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‘An Imperfect Peace’: Paramilitary ‘Punishments’ in Northern Ireland

Monaghan, R.

Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University’s Repository

Original citation & hyperlink: Monaghan, R 2004, '‘An Imperfect Peace’: Paramilitary ‘Punishments’ in Northern Ireland' Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 439-461. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550490509775

DOI 10.1080/09546550490509775 ISSN 0954-6553 ESSN 1556-1836

Publisher: Taylor and Francis

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Terrorism and Political Violence in 2004, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09546550490509775

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‘An Imperfect Peace’: Paramilitary ‘Punishments’ in Northern Ireland

Rachel Monaghan

Abstract

Since the beginning of the Troubles alternative forms of justice have emerged in

many working class areas of Northern Ireland. Such justice operates outside the

formal state system and is undertaken by paramilitaries. This article explores

the nature of this informal justice including an identification of activities liable

for ‘punishment’, the procedures involved and the types of ‘punishment’ meted

out. Moreover, this article examines the pattern of paramilitary ‘punishments’

in the pre- and post- cease-fire periods.

Introduction

Informal justice and policing mechanisms have developed in both Catholic and

Protestant working class communities from the early days of the Troubles albeit for different reasons. In Catholic areas Citizen Defence Committees (CDCs) were established and provide the earliest example of organized activities. Their primary aim was to protect Catholic enclaves from loyalist attacks. To this end they erected and supervised barricades and mounted foot and car patrols.1 With the introduction of internment without trial, the Catholic Ex-Servicemen’s Association2 supplemented the activities of the CDCs in Belfast and supervised the barricades in places such as

Ballymurphy.3 In the nationalist areas of the Bogside, Brandywell and Creggan in Derry

the local defense association established its own ‘police force’ to deal with petty crime.

The ‘punishment’ meted out usually took the form of a stern lecture regarding the need for solidarity in the area.4 In the early 1970s for a brief period, a Free Derry Police with its own chief of police (a former international soccer player who had given up his career to undertake the position) operated independently of republican paramilitaries.5

Since the early 1970s loyalist paramilitaries have also assumed a policing role in the communities in which they operate. Indeed, the largest loyalist paramilitary group, the

Ulster Defence Association (UDA) established in 1971 following the amalgamation of

Protestant vigilante groups/defense associations in Belfast adopted as its motto Codenta

Arma Togae, meaning law before violence and sought ‘to see law restored everywhere, including the no-go areas’ of nationalist Belfast.6 The UDA assumed the role of area defenders against attacks from Catholics and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), mounted roadblocks, patrolled the streets and gathered evidence against petty criminals. The

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)7 also adopted a policing role. For example, it established a special patrol group in the Shankill area of Belfast. If an individual was caught by the patrol they were either warned to stay out of trouble or handed over to the police. Patrols by paramilitaries were not designed to usurp the police, the Royal Ulster Constabulary

(RUC) but to assist them. Paramilitaries reserved the right to mete out their own form of justice if the police and courts did not adequately deal with offenders.

Activities liable for ‘punishment’

The informal justice of the paramilitaries in Northern Ireland is in part a response to community pressure for the organizations ‘to do something’ about crime in their areas.

For example, in the autumn of 1970, the IRA launched a purge against ‘anti-social’

elements in the Ballymurphy area of Belfast. Those targeted included alleged local criminals, two of which were shot dead, minor drug abusers, teenage girls suspected of fraternizing with British soldiers and anyone believed to be connected to, or having sympathy with the British state.8 Thus activities liable for ‘punishment’ can be divided into two main categories, ‘normal’ and ‘political’ crime. ‘Normal’ crime would include vandalism, car theft, joyriding, muggings, the selling of alcohol to minors, rape and drug dealing. Offences of a sexual nature attract harsh ‘punishments’ and those punished are usually shot or badly beaten. In one case, an ex-Presbyterian minister given a warning by the police for possession of an illegal homosexual pornographic video, died from injuries sustained from a UVF ‘punishment’ beating. ‘Normal’ crime also encompasses ‘anti-social behavior’. Activities considered ‘anti-social’ by the paramilitaries are diverse in nature and range from youths gathering at street corners, the playing of music too loudly, the verbal abuse of senior citizens, the dumping of trash and fighting with their volunteers or members. As one ‘punishment’ victim explains,

I was never involved in any paramilitaries, no. I had a bit of an argument with

one, he lifted his hand to hit me and because I was able to beat him he went and

told them that I picked on him and blattered him. The law of the land was “you

do not touch our members”.9

In contrast, ‘political’ crime would include informing, misuse of the organization’s name, collaborating or fraternizing with the ‘enemy’. Therefore, the decision by paramilitaries to assume a policing role is also based in part upon a need for the organizations’ to ensure their own security and survival. As Burton notes within

nationalist areas, ‘informing is particularly threatening. It attacks the fabric of the community in its capitalization on what cannot be controlled, the public nature of knowledge…Systematic informing would rip the district apart and smash its tentative organizations laying it open for a Protestant or British Army takeover’.10 Subsequently, individuals suspected of informing or ‘touting’ have been dealt with by the paramilitaries. For example, the Red Hand Commando shot dead Michael Anderson in

October 1992, who they allege had been a police informer. A claim denied by the police at Anderson’s inquest. In nationalist areas, a variety of ‘punishments’ have been undertaken against informers including the shaving of hair of female teenager ‘touts’, kneecappings and exiling.11

Not only do paramilitaries take action against alleged criminals but they also punish their own members for disobeying orders or breaching internal codes. ‘Punishments’ range from a beating for leaving a gun out of an armory to being shot for ‘bringing the movement into disgrace’; this would include self-gain robberies or misusing the organization’s name. To this end within the IRA an internal police force known as the

‘Nutting Squad’ was established to deal with matters concerning IRA Volunteers.12 For many loyalist groups, drug dealing is seen as an acceptable way to raise funds although the leaders of the main loyalist paramilitaries publicly deny this. Silke suggests that the vast majority of internal ‘punishments’ by loyalist paramilitaries involves money, for example swindling, skimming funds from the group, payment of misappropriate ‘cuts’ or self-gain robberies.13 Within both republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations, members suspected of informing are usually executed. For example, in November 1981 the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) shot dead Arthur Bettice a UDA member at his home in the Shankill.14 As a former IRA Volunteer explains, the ‘Nutting Squad’ ‘are

the ones who put a hood over the heads of informers before “nutting” them with a shot in the head and leaving their bodies at border crossings’.15

Some paramilitary members join the organization to avoid being ‘punished’ either by the group they joined or by a rival grouping. One interviewee subjected to a

‘punishment’ attack by one loyalist paramilitary group joined another group as it ‘sort of offered me protection from these other guys’.16 Throughout the Troubles both republican and loyalist paramilitaries have taken action against other paramilitary groups within their respective communities. In the 1970s, the IRA launched purges against the Official IRA17 in some parts of Belfast and in October 1992 took action against the Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO).18 The IPLO had a history of criminal activities including a gang rape of a woman in the Divis flats complex and involvement in the growing drug trade. The IRA’s action resulted in the execution of one IPLO member and the shooting of a further 20 members with assault rifles in

Belfast.19 The IPLO disbanded shortly after this.

Feuds between the rival loyalist paramilitary groups are nothing new as Bruce notes,

‘like any two competing organizations, the UDA and UVF have rarely been on good terms for long’.20 In the early 1970s disagreements were limited to fist fights but in

March 1975 this escalated into a more violent feud in Belfast resulting in bomb attacks against the homes of both UDA and UVF men.21 More recently, a feud linked to a drugs and turf war developed between the UDA/UFF and the UVF on the Shankill and spread to other areas of Northern Ireland including Ballymena, Carrickfergus and Coleraine.22

Seven men lost their lives in the feud that lasted from July until December 2000 and unlike the 1975 feud, women and children were endangered. Indeed, an 11-year-old girl

was shot in the back in Coleraine and more than 281 households in the Shankill area approached the Housing Executive23 for assistance after being forcibly evicted from their homes or decided to leave, in fear of intimidation.24 British soldiers were re- deployed in the areas affected by the feud.

Thus, paramilitaries mete out ‘punishment’ to individuals involved in crime and/or

‘anti-social’ activities, to members of their own grouping and to members of rival groupings as a result of feuds. In addition the threat of ‘punishment’ has been used as a method of press-ganging new recruits, especially within loyalist areas.25

The ‘punishment’ procedure

Both republican and loyalist paramilitaries assert that their ‘punishments’ are a response to community pressure. Incidents can be brought directly to the paramilitary organization or they become aware of an incident themselves. As one ‘punishment’ victim explains,

There’s people out there doing them, there’s people out there want them done,

the people’s not going to the RUC because they’re writing it on a bit of paper

and when you walk out of there they’re more or less throwing it away. The likes

of them people there over the weekend who have stuff stolen on them, the

RUC’s not going to get back to them. If anybody’s going to get it back to them

it’s the other boys who’ll get [it] back to them. That’s why they go there. They

want to see these people either punished or put out of the area because they

don’t want it. 26

Paramilitaries insist that individuals are only punished once an investigation has been undertaken. Initially within the IRA, a special unit was established for dealing with crime and the republican youth movement, Na Fianna Éireann, undertook early policing activities.27 In 1975, informal justice was taken out of the hands of the IRA field commanders and moved to the control of the emerging Sinn Féin.28 According to Joe

Austin, a Sinn Féin councilor for north Belfast, once a crime or incident of ‘anti-social behavior’ has been reported to Sinn Féin and the details recorded, an investigation would be launched. Following this investigation, if an offender had been identified, they would be brought before the Civil Administration Officers dealing with the case and allowed to defend themselves, although in practice this did not always happen due to limited resources and demands upon the system. A further decision would then be taken as to whether a warning should be issued or if the case should be passed to the

IRA for them to carry out a ‘punishment’.29 If the offenders were not known, then a warning would often be placed in local newsletters, the republican press and sometimes via a leaflet drop in the area. With the adoption by the IRA of a cellular structure, an

IRA Auxiliary made up of former prisoners, low-caliber members and new recruits took over responsibility for ‘punishments’. Other IRA members regard them with distaste:

‘They’re…the dregs of the organization, people who aren’t any good at anything else but beating people up’.30 In contrast, very little is known about specific loyalist informal justice mechanisms but it is believed that loyalist paramilitaries employ their Active

Service Units to investigate both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ indiscipline within the communities in which they operate.31

Over the years, a graduated scale or tariff system consistent with the seriousness of the offence under consideration has developed. This tariff ranges from warnings, threats,

curfew, fines or restitution, placarding, tarring and feathering, beatings, shootings, exiling and ultimately death.32 Paramilitaries can order people out of a local area, city,

Northern Ireland or Ireland. The exiling or expulsion of alleged criminals can vary in time from six months to a year and so on. In some cases, people are ordered out indefinitely. Expulsion orders are usually accompanied by both a leeway period of between 24 and 48 hours and an ‘or else’. Such orders are attractive to paramilitaries as they remove undesirable elements from the community and are less brutal than other forms of ‘punishments’. Males, females, youngsters under 16 and, in some instances, whole families have been exiled.

The ‘punishment’ ordered in theory would be influenced by mitigating factors such as age, gender, past criminal record and family background particularly those from a strong republican or loyalist tradition. In cases involving children, the parents of those involved would be approached and requested to exercise greater parental control.33 In some cases those due to be punished are told to turn up at a certain time and place in order to receive their ‘punishment’. Failure to do so often results in a harsher

‘punishment’. In practice, however, the level of ‘punishment’ can be arbitrarily brutal or lenient, depending upon whether the offender was ‘connected’ in some way to known paramilitaries or influential members of the republican or loyalist movement. As one

‘punishment’ victim explains, ‘There’s one rule for one and another rule for another.

See if your da[d]’s in the [I]RA, you’re sweet, you get away with everything. See if your uncle’s in the RA you get away with so much and then they just beat you. See if you’ve nobody in the RA you’re fucked!’34

Beatings administered vary and can be inflicted by either the Volunteers’ own fists and feet and/or the use of an implement. Implements used include baseball bats with and without nails in them, hurley sticks, pickaxe handles, iron bars, hammers and sledgehammers. Those beaten may be tied upright to fence railings thereby leaving them unable to shield themselves. Individuals have also had breezeblocks dropped onto their limbs. Also not all ‘punishment’ shootings are the same, a gunshot wound to the fleshy part of the thigh heals relatively quickly compared to injuries to the bone which can lead to permanent maiming. The seriousness of the crime will affect the number of times an individual is shot, the caliber of weapon used and the proximity of the wound to the joints.35

Both republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations’ assert that individuals subjected to ‘punishments’ are both investigated and warned about their behavior prior to the use of physical ‘punishments’. Interviews with individuals ‘punished’ found this not to be the case. As interviewees explain,

They don’t go and investigate nothing like. If they hear something or if they

just don’t like you, they’ll do you anyway. That’s all anybody expects from

them. They don’t investigate, no nothing like [that].

two car loads came and got me and took me away and they stabbed me, left me

with thirty-six stitches in the stomach, and told me to come back at seven

o’clock [for a beating]…In fact when they took me away I thought I was just

going away to be questioned because I hadn’t done anything.36

As already noted, individuals suspected of informing are dealt with the severest with their ‘punishment’ dependent on the type of information passed to the security forces.

Both republican and loyalist paramilitaries have offered time-specific amnesties to those within their respective communities or organization members providing information to the security forces. IRA Volunteers suspected of informing are investigated and brought before a ‘jury of their peers’ for interrogation and if found guilty, sentenced accordingly. IRA statements reported in An Phoblacht carry details of such trials:

The Irish Republican Army has accepted responsibility for the

execution last Friday, March 5th, of former IRA Volunteer Seamus

Morgan…[who] admitted to agreeing to act as an informer…he was

court martialled by a jury of his peers – comrades of equal rank – found

guilty and executed for treachery.

The Belfast Brigade of the IRA claims responsibility for the execution

of Patrick Murray from the Short Strand area…as an IRA Volunteer,

[he] was fully aware of his right to be tried by a jury made up of his

peers who could not pass a sentence of execution unless the

evidence…against him was substantiated and proven…Murray

admitted his role as an informer.37

Similarly, loyalist paramilitaries have executed their own members for informing following investigations. Coverage of UFF actions reported in New Ulster Defender are illustrative of this:

Edward ‘Ned’ McCreery, a former UDA commander was shot dead outside his

home…by a lone member of the UFF. In a statement admitting responsibility

for the killing the UFF said that he had been executed by its Special Assignment

Section after an investigation [into] his activities. The statement said that

McCreery had colluded with both the Special Branch [of the police] and “the

enemies of Ulster”.38

Individuals have also been punished as a result of mistaken identity. For example, John

Brown a 79-year-old man was mistakenly identified as a pedophile and shot in both knees and ankles. In some cases, the organization involved has publicly apologized to the person concerned. The IRA has in the past placed apologies in the local republican press including An Phoblacht/Republican News and the Anderstown News.39

As noted already, the type of ‘punishment’ meted out would (in theory) be based in part upon the individual’s age, gender and so on. Republican paramilitaries such as the IRA appear to have been reluctant to shoot women and those found ‘touting’ and/or fraternizing with the ‘enemy’ were often tarred and feathered or had their heads shaved.40 Burton suggests that tarring and feathering represents an expulsion ritual in that the punished individual knows that they are to leave the area.41 It has been suggested that within the nationalist community there existed a reluctance ‘to accept wounding as a legitimate form of punishment for female offenders’.42 The

‘disappearance’ of Jean McConville by the IRA in December 1972 from her home in

Belfast’s Divis flats is contrary to this and may explain why her body has only recently been recovered (August 2003). The IRA contends that Mrs McConville admitted to

being an Army informer, a claim strongly contested by relatives.43 Due to a relative lack of detailed information about specific loyalist informal justice mechanisms, it is unclear whether groups like the UVF or UDA have ever developed specific policies towards the punishing of females. According to available police statistics, only 2 women have received a ‘punishment’ shooting between 1990 and 2001 with a further

36 having been beaten between 1989-2001. A victim of a ‘punishment’ beating explained that on his housing estate the UDA as a rule do not physically punish females:

‘They don’t beat girls…If you’re a girl you’re all right’.44 In contrast to this is the death of Donna Wilson in November 1992, who was attacked by at least six men with baseball bats in her home in south Belfast following a complaint by a neighbor regarding noise from her flat. The neighbor received a two year suspended sentence from Belfast Crown

Court for calling in a gang to beat the woman.45

Initially, youngsters under the age of 16 would not usually receive a ‘punishment’ shooting or beating. As an anonymous youth worker explains,

the rule is that the Provos don’t “punish” – that is, don’t shoot or

severely beat – kids under sixteen. Some of our younger kids have been

“branded” – that is, made to stand against a lamppost, or outside church

on a Sunday, with a placard around their necks saying, “I am a hood,”

or “I am a joyrider.” It’s the softest option the Provos can take – public

shaming.46

Despite such assertions, according to figures cited by Kennedy, republicans have meted out physical ‘punishments’ to 147 youngsters under the age of 17 (36 ‘punishment’

shootings and 111 beatings) and loyalists 114 (36 shootings and 78 beatings). Of the loyalist ‘punishments’, one shooting and three beatings were to youngsters under the age of 14.47

Other ‘punishments’ used against those ‘too young to be kneecapped’ include curfewing, tar and feathering, being tied up and publicly painted and the punishing of parents. For example, the IRA claimed responsibility for the painting and feathering of

Francis Finnegan (aged 16) for joy-riding and the shooting of a 39-year-old father for

‘repeatedly ignoring IRA warnings to discipline two of his sons who had been involved in persistent acts of anti-social behavior’.48

Patterns of ‘punishment’ before the cease-fires

Police statistics on reported paramilitary ‘punishments’ have been kept in the case of shootings since 1973 and 1982 for beatings. It should be noted that police statistics represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of actual numbers of individuals ‘punished’ as many incidents do not get reported for a variety of reasons including fear of reprisal.

Between 1973 and 1994 there were 1997 recorded ‘punishment’ shootings. Republicans were responsible for 1199 (60 per cent) and loyalists 798 (40 per cent). This can be seen in Figure 1.

The use of shootings as a ‘punishment’ peaked in 1975 with 189 being recorded by the police. Republicans were responsible for 139 of these. While the IRA is not the only republican paramilitary organization to undertake ‘punishments’, it is fair to assume that it is probably responsible for the majority of ‘punishment’ shootings given its size, resources and support and/or control of working class Catholic areas. Silke suggests the peak can be attributed to the IRA cease-fire of 1975. At this time Sinn Féin was attempting to establish itself as a political power in nationalist areas, in addition there were more IRA Volunteers available to mete out ‘punishments’.49 Throughout the period of the Troubles, the IRA has sought alternatives to physical ‘punishments’. This can be observed in the graph above in terms of fluctuations of the number of individuals punished. For example, in 1982 the IRA embarked upon a reconsideration of its policy of ‘punishment’ after acknowledging that shootings did not solve the problem of rising crime.50 A wide-ranging debate occurred within republican circles and in nationalist areas generally as to how to combat crime. Physical action was still taken but against mainly persistent criminals, an identifiable hard-core element. In contrast, the young

hood was to be involved in a process of discussion with the republican movement as to the consequences of their behavior for their victim and larger community. They were spared ‘punishment’ if they made a public commitment to desist from their previous activities and gave a written undertaking to the IRA. If this undertaking was broken then they could expect to be dealt with more severely. By 1984 the crime problem in nationalist areas had increased and letters began appearing in the republican press calling for the IRA to reconsider its policy on hoods which it did so.

Loyalists have also meted out ‘punishment’ shootings albeit less than their republican counterparts. In 1986 an increase in ‘punishment’ shootings can be observed with loyalists undertaking more shootings than republican paramilitary groups for the first time. The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in November 1985 is cited as the reason for this as many loyalists felt betrayed by the British state.51 A policing vacuum began to develop in working class Protestant areas due to the growing mistrust between the communities and the police. The police had also begun to direct counter-terrorism measures against loyalist paramilitaries and to enforce bans on loyalist marches. This situation has been exacerbated by community perceptions of the perceived leniency of the formal criminal justice system, the inability of the police to deal with ordinary crime and the recruitment of petty criminals as informers. For example, in 1989 the West

Belfast Brigade of the UVF shot a convicted sex offender in the legs and elbows and ordered him to leave the area after he received a lenient sentence from the court.

Loyalist ‘punishment’ shootings in the prior to the cease-fires of 1994 peaked at 72 in

1992.

Although beatings occurred in the 1970s they were not reported in the republican and loyalist press in the same way as shootings and police statistics are only available from

1982 onwards. Between 1982 and 1994 there were 619 recorded ‘punishment’ beatings.

Republicans were responsible for 375 of these (60 per cent) and loyalists 244 (40 per cent). This can be seen in Figure 2.

Like ‘punishment’ shootings a number of changes can be observed. Republican

‘punishment’ beatings begin to rise in 1984, the same year as the already noted increase in petty crime in nationalist areas. A 300 per cent rise in the number of loyalist beatings can be seen in 1986, the year following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Thus, it would appear that ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings are linked not only to changing circumstances in the communities in which paramilitaries operate but also to the wider political context.

Furthermore, a shift in policy towards the punishing of women and young people under the age of 16 can also be observed. Both republican and loyalist organizations have physically punished women albeit relatively few. For example, in 1985, the IRA executed alleged informers, Catherine Mahon, her body was found with that of her husbands in an entry in the Turf Lodge area of Belfast and Caroline Moreland in July

1994.52 According to police statistics two females received a ‘punishment’ shooting in the period between 1990 and 1994 and both of these were attributed to loyalist paramilitaries. For the period between 1989 and 2000, 12 females received

‘punishment’ beatings – four from republicans and eight from loyalists. The police are unable to provide a gender breakdown of victims prior to 1989.

Police statistics on age of victim record five bands of ages: under 20; 20-29; 30-39; 40-

49; and over 50. Thus data on individuals subject to paramilitary ‘punishments’ under the age of 16 is difficult to ascertain. Having said this, Human Rights Watch cite one loyalist shooting and five republican beatings of young people aged under 17 in 1991.

They also quote an anonymous youth training director,

There has been a long list of these beatings and kneecappings over the years.

Now our sixteen- and seventeen-year-old kids are being put out of the area. Just

recently two kids knocked on my door at 7:00 a.m. and said they had to get out

of the area. They knew if they stayed around they would be kneecapped.53

Reports also appear in the republican press. For example, the Andersonstown News report that the IRA admitted responsibility for the ‘punishment’ beating of a 16-year- old youth in Twinbrook who they labeled as a ‘persistent joyrider’. The same paper also prints a letter from the mother of another 16-year-old who was shot four times in both knees and ankles.54 Thus a shift towards the physical ‘punishment’ of youths under the age of 16 can be observed.

Patterns of ‘punishment’ after the cease-fires

On 31 August 1994, the IRA declared ‘a complete cessation of military operations’, with the main loyalist paramilitary organizations (UDA/UFF and UVF/Red Hand

Commando [RHC]) following suit in October of the same year. With the introduction of these cease-fires, it was hoped that the use of violence by paramilitaries would cease.

Although the use of ‘punishment’ shootings declined to an all-time low in 1995 (3),

‘punishment’ beatings increased by over 300 per cent from 70 in 1994 to 217 in 1995.

As Winston notes this “change came about as a result of the cease-fire emphasis on removing the gun from the political picture.”55 Both republican and loyalist paramilitaries have tried to deflect criticism from their political representatives regarding the maintenance of their cease-fires and have increasingly resorted to

“punishment” beatings as opposed to shootings. This can be seen in Figures 3 and 4.

The highest level of ‘punishment’ beatings (302) recorded by the police was in 1996.

Of these, 172 were attributed to republican paramilitaries. This sharp increase coincided with the IRA ending its cease-fire with the Canary Wharf bombing on the 9 February

1996; the cease-fire was restored on the 19 July 1997. Republican beatings declined to

78 in the following year. In addition, republican shootings also increased in this period from 3 in 1996 to 26 in 1997.

Under the terms of inclusion in the multi-party talks which culminated in the Belfast

Agreement (April 1998), political parties were required to affirm their commitment to six fundamental principles (the Mitchell Principles) of democracy and non-violence.56

The sixth principle urges that “punishment” killings and beatings cease and political parties take effective steps to prevent such actions. This, however, did not occur and

‘punishment’ shootings remained static for the year 1999. ‘Punishment’ shootings attributed to republicans did decrease, but loyalists undertook more such attacks.

Loyalist beatings remain unchanged in 1999, while the number of republican beatings also decreased.

In recent years, an increase in shootings can be observed. In the year 2000, recorded numbers of ‘punishment’ shootings (136) exceeded the number of beatings (132). This trend continues. In part, this increase can be explained by the failure of Northern Ireland

Secretaries of State to rule that ‘punishment’ shootings and indeed beatings constitute a breach of the cease fires. On the republican side, the IRA have also been linked to the execution of at least 11 drug dealers since 1994, which have been claimed by a group calling itself Direct Action Against Drugs. Furthermore, in August 1999, they were directly implicated in the murder of Charles Bennett, a suspected informer. The then

Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam ruled that while the IRA had breached its cease-fire, the cessation as a whole had not broken down and no sanctions were taken against Sinn Féin. In addition, there are a number of loyalist and republican paramilitary groups that are not on cease-fire. On the loyalist side, such groups would include the

Orange Volunteers and the Red Hand Defenders and on the republican side, the Real

IRA and the Continuity IRA. All of these groups may be undertaking ‘punishment’ attacks. Media reports confirm this; for example, the Continuity IRA claimed responsibility for a ‘punishment’ beating and the exiling of a drug dealer. In addition, the Chief Constable has publicly stated that both the UDA and IRA, although on cease- fire have engaged in ‘punishment’ attacks: ‘I have attributed over 50 punishment beatings and shootings to the UDA and I would probably put a similar number on those sorts of crimes committed by the Provisional IRA’.57

In terms of the ‘punishment’ of young persons under the age of 16, these have continued and media reports of such incidents have become more frequent. For example, in

January 2004, a 14-year old boy was kidnapped and shot in the leg in north Belfast. The

Irish Nationalist Liberation Army58 (INLA) is being linked to this specific attack and

to an attack the previous April, whereby two youths aged 14 and 15 were taken from their homes, chained to a lamppost and then had tar, paint and oil poured over them.59

Loyalist paramilitaries have also punished young people under the age of 16. In April

2003, a 15-year-old boy was shot in both legs in Newtownards and in June of the previous year, another 15-year-old was targeted in the same area and received a

‘punishment’ beating. Such media coverage is also supported by academic research.

According to Kennedy, there were 19 ‘punishment’ shootings and 22 beatings of children60 in 2002. Furthermore, attacks on children represented 12.5 per cent of all victims of republican ‘punishment’ shootings and 26 per cent of all victims of republican ‘punishment’ beatings – the corresponding ratio for loyalists was 10 per cent for both types of ‘punishment’. Kennedy also contends that,

Whatever way one looks at paramilitary child abuse in 2002, be it in

terms of the absolute numbers “punished”, or relative to the share of

victims of all ages, or relative to their respective shares in the overall

population, children from a Nationalist background were at greater risk

than those from Unionist communities. The principal agency for the

organized abuse of Nationalist children is the IRA. The principal

agencies for the organized abuse of loyalist children are the UDA, the

UVF and the LVF [Loyalist Volunteer Force].61

In some instances, those ‘punished’ receive more than one beating through the course of their teenage years as the following case illustrates:

I was about thirteen or fourteen, I got the first beating…masked men

came round but they only hit us a couple of times in the arms and that

was it, and then the next time was about fifteen. They just beat us again.

It was a wee easy beating, it wasn’t hard, and then the last time was

March…I got black eyes and they beat us all about, beat us about the

legs and all. And then it happened…again, broke my nose, broke my

arm and I was beat with hammers and all, all over my body and I had

staples in…my head.62

Paramilitary ‘punishments’ and the peace process

Although many of the main paramilitary groups are on cease-fire and their political affiliates have pledged themselves to the Mitchell Principles of nonviolence and democracy, 895 ‘punishment’ shootings and 1,512 beatings have been recorded by the police between 1995 and 2003. Such shootings and beatings are a clear breach of the

Mitchell Principles but repeated Northern Ireland Secretaries of State have been reluctant to take action either against the paramilitary organizations committing these attacks or their political representatives. It is worth noting that the only time political parties were excluded from the peace talks (while the cease fires were in place) was following paramilitary murders of members of the ‘other’ community.63 Mo Mowlam, when she was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, asserted that, ‘there is no ‘‘firm evidence’’ to link punishment beatings in the north with any of the paramilitary organizations benefiting from the accelerated prisoner release scheme’.64 Attempts were made by Conservative opposition members to halt the early release of ‘political’ prisoners in light of continuing and increasing numbers of ‘punishment’ attacks. The attempt failed given the significance of prisoner releases to loyalists and republicans and the potential effect this would have had on the Belfast Agreement. Even the murder of Charles Bennett by the IRA in July 1999 did not result in sanctions. Indeed, the

Secretary of State (Mo Mowlam) in her ruling of whether or not the IRA had breached

its cease fire, while acknowledging the involvement of the IRA in Bennett’s death, declined to rule that the organization was no longer on cease fire. She further stated that

‘the peace we have now is imperfect, but better than none’.65

At key points in the peace process, paramilitary ‘punishments’ have declined or ceased all together for political expediency. Chief Superintendent Brian McCargo explains, ‘I have no doubt in my mind that the politicians linked to these paramilitaries know exactly what is going on in their areas and could take action to have it stopped’.66 Local politician Alban Maginness of the Social Democratic and Labour Party asserts that

‘IRA beatings and attacks are centrally controlled and that they are now an embarrassment and a political obstacle to Republicans’.67 For example, there was a cessation of ‘punishments’ during President Clinton’s visits to Northern Ireland and the

Mitchell review of the Good Friday Agreement in 1999 and is especially true of republican ‘punishments’. Following 9/11, a reduction in republican ‘punishments’ can be observed. Police figures attribute two shootings and three beatings per month to republicans in October and November 2001. McCaffrey and O’Neill suggest that the last mainstream republican ‘punishment’ was of two teenagers shot in West Belfast on

September 11 and that subsequent ‘punishments’ were undertaken by dissidents.

Continued paramilitary activity including ‘punishments’ continues to raise further questions regarding the condition of organizations’ cease-fires. Indeed, in October

2001, Dr John Reid, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, specified the UDA,

UFF and LVF.68 This means that the British government no longer considers the groups to be on cease-fire. Subsequently, early released prisoners associated with such groups can have their licenses suspended and returned to jail if there is evidence that they have

engaged in paramilitary activity. For example, the UFF’s Johnny Adair was returned to prison in January 2003 on the orders of the current Secretary of State, Paul Murphy, following Adair’s involvement in directing terrorism, money laundering, drug dealing and extortion rackets.

More recently, the alleged abduction of dissident republican Bobby Tohill in February

2004 from a bar in Belfast’s city center has again brought into question the IRA’s commitment to its cease fire. Tohill was badly beaten and needed 98 stitches. Four men arrested in connection with the incident were originally charged with causing grievous bodily harm, unlawful imprisonment, the possession of articles that could be of use to terrorists and membership of a proscribed organization.69 The latter charge has since been dropped. The Chief Constable has publicly stated that he believes the IRA were behind the attack and David Trimble has pulled the Ulster Unionist Party out of the current Good Friday review talks. The incident is being examined by the International

Monitoring Commission, which is tasked with monitoring and reporting on the incidence of alleged paramilitary activity and their report was expected in April/May

2004.

As noted earlier, within the republican movement some senior paramilitary figures are not exactly enthusiastic about meting out ‘punishments’ and cite pressure from the communities that support them to assume a policing role. This is also true of loyalist organizations. To this end within both loyalist and republican working-class communities, non-violent alternatives to paramilitary ‘punishments’ have developed.

On the loyalist side, notably in the Shankill, the Greater Shankill Alternatives Project supported by the local UVF and the RHC has been established. Within republican areas,

Community Restorative Justice (CRJ) initiatives have been set up in eight areas within

Northern Ireland and have support of the IRA. Such initiatives deal with a range of issues including petty crime and ‘anti-social behavior’. But despite their operation, paramilitary ‘punishments’ continue to occur.

Conclusion

The informal justice systems established and developed throughout the Troubles in both republican and loyalist working-class communities share many of the same characteristics. ‘Punishment’ beatings and shootings exist for three main reasons: the absence of a perceived legitimate or adequate policing service; the rising levels of petty crime and ‘anti-social behavior’; and the perceived failure of the formal criminal justice system. In republican areas where the police have long been regarded as lacking legitimacy, paramilitary ‘punishments’ and policing measures were developed in contrast to the formal state system. Thus, a policing vacuum emerged in such areas and was filled by the IRA and Sinn Féin. In contrast, early loyalist paramilitary policing functions were intended to aid the police and to provide internal discipline to the organizations’ members. Since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the relationship between loyalist paramilitaries and the police has changed for a number of reasons already discussed. The police and formal justice system are regarded as being weak on criminals and ‘punishments’ are taken against alleged criminals and hoods.

The perceived illegitimacy/inefficiency of the police is further compounded by the use of petty criminals as informers by the security forces. Both republican and loyalist paramilitaries have used ‘punishments’ to deal with transgressions by their own members and members of rival groups during feuds. In theory, a tariff or graduated scale of ‘punishments’ exists and the types of ‘punishments’ used have remained

constant, although tarring and feathering is a rarity. On deciding on the type of

‘punishment’, mitigating factors can also be considered. Republican paramilitaries, especially the IRA, are very anti-drugs and have taken a hard line on drug dealers, evidenced by the exiling and execution of drug dealers by Direct Action Against Drugs

(DAAD).70 Some Loyalist groups, however, are tolerant of the drug trade if they are in receipt of an appropriate ‘cut’.

A number of those subject to shootings have been permanently maimed and/or have lost limbs as a result of their injuries; in a few cases the person has died. Individuals who receive a ‘punishment’ beating are often badly injured, suffering fractured skulls, broken bones and puncture wounds if the instruments used were studded with nails.

The introduction of cease fires by the main paramilitary groups has not resulted in the eradication of such activity. If anything, ‘punishments’ have increased. Furthermore, women and young people under the age of 16 are no longer exempt from physical

‘punishments’. Also, since the introduction of the cease fires, dissident groups such as the Real IRA, Continuity IRA and the LVF have emerged in opposition to the Good

Friday Agreement and the peace process. Despite public pronouncements by political parties linked to paramilitary groups condemning the use of ‘punishments’ and such parties’ commitments to the principles of nonviolence and democracy, paramilitary actions continue. The reluctance of the British government to enforce the sanctions that are open to them, for example, the returning of political prisoners released under the

Good Friday Agreement and the exclusion of parties from the peace talks, has sent a clear signal that such paramilitary activity will go unpunished. Indeed, excluding the dissolving of the assembly in October 2002, following the discovery of an alleged IRA spy ring, the two occasions when political parties were excluded from the formal peace

process involved paramilitary activity against the ‘other’ side. It will be instructive to see if the British government takes any action against Sinn Féin if the International

Monitoring Commission’s report supports the Chief Constable’s claim that the Tohill abduction case was the work of the IRA.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The interviews of ‘punishment’ victims cited in this article were undertaken as part of an Economic and Social Research Council (Grant L133251003) funded research project. I should like to thank Mike Poole for his comments on an earlier draft of this article.

1 For a more detailed account see Johnny Connolly, Beyond the Politics of ‘Law and Order’: Towards

Community Policing in Ireland (Belfast: Centre for Research and Documentation 1997); Paddy Hillyard,

‘Popular Justice in Northern Ireland: Continuities and Change’, Research in Law, Deviance and Social

Control 7 (1985) pp.247-267; and Rachel Monaghan, ‘The Return of “Captain Moonlight”: Informal

Justice in Northern Ireland’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25/1 (2002) pp.41-56.

2 The Catholic Ex-Servicemen’s Association (CEA) was established in 1971 following the introduction of internment and sought to protect Catholic areas from attacks by Protestants. The CEA was unarmed but its members had previous military training. At its peak in 1972 it claimed some 8,000 members.

3 Hillyard (note 1); and The Tatler (Ballymurphy, Belfast: An Cumann Liam McParland Sinn Féin 1972).

4 Eamonn McCann, War and an Irish Town (London: Pluto Press 1993).

5 Ibid.

6 David Boulton, The UVF 1966-1973 (Dublin: Torc Books 1973) p.145.

7 The Ulster Volunteer Force was formed in 1966 and adopted the name of the previous UVF, which was formed in 1912 to oppose, by armed force, Home Rule in Ireland. The reformed UVF’s aim is to ensure that Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the United Kingdom is secure. The group has been on cease-fire since October 1994.

8 Find ref for this

9 Interview with ‘punishment’ shooting victim, 16 March 2000.

10 Frank Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1978) p.35.

11 See the following An Phoblacht articles for more details: ‘Campaign Against Informers’ (2 August

1974) p.3; ‘Heads Shaved’ (26 July 1974) p.5; and ‘Confessions of self-confessed, paid police spy’ (13

June 1975) p.3.

12 Eamon Collins, Killing Rage (London: Granta 1998).

13 Andrew Silke, ‘Ragged Justice: Loyalist Vigilantism in Northern Ireland’, Terrorism and Political

Violence 11/3 (1999) pp.1-31; and Richard Sullivan, ‘UVF disciplines hoods who helped themselves’,

Sunday World (10 January 1999) p.22.

14 The UFF is a cover name used by the UDA.

15 Collins (note 12) p.142.

16 Interview with ‘punishment’ beating victim, 27 September 1999.

17 In 1970 the IRA split into two factions the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA. For a detailed account of this split and the reasons for it see M.L.R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland (London: Routledge 1997). In

May 1972, the Official IRA announced a cease-fire but reserved the right to act in self-defense and undertake defensive operations.

18 The Irish People’s Liberation Organization was formed a result of a breakaway faction from the Irish

National Liberation Army. A major internal feud was waged between rival groups in 1992.

19 ‘Drug rings smashed by IRA’, An Phoblacht/Republican News (5 November 1992).

20 Steve Bruce, The Red Hand (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992) p.124.

21 For the reasons behind the feud see Bruce (note 20) and J. Cusack and H. McDonald, UVF (Dublin:

Poolbeg 1997).

22 For more information on this feud see Sharon O’Neill, ‘What are loyalists fighting for?’, Irish News

(11 September 2000) p.4; and Brian Rowan, ‘History of the loyalist feud’, BBC News On-Line, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/northern_ireland/newsid_892000/892131.stm.

23 The Housing Executive is the regional housing authority responsible for the allocation and provision of public housing in Northern Ireland.

24 Springfield Intercommunity Development Project, The Feud and the Fury (Belfast: SICDP 2001).

25 Silke, ‘Ragged Justice’ (note 13).

26 Interview with ‘punishment’ shooting victim, 10 December 1999.

27 Hillyard (note 1); and Ronnie Munck, ‘The Lads and the Hoods: Alternative Justice in an Irish

Context’, in Mike Tomlinson, Tony Varley and Ciaran McCullagh (eds), Whose Law and Order?

(Belfast: Sociological Association of Ireland 1988) pp.41-53.

28 In 1975, the IRA declared a cease-fire, which was to last into the following year. With the ending of this cease-fire, the ‘incident centers’ established by Sinn Féin to monitor breaches of the truce, evolved into ‘advice centers’. These centers were referred to locally as ‘Provo Police Stations’.

29 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Children in Northern Ireland (New York: Human Rights Watch 1992).

Sinn Féin’s Gerry Kelly has denied the existence of Civil Administrators tasked with informal justice,

Channel 4 News, broadcast 21 May 2000.

30 A former IRA member quoted in Andrew Silke, ‘Rebel’s Dilemma: the changing relationship between the IRA, Sinn Féin and paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland’, Terrorism and Political Violence

11/1 (1999) p.62.

31 Christine Bell, ‘Alternative Justice in Ireland’, in Norma Dawson, Desmond Greer and Peter Ingram

(eds), One Hundred and Fifty Years of Irish Law (Belfast: SLS Legal Publications 1996) pp.145-165.

32 Andrew Silke, ‘The Lords of Discipline: The Methods and Motives of Paramilitary Vigilantism in

Northern Ireland’, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 7/2 (1998) pp.121-156.

33 ‘Why Tar and Feathers?’, An Phoblacht (February 1971).

34 Interview with ‘punishment’ shooting victim, 23 September 1999.

35 Bell (note 31).

36 Interviews with an individual under threat of a ‘punishment’ shooting, 23 September 1999 and a

‘punishment’ beating victim, 27 September 1999.

37‘Informer Executed’, An Phoblacht/Republican News (11 March 1982); and ‘Informer Executed’, An

Phoblacht/Republican News (21 August 1986) p.2.

38 ‘War Commentary’, New Ulster Defender 1/2 (July 1992).

39 See ‘Ballymurphy Apology’, An Phoblacht/Republican News (31 December 1981) p.2 and ‘Apology to shooting victim’, Andersontown News (21 November 1992) p.10.

40 ‘Heads Shaved’, An Phoblacht (26 July 1974) p.5; and Michael Morrissey and Ken Pease, ‘The Black

Criminal Justice System in West Belfast’, The Howard Journal 21 (1982) pp.159-166.

41 Burton (note 10).

42 Morrissey and Pease (note 39) p.164.

43 ‘IRA investigation locates grave sites’, An Phoblacht (1April 1999).

44 Interview with ‘punishment’ beating victim, 25 January 2000.

45 For more details see David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney and Chris Thornton, Lost Lives

(Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing 2001).

46 Quoted in Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (note 29) p.47.

47 Figures cited in Liam Kennedy, They Shoot Children, Don’t They? (Belfast: QUB 2001).

48 ‘Joy-rider Punished’, An Phoblacht/Republican News (22 October 1987) p.2; and ‘Punishment shooting’, An Phoblacht/Republican News (25 March 1982) p.3.

49 Silke, ‘Rebel’s Dilemma’ (note 30).

50 “An alternative to punishment shootings?,” An Phoblacht/Republican News, 26 August 1982.

51 The Anglo-Irish Agreement established ‘a joint ministerial conference of British and Irish ministers, backed by a permanent secretariat…to monitor political, security, legal and other issues of concern to the

Nationalist minority’ quoted in W. D .Flackes and S. Elliot, Northern Ireland: A Political Directory

1968-1988 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press 1989) p.7.

52 See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/cgi-bin/dyndeaths.pl. and ‘IRA says woman was informer for nearly two years’, An Phoblacht/Republican News (21 July 1994) for more details.

53 Quoted in Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (note 29) p.46.

54 ‘Twinbrook Punishment Beating Claimed’, Andersonstown News (4 June 1988) p.11; and ‘No warning claim’, Andersonstown News (28 January) p.8.

55 Winston, “Alternatives to Punishment Beatings and Shootings in a Loyalist Community in Belfast,” p.123.

56 Political parties were to commit to: democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; to the total disarmament of paramilitary organizations; to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission; to renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or outcome of all-party negotiations; to agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and, to urge that “punishment” killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

57 Quoted in Jonathon McCambridge, ‘IRA and UDA in Same Number of Attacks: Orde’, Belfast

Telegraph (4 March 2004), p. 4.

58 The INLA has been on cease-fire since the 22 August 1998.

59 See Asheigh Wallace, ‘Boy’s Shooting “was Child Abuse”’, Belfast Telegraph (10 January 2004) p.

1; and Richard Sullivan, ‘Provos target Dark Cloud’, Sunday World (18 January 2004) p.8.

60 Kennedy is defining children as those aged 17 years and under. See Liam Kennedy, They Shoot

Children, Don’t They? Third and Final Report (Belfast: QUB 2003).

61 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

62 Interview, 25 January 2000.

63 Sinn Féin were excluded from the multi-party talks when they opened in June 1996 as the IRA were not on cease-fire, they were also excluded in the period from 20 February – 9 March 1998, following the

IRA’s involvement in the killing of alleged drug dealer Brendan Campbell and the UDA’s Robert

Dougan. The Ulster Democratic Party was also excluded from 26 January-23 February 1998 following the UFF’s involvement in sectarian murders including those of Larry Brennan and Benedict Hughes. For more information, see McKittrick et al. (note 45).

64 Quoted in R. Donnelly, ‘Mowlam Says No Evidence of Paramilitaries Breaking Cease Fires’, Irish

Times (3 December 1998) p. 6.

65 Mo Mowlam quoted in the News Letter, 27 August 1999, p.5

66 Channel 4 News, 21 May 2000.

67 B. McCaffrey and S. O’Neill, ‘Republican Shootings Halted “by September 11th”’, Irish News (16

November 2001) p. 1.

68 The LVF have been on cease-fire since the 15 May 1998.

69 See Chris Thornton, ‘“Kidnap” threat to peace process’, Belfast Telegraph (23 February 2004), p. 1.

70 Some writers such as Vincent Kearney, ‘Hidden Agenda to IRA hits on drug dealers’, Sunday Times

(15 February 1998), claim that the IRA is deeply involved in the drugs trade. Other including John

Horgan and Max Taylor, ‘Playing the “Green Card” – Financing the Provisional IRA’, Terrorism and

Political Violence 11/2 (1999) pp. 1-38 take a more cautious view and await clear evidence of IRA involvement in drugs.