudi Arabia is provided with an analysis of governmental data.

Theoretical Framework

In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber highlights the degree to which a religious idea system could be a factor in the rationalization of the economic sector. Weber emphasizes that a religious ethnic could have important consequences in terms of affecting people’s beliefs and actions and contributing to the transformation and legitimating of social, political, and economic institutions. Although Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis has been the subject of continual debate and criticism, with scholars challenging many of Weber’s basic claims or rejecting the thesis outright (Samuelson 1961; Tawney 1962; Swanson 1967;

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Delacroix and Nielsen 2001; Becker 1997; Stark 2005; Sanderson, Abrutyn, and Proctor 2011), many of Weber’s critics acknowledge at least in the case of Cal- vinism it played a supportive role for Calvinism in the development of industrial capitalism (c.f. Johnsonte 2008, Tawney 1962; Collins 1980). In his discussion of Protestantism and capitalism, Weber points out three prime elements in the Calvinist theology that contributed to a spirit of economic rationalism in the West:

1. Predestination: The understanding is that God has already decided who would be saved (the “Elect”) or damned; saved people demonstrate some signs of grace, honoring God and responding to His call. 2. The Calling: This is associated with an injunction to exert restless effort for the glory of God in all worldly activity. The implication is that believers could demonstrate their worthiness through diligence. Success in a calling was interpreted as a sign of being one of the Elect, and hard work and sober conduct that resulted from living a life of strict discipline had the unan- ticipated consequences of promoting wealth accumulation for the faithful (Johnstone, 2007). 3. Obligation to Glorify God: The saved believers must respond to the Lord to prove their certainty and worthiness. John Calvin that considered it was the individual’s duty to believe God has chosen an individual for salvation with no doubt; individuals were then enjoined to work hard to serve God’s glory, demonstrating that “steadfast faith would produce salvation…. Work [in the secular sphere], and work alone, banishes religious doubt and gives certainty of one’s status among the saved” (Weber, 2009: 111).

Such an “individualistic” approach dominated the Calvinist value system (Mason, 1993; Macleod, 2009). Individuals could show their status as one of the God’s chosen through their productive activities. These elements in Calvinist theology highlight the importance of an “individualist” orientation to faith and social action. Weber argues that Protestant “asceticism” contributed to wealth accumulation by encouraging “hard work,” “business planning,” and “self-denial.” Weber (2009: 96) went even further by arguing that “the power of the religious movements, not alone but above all other factors,” played a large part in encouraging a spirit of capitalism in the West.4 Thus Weber emphasizes that religion is important in the legitimation of power relations; the significance of this shall become readily apparent.

4 Some of these other factors included rational law, scientific development, modern book- keeping, a money-based economy, and a freely available labor force.

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An analysis of the rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia brings to mind a number of questions, the foremost being whether Weber’s discussion of the role of a religious ethic in the political/economic life of followers can also be used to inform an analysis of the rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. Thus, it clearly makes sense to use historical and contemporary accounts of Saudi Arabia to develop this argument, demonstrating a significant number of similarities between Calvinist Protestant Christianity and Wahhabi Sunni Islam in terms of worldly and otherworldly beliefs—including the belief that only one’s own version of a religion is legitimate.

Rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia

Wahhabism originated in 1744 with the founding of the first Saudi state under Mohammed Bin Saud (1710–1765), the fourth great grandfather of Ibn Saud (founder of the current Saudi state). At that time, Mohammed Bin Saud was the ruler of Dariya, a small town in Najd, known as “the central region of Arabia.” Mohammed Bin Saud made a pact with Shikh Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab (Steinberg, 2005) to spread the Wahabbi doctrine under the House of Saud to rule throughout the Bedouin tribes of the Arabian Peninsula (Benoist-Mechin, 1957). Under the pact, power was divided into two realms: political power for the House of Saud, and religious power for Abdul-Wahhab and his disci- ples, who were later to become the religious scholars, the Ulama, of the state (Al-Rasheed, 2010; Hertog, 2011). These allies were able to combine the existing cultural codes of the tribes— emphasizing notions such as “war’s glory,” the tribal chief’s status affecting the “honor of all tribe members,” the “shame of being behind,” with the influence and specific interpretations of Islam to offer incentives to other tribal leaders to honor the pact. The pact was not without opposition. Still, the consolidated power on the Arabian Peninsula forced those who lived in the region to follow a leader who did not belong to their tribe. These Bedouin tribes, based on Is- lamic beliefs, became subject to the leadership of an outside political (wali al- amr) Muslim community leader or religious person (Imam), rather than their traditional tribal leader (Mackey, 2002; Glosemeyer, 2005; Bowen, 2008). The tribal leaders, in turn, gained material and status-raising benefits by bringing their tribes into the fold of Bin Saud. Mohammed Bin Saud further extended his power through expansionist wars using the Najdi tribes under the religious legitimacy provided by Abdul- Wahhab. For his part, Abdul-Wahhab’s previously issued fatwa forbidding

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A Wahhabi Ethic in Saudi Arabia 283 certain practices that had been considered acceptable by other Muslim sects (such as admiring saints’ graves, wearing talismans, smoking, and so on) and which became the basis of Wahhabi jurisprudence for the new state (Bowen, 2008; Ungureanu, 2011). As the new state grew under Mohammed Bin Saud and Abdul-Wahhab, the spoils of war were replaced by taxes paid by their subjects (Menoret, 2005). Under this developing mechanism of the Saudi/Wahhabi em- pire, Mohammed Bin Saud and his successors (sons and grandsons) grew from leaders of a mere tribal group to the leaders of a religious and political en- tity which shaped the current Saudi elite—“Najdi-Wahhabis”—by combining three elements: the royal family, Islamic clerics, and tribal adherents.5 In contemporary Saudi Arabia, the elite Islamic clerics use Wahhabism to impose their views on the Saudi people. Given that these views are fully embedded in religious terms it protects their power and interests in a society where religion is considered the highest legitimate power (Valentine, 2015). As Weber and others emphasize, legitimacy is the element that distinguishes power from authority:

[I]n those groups which were politically integrated by a common supreme authority, like … the Islamic states, the body of laws to be applied by the judicial officers differed in accordance with the ethnic, religious or political characteristics of the component groups.... kalberg, cited in weber 2009: 402

Kalberg continues (p. 403):

The modern position of political organizations rests on the prestige be- stowed upon them by a specific belief held by their members in a special consecration, namely, in the “legitimacy” of the social action prescribed by these organizations.

An example of these views would include accepting the principle that the only way to be a good Muslim is to adopt the “true interpretation of Islam” (i.e., Wahhabism). This requires full loyalty to al-umma and wali-almr—Arabic

5 In this context, the term “Najdi-Wahhabi” refers to those elites coming from a Najdi tribal background who have adopted Wahhabi doctrine. For a more complete discussion of the place of Wahhabism among the Najdi, the interested reader is directed toward the first chap- ter of Awaking Islam by Lacroix and Holoch (2011).

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284 Alrebh words for “nation” and “the authoritative guardian of Muslims”—the state and the king, and enmity toward any considered the enemy of Allah/Islam. Thus, Wahhabism succeeded in keeping tribalism in place as the concept of loyalty moved from the tribe to loyalty to the state [al-umma], and from loyalty for the tribal chief to loyalty for the king [wali-almr], both of which became religious entities. After the 1990s, a number of new followers of Bin Abdul-Wahhab—in particular Afghan alumni and jihadists such as Osama bin Laden—no longer considered the Saudi King as the wali-almr (c.f. Valentine, 2015: 221–235). Those new followers are thus called “neo–Wahhabi” or “neo–Salafi” (Moussalli, 2009). These “neo-” terms have been used to distinguish them from the Wahhabis who still follow Bin Abdul-Wahhab and their loyalty to House of Saud. This sea change in loyalties also appears in some social values that originated from tribal customs—such as rules for marriage allowing higher status tribes to re- fuse giving their daughters to men of lower tribes, thus avoiding a lost sense of honor and status. Religious leaders legitimized this cultural practice, claiming couples are to hereafter be socially qualified for each other. Today, power in Saudi Arabia is centralized in two primary ways. First by keeping the circle of decision-making in the hands of a small, dominant group enjoying full privileges of state-power. Secondly, by encouraging—or even compelling via the educational and media systems—all Saudis to follow the dominant Wahhabi standards, and thus adhering to the tribal values of the Najd region (Yamani, 2008). While the Wahhabis’ homeland of Najd represents just 32.2% of the total Saudi population,6 the elite members hold 90% of the country’s ministerial positions, 100% of the National Guard, and—according to the Consultative Council ()—approximately 44.66% of the Consultative Council.7 This last body is claimed to be representative of the country, but that has not been the case, as the king appoints with similar interests and loyalties.8,9

6 This includes the non-Najdi people who moved to the Central Region to work or establish businesses, as the capital of Riyadh became the headquarters of most government depart- ments and ministries, as well as leading firms. As they increased the population of Najd they indicated their original regions when it came to analyzing the number of Ministerial Posi- tion Per Region in Saudi Arabia. In other words, those non-Najdi added to the value of Najd’s population, yet are not counted as Najdis when they are demographically considered as individuals. In Saudi culture, people are attributed to their original regions and tribes. 7 Illustrated later in this essay. 8 For a robust description of what has been identified as factors contributing to the stability of the Saudi political strategy during the post-Arab Spring, see Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East by F.G. Gause, particularly pages 5–9. 9 By contrast, Protestantism invests efforts in the market, with no overt intentions of political control upon the state.

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Wahhabism and Protestantism in the Literature

Several authors have attempted to draw a parallel between both Wahhabism and Calvinist Protestantism and between Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab and John Calvin. Ehrenreich (2006: 119–125) pointed to Samuel P. Huntington as potentially the first observer to note this parallel in his 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. However, Huntington did not discuss Wahhabism or its founder, Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab, but rather compared Protestantism with Islamic fundamentalist movements in general. Huntington described Ayatollah Khomeini as a leader whose monastic discipline could be compared to that of John Calvin (see Huntington, 1996: 111). Khomeini was a Shia leader, whose theology is in conflict with that of Wah- habism. Nevertheless, Huntington’s observations about a parallel between ascetic Protestantism and fundamentalist Islam laid the groundwork for further investigation. Ware and Kisriev also noted a similar connection when stressing that “Wah- habism offered many of the traditional appeals of Protestantism” (2010: 93). Ware and Kisriev drew upon similarities between fundamentalist branches of Islam and Protestantism and emphasized that the faithful in both traditions were confident that their beliefs were the most accessible to the creator. Similar ideas have been raised by other observers (see Browers and Kurzman, 2004; Allen, 2006; and Ankerberg and Caner, 2009). Doumato (2000: 217), for example, added that both religious traditions embrace a harsh attitude toward miraculous healing and other supernatural forces from a non-Godly source.10 Natana and Delong-Bas describe the typical portrayal of the Wahhabis as austere and puritan in their approach to life” (2008:165).11 Even in Western media, Wahhabis have been referred to as “Puritans”12 or as “Calvinist Muslims.”13 This

10 Not unlike the modern Christian Scientists and Sufis. 11 The term “austere” in this context recalls asceticism from The Protestant Ethic. 12 Alrebh and Ten Eyck (2014: 7) reported five articles from The Times in the period between 1927–1937 describing Wahhabis as “Puritan Muslims.” In addition, Alrebh (2015: 205) reported six articles from the New York Times in the period between 1901–1932 describing Wahhabism as “puritans” and/or “fanatic Muslims.” 13 A review of the New York Times archive between 1901–1932—the period of building the Saudi Kingdom (searched in “Wahhabis”)—reveals 9 articles describing Wahhabis as “Puritans” or some similar term. Furthermore, an article dated October 5, 1924 titled, “Wild Reformers Storm Gates of Holy Mecca: Moslem [sic] Sect of Wahabis [sic], Led by Ibn Saud, Who Knows Koran by Heart, Out to Purify City and Its Apostates by the Sword” associated Bektashis and Wahhabis on the Muslim side with the Quakers and Calvinists in the Christian side (Alrebh, 2015). So, we see here: Bektashis versus Quakers, and Wah- habis versus Calvinists as listed in the order.

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286 Alrebh link between Wahhabism and Puritanism conveys the notion that such groups are fanatical in their religious beliefs (Alrebh and Ten Eyck, 2014). These sources have offered only general statements describing a sort of parallel between the Calvinist Christian and Wahhabi Muslim without providing enough of an explanation to explain the social forces behind each movement. Rather than mentioning potential parallels, scholars should in- vestigate how Calvinist Christians and Wahhabi Muslims flourished in their nations, given the unique historical circumstances characteristics of these two faith traditions. Calvinist Protestants believed themselves to be chosen by God for salvation. Stark and Glock refer to this as “particularism,” that is, “the belief that only one’s own religion is legitimate” (1966: 20; cf., Ronald L. Johnstone, 2007: 133). Schervish and Whitaker (2010) indicate that Calvin himself addressed this in his doctrine of Unconditional Election when they say it “is perhaps the most famous of Calvin’s thought[s].” They continue:

According to this doctrine, God, before creating the world, chose whom he wished to save. He did not do so based upon merit. Nor did he make it by predicting who would or would not accept the Gospel. God has chosen (“elected”) some souls for glory, based solely upon his own will and wis- dom—and he has elected others for damnation. schervish and whitaker, 2010: 125

This notion of election is also evident in the Islamic tradition. In Muslim literature, there is a Hadith14 which indicates that the Ummah [Muslims] would part into 73 groups, 72 of which would go to Hell either temporarily or eternally (see Al-Bag, 1920: 9), while one part would be saved. Wahhabism asserts this Hadith in the following:

… my Ummah will split into 73 sects: one will enter Paradise and 72 will enter Hell”. Someone asked, “O Messenger of Allah (Peace be upon him), who will they be?” He replied, “The main body of the Muslims (al-Jama’ah)”.15

Ahlus sunnah wal Jama’ah “refers to those who follow the Prophet (saw) and the understanding of the Sahabah (companions) and those that followed them bil Ihsaan i.e., the Tabi’een and Tabi’ Tabi’een” (Muhammad, 2004: 49).

14 All narrations concern the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. 15 To see this in English translation see: http://www.sunnah.org/msaec/articles/madhhabs .htm.

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According to Ibn Taymiyah, whom Wahhabis highly admire as Sheikh ul-islam (the highest scholar of Islam), Ahlus sunnah wal Jama’ah are the people who

have faith in the same manner as they have faith on the information given about them by Allah in His Book without distortion and negation and without adding quality and resemblance. In fact, among all the sects of the Ummah, this sect alone is moderate just as the community of Mus- lims is a moderate one among all the communities. ibn taymiyah, 1989: 144

Wahhabis always refer to themselves as Ahl-sunnah wa al-Jama’ah (Schubel, 1993; Ibn Taymiyah, 1989: 219), and thus the saved sect (see for example Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, 2004: 11). Thus Wahhabis share a perspective similar to a Calvinist perspective regarding an exclusive eligibility for salvation. Both the Calvinist and Wahhabi traditions look at themselves as those who carry an obligation to represent their religion and serve God. Calvin believed that “[t]he cosmos of the world serves the majesty of God and His self- glorification” (Weber, 2009: 19). In the same way, this obligation to glorify God in Wahhabism makes the faithful the defenders of the monotheism of Allah. The principal base of the Wahhabism movement is a defense of Tawhid (the Arabic word for monotheism). This movement has fought most of the Arabian population who had different interpretations of Tawhid (Moussalli, 2009). As a concept, Tawhid started with the Shahadah, the Islamic pledge of the convic- tion of one’s faith: “I bear witness that there is no deity but Allah and I bear witness that Muhammad is His Messenger”. All Muslims claim to adopt this pledge, though Wahhabis claim that other Muslims do not follow the truest path of the pledge. Indeed, the Saudi flag includes this Shahadah in Arabic script, but shares the flag with a sword. This perhaps best illustrates that the most contentious matter Wahhabis address regarding the faith of their Muslim enemies is that of shirk, idolatry, (Abdul-Wahhab, 1999).16 Another common theme between Calvinists and Wahhabis is their strug- gle against the notion of the miraculous and the sacred power of saints. To both groups, saints are no more than dead people. Berger (1967) argues that Protestantism brought about an inevitable tendency to shrink the miraculous power of the saints. Similarly, Wahhabism calls for cutting irrational relations

16 He listed his own vision of the primary lessons of the conservative Sunni beliefs in Kitab at-Tauhid (The Book of Monotheism). Yet, it is hard to determine the date of the first version published of this book, For English translation of this book, please see: http://www.shareislam.com/order/books/tawheed.pdf.

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Figure 1 Saudi Arabia’s Flag (white images on a green field). with the dead, and Wahhabis wilfully disrespect the graves of Muslim saints (Moussalli, 2009). Beyer (2006: 161) summarized the Wahhabis’ attitude: “submission (Islam) as obedience to God was not to be done on the basis of imitating a human authority, thereby creating another intermediary between God and Human beings.” Wahhabis and Protestants, both this-worldly ascetics, look at the relationship between people and God as a personal one. There are, however, two practical differences between Weber’s views regarding Calvinism and the Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia regarding the creation of fortune. First, according to Weber’s account of this-worldly ascetic Protestant- ism, wealth becomes a by-product of one’s living a holy (ascetic) life, as individuals honor God and live according to His will. In contrast, Wahhabis tend to live as a group in a state that imposes God’s law. Second, as the primary desires are different, the intent of the sort of power both religious groups gained is different. Ascetic Protestantism encourages its followers to live a life of strict discipline leading to the consequence that individuals may advance economically. On the other hand, Wahhabism encourages its adherents to follow an Islamic vision that imposes God’s law, which has led to the establishment of a hoped theocratic state and their obtaining political power as a group. While it may seem ironically true that Protestants have gained the power of the political upper hand in some nations (such as the u.s. and the u.k.) while Wahhabis have dominant economic power in others (such as Saudi Arabia), these accu- mulations of power have occurred without religious motivation. Indeed, political and economic powers are matters clearly supportive of each other, regardless of the intention. This is especially the case wherein:

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1. The political system of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia gives the King and his elite circle the ability and authority to rise to economic power. Saudi Arabia is a Rentier state (Burnell and Randall, 2008: 446), receiving substantial income from the outside world; thus, economic power supports the political elite and helps it maintain political power. This economic power has become an unintended consequence for the religious leaders as well. 2. The economic system in the West involves more than just political interests. Political power is used to make policies that support the dominant economic interests.

Regardless of the intentions of religious authorities, the mechanism of flourishing in both cases—Calvinists and Wahhabis—works in opposite ways. Cal- vinists flourish economically based on a religious ethic of honoring God and living according to His will, and political power is solidified without an overtly religious motivation. In contrast, Wahhabis seek to establish a state imposing theocratic laws (Sharia)17 through political power based on religious ethics, and their economic ascendancy legitimates their authority, aside from any religious motivations. Following Weber’s perspective of the Protestant ethic, Table 1 illustrates the role of belief on both movements in terms of doctrine perceptions of calling, honoring God, and live according to His will. Table 2 summarizes key commonalities and differences between these two traditions. Based on Tables 1 & 2, we can see the vital role of belief in the success of followers Wahhabism. To track this success in the Saudi Arabian realm, the follow section investigates the flourishing of Wahhabis and their position in the state.

Wahhabi Successes/Accomplishments

The discovery and exploitation of oil in the late 1930s changed the structure of the Kingdom. While Ibn Saud started his Kingdom with direct rule and only four ministers (Salameh, 1980), Saudi Arabia today has a Council of Ministers in addition to a number of major institutions that represent the bureaucratic apparatus of the state.

17 Sharia is both the body of Islamic religious law and the legal framework in which public and private aspects of life are regulated based on Muslim principles of jurisprudence (Standke, 2008: 2).

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Table 1 The Conceptual Beliefs of both Movements

Parallels Mechanism

Predestination God already decided the destiny of every human being, yet He also left people free to read the sacred text and think about what one who merited salvation ought to do. Calvinists believe in the economic success in the industrial business, while Wahhabis believe in the political success of establishing the state of God and applying Sharia Obligation to John Calvin maintained Elect (i.e., saved) believers must Glorify God respond to the Lord to prove their certainty and worthiness. In the same manner, Mohammed Bin Abdul-Wahhab maintained the believers must respond to the Lord to prove their loyalty to Him alone through “pure monotheistic worship.” Asceticism: Wahhabism advocates austere form of Islamic asceticism, Wahhabi prohibiting such activities as premarital sex or indulgences in music or cinema (or other forms of light entertainment). Penalties for indulgence range from being merely “frowned upon” to being banned by force. Wahhabi interpretation of Sharia law is seen as the only sure way to obtain salvation. Asceticism: Strict self-discipline was the moral principle promising Calvinist-Protestants long-term economic gains through strong inner worldly asceticism. Hard Work and While Calvinists insisted on the Work Ethic that clearly Diligence flourished in the economy of its time, the Wahhabis insist on all work being toward the establishment of the Islamic State. Calling: Restless effort establishing the glory of God in all worldly Calvinist-Protestants activity; believers demonstrate their worthiness through diligence. A sign of being one of the saved group (“Elect”): hard work, sober conduct, living a life of strict discipline had the consequence of promoting wealth accumulation for the faithful. Calling: Wahhabis Restless effort establishing the glory of God in all worldly activity; believers’ success in a calling interpreted as a sign of being one of the saved group: hard work, sober conduct, living a life of strict discipline had the consequence of promoting the theocracy.

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Table 2 Parallels Between Protestantism and Wahhabism

Protestantism Wahhabism

Emphasis on Individuals Group Degree of Calling people, people saved/ The only group among Particularism elected by God. 73 groups saved by God “Ahl-sunnah wa al-jama’ah”. Missionary Evangelism in order to Da’wa (Muslim proselytiz- (Spreading the Faith) increase the number of ing) in order to increase the believers number of believers. Main Goal Living to honor God by living Living to honor God by according to His will. living according to His will. Method to Achieve Working hard and living a Imposing theocratic law the Goal life of strict discipline (Shria) via building a (asceticism) theocratic state through monopolizing the highest governmental positions, sources of wealth, and religious leadership. Outcomes Increase class position Expanding one’s access to (economic) which leads to power (political) which power (political). leads to increase one’s class position (economic).

Wahhabis control the formal institutions of Saudi Arabia, but that does not mean the Kingdom is a theocratic state (Al-Hassan, 2006). The term “Wahhabi” indicates more than religious background. It is an “umbrela” term representing the elite who come from Najdi tribes and adopt Wahhabism as a belief, regardless of the individual’s level of religiosity. Hamza Al-Hassan’s survey of the Saudi bureaucratic apparatus found that Najdi-Wahhabis control all the vital ministries and institutions. Furthermore, the more important the apparatus, the more it will be controlled by the elite. For example, the Royal Court, which represents the small circle surrounding the king, is completely composed of Najdi-Wahhabis of the King Fahd epoch (Al-Hassan, 2006).18 As of 2016, the

18 It is difficult to gain precise information about the recent Royal Court because there is no official website for this institution. It should also be noted the data used by Hamza Al-Hassan were collected by May 2005. However, I have searched the formal websites that are available and collected my own data presented here.

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Najdi-Wahhabis held 90% of the country’s ministerial positions. By reviewing the formal websites of the Saudi ministries, Table 3 shows the regional back- grounds of members of the highest institution, the results are clear that Najdi- Wahhabi families are control the Saudi government. Table 3 indicates that Najdi-Wahhabis (those from the Central region) hold 27 of 30 ministerial positions. Fully 90% of the ministerial positions are held by members from a region accounting for just 32.2% of the total population. Having such a position puts such ministers in a significantly higher economic class in a country where its people define themselves by economic class, kinship group, and geographic region—loosely corresponding to Weber’s class, status, and party dimensions of stratification. It worth noting that this domination of the high ranking positions in the Kingdom was mentioned in two former pieces. Abdolazeez Al-Otaibi (1988) covered this topic of the elite Najdi-Wahhabis up to 1988 and Hamed Al-Wardy (1996) covered it up to 1996. What makes these two pieces most distinctive is that both Al-Otaibi and Al- Wardy themselves held high ranking government positions in Saudi Arabia; thus those two academic/governmental sources support this paper’s argument of Najdi-Wahhabi supremacy with a great deal of significant empirical data. Additionally, Najdi-Wahhabis always have the majority in the Consultative Council whose members are appointed by the king, even though that institution is not a real parliament because it only provides recommendations without power to write laws. Al-Hassan (2006) has collected data on the Consultative Council and the percentage of its members per region for four appointment cycles between 1992 and 2005. Table 4 includes not only Al-Hassan’s data, but also data I have collected from the last two appointment cycles (2009 and 2013) following the same method:19

Table 3 Size of Ministerial Position Per Region in Saudi Arabia, 2016

Najd Hejaz Al-Hasa Southern Northern (Central (Western (Eastern Region Region Region) Region) Region)

% of Total Population 32.2% 30.2% 15.5% 18.8% 3.3% Number of Members 27 2 0 1 0 (out of 30) % of 30 Members 90% 6.67% 0% 3.33% 0

19 From the members’ cvs at http://www.shura.gov.sa/wps/wcm/connect/ShuraEn/ internet/cv/ accessed August 10, 2016.

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Table 4 Regional Origin of the Members of the Consultative Council

Consultative No. of Najd Hejaz Al-Hasa Southern Northern Council Members (Central (Western (Eastern Region Region Region) Region) Region)

1992 60 33 18 5 2 2 55% 30% 8.33% 3.33% 3.3% 1996 90 48 28 6 5 3 53.3% 31.1% 6.7% 5.6% 3.3% 2004 120 59 38 6 9 8 49.16% 31.67% 5% 7.5% 6.67% 2005 150 72 45 9 18 6 48% 30% 6% 12% 4% 2009a 150 70 45 9 17 9 46.64 % 30% 6% 11.3% 6% 2013b 150 67 37 14 23 9 44.66% 24.66% 9.33 15.33% 6% % of total population 32.2% 30.2% 15.5% 18.8% 3.3%

a From the members’ cvs in http://www.shura.gov.sa/wps/wcm/connect/ShuraEn/internet/ cv/ access 9 November, 2009. b From the members’ cvs in http://www.shura.gov.sa/wps/wcm/connect/shuraarabic/internet/ cv access 15 December, 2013.

Even though this council is no more than a consultative institution with limited power, it is a symbol of representation of social prestige, as these individuals are positioned to have strong relationships with decision makers at the state level, which strengthen the members’ immediate social circles. There are several Saudi institutions that are completely controlled by theocrats. These include: the Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Da’wah [preaching] and Guidance; the Ministry of Justice; and the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice—the so-called “religious police.” In addition, there are three Islamic universities located in Riyadh, Mec- ca, and Madinah controlled by theocrats. Moreover, theocrats have controlled female education ever since King Faisal convinced the religious clerics that female schools would not westernize these Muslim women, but still established females’ education under the theocrats’ rule. In practical terms, Wahhabi clerics limit their authority to religious teach- ing and jurisprudence, and leave the political authority to the King and his deputies; the clerics may engage in such authority only if the King asks for

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294 Alrebh their intervention in some matter.20 For example, in 1990 when the Head of the Council of Senior Scholars [the highest formal clergy institution at that time] Abdul-Aziz Bin Baz issued a fatwa [religious edict] proclaiming there was no problem with the non-Muslim military participating in the Gulf War, this pos- ited the formal religious institution against the younger, more fanatical Wah- habi clerics (Al-Rasheed, 2005; Moderchai, 1993). In addition, Najdi-Wahhabis control such vital Ministries as Interior, For- eign Affairs, Defense, Municipal and Rural Affairs, Finance, Health, Education, and Higher Education. Furthermore, the Prime Minister of the country is the King himself, the First Deputy is the Crown Prince, and if there is a Second Deputy, he should be a sovereign Minister such as the Minister of Interior, all Ibn Saud’s sons or grandsons. Najdi-Wahhabis are the driving force behind the bureaucratic device of the state. The aforementioned leads to the conclusion that the Saudi bureaucratic system does not illustrate a bureaucratic order based on what Weber called ‘the rational-legal authority,’ though the structure may look somehow close to a Western bureaucracy. Yet the Saudi bureaucratic system supports the King- dom’s traditional authority by asserting its dependency on individuals who mostly come from the same Najdi-Wahhabi background. This is obvious from the power circles the King and senior princes have around themselves (see Al- Rasheed, 2005: 199–208). Each of the royal senior members surrounds himself with a group of loyal adherents who come from Najdi-Wahhabi noble families under the title of a national institution. Examples include the Internal Security Forces (controlled by Prince Abdulaziz bin Saud Al Saud who succeeded his uncle—the former Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Naif who succeed his father in both positions which keeps the ministry within Naif dynasty), the Saudi Army (controlled by Mohammed Bin Salman who succeeded his father in the ministry in 2015, and appointed as the Crown Prince in 2017), and the National Guard (controlled by former King Abdullah’s sons). Combined, these institutions include hundreds of thousands of employees, most of whom are soldiers, ruled by a single family. Indeed, the Saudi bureaucracy remains reliant on the personalities of certain leading members of the royal family and is far from what Weber believed to be a typical bureaucracy. At this point, we can see

20 Indeed, there are some activities supported by the royal family are opposed by clergy, such as soccer and music. However, these are no more than minor things would not cast doubt the legitimacy of the king. Sunnis –including Wahhabis–believe in the stability of Muslim nations under a single strong ruler, regardless of his level of religiosity. As long as he does not deny any principles of Islam, all Muslims—including the clergy—must obey him (Alrebh, 2017).

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A Wahhabi Ethic in Saudi Arabia 295 the Najdi-Wahhabi elite—who do not hold high bureaucratic positions— can play the role of “broker” between individuals and institutions with state- officials using their kinship (c.f., Hertog, 2011:21–36). However, religion still plays a vital role in the Saudi political realm, in contrast to the more secular Western realm. In the following section, I will focus on theocratic and secular forms in the West and Middle East.

The Secularism of Protestantism vs. the Theocracy of Wahhabism

In the West, Protestants, especially those in the United States, accepted a secular economic worldview as early as the 18th century. As Kalberg (2009: 177) notes, “the Protestant ethic begin to lose its specifically religious foundation in many regions of the United States as early as the mid-eighteenth century.” Thus the religious basis for economic accumulation died away long ago. In the West, there is a strong relationship between democracy and capitalism, since capi- talist economies developed along with the process of democracy and political participation (Alford and Friedland, 1985). Capitalism encourages economic competition among individuals and decreases the state’s role in the market. Democracy is based on open political competition, just as capitalism ostensi- bly operates through open economic competition (Khan, 2003: 167–8). Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia, conversely, still insist on a theocratic ideal through emphasizing Ibn Saud’s decision in 1932 to make the Quran the nation’s constitution, and to make Islamic law (Sharia) supreme (Habib, 2009: 67). In Saudi Arabia, the circumstances of establishing the state required both religious legitimacy and military force to control the territories. During the early Wahhabi period beginning in the 18th century, religion was the supreme source of knowledge in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the only source of education and law, so every social-political expression needed to be articulat- ed through religious terms (see al-Dakhil, 2009: 34). In the early 20th century, when Ibn Saud started building his state, the Arabian Peninsula was ruled by different families controlling limited territories and followed patriarchal systems (Lacey, 1981; Menoret, 2005). Thus, the only way to gain power in Arabia during that period was through military force. Such patriarchal rule provides an illustration of the traditional authority. Just as Saudi families followed the patriarchal system with the father of the family as the highest authority, at the top of the national patriarchal hierarchy were the male Saudi rulers (Federal Research Division, 2004). In the case of the Saudi state, the King is the father. His Islamic title is wali-almr , which literally means the guardian with authority over his dependents (Alrebh,

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2017). In Islamic literature, it is normal for the father to control the economic functions of his family —or in the case of a state, its citizens—and manage the sources of pr oduction and distribution. Saudi Arabia is a rentier-economy state. The state owns and controls the natural resources and provides public services such as education, health care, and so on (Niblock and Malik, 2007). In addition, Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy (Mackey, 2002; Brown, 2008) which gives the King and his circle full authority to control the enormous wealth coming from oil, helping to keep political power connected to economic power for the Saudi elite, and isolated from attempts at democratization. As Anderson (2001: 54) has stated:

Those that are rich, on the other hand, are so because of oil, which is controlled by the state and hence enhances the power of the state in general and of the bureaucracy in particular. Saudi Arabia and some of the smaller Arab oil-rich Gulf countries have from time to time made some modest gestures toward the introduction of democratic institutions, but these have not gone far and have often been reversed.

This is the opposite of the political rise of Protestantism in the West, where economic power paved the way for political influence. As indicated above, both Calvinist and Wahhabi religious traditions em- ployed unique methods to expand their authority and influence. They both illustrate rationalist modes in that the social-political climate was used in such a way as to place them on the top of the hierarchy. The cultural hegemony of these groups was then legitimized through religious doctrine, interpreted to meet the needs of the group in power. To understand the Parallel between the Calvinist and Wahhabi ethics, it is worth to note the paradigms and circumstances of the development of these ethical models. Using Averroes’ argument regarding the relationship between the rulers and their masses, al-Jabiri compares the classical European paradigm with the Arabs paradigm. In the Europe, ‘money is useful for authority,’ as it puts the authority the position of the nobles with vassals “citizens/masses.” Contrarily, in the Arab model ‘authority is useful for money,’ as it let the states- man to generate wealth as part of their privilege of controlling the sources and masses (al-Jabiri, 2005: 217–218). al-Jabiry supports Ibn Khaldun’s argument of the importance of flattery of the statesmen in order to move to the upper social class/status (2005, 1377). At this point, I would argue that Wahhabism could not survive as a significant political power without its ties to state control, leading to economic resources. For example, after losing their Saudi and American support, the

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Taliban in Afghanistan (inspired by Wahhabism) were forced to find economic sources—such as opium production and arms dealing—to generate economic wealth (Rubin, 2000), despite the illegality and immorality of such enterprises.21

Conclusion

This paper incorporated Weberian insights about religion, power, and authority in order to explain the rise and continuation of Wahhabi power in Saudi Arabia. An examination was made of commonalities and differences between Calvinist Protestant Christianity and Wahhabi Sunni Islam, especially with respect to power relations based on their respective ethical systems. While the paths to power differed remarkably, both religious traditions have helped shape the structures of authority in question, with believers gaining social, political, and economic influence. That is, Calvinist Protestantism moved from economic wealth to gain political power, while Wahhabism started from political-military power to gain economic wealth. It was argued that the reason behind this is related to the type of authority structure operative in each case. In the Western world of the 17th century, economy was the vehicle for the establishment of hegemonic political influence, and the Calvinism-inspired individualist religious ethic provided ideological support for rationalist economic behavior. By contrast, in the early 20th century Middle East, building a powerful military was the vehicle to gain political control, which inexora- bly led to reaping economic benefits. The Saudi elite then pursued hegemony through building a system of bureaucracy asserting their authority and keeping decision-making in a tight circle of Najdi-Wahhabi elites. Finally, there is a principle difference between the two religious systems regarding the legitimation of power. Although Wahhabism insist on furthering

21 It is worth noting the cooperation between Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia and the Afghanis and American agendas against communism (e.g., Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan) in the 1980s. Saudi Arabia was one of main players in the “Reagan Doctrine” which attempted to cut off the global influence of the Soviet Union and its communist alliances during the final years of the Cold War in the 1980s. Both nations supported the Mujahe- deen against the Soviet military (Simpson, 2006). For Wahhabis, communists are enemies because they represent al-ilhad [Atheism] in terms of Islamic beliefs. For Americans, communists are enemies because they represent a competing model to the spirit of capitalism. In the 1980s, the interests of both power groups converged, and once the Soviet threat was defeated, there was a sea change in the relationships between the U.S. Saudi Arabia, and Afghanis.

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298 Alrebh theocratic thinking, ascetic Protestantism plays a minimal role in today’s in- creasingly secularized Western democracies. Nevertheless, in both cases a religious ethic played a significant role in structuring economic and political relations in their respective social systems.

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